Eva Gerharz: âThe Construction of Identities: The Case of the Chitta ...
Eva Gerharz: âThe Construction of Identities: The Case of the Chitta ...
Eva Gerharz: âThe Construction of Identities: The Case of the Chitta ...
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<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong>: „<strong>The</strong> <strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Case</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong<br />
Hill Tracts in Bangladesh“<br />
Contents<br />
1. Introduction<br />
1.1. <strong>The</strong> People <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
1.2. <strong>The</strong>oretical Presumptions<br />
2. Methodology<br />
2.1. Applied Methods – Expectations and Reality<br />
2.2. <strong>The</strong> Necessity <strong>of</strong> Somebody Who Takes Care<br />
3. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts and <strong>the</strong> Nation-State<br />
3.1. British Colonialism and <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Period<br />
3.2. Bangladesh Becomes Independent<br />
3.2.1. Politics <strong>of</strong> Nationalism<br />
3.2.1. A Question <strong>of</strong> Identity – <strong>The</strong> New State <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh and <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
4. Economy and Disadvantage - Land as an Essential Need<br />
4.1. <strong>The</strong> Kaptai Hydroelectric Project and Its Impact on Land Issues<br />
4.2. <strong>The</strong> Settlement Programme <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi Government<br />
4.3. A Demographic Shift and Its Political Dimension<br />
4.4. <strong>The</strong> “Tribal Market” in Rangamati<br />
4.5. Economy and Trade<br />
4.6. How <strong>the</strong> Hill People Perceive <strong>The</strong>ir Economic Position<br />
5. Education<br />
5.1. <strong>The</strong> State <strong>of</strong> Education among <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
5.2. <strong>The</strong> Advanced Position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma<br />
6. Cultural differences – Cultural Habits and <strong>The</strong>ir Importance<br />
6.1. Dress<br />
6.2. Language<br />
6.3. Religion<br />
6.4. <strong>The</strong> “Boundary-Markers” as One Aspect <strong>of</strong> Identity <strong>Construction</strong><br />
7. <strong>The</strong> Peace Accord – A Political Solution<br />
7.1. Development Issues – National NGOs in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
7.2. Ano<strong>the</strong>r Insurgency?<br />
8. Conclusion<br />
References<br />
Appendix:<br />
Glossary <strong>of</strong> Foreign Words, List <strong>of</strong> Abbreviations, Pictures, Maps
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
1. Introduction – Bangladesh and Its Minorities<br />
Bangladesh is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most homogeneous states as regards ethnic and religious differences.<br />
<strong>The</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population (86.7%) are Muslims, 12.1% Hindus and <strong>the</strong> rest, 1.2%<br />
are Buddhists, Christians and Animists. Those who are non-Muslims live in different communities<br />
spread all over <strong>the</strong> country. As <strong>the</strong> Hindus are chiefly counted as Bengalis, a very little<br />
minority belongs to those entitled as “ethnic communities” (Khaleque 1995, 9) or “tribals” 1 .<br />
How many groups <strong>the</strong>re actually are, is controversially discussed in <strong>the</strong> literature and varies<br />
between 12 and 46. According to <strong>the</strong> 1991 census <strong>the</strong>re are 29 different ethnic groups living<br />
in Bangladesh, but even <strong>the</strong> census, which is carried out every 10 years, is disputed, as some<br />
groups are mentioned twice with different names while o<strong>the</strong>rs are left out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> scheme.<br />
Leaving out <strong>the</strong> clarification <strong>of</strong> that question, approximately 1.2 Million Bangladeshis belong<br />
to <strong>the</strong>se groups according to <strong>the</strong> 1991 census (Khaleque 1995).<br />
<strong>The</strong> different communities vary broadly besides in religious, linguistic and cultural features,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> grade <strong>of</strong> acculturation and resistance. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts (CHT) and its inhabitants<br />
can considered to be extraordinary in respect to historical developments and present<br />
political affiliations 2 . <strong>The</strong> indigenous population <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT is estimated at approximately<br />
530,000 3 , that is 0,45% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole population More than 20 years <strong>of</strong> armed resistance have<br />
led <strong>the</strong> CHT to get special attention in Bangladesh as well as across its borders in comparison<br />
to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r indigenous groups in Mymensingh, Jamalpur and Sylhet 4 .<br />
1.1. <strong>The</strong> People <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
Geographically <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts are located in <strong>the</strong> south-east <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh, next to<br />
<strong>the</strong> border <strong>of</strong> Myanmar and <strong>the</strong> Indian states Tripura and Mizoram. <strong>The</strong> total land area comprises<br />
about 12,181 square kilometres and constitutes about 10% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total area <strong>of</strong><br />
Bangladesh (Ahsan, 1989, 961). <strong>The</strong> landscape <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts is amazing, with<br />
its comparatively small hills covered by jungles and jhum 5 , while <strong>the</strong> fertile valleys look a<br />
1 This term has been preferably used by <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshis, for ascription as well as self-ascription. Having in<br />
mind <strong>the</strong> negative connotation <strong>of</strong> that term related to “tribalism”, I will try to avoid its usage if possible. Preferred<br />
comp arable terms are “Hill People”, “indigenous”, “jhumma” or “peoples”<br />
2 Although resistance and rebellion have happened among <strong>the</strong> Garo for example (Khaleque 1995). It is not my<br />
intention to marginalise <strong>the</strong>se, but <strong>the</strong> CHT case has gained most attention in <strong>the</strong> recent in national politics as<br />
well as regarding international recognition<br />
3 Numbers from <strong>the</strong> Statistical Pocketbook Bangladesh 98<br />
4 For <strong>the</strong> spatial distribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different indigenous groups see Khaleque (1995, 13).<br />
5 Jhum means shifting cultivation. <strong>The</strong> term also relates to <strong>the</strong> fields in which this mode <strong>of</strong> cultivation is practised
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
little bit like paradise when <strong>the</strong>y appear in front <strong>of</strong> someone who reaches <strong>the</strong> top <strong>of</strong> a hill. I<br />
have never seen such natural, green and beautiful scenery before.<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts are divided into three districts 6 , Bandarban, Rangamati and<br />
Kagrachari. Rangamati as <strong>the</strong> biggest district has an area <strong>of</strong> 6,089 square kilometres and is<br />
divided into nine thanas. Bandarban, <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn district covers about 4,502 square kilometres,<br />
subdivided into seven thanas. <strong>The</strong> smallest district is <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Kagrachari, covering<br />
2,590 square kilometres and divided into eight thanas (Ullah 1995, 99).<br />
<strong>The</strong> inhabitants are categorised into 13 different groups 7 . <strong>The</strong> major ones are <strong>the</strong> Chakma,<br />
Marma and Tripura, <strong>the</strong> minor ones are: Tanchangya, Riyang, Khumi, Murong, Lushai, Kuki,<br />
Bawm, Kheyang, Pankhua and Chak 8 . Every group has its own language, dress and social<br />
customs, so that one can say that every one has its own culture 9 . <strong>The</strong>se groups can be roughly<br />
divided into two categories: <strong>the</strong> valley groups, comprising Marma, Chakma and Tripura, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs who live on <strong>the</strong> ridges <strong>of</strong> hills. 10 <strong>The</strong>re has always been a small minority <strong>of</strong> Bengalis<br />
in <strong>the</strong> area, as well as some non-tribal Hindu communities and non-tribal Buddhists.<br />
Until 1951 <strong>the</strong> population remained small in numbers; <strong>the</strong> population census <strong>of</strong> that year estimated<br />
a density <strong>of</strong> 57 inhabitants per square kilometre, which has grown to 190 per square<br />
kilometre until 1991. 11<br />
In <strong>the</strong> following I will give a short description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main groups which I have selected on<br />
<strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> my experiences in <strong>the</strong> field.<br />
Chakma:<br />
<strong>The</strong> Chakma are <strong>the</strong> biggest group among <strong>the</strong> Hill Peoples. <strong>The</strong>y belong to <strong>the</strong> Mongoloid<br />
group and <strong>the</strong>ir language originates in <strong>the</strong> Indo-Aryan group. <strong>The</strong>ir descent is unclear, as <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have, like <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r groups, no written history and different <strong>the</strong>ories about <strong>the</strong>ir origin. Some<br />
6 See map in appendix<br />
7 Again <strong>the</strong> number varies. Some authors mention less or more than 13, for example Bernot (1960) mentions 10.<br />
My decision to assume <strong>the</strong>re are 13 groups is backed by Mohsin (1997), Shelley (1992) and my Chakma informants<br />
in <strong>the</strong> field<br />
8 In <strong>the</strong> literature <strong>the</strong> spelling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> names varies. Shelley (1992, 45) examines <strong>the</strong>se most broadly<br />
9 For <strong>the</strong> conception <strong>of</strong> culture which is used in this paper see Chapter 6<br />
10 T.H. Lewin who served as an British administrator in <strong>the</strong> 19 th century in <strong>the</strong> hills and who has published two<br />
basic ethnological books on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts named <strong>the</strong>m according to this distinction Khyoungtha and<br />
Toungtha which is Burmese-Arakanese and means “children <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> river” and “children <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hills”<br />
11 To recognise <strong>the</strong> immense growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT is important for several reasons. Until <strong>the</strong> Pakistan regime <strong>the</strong><br />
area was an “excluded area” which means that no one could settle in <strong>the</strong> CHT if he had not got permission from<br />
<strong>the</strong> tribal-chiefs and <strong>the</strong> deputy commissioner. Later under Bangladesh regime <strong>the</strong> CHT were used to rehabilitate<br />
landless Bengalis from <strong>the</strong> plains. <strong>The</strong> influx <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se settlers enlarged <strong>the</strong> density <strong>of</strong> population immensely,<br />
especially <strong>the</strong> non-tribal portion.
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
consider <strong>the</strong> Chakma to be <strong>of</strong> Muslim origin, o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ories, particularly those which are<br />
propagated by <strong>the</strong> Chakma <strong>the</strong>mselves, tell that <strong>the</strong>y migrated from a place called Champaknagar<br />
12 to <strong>the</strong> Hill Tracts (Mohsin, 1997, 12ff). This unclearness is sometimes utilised for<br />
political discussions, as <strong>the</strong>y are regarded as being a “rootless tribe” by Abedin 13 (1997, 58).<br />
<strong>The</strong> Chakma are Buddhists, whose society shows patriarchal patterns, and <strong>the</strong>y are not just<br />
numerically <strong>the</strong> dominant group in <strong>the</strong> CHT. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political leaders who influence <strong>the</strong><br />
policies and processes <strong>of</strong> decision are members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma, as well as those taking part in<br />
insurgency actions. 14 <strong>The</strong>y are concentrated in Rangamati and Kagrachari district. In Rangamati<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indigenous populations and <strong>the</strong> Rajbari 15 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma<br />
chief is located <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
Marma:<br />
<strong>The</strong> Marma, who also belong to <strong>the</strong> Mongoloid group are Buddhists as well. <strong>The</strong> Marma<br />
community is divided into two; one mainly lives in and around Bandarban, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r in<br />
Kagrachari. 16 Both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se groups came from Arakan in Burma. <strong>The</strong> word Marma itself derives<br />
from <strong>the</strong> name “Myanmar” for <strong>the</strong> Burmese nation (Prue, 1994, 1). <strong>The</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn Marma<br />
came to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong area in <strong>the</strong> 17 th century, went back to Arakan in 1756 under Moghal<br />
pressure until <strong>the</strong>y finally reached Bandarban in <strong>the</strong> 19 th century. <strong>The</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Marma were<br />
refugees driven out <strong>of</strong> Arakan some time later (Mohsin 1997, 15). As I was told at <strong>the</strong> Tribal<br />
Cultural Institute in Bandarban, <strong>the</strong> Marma language and script (which is almost forgotten) is<br />
very similar to Arakanese. Unusual for <strong>the</strong> CHT groups is <strong>the</strong> latent bias towards matriarchal<br />
societal structures among <strong>the</strong> Marma, which is revealed by <strong>the</strong> literature (Shelley 1992, 53).<br />
My empirical data show that <strong>the</strong> Marma gender order can considered to be extraordinary in<br />
comparison to <strong>the</strong> Bengali society 17 . Norms in respect to <strong>the</strong> occupation <strong>of</strong> public spaces for<br />
12 <strong>The</strong>re is no hint to find where <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Champaknagar was. Some <strong>the</strong>ories maintain that it was located near<br />
Malacca, in Tripura, in Bihar or somewhere in Thailand<br />
13 His opinion about <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r groups is not better. In <strong>the</strong> Chapter “CHT: Home <strong>of</strong> Alien Tribes” he writes: „All<br />
<strong>the</strong> tribes living in <strong>the</strong> CHT are outsiders and none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are sons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soil” (Abedin 1997, 53)<br />
14 <strong>The</strong> Chakma-dominance among <strong>the</strong> hill people will be explained and analysed more broadly in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
chapters. This fact is essential for <strong>the</strong> understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong> ethnicity and identity-construction.<br />
15 <strong>The</strong> chiefs’ residence<br />
16 Mohsin tells that <strong>the</strong>y had two chiefs, <strong>the</strong> Bohmang Raja in Bandarban, <strong>the</strong> Mong Raja in Ramgarh. <strong>The</strong><br />
community was divided by <strong>the</strong> Karnafuli river, those living south were headed by <strong>the</strong> Bohmang chief, those<br />
living in <strong>the</strong> north were ruled by <strong>the</strong> Mong chief. Of interest here are <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn Marma, since I have been in<br />
Bandarban and have very little knowledge about <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn group. As I was told <strong>the</strong> difference is not <strong>of</strong> great<br />
importance<br />
17 During my field work I observed that <strong>the</strong> gender order among <strong>the</strong> Hill People varies to some extent from that<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali society. <strong>The</strong>se differences can be traced back to religion for example and will be examined in<br />
Chapter 6 more broadly
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
example are very different to those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali community and even to those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Hill People. Smoking in public spaces is not a taboo for <strong>the</strong>m. Receiving guests in a Marma<br />
house is <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> woman. I have heard several times in <strong>the</strong> field: “our women are very<br />
active”.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Hindu 18 Tripura are <strong>the</strong> third largest group. Since <strong>the</strong>y have no chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own, <strong>the</strong><br />
Tripura live within <strong>the</strong> jurisdictions <strong>of</strong> Marma or Chakma rajas. <strong>The</strong>ir origin is considered to<br />
be in <strong>the</strong> Indian state <strong>of</strong> Tripura, which borders on <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT. <strong>The</strong> Tripura<br />
are mainly concentrated in <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Kagrachari district. <strong>The</strong> Murong are living predominantly<br />
in Bandarban district. <strong>The</strong>y are Animists and have no religious book. <strong>The</strong>ir cultural<br />
background and <strong>the</strong>ir social customs are sometimes regarded as extraordinary 19 . <strong>The</strong> Murong<br />
believe that a bull was sent by <strong>the</strong>ir god Turai to carry <strong>the</strong> religious book but had eaten it up<br />
on <strong>the</strong> way (Mohsin 1997, 18). Informants told that <strong>the</strong>y have special rituals like playing <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
pipe in return for baksish. <strong>The</strong> Chak and Tanchangya are considered as sub-groups <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Chakma. In general <strong>the</strong>re has been very little knowledge about <strong>the</strong> smaller groups, since <strong>the</strong>y<br />
lived isolated from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs (Mohsin, 1997, 20).<br />
1.2. <strong>The</strong>oretical Presumptions<br />
<strong>The</strong>ories on identity construction are broad. Among <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories on <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> ethnic<br />
identity, likewise national identity, two guiding positions can be distinguished. <strong>The</strong> first comprises<br />
<strong>the</strong> idea that ethnicity is a stable, contingent characteristic, tied to social circumstances,<br />
in which individuals are socialised and to which <strong>the</strong>y belong. Contrasting this primordialist<br />
perspective, an instrumentalist perspective, grounded in <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> Frederic Barth (1969),<br />
has been developed, which largely dominates <strong>the</strong> discourse on ethnicity. <strong>The</strong> instrumentalist<br />
notion can be supplemented by a third strain, <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> rational choice (Kößler 1995, 3). <strong>The</strong><br />
combination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two ideas comprises <strong>the</strong> assumption that ethnicity is seen as a construction,<br />
an invention 20 , on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and that ethnicity can be <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a rational choice, a<br />
strategy, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand. That <strong>the</strong>orem, guided by an idea <strong>of</strong> constructivism, comprises<br />
according to Barth (1998, 6) three main features. First, ethnicity is <strong>the</strong> social organisation <strong>of</strong><br />
cultural difference. Second, ethnicity is a matter <strong>of</strong> self-ascription and ascription by o<strong>the</strong>rs in<br />
18 According to my field experience <strong>the</strong>re are some Tripura who have converted to Christianity. That fact does<br />
not appear in <strong>the</strong> literature<br />
19 Literature: Schendel 1992a, Shelley 1992, 54. In <strong>the</strong> Bengali society a visitor will consider various kinds <strong>of</strong><br />
stereotypes towards <strong>the</strong> CHT peoples in general.
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
interaction and <strong>the</strong>refore constructed by <strong>the</strong> actors <strong>the</strong>mselves. Third, <strong>the</strong> boundaryconnectedness<br />
<strong>of</strong> cultural features, implying that <strong>the</strong> actors <strong>the</strong>mselves develop diacriteria<br />
along which members and non-members are categorised, included or excluded. <strong>The</strong> key element<br />
<strong>of</strong> ethnicity is <strong>the</strong> stability <strong>of</strong> boundaries between groups (von Bruinessen 1997, 196).<br />
<strong>The</strong> cultural features <strong>the</strong>mselves are flexible. According to rational decisions <strong>the</strong>se “markers”<br />
can be constructed: clothing, language, food habits, religion or modes <strong>of</strong> cultivation gain importance,<br />
whenever rational calculation stresses <strong>the</strong>ir concern. A common history can be<br />
invented, whenever it is considered to be necessary. Cultural features can become activated,<br />
when pressure from outside for example requires (Kößler 1995, 4). Pressure can have its origins<br />
in political as well as economic processes (Schlee 1996, 20), <strong>the</strong> resulting inclusion<br />
based on cultural features <strong>the</strong>n affects those processes vice versa. At <strong>the</strong> same time flexibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> cultural features can have <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> various identities as a consequence: Depending<br />
on <strong>the</strong> concern which is considered to be important, different identities are stressed:<br />
in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People three or more different levels can’t be distinguished: <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi<br />
identity, <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s identity, <strong>the</strong> group’s identity and <strong>the</strong> clan’s identity. Schlee<br />
(1996) defines <strong>the</strong>se as pluritactic constructions.<br />
Starting from this very general <strong>the</strong>oretical base, after presenting <strong>the</strong> methodology, I will first<br />
examine <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> nationalism and counter-nationalism in Bangladesh and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong<br />
Hill Tracts. Mechanisms <strong>of</strong> inclusion and exclusion related to political processes are<br />
explored here. Secondly economic processes are analysed with regard to <strong>the</strong>ir importance for<br />
processes <strong>of</strong> group-formation. Education in Chapter 5 is treated as a kind <strong>of</strong> excurse. After<br />
analysing three exemplary “markers”, cultural features will be <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> Chapter 6, embedded<br />
into a <strong>the</strong>oretic conclusion. As a question <strong>of</strong> current interest <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord is<br />
examined and an outlook about <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> ethnic relations in <strong>the</strong> CHT will be given<br />
here. <strong>The</strong> main aspects will be summarised in a final conclusion.<br />
2. Methodology<br />
“You should always keep in mind three things. First, you are in a tribal area. Second, tribals<br />
are shy. Third, <strong>the</strong>y are sensitive”<br />
To investigate identity construction I conducted field work in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> beginning organisational problems hindered my attempt to start, but after two weeks “acclimatisation”<br />
in Bangladesh I found a NGO with projects in <strong>the</strong> CHT, namely <strong>the</strong> Integrated<br />
20 Revealed by Hobsbawm’s notion on <strong>the</strong> invention <strong>of</strong> Tradition (Der Spiegel 1999 Nr. 52, pp. 144-148)
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
Development Foundation (IDF). <strong>The</strong> field trip consisted <strong>of</strong> three phases: First I spent eight<br />
days in Rangamati and immediately after one week in <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn district <strong>of</strong> Bandarban 21 .<br />
After a break <strong>of</strong> approximately two weeks I returned to Rangamati for ano<strong>the</strong>r nine days.<br />
Helpful like all Bangladeshis, in my experience , IDF organised my first journey to Rangamati<br />
and a suitable accommodation. Besides my hosts interest in my work <strong>the</strong>y had enough<br />
time to introduce me to different areas <strong>of</strong> social life in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> Rangamati in <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
Tracts. <strong>The</strong> host provided me with access to members and leaders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local elite as well as<br />
to people <strong>of</strong> lower socio-economic status and villagers around Rangamati. An immense advantage<br />
for <strong>the</strong> field entry was my hosts’ knowledge <strong>of</strong> English, which made it possible to do<br />
research without finding an interpreter first. <strong>The</strong> difficulties <strong>of</strong> understanding, which are discussed<br />
by Bernard (1995, 145) were not as problematic because even among <strong>the</strong> villagers a<br />
lot <strong>of</strong> people know English and if necessary my informants translated. Additionally IDF gave<br />
me <strong>the</strong> chance to visit development projects in <strong>the</strong> area and provided an insight into <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
work in general. Besides that I was able to use <strong>the</strong> contacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> host-family to visit o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
NGOs as well as governmental development organisations. Through <strong>the</strong>se contacts my sample<br />
was largely influenced: finding people for interviews presupposes that <strong>the</strong> researcher<br />
knows somebody who knows someone and so on. <strong>The</strong> fact that I had, by accident, wonderful<br />
informants differing in age and position, provided me with contact to a broad variety <strong>of</strong> interviewees.<br />
To realise <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>oretical sampling” (Strauss 1994) to a certain extent was<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore easy, as I was still able to express preferences about whom I would like to meet besides<br />
<strong>the</strong> contacts I got through <strong>the</strong> family contact in general 22 . During <strong>the</strong> first time I spent in<br />
Rangamati I talked to several members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional elite, teachers, people working in<br />
government jobs and international organisations, employees <strong>of</strong> several NGOs and <strong>the</strong>ir members,<br />
former insurgents, unemployed people, villagers and several members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political<br />
elite. During <strong>the</strong> second term at Rangamati I visited additionally <strong>the</strong> Tribal Cultural Institute<br />
and some o<strong>the</strong>r villages; fur<strong>the</strong>rmore I intensified some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former contacts. <strong>The</strong> sample<br />
consisted exclusively <strong>of</strong> Chakma apart from contacts I had to a few Bengalis. This is indeed<br />
not a representative sample for investigating an area in which 13 different indigenous groups<br />
are living, besides many Hindu and Muslim Bengalis and smaller non-indigenous and non-<br />
Bengali groups 23 . But <strong>the</strong> limitedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> time-frame as well as <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> indigenous<br />
21 My experiences in Bandarban will be described later. <strong>The</strong> two cases are kept apart as <strong>the</strong> experiences are quite<br />
different<br />
22 It was impossible <strong>of</strong> course to reach a certain saturation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sample<br />
23 <strong>The</strong> Barua mentioned in Chapter 6
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
population <strong>of</strong> Rangamati is predominantly Chakma 24 turned out to be a structural constraint.<br />
Contacts to Bengalis were even more difficult as in this conflict-ridden area ethnic<br />
segregation is well practised. Having once access to <strong>the</strong> Chakma circle, I recognised it as extremely<br />
difficult to establish any connection to Bengali inhabitants, except formal contacts to<br />
shopkeepers for instance.<br />
2.1. Applied Methods - Expectations and Reality<br />
According to Lentz (1992, 320f) qualitative methods are appropriate when <strong>the</strong> researcher does<br />
not have much knowledge about <strong>the</strong> field. <strong>The</strong> close relationship to my host-family was a<br />
good basis for concentrating on participant observation (Bernard 1995, 136ff). Especially during<br />
<strong>the</strong> first days I was very curious about everything that I observed, that was different from<br />
my own or <strong>the</strong> Bengali society. Every detail had to be considered as being important (Bernard<br />
1995, 147). Besides participant observation I made interviews which turned out to be quite<br />
different from what I expected. As my research topic is a very sensitive one, a lot <strong>of</strong> distrust<br />
and reluctance hampered collecting <strong>the</strong> data. Using a recorder while interviewing was impossible<br />
and formal interview-situations turned out to be counter-productive. Whenever a<br />
“classical interview-situation” 25 appeared, <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gained information was reduced<br />
to a non-satisfying level. I got <strong>the</strong> impression that people became suspicious whenever <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were reminded that I am not just a visitor but a researcher. Informal interviews, talks, conversations<br />
while having a drink and sitting toge<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand were very informative. In<br />
<strong>the</strong>se situations people sometimes chatted among <strong>the</strong>mselves, from time to time somebody<br />
summarised <strong>the</strong> conversation for me. Whenever I had any questions I could address <strong>the</strong>se<br />
openly. In some situations I became aware that people took me for a donor or some representative<br />
and started to complain about <strong>the</strong>ir disadvantaged situation as a minority, which is <strong>of</strong><br />
course quite important but limited my possibilities in investigating issues related to every-day<br />
life. When I got an audience from Shantu Larma for example my informant in advance and<br />
Shantu himself during <strong>the</strong> talk asked me directly to do something for <strong>the</strong> CHT and support <strong>the</strong><br />
24 Although eight different groups are scattered throughout Rangamati district (Ullah 1995, 99), most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are<br />
living in remote villages which I could not reach during <strong>the</strong> short time I had. <strong>The</strong> Bengali population is approximately<br />
50%<br />
25 <strong>The</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> a researcher addressing serious questions to an interviewee
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord <strong>of</strong>ficially. I was merely put into an advocacy-role<br />
(Lachenmann 1995, 6), although I always emphasised that I am not an influential person.<br />
<strong>The</strong> close relationship to my informants and interviewees turned out to be more problematic<br />
than expected. As Levi-Strauss (1978, 378) notes, a researcher has two possibilities: to represent<br />
<strong>the</strong> values <strong>of</strong> one’s own group or to submit oneself totally to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs, which implies<br />
loss <strong>of</strong> objectivity. In my case it was merely a question <strong>of</strong> sympathy for ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
or Bangladesh and <strong>the</strong> Bengalis. Sometimes I found myself in <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> judging too fast<br />
without considering my situation as a researcher, who is asked to have a merely neutral position<br />
(Lachenmann 1995, 6). Statements like “<strong>the</strong>se Bengalis are all <strong>the</strong> same” whenever <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was reason to complain influenced me so, that I had some problems to force myself to take a<br />
neutral position again. Being encapsulated in <strong>the</strong> field I recognised from time to time as being<br />
an enormous emotional burden. <strong>The</strong> destiny <strong>of</strong> some people I was confronted with in <strong>the</strong> context<br />
<strong>of</strong> 25 years’ armed conflict was sometimes hard to bear. <strong>The</strong> good understanding and<br />
warm kindness I experienced during my field work 26 , whilst limiting my objectivity enormously<br />
sometimes, gave me at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> possibility to get very attached to <strong>the</strong> field, a<br />
necessity for good participant observation.<br />
2.2. <strong>The</strong> Necessity <strong>of</strong> Somebody Who Takes Care<br />
After <strong>the</strong> first week in Rangamati I spent a fur<strong>the</strong>r one organised by IDF in Bandarban. <strong>The</strong><br />
research situation was quite different as it was only possible to find accommodation in a hotel.<br />
<strong>The</strong> field access was even more difficult because I did not get an informant with <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary ability to communicate in English. This was <strong>the</strong> first time I realised <strong>the</strong> language<br />
problem mentioned by Bernard (1995, 145f), which hampered <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> gaining information<br />
immensely and produced a lot <strong>of</strong> misunderstandings 27 . Making appointments for instance<br />
was difficult for myself as I had not enough knowledge to find <strong>the</strong> people, finding someone’s<br />
house was already complicated enough 28 .To overcome <strong>the</strong> distance to <strong>the</strong> field, I recognised<br />
<strong>the</strong> opportunity to try new methods like formal and expert interviews. Additionally I could<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>it from having different informants which opened new fields and situations. This mix <strong>of</strong><br />
26 Without <strong>the</strong> Bengali habit <strong>of</strong> staring at me wherever I appeared, which got on my nerves quite a lot sometimes<br />
when in Bengali dominated areas. A habit which influenced my sympathy immensely, when I recognised <strong>the</strong> shy<br />
behaviour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People in observing me. Even in <strong>the</strong> villages people came, as if by accident, to have a look<br />
at me from a safe distance<br />
27 In Bandarban I got <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong>re is a visible difference in <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> education in comparison to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Chakma (examined in Chapter 5). Communication was even harder as <strong>the</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> groups is broader and<br />
with this <strong>the</strong> languages<br />
28 As <strong>the</strong>re are no street-names and numbers
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
different methods and changed perspectives, which are known as triangulation in <strong>the</strong><br />
qualitative research methodology (Flick 1995, 250), was an important component <strong>of</strong> my research<br />
process. Besides difficulties concerning <strong>the</strong> field-entry <strong>the</strong> police <strong>of</strong> Bandarban became<br />
suspicious about my work. <strong>The</strong>y realised that I am not just a tourist I had to visit <strong>the</strong> police<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice regularly to report about my activities. Having only a few references to justify my stay<br />
in Bandarban, no direct contact to anyone who could defend me, <strong>the</strong> situation turned to be<br />
problematic and caused an earlier departure than had been planned. Again, that problem <strong>of</strong><br />
being thought a spy must be considered as a danger <strong>of</strong> certain field work in general (Bernard<br />
1995, 144). It would have been helpful to have an <strong>of</strong>ficial research permit.<br />
Altoge<strong>the</strong>r I interviewed some members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional elite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bandarban Marma circle,<br />
employees <strong>of</strong> various developmental organisations from different departments 29 , activists<br />
in <strong>the</strong> JSS <strong>of</strong>fice in Bandarban and <strong>the</strong> political elite, some intellectuals <strong>of</strong> various occupations,<br />
members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> credit programmes <strong>of</strong> IDF, employees and students <strong>of</strong> a residential<br />
school and “normal” families. <strong>The</strong> interviewees were mainly Marma, a few Tripura and<br />
Murong as well as Bengalis. Although my sample and <strong>the</strong> information I got satisfied me afterwards,<br />
<strong>the</strong> feeling <strong>of</strong> not getting “real access” to <strong>the</strong> field was <strong>the</strong>re during my stay in<br />
Bandarban. Without being in close touch with someone, fieldwork can turn out to be problematic.<br />
3. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts and <strong>the</strong> Nation-State<br />
“To understand <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts it is essential to have some knowledge<br />
about <strong>the</strong> history”, said an informant before he started to explain <strong>the</strong> historical<br />
development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict between <strong>the</strong> Hill People and Bangladesh. For my research purposes,<br />
<strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ethnic segregation and <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong><br />
identity, investigating history and development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation-state is particularly essential.<br />
In this chapter I will roughly describe some major changes in <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> British colonialisation<br />
and <strong>the</strong> massive ones during <strong>the</strong> Pakistan period, in which <strong>the</strong> patterns <strong>of</strong> life changed<br />
totally especially with <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation state and <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai<br />
dam 30 . After Bangladesh became independent in 1972, <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh nationalist movement<br />
created rising insurgency, which lasted until December 1997. A peace treaty between <strong>the</strong><br />
29 For example an agriculturist, a health worker and co-ordinators <strong>of</strong> credit programmes<br />
30 As an very important issue <strong>the</strong> Kaptai Dam will not just be <strong>of</strong> interest here but in Chapter 4.1 as well.
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
Bangladesh government and <strong>the</strong> Paratya Chattrogram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS), <strong>the</strong> political<br />
front <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts people, was signed.<br />
3.1. British Colonialism and <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Period<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is no literature about <strong>the</strong> CHT before <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> British colonial power to be<br />
found. As in many societies with limited access to writing and reading, knowledge about <strong>the</strong><br />
past is based on oral history. <strong>The</strong> first person who wrote about <strong>the</strong> CHT was Francis Buchanan,<br />
who travelled Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Bengal in 1798 in search <strong>of</strong> places for <strong>the</strong> cultivation <strong>of</strong><br />
spices (van Schendel 1992). Later <strong>the</strong> British administrators Hutchinson (1906) and Lewin<br />
(1869) published <strong>the</strong> first quasi-ethnologic studies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area 31 . <strong>The</strong>y pointed out that <strong>the</strong> administration,<br />
<strong>the</strong> social structure and political system were <strong>of</strong> a typical tribal character in a<br />
clan-order.<br />
“In <strong>the</strong> hills <strong>the</strong> different peoples were basically self-governing small entities without highly<br />
formalised political systems, whereas <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> plain were always subject to an external<br />
power”. (Bangladesh Group Nederland: Roy 1995, 50)<br />
British Colonialism:<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts were ceded to <strong>the</strong> British East India Company by Nawab Mir Qasim<br />
Ali Khan, who was <strong>the</strong> semi-independent governor under <strong>the</strong> Moghals in 1760. Until<br />
1900 <strong>the</strong> main objectives by which <strong>the</strong> British policy was guided were <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
own political, economic and military interests as well as keeping <strong>the</strong> Hill People segregated<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Bengalis (Mohsin 1997, 26). In 1860 <strong>the</strong> area was separated from <strong>the</strong> district <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong<br />
and became <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts as it remained until today. But <strong>the</strong> British<br />
colonialists did not establish any administrative structure worth mentioning, as <strong>the</strong> contacts<br />
were limited to <strong>the</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> taxes (Shelley 1992, 28). <strong>The</strong>ir policies included <strong>the</strong> legal and<br />
judicial system was being simplified so far that <strong>the</strong> Hill People could retain <strong>the</strong>ir traditional<br />
norms and institutions (Ahsan 1989, 962).<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900, <strong>the</strong> district <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT was divided<br />
into three circles under supervision <strong>of</strong> a deputy commissioner. Following <strong>the</strong> traditional struc-<br />
31 In <strong>the</strong> Tribal Cultural Institute <strong>of</strong> Rangamati and Bandarban I was able to have a look into <strong>the</strong>se publications.<br />
Unfortunately I could not go into it more deeply because <strong>of</strong> a lack <strong>of</strong> copy-machines and time
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
tures <strong>the</strong>se were <strong>the</strong> Chakma, Mong and Bohmong 32 , each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m placed under <strong>the</strong><br />
jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> a tribal chief who collected revenues 33 and managed internal affairs. According<br />
to <strong>the</strong>se circles subdivisional <strong>of</strong>ficers were responsible to <strong>the</strong> deputy commissioner. <strong>The</strong> circles<br />
were subdivided into mouza and para (Ahsan 1090, 962). <strong>The</strong> mouza, ruled by a<br />
headman, is itself subdivided into paras where karbaris 34 represent <strong>the</strong> chief in all social affairs.<br />
<strong>The</strong> following act, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts (Amendment) Regulation <strong>of</strong> 1920<br />
declared <strong>the</strong> CHT to be a so-called excluded area. Besides <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> British safeguarded<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir financial and administrative interests, <strong>the</strong> exclusive status provided special rights and<br />
privileges for <strong>the</strong> tribals living in <strong>the</strong> CHT, especially related to land and settlement. <strong>The</strong> Hill<br />
People had a self-governmenting system to a considerably large extent. (Shelley 1992, 28;<br />
D’Souza 1995, 161; Löffler 1968).<br />
With <strong>the</strong> partition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indian subcontinent, <strong>the</strong> Hill People were caught in a difficult situation.<br />
<strong>The</strong> question to which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new created states <strong>the</strong> CHT would belong affected all Hill<br />
People equally, but <strong>the</strong>ir interests were not represented properly. <strong>The</strong> elite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different<br />
groups was not united itself: <strong>the</strong> Chakma elite was mainly in favour <strong>of</strong> union with India, while<br />
<strong>the</strong> Marma supported Burma (Mey 1988, 40). This explains <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Chakma hoisted<br />
<strong>the</strong> Indian flag at Rangamati, <strong>the</strong> Marma <strong>the</strong> Burmese flag in Bandarban before <strong>the</strong> CHT became<br />
a part <strong>of</strong> Pakistan on <strong>the</strong> 16 th August 1946, as a part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong division, a<br />
decision guided by mainly administrative and strategic reasons: <strong>the</strong> CHT were exchanged for<br />
Ferozepur in India, where trouble among <strong>the</strong> local Sikhs was expected if Ferozepur were to<br />
allotted to Pakistan (Mey 1988, 40).<br />
Pakistan Period:<br />
<strong>The</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Government and <strong>the</strong> CHT remained difficult during <strong>the</strong><br />
whole Pakistan period. Contemporarily with <strong>the</strong> first Pakistani constitution in 1956 <strong>the</strong> Regulation<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1900 and <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> an excluded area was retained and <strong>the</strong> Hill People were given<br />
<strong>the</strong> right to vote, which had stabilising consequences on <strong>the</strong> CHT situation. However <strong>the</strong> regime<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ayub Khan changed <strong>the</strong> administrative status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT in 1962 from an “excluded<br />
32 <strong>The</strong> Mong and Bohmong are two different groups which both belong to <strong>the</strong> Marma group. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m is<br />
concentrated in <strong>the</strong> north mainly in Kagrachari, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r one that is <strong>the</strong> Mong have <strong>the</strong>ir residence in Bandarban<br />
as already stated in Chapter 1.2.<br />
33 Among <strong>the</strong>se taxes <strong>the</strong> jhum tax was <strong>the</strong> most important but also most troublesome. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
were attached to jhumming and <strong>the</strong>refore putting taxes on jhum was one pr<strong>of</strong>itable way <strong>of</strong> making money. Ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
reason for <strong>the</strong> tax was that jhum, as a traditional mode <strong>of</strong> cultivation, was regarded to be backward. <strong>The</strong> tax<br />
was <strong>the</strong>refore additionally one way <strong>of</strong> forcing <strong>the</strong> Hill People to take up modernised methods <strong>of</strong> cultivation<br />
34 Karbari is <strong>the</strong> headman <strong>of</strong> a village (para). A unit <strong>of</strong> villages is called mouza
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
area” to a “tribal area” 35 . Although <strong>the</strong> special status was abolished by a constitutional<br />
amendment in 1962, <strong>the</strong> Regulation <strong>of</strong> 1900 was kept operative and <strong>the</strong> Hill People still enjoyed<br />
some privileges. At this time <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> nation was used to consolidate Pakistani<br />
dominance over East Bengal, including <strong>the</strong> CHT (Mohsin 1997, 45ff). Alongside administrative<br />
and legal changes, Pakistan undertook some measures for economic development and <strong>the</strong><br />
utilisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two major natural resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area, forestry and hydroelectricity. <strong>The</strong><br />
consequence was that a paper mill was established in 1950 and <strong>the</strong> Karnaphuli Multipurpose<br />
Project, beginning in 1957, resulted in <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a dam which crossed <strong>the</strong> Karnaphuli<br />
river. <strong>The</strong> project was finished in 1963, established by <strong>the</strong> Pakistani government and<br />
financed by USAID (Shelley, 1992, 31). Like many o<strong>the</strong>r comparable development projects,<br />
none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> projects planners took into account how immense <strong>the</strong> impact on <strong>the</strong> inhabitants’<br />
project area would be 36 . <strong>The</strong> tribal interests have not been recognised at all. <strong>The</strong> dam built<br />
over <strong>the</strong> Karnaphuli next to Kaptai is about 666 metres long and 43 metres high. <strong>The</strong> product<br />
is an artificial lake which covers an area <strong>of</strong> about 655 sq. km 37 and has swallowed about 125<br />
moujas, including <strong>the</strong> major portion <strong>of</strong> Rangamati town (Ullah, 1995, 1). About 100,000 people<br />
were affected by <strong>the</strong> flooding. Although <strong>the</strong> compensation for homes and o<strong>the</strong>r belongings<br />
as well as <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong> farmland that got lost was promised by <strong>the</strong> government, reports<br />
show that this has never happened. <strong>The</strong> result was that about 40,000 Chakmas crossed <strong>the</strong><br />
border to India as refugees (Ullah, 1995, 21). As 40% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best cultivable land was flooded,<br />
<strong>the</strong> land given to <strong>the</strong> families by rehabilitation programmes was not sufficient for proper cultivation.<br />
About 1,500 families were completely left out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> scheme. Altoge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />
government only compensated one third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flooded land (Mohsin, 1997, 114).<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Karnaphuli power project was regarded as revolutionising Bangladesh’s industrialisation,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People could not really benefit from it. 38 During my stay in <strong>the</strong> CHT, I<br />
got <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> Karnaphuli Hydroelectric Project is <strong>the</strong> causal factor for most <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> problems in <strong>the</strong> area. Not only did an immense change <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional patterns <strong>of</strong> life<br />
derive from it, including land problems 39 but also difficulties with <strong>the</strong> relationship to <strong>the</strong> ruling<br />
state in general 40 . Already at that time some ingenious students started to develop a<br />
35 <strong>The</strong> consequence was that <strong>the</strong> area remained distinctive but not excluded any longer<br />
36 A controversially discussed example which is presently discussed is <strong>the</strong> Narmada dam in India, by which<br />
approximately 4 Million people are affected (Chatterjee 1999)<br />
37 Regarding <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lake <strong>the</strong> data differ. Shelley (1992, 31) for example states that <strong>the</strong> submerged area is<br />
about 1036 kilometres. Unlike as in o<strong>the</strong>r cases (see Chapter 4.1), no political intention for <strong>the</strong> differing estimations<br />
can be seen. <strong>The</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> literature is uniform regarding <strong>the</strong> estimation <strong>of</strong> 40% <strong>of</strong> best cultivable land<br />
which was swallowed leads me to <strong>the</strong> assumption that <strong>the</strong> differences here are not <strong>of</strong> great importance.<br />
38 <strong>The</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> economic consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai Hydroelectric Project will be discussed in Chapter 4.<br />
39 In Chapter 4.1 <strong>the</strong> land issue will be analysed broadly<br />
40 See Chapter 3.2
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
political campaign against <strong>the</strong> government and represented “a new wave <strong>of</strong> Chakma and<br />
Marma political identity and consciousness” (Ahmed 1993, 39). <strong>The</strong> first conversation I had<br />
with a Chakma when I came to Rangamati ended after five minutes with <strong>the</strong> following statement:<br />
“This dam has caused all our problems we have here in <strong>the</strong> CHT”. Later he explained to<br />
me: “<strong>The</strong>y could give <strong>the</strong> tribals free access to electricity or fishery after this dammed lake<br />
has taken all our land, but it had just one intention: to destroy tribals’ life”.<br />
3.2. Bangladesh Becomes Independent<br />
In 1971 Bangladesh became independent after nine months <strong>of</strong> war. <strong>The</strong> Liberation War arose<br />
from an effort to free Bengal from <strong>the</strong> hegemonic system <strong>of</strong> Pakistan, which defines itself by<br />
religion. <strong>The</strong> ethnocentric political programme was guided by <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “pureness” 41 <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Islam which included <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> Urdu being <strong>the</strong> Islamic language 42 . <strong>The</strong> Bengalis were<br />
considered to be a lower Hindu caste although <strong>the</strong>y had actively supported <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> a Muslim<br />
Pakistani state 43 . <strong>The</strong> Pakistani hegemony <strong>the</strong>n led <strong>the</strong> Bengalis to assert <strong>the</strong>ir separate<br />
identity, which was now based on distinction through language and culture, instead <strong>of</strong> religion.<br />
Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exclusion from Pakistani Islamic nationalism a new form <strong>of</strong> nationalism<br />
guided by culture and language arose which became <strong>the</strong> guiding paradigm for <strong>the</strong> independent<br />
Bangladesh.<br />
3.2.1. Politics <strong>of</strong> Nationalism<br />
<strong>The</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi state is determined by two distinct forms <strong>of</strong> nationalism,<br />
namely <strong>the</strong> Bengali and <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi variant. <strong>The</strong> first one was developed and practised<br />
under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who guided <strong>the</strong> independent movement and became <strong>the</strong> first<br />
political leader <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh. It comprises two dimensions, <strong>the</strong> cultural and <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
one. <strong>The</strong> cultural dimension is particularly determined by <strong>the</strong> language movement 44 and secularism,<br />
both developed in <strong>the</strong> attempt to demarcate itself from West Pakistan, where Urdu as<br />
state-language and Islam as state-religion were considered as determining features <strong>of</strong> national-<br />
41 “pak” means pure, “stan” means land (Mohsin 1997, 38)<br />
42 Urdu is written in a Arabic Persian script, while Bengali was sanskritised by <strong>the</strong> Hindu elites during colonialisation<br />
(Mohsin 1996, 35)<br />
43 After <strong>the</strong> Muslim population <strong>of</strong> Bengal had been dominated by a Hindu aristocracy created by <strong>the</strong> British<br />
colonial policy Hindu as well as Muslim identity which arose after <strong>the</strong> pre-colonial syncretism (Mohsin 1996,<br />
74)<br />
44 Bangladesh literally translated means “<strong>the</strong> land <strong>of</strong> Bangla speaking people” (Mohsin 1997, 54)
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
ism. <strong>The</strong> Bengali nationalism was indeed specific about its territorial boundaries 45 <strong>of</strong> East-<br />
Bengal. This concept <strong>of</strong> Bengali nationalism thus was defined as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state principles in<br />
Article 9: “ <strong>The</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language and<br />
culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined<br />
struggle in <strong>the</strong> war <strong>of</strong> independence, shall be <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> Bengali nationalism” (cited in:<br />
Mohsin, 1997, 60). Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore <strong>the</strong> ideology was based on a centralist idea <strong>of</strong> state under<br />
non-capitalist objectives, marked by <strong>the</strong> total integration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual within <strong>the</strong> community<br />
(Jahangir 1986, 33). Bangladesh with its uni-cultural, ethnocentristic nationalism<br />
developed <strong>the</strong> same kind <strong>of</strong> hegemony <strong>the</strong> population <strong>of</strong> East Bengal had to suffer during <strong>the</strong><br />
Pakistan period.<br />
When Sheikh Mujib was assassinated in 1975, <strong>the</strong> BNP with General Ziaur Rahman took over<br />
<strong>the</strong> political leadership. <strong>The</strong>ir concept <strong>of</strong> Bangladeshi nationalism, distinct from <strong>the</strong> Bengali<br />
variant, was determined mainly by religion 46 . This trend arose already increasingly after Mujib’s<br />
secularism. Territoriality became more determining in drawing a line between East and<br />
West Bengal in India and gave <strong>the</strong> state a new totality (Mohsin 1996, 47ff ). As a consequence<br />
this turn towards religion and territoriality had some substantial changes on different<br />
levels. Islamiat was introduced in <strong>the</strong> education system and fur<strong>the</strong>rmore administrative policies<br />
and mass media were induced by religious rituals. Additionally <strong>the</strong> Constitution was<br />
changed, <strong>the</strong> word “secularism” replaced by “absolute trust and faith in <strong>the</strong> Almighty Allah”<br />
(Jahangir 1986, 79f). Bangladesh’s policy became Islamised and as a consequence <strong>the</strong> citizens<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bangladesh were defined as Muslims as one unit against non-Muslims.<br />
Under General H.M. Ershad from 1982 onwards Bangladeshi nationalism moved towards<br />
Islamic nationalism. <strong>The</strong> model <strong>of</strong> nationhood became even more rigid and totalitarian in its<br />
Islamic orientation. He “raised <strong>the</strong> slogan <strong>of</strong> building a mosque-centred society” 47 and introduced<br />
Islam as <strong>the</strong> state religion through an amendment to <strong>the</strong> Constitution (Mohsin 1996,<br />
52).<br />
3.2.2. A Question <strong>of</strong> Identity – Bangladesh and <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
45 What is reflected by “Amar Sonar Bangla Ami Tomae Bhalobashi” (O my golden Bengal, I love <strong>the</strong>e) <strong>the</strong><br />
highly patriotic song written by Rabindranath Tagore as <strong>the</strong> national an<strong>the</strong>m.<br />
46 <strong>The</strong> BNP defined Bangladesh nationalism as follows: “Religious belief and love for religion are a great and<br />
imperishable characteristic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi nation ... <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> out people are followers <strong>of</strong> Islam.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fact is well reflected and manifest in out stable and liberal national life” (Mohsin 1996, 49)<br />
47 <strong>The</strong> issue mosque-centredness and its meaning for <strong>the</strong> Hill People will be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 6.3.
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
<strong>The</strong> Hill People and <strong>the</strong> CHT played a controversial role in <strong>the</strong> War <strong>of</strong> Independence.<br />
<strong>The</strong> former Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy co-operated with Pakistan, but at <strong>the</strong> same time many<br />
Hill People joined <strong>the</strong> war in favour <strong>of</strong> independence. Never<strong>the</strong>less many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m had to face<br />
discrimination by <strong>the</strong> Bengalis 48<br />
(Mohsin 1996, 38). Immediately afterwards, some indigenous<br />
people were accused <strong>of</strong> being collaborators and killed. Violence against <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
continued for months. <strong>The</strong> excuse given by Sheikh Mujib, that such incidents are natural after<br />
a war 49 was not accepted at all by <strong>the</strong> Hill People. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m set up an administrative system<br />
for <strong>the</strong> villages and resisted <strong>the</strong> Bengalis 50 (Mohsin 1996, 39). <strong>The</strong> Hill People did not<br />
just demonstrate <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GOB to protect <strong>the</strong>ir rights but, more important, this was<br />
<strong>the</strong> first manifestation <strong>of</strong> group formation processes among <strong>the</strong> Hill People in order to “protect”<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves from Bengalis.<br />
Some Hill People’s representatives met Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to demand four basic arrangements<br />
for <strong>the</strong> CHT, under <strong>the</strong> leadership <strong>of</strong> Manabendra Narayan Larma 51 . <strong>The</strong>se<br />
included four points:<br />
(1) autonomy for <strong>the</strong> CHT including its own legislature<br />
(2) retention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1900 manual in <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh<br />
(3) continuation <strong>of</strong> tribal chiefs’ <strong>of</strong>fices<br />
(4) a constitutional provision restricting <strong>the</strong> amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1900 Regulation and imposing<br />
a ban on <strong>the</strong> influx <strong>of</strong> non-tribals (Ahsan, 1989, 967)<br />
Sheikh Mujib advised <strong>the</strong>m to get rid <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir tribal identities and merge with “Bengali” nationalism.<br />
As no special provision for <strong>the</strong> CHT was made in <strong>the</strong> 1972 constitution, M.N.<br />
Larma formed <strong>the</strong> Parbattaya Chattragam Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS/JSS) as an oppositional<br />
political platform for <strong>the</strong> Hill People. Never<strong>the</strong>less in a pre-election meeting in<br />
Rangamati, Sheikh Mujib maintained that all tribal people are Bengalis and nothing else. According<br />
to <strong>the</strong> political programme <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> AL and Sheikh Mujib in particular distinct identities<br />
could not be accepted. In his view nationalism based on secularism should include <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
People and any differences were denied. <strong>The</strong> demand to merge with Bengali nationalism was<br />
48 Mohsin emp hasises here that many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People could not join <strong>the</strong> forces because <strong>the</strong>ir ideological background<br />
did not fit in with those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Awami League which was responsible for recruiting <strong>the</strong> soldiers. Some<br />
Hill People came back from <strong>the</strong> training camps because <strong>of</strong> discrimination<br />
49 Stated by Charoo Bikash Chakma, who was <strong>the</strong> leader <strong>of</strong> a delegation which met Sheikh Mujib on 29 January<br />
1972 to appraise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation cited in Mohsin (1996, 39)<br />
50 <strong>The</strong> local youth recovered arms left behind by <strong>the</strong> Pakistan army in <strong>the</strong> jungles. <strong>The</strong>y were called Shanti Bahini,<br />
and can be seen as <strong>the</strong> early beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> armed wing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS<br />
51 M.N. Larma was at that time member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi parliament and functioned, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, as a political<br />
leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People and formed <strong>the</strong> JSS. He was assassinated on 10 November 1983 by supporters <strong>of</strong> an<br />
opposing political group <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People. His younger bro<strong>the</strong>r, Shantu Larma took over his function and is <strong>the</strong><br />
present leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS and Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHTRC
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
not seen as a force but as an invitation, <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> Hill People should be grateful 52 . <strong>The</strong> Hill<br />
People already had to face discrimination by Bengalis and <strong>the</strong>ir relationship to <strong>the</strong> ruling state<br />
was due to <strong>the</strong> Kaptai dam, wholly determined by suspicion and doubt. Under <strong>the</strong> leadership<br />
<strong>of</strong> M.N. Larma <strong>the</strong> representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s community expressed <strong>the</strong>ir dissatisfaction<br />
with <strong>the</strong> state policies <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh. As a member <strong>of</strong> parliament M.N. Larma was able<br />
to articulate <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s interests directly, but instead he experienced paternalistic rejection<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se. <strong>The</strong> debate between M.N. Larma and his supporters on <strong>the</strong> one hand and Sheikh<br />
Mujib on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand has given rise to <strong>the</strong> conflict between <strong>the</strong> two groups. <strong>The</strong> nature <strong>of</strong><br />
Bengali nationalism with its ethnocentric and hegemonic outcome was categorically rejected<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Hill People. Bad experiences and <strong>the</strong> fear <strong>of</strong> becoming submerged under <strong>the</strong> majority<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bengalis has led to <strong>the</strong>ir being conscious <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir distinctiveness. <strong>The</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> any minority<br />
rights in <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> Bill declaring Bangladesh as a uni-cultural and unilingual<br />
nation-state has created a feeling <strong>of</strong> being oppressed by <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People.<br />
M.N. Larma asserted in <strong>the</strong> Parliament: “Our main worry is that our culture is threatened<br />
with extinction ... we want to live with our separate identity” (Mohsin 1996, 44). <strong>The</strong> emphasis<br />
on a separate identity in this context expresses <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> cultural habits in <strong>the</strong><br />
process <strong>of</strong> identity construction, but at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong>ir importance is ultimately developed<br />
in a process <strong>of</strong> becoming conscious <strong>of</strong> it. <strong>The</strong> differentiation <strong>of</strong> groups itself is not <strong>the</strong> cause<br />
<strong>of</strong> conflict. Differences and cultural peculiarities become apparent when pressure and threat<br />
from outside or <strong>the</strong> dominant group within a nation-state necessitates inclusion for defence.<br />
(Kößler 1995, 4). With <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation-state <strong>the</strong> Hill People started to develop<br />
a unified identity as all groups were equally affected by <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali hegemony 53 .<br />
<strong>The</strong> government reacted to <strong>the</strong> appealing group-consciousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People by dividing<br />
<strong>the</strong> CHT into <strong>the</strong> three districts: Rangamati, Bandarban and Kagrachari 54 . <strong>The</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> this<br />
measure was, as a Chakma expressed it in an interview, to cleave <strong>the</strong> Hill People and reduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> collective resistance.<br />
General Zia’s Bangladeshi nationalism, which emphasised religion as <strong>the</strong> central feature <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi society, besides culture and language, alienated <strong>the</strong> Hill People fur<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Changes towards an Islamic orientation in mass media, education, administration and <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution affected <strong>the</strong> Hill People even more directly. <strong>The</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> religion on every-day<br />
52 In his speech at Rangamati in 1973 Sheikh Mujib stated: “From this day onward <strong>the</strong> tribals are being promoted<br />
into Bengalis” (Mohsin 1996, 74)<br />
53 While <strong>the</strong> Kaptai Dam had mainly touched <strong>the</strong> Chakma and some groups, but some not at all<br />
54 In March 1989 <strong>the</strong> parliament passed several Bills which enabled <strong>the</strong> government to transform <strong>the</strong> administrative<br />
system with <strong>the</strong> resulting partition into <strong>the</strong> three districts (Mahmud Ali 1993, 162)
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
life expressed in symbols and rituals confronted <strong>the</strong> Hill People massively with <strong>the</strong><br />
feeling <strong>of</strong> being different 55 .<br />
Recognising <strong>the</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s demands by Zia and <strong>the</strong> BNP M.N. Larma<br />
started acting in <strong>the</strong> underground and formed <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini as <strong>the</strong> armed wing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS<br />
to enforce <strong>the</strong> demands <strong>of</strong> JSS in an armed struggle. Later he crossed over to India and started<br />
to launch massive guerrilla action against <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh authorities 56 (Ahmed 1993, 45).<br />
Training camps were established in India, fighters were recruited from <strong>the</strong> refugee camps and<br />
only a few years later <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini constituted a military and political threat for Bangladesh.<br />
<strong>The</strong> GOB reacted by militarising <strong>the</strong> area 57 . At <strong>the</strong> same time Zia tried to win over <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill People by drawing special attention to development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT 58 and developed a settlement<br />
programme for landless Bengalis who should be rehabilitated in <strong>the</strong> CHT 59 . His<br />
attempts were regarded as forced assimilation by using strategies <strong>of</strong> oppression. <strong>The</strong> settlement<br />
programme, although guided by pragmatic and humane intentions, established a<br />
demographic shift 60 in <strong>the</strong> area. <strong>The</strong> aim was to put <strong>the</strong> Hill People regionally into a minority<br />
position to reduce <strong>the</strong> power <strong>the</strong>y gained from <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> identity - based institutions.<br />
In o<strong>the</strong>r words: <strong>the</strong> GOB tried to segregate <strong>the</strong> Hill People in order to prevent group<br />
formation on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> identity. <strong>The</strong> pressure which was put on <strong>the</strong> Hill People and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
organisations showed effects. <strong>The</strong> Hill People were forced to decide for or against <strong>the</strong> Shanti<br />
Bahini forces but whatever side <strong>the</strong>y chose <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r one put pressure on <strong>the</strong>m. As my data<br />
show <strong>the</strong> society is roughly divided along <strong>the</strong>se political lines, which are not directly compatible<br />
with those <strong>of</strong> ethnic segregation; meaning some opt for, o<strong>the</strong>rs against insurgency. But<br />
also on <strong>the</strong> organisational level processes <strong>of</strong> separation developed out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military pressure<br />
exterted. <strong>The</strong> JSS, formed on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> an ideological dispute 61 , was divided into one faction<br />
led by Preeti Kumar Chakma, one by <strong>the</strong> Larma bro<strong>the</strong>rs. As a consequence M.N. Larma<br />
was assassinated by <strong>the</strong> opposing group in 1983. His bro<strong>the</strong>r Shantu continued Manobendra<br />
Larmas work, whereas Preeti and his supporters surrendered to <strong>the</strong> GOB in response to an<br />
amnesty which was <strong>of</strong>fered by Ershad in 1985.<br />
55 <strong>The</strong>se cultural differences will be investigated in Chapter 6.<br />
56 India provided active support to <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini by allowing <strong>the</strong>m to establish bases in Tripura and supplying<br />
military logistics (Ahmed 1993, 49)<br />
57 Zia even tried to give <strong>the</strong> armed forces unlimited power by proposing <strong>the</strong> Disturbed Area Bill in 1980, but <strong>the</strong><br />
bill failed to pass (Ahsan 1989, 969)<br />
58 For that issue see Chapter 4.3<br />
59 See Chapter 4.1<br />
60 <strong>The</strong> demographic shift will be investigated in Chapter 4.1 too<br />
61 Beside questions <strong>of</strong> leadership and power <strong>the</strong> current cause for <strong>the</strong> dispute was related to <strong>the</strong> aims <strong>of</strong> insurgency<br />
action. Preeti opted for a “decisive war” in <strong>the</strong> CHT to merge with India after secession from Bangladesh<br />
while M.N. Larma pleaded for autonomy within Bangladesh
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
Within <strong>the</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> group-formation among <strong>the</strong> Hill People <strong>the</strong> JSS acted as a political<br />
platform for <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People and attempted to establish a counter-hegemony to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bengali one. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand <strong>the</strong> JSS as a Chakma dominated organisation started more<br />
and more to represent <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma community instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People in<br />
general. As a result <strong>the</strong> JSS has been rejected by o<strong>the</strong>r groups as <strong>the</strong>y considered its policies<br />
as a hegemony <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma over <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs (Ahmed 1993, 54). <strong>The</strong> Marma, Murong and<br />
Tripura became resentful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dominance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma in <strong>the</strong> JSS. which was considered a<br />
hegemony over <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. Especially <strong>the</strong> Marma opposed <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini after Chabai<br />
Mogh, a prominent Marma JSS leader, who had been imprisoned toge<strong>the</strong>r with Shantu Larma<br />
from 1976 to 1980, went back to normal life. Subsequently he was killed by <strong>the</strong> insurgents.<br />
Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marma left <strong>the</strong> movement and went back to normal life. <strong>The</strong> Murong also revolted<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Chakma-dominated JSS. Between 1983 and 1985 <strong>the</strong> Murong Bahini<br />
(Murong Force) were set up by <strong>the</strong> military to resist <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini with a strength <strong>of</strong> 1,000<br />
(Shelley 1992, 117, Mohsin 1997, 176). As a result Bandarban was almost free from insurgent<br />
actions from 1984 on and was consequently less involved in struggle between <strong>the</strong> military and<br />
insurgents, as one <strong>of</strong> my Marma informants stated: “<strong>the</strong> people in Kagrachari and Rangamati<br />
had to suffer much more <strong>the</strong>n us. Here <strong>the</strong> situation was very calm”. <strong>The</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> this development<br />
was that 98% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> insurgents were Chakma and <strong>the</strong> political movement, as Shelley<br />
(1992, 118) states, turned into one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma section. Besides <strong>the</strong> literature an expert<br />
interviewee in Dhaka told me about this issue. During my stay in <strong>the</strong> area I tried to find people<br />
to confirm this hypo<strong>the</strong>sis but all interviewees and informants asserted that <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
division <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill Peoples with regard to political interests. Never<strong>the</strong>less my data show that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are cleavages to be found 62 . One Marma insisted <strong>the</strong>re was a lack <strong>of</strong> democracy because<br />
political leadership among <strong>the</strong> Marma is missing. I would trace <strong>the</strong> reticence I have experienced<br />
back to <strong>the</strong> assumption that people do not want to harp upon internal trouble when <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are talking to a foreigner. At <strong>the</strong> same time one has to bear in mind that <strong>the</strong> internal quarrel is<br />
not necessarily a question <strong>of</strong> entire separation but is dependent on a separate situation 63 .<br />
4. Economy and Disadvantage – Land as an Essential Need<br />
“We are poor, we have no land. Our land was taken by <strong>the</strong> lake and by <strong>the</strong> Bengalis. We<br />
don’t know what to do. We had to move to <strong>the</strong>se hills here after <strong>the</strong> lake swallowed our land.<br />
But here is not enough space. We have some land at ano<strong>the</strong>r place over <strong>the</strong>re but it was captured<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Bengalis.”<br />
62 As <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r chapters 5, 6, 7 for example will show<br />
63 This will be examined broadly in Chapter 6.4.
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
I have heard statements like that several times. Land is <strong>the</strong> most substantial problem in <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT and can be regarded as <strong>the</strong> present cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict in <strong>the</strong> region. <strong>The</strong>re are at least<br />
two main reasons for <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> land-scarcity in <strong>the</strong> area. <strong>The</strong> first one was <strong>the</strong> development<br />
undertaking “Kaptai Hydroelectric Project” 64 . Only a few years later <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh<br />
government started a settlement project in <strong>the</strong> Hills to relieve <strong>the</strong> densely populated plains <strong>of</strong><br />
Bangladesh, which is regarded as <strong>the</strong> second impact on Hill People‘s lives.<br />
4.1. <strong>The</strong> Kaptai Hydroelectric Project and Its Impact on Land Issues<br />
With <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai Hydroelectric Project about 40%, that is 54,000 acres, <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> most fertile land has been covered by <strong>the</strong> lake. Of those having lost <strong>the</strong>ir land, about<br />
100,000 families fled to India (see: Roy 1995, 56; Bertocci 1989, 156; Ahsan 1989, 963). Besides<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that barely one third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lost lands were replaced, <strong>the</strong> compensation was<br />
largely paid in cash (Roy, 1995, 56). <strong>The</strong> Hill People alleged that <strong>the</strong> affected Bengalis were<br />
<strong>the</strong> first who got compensation, as <strong>the</strong> Revenue Compensation <strong>of</strong>fice was staffed with Bengalis<br />
only. Of <strong>the</strong> total sum <strong>of</strong> US $51 million, which was set aside by <strong>the</strong> government for<br />
rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> affected population, only US $2.6 million were actually distributed.<br />
(Mohsin, 1997, 104)<br />
<strong>The</strong> Chakma, who are concentrated in <strong>the</strong> area, suffered especially. For years many had already<br />
been cultivating <strong>the</strong> plains and were dependent on <strong>the</strong>ir paddy fields. This change had<br />
taken place when <strong>the</strong> Chakma raja brought Bengali cultivators into <strong>the</strong> Hill Tracts to train <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill People in methods <strong>of</strong> plain cultivation 65 (Ullah, 1995, 14). But especially those still dependent<br />
on shifting cultivation could not benefit from <strong>the</strong> rehabilitation programme at all,<br />
because most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m had no titles to land (Mohsin 1997, 103). Besides <strong>the</strong> Chakmas, using<br />
plough cultivation, were not familiar with property rights and ownership ei<strong>the</strong>r. Land has<br />
been recognised as common property 66 grounded in customary rights.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Hill People were forced to change <strong>the</strong>ir pattern <strong>of</strong> life radically. <strong>The</strong>y were used to working<br />
as agriculturists and had, due to land scarcity, to adopt horticulture 67 . Even before <strong>the</strong><br />
construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dam <strong>the</strong> available cultivable land was insufficient for <strong>the</strong> comparatively<br />
64 Already presented in Chapter 3.1<br />
65 It can be regarded as a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> jhum tax, which had been evied since <strong>the</strong> 1900 Manual to discourage<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People from continuing jhum cultivation.<br />
66 Or merely <strong>the</strong> Raja’s property, as Ahmed (1993, 47) writes: “<strong>The</strong> Chakma Rajas having no right to land, by a<br />
mere accident <strong>of</strong> local custom” treated <strong>the</strong> persons living on it as private property, thus creating “human talooks”<br />
instead <strong>of</strong> “hereditary zamindarees”, which were sold, subdivided and inherited like landed property”<br />
67 Horticulture means fruit gardening for commercial use which implies several problems like transport and storage
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
sparse population in <strong>the</strong> CHT 68 (Mohsin, 1997, 114). Some people tried to cultivate in <strong>the</strong><br />
jhum again, o<strong>the</strong>rs settled <strong>the</strong> fringe land 69 around <strong>the</strong> lake. This land is cultivable but implies<br />
a great risk, because it largely depends on <strong>the</strong> rise and fall <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lake water and is exposed to<br />
storm and drought (Ullah, 1995, 33ff). <strong>The</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> Jhum cultivation decreased as well<br />
due to scarcity <strong>of</strong> land: <strong>the</strong> jhum cycle needs ten to fifteen years to allow <strong>the</strong> fields to recover.<br />
Intensive usage reduced <strong>the</strong> circle to three to five years. <strong>The</strong> consequences are erosion <strong>of</strong> soil<br />
and a resulting decline <strong>of</strong> soil fertility. (Mohsin, 1995, 104; Mey 1988, 36)<br />
4.2. <strong>The</strong> Settlement Programme <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi Government<br />
<strong>The</strong> land problem, already acute after <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> Kaptai dam, was aggravated even<br />
more in <strong>the</strong> 1970s, when <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi government initiated a settlement programme for<br />
landless plainsmen.<br />
Bangladesh, with its agrarian economy, is substantially dependent on land. Densely populated,<br />
<strong>the</strong> country had 0.29 acres per-capita land in 1992 (Mohsin, 1997, 113). But even 0.5<br />
acres cannot be seen as sufficient for subsistence production and are <strong>the</strong> absolute minimum<br />
level for existence (Jessen 1997, 59). That brings about immense problems with providing<br />
food for <strong>the</strong> roughly 120 Million Bangladeshis 70 and regular floods make <strong>the</strong> situation even<br />
worse. In contrast, <strong>the</strong> CHT are regarded to as sparsely populated 71 , as 0.75% <strong>of</strong> Bangladeshs’<br />
population inhabits 9.2% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land (Siddique 1997, 1).<br />
In 1979 <strong>the</strong> government 72 changed Rule 34 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1900 Manual and removed <strong>the</strong> restrictions<br />
against settlements by non-residents in <strong>the</strong> CHT. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore <strong>the</strong> GOB decided to settle about<br />
30,000 Bengalis on government-owned “Khas” 73 land. Each family got five acres <strong>of</strong> land,<br />
some cash and provisions. In August 1980 ano<strong>the</strong>r settlement phase was initiated, in 1982 a<br />
68 <strong>The</strong> problems which arose after <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> Kaptai dam have already bee described. Lots <strong>of</strong> people did<br />
not get any land as compensation, or if <strong>the</strong>y got it was not equivalent to <strong>the</strong> land <strong>the</strong>y had before<br />
69 Cultivating <strong>the</strong> fringe land means that during <strong>the</strong> dry season rice seedling’s are planted and after its harvest <strong>the</strong><br />
land is filled with weeds. <strong>The</strong>se rot under water when <strong>the</strong> level goes up again and remain <strong>the</strong>re till <strong>the</strong> next rice<br />
seedlings are planted<br />
70 Meyers Taschenbuchlexikon (1995), Bd. 3, S. 29<br />
71 <strong>the</strong>re are various surveys to examine <strong>the</strong> actual capacity <strong>of</strong> land in <strong>the</strong> CHT. One example is given in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
part with <strong>the</strong> survey <strong>of</strong> an Canadian Company. Ano<strong>the</strong>r example <strong>of</strong> calculating how much available land<br />
is in <strong>the</strong> CHT gives Abedin (1997, 14). He argues that <strong>the</strong> geo-natural formation has to be analysed, and that<br />
instead <strong>of</strong> 5093 sq. miles <strong>the</strong> CHT area comprises 11.439.25 sq. miles, if geometrically measured. It has to be<br />
said that his book as a whole is written in a conservative, “pro-bengali” manner. This example shows that <strong>the</strong><br />
availability <strong>of</strong> land is discussed very controversially. Different actors use it for political purposes<br />
72 At that time under Prime Minister General Zia<br />
73 Khas land is regarded by <strong>the</strong> Hill People as common land which has been cultivated by <strong>the</strong>m for centuries<br />
(Mohsin, 1997a, 99). Officially khas land is government-owned land available for distribution to people<br />
(Rashiduzzaman 1998, 659)
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
third one. (Mohsin, 1997, 112) Altoge<strong>the</strong>r it is estimated that about 400,000 Bengalis had<br />
been settled by 1984 (<strong>The</strong> Guardian 6.3.1984 cited in: Mohsin, 1997, 113). But it seemed that<br />
nobody had taken into consideration that <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> land or conflict because <strong>of</strong> land in <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT already arose after <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai dam. Roy (1995, 57) argues by using a<br />
survey made by a Canadian company in 1964 that <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> available land in <strong>the</strong> CHT was<br />
already very critical before <strong>the</strong> dam-construction:<br />
- Only 3.2% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land in <strong>the</strong> CHT graded as class “A” (suitable for all purpose agriculture)<br />
- 2.9% was graded as class “B” (suitable for terraced agriculture and fruit gardening in part)<br />
- class “C” was about 15.5% (suitable for horticulture and partly afforestation)<br />
- class “C-D” accounted for 1.4%, which is suitable for afforestation and horticulture after<br />
terracing <strong>the</strong> slopes<br />
- 77% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land constituted class “D”, and <strong>the</strong>refore exceptionally suitable for afforestation<br />
This shows that <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land cannot be used for cultivation, except for afforestation<br />
(Roy, 1995, 57). Taking into account that according to <strong>the</strong> 1974 census about 80,000<br />
to 100,000 families had to share 270,000 acres <strong>of</strong> suitable land, that is class A, B and half <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> land classified C and C-D which could be used for cultivation. Consequently each family<br />
could have between approximately 3.7 and 4.63 acres, while <strong>the</strong> government-assessed minimum<br />
is 5 acres. (Roy, 1995, 59)<br />
<strong>The</strong> resettlement projects were carried out without informing <strong>the</strong> rajas and mouza headmen,<br />
although according to <strong>the</strong> CHT Manual <strong>the</strong>y should have been involved in <strong>the</strong> decision process.<br />
<strong>The</strong> regulations as well as o<strong>the</strong>r traditional rights, conventions and practices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
People were <strong>the</strong>refore largely violated. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> settlers did not get adequate land and a<br />
large number <strong>of</strong> encroachments took place. Settlers grabbed land violently and many thousands<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People were uprooted and pushed into <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries for a<br />
second time (Roy, 1995, 60). Many Hill People who actually possessed land somewhere have<br />
no chance to get it back because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> militant behaviour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> settlers who had captured it<br />
in <strong>the</strong> meantime. Several interviewees reported having been affected by <strong>the</strong>se processes. During<br />
<strong>the</strong> days I spent in <strong>the</strong> Hill Tracts two Hill People were killed in such a dispute 74 .<br />
<strong>The</strong>se disputes highlighted <strong>the</strong> conflict between <strong>the</strong> Hill People and GOB. <strong>The</strong> settlement<br />
programmes could not be carried out without heavy militarisation, since Shanti Bahini violently<br />
opposed <strong>the</strong>se. <strong>The</strong> military worked toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> settlers. On <strong>the</strong> one hand <strong>the</strong><br />
military gave <strong>the</strong>m enough power to encroach on <strong>the</strong> lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People by equipping
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>m with government-provided arms, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand <strong>the</strong>y were used as “human shields”<br />
in battles with Shanti Bahini forces (Lee 1996, 74). Strategically, indigenous villages were<br />
destroyed, Hill People were put into cluster villages 75 or had to flee (CHT Commission, 1991,<br />
64ff). At <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini also put enormous pressure on <strong>the</strong> Hill People by<br />
tax collecting 76 and kidnapping for example, in search <strong>of</strong> eventual collaborators. From 1980<br />
to 1985 Shanti Bahini killed 44 and kidnapped 84 Hill People (CHT Commission 1991, 43f).<br />
4.3. A Demographic Shift and Its Political Dimension<br />
“<strong>The</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts want to survive as human beings, nothing else”<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is evidence for <strong>the</strong> assumption, that <strong>the</strong> settlement programmes involved an effort to<br />
establish a demographic shift in <strong>the</strong> CHT for political reasons. <strong>The</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT<br />
demography shows that while in 1947 <strong>the</strong> Hill People constituted about 98% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population,<br />
in 1956 already less, that is 91%. <strong>The</strong> Bengali population rose from 1961 with 12% to<br />
40% in 1981 and as much as 50% in 1991. In Bandarban and Kagrachari districts <strong>the</strong> Bengalis<br />
account for <strong>the</strong> majority with 53% and 52% (Mohsin, 1997, 119). “When I was a girl you<br />
could see mainly tribals on <strong>the</strong> street, now <strong>the</strong>y are a minority” asserted one lady during my<br />
field work.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> following I will concentrate on <strong>the</strong> political dimensions <strong>of</strong> land as well as on <strong>the</strong> aspects<br />
<strong>of</strong> identity construction in relation to land.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> settlement programmes were considered non-natural or political migration<br />
processes 77 gave <strong>the</strong> Hill People more motives for <strong>the</strong> feeling <strong>of</strong> being deprived and disregarded.<br />
<strong>The</strong> feeling <strong>of</strong> being disadvantaged excluded <strong>the</strong>m from Bangladeshi society more<br />
that it had integrated <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>The</strong> impression <strong>of</strong> being a minority in <strong>the</strong>ir own “country” has<br />
provoked processes <strong>of</strong> constructing a “counter identity”. <strong>The</strong> Hill People have been dispossessed<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir traditional rights over land 78 , which is an important issue for an agro-based<br />
society. <strong>The</strong> possibility to cultivate land is essential to survival in <strong>the</strong> Hills due to <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong><br />
74 Interview with a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma group. <strong>The</strong> incidents happened in August 1999.<br />
75 cluster villages are usually located around army camps or close by. <strong>The</strong>y were justified as providing economic<br />
development for <strong>the</strong> tribal people. Army personnel controls movements in and out <strong>the</strong> settlement. <strong>The</strong> cluster<br />
village programme was actually installed because <strong>of</strong> Shanti Bahini actions, partly to protect <strong>the</strong> army camps<br />
from Shanti Bahini attacks, partly to control <strong>the</strong> Hill People so <strong>the</strong>y do not to participate or support <strong>the</strong> Shanti<br />
Bahini<br />
76 Tax collection and kidnapping for ransom was carried out by Shanti Bahini among <strong>the</strong> Hill People and <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis by force to secure <strong>the</strong>ir income<br />
77 <strong>The</strong>se terms were introduced by Mohsin (1997, 112)<br />
78 <strong>The</strong> “government owned Khas land” was regarded as common property. For fur<strong>the</strong>r information see Mohsin,<br />
1997a, 99; Roy 1955, Mey 1988, 47
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
economic infrastructure 79 . Possessing and cultivating land in such a society determines<br />
<strong>the</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> identity construction as it is a part <strong>of</strong> lifestyle based on tradition. Although<br />
tradition can be understood as a historical construct (Kößler 1995, 7) it is part <strong>of</strong> a people’s<br />
culture and in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT tradition is <strong>the</strong> feature which integrates <strong>the</strong> different groups<br />
equally. Though especially <strong>the</strong> Chakma had largely shifted from jhumming to ploughland cultivation,<br />
jhum still or again determines <strong>the</strong>ir identification as Hill People. <strong>The</strong> choice <strong>of</strong> terms<br />
like “jhumma” for self description or “Jhummaland” (Mohsin 1997, 197) for describing <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> autonomy by <strong>the</strong> JSS demonstrates and gives evidence for this assumption.<br />
Hence besides <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People depend on land,<br />
emphasising <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> jhum relates to <strong>the</strong> demarcation from Bengali society, which<br />
is not less agro-based 80 . For self-identification in demarcation from o<strong>the</strong>rs is tradition very<br />
important as a historical construction (Kößler 1995, 7).<br />
<strong>The</strong> term jhumma was ultimately introduced to unify <strong>the</strong> Hill People against <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengali majority in Bangladesh and can be seen as a political construct 81 . One has to take into<br />
consideration that <strong>the</strong>re is a difference between <strong>the</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term jhum for describing a<br />
political project (as in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS) and <strong>the</strong> usage for self-ascription in every day life.<br />
During my field research I have never heard somebody describe himself and those he identifies<br />
himself with by using <strong>the</strong> term jhumma. This term moreover relates to <strong>the</strong> political<br />
strategy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS and <strong>the</strong> attempt to unify <strong>the</strong> Hill People under one designation. But that<br />
does not mean that <strong>the</strong> Hill People do not feel unified. Likewise <strong>the</strong>y refer to terms like<br />
“tribal” or “pahari” which can be explained from <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> invention <strong>of</strong> jhumma is historically<br />
a very recent phenomenon, while “tribal” or “pahari” were used for self-ascription as<br />
well as for ascription by o<strong>the</strong>rs long before. <strong>The</strong> term jhumma can <strong>the</strong>refore be seen as politically<br />
invented, but <strong>the</strong> actual meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term, <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> cultivation, presents an<br />
essential part <strong>of</strong> Hill People’s life and functions as a symbol for unity.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> next chapter I will argue that not just land issues were affected by settling plainsmen,<br />
but trade and economic infrastructure as well.<br />
4.4. <strong>The</strong> “Tribal Market” in Rangamati<br />
79 Will be examined in <strong>the</strong> following chapter<br />
80 and <strong>the</strong>refore not less depended on land<br />
81 <strong>The</strong> nomenclature was adopted among o<strong>the</strong>r reasons as an assertion <strong>of</strong> Hill Peoples equality and an attempt to<br />
come out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> negativism associated with tribalism, although it originally derives from <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian dialect<br />
(Mohsin 1998, 82)
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
Early in <strong>the</strong> morning I had to get up to visit <strong>the</strong> „tribal market“ in Rangamati 82 . I was told that<br />
it is something special. I was fetched at 7.00 a.m. by a friend to go to <strong>the</strong> market, which was<br />
about five minutes to walk. Some Chakma ladies were sitting on <strong>the</strong> side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main road,<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir goods in front <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>The</strong>y had only a few things, bamboo-shoots, pumpkins, fruit,<br />
spices and herbs which are, I was told, special tribal ones. <strong>The</strong> women were sitting toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
on <strong>the</strong> ground, two or three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m chatting. A few metres fur<strong>the</strong>r I saw several male Bengali<br />
vendors with a much broader range on <strong>of</strong>fer: <strong>The</strong>y had fruit and some vegetables as well as<br />
mainly fresh sea fish, dried fish, fish paste, chilli, onions and readymade things like buckets,<br />
pots, and o<strong>the</strong>r goods made <strong>of</strong> plastic. <strong>The</strong>ir way <strong>of</strong> presenting <strong>the</strong> goods was fundamentally<br />
different. <strong>The</strong>y had tables and big bowls for <strong>the</strong>ir goods. I walked around between <strong>the</strong> Bengali<br />
vendors with a wide range <strong>of</strong> goods and <strong>the</strong> few Chakma women sitting on <strong>the</strong> floor presenting<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir few goods. After a short while <strong>the</strong> Chakma ladies started packing. <strong>The</strong>y put <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
belongings into <strong>the</strong> kalong, a basket made <strong>of</strong> bamboo which is carried on <strong>the</strong> back with a strap<br />
on <strong>the</strong> forehead 83 , to go to <strong>the</strong> next market. My informant asserted that <strong>the</strong>y try to sell <strong>the</strong><br />
goods so that <strong>the</strong>y can change <strong>the</strong> small amount <strong>of</strong> money <strong>the</strong>y earn into rice or o<strong>the</strong>r necessary<br />
things. After that <strong>the</strong>y would take a boat to reach <strong>the</strong>ir villages across <strong>the</strong> lake or walk<br />
home with <strong>the</strong> kalong on <strong>the</strong>ir back.<br />
I was not really attracted by that event and was surprised that this was <strong>the</strong> much-praised tribal<br />
market. This bazaar was obviously dominated by Bengalis whereas <strong>the</strong> Chakma ladies<br />
seemed to be something like a rare object being left over from former times. Later I learned<br />
how important this observation was for my research. I saw ano<strong>the</strong>r tribal market in Bandarban<br />
with nearly <strong>the</strong> same situation: Marma women selling a few goods, mainly bamboo-shoots,<br />
pumpkins and some sweet-water crabs. I realised that none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shopkeepers in <strong>the</strong> whole<br />
town <strong>of</strong> Bandarban looked like a hill person. Later an interviewee stated that <strong>the</strong>re are some<br />
shopkeepers who look like Hill People, but <strong>the</strong>y would come from Arakan in Burma. Ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
obvious feature was that nearly all rikshawalas as well as <strong>the</strong> babytaxi-drivers were Bengalis.<br />
Even in <strong>the</strong> tribal areas <strong>of</strong> Bandarban I saw lots <strong>of</strong> Bengalis in <strong>the</strong> shops. <strong>The</strong>se observations<br />
reveal that <strong>the</strong> Hill People are a minority nowadays among <strong>the</strong> crowds <strong>of</strong> Bengalis, but also<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Hill People are clearly disadvantaged in economic activities and absolutely<br />
dependent on <strong>the</strong> economic structures established by <strong>the</strong> Bengali people in <strong>the</strong> area.<br />
82 This is a description <strong>of</strong> an observation in Rangamati at 14 th August 1999<br />
83 Although I was told that this kind <strong>of</strong> basket is exclusively used by Chakma, I have observed that <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Hill<br />
People in <strong>the</strong> CHT as well as those in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh, that is <strong>the</strong> Santals, Garo, etc. use this kind <strong>of</strong><br />
basket known in Nepal e.g.
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
4.5. Trade and Economy<br />
<strong>The</strong> trade relations from <strong>the</strong> plains into <strong>the</strong> CHT have a long tradition. Already in <strong>the</strong> precolonial<br />
days <strong>the</strong> Hill People exchanged <strong>the</strong>ir goods for those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengalis at market<br />
places. <strong>The</strong> Bengalis came by boat from <strong>the</strong> plains around <strong>Chitta</strong>gong, <strong>the</strong> Hill People from<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir villages (van Schendel 1992, 85; van Schendel 1992a, 114). <strong>The</strong> colonial policy allowed<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People to trade with <strong>the</strong> Bengalis although <strong>the</strong> area was restricted according to <strong>the</strong><br />
1900 Manual. <strong>The</strong> trade between <strong>the</strong>se two groups was based on <strong>the</strong> exchange <strong>of</strong> necessary<br />
goods which were not available in <strong>the</strong> Hills, like dried fish and salt for example and timber<br />
and bamboo which were, in contrast hardly available in <strong>the</strong> plains (van Schendel 1992a, 115).<br />
But a relatively high level <strong>of</strong> self-sufficiency remained and left <strong>the</strong> Hill People living mainly<br />
on subsistence production 84 . <strong>The</strong>y had not just <strong>the</strong> staple food which was grown in <strong>the</strong> jhum,<br />
but also clo<strong>the</strong>s and o<strong>the</strong>r goods produced by <strong>the</strong>mselves.<br />
Already between 1930 and 1947 when <strong>the</strong> restriction on <strong>the</strong> CHT was loosened, a lot <strong>of</strong> plains<br />
people entered <strong>the</strong> area most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m were shopkeepers and tradesmen 85 . <strong>The</strong>y lived in <strong>the</strong><br />
bazaar areas and had little interest in land (Roy 1995, 65). Important for <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r argumentation<br />
is to recognise that <strong>the</strong> restriction itself, although <strong>the</strong> aim was to protect <strong>the</strong> Hill People,<br />
has isolated <strong>the</strong>m from social changes in <strong>the</strong> outside world (Ahmed 1993, 34). <strong>The</strong> Hill People<br />
were not prepared for integrating <strong>the</strong>mselves into <strong>the</strong> mainstream development and<br />
adopting <strong>the</strong> patterns <strong>of</strong> market and trade which were established by <strong>the</strong> newcomers.<br />
<strong>The</strong> great impact came with <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai dam, <strong>the</strong> opening <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hills and<br />
<strong>the</strong> influx <strong>of</strong> Bengali settlers with Zia’s regime in <strong>the</strong> 1970s. After <strong>the</strong> Hill People had lost<br />
most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir plain lands used for cultivating <strong>the</strong> socio-economic structure had to change immensely<br />
86 . Without land <strong>the</strong> Hill People had to search for alternatives for surviving and<br />
securing a livelihood. <strong>The</strong> agro-based society shifted towards a structure more determined by<br />
trade, economy and market. At <strong>the</strong> same time Bengali people who were familiar with commercial<br />
fishing and plough cultivation came from <strong>the</strong> plains, which <strong>the</strong> Hill People had to<br />
learn first after being disrupted. <strong>The</strong>y could not go into <strong>the</strong> trade and market economy since<br />
84 According to <strong>the</strong> “Bielefelder Verflechtungsansatz” three modes <strong>of</strong> production can be distinguished: formal<br />
production, informal production and subsistence production. Subsistence Production can be seen as a relatively<br />
autonomous mode <strong>of</strong> production. <strong>The</strong>se three modes are entwined with each o<strong>the</strong>r, more or less according to <strong>the</strong><br />
impact <strong>of</strong> capitalist market economy in a society (Evers 1987)<br />
85 <strong>The</strong>se tradesmen came mainly from <strong>the</strong> plains around <strong>Chitta</strong>gong to which <strong>the</strong> Hill People always had a relatively<br />
good relationship, at least because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> long trading tradition. <strong>Chitta</strong>gong can also be seen as a<br />
connecting point with <strong>the</strong> outside world. It is quite necessary to distinguish between those plainsmen from <strong>the</strong><br />
area <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong and those coming from o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh, <strong>the</strong> crucial feature for distinguishing here<br />
is language, I will examine that broader in Chapter 6.1.<br />
86 As already discussed in <strong>the</strong> previous chapters
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
market and trade structures had already been occupied by Bengalis as a socio-economic survey<br />
<strong>of</strong> six Chakma-majority villages by Rahman 87 shows:<br />
“about 78 market places and bazars in <strong>the</strong> district ... are owned, run and controlled by <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengali population” and <strong>the</strong> tribal people are “totally dependent on <strong>the</strong> market for exchange<br />
[<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir agricultural goods] and <strong>the</strong> cash income generated ... to purchase <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
life” and “[l]eft in <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali traders <strong>the</strong>re is a feeling among <strong>the</strong> tribal people<br />
that <strong>the</strong>y are being exploited” (Bertocci 1989, 153)<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Hill People were at large familiar with fishing before <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Kaptai dam, none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m had <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> selling <strong>the</strong> fish, because it was exclusively for <strong>the</strong><br />
family consumption (Ullah 1995, 54). Nowadays more and more people see fishing as one<br />
possible income source 88 , although it is against <strong>the</strong>ir Buddhist faith as an informant asserted.<br />
Some Hill People who had received some cultivable land tried fruit-gardening raising pineapple,<br />
mango, jackfruit, lemon or bananas. But <strong>the</strong> problem here is marketing, transport and<br />
storage. <strong>The</strong> fruit farmers are forced to sell <strong>the</strong> goods sometimes below <strong>the</strong> production costs<br />
because <strong>the</strong> storage possibilities are very limited. When <strong>the</strong> Hill People have carried <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
goods from <strong>the</strong>ir villages down to <strong>the</strong> markets <strong>the</strong> middlemen know that <strong>the</strong>y will not take it<br />
back home again if <strong>the</strong>y do not get a reasonable amount <strong>of</strong> money for it. <strong>The</strong>y are dependent<br />
on selling it for lowest prices because <strong>the</strong>y have no choice. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> soilerosion<br />
control 89 has led to a diminishing <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its (Ullah 1995, 75; Roy 1995, 85).<br />
<strong>The</strong> extraction <strong>of</strong> forest products like timber and bamboo has been dominated by Bengalis<br />
since <strong>the</strong> times <strong>of</strong> British rulership as it has largely been in <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> gangs <strong>of</strong> wood-cutters<br />
coming from <strong>the</strong> plains to manage <strong>the</strong> transport to <strong>Chitta</strong>gong (Bertocci 1989, 151). Having<br />
visited a wood storage place in Rangamati this is obvious even nowadays.<br />
Apart from forest products which are principally not finished in <strong>the</strong> Hills but transported to<br />
<strong>Chitta</strong>gong, <strong>the</strong>re is very little industrial development in <strong>the</strong> CHT. Although <strong>the</strong> Karnaphuli<br />
power project and <strong>the</strong> Chandraghona Paper Mill have revolutionised industrialisation <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
People could hardly benefit from this. Ahsan (1989, 964) argues that “tribal employment in<br />
major industries ... has been less than 1%” 90<br />
nearby which employs some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local people 91 .<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r I was told that Rangamati has a dairy<br />
87 Rahman, A, (1982): Social Development in a Tribal Society: Socio-economic Pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Valleys<br />
in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts, Dhaka, Institute <strong>of</strong> Business Administration, University <strong>of</strong> Dhaka, cited in: Bertocci<br />
1989, 153<br />
88 In 1981 about 20-25% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 3000 registered fishermen were Hill People (Islam 1981, 1217)<br />
89 which is always necessary in a hilly area<br />
90 Ahsan 1989, 964. Unfortunately her argumentation does not give any fur<strong>the</strong>r information about this number. It<br />
is not clear, if she means less than 1% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribals are employed in that project or 1% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> employees are<br />
tribal. Mohsin’s argumentation relates only to <strong>the</strong> paper mill project. She writes that it has employed less <strong>the</strong>n
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
4.5. How <strong>the</strong> Hill People Perceive <strong>The</strong>ir Economic Position<br />
“That’s, our villagers are very poor and <strong>the</strong>y live from hand to mouth. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> villagers<br />
have no <strong>the</strong>ir own land for cultivation and illiterate. So it is <strong>the</strong> only income source <strong>the</strong> day<br />
labour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ... My elder bro<strong>the</strong>r is also married now and he is separate from us. He lives by<br />
fishing ... My younger sister is too married in <strong>the</strong> same village one year ago. Her husband<br />
does nothing but day labour ... In spite <strong>of</strong> my having parents <strong>the</strong>y cannot bear my educational<br />
expenses as he is old and ignorant.” <strong>The</strong>re is no earning way in our village or town. Even in<br />
our village or town day labour is not available ... I’m studying through <strong>the</strong>se suffering and<br />
distress.” 92<br />
Talking to <strong>the</strong> villagers I recognised that <strong>the</strong>ir most essential problem is land, since <strong>the</strong>ir economic<br />
position is heavily dependent on it. An empirical study conducted by <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh<br />
Academy for Rural Development (BARD) in 16 mouzas in all three CHT districts in 1995<br />
investigates <strong>the</strong> occupational structure. According to <strong>the</strong>ir data 72% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents are<br />
still jhum cultivators. Besides 15,2% are day-labourers, 9.2% service holders, 2.6% businessmen<br />
and 1% housewives (Quddus 1996, 30) 93<br />
According to my empirical data <strong>the</strong> Hill People were predominantly critical about state politics:<br />
“We are a minority in this country, depressed and disadvantaged”. Although <strong>the</strong> Bengali<br />
settlers are blamed very <strong>of</strong>ten, I have heard statements like: “<strong>The</strong> Bengalis here are not in a<br />
better situation <strong>the</strong>n we are.” Besides land issues administrative and <strong>of</strong>ficial matters were also<br />
mentioned. Tripura and Marma interviewees in Bandarban asserted: “one problem is how we<br />
are deprived by <strong>the</strong>se people...”. Asking for examples I was told that decision-takers in most<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions like banks or political institutions are Bengalis. <strong>The</strong>y usually prefer Bengalis.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are indigenous service holders, but <strong>the</strong>y usually have <strong>the</strong> junior status and no<br />
rights to take decisions. When people want to get loans from a bank, <strong>the</strong>y have to prove <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
landownership. As 80% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People in Bandarban are landless or can not make sure<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are landowners, <strong>the</strong>y have no chance <strong>of</strong> getting a credit. Being disadvantaged was likewise<br />
confirmed with <strong>the</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong> Bengalis have <strong>the</strong> power to control <strong>the</strong> market<br />
prices.<br />
Economic deprivation, combined with <strong>the</strong> already discussed land problems and political implications<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore plays a crucial role in <strong>the</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> group formation. <strong>The</strong> Hill People<br />
1% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local population (Mohsin 1997, 106). I guess that <strong>the</strong>y have used <strong>the</strong> same reference. Mohsin refers to<br />
her own work from 1996 and Ahsan to a publication <strong>of</strong> Siddharth Chakma’s, but I guess that <strong>the</strong>y both come<br />
from <strong>the</strong> same source<br />
91 Unfortunately I cannot go into this more deeply because <strong>of</strong> a <strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> available literature<br />
92 A letter received from a boy from <strong>the</strong> village Vedvedi close to Rangamati on 11.10.1999. I met him when I<br />
was invited to <strong>the</strong> village on 18.09.1999<br />
93 <strong>The</strong> numbers relate to mouzas which are exclusively inhabited by Hill People
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
perceive that <strong>the</strong>ir possibilities <strong>of</strong> economic development are immensely hampered by <strong>the</strong><br />
dominance <strong>of</strong> settled plains people and <strong>the</strong>ir economic strength, especially after <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
been alienated from <strong>the</strong>ir land. <strong>The</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> production due to land scarcity<br />
favours <strong>the</strong> plainsmen. <strong>The</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> skills required within this economic transition has<br />
left <strong>the</strong> Hill People “backward”, although <strong>the</strong>y try to compensate for <strong>the</strong> so-called backwardness<br />
with alternative skills like, for example, a high level <strong>of</strong> education. <strong>The</strong>ir chance would<br />
have been to integrate into <strong>the</strong> given economic structures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali society, but most <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> attempts failed. Not just “backwardness” in <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> different structures and modes <strong>of</strong><br />
production 94 hampers economic development but also being disadvantaged in administrative<br />
structures and decisions which have been, although established by British, continued by Bengalis.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fact that administrative and economic structures are mainly determined by <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis can be seen as strongly related to <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state in Bangladesh. <strong>The</strong> statecentred<br />
paradigm <strong>of</strong> nationalism in Bangladesh, which by Constitution excludes minorities,<br />
produces advantages for <strong>the</strong> majority leaving minorities behind. Although economic deprivation<br />
need not necessarily be traced back to an explicit aim <strong>of</strong> state politics, <strong>the</strong> settlement<br />
programmes would give evidence for that argument 95 . On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand has <strong>the</strong> CHTDB established<br />
lots <strong>of</strong> different development programmes. <strong>The</strong> foundation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Development<br />
Board was guided by General Zia’s attention to accelerating <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> economic development<br />
in <strong>the</strong> CHT and <strong>the</strong> aim was to integrate <strong>the</strong> Hill People “into <strong>the</strong> mainstream” 96<br />
(Ahmed 1993, 57). An informant has illustrated <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se development intentions:<br />
“why do <strong>the</strong>y build pavements when <strong>the</strong> people here do not use it? <strong>The</strong>y have no idea <strong>of</strong> what<br />
a pavement is used for, <strong>the</strong>y are sitting on it and chatting”. What becomes obvious here is that<br />
development issues were related exclusively to ideas <strong>of</strong> structural development. Even more<br />
evidence for this argument is given by looking at <strong>the</strong> streetmap <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT: constructing<br />
streets was not for developing <strong>the</strong> infrastructure, but to provide <strong>the</strong> military access to <strong>the</strong> hills.<br />
Nearly all streets are constructed for a strategic military cause (CHT Commission 1992, 83).<br />
<strong>The</strong> settlers from <strong>the</strong> plains indeed were those who pr<strong>of</strong>ited most, as many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir villages<br />
are close to army camps so as to be protected from Shanti Bahini threat. <strong>The</strong> accusation<br />
94 In Bangladesh jhum cultivation has been considered as backward due to a world-wide paradigm (Torres-<br />
Trueba 1986) and is still. Even nowadays this opinion dominates <strong>the</strong> ideas <strong>of</strong> rural development in <strong>the</strong> CHT, as<br />
<strong>the</strong> changes introduced in <strong>the</strong> Hills, i.e. shift from “food ga<strong>the</strong>ring practices to cultivation” and <strong>the</strong> shift to<br />
plough cultivation are seen as revolutions. Even <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> market mechanism by middlemen is<br />
considered to be a step forward (Siddique 1997, 3)<br />
95 Which is expressed in <strong>the</strong> literature for example in Mohsin 1997 and Mey 1988<br />
96 One measure was <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> reservation for Hill People in jobs, universities and o<strong>the</strong>r educational<br />
systems. For education issues see Chapter 5
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
against <strong>the</strong> CHTDB does not just relate to a not adjusted structural development but to a<br />
political strategy as well:<br />
“<strong>The</strong> CHTDB was established in 1976 by late Ziaur Rahman to fight <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini. It is a<br />
purely political organisation to bribe <strong>the</strong> tribals. Loans are given for private purpose, to businessmen<br />
and tribal leaders ... Yes, it is mostly a political bribe to tribal leaders to buy <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong>f<br />
so that <strong>the</strong>y would not help <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini” (CHT Commission 1992, 84).<br />
One <strong>of</strong> my informants expressed this similarly when he stated that “development in <strong>the</strong> CHT<br />
was not more <strong>the</strong>n development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir pockets” 97 .<br />
<strong>The</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> economic disadvantage is <strong>the</strong>refore a result <strong>of</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> identity construction<br />
on <strong>the</strong> one hand and invigorates <strong>the</strong>se on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand. <strong>The</strong> GOB has marginalised <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
People as a group with ano<strong>the</strong>r identity in order to integrate <strong>the</strong>m into centralised statepolitics<br />
by using military forces and development programmes. As a result especially <strong>the</strong><br />
plainsmen in <strong>the</strong> hills have been advantaged by <strong>the</strong>se institutions along <strong>the</strong> previously existing<br />
ethnic segregation. Instead <strong>of</strong> supporting <strong>the</strong> Hill People, <strong>the</strong> not less poor newly settled<br />
plainsmen are those gaining pr<strong>of</strong>it from <strong>the</strong>se steps. This fact in turn created a feeling <strong>of</strong> being<br />
disadvantaged among <strong>the</strong> Hill People, alienates <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong> Bengali society and streng<strong>the</strong>ns<br />
<strong>the</strong> inclusion within <strong>the</strong> group <strong>of</strong> Hill People, as all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are equally affected.<br />
Consequently homogenisation 98<br />
respect to <strong>the</strong> advanced Bengalis.<br />
processes are <strong>the</strong> result as well as processes <strong>of</strong> exclusion in<br />
5. Education<br />
<strong>The</strong> most crucial dilemma among <strong>the</strong> Chakma is to be educated, eventually even to graduate,<br />
but not to have an adequate job. This can be mainly regarded as a problem <strong>of</strong> economic infrastructure<br />
and as a consequence <strong>of</strong> a relatively highly developed educational system in <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT. <strong>The</strong> literacy rate in <strong>the</strong> CHT is comparatively high for Bangladesh. From 1974 to 1991<br />
<strong>the</strong> literacy rate in <strong>the</strong> CHT increased from 18.2% to 27.6% 99 (<strong>The</strong> Independent, Editorial<br />
09.07.1999). This fact has mainly to do with an exceptionally high rate among <strong>the</strong> Chakma<br />
which is estimated to be 70% in comparison to 28% among <strong>the</strong> Bengalis living in <strong>the</strong> CHT<br />
97 He did not mention whose pockets he was thinking <strong>of</strong>. I guess that he means those who are responsible for <strong>the</strong><br />
planning <strong>of</strong> development projects, that are not just Bengalis but Hill People involved in <strong>the</strong>se processes as well,<br />
because I have heard accusations against tribal political leaders like those who are a member <strong>of</strong> parliament as<br />
well as those involved in <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> CHT affairs quite <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
98 Although I would assume that <strong>the</strong>re is an obvious tendency towards <strong>the</strong> homogenisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is enough evidence to prove <strong>the</strong> opposite. Indeed <strong>the</strong>re are demonstrable processes <strong>of</strong> seclusion among <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill People. One main reason is <strong>the</strong> advanced position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma within political and educational issues. See<br />
Chapter 5 and 6
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
and <strong>the</strong> Marma and Tripura among whom about 20% are literate (Rashiduzzaman 1998, 660).<br />
<strong>The</strong> educational system in <strong>the</strong> CHT has a long tradition, which is directly related to <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
and necessity <strong>of</strong> scriptural knowledge in Buddhist societies as well as to <strong>the</strong> rulership <strong>of</strong><br />
British authorities. In <strong>the</strong> following I will try to analyse three questions: What is <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong><br />
tribal education in <strong>the</strong> CHT? Why are <strong>the</strong> Chakma more advanced than <strong>the</strong> Bengalis as well<br />
as to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Hill Peoples? How does <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> education influence <strong>the</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> identity<br />
construction?<br />
5.1. <strong>The</strong> State <strong>of</strong> Education among <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are different strains <strong>of</strong> educational systems in <strong>the</strong> CHT. <strong>The</strong> most important in fact is<br />
<strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> governmental institutions. From <strong>the</strong> sixties on <strong>the</strong> government had established a<br />
large number <strong>of</strong> primary schools, as well as high schools and colleges. <strong>The</strong> Rangamati college<br />
was set up in 1965 and upgraded into a degree college in 1970. A present <strong>the</strong>re are four government<br />
colleges in <strong>the</strong> CHT. <strong>The</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHTDB plays also a role in <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong><br />
education. It gave Tk 52 lakh as grant bursary to 5,500 students <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT until 1990. (<strong>The</strong><br />
Independent, Editorial 09.07.1999)<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less some people consider <strong>the</strong>se steps accomplished by <strong>the</strong> Government as clearly<br />
advantaging <strong>the</strong> Bengali population. <strong>The</strong> schools are mainly in <strong>the</strong> densely populated valleys<br />
while many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People live in villages, and reaching <strong>the</strong> schools is much more difficult<br />
for <strong>the</strong>m (Mohsin 1997, 127). Ano<strong>the</strong>r problem is <strong>the</strong> curriculum <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government schools,<br />
where <strong>the</strong> medium <strong>of</strong> instruction is Bengali exclusively. A teacher at Rangamati college insisted<br />
to me that he would love to teach in English because he is much more familiar with it<br />
and it is easier for him but he is not allowed to 100 . Since <strong>the</strong> curriculum is <strong>the</strong> same as for <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r government schools all over Bangladesh, it is <strong>of</strong> Bengali character. <strong>The</strong> cultural and<br />
historical content is Bengali. <strong>The</strong> governmental educational institutions are <strong>the</strong>refore an instrument<br />
for assimilation to <strong>the</strong> Bengali culture. <strong>The</strong> Bengali language becomes more familiar<br />
than <strong>the</strong>ir own traditional one, in <strong>the</strong> “hidden curriculum” 101 values, trends and ideas are<br />
transmitted which include modes <strong>of</strong> dresses for example. 102 <strong>The</strong>re are two alternatives for <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill students: to assimilate <strong>the</strong>mselves to <strong>the</strong> Bengali mainstream or feel alienated by it and<br />
99 It must be taken into account that <strong>the</strong> relation tribal - non-tribal changed immensely until 1991, <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong><br />
population was 51% tribals and 49% non-tribals<br />
100 One has to bear in mind that <strong>the</strong> educational system was based on <strong>the</strong> English language until <strong>the</strong> independence<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bangladesh and especially <strong>the</strong> older people are more familiar with it. See chapter about language<br />
101 For <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> hidden curriculum see Hannerz (1987, 554)<br />
102 See Chapter about cultural differences, especially language and dress
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
express this by protest. This alienation from Bengali society involves a reflection on <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own group and identification with it. In o<strong>the</strong>r words: <strong>the</strong> feeling <strong>of</strong> being excluded from <strong>the</strong><br />
mainstream society has <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> people’s own group as a consequence. Differences<br />
between <strong>the</strong> two become visible and evident, <strong>the</strong> immanent conflict is streng<strong>the</strong>ned.<br />
<strong>The</strong> processes typically involve group formations, in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT students <strong>the</strong>, Pahari<br />
Chattro Parishad which is associated to <strong>the</strong> JSS.<br />
An alternative for <strong>the</strong> Hill People to avoid <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government education is to<br />
send <strong>the</strong> children to a private, non-governmental school. Not just Buddhist institutions 103 have<br />
established schools but also Christian initiatives as well as non-religious ones. As a relict<br />
from colonialism <strong>the</strong> bigger towns have missionary schools, which have <strong>the</strong>ir own curriculum<br />
which is <strong>of</strong>ten taught in English. O<strong>the</strong>rs are CCDB (Christian Council for Development <strong>of</strong><br />
Bangladesh) or World Vision. <strong>The</strong> latter has established in co-operation with Fatima Rani<br />
Catholic Church a residential school combined with an orphanage in Bandarban which I have<br />
visited. <strong>The</strong> fa<strong>the</strong>rs insisted to me that <strong>the</strong>y are not <strong>the</strong>re to convert <strong>the</strong> mainly Tripura but for<br />
developmental reasons. For <strong>the</strong> same purpose NGOs like BRAC have recently established<br />
primary schools in Hill People’s villages.<br />
5.2. <strong>The</strong> Advantaged Position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma<br />
After <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai dam many people, principally Chakma were uprooted<br />
from <strong>the</strong>ir traditional way <strong>of</strong> life in an agrarian society 104 . <strong>The</strong> socio-economic and cultural<br />
life <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People has been effected enormously as well as <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> education in <strong>the</strong><br />
region. Although <strong>the</strong>re had always been a great interest in education 105 , many people could<br />
not afford to send <strong>the</strong>ir children to schools. As a consequence many Buddhist institutions had<br />
set up orphanages to take children <strong>of</strong> poor families as well as orphans into residential schools.<br />
One example which I have visited is <strong>the</strong> Monaghor Complex in Rangapai near Rangamati<br />
town. This residential school provides education from primary up to high-school level combined<br />
with vocational training in a carpentry for example, and it is <strong>the</strong> present home <strong>of</strong><br />
approximately 2,000 students 106 . With <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> French government <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
studying abroad can be <strong>of</strong>fered to some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> scholars, this year for example approximately<br />
103 <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> Buddhist schools in <strong>the</strong> educational system will be seen in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
104 I refer to my argumentation in <strong>the</strong> Chapters about history and land<br />
105 Every Buddhist village traditionally had its own monastery in which education was held in high regard (CHT<br />
Commission, 1991, 103)<br />
106 Informant’s estimation
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
70 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m could go to France 107 . Some o<strong>the</strong>r institutions with a similar background are <strong>the</strong><br />
Bonophul-Complex in Dhaka as well as an orphanage in Calcutta. But <strong>the</strong>re are projects <strong>of</strong><br />
this kind which are not exclusively for Buddhists, as <strong>the</strong> Murong-Complex in Shoalak 108 , established<br />
with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> UNICEF, shows.<br />
<strong>The</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se activities was to give <strong>the</strong> affected people education to prepare <strong>the</strong>m for getting<br />
a paid job and to “fight back”. <strong>The</strong> motto was “Education is mightier <strong>the</strong>n sword” 109 .<br />
Some asserted that <strong>the</strong> high educational level is a reaction on <strong>the</strong> economic strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis and <strong>the</strong> Chakmas’ economical marginalisation. In fact, <strong>the</strong> Chakma seem to be very<br />
proud <strong>of</strong> and especially <strong>the</strong> elite has great interest in education 110 . Those I met spoke perfect<br />
English 111 and supported education actively. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m were educated abroad, in India or<br />
Britain. At <strong>the</strong> same time education relates to how <strong>the</strong> Chakma are described by o<strong>the</strong>rs. Once<br />
I talked to <strong>the</strong> cousin <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marma Raja Aung Shui Prue Chowdury about <strong>the</strong> Chakma royal<br />
family and <strong>the</strong>ir raja who is a barrister in Dhaka. He declared: “Yes, <strong>the</strong>y are very active, well<br />
educated, <strong>the</strong>y are doing a lot”. <strong>The</strong> Marma raja is a raja by pr<strong>of</strong>ession however. Being conscious<br />
about <strong>the</strong>se differences leads to processes <strong>of</strong> exclusion, as a Marma who has visited <strong>the</strong><br />
Monaghor Complex in Rangamati district said. He told me that he could not participate in an<br />
exchange programme with France because he was not a Chakma.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> Chakma are those mainly engaging in <strong>the</strong> representation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s political<br />
interests 112 , <strong>the</strong>re seems to be a relationship between education and <strong>the</strong> “political consciousness”.<br />
Engagement in political organisations presupposes a manifest identification with <strong>the</strong><br />
group which is represented by <strong>the</strong> organisation as well as <strong>the</strong> consciousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> own identity<br />
(in demarcation to o<strong>the</strong>rs). I would <strong>the</strong>refore assume that <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> a “political<br />
consciousness” is strongly tied to <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> education 113 an individual has.<br />
<strong>The</strong> divergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> education among Chakma and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs goes back to <strong>the</strong> times<br />
<strong>of</strong> decolonialisation. Already at that time <strong>the</strong> Chakma had been more educated and took <strong>the</strong><br />
leading political role in negotiations and representing Hill People’s interests (Ahmed 1993,<br />
107 Information given by a staff member<br />
108 mouza in Bandarban district dominated by Murong, about 15 kilometres from Bandarban town<br />
109 statement <strong>of</strong> an informant at Rangamati<br />
110 see also statements <strong>of</strong> several members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma elite including Raja Devasish Roy in Ullah (1995, 70f)<br />
111 For somebody who is going to do research in <strong>the</strong> area it is quite useful, that nearly every man, and <strong>the</strong> women<br />
sometimes too, speaks at least some words <strong>of</strong> English and communication seems to be much easier <strong>the</strong>n in <strong>the</strong><br />
plains<br />
112 for <strong>the</strong> Chakma dominance in <strong>the</strong> JSS see Chapter 3<br />
113 <strong>The</strong> term “state <strong>of</strong> education” does not specifically relate to formal education in <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> being able to<br />
read, write or calculate. It merely describes <strong>the</strong> knowledge about principal and political rights, as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
ability to overview one’s own situation in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> larger organisational social structures. Quoting Hannerz,<br />
“Education is a cultural process, an organised way <strong>of</strong> giving individuals cultural shape” (1987, 553)
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
34). This gap has, with regard to <strong>the</strong> push given by <strong>the</strong> anomic situation <strong>the</strong> Chakma<br />
were in after Kaptai dam, widened. <strong>The</strong> representation <strong>of</strong> interests which is mainly followed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> JSS as <strong>the</strong> political elite on <strong>the</strong> one hand and <strong>the</strong> traditional elite on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, is largely<br />
dependent on <strong>the</strong> engagement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma 114 . <strong>The</strong> Chakma here can be described as a strategic<br />
group (Evers 1988, Elwert 1989). <strong>The</strong> Chakma dominance within <strong>the</strong> JSS, although<br />
productive in <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> resistance against <strong>the</strong> Bengali majority, has provoked processes<br />
<strong>of</strong> exclusion among <strong>the</strong> Hill People 115 . <strong>The</strong> policies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS can even be regarded as a new<br />
hegemony <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma over <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Hill People 116 . Educational differences <strong>the</strong>refore play<br />
an important role in <strong>the</strong> differentiation <strong>of</strong> societies and streng<strong>the</strong>n already existing cleavages.<br />
6. Cultural Differences – Cultural Habits and <strong>The</strong>ir Importance<br />
To investigate cultural differences <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> culture which is used in this paper must be<br />
defined. <strong>The</strong> conception <strong>of</strong> culture in sociology comprises on a very general level “all that in<br />
human society which is socially ra<strong>the</strong>r than biologically transmitted. ... Culture is thus a general<br />
term for <strong>the</strong> symbolic and learned aspects <strong>of</strong> human society” (Marshall 1998, 137).<br />
Although culture can be defined on a very general level, it always involves diversification. As<br />
cultural features determine matters <strong>of</strong> self-ascription as well as ascription by o<strong>the</strong>rs in interaction,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are boundary-connected. Members <strong>of</strong> groups and <strong>the</strong>ir actions are evaluated and<br />
judged by <strong>the</strong> diacriteria which determine membership by o<strong>the</strong>rs and co-members (Barth<br />
1998, 6).<br />
Above all two cultural models can be distinguished in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> my research topic: <strong>the</strong><br />
South-Asian (represented in <strong>the</strong> Bengali variant) and <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Asian (in <strong>the</strong> Burmese/Arakanese<br />
variant). <strong>The</strong> Hill Peoples can considered to comprise a continuum placed in<br />
between <strong>the</strong>se two models, according to <strong>the</strong> influences imposed on <strong>the</strong>m over time 117 , <strong>the</strong><br />
Tripura on <strong>the</strong> South-Asian side, <strong>the</strong> Marma on <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>ast-Asian side 118 . <strong>The</strong> Chakma can<br />
be placed linguistically and religiously somewhere in-between (van Schendel 1992, 106f.).<br />
Within that broad frame it can be said that each group can develop an own culture as it distinguishes<br />
itself from o<strong>the</strong>rs. Even smallest entities can have <strong>the</strong>ir own culture. Whenever a<br />
group is categorised according to its own culture, that does not automatically imply that <strong>the</strong><br />
114 see Chapter 3.2.1.<br />
115 for resistance against <strong>the</strong> Chakma dominated JSS and its political interests: see Chapter 3.2.1.<br />
116 this <strong>the</strong>sis is proposed by Mohsin (1997)<br />
117 This is <strong>of</strong> course a very complex system <strong>of</strong> influences over a long period <strong>of</strong> time, which cannot be examined<br />
at length here. Again, <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> basic differentiation is useful as well as necessary for my purpose.
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
entity has a homogenous conglomerate <strong>of</strong> cultural features. It does not even mean that it is<br />
particularly coherent (Hannerz 1989, 550).<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time it is necessary for my purpose to find categories which can be used to organise<br />
<strong>the</strong> description and analysis <strong>of</strong> cultural differences. As revealed by my empirical data,<br />
language, dresses and religion are categories which are used for ascription by <strong>the</strong> people<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves and seemed to me obviously clear modes <strong>of</strong> distinction. <strong>The</strong>se categories are<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> most coherent aspects <strong>of</strong> culture which could be found and are fur<strong>the</strong>rmore referred<br />
to in <strong>the</strong> literature on ethnicity (Schlee 1996, 10). <strong>The</strong>y <strong>the</strong>refore comprise <strong>the</strong> main<br />
aspects <strong>of</strong> differentiating societies in <strong>the</strong> given context 119 . Religion in particular is a guiding<br />
cultural system for differentiation as it influences a large number <strong>of</strong> different matters in everyday<br />
life. Gender order for instance is usually a religiously determined phenomenon (Levi-<br />
Strauss 1978, 404). <strong>The</strong> same is true for many habits I have observed in <strong>the</strong> field, in which <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill People differ from <strong>the</strong> Bengali population. A very obvious case for example are differences<br />
in food habits. While Muslims reject <strong>the</strong> consumption <strong>of</strong> pork and alcoholic drinks<br />
because <strong>of</strong> religious norms, <strong>the</strong> Hill People do not have restrictions which condemn <strong>the</strong> consumption<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se 120 . Having alcoholic drinks is according to my experience even a very<br />
important part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakmas’ way <strong>of</strong> life 121 . <strong>The</strong> case <strong>of</strong> consuming pork was quite visible<br />
in Bandarban, where one can easily distinguish <strong>the</strong> tribal from <strong>the</strong> non-tribal area by <strong>the</strong> numbers<br />
<strong>of</strong> pigs running around on <strong>the</strong> streets.<br />
Besides <strong>the</strong>se religiously determined differences I observed a lot <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r things distinguishing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People from Bengalis. <strong>The</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> kalong for carrying goods for example or<br />
a characteristic way <strong>of</strong> constructing houses out <strong>of</strong> bamboo 122 . Ano<strong>the</strong>r feature <strong>of</strong> distinction<br />
which has been, I surmise, historically developed, are different modes <strong>of</strong> preparing food. I<br />
could observe for instance that <strong>the</strong> Chakma boil vegetables instead <strong>of</strong> frying <strong>the</strong>m which is<br />
what <strong>the</strong> Bengalis do. O<strong>the</strong>r spices and herbs are used for cooking, <strong>the</strong> instruments for grind-<br />
118 <strong>The</strong> Marmas’ closeness to Burma, very obviously visible in <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term Marma and Myanmar<br />
for instance, has been examined in Chapter 1 already<br />
119 I would like to emphasise again that this categorisation evolved out <strong>of</strong> my experiences in <strong>the</strong> field, and can be<br />
considered to be an axiomatic guiding differentiation which is, in my estimation, necessary for structuring this<br />
part <strong>of</strong> my paper. This is backed by my wish not to examine culture in its <strong>the</strong>oretical concepts but to analyse<br />
identity construction processes in a specific case <strong>of</strong> ethnic conflict<br />
120 Although Buddhist <strong>the</strong> norms concerning an ascetic way <strong>of</strong> life include <strong>the</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> alcoholic drinks and<br />
<strong>the</strong> taking <strong>of</strong> meat because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> condemnation to kill any living creature, a lot <strong>of</strong> Buddhist Hill People consume<br />
both. I was told by a Thai Buddhist, that <strong>the</strong>se norms do predominantly affect those who “practice” religion, like<br />
monks for example, while it is quite common among <strong>the</strong> “normal” population not to follow <strong>the</strong>se rules strictly.<br />
121 This assumption is revealed in <strong>the</strong> literature commonly too. See Shelley 1992, 52 for example<br />
122 for <strong>the</strong> characteristic way <strong>of</strong> constructing houses see Levi-Strauss 1951 or Mey 1988
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
ing spices differ from those used by Bengalis as well 123 . <strong>The</strong> ways <strong>of</strong> treating a foreigner are<br />
different in respect to serving snacks or presenting alcohol before having a meal. All <strong>the</strong>se<br />
differing habits <strong>of</strong> managing everyday life 124 contribute to <strong>the</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> diversification <strong>of</strong><br />
two (or more) groups and should be taken into account especially concerning processes <strong>of</strong><br />
identity construction. In <strong>the</strong> following dress, language and religion are treated in separate sections<br />
and are affiliated again in <strong>the</strong> last one under a general <strong>the</strong>oretical hypo<strong>the</strong>sis which<br />
derives from <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three.<br />
6.1. Dress<br />
“This is our national dress” said a Chakma lady when she entered my room to give me a<br />
khadi in memory <strong>of</strong> my time in Rangamati. As <strong>the</strong>re are 13 different groups living in <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT, every one has its own traditional dress 125 . Dress is an important characteristic since one<br />
can see at first glance to which group someone belongs. <strong>The</strong> women are those who usually<br />
still wear <strong>the</strong> traditional dresses, but that depends on which group <strong>the</strong>y belong to and which<br />
status <strong>the</strong>y have. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> women’s dresses are more or less similar, for example <strong>the</strong><br />
Chakma and Tanchangya dress like <strong>the</strong> Tripura dress. It is a hand-woven skirt with stripes, a<br />
blouse and a scarf. Colour and design vary, details are used for distinction in <strong>the</strong>se cases, for<br />
example jewellery. <strong>The</strong> Marma dress is a skirt <strong>of</strong> a lungi-type, but not tied in <strong>the</strong> middle as <strong>the</strong><br />
men do but on <strong>the</strong> side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hips, mostly in a colourful design. <strong>The</strong> Murong women traditionally<br />
wear a one-piece cloth which covers nei<strong>the</strong>r knees nor breast. Contrarily <strong>the</strong> male Hill<br />
People I have seen do not wear traditional dresses at all. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are dressed ei<strong>the</strong>r in<br />
western clo<strong>the</strong>s, or in lungis.<br />
It is a common phenomena in South Asia that women preserve traditions expressed by clothing,<br />
while men’s clo<strong>the</strong>s symbolise modernity (Wichterich 1998, 198). This fact is related to<br />
<strong>the</strong> occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> so-called public space mainly by men while women are found in primarily<br />
domestic spheres <strong>of</strong> social life (Kabeer 1991, 129). In <strong>the</strong> Islamic Bengali society gender<br />
seclusion is a part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gender order 126 . As <strong>the</strong> public space is increasingly occupied by <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis, gender seclusion related to public space seems to be transferred.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less dresses are connected with a symbolic value as expressions <strong>of</strong> cultural difference.<br />
Especially women have taken over <strong>the</strong> part to represent cultural difference by using<br />
123 I was told by a Chakma that <strong>the</strong>y use a mortar made out <strong>of</strong> clay, while <strong>the</strong> Bengali variant is to grind spices<br />
with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> a stone roll<br />
124 Where I could add a lot <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r features<br />
125 Photographs <strong>of</strong> Chakma and Tripura dresses are to be found in <strong>the</strong> Appendix
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
markers in <strong>the</strong> Hill Peoples society as well as in <strong>the</strong> Bengali society (Kabeer 1991, 121). <strong>The</strong><br />
clothing matters are a method <strong>of</strong> defining or representing a group identity on two levels: on<br />
<strong>the</strong> one hand it demonstrates <strong>the</strong> affiliation to one’s own group, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> dress shows<br />
<strong>the</strong> demarcation from o<strong>the</strong>rs (Tarlo 1996, 318). <strong>The</strong> highly developed diversity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
People’s dresses demonstrates <strong>the</strong> exclusiveness <strong>of</strong> every group. <strong>The</strong> dual processes <strong>of</strong> differentiation<br />
and identification <strong>the</strong>refore according to inclusion and exclusion can be understood<br />
as a matter <strong>of</strong> classification according to horizontal demarcation lines or regarding hierarchies<br />
and rivalry. In respect to <strong>the</strong> different Hill Peoples <strong>the</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> dresses can be interpreted<br />
as a distinctive mark based on horizontal structures. Some groups, <strong>the</strong> Kuki or <strong>the</strong> Murong for<br />
example have been reported to be highly exclusive 127 by several authors (van Schendel 1997,<br />
105; Mohsin 1997, 20; Löffler 1986). This relates mainly to those living on <strong>the</strong> ridges <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
hills 128 . Limited infrastructure and mobility has left those groups largely isolated. Contact to<br />
strangers could mean threat to <strong>the</strong> space occupied by <strong>the</strong> group.<br />
A look at <strong>the</strong> areas <strong>of</strong> settlements illustrates this argument 129 : <strong>The</strong> different peoples, except<br />
<strong>the</strong> Marma, are largely concentrated in particular areas, <strong>the</strong> Tripura for example in <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT, <strong>the</strong> Murong in <strong>the</strong> Southwest and <strong>the</strong> Khumi in <strong>the</strong> South. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hand <strong>the</strong>re has been a complex structure <strong>of</strong> exchange between some groups, for example <strong>the</strong><br />
Chakma and Tanchangya. Contact among some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different groups has been quite intensive<br />
130 , especially when <strong>the</strong>y share one religion (van Schendel 1997, 105; Löffler 1968).<br />
Hence differences in dressing illustrate <strong>the</strong> isolation <strong>of</strong> some groups, while similarities can be<br />
regarded as a result <strong>of</strong> hybridisation processes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different indigenous societal systems.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Bengali influence, as well as <strong>the</strong> British, has fur<strong>the</strong>rmore transformed habits <strong>of</strong> dressing,<br />
particularly in respect to demands <strong>of</strong> clothing which cover certain parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> body within<br />
ethic-religious conventions 131 . <strong>The</strong> traditional dresses do usually not fulfil <strong>the</strong>se norms. An<br />
informant explained that <strong>the</strong> traditional dress <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Murong for example has changed so that<br />
it covers <strong>the</strong> knees and now usually covers <strong>the</strong> breast. I could observe that some Murong do<br />
not even wear <strong>the</strong> traditional dress at all but shalwar kameez or sari however. Though this<br />
could be regarded as a sign for Bengalisation or foreign influence in general, never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
more pragmatic aspects have to be taken into account. Dresses as traditions are changeable<br />
126 See <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> Astrid Marxen: “Negotiating gender. Changing Lifestyles <strong>of</strong> Female Students in Dhaka”<br />
127 An aspect which will be discussed in Chapter Language more broadly<br />
128 For <strong>the</strong> main distinction <strong>of</strong> two groups, those living on <strong>the</strong> hill tops and those living in <strong>the</strong> valleys see Chapter<br />
1<br />
129 see map in Appendix<br />
130 It would be interesting to examine <strong>the</strong> origin or meaning <strong>of</strong> similarities between <strong>the</strong> dresses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
and those in o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> South(east)asia <strong>the</strong>re are obviously similarities
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
according to needs and circumstances <strong>of</strong> every-day life (Bausinger 1986 cited in<br />
Kößler 1995, 8). I would assume that especially those having regular contact to Bengalis prefer<br />
a sari or a shalwar kameez in order not to attract attention by <strong>the</strong>ir clothing. Dresses are an<br />
obviously visible mode <strong>of</strong> distinction. In respect to militarisation and threat 132 , one would<br />
assume that assimilation is a strategy for being protected from risks to a certain extent.<br />
I have observed that especially women <strong>of</strong> higher status do not use <strong>the</strong> traditional dress any<br />
longer. Better situated Chakma women usually wear a sari or shalwar kameez at least when<br />
going out. One has to take in consideration that some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se women have been educated at<br />
<strong>the</strong> universities in <strong>Chitta</strong>gong or Dhaka where <strong>the</strong>y had to accommodate to <strong>the</strong> surrounding,<br />
as a Marma explained: “When we are going to Dhaka or <strong>Chitta</strong>gong, our women cannot wear<br />
<strong>the</strong>se traditional dresses”. Never<strong>the</strong>less it seems contradictory that especially those conscious<br />
about <strong>the</strong>ir distinct identity 133 do not insist upon traditional dresses. Being aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contradiction<br />
one Chakma argued that it is more and more difficult to get <strong>the</strong> traditional dresses<br />
in <strong>the</strong> shops because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali cultural impact. But this is indeed, as I have observed, not<br />
<strong>the</strong> case. <strong>The</strong>re are several shops selling <strong>the</strong> traditional clo<strong>the</strong>s in Rangamati as well as in<br />
Bandarban 134 . I would assume that <strong>the</strong> changes in dressing can merely regarded to be a result<br />
<strong>of</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> differentiation according to socio-economic status and <strong>the</strong>refore according to<br />
hierarchies. <strong>The</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma society with its system determined by order according<br />
to clan has been strongly influenced by Hindu elements 135 for years and <strong>the</strong>refore adopted<br />
hierarchical structures (van Schendel 1997, 106). Distinctions can additionally be made between<br />
those having contact to <strong>the</strong> “mainstream culture” 136 and those living more or less upon<br />
traditional values and habits. Among <strong>the</strong>se two groups hierarchical structures are obviously<br />
related to socio-economic status. But <strong>the</strong> choice <strong>of</strong> a sari does not necessarily mean an assimilation<br />
to Bengali culture; it can merely be seen in respect to <strong>the</strong> previous argument as related<br />
to <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> Hindu Culture. My data show that those Hill People, emphasising <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
distinctiveness from <strong>the</strong> Bengalis, try to construct a justification for <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong><br />
clothing matters, implying an assimilation to <strong>the</strong> dominant Bengali culture. One example is<br />
132 <strong>the</strong> argument here relates to human rights violations and oppression which are examined in some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
chapters, for example 6.3<br />
133 <strong>The</strong> assumption that <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> own identity and educational status are related to each o<strong>the</strong>r is discussed<br />
in Chapter 5<br />
134 <strong>The</strong>re are for example <strong>the</strong> government installed factories and BCSIC shops or <strong>the</strong> indigenous NGO Green<br />
Hill<br />
135 A typical Hindu tradition I have observed during <strong>the</strong> field research is to touch <strong>the</strong> feet <strong>of</strong> somebody honourable<br />
and elderly people for greeting<br />
136 <strong>The</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term mainstream in <strong>the</strong> context here is indicated in Chapter 4. Mainstream means nothing<br />
more <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> dominant Bengali society with its structures and content
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> explanatory construct for <strong>the</strong> shalwar kameez categorically given in a reply by a Chakma<br />
to my question why some Chakma women wear it although it is a Bengali dress: “<strong>the</strong> shalwar<br />
kameez is not a Bengali dress, it comes originally from Pakistan”. I put <strong>the</strong> same question to<br />
someone in Bandarban concerning lungis, and his answer was: “<strong>the</strong>se lungis we are wearing<br />
are originally from Burma”. Interestingly I could observe a difference between <strong>the</strong> Chakma<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Marma in respect to this: while <strong>the</strong> better situated Chakma women in Rangamati preferred<br />
a sari, I saw in Bandarban even among those belonging to <strong>the</strong> traditional and political<br />
elite wearing <strong>the</strong> Marma skirt. Recognising that <strong>the</strong> Marma dress itself leaves much more<br />
space for variations in style than <strong>the</strong> Chakma dress, which is relatively fixed in its design, I<br />
would assume that <strong>the</strong> changes <strong>of</strong> dresses among <strong>the</strong> Chakma should not be interpreted as a<br />
more advanced assimilation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma, but could be merely a matter <strong>of</strong> fashion or lifestyle<br />
based on hierarchical structures.<br />
Traditional dresses are a female phenomenon. Its a common occurrence in South Asia, that<br />
women are those for whom <strong>the</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> tradition intrinsic to communal identity has<br />
restrictive implementations, not just in clothing matters, but in regard to o<strong>the</strong>r rituals and<br />
practices as well (Dube 1998, 106). Dresses distinguish according to horizontal and hierarchical<br />
structures <strong>of</strong> society. <strong>The</strong> latter is, according to my data and interpretations, not<br />
necessarily related to questions <strong>of</strong> ethnic identity among <strong>the</strong> CHT peoples. <strong>The</strong> assimilation to<br />
Bengali culture in dressing matters does not imply <strong>the</strong> acceptance <strong>of</strong> Bengali culture in general,<br />
but can be traced back to processes <strong>of</strong> taking over parts <strong>of</strong> a dominating culture, which<br />
claims for itself to be advanced and modern, while <strong>the</strong> Hill People are “backward” according<br />
to <strong>the</strong> paradigm <strong>of</strong> Bengali nationalism. <strong>The</strong> process <strong>of</strong> constructing a nation out <strong>of</strong> cultural,<br />
linguistic, religious and ethnic attributes are determined as “high” culture which gets <strong>the</strong><br />
prominence (Ahmed 1996, 109).<strong>The</strong> fact that men are attracted by wearing western clo<strong>the</strong>s<br />
gives evidence for this assumption 137 . By constructing justifications for <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> Bengali<br />
clo<strong>the</strong>s <strong>the</strong> people demarcate <strong>the</strong>mselves from Bengali culture on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> being conscious<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference. Dress <strong>the</strong>refore, as one aspect <strong>of</strong> a very complex system <strong>of</strong> cultural boundaries,<br />
have to be seen in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> political structures.<br />
6.2. Language<br />
137 In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> women western clo<strong>the</strong>s do largely not fulfil <strong>the</strong> claims determined by religious conventions <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> dominant Bengali society
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
Every one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different ethnic groups in <strong>the</strong> Hill has a language <strong>of</strong> its own. Nowadays<br />
most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people are at least bilingual as <strong>the</strong>y have to understand <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian 138 or Bengali<br />
when <strong>the</strong>y communicate with Bengalis or, in some cases, with Hill People not belonging to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own group. <strong>The</strong> different languages are more or less connected to each o<strong>the</strong>r. Most <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>m belong to <strong>the</strong> Tibeto-Burmese linguistic family, like Tripura for example. <strong>The</strong> Marma<br />
language can considered to be a form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Arakanese language in Burma in <strong>the</strong> spoken as<br />
well as in its written form (Bernot 1960). A second group is <strong>the</strong> Kuki-Chin group, to which<br />
<strong>the</strong> oral languages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pankhua, Bawm, Kheyang, Khumi, Lushai and Kuki belong. Interesting<br />
about <strong>the</strong>se groups is that <strong>the</strong> Kuki for example nei<strong>the</strong>r learnt o<strong>the</strong>r languages nor<br />
allowed o<strong>the</strong>rs to learn <strong>the</strong>ir language; <strong>the</strong> Khumi even believed that if <strong>the</strong>y learn ano<strong>the</strong>r language<br />
<strong>the</strong>y will lose <strong>the</strong> power to resist evil (Mohsin 1997, 17ff). This characteristic can be<br />
related to <strong>the</strong> fear <strong>of</strong> being threatened by o<strong>the</strong>rs, illustrated by Shelley’s assertion that <strong>the</strong><br />
Khumi build <strong>the</strong>ir houses on tree-tops on <strong>the</strong> top <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hills. <strong>The</strong> villages are protected by a<br />
bamboo wall. Nobody is allowed to enter without <strong>the</strong>ir permission (Shelley 1992, 61). <strong>The</strong><br />
Lushai were extremely ferocious until <strong>the</strong>y were pacified and Christianised by <strong>the</strong> British<br />
(Mohsin 1997, 18). Illustrated here is <strong>the</strong> extreme exclusiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different, especially<br />
<strong>the</strong> smaller groups. <strong>The</strong>se characteristics show that <strong>the</strong>y had lived very isolated from o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
without contact or, as Löffler (1968) shows, in multiethnic communities where <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
identity was greatly emphasised. This is indeed an important issue for identity construction as<br />
<strong>the</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> contact with o<strong>the</strong>rs is strongly related to a very strong feeling <strong>of</strong> belonging<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r within <strong>the</strong> group (Elwert 1989, 448).<br />
As my contact during <strong>the</strong> field research was concentrated mainly on Marma and Chakma, I<br />
would like to emphasise <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter here . Bernot (1960, 145f.) writes: “Very little is<br />
known concerning <strong>the</strong> ancient Chakma language. Nowadays, men and women <strong>of</strong> this group<br />
speak Bengali, only or more precisely <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian Bengali ... <strong>the</strong>ir ancient writing was<br />
very near to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Burmese – though nowadays <strong>the</strong>y use Bengali writing – ... <strong>The</strong><br />
Chakma group appears to be an example <strong>of</strong> a Mongoloid group giving up its own language to<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indo-European”. According to my own data this is not true. Language was<br />
an issue which interested me a lot, and I asked several times about it. My interview partners<br />
explained that <strong>the</strong> Chakma language is still used among members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> group besides <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian<br />
dialect, which is especially favoured among those who have a close relationship to<br />
<strong>Chitta</strong>gong (because <strong>of</strong> business for example). Additionally I realised, thanks to my infor-
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
mants as well, that a creolisation 139 <strong>of</strong> language has taken place. In a conversational context<br />
language mixing is quite common among <strong>the</strong> Chakma as well as <strong>the</strong> Marma. Several times<br />
when I asked in which language people are communicate <strong>the</strong>y replied that “it is everything<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r”. <strong>The</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> different groups living on a very limited territory has led <strong>the</strong><br />
people to mix <strong>the</strong> different indigenous languages; only when a small minority <strong>of</strong> one group is<br />
living with members <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r one, <strong>the</strong>y do adopt <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r group, it was<br />
explained to me by a Marma. <strong>The</strong> former British influence means especially <strong>the</strong> older people<br />
to be more familiar with English <strong>the</strong>n with Bengali. <strong>The</strong> more educated Chakma I met tend to<br />
mix Chakma with English and <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian in informal conversations. <strong>The</strong> contradiction<br />
which appears here again can be explained according to Hannerz (1987) not as matters <strong>of</strong> rejection<br />
or assimilation, but as processes in which new cultural “systems <strong>of</strong> meaning” emerge.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se creolisation processes in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> language occur following <strong>the</strong> same mechanisms as<br />
has been assumed in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> dress already.<br />
But to return to <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian, which can be seen as <strong>the</strong> lingua franca <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area, as those<br />
tradesmen from <strong>the</strong> plains coming to <strong>the</strong> CHT were from <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong and <strong>the</strong> dialect<br />
developed as <strong>the</strong> main medium <strong>of</strong> communication with <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>The</strong> “new settlers” are<br />
living, according to my experience, relatively isolatedly 140 . Although Bengali is <strong>the</strong> medium<br />
<strong>of</strong> instruction at school, <strong>the</strong> common language in newspapers and o<strong>the</strong>r written media (besides<br />
English), some Chakma let me know that <strong>the</strong>y would never use it in informal conversations.<br />
This rejection <strong>of</strong> that language must be seen in <strong>the</strong> political context. Bengali is <strong>the</strong> language<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh 141 , used by <strong>the</strong> settlers coming with <strong>the</strong> settlement programmes to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hills, while <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian was known and used already before, as trade relations had made<br />
it necessary for communicating with outsiders and those “naturally migrated” Bengalis who<br />
have lived in <strong>the</strong> CHT already for a longer time. <strong>The</strong> Hill People seem to feel more attached<br />
to <strong>the</strong>m than to <strong>the</strong> “political” settlers. An interviewee maintained: “<strong>The</strong>se Bengalis who are<br />
originally here are becoming like us.” Bengali on <strong>the</strong> contrary was like a foreign language for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People. One older informant maintained that he did not even know Bengali when it<br />
was introduced as <strong>the</strong> state-language.<br />
138 <strong>Chitta</strong>gonian is a dialect spoken in <strong>the</strong> south-east. According to my information it is a dialect <strong>of</strong> Bengali, but<br />
very different and for people coming from o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh almost not understandable. I would compare<br />
it with <strong>the</strong> relation between Swiss German and German.<br />
139 For <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> creolisation see Hannerz 1987. Important here is that creolisation implies <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong><br />
something new out <strong>of</strong> sources which are <strong>of</strong>ten originally widely different<br />
140 my data reveal that <strong>the</strong> settlers live usually in separate villages or at least in separate areas <strong>of</strong> villages or<br />
towns. According to my experience <strong>the</strong>re is no village to be found where Chakma and Muslim settlers are living<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
141 Bangladesh is by constitution a uni-lingual and uni-cultural state, see Chapter 3.
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
<strong>The</strong> Bengali language can <strong>the</strong>refore be seen as a symbol <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hegemony <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi<br />
state, as it is for <strong>the</strong> Bengalis a symbol for <strong>the</strong>ir unity. Thus <strong>the</strong> so-called jhumma-identity is<br />
based on non-Bengali language (Haque 1998, 132). Language is a good example to illustrate<br />
<strong>the</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> identity construction along cultural differences which must always be analysed<br />
with regard to political issues. <strong>The</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> Muslim religion becomes relativised<br />
when previously accepted language commonalties appear. Categorisation according to <strong>the</strong> socalled<br />
boundary markers is <strong>the</strong>refore always tied to political aspects <strong>of</strong> ethnicity.<br />
6.3. Religion<br />
<strong>The</strong> variety <strong>of</strong> different religions is quite broad in <strong>the</strong> CHT. <strong>The</strong> Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya,<br />
Chak, Kheyang are Buddhists, <strong>the</strong> Tripura believe in Hinduism and <strong>the</strong> Murong, Khumi<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Kuki are Animists. Lushai, Bawm and Pankhua used to be Animists until <strong>the</strong>y had<br />
largely been Christianised by <strong>the</strong> British. <strong>The</strong> complex structure <strong>of</strong> religious beliefs among<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People has its potential for conflicts in itself quite apart from <strong>the</strong> fact that none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
groups believe in Islam. Religious differences <strong>the</strong>refore play a tremendous role in processes<br />
<strong>of</strong> identity construction on two levels. First I will describe and analyse <strong>the</strong> conflicts arising<br />
out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s relationship to <strong>the</strong> Bengali Muslim population, which are, remembering<br />
<strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> religion in Bangladeshi nationalism in particular, a constitutive feature<br />
<strong>of</strong> demarcation and group-formation. <strong>The</strong> second part will deal with <strong>the</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> religious<br />
differences among <strong>the</strong> Hill Peoples <strong>the</strong>mselves and <strong>the</strong> resulting consequences for a<br />
“possible” collective identity.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> militarisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT and <strong>the</strong> move towards an Islamic orientation in Bangladesh’s<br />
state policies, religion became more and more instrumentalised and politicised within<br />
<strong>the</strong> armed conflict. 54 Buddhist temples were destroyed within eight months as well as 22<br />
Hindu temples in 1986 (EMAIL 1993, 30f. cited in: Mohsin 1997, 179). Quite common has<br />
also been <strong>the</strong> prohibition <strong>of</strong> religious ceremonies, or sacrileges like entering a temple in shoes,<br />
which is a religious taboo for Buddhists (Mohsin, 1997, 32). Some <strong>of</strong> my interviewees insisted<br />
that it is a common practice for Muslims to convert tribal girls by forcing <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
marry. This forced intermarriage was used as an instrument to integrate <strong>the</strong> Hill People into<br />
Bengali society and to change <strong>the</strong> demographic relations in <strong>the</strong> area 142 . <strong>The</strong> Report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT Commission outlines about 30 different cases <strong>of</strong> women who had been kidnapped, con-<br />
142 A secret memorandum for example encouraged army <strong>of</strong>ficers to marry tribal women. I would assume that this<br />
was strategy to follow this aim. Although it could be considered as an imputation, it is at least represented by
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
verted and married (CHT Commission, 1991, 108). With such incidents <strong>the</strong> Hill People became<br />
increasingly aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> religious difference. A Tripura interviewee complained about<br />
<strong>the</strong> massive Islamisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT. From both sides religion was transformed into <strong>the</strong> distinctive<br />
guiding mark. Besides <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>the</strong> Hill People feared, especially under Ershad’s<br />
regime, that a paradigm <strong>of</strong> a mosque-centred society has been achieved. Although <strong>the</strong>re were<br />
only 40 mosques in <strong>the</strong> Hill Tracts in 1961, <strong>the</strong>ir number had increased by 1974 to 200 and in<br />
1981 <strong>the</strong>re were already 592 mosques (Mohsin 1997, 179). Since <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> number has increased<br />
manifold (Mohsin 1996, 74). For <strong>the</strong> Hill People <strong>the</strong> mosques are a symbol <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
oppression. Once on a walk in <strong>the</strong> Hills I noticed a colourful mosque in a village. <strong>The</strong><br />
Chakma who accompanied me saw my astonishment and maintained bitterly that <strong>the</strong> mosques<br />
are always built in such a striking way while <strong>the</strong> Buddhist temples are always modest and<br />
hidden. <strong>The</strong> noisy loudness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim prayer five times a day appeared to be disturbing as<br />
well. In regard to <strong>the</strong>se issues directly related to religious symbols and practices, <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
develop prejudices against <strong>the</strong> Bengalis which focus on <strong>the</strong>ir Muslim faith. I was told for<br />
example that “<strong>the</strong> Bengalis know just Allah and women”, or that nearly all Bengalis would<br />
rape <strong>the</strong>ir wives.<br />
Besides cases <strong>of</strong> human rights violations caused by religious differences and those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usage<br />
<strong>of</strong> visible signs for distinction, <strong>the</strong> Islamisation <strong>of</strong> state politics has its consequences on<br />
<strong>the</strong> institutional level as well. Various religiously motivated NGOs and political parties are<br />
highly influential in <strong>the</strong> CHT. Jammat-i-Islam 143 is strongly supported by <strong>the</strong> Bengali settlers<br />
and works very closely toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> military in <strong>the</strong> CHT. <strong>The</strong> same is true for Al-Rabita,<br />
a Saudi government-founded NGO which works as a missionary organisation and is entrusted<br />
with <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> Islamisation backed by <strong>the</strong> military (Mohsin, 1997, 179). <strong>The</strong>se Islamically<br />
oriented organisations seem to be supported by <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials, as an assertion <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Chakma interviewees shows. He maintained that a tribal association had organised <strong>the</strong> construction<br />
<strong>of</strong> a new hospital financed by South Korea, but <strong>the</strong> local government had abandoned<br />
<strong>the</strong> project, while ano<strong>the</strong>r hospital financed by Saudi-Arabia was released for construction. It<br />
is obvious that <strong>the</strong>se kinds <strong>of</strong> actions make people aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir religious distinctiveness.<br />
<strong>Case</strong>s <strong>of</strong> being disadvantaged are directly traced back to religion. By rejecting Islam <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
People construct a commonality that crosses <strong>the</strong>ir internal religious diversity, viz. not being<br />
some people. See CHT Commission (1991, 108f.). Rape, which was perpetuated in <strong>the</strong> Hills as well can be considered<br />
to have <strong>the</strong> same background<br />
143 Jammat-i-Islam is a political party which can be categorised as radical from <strong>the</strong> right-wing spectrum. Already<br />
existing in <strong>the</strong> 1970s, utilised Saudi-Arabian support for political and social welfare work to extend resources to<br />
<strong>the</strong> rural poor population (Feldman 1998)
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
Muslim. This involves all Hill People equally and <strong>the</strong> non-tribal Hindus and Barua 144 living<br />
in <strong>the</strong> CHT as well. <strong>The</strong> we-group feeling (Elwert 1998) which is characterised by an anti-<br />
Islam attitude thus comprises all groups equally regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir status as Hill People or<br />
not, and is developed solely out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exclusion from <strong>the</strong> dominant Muslim society. It can<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore be regarded as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most universal factors <strong>of</strong> identity construction.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time a diversification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People can be observed. <strong>The</strong>se differences relate<br />
mainly to political issues 145 and <strong>the</strong> educational advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chakma in particular. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore<br />
<strong>the</strong> dominance <strong>of</strong> Buddhist groups is recognised as well. In <strong>the</strong> early 1980s an<br />
organisation namely <strong>the</strong> Buddhist Minority Protection Committee (BMPC) was founded,<br />
which started a communal “hate campaign” against Bangladeshi authorities. <strong>The</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
organisation was to accuse <strong>the</strong> GOB <strong>of</strong> religious intolerance and Islamisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT. <strong>The</strong><br />
non-Buddhist peoples did not support <strong>the</strong> campaign and <strong>the</strong> final result was a trend to resent<br />
<strong>the</strong> Buddhist dominance among some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r groups (Ahmed 1993, 53). During <strong>the</strong> field<br />
work I conducted, an expert interviewee at Dhaka inform me that some peoples, <strong>the</strong> Tripura<br />
in particular, have immense resentments against <strong>the</strong> Buddhist/Chakma majority in <strong>the</strong> JSS. In<br />
Bandarban I was told by a Murong that his community is thinking about conversion to Christianity<br />
in order to get more power to resist <strong>the</strong> Buddhist dominance in <strong>the</strong> CHT, which is seen<br />
as a problem, especially since <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord 146 .<br />
<strong>The</strong> Muslim majority within Bangladesh and <strong>the</strong> hegemonial nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Islam based state<br />
policies has contributed substantially to <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s alienation from <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi<br />
society. Demarcation through religion is hence directly related to <strong>the</strong> political interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
groups. Whenever one group starts to develop hegemony over o<strong>the</strong>rs, religious differences<br />
become important for demarcation. In respect to <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People and <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis, being Muslim or not is a guiding aspect for constructing identity, which could be<br />
traced back to <strong>the</strong> immense gap between <strong>the</strong> majority and minority and <strong>the</strong> strategic use <strong>of</strong><br />
religion by <strong>the</strong> GOB. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand <strong>the</strong> Hill People use religious differences for identification<br />
whenever political disputes and discussions come up. In <strong>the</strong>se cases religiously based<br />
identities become reinterpreted and instrumentalised according to political interests. As presented<br />
above, religion determines a large part <strong>of</strong> differences in culture, so that its importance<br />
144 Barua is called a non-tribal group which believes in Buddhism and comes from <strong>the</strong> plains <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong. Very<br />
little is found in <strong>the</strong> literature about <strong>the</strong>m. During my stay I have met some Barua at Rangamati. <strong>The</strong>ir outward<br />
appearance is only slightly different to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
145 As I have already presented in Chapter 3 and 5<br />
146 <strong>The</strong> Peace Accord between <strong>the</strong> GOB and <strong>the</strong> JSS has been criticised as being an agreement between <strong>the</strong><br />
Chakma and <strong>the</strong> GOB without taking into account <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r groups. See Chapter 7
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
in keeping groups apart is quite influential. Like dress and language, religion must be seen in<br />
<strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> political events, which I will outline in <strong>the</strong> following part.<br />
6.4. Cultural Habits as One Aspect <strong>of</strong> Identity <strong>Construction</strong><br />
Recognising cultural differences does not necessarily provoke an ethnic conflict. In writing<br />
this chapter my aim was to investigate <strong>the</strong> complex structure <strong>of</strong> different causes and factors<br />
which maintain <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> identities in <strong>the</strong> conflict context. I assume that <strong>the</strong>se cultural<br />
aspects and <strong>the</strong> attempt to emphasise <strong>the</strong>se by <strong>the</strong> different groups are heavily interconnected<br />
with political and economic aspects, which I will illustrate in <strong>the</strong> following by<br />
choosing several examples, which are appropriated due to <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> language, culture<br />
and religion for <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation and a counter-model at <strong>the</strong> same time.<br />
<strong>The</strong> cultural features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> different groups are a result <strong>of</strong> historical processes and diversification<br />
due to <strong>the</strong> occupation <strong>of</strong> different ecological spaces as well as <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a process <strong>of</strong><br />
ascription and self-ascription. According to Barth (1969) ethnic groups are not just a result <strong>of</strong><br />
stratification but are seen as a form <strong>of</strong> social organisation, that is, <strong>the</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> categorisations<br />
to define a person for purposes <strong>of</strong> interaction (Barth 1969, 13f). Fur<strong>the</strong>r he mentions that “<strong>the</strong><br />
features that are taken into account are not <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> ‘objective’ differences, but only those<br />
which <strong>the</strong> actors <strong>the</strong>mselves regard as significant ... some cultural features are used by <strong>the</strong><br />
actors as signals and emblems <strong>of</strong> differences, o<strong>the</strong>rs are ignored” (Barth 1969, 14). Which<br />
features are regarded as important for ascription or demarcation is to a large extent <strong>the</strong> result<br />
<strong>of</strong> political processes <strong>of</strong> constructing 147 <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> a group. At <strong>the</strong> same time economic and<br />
political developments affect <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong> cultural habits. <strong>The</strong>ir results provoke an interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> political or economic measures according to cultural boundaries.<br />
My Chakma and Marma interviewees explained, that <strong>the</strong>ir women would never work in o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
people’s households for money and that a Hill Person would never beg, different than <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis, because <strong>the</strong> Hill People would be too proud. That rejection is heavily connected to<br />
economic as well as political features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s society as well: as an agro-based<br />
society having lived mainly subsistent, economic independence seems to be a very important<br />
issue for <strong>the</strong>m. Working in o<strong>the</strong>r people’s household would reflect dependence on o<strong>the</strong>rs. Being<br />
independent is obviously a political aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People as well.<br />
147 for that assumption see Anderson’s notion <strong>of</strong> “imagined communities” where he examines <strong>the</strong> construction<br />
<strong>of</strong> a nation by using different strategies based on commonalties <strong>of</strong> a group
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
A basic issue is that <strong>of</strong> nationalism in Bangladesh. While Bengali nationalism<br />
constructed unity on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> language and cultural commonalties, Bangladeshi nationalism<br />
is based on religion. All <strong>the</strong>se features maintain boundaries between <strong>the</strong> Bengalis and <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill People, as none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m can be used for self-ascription by <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>The</strong> boundaries drawn<br />
between <strong>the</strong> two groups can be seen as politically constructed. A good example is <strong>the</strong> formation<br />
<strong>of</strong> religiously based organisations for interest-representation, like <strong>the</strong> BMPC, which was<br />
founded during <strong>the</strong> Islamist regime <strong>of</strong> Ershad in <strong>the</strong> 1980s. Illustrative is my observation that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hill People rejected <strong>the</strong> “political settlers” much more than <strong>the</strong> “original” ones, regardless<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir common religion.<br />
<strong>The</strong> “artificial” emphasis <strong>of</strong> cultural differences must be seen in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> extreme<br />
majority-minority-relationship which is demographically given in Bangladesh. <strong>The</strong> consciousness<br />
was sharpened by <strong>the</strong> demographic changes in <strong>the</strong> CHT as <strong>the</strong> Hill People were<br />
confronted, due to <strong>the</strong> settlement programme with <strong>the</strong> majority. In this process <strong>the</strong>y became<br />
aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir minority status within <strong>the</strong> hegemonial structures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state. <strong>The</strong> relationship<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bengalis and Hill People in <strong>the</strong> CHT, as well as all over Bangladesh, turned out not to be<br />
symbiotic, as Barth describes <strong>the</strong> prerequisite for stability in such systems (Barth 1969, 20).<br />
In such a case <strong>the</strong> groups choose a strategy for <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> change. In our case <strong>the</strong><br />
elite has chosen to ground <strong>the</strong>ir strategy on <strong>the</strong> emphasis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir distinct ethnic identity 148 .<br />
<strong>The</strong> decision for that strategy must be seen in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kaptai-impact, <strong>the</strong> settlement<br />
programme and <strong>the</strong> hegemonial structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state system. Besides <strong>the</strong>se cultural differences<br />
are used for ascription by <strong>the</strong> people <strong>the</strong>mselves, namely religion (non-Islam), language<br />
(non-Bengali) and culture expressed in modes <strong>of</strong> cultivation (jhum) and dress for instance.<br />
Besides <strong>the</strong>se, seclusion processes have meant that inter-ethnic relationships are categorically<br />
rejected. A characteristic feature becoming visible in <strong>the</strong> Hills is <strong>the</strong> total segregation <strong>of</strong> villages<br />
and areas <strong>of</strong> living in <strong>the</strong> towns. A typical “multi-ethnic” village in Rangamati has one<br />
quarter for <strong>the</strong> Chakma and ano<strong>the</strong>r one for <strong>the</strong> Bengalis (not settlers), Barua, Hindus and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs. <strong>The</strong>re is a school in <strong>the</strong> middle holding <strong>the</strong> two areas toge<strong>the</strong>r and apart in one. Asked<br />
for “real” multi-ethnic villages, <strong>the</strong> informant replied that I would never find a mixed village<br />
different from those previously described.<br />
As much as <strong>the</strong> boundary-markers seclude two groups which are per se segregated, <strong>the</strong>y become<br />
reinterpreted and instrumentalised according to rational decisions. Common patterns <strong>of</strong><br />
148 Barth distinguishes three strategies: becoming incorporated into <strong>the</strong> pre-established system, accepting <strong>the</strong><br />
minority status but encapsulating cultural differences in sectors <strong>of</strong> non-articulation or, as chosen in <strong>the</strong> CHT<br />
case, emphasising ethnic identity and using it to develop new positions and patterns to organise activities in<br />
sectors formerly not found in <strong>the</strong>ir society (Barth 1969, 33)
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
distinction lose relevance whenever it is considered to be required, o<strong>the</strong>rs become <strong>the</strong> dominant<br />
ones. This is illustrated by analysing <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong> relationships among <strong>the</strong> different<br />
groups. As presented above, <strong>the</strong>re are macroscopic cleavages between various groups which<br />
are directly related to <strong>the</strong> emphasis <strong>of</strong> cultural boundaries in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> political events. In<br />
<strong>the</strong>se processes o<strong>the</strong>r identities become obvious: when within <strong>the</strong> indigenous community a<br />
struggle for political power arises, boundaries are drawn on religious lines, like Buddhist and<br />
non-Buddhist, or Chakma and non-Chakma for instance. (Ethnic) <strong>Identities</strong> are <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
never stable systems for ascription and self-ascription, but are changeable and fluent or, as<br />
Schlee (1996, 11) argues, multiple configurations 149 . <strong>The</strong>se taxonomies can be adverse or<br />
overlapping. Whenever various taxonomies are considerable, <strong>the</strong> agents can emphasise one or<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r difference or commonality, whatever <strong>the</strong> adequate one in a given situation is (Schlee<br />
1996, 15). Within that kind <strong>of</strong> perspective <strong>the</strong> actors can switch from one identity to ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
an accordance with <strong>the</strong> context. This is revealed by <strong>the</strong> famous statement <strong>of</strong> M.N. Larma<br />
given in 1972 in <strong>the</strong> parliament:<br />
“I am a Chakma. A Marma can never be a Chakma, a Chakma can never be a Bengali ... I am<br />
a Chakma. I am not a Bengali. I am a citizen <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh – Bangladeshi, You are also<br />
Bangladeshis but your national identity is Bengali ... <strong>The</strong>y [Hill People] can never be Bengalis”<br />
(Shelley, 1992, 110; Mohsin 10997, 62).<br />
7. <strong>The</strong> Peace Accord – A Political Solution<br />
“<strong>The</strong> high priest was asked if he expects that <strong>the</strong> new government under Sheikh Hasina will<br />
do a better job than <strong>the</strong> former one. <strong>The</strong> priest answered: If you take a mango and it tastes<br />
sour, do you really expect that ano<strong>the</strong>r one from <strong>the</strong> same tree will be sweet?”<br />
After several years <strong>of</strong> negotiations between <strong>the</strong> GOB and <strong>the</strong> JSS a peace accord was signed<br />
on 2 nd December 1997. <strong>The</strong> Peace Accord got international recognition and acknowledgement.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> 26 th September 1999 Sheikh Hasina received <strong>the</strong> UNESCO’s Felix Houphonet-<br />
Boigny Peace Award as her reward in establishing peace in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts 150 . Especially<br />
its significance for stability and economic development in <strong>the</strong> region has been<br />
appreciated, as it ended 27 years <strong>of</strong> insurgency. <strong>The</strong> Peace Accord comprises <strong>the</strong> following<br />
provisions (Mohsin 1998; Rashiduzzaman 1998):<br />
149 Schlee uses <strong>the</strong> term “Pluritaxis” here<br />
150 see: http://shobak.org/jumma/ and http://thirdculture.com/ipa/
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
1. <strong>The</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> a CHT Regional Council (CHTRC/RC) comprising 22 indirectly<br />
elected members 151 including <strong>the</strong> chairman who is elected by <strong>the</strong> members. <strong>The</strong> three<br />
chairmen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> District Councils are ex-<strong>of</strong>ficio members enjoying <strong>the</strong> right to vote. <strong>The</strong><br />
RC constitutes as follows: 12 tribal men and 2 female tribal members, 6 Bengali men and<br />
1 Bengali female member.<br />
2. Reformation and renaming <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> District Local Government Council into Hill District<br />
Council. <strong>The</strong> Hill District Council is responsible for <strong>the</strong> recruitment <strong>of</strong> local police forces<br />
up to <strong>the</strong> sub inspector level.<br />
3. <strong>The</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a Ministry for <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts Affairs.<br />
4. <strong>The</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> all temporary army camps except <strong>the</strong> BDR and three cantonments.<br />
5. A general amnesty for <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini fighters under <strong>the</strong> condition that <strong>the</strong>y surrender<br />
arms and ammunition and return to normal life. If not, legal action will be taken against<br />
<strong>the</strong>m. Every family receives Taka 50.000 for rehabilitation.<br />
6. A land commission headed by a retired judge and constituted with <strong>the</strong> following members:<br />
<strong>the</strong> raja and Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> District Council concerned, a Chairman representative<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> RC and <strong>the</strong> Divisional Commissioner. <strong>The</strong> Commission “shall have full power to<br />
annul all rights <strong>of</strong> ownership on Lands and Hills which have so far been given illegal settlements<br />
or encroached illegally. No appeal can be made against <strong>the</strong> verdict <strong>of</strong> this<br />
commission and <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> this commission will be treated as final. This will be implied<br />
in case <strong>of</strong> fringe land” (Independent 12 th Dec. 1997).<br />
While <strong>the</strong> government’s success in <strong>the</strong> negotiations is still celebrated, <strong>the</strong> opposition party<br />
BNP utilises <strong>the</strong> accord for <strong>the</strong>ir political aims and competition. On 25.08.1999 <strong>the</strong> Daily<br />
Star 152<br />
reports Khaleda Zia’s demand to rehabilitate <strong>the</strong> slum dwellers <strong>of</strong> Dhaka in <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT 153 . In <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supporters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord this demand looked like a provocation,<br />
but has, besides that, to be seen in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> BNP’s policies towards India 154 on <strong>the</strong><br />
one hand and in respect to <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> policy-making in Bangladesh in general 155 . India has<br />
played an important role and <strong>the</strong> negotiations finally got <strong>the</strong> necessary impetus, as India did<br />
not support <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini any longer 156 (Rashiduzzaman 1998).<br />
151 <strong>The</strong> RC members are indirectly elected by <strong>the</strong> directly elected members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three Hill District Councils.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se District Local Government Councils were established already in 1989 through <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> a Parliamentary<br />
Act under Ershad<br />
152 One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> more important Bangladeshi newspapers written in English<br />
153 During that time <strong>the</strong> government set forth a forced eviction <strong>of</strong> many slums in Dhaka. <strong>The</strong> slums were systematically<br />
razed by bulldozers. This event was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most discussed political events in Bangladesh during<br />
August 1999 and provoked several hartals. <strong>The</strong> eviction started with several slums along <strong>the</strong> railway, where <strong>the</strong><br />
GOB acted in co-operation with <strong>the</strong> railway company. On <strong>the</strong> 09.08.1999 <strong>The</strong> Independent reported about 4,000<br />
razed shanties and 20,000 homeless people<br />
154 BNPs policies are based on <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> Bangladeshi nationalism, which demarcates <strong>the</strong> Muslim Bengalis<br />
from West-Bengal in India. <strong>The</strong> programme involves <strong>the</strong>refore a general rejection <strong>of</strong> India. Heavily discussed<br />
(and opposed by <strong>the</strong> BNP) was during that time <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a corridor for transhipment to India<br />
155 <strong>The</strong> state-system in Bangladesh is highly dependent on decision-making by utilising hartals. <strong>The</strong>se strikes<br />
which mainly involve transport stops have <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> influencing and disrupting <strong>the</strong> economic development and<br />
<strong>of</strong> putting pressure on <strong>the</strong> government<br />
156 <strong>The</strong> times before <strong>the</strong> Shanti Bahini had recruited <strong>the</strong>ir fighters, mainly out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> refugee camps in India and<br />
had <strong>the</strong>ir training camps <strong>the</strong>re
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
Examining <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord turned out to be <strong>the</strong> most problematic question <strong>of</strong><br />
my work. Whenever I tried to find something out about continuities and change in relation to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Peace Accord, <strong>the</strong> results were frustrating. Only a few people seemed to consider <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> treaty to be such as it was celebrated in <strong>the</strong> international public and <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangladeshi party policies. <strong>The</strong> treaty was merely considered to be something abstract, <strong>the</strong><br />
people do not have much to do with. <strong>The</strong> opinions <strong>of</strong> my interviewees were very diversified.<br />
Generally three categories can be distinguished: those who are optimistic and who believe in<br />
<strong>the</strong> unifying character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> event, those who blame especially administrative and democracy<br />
problems and finally those who reject <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord in general.<br />
It was a striking phenomenon that especially those Hill People in <strong>of</strong>ficial positions but not<br />
involved in party policies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS expressed a lot <strong>of</strong> trust related to <strong>the</strong> peace accord. <strong>The</strong>se<br />
idealists were nearly unreliable in <strong>the</strong>ir optimistic attitude. Several interview-partners <strong>of</strong> that<br />
category stated something like:<br />
“We have to be patient, <strong>the</strong> Hill People must be unified with <strong>the</strong> Bengalis and live in peace.<br />
Already now <strong>the</strong> situation here turns back to normal life. Of course, <strong>the</strong>re are some student<br />
protests or something, but <strong>the</strong>se are a common phenomenon in Bangladesh. This must not be<br />
seen in relation to <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord”.<br />
Sometimes I had <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong>se interviewees were reluctant to give statements<br />
which are not legitimised by <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>of</strong>ficial position, a <strong>the</strong>sis which I cannot confirm comprehensively.<br />
A lot <strong>of</strong> people complained that <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord is <strong>the</strong> most serious<br />
problem. As <strong>the</strong> land commission has not been installed, <strong>the</strong> temporary army camps not withdrawn<br />
and <strong>the</strong> local police force not recruited yet 157 , a lot <strong>of</strong> people seemed to be disappointed<br />
and disillusioned. People blame ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> GOB for <strong>the</strong>se failures or <strong>the</strong> RC and <strong>the</strong> JSS itself.<br />
One interviewee expressed <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> JSS would lose its contact to <strong>the</strong> base and as<br />
long as Bangladesh did not accept democratic values and realise <strong>the</strong>se in state policies, <strong>the</strong><br />
situation would not become better. A great problem according to him is that <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
“are not facing <strong>the</strong> problem”. A lack <strong>of</strong> education and <strong>the</strong>ir socio-economic status would not<br />
allow <strong>the</strong>m to participate in <strong>the</strong> political decision-making process. Fur<strong>the</strong>r administrative reasons<br />
were maintained quite <strong>of</strong>ten for <strong>the</strong> problems with <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace<br />
Accord. Those responsible are blamed because <strong>the</strong>y recruited <strong>of</strong>ficial personnel from <strong>the</strong> underground,<br />
who are not qualified for <strong>the</strong> administrative work in <strong>the</strong> RC. Never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong><br />
Peace Accord in general was considered to be a step towards peace and stability in <strong>the</strong> region.<br />
157 During <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> research in September 1999
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
Talking to JSS people I realised that <strong>the</strong>y are merely discontented with regard to <strong>the</strong> implementation<br />
and <strong>the</strong> role played by <strong>the</strong> GOB. <strong>The</strong> not accomplished agreements implied in <strong>the</strong><br />
Peace Accord, like <strong>the</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> army and <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land commission,<br />
which are very sensitive issues in <strong>the</strong> Hills 158 , are interpreted as not fulfilled promises and<br />
fraud. That appreciation confirms stereotypes and prejudices <strong>the</strong> Hill People developed towards<br />
Bengalis over years. “<strong>The</strong>y never do what <strong>the</strong>y have promised” 159 asserted a Chakma<br />
during my field work.<br />
<strong>The</strong> third category comprises activists complaining being “sold out” to <strong>the</strong> government, as<br />
original demands 160 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS were not recognised in <strong>the</strong> negotiations and <strong>the</strong> treaty (Mohsin<br />
1998). <strong>The</strong> Pahari Chattro Parishad for example is one important fraction which clearly opposes<br />
<strong>the</strong> Peace Accord for, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong>se reasons. <strong>The</strong> students’ organisation as well<br />
as <strong>the</strong> Hill Women’s Federation (HWF), both attached to <strong>the</strong> JSS and <strong>the</strong> main political forum<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> party largely reject <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord, as it brings about insecurity, inequality and fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
polarisation (Mohsin 1998, 107). Besides <strong>the</strong>se politically organised groups especially<br />
those having, although highly educated, problems with integrating into <strong>the</strong> not sufficient socio-economic<br />
structure in <strong>the</strong> Hills, seem to reject <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord. <strong>The</strong> belief, that full<br />
autonomy and <strong>the</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> settlers would solve <strong>the</strong>ir problems derives from a nationalist<br />
attitude, developed out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> counter-nationalism movement propagated by <strong>the</strong> JSS<br />
over years.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Bengali settlers in <strong>the</strong> area oppose <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord largely, as <strong>the</strong>y see <strong>the</strong>ir interests not<br />
properly represented. <strong>The</strong>y see <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord as a measure to empower <strong>the</strong> Hill People, as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are not representatively taken into account in <strong>the</strong> newly established decision-taking<br />
institutions 161 .<br />
Considering <strong>the</strong>se diversified opinions and interests, “<strong>the</strong> CHT today is divided in every<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word” (Mohsin 1998, 107), not just along lines <strong>of</strong> ethnic segregation. A Chakma<br />
college student has written in a letter:<br />
“But <strong>the</strong> government shows <strong>the</strong> reluctance in <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> problems solution. As a result, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
organised two groups. Of <strong>the</strong>m one is known as Agreement Supported Group and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r is<br />
Agreement Non-Supported group. Among <strong>the</strong>se two groups JSS itself is one, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r is opposite<br />
<strong>of</strong> JSS ... In exchange <strong>of</strong> many blood <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord is out today’s crop. And <strong>the</strong>re<br />
too occurred many obstacle in <strong>the</strong> ... implementation. Still <strong>the</strong> Chakma refugees ... did not get<br />
158 As one has hopefully recognised after having read my paper: land problems and military threat combined<br />
with settlement problems are <strong>the</strong> most serious difficulties <strong>the</strong> Hill People had to face. <strong>The</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>se points hamper <strong>the</strong> trust-building effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accord immensely<br />
159 A hint at <strong>the</strong> Muslim “Inshallah” what means “if God wishes”<br />
160 Like <strong>the</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> all Bengali settlers and full autonomy within Bangladesh (see Chapter 3.2.)<br />
161 This relates to <strong>the</strong> RC as well as to <strong>the</strong> power <strong>the</strong> land commission will gain
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir rehabilitation. <strong>The</strong> Land Commission is not in force yet ... <strong>The</strong> Temporary Army Camps<br />
have not been removed yet. <strong>The</strong>se transient forces devastate and do great harm to us. This is<br />
<strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> our country.”<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> Hill People appear to be divided along political lines, my data reveal <strong>the</strong> assumption<br />
that most people perceive <strong>the</strong>ir every-day life as going as regularly as it was before.<br />
Some interviewees considered <strong>the</strong> shift from <strong>the</strong> military regime towards a democratic state<br />
policy as much more important. Interviewees asserted that until 1993 it was impossible for<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to enter <strong>the</strong> streets after darkness 162 . One could get <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> détente during<br />
that time had been considered as a much more significant event than <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord.<br />
Examining <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> my field work in respect to <strong>the</strong> various opinions and views on <strong>the</strong><br />
Peace Accord, I will concentrate in <strong>the</strong> following on two important questions. <strong>The</strong> first relates<br />
to development issues in <strong>the</strong> CHT. Like everywhere in Bangladesh, national and international<br />
NGOs constitute a substantial part <strong>of</strong> civil society. <strong>The</strong>refore NGOs have to be seen as very<br />
important agencies for development. <strong>The</strong> NGOs are <strong>of</strong> particular interest, as <strong>the</strong>y provoke,<br />
reflect and are utilised for, <strong>of</strong>ten not intentionally, <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> ethnic segregation. <strong>The</strong> Chapter<br />
will be ended by looking at questions <strong>of</strong> stability and sustainability <strong>of</strong> peace in <strong>the</strong> CHT.<br />
7.1. Developmental Issues – National NGOs in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is not much literature available about NGOs in <strong>the</strong> CHT as <strong>the</strong>ir establishment can be<br />
considered as a recent phenomenon. Nowadays especially <strong>the</strong> bigger national NGOs in Bangladesh,<br />
such as Proshika and BRAC, and international ones like Caritas and World Vision<br />
have established projects in <strong>the</strong> area. Besides <strong>the</strong>re are several local ones as well, which are<br />
predominantly working for and with Hill People 163 . Many people try to establish new NGOs<br />
based on specific Hill People’s issues. One example is Green Hill, which claims to be “a development<br />
organisation for <strong>the</strong> indigenous community” (Annual Report 1995-97). Besides<br />
various smaller ones are to be found in Rangamati as well as in Bandarban.<br />
162 During that time several measures were taken, such as a pacification programme and rehabilitation for indigenous<br />
families and returnees from India (Shelley 1992, 149ff.). Until that time five amnesties had been taken<br />
from 1983 till 1991. Already in 1987 <strong>the</strong> GOB started negotiating with <strong>the</strong> JSS (Shelley 1992, 140). <strong>The</strong> army<br />
used ano<strong>the</strong>r strategy from <strong>the</strong>n on: it has been partly more involved in stimulating and backing organisations <strong>of</strong><br />
settlers. <strong>The</strong> democratic movement (Pahari Chattro Parishad and HWF) has been isolated and criminalised.<br />
Arens even assumes that Khaleda had negotiated only to satisfy foreign donors. That may be an exp lanation why<br />
more than 10 years <strong>of</strong> negotiation had to necessary for signing a Peace Accord (Arens 1997, 1817)<br />
163 As well as those concentrating on <strong>the</strong> settlers’ interests, see Chapter 4
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
<strong>The</strong> local organisation I worked with, IDF 164 , has based its work on an integrated<br />
programme and serves both groups, Bengalis as well as Hill People. IDF, although concentrated<br />
on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong area and <strong>the</strong> CHT, is recognised as a national NGO by many Hill<br />
People as it is an Bengali initiative 165 . Especially among <strong>the</strong> Chakma a lot <strong>of</strong> people mentioned<br />
IDF toge<strong>the</strong>r with BRAC and Proshika in one breath. Some <strong>of</strong> my interviewees have<br />
blamed especially <strong>the</strong>se three organisations for preferring <strong>the</strong> settlers in <strong>the</strong> Hills. Interviewees<br />
stated that those NGOs would exploit young indigenous women for field work, as <strong>the</strong><br />
hierarchical structure <strong>of</strong> Bengali organisations would not correspond with <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s<br />
organisational structure, especially related to <strong>the</strong> different gender order among <strong>the</strong> Hill People<br />
166 . <strong>The</strong> NGOs would not try to investigate <strong>the</strong> socio-economic situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT and<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir judgement would <strong>the</strong>refore be not accurate. As <strong>the</strong> institutions largely work with microcredit<br />
programmes 167 , it was criticised that <strong>the</strong>se would not be suitable for <strong>the</strong> Hill region, as<br />
people have a lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge how to invest <strong>the</strong> money admitted in <strong>the</strong> micro-credit programmes.<br />
Besides <strong>the</strong> NGOs have been accused for preferring <strong>the</strong> settlers in providing loans,<br />
while <strong>the</strong> Hill People are left out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> scheme. <strong>The</strong>se measures have been interpreted to have<br />
<strong>the</strong> objective <strong>of</strong> supporting <strong>the</strong> settlers so that <strong>the</strong>y overcome <strong>the</strong> Hill People economically 168 .<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> IDF <strong>the</strong> monthly statement June 1999 shows that in all Hill Districts <strong>the</strong> distribution<br />
is approximately equal 169 . <strong>The</strong> contradiction can be explained in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong><br />
nationalism and boundary drawing between <strong>the</strong> two groups. In every way <strong>the</strong> Hill People try<br />
to distance <strong>the</strong>mselves from national institutions, or those being categorised as such, having<br />
<strong>the</strong> historical background <strong>of</strong> development in <strong>the</strong> CHT in mind. Along <strong>the</strong> above mentioned<br />
data <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong> demarcation from <strong>the</strong> Bengali society becomes clear again. It could be<br />
assumed that those interviewees recognised <strong>the</strong> rising “NGO scene” in <strong>the</strong> Hills as a sign <strong>of</strong><br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r Bengalisation, inasmuch as NGOs play a significant role in <strong>the</strong> development process<br />
in Bangladesh 170 (White 1999, 307). <strong>The</strong> NGOs <strong>the</strong>refore are categorised along <strong>the</strong> boundaries<br />
between Bengali and indigenous culture. As a counter-model <strong>the</strong> Hill People tend to<br />
construct spaces for development based on <strong>the</strong>ir traditional way <strong>of</strong> life. Years ago already <strong>the</strong><br />
164 Integrated Development Foundation has its project area concentrated on <strong>the</strong> three Hill Districts and <strong>Chitta</strong>gong<br />
District<br />
165 At <strong>the</strong> same time IDF has a policy <strong>of</strong> employing Bengali as well as indigenous workers equally. <strong>The</strong> interviewed<br />
staff members have never mentioned any problems at <strong>the</strong> working-place in respect to ethnic differences<br />
166 Here again <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> gender order in Islamic and Buddhist society becomes obvious, see Chapter 6<br />
167 <strong>The</strong>se micro-credit programmes were first developed by Grameen Bank and gained international recognition<br />
as <strong>the</strong>y have been considered to be very effective for rural development in particular. It is a simple procedure:<br />
women receive a small amount <strong>of</strong> money to invest in cattle, a shop, or goods for trading. <strong>The</strong> rates are paid back<br />
weekly over a longer period. If <strong>the</strong>se contributions have been paid back reliably, <strong>the</strong> member receives a bigger<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> money next time<br />
168 Compare Chapter 4<br />
169 <strong>The</strong> monthly statement mentions 19662 members in <strong>the</strong> Hill Districts <strong>of</strong> whom 8957 are tribal
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
Chakma Raja Devasish Roy has stated that it was necessary to “modernise jhum technology<br />
to fight back <strong>the</strong> government propaganda <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir backwardness” (Janakantha 13.5., 1994<br />
cited in Mohsin 1997, 119). Green Hill tries to realise <strong>the</strong>se aims by emphasising technological<br />
development combined with ecological and environmental issues and has <strong>the</strong> aim to<br />
“innovate sophisticated technology by preserving indigenous traditional system <strong>of</strong> plantation”<br />
(Annual Report 1995-97). Besides Green Hill stresses <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional indigenous<br />
hand loom, which is sold in a shop attached to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice in Rangamati. Never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
during my field work some people criticised <strong>the</strong> NGOs in general, regardless if Bengali or<br />
indigenous ones. That can be explained by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon NGO in general is<br />
seen as a Bengali one. Self-appointed representatives are no exceptions <strong>the</strong>re, as distrust remains.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> NGO sector was mentioned as a potential provider <strong>of</strong> jobs which<br />
are badly needed in <strong>the</strong> area. Again <strong>the</strong> rational calculation determines <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> cultural<br />
boundary-markers.<br />
7.2. Ano<strong>the</strong>r Insurgency?<br />
“If necessary, I will not hesitate to shed blood for full implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accord” said<br />
Shantu Larma at <strong>the</strong> first anniversary meeting <strong>of</strong> signing <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord (<strong>The</strong> Daily Star<br />
03.12.1998). That intimidation Shantu Larma shares with many Hill People. Two main objectives<br />
can be distinguished here. First <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord does not provide autonomy for <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT, as has been wished by many Hill People. An interviewee told me: “You can say that<br />
you are German, that you have a flag, something to be proud <strong>of</strong>, I can’t say that”. Among <strong>the</strong><br />
Hill People <strong>the</strong>re can be found one fraction which proclaims a nationalist view reaching full<br />
autonomy 171 . For those people <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord means being sold out to Bangladesh. <strong>The</strong><br />
second reason is <strong>the</strong> problems with <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord, which partly<br />
difficult to achieve and has been mentioned above already. That is what Shantu Larma complains<br />
about.<br />
As long as <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord is not pushed forward despair and frustration<br />
remain. Many interviewees complained about <strong>the</strong> law-and-order situation in <strong>the</strong> Hill<br />
Tracts. So-called tax-collecting in <strong>the</strong> villages, which was practised earlier too 172 , was reported<br />
to be a great problem in <strong>the</strong> remote areas as well as on <strong>the</strong> streets where transport is<br />
been disrupted by opposing groups. Increasing drug-use and street-crime were also men-<br />
170 Bangladesh is said to be <strong>the</strong> country with <strong>the</strong> greatest density <strong>of</strong> NGOs world-wide<br />
171 Compare to struggle about autonomy between M.N. Larma and Preeti mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1.<br />
172 See Chapter 4
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
tioned. One interviewee stated: “Before <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>the</strong>ir law and our law,<br />
but now <strong>the</strong>re is no law any longer”. Especially <strong>the</strong> Pahari Chattro Parishad are blamed for<br />
creating trouble reaching fur<strong>the</strong>r than within <strong>the</strong> college at Rangamati. In <strong>the</strong> regular clashes<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Pahari Chattro Parishad and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r college parties, shopkeepers 173 and police<br />
forces are quite <strong>of</strong>ten involved. On <strong>the</strong> 05.09.1999 at least 30 people were injured in Rangamati<br />
in such a incident (Bangladesh Observer 06.09.1999). During my stay in Rangamati<br />
shopkeepers were attacked several times by indigenous opponents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord. Besides,<br />
hartals are used for <strong>the</strong> “disturbance <strong>of</strong> normality”. Although <strong>the</strong>se hartals are a<br />
national phenomenon, <strong>the</strong>y are utilised in <strong>the</strong> Hills for <strong>the</strong> escalation <strong>of</strong> ethnically determined<br />
incidents, according to my informant’s view. Even when a hartal has a different political<br />
background, <strong>the</strong> indigenous and <strong>the</strong> Bengali population blames each o<strong>the</strong>r for damage. Mentionable<br />
are likewise cases in which disputes escalate. An incident which was heavily<br />
discussed during my field work happened in Dighinala 174 : On <strong>the</strong> 22.08.1999 <strong>the</strong> Daily Star<br />
reported that at least 18 people had been injured in a dispute between some Hill People, settlers<br />
and <strong>the</strong> police. <strong>The</strong> Hill People, repatriated refugee families, sheltered in a schoolbuilding<br />
had been attacked by some Bengali people for reasons <strong>of</strong> revenge for ano<strong>the</strong>r incident.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Daily Star (26.06.1999) reports that at least thirteen people were killed and about<br />
hundred kidnappings had happened since <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Accord. On <strong>the</strong> 17.10.1999 about<br />
60 people were injured in a clash between <strong>the</strong> police and Peace Accord opponents 175 . Though<br />
<strong>the</strong>se incidents give no representative picture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill People’s opinions, <strong>the</strong> increase seems<br />
to be alarming. Ethnic diversity, violence, economic pressure and political difficulties are involved<br />
in a process <strong>of</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning each o<strong>the</strong>r. Just because a Peace Accord has been signed,<br />
<strong>the</strong> people do not change <strong>the</strong>ir minds overnight. Expectations and hope set upon <strong>the</strong> Peace<br />
Accord have been belied. That in turn streng<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>the</strong> demarcation based on ethnic diversity<br />
and <strong>the</strong> outbreak <strong>of</strong> violence. <strong>The</strong> Independent (07.02.1999) reported that local police forces<br />
in Rangamati recovered 107 sharp weapons and 623 persons besides several more in o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
areas. Armed opposing groups were formed immediately after <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Accord.<br />
Chakma Interviewees reported a group called Jhumma National Army 176 is actively resisting<br />
<strong>the</strong> accord. Problematic are former Shanti Bahini fighters, are still without work although <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were promised employment in <strong>the</strong> local police forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hill District Councils, which have<br />
173 As <strong>the</strong> shopkeepers are mainly Bengalis, <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>of</strong> special interest for those who want to protest<br />
174 Belonging to Kagrachari district<br />
175 http://www.shobak.org/jumma/<br />
176 that group is mentioned in Rashiduzzaman (1998, 661) as well. He also reports that besides <strong>the</strong> Pahari Chattro<br />
Parishad, <strong>the</strong> HWF, <strong>the</strong> Preeti group (see Chapter 3.2.1.) a faction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former Shanti Bahini is involved into<br />
<strong>the</strong> armed resistance. <strong>The</strong> aims are <strong>the</strong> same as before <strong>the</strong> Accord: <strong>the</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bengali settlers from <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
not been forthcoming. As <strong>the</strong>y have not got <strong>the</strong> necessary skills for o<strong>the</strong>r jobs, engagement in<br />
insurgency actions is considered as a possible alternative. As long as <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord does<br />
not turn into a matter <strong>of</strong> every-day life <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people living in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts, ethnic<br />
segregation will always provoke violence and bloodshed.<br />
8. Conclusion<br />
Field work in <strong>the</strong> CHT and in Bangladesh in general was a great experience. It provided an<br />
insight into <strong>the</strong> methodological issues <strong>of</strong> social research as well into <strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> social life in<br />
areas <strong>of</strong> ethno-political conflict. Unfortunately a lot <strong>of</strong> interesting data had to be left out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
scheme in this paper, as <strong>the</strong> issue is a very complex one.<br />
<strong>The</strong> guiding <strong>the</strong>oretical question, how identities are constructed, has been investigated in<br />
combination with a very shortened description <strong>of</strong> historical processes, economic features and<br />
cultural differences. <strong>The</strong> analysis has shown that ethnic diversity and <strong>the</strong> resulting conflict are<br />
predominantly bound to historical and economic processes. Policies in <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nationstate<br />
are always determined by <strong>the</strong> attempt to construct entities based on cultural features, as<br />
is <strong>the</strong> case in Bangladesh. Its independence is based on <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> establishing one entity<br />
characterised by linguistic, cultural and religious features. Minorities in such a relatively homogeneous<br />
systems are marginalised and devaluated in order to create one people. That in<br />
turn provokes processes in which minorities establish counter movements. Exclusion leads to<br />
inclusion and vice versa. This dynamic permeates all spheres <strong>of</strong> social life. <strong>The</strong> economy, as a<br />
highly state determined aspect, is characterised by <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> majority Bengali<br />
society and <strong>the</strong> Hill People as a minority. Land has a key role here, and in addition<br />
economic development shows an interethnic dynamic, characterised by marginalisation, preference<br />
and deprivation. Education has been treated as an exclusively Hill Peoples matter in<br />
this work. Inasmuch as interethnic relationships within <strong>the</strong> state-system determine social life,<br />
<strong>the</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> interethnic relationships among <strong>the</strong> 13 different indigenous groups in <strong>the</strong><br />
CHT embraces processes <strong>of</strong> domination and marginalisation. <strong>The</strong> aspects <strong>of</strong> political, economic<br />
and educational life are deeply interwoven with cultural features. As key elements <strong>of</strong><br />
ethnic identity construction, <strong>the</strong>y determine and are determined by <strong>the</strong> various processes.<br />
Summarising <strong>the</strong> most important processes, <strong>the</strong> paper is <strong>the</strong>oretically embedded in <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong><br />
Chapter 6. <strong>The</strong> last Chapter about <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord gives an impression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present situation<br />
in <strong>the</strong> CHT in respect to questions <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> future <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CHT will look like. <strong>The</strong> main<br />
<strong>the</strong>sis here is that peace cannot be established as long as it does not become a matter <strong>of</strong> every-
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
day life. Animosities will remain and conflict can break out at any time, whenever ethnic<br />
differences are utilised in <strong>the</strong> attempt to gain power.<br />
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Appendix 1<br />
Glossary <strong>of</strong> Foreign Words<br />
hartal<br />
headman<br />
jhum<br />
jhumia<br />
kalong<br />
karbari<br />
Bengali word for strike<br />
principal <strong>of</strong> a mouza<br />
shifting cultivation, burn and slash method <strong>of</strong> cultivation<br />
those people who are cultivating in <strong>the</strong> jhum<br />
basket made <strong>of</strong> bamboo which is carried on <strong>the</strong> back with <strong>the</strong><br />
help <strong>of</strong> a lea<strong>the</strong>r-stripe on <strong>the</strong> forehead<br />
principal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> para<br />
khadi traditional Chakma dress which is a piece <strong>of</strong> cloth bounded around <strong>the</strong> breast
<strong>Eva</strong> <strong>Gerharz</strong><br />
lakh equally with 100.000<br />
lungi<br />
mouza<br />
para<br />
raja<br />
rajbari<br />
sari<br />
shalwar kameez<br />
Shanti Bahini<br />
thana<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> skirt which is commonly worn by men in parts <strong>of</strong> South<br />
Asia<br />
union <strong>of</strong> several paras<br />
village<br />
clans chief, king<br />
<strong>the</strong> kings residence<br />
long piece <strong>of</strong> cloth worn by women in South Asia<br />
loose trouser shirt<br />
armed wing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> JSS, means literally peace force<br />
organisational unit according to <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> a police<br />
station<br />
Appendix 2<br />
List <strong>of</strong> Abbreviations<br />
BCSIC<br />
BDR<br />
BMPC<br />
BNP<br />
BRAC<br />
Bangladesh Cottage and Small Industries Co-operation<br />
Bangladesh Rifles, a quasi-military border control<br />
Buddhist Minority Protection Committee<br />
Bangladesh Nationalist Party<br />
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, biggest NGO in<br />
Bangladesh
<strong>Construction</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Identities</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
CHT <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts<br />
CHTDB<br />
CHTRC/RC<br />
GOB<br />
HWF<br />
IDF<br />
NGO<br />
PCP<br />
PCJSS/JSS<br />
<strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts Development Board<br />
<strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts Regional Council<br />
Government <strong>of</strong> Bangladesh<br />
Hill Women’s Federation, associated to PCJSS<br />
Integrated Development Foundation<br />
Non-governmental Organisation<br />
Pahari Chattro Parishad, Hill Students Federation, associated to<br />
PCJSS<br />
Parbattya Chattragram Jana Samhati Samiti, <strong>The</strong> United Peoples<br />
Party <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Chitta</strong>gong Hill Tracts