National Security Agency - The Black Vault

1970s
1970s
Vice Admiral Inman
In 1977 General Allen gained his fourth
star and became Commander of the U.S. Air
Force Systems Command. He was replaced
by Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, USN, the
fourth Director of the ‘70s era. Unlike some
of his predecessors, he had an impressive
intelligence background. Inman served in
the Korean War and had assignments as an
Operations Intelligence Analyst at NSA and as
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. His prior
assignment as Vice Director, Plans, Operations
and Support at DIA also gave Inman invaluable
experience in the complexities of intelligence.
His tenure continued to focus on the Soviet/
Warsaw Pact target, although transnational
targets, such as terrorism and counternarcotics,
The NESTOR system was developed in answer to the
military’s need for lighter and more efficient communication
systems. The Soldier above is using the KY-38 “manpack.”
were beginning to come to the forefront. After
serving as DIRNSA, VADM Inman went on
to become Deputy Director and later Acting
Director of the CIA.
Securing Networks
Developments in cryptographic technology
boomed in the 1970s. The new public
cryptography gave NSA a fresh challenge -- it
had to not only keep up with, but find a way
to stay ahead of the curve.
Great leaps forward in computer and electronic
network technology meant NSA had to become
expert in securing information systems. As
newer, faster, and more efficient ways of storing
and moving information developed, the private
sector and scientific community grew concerned
about the security of their communications.
Demands for protection led to rapid
developments in publicly available cryptology.
NSA struggled with this dilemma, largely
because, while the Agency understood the
need for robust public cryptography, its first
mission was to maintain the cryptologic
capabilities needed to protect the Nation.
The fear was that the Nation’s adversaries
would be able to easily buy U.S. commercially
available encryption technology.
The Agency and federal authorities realized
that, while exporting the new technology
was good for economic reasons, it needed
to be balanced against security concerns.
In sum, strong public cryptography could
harden COMINT targets, and thus deny vital
information to decision makers. On the other
hand, if the Agency took too aggressive a
stance, it would run the risk of being seen as
curtailing the rights of American citizens. NSA
had to proceed cautiously in its efforts to
allow the free flow of commerce while at the
same time doing what was needed to protect
the Nation.
But while the Agency was rightfully concerned
about the challenges of public cryptography, its
first obligation was securing government and
military communications. Drawing on its vast
expertise in the field, the Agency developed a
group of cipher machines, including the first
device that combined radio and encipherment
in a single unit.
During this time, NSA was also developing
lighter and more efficient communication
systems for military use. The Vietnam War
taught the Agency’s system developers
that troops in the field were reluctant to
use communications equipment that was
too heavy or cumbersome. As a result,
the Agency’s communications security
organization began to develop equipment
better suited to COMSEC in a war zone.
Under the NESTOR program a number of
portable devices that retained high security
and good voice quality were produced.
The White House and Executive Branch
In 1976 The White House directed NSA to
look for solutions that would ensure U.S.
communications were secure. By that time,
senior officials had begun to realize the threat
posed by Soviet monitoring of communications
within the United States and the vulnerability of
American communication networks.
The National Security Decision Memorandum
tasked NSA to work with the Office of
Telecommunications Policy to develop
an action plan for the express purpose of
ensuring that “U.S. citizens and institutions
have a reasonable expectation of privacy
from foreign or domestic intercept.”
The White House plan, implemented in
1977, called for expedited measures to
secure communications in the Washington,
New York City, and San Francisco areas.
The administration considered these areas
as the most vulnerable to Soviet intercept
efforts. These proactive measures worked
and were later extended more widely in the
U.S. Preventive measures included shifting
sensitive government communications from
microwave to cable and bulk scrambling for
microwave links (See Document D at end of
chapter.). NSA’s success in this arena earned
it the reputation it still enjoys as the world’s
leader in strong communications security
practices and devices.
The Mayaguez Incident
In May 1975, NSA issued a series of summary
intelligence reports detailing the capture
of American merchant sailors on the ship
Mayaguez by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
The Mayaguez was a U.S. cargo ship involved
in the support of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.
On May 7, 1975, the ship left Hong Kong on
what was to be a routine voyage. On May 12,
1975, the Mayaguez was 60 miles off the
coast of Cambodia when it was attacked and
boarded by Khmer Rouge naval forces and
forced to follow the Cambodian ships toward
the mainland.
President Gerald Ford denounced the action
as an “act of piracy” and demanded immediate
release of the ship. Despite the attempts of
the Ford administration to find a diplomatic
solution, all efforts failed, and on May 14,
the President ordered military action. A U.S.
Marine Corps detachment in the Philippines
was given the assignment and instructed to
board the ship at sea.
Early in the morning of that day, the Marine
contingent boarded the Mayaguez and
took control of the vessel. Shortly after the
boarding, a Thai fishing boat approached
the USS Wilson, which was supporting the
amphibious assault. Aboard the fishing boat
were a Thai crew and the 39 men of the
Mayaguez. They had been set free by their
captors. By noon, all Mayaguez crewmen
were back aboard their own ship.
Since the resolution of the incident,
historians and analysts have debated the
reasons for the unexpected release of the
Mayaguez crew. Some have proposed that
either China or another nation with influence
over the Khmer Rouge played a role, but the
complete reason will never be known.
Remote Keying
Soviet espionage activities in the United
States steadily grew in the 1970s, prompting
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