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<strong>Asset</strong> <strong>Backed</strong> <strong>Securities</strong><br />

PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR INVESTORS<br />

This guide is an introduction to ABS, presented from the point of view of the investor. It<br />

proposes a breakdown in simple notions, which enable a partial reading. A glossary, in<br />

the last page, regroups the main technical terms and indicates where they appear <strong>for</strong><br />

the first time in the text (also outlined in italic)<br />

.<br />

I<br />

What is an ABS?<br />

ABS (<strong>Asset</strong> <strong>Backed</strong> <strong>Securities</strong>) are<br />

experiencing strong growth on the capital markets.<br />

These financial instruments enable companies to<br />

raise capital using the securitisation method<br />

described below.<br />

Securitisation. Securitisation is a way <strong>for</strong><br />

companies to raise capital and consists in using one<br />

of the company's financial assets to guarantee a<br />

security issued on the capital markets.<br />

Let us take the example of an industrial<br />

manufacturer with an average credit rating, who is<br />

experiencing difficulties in obtaining financing from<br />

banks. This manufacturer has sold capital goods to<br />

customers with a strong credit rating. The idea<br />

behind securitisation is to structure a financing<br />

package backed by these high quality trade account<br />

receivables. In this way repayment no longer<br />

depends on the manufacturer, but only on the<br />

customers' ability to pay <strong>for</strong> the goods.<br />

A company is created <strong>for</strong> this purpose (SPV<br />

or Special Purpose Vehicle). The manufacturer (the<br />

Seller) sells the portfolio of trade account receivables<br />

(the underlying asset) to the SPV. The SPV then<br />

refinances this purchase by issuing rated securities,<br />

with repayment of these debts depending on the<br />

customers' (the final debtors') ability to pay.<br />

ABCP, MBS and ABS. <strong>Securities</strong> issued using<br />

the securitisation method are called "Term Deals" if<br />

they are offered to the markets as a long-term bond<br />

and "Conduits" if they are short-term.<br />

ABCP. Conduits are mainly refunded by<br />

issuing commercial paper. These securitisation<br />

programmes, known as <strong>Asset</strong> <strong>Backed</strong> Commercial<br />

Paper (ABCP) accounted <strong>for</strong> a total outstanding of<br />

more than USD 500bn in the US in 1999, (i.e. more<br />

than a quarter of the US commercial paper market).<br />

MBS. Term deals where the underlying assets<br />

comprise mortgage loans are called Mortgage <strong>Backed</strong><br />

<strong>Securities</strong>. These represent a highly specific market<br />

and are mainly traded on the US domestic market.<br />

MBSs are generally fixed rate and their risk is<br />

principally linked to early repayment of the<br />

underlying mortgage loans. More than USD 400bn<br />

MBSs were issued in the US in 1999.<br />

ABS. ABSs are all the Term Deals which do<br />

not fall under the MBS category: unlike MBSs, ABSs<br />

are mostly floating rate notes and principally carry a<br />

credit risk. In 1999, approximately USD 350bn of<br />

ABSs (excluding MBS) were issued.<br />

HEL<br />

AUTO<br />

USD assets only<br />

Graph 1 : ABS issued in 1999<br />

14%<br />

25%<br />

OTHERS<br />

14%<br />

CARD<br />

15%<br />

7%<br />

CMBS<br />

CBO/CLO<br />

25%<br />

TOTAL ABS $ 350 Billion<br />

Fast-developing. Since 1996, ABSs have<br />

accounted <strong>for</strong> one of the strongest growth segments<br />

in the capital markets and are also developing<br />

outside of the US (issuance volume on the European<br />

market was USD 75bn in 1999).<br />

On the whole, this trend can be explained by<br />

increasing pressure from shareholders, which leads<br />

more and more companies to deconsolidate financial<br />

or property assets in order to optimise their Return<br />

On Equity (ROE).<br />

In the same way, in<strong>for</strong>mation on ABSs is<br />

increasingly available and transactions are<br />

progressively standardised, leading to more<br />

transparency.<br />

Finally, ABSs are often sold as variable rate<br />

securities, and benefit enormously from growth in<br />

the credit market, while offering an attractive means<br />

of diversifying investments, especially in Europe.<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 1


Market segments. Each securitisation is, to<br />

a large extent, characterised by its underlying asset.<br />

According to this criteria, the ABS market can be<br />

divided into several segments:<br />

US household debt (around USD 5000bn)<br />

represented the first pool of securitisable assets<br />

which gave rise to MBSs and to the main ABS<br />

categories, according to the type of asset: Credit<br />

Cards, Home Equity Loans or HEL (consumer loans<br />

secured by mortgages), Auto Loans, and Student<br />

Loans.<br />

The "Credit Card" type of ABS has<br />

experienced steady growth over the last ten years<br />

and account <strong>for</strong> the most mature and standardised<br />

segment of the market, with USD 50bn of new issues<br />

in 1999. US consumer loan organisations do not<br />

dispose of a large amount of capital and securitise<br />

their outstanding credit card debt heavily: they turn<br />

to the markets several times a year and each time sell<br />

a portfolio of around USD 1bn of outstanding on<br />

thousands of individual debtors over the entire US.<br />

Since 1996, the increase in ABSs has been<br />

greatly helped by CLO, CBO and CMBS securitisation<br />

types: to maximise their capital, financial institutions<br />

have proceeded with a large scale deconsolidation of<br />

their loan portfolios (Collateralised Loan Obligation<br />

or CLO), security portfolios (Collateralised Bond<br />

Obligation or CBO), or commercial property<br />

portfolios (Commercial Mortgage <strong>Backed</strong> <strong>Securities</strong> or<br />

CMBS). By way of example, the volume of CBOs and<br />

CLOs issued worldwide in 1999 was almost twice the<br />

volume of of "Credit Card" type ABSs issued.<br />

II<br />

5 stages in<br />

evaluating an ABS<br />

The main difficulty faced by an investor lies<br />

in evaluating the offered security within a reasonable<br />

time frame. This section suggests a method of<br />

breaking down an ABS into its five component parts:<br />

underlying asset, credit enhancement, cashflow<br />

mechanics, legal structure and links with the seller.<br />

Stage 1: Underlying assets<br />

In a securitisation, the analysis of the<br />

underlying asset is crucial: whether the issued<br />

securities are repaid depends in the first instance on<br />

its strong or weak per<strong>for</strong>mance. The main points to<br />

study are: the quality of the final debtors, the<br />

monitoring of the portfolio the maturity of the<br />

receivables, and finally how these loans were set up.<br />

Debtors. It is possible to distinguish<br />

between securitisations where the final debtors are<br />

individuals, and those which have companies as the<br />

final debtors. Risk linked to a portfolio containing<br />

many hundreds of thousands of US households'<br />

consumer loans can be seen as purely statistical and<br />

strongly linked to the economic environment,<br />

whereas a portfolio of, <strong>for</strong> example, twenty company<br />

loans needs to be analysed debtor by debtor, since<br />

each one accounts <strong>for</strong> a larger proportion of the<br />

underlying asset.<br />

The credit risk of securitisations backed by<br />

individuals is little correlated to securitisation<br />

backed by companies.<br />

Reporting. When a transaction is set up,<br />

credit rating agencies require frequent reporting,<br />

following a predetermined set of criteria, to assess<br />

the development quality of the underlying asset. For<br />

household consumer loan portfolios, global<br />

statistical data is enough to describe the portfolio<br />

(net yield rate, geographical distribution of debtors).<br />

Conversely, ten office blocks will need detailed<br />

asset-by-asset reporting (vacancy rate, description of<br />

the tenants, rents).<br />

The Diversity Score is a standardised<br />

indicator to measure the diversity of a corporate loan<br />

portfolio: if, <strong>for</strong> example, a portfolio of 200 loans has<br />

a score of 50, this means that the portfolio is<br />

equivalent to a hypothetical group of fifty loans to<br />

uncorrelated companies. This calculation, made by<br />

credit rating agencies, is based on the correlation<br />

between different economic sectors.<br />

Maturity. To fully understand an underlying<br />

asset, a distinction needs to be made between longterm<br />

and short-term assets: in order to be refunded<br />

by a long-term bond, a portfolio of 30-day<br />

commercial debts should be renewable. This means<br />

that with the repayments, the SPV will buy new debts<br />

from the seller over, <strong>for</strong> example, a five year<br />

reinvestment period.<br />

On the contrary, a portfolio of 15-year<br />

mortgage loans does not require a reinvestment<br />

period. This portfolio is referred to as static: it does<br />

not change during the course of the transaction and<br />

is amortised with each repayment. A static portfolio<br />

has the advantage of being completely transparent<br />

from the beginning of the transaction.<br />

For a renewable portfolio, agencies<br />

safeguard against a deterioration in quality of the<br />

original portfolio by imposing stringent criteria on<br />

reinvestments. The more short-term the asset, the<br />

greater the turn-over, which in turn makes <strong>for</strong> more<br />

dynamic structure management, thus guarding<br />

against a deterioration in quality by adding superior<br />

quality investments.<br />

Origination. Origination covers the entire<br />

process <strong>for</strong> setting up a new loan. In most cases<br />

financial assets are created during the day-to-day<br />

business of the seller: consumer loans, syndicated<br />

loans to leading companies, and trade account<br />

receivables following the sale of capital goods. By<br />

studying the procedure <strong>for</strong> granting loans<br />

(circulation of the credit profile, scoring method), it<br />

is possible to see how the final debtor's credit risk<br />

was calculated and checked by the seller. The more<br />

selective the origin, the easier it is to get an idea of<br />

the underlying asset.<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 2


The origination is more important when the<br />

transaction includes a reinvestment phase in new<br />

assets, due to be generated at a later date. Certain<br />

ABSs, of the "Future flows" type, are securitisations of<br />

future receivables which do not yet exist: <strong>for</strong><br />

example, an oil company can securitise income in<br />

dollars, received in exchange <strong>for</strong> expected oil sales<br />

over the next two years. To take this extreme<br />

example, the securitised portfolio is only described<br />

by the asset creation procedure, i.e. a description of<br />

the oil selling process.<br />

Stage 2: Credit enhancement<br />

To optimise refunding costs, securities sold<br />

on the market are generally awarded a high credit<br />

rating from credit rating agencies: <strong>for</strong> example AAA,<br />

the highest rating, means that there is only a slight<br />

possibility of default on the security. It is rare to find<br />

an underlying asset in a securitisation which has<br />

sufficient quality of its own, to obtain this rating. A<br />

portfolio of several thousand debtors will inevitably<br />

contain some defaults in payment.<br />

Credit enhancement is a means of absorbing<br />

these defaults, in such a way that they do not affect<br />

the quality of issued securities. The more the<br />

security benefits from credit enhancement, the less<br />

the risk of default. In a transaction comprising<br />

several risk profiles, the senior tranche is the one<br />

with the most credit enhancement.<br />

Methodology. A credit rating assesses the<br />

ability of issuers to withstand worst case scenarios.<br />

There<strong>for</strong>e, to designate an AAA rating to the senior<br />

tranche of an ABS, the credit rating agencies demand<br />

that the overall structure is able to withstand a<br />

worst-case increase in defaults in the underlying<br />

portfolio, without the senior tranche being subject to<br />

default.<br />

For a diversified portfolio, historical<br />

statistical data (standard deviation) can be used to<br />

predict worst-case scenarios: <strong>for</strong> example, to obtain<br />

AAA status, the SPV should be able to fully repay<br />

senior debt obligations, even if the underlying asset<br />

experiences a sudden default on payment equal to<br />

[4] times the annual loss rate, the highest over the<br />

last [5] years. These scenarios are even more relevant<br />

given that a reliable database exists, which is the<br />

case <strong>for</strong> US consumer loans. If the credit rating<br />

agency does not have access to reliable historical<br />

data, this does not imply that the AAA rating cannot<br />

be achieved, but simply that the agency insists on a<br />

larger multiplier coefficient.<br />

This statistical approach is generally<br />

complemented by an asset by asset approach, paying<br />

particular attention to debtors with a substantial<br />

concentration of debts or debtors with a high risk<br />

profile. This approach is used with CLOs where the<br />

underlying asset is comprised of loans to final<br />

debtors, rated by agencies or scored by the seller<br />

bank. In this case the credit rating agency demands a<br />

worst-case scenario which takes the <strong>for</strong>m of a<br />

simultaneous default of all debtors who account <strong>for</strong><br />

more than [1%] of the portfolio, as well as all debtors<br />

with a rating below [BBB-].<br />

Finally, the credit report level required to<br />

obtain AAA status, depends on more qualitative data,<br />

which in turn depends on the nature of the assets<br />

and more generally on the technical and legal<br />

securitisation environment.<br />

All credit rating agencies have teams of<br />

analysts specialised in structured finance, and follow<br />

market developments with the publication of<br />

increasingly standardised quantitative and<br />

qualitative methods. However, the agency still<br />

examines each transaction on an individual case<br />

basis, with a due diligence visit to the seller, to<br />

guarantee reliability of the credit rating.<br />

In order to withstand the worst-case<br />

scenarios predicted by the agencies, a securitisation<br />

structure can use several credit enhancement<br />

techniques. The main ones are:<br />

Subordination (see graph 2). To finance a<br />

portfolio of 100, the issue will be composed of a<br />

rated tranche of 92 (senior tranche). The remaining 8<br />

will be financed by a non-rated subordinated tranche,<br />

that is, repayable only after other senior debts have<br />

been repaid in full. There<strong>for</strong>e, the subordinated<br />

tranche absorbs the first losses on the underlying<br />

asset, up to 8, without the senior tranche being<br />

affected.<br />

In addition to the senior tranche (often<br />

called "Class A") and the most subordinated tranche<br />

(sometimes incorrectly referred to as "Equity"), the<br />

structures often contain several intermediary<br />

tranches ("mezzanines"), called Classes B, C, D,<br />

according to their subordination level. Each of these<br />

classes can be split into several tranches of different<br />

maturities (<strong>for</strong> example tranches A-1 and A-2 of class<br />

A), however, the level of risk remains the same.<br />

Excess Spread (see graph 2). This is the<br />

spread between the yield of the underlying portfolio<br />

(<strong>for</strong> example Libor+1.00%)and the interest payable to<br />

holders of the rated tranches (<strong>for</strong> example<br />

Libor+0.10%). In theory, providing all goes well,<br />

residual flow surplus is paid to the holder of the<br />

most subordinated tranche in payment <strong>for</strong> risks<br />

taken (in our example 0.90%p.a.). However, this<br />

payment depends on whether the structure is<br />

per<strong>for</strong>ming well: in the event that the per<strong>for</strong>mance of<br />

underlying assets falls below a predetermined level,<br />

the Excess Spread is used to repay the rated<br />

tranches, and in this respect, represents an<br />

additional credit support.<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 3


Graph 2 : Credit enhancement<br />

SPV<br />

Underlying<br />

debtors<br />

Libor + 1.00%<br />

<strong>Asset</strong>s<br />

Liabilities<br />

Senior 92<br />

Collateral 100<br />

Subordinated 8<br />

A1+/ P1 <strong>Asset</strong>s 0.5 Cash Deposit 0.5<br />

Libor + 0.10%<br />

Excess Spread<br />

0.90% p.a.<br />

Senior<br />

investors<br />

Subordinated<br />

investors<br />

Subordination : 8%<br />

Cash Deposit : 0.5% => Total credit enhancement : 9.40%<br />

Excess Spread : 0.90% p.a.<br />

Cash deposit (see graph 2). On the whole<br />

credit rating agencies require the seller to pay a cash<br />

deposit to the SPV, repayment of which is ranked the<br />

same as the most subordinated tranche. The SPV will<br />

then reinvest this amount in liquid financial<br />

instruments rated A1+/P1 (<strong>for</strong> example treasury<br />

bills), which can then immediately be cashed to pay<br />

the holders of the senior tranches, if necessary.<br />

Certain structures sometimes allow <strong>for</strong> part of the<br />

Excess Spread to pay the Cash Deposit.<br />

Guarantee. Certain structured transactions<br />

use credit enhancing guaranteed by a third party (a<br />

bank, an insurance company): in case of default, the<br />

guarantor is substituted <strong>for</strong> the issuer of the security<br />

and is obliged to repay. US insurance companies,<br />

generally rated AAA (the monolines) expanding in<br />

financial insurance: they insure payment of a<br />

security on a specific date, which is also ranked AAA,<br />

by the insurance company. In general they only<br />

insure risks already considered as investment grade<br />

(i.e. of minimum ranking BBB-/Baa3): <strong>for</strong> a<br />

securitisation, if the underlying asset has a lower<br />

average ranking, it needs to be upgraded by other<br />

means to BBB status be<strong>for</strong>e the monoline will<br />

guarantee it, and accord the security a AAA rating.<br />

For example, a BB portfolio will have a credit<br />

enhancement using a subordinated tranche in order<br />

to achieve a BBB rated senior tranche: this tranche<br />

will be guaranteed by the monoline.<br />

Stage 3: cashflow mechanics<br />

The SPV's only source of income is the flow<br />

of payments from final debtors related to the<br />

underlying asset. Payments originating from the<br />

redemption in capital of debtors are entered in the<br />

accounts as principal collections. Interest collections<br />

include the interest paid by debtors, but also,<br />

overdue penalties and operating costs (particular<br />

case: the trade receivables do not bear interests,<br />

however, a receivable with a value of 100 to be<br />

received in 3 months, will be sold 99 to the SPV,<br />

which enable to consider 99 in principal and 1 in<br />

interest).<br />

The allotment of incoming payments is set<br />

out in full in the legal documentation. It is important<br />

to understand the principles of payment allocation<br />

as the order of subordination of the various tranches<br />

depends on this.<br />

Reinvestment. If the structure is<br />

rechargeable, the period of reinvestment needs to be<br />

analysed separately from the period of repayment.<br />

During the initial phase, principal collections are<br />

reinvested in new eligible assets in order to ensure<br />

the consistency of the quality of the underlying.<br />

During this phase, and similarly, during the<br />

phase of amortisation, interests and fees collections<br />

are mainly allocated to the interest payments of<br />

securities in the order of subordination of the<br />

various tranches.<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 4


Repayment. After the reinvestment phase,<br />

if there is one, and otherwise from the outset,<br />

principal collections are used to repay the different<br />

tranches.<br />

When the underlying asset consists of a<br />

large number of debtors, principal collections are<br />

daily. These amounts are placed by the SPV in highly<br />

liquid A1+/P1 rated assets, in preparation <strong>for</strong><br />

payment, to take place on a coupon due date (usually<br />

monthly or quarterly).<br />

A security to be repaid on a pre-determined<br />

date is known as a Hard Bullet: if the security is not<br />

repaid on this date, this constitutes a default. Unlike<br />

standard bond issues, the Hard Bullet is very rarely<br />

used in securitisation operations.<br />

The Soft Bullet (see graph 3) is one of the two<br />

most frequently employed repayment methods: all<br />

principal collections are placed in one of the SPV's<br />

accounts. Only when there is sufficient capital in the<br />

account will the A tranche be repaid, in one<br />

instalment. Subsequently, the process of<br />

accumulation will continue in order to repay the B<br />

tranche afterwards, then C, and so on.<br />

A Pass-Through type redemption is one<br />

where principal collections are fully repaid on the<br />

next coupon due date to holders of class A securities,<br />

and when these have been repaid in full, to holders<br />

of class B securities. This method is generally used<br />

when the rate of principal collections is slower (<strong>for</strong><br />

example, long-term assets) in which case it would be<br />

uneconomical to accumulate the reinvested amounts<br />

in low-yielding instruments while awaiting a bullet<br />

payment.<br />

Some structures make use of Controlled<br />

Amortisation. which is a type of Pass-Through<br />

repayment. However, if payment in principal is<br />

greater than expected over a certain period, a<br />

specific amount is retained in the structure. This<br />

enables smoothing of the repayment profile to make<br />

it as linear as possible.<br />

Rapid amortisation. Throughout the entire<br />

life span of the transaction, the quality of the<br />

structure is monitored by regular reports submitted<br />

to credit rating agencies. Each indicator in the report<br />

has a threshold level (a Trigger). If this level is<br />

reached it triggers a further sequence of allocation of<br />

flows so as to maintain the quality of the rated<br />

tranches:<br />

If triggering takes place during the<br />

reinvestment phase (see graph 4), this phase will<br />

come to an end, and the amounts paid in principal<br />

will be used to repay bondholders in a pass-through<br />

mode (to avoid to retain cash in the structure). At the<br />

same time, the Excess Spread will no longer be paid<br />

to holders of the lowest ranking tranche, but will be<br />

used to repay holders of rated tranches. As a general<br />

rule, all amounts received will be used to repay the<br />

tranches as fast as possible.<br />

Repayment date. The Expected Maturity is<br />

the most likely repayment date according to<br />

simulations carried out on the structure. When<br />

securitisation takes place, the effective repayment<br />

date of securities may differ from the expected<br />

maturity without constituting a default clause. The<br />

legal cut-off date <strong>for</strong> repayment of securities is said<br />

to be Legal Final. On this date, if securities have not<br />

yet been repaid, default is declared and the structure<br />

is liquidated to cover securities which are as of yet<br />

unpaid, according to the predetermined order of<br />

payment.<br />

The first factor causing deviation between<br />

the expected and actual repayment date is the<br />

variation in the rapidity of repayment of debtors in<br />

relation to the original scenario. This risk is<br />

important <strong>for</strong> MBSs, and investors generally have a<br />

chart linking expected maturity to the early<br />

repayment rate of underlying debtors. On the other<br />

hand, this is fairly unlikely in the case of a shortterm<br />

asset (such as credit card receivables), or when<br />

the underlying debtors do not possess an early<br />

repayment option (such as syndicated corporate<br />

loans to businesses). Securitisations of long term<br />

assets often incorporate a Clean-up Call, i.e. the<br />

possibility of liquidating the structure when the<br />

outstanding falls below 10% of initial value.<br />

Outstanding<br />

Graph 3 : Soft bullet repayment<br />

Outstanding<br />

Graph 4 : Rapid amortisation (Pass through)<br />

100<br />

100<br />

Tranche A<br />

senior<br />

cash<br />

Tranche A<br />

senior<br />

cash<br />

Tranche B<br />

mezzanine<br />

Tranche B<br />

mezzanine<br />

Tranche C subordinated<br />

Tranche C subordinated<br />

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Years<br />

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Years<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 5


The second factor contributing to<br />

uncertainty hinges on early repayment should an<br />

emergency procedure be triggered. This scenario<br />

appears under extremely precise circumstances, and<br />

depends on legally predetermined trigger targets. To<br />

date, early repayment has never affected standard<br />

ABS categories such as credit cards. If the emergency<br />

procedure is triggered, this indicates abnormal<br />

deterioration of the underlying, which is better than<br />

a default. In general, triggers apply to averaged<br />

figures, to avert the triggering of early repayment by<br />

an insignificant poor per<strong>for</strong>mance over a month.<br />

For each transaction, repayment risk should<br />

be examined in each individual case. However, a<br />

distinction is being made with increasing frequency<br />

between pure credit products such as ABSs, where<br />

uncertainty is reduced by a maximum, and MBSs<br />

where repayment risk is an important factor in price<br />

mechanisms: CMOs (Collateralised Mortgage<br />

Obligation), securitisations of MBS portfolios, are<br />

transactions which offer investors high profit<br />

profiles by exerting a leverage effect on the<br />

repayment rate of underlying debtors.<br />

Master-Trust: this is a super SPV, which can<br />

be re-used <strong>for</strong> several consecutive transactions, by<br />

issuing individualised series (<strong>for</strong> example "serie 98-<br />

1" represent the first transaction in 1998 <strong>for</strong> this<br />

seller). Each serie is backed by the same underlying<br />

receivables pool, and each time the seller carries out<br />

a new securitisation, he add underlying assets to the<br />

total portfolio. Collections in principal and interest is<br />

allocated pro rata in each serie.<br />

Each serie then has its own cashflow<br />

mechanics and amortisation profile. The use of a<br />

universal structure enables amortisation of fixed<br />

costs, but above all, the constitution of an extremely<br />

large and diversified underlying portfolio developed<br />

over consecutive operations. This technique is<br />

mainly employed by credit card institutions which<br />

frequently turn to the markets <strong>for</strong> financing: some<br />

Master Trusts contain over 30 series.<br />

With the exception of the underlying asset,<br />

each serie may be analysed in financial terms as a<br />

separate SPV. However, some Master Trusts establish<br />

solidarity between series: if a serie defaults, the<br />

Excess Spread of another, stronger serie may be used<br />

to support the weaker series.<br />

Stage 4: Legal structure<br />

ABS transactions are often given outlandish<br />

names, ranging from the name of a flower to an<br />

unpronounceable sequence of letters. This name<br />

refers to the legal structure which issues the<br />

securities and which has been created specifically to<br />

this effect.<br />

Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) The<br />

securitisation structure is a company specifically<br />

created <strong>for</strong> this purpose, whose assets consist of the<br />

disposed underlying asset and which is refinanced<br />

by issues of securities. Some countries benefit from<br />

legal securitisation structures; as in France (Fonds<br />

Communs de Créances (FCC)). However, most<br />

securitisations are issued by offshore vehicles which<br />

side-step the restrictions of domestic legislation.<br />

(The laws ruling FCCs have recently been relaxed,<br />

showing increasing resemblance to Anglo-Saxon<br />

style SPVs).<br />

SPVs are established in Jersey, in the<br />

Cayman Islands, and in Delaware, <strong>for</strong> technical<br />

reasons: ease of registration, absence of the need <strong>for</strong><br />

a physical board of directors, reduced costs, and<br />

uni<strong>for</strong>mity of structure. The use of tax havens is not<br />

motivated by the desire to hide from the domestic<br />

legislator: the practice of offshore securitisation is<br />

widely recognised by most major states, as in any<br />

case, the operation must be approved by the local<br />

authorities, which decide on the deconsolidating<br />

nature of the structuring (i.e. the possibility of offbalance<br />

sheet accounting <strong>for</strong> the seller).<br />

Underlying<br />

portfolio<br />

Collection<br />

principal & interest<br />

Graph 5 : Master Trust<br />

ASSET<br />

% prorata<br />

LIABILITY<br />

Serie 98-1<br />

Futur serie<br />

Seller's interest<br />

(part not yet financed)<br />

Class A<br />

senior<br />

Class B<br />

mezzanine<br />

Class C<br />

subordinated<br />

class A<br />

class B<br />

class C<br />

class D<br />

Documentation. The SPV is legally<br />

independent of the seller: when the SPV is<br />

established as a company, its ownership is<br />

established by a symbolic company capital held by<br />

the Board of Directors. In the majority of cases, the<br />

SPV is established as a Trust, which means that the<br />

company's capital is maintained and managed by a<br />

professional Trustee, who acts in the interest of<br />

bondholders.<br />

Although independent, the trustee does not<br />

have total freedom of hand, as each event which<br />

takes place during the company's life is clearly<br />

stipulated in the legal documentation: cash<br />

management, allocation of flows, third-party default<br />

and so on.<br />

investors<br />

investors<br />

seller<br />

Seller<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 6


The most important legal document relating<br />

to offshore structured financing is the Security Trust<br />

Deed, which clearly lays out the circumstances of<br />

default and the way in which the Trustee should<br />

liquidate assets <strong>for</strong> distribution to bondholders.<br />

As everything is legally predetermined, one<br />

aspect of the SPV is known as "Bankruptcy Remote",<br />

which means that it can only be liquidated by the<br />

Trustee. This aspect is what makes securitisations<br />

longer-lasting than certain companies, whose<br />

financial strength may be abruptly undermined, <strong>for</strong><br />

example, by a court case or embezzlement by a<br />

director.<br />

True sale. The most important legal aspect<br />

of securitisation is the quality of asset transfer from<br />

the seller to the SPV. As a general rule, credit rating<br />

agencies require a True Sale, which means that once<br />

the underlying has been disposed of, it is wholly<br />

possessed by the SPV. For example, should the seller<br />

default, his creditors no longer have any right to the<br />

underlying assets and have no right on the SPV. This<br />

principle clearly establishes that there is no direct<br />

seller risk.<br />

The True Sale aspect is validated by a legal<br />

opinion given by the firm of lawyers having set up<br />

the initial legal framework. From time to time,<br />

securitisation operations make use of an<br />

intermediary SPV which intervenes between the<br />

seller and the issuing SPV so as ensure that disposal<br />

and decorrelation with the seller is as complete as<br />

possible.<br />

Default. When a securitisation operation is<br />

set up, the main objective is to avoid as far as<br />

possible the risk of default on tranches with the<br />

highest ratings. Default follows an early repayment<br />

event, if all overcollateralisation resources have been<br />

exhausted. Default clauses are defined precisely in<br />

the legislation, being objective events (<strong>for</strong> example,<br />

the non payment of interest on rated securities <strong>for</strong><br />

over seven days) which authorise the liquidation of<br />

the structure. In the case of an SPV set up as a trust,<br />

the trustee recovers possession of the assets and is<br />

responsible <strong>for</strong> their liquidation <strong>for</strong> distribution to<br />

bondholders according to the order in which the<br />

tranches are subordinated.<br />

Stage 5: Links with the seller<br />

In the majority of securitisation operations,<br />

asset disposal is a True Sale, which clearly indicates<br />

that the quality of the underlying portfolio does not<br />

depend on the quality of the seller. Even if the seller<br />

remains involved in the operation, back-up measures<br />

are implemented so that the structure is able to<br />

withstand straight<strong>for</strong>ward default by the seller. It is<br />

not unknown to see AAA rated securitisations whose<br />

seller is close to liquidation.<br />

Servicing. In general, the seller wishes to<br />

maintain a business relationship with final debtors.<br />

As such, he remains the Servicer , which means that<br />

he continues to manage the receivables on behalf of<br />

the SPV (collection of receivables, administration). In<br />

many cases, the end debtor is not even aware that his<br />

debt has been securitised. In most cases, the seller<br />

retains the most subordinated tranche, which serves<br />

as motivation to pay back as much as possible of the<br />

amounts due to the SPV: each dollar of lost payment<br />

is endured by the seller, as the subordinated tranche<br />

absorbs all initial risks.<br />

Structures generally allow <strong>for</strong> a certain level<br />

of deterioration in the quality of the seller (<strong>for</strong><br />

example, downgrading of his rating to below BBB), at<br />

which point a Back-Up Servicer takes over. This<br />

replacement will quickly come into effect if there are<br />

few debtors or if they are clearly identified, such as<br />

bank CLOs whereby the majority of debtors are<br />

major corporates known throughout the financial<br />

community. On the other hand, <strong>for</strong> individual<br />

portfolios involving hundreds of thousands of<br />

debtors, the Back-Up Servicer is named at the<br />

beginning of the transaction, and regularly receives<br />

the necessary computer files so as to be quickly<br />

operational, if necessary.<br />

Commingling. As a general rule, the seller<br />

collects the receivables on his own account. The end<br />

debtor may have two receivables, one securitised, the<br />

other not, but he will discharge both directly to the<br />

seller. The next day, the seller pays back to the SPV<br />

the amounts paid to the order of the securitised<br />

receivables. This presents the risk of Commingling,<br />

i.e. the risk that the accounts of the seller will merge<br />

with those of the SPV.<br />

This is a contained risk, as, in the event of<br />

the occurrence of the slightest anomaly, or<br />

deterioration of the seller's financial strength, the<br />

SPV maintains the right to notify the end debtor that<br />

amounts due should be paid directly to the SPV.<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 7


Swaps. In most cases, ABSs give exposure to<br />

underlying credit without enduring <strong>for</strong>eign exchange<br />

or interest rate risk. Where necessary, underlying<br />

interest is trans<strong>for</strong>med by the SPV into the rate and<br />

the currency of issue via a swap. Credit rating<br />

agencies generally require the rating of the<br />

counterparty of the swap to be at least A1+/P1. When<br />

the seller is a highly rated financial counterpart, the<br />

bank will often provide the swap.<br />

For the holder of senior equity, the risk on<br />

the counterpart of the swap is extremely indirect:<br />

be<strong>for</strong>e loss can be recorded, the counterpart of the<br />

swap must default despite his high rating, the<br />

replacement cost (mark-to-market) of the swap must<br />

be positive, and the mark-to-market must be higher<br />

than the level of overcollateralisation of the senior<br />

tranche. This indirect risk is often further reduced by<br />

the existence of a trigger, which obliges the SPV to<br />

reassign its swap (i.e. change counterpart) as soon as<br />

the counterpart falls below A1+/P1.<br />

Spread<br />

(BP)<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

Graph 6 : Credit card Spread over Libor<br />

(Senior tranche AAA, 3 years)<br />

jan-92 jan-93 jan-94 jan-95 jan-96 jan-97 jan-98 jan-99<br />

Annual<br />

volume<br />

(USD BN)<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 8


III<br />

Why purchase<br />

ABSs?<br />

Despite the increasing standardisation of<br />

transactions and amount of available in<strong>for</strong>mation,<br />

the purchase of an ABS still requires a little more<br />

analytical ef<strong>for</strong>t, in order to understand the<br />

structure, than a plain vanilla security.<br />

However, more and more investors are<br />

creating dedicated teams, specialising in ABSs and<br />

credit products in general. This trend may be<br />

explained in a generalised fashion by the following<br />

reasons:<br />

Diversification. ABSs provide a means of<br />

diversifying a portfolio into low risk products<br />

offering exposure to a diversified portfolio.<br />

Financial strength. The hypotheses of<br />

credit rating agencies are extremely conservative<br />

and depend <strong>for</strong> the most part on extremely objective<br />

and quantitative criteria. Unlike companies, SPVs are<br />

not as sensitive to subjective and volatile criteria,<br />

such as corporate image.<br />

Stability. Overcollateralisation is a dynamic<br />

element: the structure adapts to maintain the same<br />

risk quality. Unlike corporates, the security is not<br />

sensitive to unexpected dramatic events, such as the<br />

departure of a key member of staff or poor strategic<br />

choices.<br />

Recovery rate. As the underlying assets are<br />

diversified, clearly identified and lodged as collateral<br />

in the best interest of holders of the securities, rating<br />

agencies judge that the recovery rate <strong>for</strong> holders in<br />

case of default (which remains theoretical) is<br />

extremely high.<br />

Standardisation.<br />

Increasingly,<br />

securitisation and ABSs in particular are becoming<br />

standard <strong>for</strong>ms of structured financing, and<br />

in<strong>for</strong>mation about them is more and more widely<br />

available. This enables enhanced visibility when<br />

drawing comparisons between transactions.<br />

Liquidity. Securitisation has become a big<br />

industry: in the US in 1997, 50% of domestic US<br />

issues (excluding T-bills) took the <strong>for</strong>m of<br />

securitisation. Liquidity is increasing in the major<br />

segments such as ABS Credit Cards and financial<br />

CLOs, where the issue volume of USD 45bn is<br />

constantly increasing. Even during the credit crunch<br />

in October 98, credit cards have remained actively<br />

traded assets ( graph 6).<br />

Return. With equal ratings, ABSs generally<br />

provide interesting margins <strong>for</strong> long term investors.<br />

In addition, the new asset classes offer spread<br />

narrowing potential: <strong>for</strong> example, in tandem with the<br />

development of this market segment, spreads on<br />

credit cards have narrowed by around 80bp since<br />

1992 ( graph 6).<br />

Olivier MELENNEC<br />

European ABS Group, SG<br />

Paris: 33 1 42 13 80 51<br />

London:44 20 7676 7649<br />

E-mail:olivier.melennec@socgen.com<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 9


GLOSSARY<br />

<strong>Asset</strong> <strong>Backed</strong> <strong>Securities</strong> : I- Introduction<br />

<strong>Asset</strong>-<strong>Backed</strong>-Commercial-Paper : I- ABCP, MBS and ABS<br />

Auto Loans : I- Market segments<br />

Back-up Servicer : II- Stage 5- Servicing<br />

Bankruptcy Remote : II- Stage 4- Documentation<br />

Cash deposit : II- Stage 2- Cash deposit<br />

Class : II- Stage 2- Subordination<br />

Clean-up Call : II- Stage 3- Repayment date<br />

Collateralised Bond Obligation : I- Market segments<br />

Collateralised Loan Obligation : I- Market segments<br />

Collateralised Mortgage Obligation : II- Stage 3- Repayment date<br />

Commercial Mortgage <strong>Backed</strong> <strong>Securities</strong> : I- Market segments<br />

Commingling : II- Stage 5- Commingling<br />

Conduits : I- ABCP, MBS and ABS<br />

Controlled Amortisation : II- Stage 3- Repayment<br />

Credit Cards : I- Market segments<br />

Credit enhancement : II- Stage 2- Credit enhancement<br />

Diversity Score : II- Stage I- Reporting<br />

Equity : II- Stage 2- Subordination<br />

Excess Spread : II- Stage 2- Excess Spread<br />

Expected Maturity : II- Stage 3- Repayment date<br />

Final debtors : I- Securitisation<br />

Fonds Communs de Créances : II- Stage 4- Special Purpose Vehicle<br />

Future flows : II- Stage I- Origination<br />

Hard Bullet : II- Stage 3- Repayment<br />

Home Equity Loans : I- Market segments<br />

Interests collections : II- Stage 3- Cashflow mechanics<br />

Investment grade : II- Stage 2- Guarantee<br />

Legal Final : II- Stage 3- Repayment date<br />

Legal opinion : II- Stage 4- True sale<br />

Master-Trust : II- Stage 4- Master Trust<br />

Mezzanines : II- Stage 2- Subordination<br />

Monolines : II- Stage 2- Guarantee<br />

Mortgage-<strong>Backed</strong>-<strong>Securities</strong> : I- ABCP, MBS and ABS<br />

Offshore : II- Stage 4- Special Purpose Vehicle<br />

Origination : II- Stage I- Origination<br />

Pass-Through : II- Stage 3- Repayment<br />

Principal collections : II- Stage 3- Cashflow mechanics<br />

Reinvestment period : II- Stage I- Maturity<br />

Renewable : II- Stage I- Maturity<br />

Reporting : II- Stage I- Reporting<br />

Return On Equity : I- Fast-developing<br />

Scoring : II- Stage I- Origination<br />

Securitisation : I- Securitisation<br />

Security Trust Deed : II- Stage 4- Documentation<br />

Seller : I- Securitisation<br />

Senior : II- Stage 2- Introduction<br />

Servicer : II- Stage 5- Servicing<br />

Servicing : II- Stage 5- Servicing<br />

Soft Bullet : II- Stage 3- Repayment<br />

Special Purpose Vehicle : I- Securitisation<br />

Static : II- Stage I- Maturity<br />

Student Loans : I- Market segments<br />

Subordinated : II- Stage 2- Subordination<br />

Term Deals : I- ABCP, MBS and ABS<br />

Trigger : II- Stage 3- Rapid amortisation<br />

True Sale : II- Stage 4- True sale<br />

Trust : II- Stage 4- Documentation<br />

Trustee : II- Stage 4- Documentation<br />

Underlying asset : I- Securitisation<br />

SG does not make any representations or warranty, express or implied, as to, nor does it assume any responsibility or liability<br />

<strong>for</strong>, the authenticity, origin,validity or completeness of, or any omissions in any in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this document.<br />

SG ABS RESEARCH – updated 15/05/2000 10

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