Indian Climate Policy: Choices and Challenges - The Stimson Center

46 | MATHUR AND VARUGHESE
Having undertaken proactive policies in the last year and having made
considerable efforts to communicate them, India has managed to erase somewhat
the impression that it represents an “obstruction to a climate deal” as it had been
painted by many countries. Often, however, the seemingly pragmatic focus of
the Annex I states on the reality that all countries need to act fast misses the
Indian moral arguments, leading to frustration on both sides. It is therefore now
the turn of the Annex I countries to recognize their historical responsibility and
make a radically enhanced offer of mitigation effort and finance.
THE WAY FORWARD
As many analysts have pointed out, India has historically been more comfortable
with negotiations when it is defending its moral entitlements (e.g., in the WTO
on issues of stonewalling by developed countries against granting full market
access to the exports of poor countries and instead demanding serious
concessions from developing countries.) And in these negotiations, India has
often stood its ground well. But one of the consequences of India’s traditional
negotiating position is that it has seldom been strong at bargaining. A moral
entitlement approach to negotiation and a bargaining approach to negotiation
require two very different sensibilities. The former requires sticking to a
principle, even if the outcome is deadlock or isolation. The latter requires cutting
deals, even if they are not based on the most equitable moral principle.
While India’s position so far has been largely articulated in the language of
entitlements, recent statements by Indian leaders in international meetings have
indicated a shift towards the bargaining style. This is understandable, since many
of the major countries in the G77 block such as Brazil, Argentina, and China
have shown signs of being willing to give and take as well on crucial issues like
emission reductions, Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV), and
Reduced Emissions on Degradation and Deforestation (REDD). Agreement
between India and China to coordinate and calibrate their positions before every
major international gathering on climate change – and not to accept legallybinding
targets on emissions reductions that may impact their development
priorities – shows that India does not plan to let itself be sidelined during the
central deal. But India’s negotiators will keep open the option of a veto at
Copenhagen if confronted with what they regard as an unreasonable outcome. It
would not be difficult to sell this decision domestically by highlighting how little
India has contributed to the problem and how pressing its development needs are.