The Office of Scientific Intelligence 1949-68 (Vol - The Black Vault

More documents

Recommendations

Info

COO629617 time went on electronics intelligence became increasingly involved with defensive systems, such as air defense and anti-missile systems, and in 1962 I 1 L In consequence of the wide divergence of I views about Soviet scientific capabilities (were they midgets or 10 feet tall?), a good deal of OS1 effort went into studies of the Soviet educational system, the numbers of graduating scientists and engineers, and their utilization. Almost alone among OS1 divisions, t h e 7 1 1 lived in comparative harmony with the DOD intelligence agencies. Its products were well received and during the early 50's there was little outside competition in its field of coverage. Increasing awareness of the Soviet build-up in scientists and engineers led to a full-dress briefing of the NSC on this subject in October 1953. Perhaps the high point of= life was reached in June of 1954 when Allen Dulles used as his commencement topic at Columbia University c "Soviet S&T Manpower1' with text supplied by With this speech and the declassification of much F. I - 34 -
information 8s its aftermath, the problem increasingly slipped into the public domain. More and more scholars and research institutes took on the problems of numerical and qualitative assessment of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower. -]once preeminent position declined. Eventually about forty able young college graduates, generally with bachelor level training in the Arts and Sciences, were recruited and given 1 I lpublished a number of such studies", as they came to be called, and contributed a good deal to the growing fund of knowledge on Soviet S&T capabilities. Inexorably, however, the impingement on the other OS1 divisions increased as - 35 - I
Page 2 and 3: COO629617 / -L --- . ., .. ........
Page 4 and 5: COO 629617 PREFACE 1 u In preparing
Page 6 and 7: COO629617 VOLUME I11 Annex VI11 - O
Page 8 and 9: COO629617 T- Intelligence Branch, A
Page 11 and 12: COO629617 ' In its teatimony before
Page 13 and 14: esulted in the so-called Dulles Rep
Page 15 and 16: COO 629617 Because of mounting frus
Page 17 and 18: COO629617 The internal issues beset
Page 19 and 20: _ _ ~ COO 62 9 617 T,.-%Y, n*'-Tyr
Page 21 and 22: COO629617 I .. that so severely cir
Page 23 and 24: COO629617 to Admiral Hillenkoetter
Page 25 and 26: COO629617 implement a rather litera
Page 27 and 28: 1 1- The result was a new directive
Page 29 and 30: COO629617 is necessary to back up i
Page 31 and 32: support. The number of consultants
Page 33 and 34: in November 1957. Both Kistiakowsky
Page 35 and 36: I - __ COO629617 __ . early, howeve
Page 37 and 38: COO629617 The result was not only v
Page 39: usable information as well. Despite
Page 43 and 44: , Finally, in mid-1954, Chadwell be
Page 45 and 46: together of analysts was not a pana
Page 47: A critical I. G. report of early 19
Page 50 and 51: COO629617 Early attempts to argue t
Page 52 and 53: COO629617 -4lFwMF was tantamount to
Page 54 and 55: COO 62 9 617 1 - 1 - : i -8 i , . \
Page 56 and 57: COO629617 n - 50 -
Page 58 and 59: COO629617 One of the schemes that t
Page 60 and 61: COO 629617 The effect on OS1 of the
Page 62 and 63: COO629617 aftermath of Sputnik was
Page 64 and 65: ~ COO629617 Directorate was to prov
Page 66 and 67: COO629617 i I backgrounds in the ph
Page 68 and 69: in the form of considerable uneasin
Page 70 and 71: COO629617 I The process of paring O
Page 72 and 73: any great extent. Hence, in Chamber
Page 74 and 75: Selected OS1 staff members went int
Page 76 and 77: COO 629617 collaboration. Beginning
Page 78 and 79: COO629617 ments it is in 1968 distr
Page 80 and 81: COO629617 This account of the histo
Page 82 and 83: COO629617 . . . . . . . . . .... AN
Page 84 and 85: COO629617 ANNEX I1 r OS1 and Atomic
Page 86 and 87: c __..__-- COO 629617 T be brought
Page 88 and 89: COO629617 mental departments, becau
Page 90 and 91:
---- COO 62 9 617 ._ _- The Beginni
Page 92 and 93:
e turned over to the AEC. General G
Page 94 and 95:
, -. --- - Following the Eniwetok t
Page 96 and 97:
COO629617 energy developments inclu
Page 98 and 99:
COO 629617 aggressive moves of othe
Page 100 and 101:
COO629617 to Senator Hickenlooper,
Page 102 and 103:
Mr. Forrestal's memorandum, that a
Page 104 and 105:
COO 629617 T effort in which the)lC
Page 106 and 107:
In the aftermath of( /atomic energy
Page 108 and 109:
COO629617 reached in the estimates.
Page 110 and 111:
Because of the tight security and s
Page 112 and 113:
During the 1956-60 period, )- COO 6
Page 114 and 115:
___~~ __ COO629617 Beginning in the
Page 116 and 117:
COO 629617 As this chepter on OSI's
Page 118 and 119:
T Annex I11 Collection Support Acti
Page 121 and 122:
-..__ - --- ~ -~.~ . . - . ... . ..
Page 123 and 124:
COO629617 OS1 viewed its position a
Page 125 and 126:
COO629617 - 7 -
Page 127 and 128:
COO 629617 - 9 -
Page 129 and 130:
COO629617 - 11 -
Page 131 and 132:
111. CENTRALIZED COLLECTION SUPPORT
Page 133 and 134:
B. Programs Throughout its existenc
Page 135 and 136:
COO 629617 they were not suitable f
Page 137 and 138:
- - . . ... . .- ...- -- NEXT 35 PA
Page 139 and 140:
COO629617 OS1 guidance and support
Page 141 and 142:
COO 62 9 617 . OS1 has actively sup
Page 143 and 144:
- -- COO629617 The close O ffice re
Page 145 and 146:
-+ ~_____~.- COO 62 9617 f
Page 147 and 148:
.a . COO62 9617 A Satellite Rocket
Page 149 and 150:
~ 1 COO62 9617 It was now apparent
Page 151 and 152:
I - __- COO 62 9 617 On 15 Septembe
Page 153 and 154:
- . . COO629617 could be made in sc
Page 155 and 156:
COO 62 9 617 result from the initia
Page 157 and 158:
COO62 9617 C, , , r .-', 3 Ys-, T s
Page 159 and 160:
COO 62 9617 EPILOGUE A number of fa
Page 161 and 162:
In the Spring of 1954, Kelly Johnso
Page 163:
__A________-- - COO 629617 I ! T e
show all

The Office of Scientific Intelligence 1949-68 (Vol - The Black Vault

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?