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National Security Agency - The Black Vault

National Security Agency - The Black Vault

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1970s<br />

1970s<br />

<strong>The</strong> Church<br />

Committee<br />

From its inception, NSA had developed<br />

what could only be described as a cursory<br />

relationship with the U.S. Congress. At times,<br />

the <strong>Agency</strong> would engage with Congress<br />

on budget matters and other serious issues.<br />

However, due to the secretive environment<br />

of the Cold War and the perception that<br />

the subject matter the <strong>Agency</strong> dealt with<br />

was both highly specialized and classified,<br />

many congressmen were uncomfortable<br />

exercising more than minimal oversight.<br />

This scenario changed dramatically after<br />

credible media reports surfaced that U.S.<br />

intelligence agencies had violated the<br />

rights of American citizens by engaging in<br />

unlawful behavior. In order to investigate<br />

these claims, the United States Senate formed<br />

an investigating committee under Senator<br />

Frank Church (D, Idaho). Soon after, the<br />

House would follow suit, forming a committee<br />

under Congressman Otis Pike (D, New York).<br />

When their work was finally completed,<br />

both investigative bodies produced reports<br />

denoting that two specific NSA projects,<br />

Project SHAMROCK and Project MINARET,<br />

had violated a number of Americans’ Fourth<br />

Amendment rights. n<br />

NSA Director, Lt Gen Lew Allen, Jr. USAF testified during a<br />

Senate hearing in 1975. (See Document B at end of chapter)<br />

A critical part of the directive called for the<br />

Director of NSA to serve simultaneously<br />

as the Chief of the CSS. <strong>The</strong> initiative also<br />

tasked the Director to carry out a wide range<br />

of responsibilities in the areas of tasking,<br />

training, research and career development, and<br />

government cryptology.<br />

Lieutenant General Phillips<br />

In the early summer of 1972, Admiral Gayler<br />

gained his fourth star and headed off to<br />

Hawaii to become head of the U.S. Navy’s<br />

Pacific Command. Taking his place was Air<br />

Force Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips.<br />

Phillips had no intelligence experience,<br />

but was well versed in the area of missiles<br />

and space. His focus during his brief time<br />

at NSA was on organizational reforms and<br />

streamlining NSA operations.<br />

Lieutenant General Allen<br />

He was replaced by another Air Force General,<br />

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., in August 1973.<br />

Previous to his appointment to the Directorship,<br />

Allen had managed a wide range of overhead<br />

assets, including satellites that monitored Soviet<br />

nuclear arms control treaty compliance. Allen<br />

was the first NSA Director to hold a Ph.D.,<br />

having obtained his doctorate in physics at the<br />

University of Illinois.<br />

One of his most compelling challenges<br />

was to deal with the ramifications of the<br />

investigations of the U.S. Intelligence<br />

Community, including NSA, by the Church<br />

and Pike Committees.<br />

SHAMROCK and MINARET<br />

In the 1930s Congress passed a law prohibiting<br />

communications companies from revealing the<br />

content of telegrams to third parties. During<br />

WWII, however, Congress implemented a series<br />

of censorship laws that superseded the original<br />

law and allowed U.S. authorities to examine the<br />

content of telegrams sent to and from the United<br />

States. In addition, any encrypted messages were<br />

sent to Arlington Hall.<br />

When WWII ended, the authorization for the<br />

program expired. However, with the coming of<br />

the Cold War, the Army <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Agency</strong> appealed<br />

to the patriotic sentiments of the companies to<br />

continue to provide copies of messages to and<br />

from the Soviet Union. This practice, by then<br />

known as Operation Shamrock, continued up to<br />

the NSA era.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Church Committee raised concerns<br />

about whether NSA, in carrying out Operation<br />

SHAMROCK, had exceeded its legal authorities<br />

and violated the privacy rights of Americans as<br />

protected by the Fourth Amendment.<br />

Operation MINARET began in the 1960s.<br />

<strong>The</strong> project involved the monitoring of the<br />

international voice communications of specific<br />

U.S. citizens whose names had been placed on<br />

a “watch list.”<br />

A Guide for the Silent Sentinel: United<br />

States Signals Intelligence Directive<br />

(USSID)<br />

<strong>The</strong> activities of the Church and Pike<br />

Committees revealed holes in the legal<br />

procedures that underpinned NSA and its<br />

work, although, from its earliest days NSA had<br />

sought to construct standards and regulations<br />

to govern and guide its work.<br />

<strong>The</strong> predecessor to the USSID system, dating<br />

from 1958, was the Manual of U.S. SIGINT<br />

Operations (MUSSO). MUSSO was intended<br />

to bring structure and orderly procedures to<br />

a SIGINT system that had grown rapidly over<br />

the previous decade and worked efficiently in<br />

its early years.<br />

System managers, however, found serious<br />

difficulties with MUSSO as the cryptologic<br />

environment evolved and greater challenges<br />

emerged. Specifically, there were serious<br />

problems in trying to craft a system that<br />

could adapt to the wide range of changing<br />

procedures and practices in timely ways. Most<br />

importantly, the manual did not provide any<br />

clear authority for the procedures in question.<br />

With the growing demand for SIGINT, it was<br />

clear that NSA needed better guidelines and, in<br />

the early 1970s, NSA’s leadership introduced<br />

the United States Signals Intelligence Directive<br />

(USSID) system. Unlike previous systems,<br />

these directives provided timely procedural<br />

guidelines for practitioners throughout the<br />

SIGINT system. <strong>The</strong>y could also be updated<br />

quickly to reflect changing needs and<br />

procedures and be disseminated rapidly via<br />

electrical communications.<br />

<strong>The</strong> development and promulgation of USSID<br />

#1 proved to be critical to the Intelligence<br />

Community. Issued in 1971, the document<br />

spelled out the structure of the U.S. SIGINT<br />

System around the world. (See Document C<br />

at end of chapter.) Over time these USSIDs --<br />

NSA directives on SIGINT -- would prove to be<br />

indispensable to NSA employees and affiliates<br />

in gaining an understanding of the proper<br />

handling of SIGINT. To ensure that all <strong>Agency</strong><br />

employees and affiliates were familiar with<br />

the standards, training requirements on the<br />

handling of information regarding U.S. persons<br />

were stringent and demanding.<br />

A Host of Increasing<br />

Asymmetrical Challenges<br />

In addition to the Soviet threat, terrorism<br />

emerged as an important concern in the ‘70s,<br />

which sparked a significant shift in how NSA<br />

organized its operational and analytic business.<br />

Real-time reporting was essential.<br />

Despite the challenges associated with<br />

“standing up” a new analytic area, NSA proved<br />

to be adept at producing critical information<br />

on terrorist incidents and activities. In<br />

1974 <strong>Agency</strong> analysts uncovered a plot to<br />

assassinate Secretary of State Henry Kissinger<br />

during an overseas trip.<br />

During the ‘70s, NSA became directly involved<br />

in covering terrorist-related kidnappings,<br />

assassinations, and hijackings. <strong>The</strong> support and<br />

assistance provided by the <strong>Agency</strong> in these<br />

events were ultimately seen as indispensable<br />

to the Nation’s ongoing effort to prevent<br />

and manage terrorist threats. <strong>The</strong>se activities<br />

further cemented NSA’s key role in providing<br />

intelligence support to <strong>The</strong> White House, as<br />

well as other important consumers.<br />

54 60 Years of Defending Our Nation <strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Agency</strong><br />

<strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Agency</strong> 60 Years of Defending Our Nation 55

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