Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center
Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center
Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center
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<strong>Interview</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>GENERAL</strong> <strong>JAMES</strong> L. <strong>JONES</strong>,<br />
<strong>USMC</strong> (Ret.), former National Security Advisor and NATO Supreme Allied Commander<br />
Conducted by LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR.,<br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Board, Henry L. <strong>Stimson</strong> <strong>Center</strong><br />
BLOOMFIELD: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the<br />
<strong>Stimson</strong> <strong>Center</strong>. I’m Linc Bloomfield. We had overwhelming RSVPs for today’s<br />
program; it’s no surprise. Please welcome a familiar face, General James Jones, the<br />
former National Security Advisor. Thanks for coming, sir.<br />
When we first conceived <strong>of</strong> the Chairman’s Forum, the idea was to get a little<br />
bit past the in basket, the issue <strong>of</strong> the day, the story in the news, to a slightly higherlevel<br />
perspective. And nobody embodies the spirit <strong>of</strong> this forum more than my guest<br />
today. General Jim Jones has served the United States in many capacities his entire<br />
adult life: forty years in uniform as a United States Marine, rising to the top position<br />
as our nation’s 32 nd Commandant <strong>of</strong> the US Marine Corps, member <strong>of</strong> the Joint<br />
Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff, he commanded our largest alliance as Supreme Allied Commander <strong>of</strong><br />
NATO, he was simultaneously the Geographic Combatant Commander, and<br />
Commander <strong>of</strong> US European Command at a time when I think it spanned 90<br />
countries, including all <strong>of</strong> Africa and Europe from Iceland to Eastern Russia and<br />
everything in between.<br />
So someone who has had highest levels <strong>of</strong> military command and experience<br />
suddenly transitioned to the highest levels <strong>of</strong> civilian policy‐making; that, actually, I<br />
find rare. I might be missing a few here, but there aren’t that many people who have<br />
served at the highest levels <strong>of</strong> the military who have moved across to the highest<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> civilian policy‐making. We see General Officers in the intelligence<br />
community, in Homeland Security, and other czar positions and whatnot, but I’m<br />
thinking <strong>of</strong> George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Alexander Haig, Colin Powell. <strong>The</strong><br />
list … there may be a few I’m missing, but that’s the club you’re in.<br />
I want to ask you first <strong>of</strong> all, General Jones, <strong>of</strong> all the attributes <strong>of</strong> military<br />
leadership that you’re quite comfortable with, going into the White House, what was<br />
different about a civilian top‐level job? What was the rest <strong>of</strong> it that you had to adapt<br />
to?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: <strong>The</strong> big difference is that an order is a basis for negotiation in the<br />
White House.<br />
[Laughter.]<br />
BLOOMFIELD: <strong>The</strong>re’s a start. Well, the White House is supposedly pretty<br />
powerful. When they call and say “this is the White House calling,” people usually …
you can usually hear their heels clicking together even as civilian agencies. Was that<br />
your experience?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I found that the biggest imperative to get right with a new<br />
administration is to make sure that you’re as well‐organized as you can be as to how<br />
it’s going to work. And I think the biggest challenge was to … and for me it was<br />
difficult because I did not know the president elect very well, I had met him maybe<br />
half a dozen times. I knew no one in the West Wing. So on January 20 th everybody<br />
came together, really, for the first time. <strong>The</strong>re may have been a couple <strong>of</strong> meetings in<br />
Chicago, but there wasn’t a lot <strong>of</strong> overlap. So the real challenge, I think, was to figure<br />
out very quickly what works for this president: How is it that you can best serve?<br />
How is it you can best organize what your area <strong>of</strong> responsibility is to provide that<br />
service?<br />
We—in the research and discussions—figured out that he was very much a<br />
bottom‐up type person. In other words, that the decisions were going to be made, at<br />
least on national security, were going to be driven by a centrifugal force known as<br />
the National Security Council, around which the interagency would pivot, with a<br />
couple <strong>of</strong> absolute requirements: one is, that it be an inclusive process, and that<br />
anyone who has equities, or stakeholders in the interagency should be at the table<br />
through the four levels <strong>of</strong> decision‐making, starting with the Working Groups, and<br />
the Deputy’s Committee, and the Principals Committee, and then the full NSC.<br />
That was very exciting, actually, to be able to recreate a National Security<br />
Council that was somewhat different in terms <strong>of</strong> its operation, that certainly wasn’t<br />
top‐down driven, but—as I said—was bottom‐up, was very inclusive in terms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
participation around the table. And to be able to interview, and even hire, really<br />
quality people, but also make them believe in this system. And there were many<br />
ways in which we did that.<br />
But at the end <strong>of</strong> the day I think some <strong>of</strong> the things we did early on, we<br />
guessed right on. One was combining Homeland Security and the National Security<br />
Council, which was a very good move as it turns out. And the personalities mesh<br />
very well at the leadership position and also at the staff level.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re were some things, though, that we could have done better. <strong>The</strong> budget<br />
for the National Security Council on January 20, 2009 was about $6 million, and we<br />
were $2 million in the hole on January 21 st . <strong>The</strong> real budget for the National Security<br />
Council after two years there was about—should be about—$24 million. We’ve<br />
never been able to get it to that level, which is disappointing to me, and I put it in my<br />
final report I think, that as important as that organization is to basically making the<br />
trains run on time and keeping the plates balanced on the bamboo poles so that they<br />
don’t come crashing down all at once, is difficult, and it’s got to be—Jim Locher and I<br />
have talked about this before—it’s got to have (the NSC, in order to be successful), in<br />
my view has to have agency‐like qualities, but at a very small level. It has to have a<br />
budget, it has to be funded, and too <strong>of</strong>ten it runs on a lick and a promise.
BLOOMFIELD: It has changed in size, though, over the decades; it’s been<br />
small, and it’s been large. What’s the right size today—and looking forward—for the<br />
NSC staff?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: If you agree that the National Security portfolio is more diverse now<br />
than ever before—in other words, it’s not just about the Defense Department, and a<br />
little bit <strong>of</strong> the State Department, and the NSC—but it includes things like<br />
cybersecurity, it includes the family <strong>of</strong> asymmetric threats, it includes economic<br />
issues. And you have to build in the communications system to make sure that you<br />
have competent people branching out to other agencies and departments, I think the<br />
total NSC commitment—I’m talking about from the National Security Advisor to a<br />
watchstander in the situation room—is about 350 people.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: You mentioned economics. You combined Homeland and<br />
NSC, but there was an Economic Security Council. <strong>The</strong>re are certainly economic<br />
advisors, finance has always been a special province in our government and in<br />
others—walled <strong>of</strong>f from other agencies—and yet the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Joint Chiefs,<br />
Admiral Mullen said not long ago that debt is our number one threat, above all <strong>of</strong> the<br />
other major national security threats.<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: And he <strong>of</strong>fered to return some <strong>of</strong> the money that we …<br />
[Laughter.]<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well, he may have a chance before the handover. <strong>The</strong><br />
economy <strong>of</strong> effort at large does seem to be a theme that’s suddenly being imposed<br />
on the United States <strong>of</strong> America, and I guess my question is: Should there be so many<br />
walls between competencies? Is economics really so far afield from national security<br />
at this point?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: No, and to the contrary Linc, I think national security… I mean from<br />
my standpoint I think one <strong>of</strong> our biggest challenges … I mean the Chairman said that,<br />
and I would say an equal concern <strong>of</strong> mine, which is a national security concern,<br />
would be our competitiveness globally.<br />
As a matter <strong>of</strong> fact one <strong>of</strong> the things I will never forget about my tour as<br />
National Security Advisor is the day the President asked me to lead a small<br />
delegation composed <strong>of</strong> the Secretary <strong>of</strong> Commerce, the US Trade Representative,<br />
the Secretary <strong>of</strong> State and the Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense up to Capitol Hill to talk to the<br />
leadership about the need for export control reform as a national security issue.<br />
This is a 21 st century issue, and how we handle this issue is going to affect the<br />
United States. I came back from my tour in Europe and Africa as NATO [Supreme<br />
Allied Commander] really despondent about the number <strong>of</strong> times I heard leaders in<br />
Europe and Africa say “you know, we really appreciate the United States coming
here and analyzing all <strong>of</strong> our problems and telling us what we do, but what we really<br />
appreciate is the Chinese giving us everything that we need to develop ourselves<br />
with.” Or words like “we would really like to buy US products, US technology, but it’s<br />
just too hard, and you put too many strings on it, and by the way we can by it from<br />
the French or Israelis or the Germans or the Japanese without any strings attached.”<br />
We have a system that worked well in the 20 th century, when we were the<br />
unquestioned global leader in so many areas. We need to take another look at<br />
ourselves in order to be competitive in the ways that we’re going to have to be to<br />
meet the challenges that are coming, not only economically but in other spheres.<br />
This is the world that we shaped in the 20 th century, so we got what we asked<br />
for. And now we find that some <strong>of</strong> our institutions and some <strong>of</strong> our elected<br />
representatives are living in a different century, they’re not focusing on the<br />
environment that we’re in. And like any business, if you don’t understand the<br />
environment you’re in, you can’t compete. So it’s time to really take a look at our<br />
laws, our regulations, our policies, and to empower the greatness <strong>of</strong> America. When<br />
we face challenges, we’ve always overcome them. And we are definitely being<br />
challenged.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: That’s a very interesting comment, and the business analogy<br />
is probably apt because the bureaucracy is quite content to live amongst itself inside<br />
the beltway. And the question is: Who’s the customer, and are they in tune with the<br />
speed <strong>of</strong> business?<br />
You mentioned export control, so let me pivot <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong> that. This is a process<br />
question. It is traditional, I would venture to say, that when an Administration<br />
comes in they do policy reviews and they say: “Let’s take a look at export controls,<br />
let’s look at space policy, let’s look at nonproliferation, let’s look at arms control<br />
issues.” <strong>The</strong> list is long. And then they push it out into the bureaucracy, saying “come<br />
back with a revised policy.” But you’re giving it to all the people that are in that 20 th<br />
century architecture that you just described, and I would guess that rare is the<br />
bureaucrat that says “why don’t you just disband my <strong>of</strong>fice, fire me, because I’m<br />
really not relevant to what is needed out there today.”<br />
And so, in the case <strong>of</strong> export control, Secretary Gates spoke up and said, let’s<br />
scrap the whole thing—new agency, one list, one law—which was quite different<br />
from what the bureaucracy, including my colleagues in my old bureau, doing<br />
defense export controls, would have wanted. What’s your reaction to that? What’s<br />
the right way for an administration to affect relevant change on this list <strong>of</strong> policies<br />
when they come in? Do you ask the bureaucracy to tell you what you should do? Or<br />
do you bring in a whole new change and impose it on them, or what?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: It’s been my experience that everyone in Washington is for change.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re’s nobody who fights change except when it’s imposed on them, and then it’s<br />
not fun. As long as you’re okay, you’re happy to change everybody else.
I don’t think, given the pace and intensity <strong>of</strong> the daily workload, that it’s<br />
possible to accomplish the type <strong>of</strong> reorganization that we need from the inside. We<br />
can do some things, but if you start going down that trail, then that’s all you’re going<br />
to do, and bad things are really going to happen around the world. We did<br />
Goldwater Nichols—I see Jim sitting here—you know, that was done from the<br />
outside. I mean it was inside the Legislative Branch, but it was opposed by every<br />
sitting Service Chief unanimously, with a very well‐orchestrated campaign to block<br />
it. I think the vote was ninety‐nine to nothing in the Senate, if I’m not mistaken. I<br />
think it’s going to have to be done from the outside, but I think there are some things<br />
that can be done.<br />
For example, one <strong>of</strong> my big concerns about our future <strong>of</strong> national security has<br />
to do with energy. I’m still unconvinced that we have a strategic energy plan that<br />
most Americans understand or that’s been adhered to. Instead, I think we have an<br />
ala carte energy policy where somebody like Boone Pickens spends a few million<br />
dollars and you hear about wind and solar and gas for several months, and then that<br />
disappears. <strong>The</strong>n another sector <strong>of</strong> our energy portfolio spends money, and you<br />
hear about that for awhile. But nobody’s really put it all together, and no<br />
administration, including this one, has really grabbed the energy problem and made<br />
it a truly national security issue in a way that we can explain what the energy<br />
portfolio is, measure it against the technology capabilities <strong>of</strong> every element in that<br />
portfolio, and then present a coherent picture <strong>of</strong> how we’re moving down that trail<br />
for five years, or the next ten years.<br />
I think that’s a critical aspect and a critical shortcoming <strong>of</strong> the overall<br />
discussion <strong>of</strong> our national security policy. And I failed to make the case adequately<br />
to have a Senior Director in the National Security Council for energy. By the time<br />
January 20 th <strong>of</strong> 2009 came around, they had already decided how they were going to<br />
do the energy portfolio, and I said “look I’ve got enough on my plate right now, but<br />
we’ll watch it.” But, when I left the White House, the President asked me what I<br />
would have done differently—what I wish I could have done but I didn’t get done—<br />
and I said, clearly, “energy.”<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well, just to tip my cap to people on the outside <strong>of</strong> the<br />
government, there are many people who run NGOs, and academic and scientific<br />
experts in energy, there are CEOs, there are technology players. <strong>The</strong>re’s a lot <strong>of</strong><br />
talent and knowledge out there … people writing about it, etc.<br />
Let me serve up to you a possible strategic‐level national security way to look<br />
at it. For decades we’ve been subject to a cartel on the price <strong>of</strong> oil—it’s not perfect,<br />
but even in Vienna a couple <strong>of</strong> weeks ago you could argue it was still functioning. Is<br />
the neutralization <strong>of</strong> a cartel, that puts leverage on the United States <strong>of</strong> America, a<br />
worthy national security goal, or is that a bridge too far?
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, that may be one <strong>of</strong> the effects, but it’s not the prime reason that<br />
you’d go about this. I think the prime reason that you’d go about this is because it<br />
has to be done. <strong>The</strong> good news is there’s really an abundance <strong>of</strong> energy. I don’t know<br />
<strong>of</strong> any country that has more diversity and potential for diversity in its energy<br />
portfolio than the United States.<br />
And as we get into this issue <strong>of</strong> oil sands and oil shale, you really do have a<br />
potential escape valve here where it could dramatically change things if we do it<br />
correctly: if we do adopt an energy strategy that is good, that we empower the<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Energy and specifically the Secretary <strong>of</strong> Energy to be the go‐to guy on<br />
all <strong>of</strong> energy, not just nuclear energy, which has been the past. But I think we know<br />
when the President turns to the Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense or the Secretary <strong>of</strong> State on<br />
matters <strong>of</strong> energy he should have a single point <strong>of</strong> reference that we haven’t had for<br />
a long time.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: But the Defense Department, I believe, uses something like<br />
11% <strong>of</strong> the nation’s energy. And you began this today by saying an order, at least in<br />
the military, starts the negotiation. Would an order be productive in the defense side<br />
… and, to be fair there’s a lot that’s starting to happen on the defense side in both<br />
facilities and operational energy … but would a more concerted mandate that this<br />
will happen, we will do this, let’s move, and put the resources behind it [be<br />
productive]?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, when you have an energy portfolio that’s as diverse as ours is—<br />
scattered over nine major departments and agencies, maybe more, which spawns<br />
thirty to thirty‐two oversight committees and subcommittees on Capitol Hill—how<br />
do you get coherence?<br />
<strong>The</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense goes to see the two Appropriations Committees and<br />
two Armed Services Committees. <strong>The</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> State has a limited appearance<br />
schedule. <strong>The</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Energy could be actually … that’s all he’d be doing, is<br />
going to these different Oversight Committees. I use this as an example <strong>of</strong> something<br />
that, I think, is really simple to understand and really needs to be fixed. It’s hard to<br />
understand why we don’t do it.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well let’s pivot from that, and suggest that maybe that is<br />
symptomatic <strong>of</strong> the way a lot <strong>of</strong> things work inside the government. I’m cheating a<br />
little bit, and correct me if I’m wrong, but I would guess you came into government<br />
from the perspective <strong>of</strong> someone who sat at a combatant command, at alliance<br />
headquarters, with regional briefings on a daily basis, wondering why the diplomats<br />
didn’t have anybody regionally based. <strong>The</strong>y’re either in a capitol working one<br />
country, or they’re in Washington, catching all the meetings and phone calls, and<br />
running the bureaucracy.<br />
I guess my question—because I want to talk about the interagency players<br />
bit by bit—but structurally, what did you want to see happen, coming in, and what
would you still like to see happen? Is this the right way to organize … let’s go back to<br />
the ‘47 National Security Act, but looking at how we do diplomacy, media, all the<br />
competencies … and now you have Homeland Security, which could probably outdo<br />
anybody on the number <strong>of</strong> oversight hearings they have to go to… what’s the right<br />
way to do this, that is more efficient, and has a better use <strong>of</strong> people’s time, and gets<br />
more output for input?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, with regard to the National Security Council itself, with how it’s<br />
organized, every President has the option <strong>of</strong> doing it anyway they want. I think<br />
that’s a good thing, to be honest with you. I happen to believe that the organization<br />
that serves this President has the right focus; it reflects his analytical desire, his<br />
desire for debate, his desire for different views to be aired all the way up until the<br />
time that he makes a decision. I can say without any fear <strong>of</strong> exaggeration that he<br />
does get that.<br />
Through the review <strong>of</strong> the Afghan strategy, for example, the media liked to<br />
call it “dithering.” Well, I’ll tell you, it was pretty intensive dithering. If that’s what<br />
dithering is, then I’m for it, because it really brought a lot <strong>of</strong> different views together,<br />
there was a lot <strong>of</strong> passion, a lot <strong>of</strong> discussion, there were people who felt very<br />
strongly about certain things, we all got to know each other a little bit better as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> that length, and when the President made his decision, everybody saluted<br />
smartly, which is kind <strong>of</strong> the way it’s supposed to work. So, I think that for this<br />
President, the organization is sound.<br />
I would like to see some <strong>of</strong> the support mechanisms for the NSC more<br />
formalized instead <strong>of</strong> a little bit too ad hoc in terms <strong>of</strong> funding, in terms <strong>of</strong> hiring, in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> the support mechanisms that you have to have. But the<br />
organization, I felt very good about, in terms <strong>of</strong> how the President was being<br />
informed as to the key issues that he had to decide on.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: But let me go back to something that you said when you were<br />
in NATO. You visited Afghanistan …<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I didn’t mean it.<br />
[Laughter.]<br />
BLOOMFIELD: I hope you did. Because I think you said, years ago, something<br />
that both General McChrystal and Petraeus embraced, which is: “We’re not going to<br />
succeed in this mission by military force alone.” That’s what you said, if I’m correct.<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: That’s correct.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: So that sort <strong>of</strong> points to: What are the nonmilitary tools in the<br />
kit? And I take your point about President Obama’s deliberative process, but you’ve<br />
got seventeen intelligence agencies, you’ve got a State Department that has just had
its budget request cut by, what, eleven billion dollars when Defense went down nine<br />
[billion dollars]?<br />
So, proportionately, it’s orders <strong>of</strong> magnitude greater. We’re not building up<br />
the nonmilitary toolkit. What’s your comment on which way we should be going and<br />
which way we are going?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, it is worrisome. I believe that in the 21 st century, at least for as<br />
far ahead as I can see, American leadership, for it to be substantive and effective, is<br />
going to have to be <strong>of</strong> a little bit different take than it was in the 20 th century, which<br />
was—in the last half <strong>of</strong> the century—really the American half <strong>of</strong> the century in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> global leadership, global preeminence, not only militarily but economically.<br />
You can argue the cultural expansion around the globe <strong>of</strong> things American was what<br />
people aspired to in millions and millions <strong>of</strong> different ways.<br />
This is a different century. This is not a century, so far, where we are faced<br />
with a future‐classic—a conventional—war with a major power. <strong>The</strong> asymmetric<br />
threats: proliferation, the energy problems, the unification <strong>of</strong> narco‐trafficking,<br />
organized crime and terror, which are increasingly collaborating together, is a real<br />
threat—it’s not just a national threat, it’s an international threat.<br />
So I think as we look at the so‐called Arab Spring breaking out, the solution<br />
set is going to have three characteristics to it. One is the security pillar, and you’ve<br />
got to have that. But accompanying that, you have to have an economic package that<br />
gives people who don’t have any hope, hope for a better future. That’s the answer to<br />
the terrorist threat, really. <strong>The</strong> radicals preach that we’re the evil, but if we’re able<br />
to come at them with a plan where their lives are going to get better in the future,<br />
economically, and their children’s lives are going to be better, that’s a powerful tool<br />
to counter the terrorist propaganda. And the third one is governance and rule <strong>of</strong><br />
law, and I include corruption and all <strong>of</strong> those other things.<br />
But those three pillars have to kind <strong>of</strong> be working together. If only one <strong>of</strong><br />
those works—and usually our strong suit is the security pillar—and it’s not<br />
accompanied by the other two, then you probably have a much longer and much<br />
bigger problem because, eventually, the foreign military presence in other countries,<br />
for long periods <strong>of</strong> time in a fight, regardless <strong>of</strong> whether you’re trying to help them<br />
or not … bad things start to happen.<br />
We learned that lesson after World War II; we rebuilt Europe, we rebuilt<br />
Japan. That was an example <strong>of</strong> an enlightened view <strong>of</strong> things. <strong>The</strong> Marshall Plan, I’m<br />
told, politically wasn’t very popular in this country, but we went ahead and did it.<br />
I’ve heard some talk—that I find very much agreement with—about thinking <strong>of</strong> a<br />
way in which the international community <strong>of</strong> the half‐nations if you will, to include<br />
the newly wealthy nations like Brazil and India and other rising economic powers,<br />
can get together and help these countries migrate towards a freer society, a more<br />
democratic society, perhaps.
I think Egypt is extremely important. In a short period <strong>of</strong> time we understand<br />
that we cannot afford to lose Egypt to become another Iran or something like that.<br />
But it’s not going to be just about the military here, it’s going to have to be the<br />
security package plus some economic package which can be international. And I<br />
think the United States can play a huge role in helping [to] develop that. And then<br />
the governance and rule <strong>of</strong> law piece I think is extremely important.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well you’ve used words like “aspiration,” you’ve talked about<br />
perception, you mentioned propaganda. Is it not possible that the United States<br />
could be writing some big checks and not getting the perceptual result among the<br />
House population?<br />
Pakistan comes to mind in the recent past, where we’ve made these longterm<br />
pledges <strong>of</strong> billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, but the anti‐Americanism doesn’t seem to be<br />
affected by that. And I think the question is: Can you elaborate on what it is that the<br />
United States can be doing? In addition to the President associating our goals with<br />
the aspirations <strong>of</strong> people around the world, which I think is fundamental … but<br />
beyond that, how do we get into that space?<br />
Secretary Gates gave a speech in 2007 at Kansas State, I think, and he talked<br />
about the media. And he said the enemies <strong>of</strong> the United States, the extremists are<br />
using these new forms <strong>of</strong> media to great effect. We invented half <strong>of</strong> this stuff, but it’s<br />
being used against us, [and] we need to get our game up. Are there things we’re not<br />
doing that we should be considering in this 21 st century environment to get that<br />
perception across <strong>of</strong> what we stand for, what we intend to do, and how it affects<br />
people on the street?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: That’s really the million dollar question. One <strong>of</strong> my conclusions after<br />
four decades in uniform is that we can’t want things for people that they don’t want<br />
for themselves.<br />
I think I learned that as a twenty‐two year old second lieutenant in Vietnam.<br />
When I left Vietnam in 1968, if somebody had asked me, “What’s your opinion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
South Vietnamese Army? Do you think they’ll fight if left alone to face the North<br />
Vietnamese?” I would have said “Absolutely not.” From what I saw, from where I<br />
was … there were some good units I’m sure, but I didn’t detect—in the people that I<br />
was around and in the army that we were supporting—the will to really achieve.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y were happy to let us do it, but I wasn’t sure that they were…<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Care to venture a comment on the Iraqi security forces as we<br />
face these deadlines?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, I think they’ve been given the tools. I probably think that they<br />
will be okay. I’m not sure that that okay will necessarily translate with what we<br />
would like, but I think that the Iraqi security forces will be adequate to do what the
government <strong>of</strong> Iraq wants them to do. I’m a little worried about what that might be.<br />
But I don’t think that they’re going to be faced with an external threat anytime soon<br />
that’s going to put that to the test, like the South Vietnamese army was.<br />
But the point I’m trying to make is that if you have a country like Egypt,<br />
where this was not a terrorist‐inspired movement, this was a bottom‐up cry for<br />
transparency, a better life, better representation, better hope for the future<br />
economically, better governance, better rule <strong>of</strong> law, and a cry for a different kind <strong>of</strong><br />
leadership. It was somewhat inspirational in the way that it happened, and so the<br />
question for us now, which is strategically important for Egypt, is what do we do<br />
about that?<br />
You can be sure that, just as thirty years ago, when Iran fell, there was a cry<br />
for transparency and openness <strong>of</strong> government and better lives for the people, and<br />
look what we got. It didn’t quite work out that way. You can be sure that underneath<br />
the radar, forces that do not want this democratic movement—that do not want an<br />
Egypt to emerge with this type <strong>of</strong> government, and this type <strong>of</strong> society—are hard at<br />
work on this. So the question is, how is this going to work out?<br />
Egypt is to me one <strong>of</strong> the pivotal countries that we really have to watch. It’s<br />
an opportunity for us to lead in a different way, to bring economic incentives. And I<br />
think that, frankly, the administration has already shown a little courage here in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> an economic package, but it needs to be bigger than that, and it needs to be<br />
international in scope. And that’s what I mean by some sort <strong>of</strong> Marshall Plan to<br />
<strong>of</strong>fset the forces that are trying to steer this thing in a bad way.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well that’s very interesting, because you did talk about post‐<br />
World War II Japan, Europe, then you mentioned Iran, where it went the other way,<br />
and you said the forces under the radar are hard at work. And the question is, do we<br />
have the tools, if we wanted to deploy them to help with transparency, governance,<br />
economic reform, judicial sector, teaching young people how to be effective<br />
executives, and all that?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I think we do, and I think that this is a classic situation where<br />
American know‐how leadership has to be brought to the fore, and we have to reach<br />
out to a whole‐<strong>of</strong>‐government concept. You’ve mentioned things that have to<br />
happen from about four or five different agencies just <strong>of</strong>f the cuff. And we need to<br />
make the adjustments that we need to make, whether it’s legislatively or in the<br />
executive branch in order to provide that kind <strong>of</strong> guidance.<br />
One thing I’m sure <strong>of</strong>, Linc, is that not too many governments on this planet<br />
want to consider a 21 st century with a diminished American leadership role. <strong>The</strong><br />
alternative is not something they’re looking forward to. <strong>The</strong>y very much want us to<br />
play the traditional role that they expect us to play, and they’re very disappointed<br />
when we don’t rise to that challenge.
We have to analyze our own situation, we have to analyze the environment<br />
we’re in, and we have to have the courage to change from within. It’s slow in our<br />
democracy; we eventually figure it out. <strong>The</strong> question is: Will we figure it out in time?<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well, I want to touch on Congress. You mentioned it. During<br />
your military career you’d be able to sit in front <strong>of</strong> the Armed Services Committee,<br />
and a four‐star in uniform is a pretty impressive presence, and there was a lot <strong>of</strong><br />
deference, although there were some hard questions and a few dissents.<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Didn’t last long.<br />
[Laughter.]<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Right. From the perch <strong>of</strong> the White House, watching the<br />
whole Administration making its case to Congress and seeing the phone calls and all<br />
that, what is your assessment <strong>of</strong> the way the Executive and Legislative Branches,<br />
irrespective <strong>of</strong> politics, get their business done in world affairs, and is there a<br />
different vision that you could foresee <strong>of</strong> either convergence between these two<br />
branches to get in the same locker room and work this thing out on the big things, or<br />
is it fine the way it is?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I don’t think it’s fine the way it is. As a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, I took the job as<br />
National Security Advisor because I knew I didn’t have to be confirmed.<br />
[Laughter]<br />
But I think everybody here has a feeling that we have to get back to a more<br />
civil political dialogue. We have to understand that on issues <strong>of</strong> national security,<br />
different opinions are fine, but partisanship shouldn’t play a role.<br />
I’ll use the example <strong>of</strong> the START treaty. One <strong>of</strong> the great successes, I think, in<br />
the recent years has been … you can call it whatever you want, some people call it<br />
the reset between us and the Russians … it’s a fascinating study, in terms <strong>of</strong> how<br />
things can change so rapidly in combination <strong>of</strong> common interest and personal<br />
regard on the part <strong>of</strong> the leadership <strong>of</strong> the country for two leaders who happen to<br />
hit it <strong>of</strong>f, and that relationship propels the weight <strong>of</strong> both countries towards a<br />
certain goal. It was amazing.<br />
But at the end <strong>of</strong> the day the United States was relegated to watching one <strong>of</strong><br />
the most important treaties <strong>of</strong> our modern time relegated to a lame duck session in<br />
Congress; and that was purely partisan. <strong>The</strong>re was a lot <strong>of</strong> effort made to bridge that<br />
gap before we came to the vote. And we made strong effort to consider the red lines<br />
<strong>of</strong> the minority—in this case the Republican Party in the Senate—a lot <strong>of</strong> visits on<br />
the Hill to explain exactly where we were, we asked our negotiators to be<br />
completely transparent with both sides and the leadership on both sides. And at the<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the day, for partisan reasons, we dragged it all the way down to a lame duck,
last‐minute session that, frankly, diminished us in the eyes <strong>of</strong> the world, and<br />
certainly in the eyes <strong>of</strong> our interlocutors in Russia.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well let me slide right into national security strategy, if I may,<br />
because …<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: <strong>The</strong> answer to your question is I think we need to get back to a level<br />
<strong>of</strong> civility on national security issues that is free from just pure partisan politics. In<br />
other words, if we live in an era where one side says, “I’m against it because they’re<br />
for it” on national security issues, that’s not the way you want to run this country.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: But accepting, if you do, that there were concerns about, for<br />
example, whether we will still have a functioning nuclear establishment x years<br />
hence, or whether missile defense would or would not move forward, backward,<br />
neutral, what would be the fate <strong>of</strong> the program. <strong>The</strong>re were a lot <strong>of</strong> champions <strong>of</strong><br />
different pieces <strong>of</strong> this who were hanging onto their piece, if I could at least posit<br />
that much. And the reason I raise national security strategy, is I watched two <strong>of</strong><br />
them under President Bush’s Administration, the second one was similar to the first,<br />
but it was a reaction to 9/11, preemption, etc.<br />
<strong>The</strong> NSS that came out a year ago reacted to that, it said we’re going to be<br />
more engaged, we’re going to be working more collaboratively, etc. I’m not sure<br />
whether you agree with me on this, but it didn’t seem to put a mark on the wall that<br />
said: “<strong>The</strong>se are the four or five things that are either going to make the United<br />
States the best it can be, including setting an example that wins it a leadership status<br />
in the world, or will break this country and be a huge burden on our ability to<br />
function and excel and prosper.”<br />
<strong>The</strong>y never mention major powers by name, and maybe that’s for good,<br />
political reasons, but I wanted to ask you about major power relationships, because<br />
if China, if Russia in thirty years moves into a very adversarial position and decides<br />
that the Americans are just simply the burden on their future, and their aspirations<br />
are in direct contradiction to our presence in the world, that’s a different outcome<br />
than one where we are able to function congenially and prosperously and<br />
peacefully.<br />
So my question about the reset, just to start there, is: Do you think we’ve<br />
gotten past a post‐1991 situation where Russia started to move in a democratic<br />
direction, has a democratic direction, but … you know, there are a lot <strong>of</strong> issues there,<br />
there’s a lot <strong>of</strong> mistrust there. <strong>The</strong> previous President was pushing NATO expansion<br />
pretty far into their neighborhood, which seemed to incur … and I’m just throwing<br />
this out as a devil’s advocate—and missile defense was the unanswered question,<br />
not far from their borders. And it seemed like Soviet thinking found new life. How<br />
do you rate the reset, and what should we really be aiming to do in five to ten years<br />
to get this major power relationship into a place that conforms precisely with our<br />
vision <strong>of</strong> a peaceful world?
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, there’s no doubt in my mind that if you publish a national<br />
security strategy where you name names, people are going to react. I’m always<br />
amazed that people are surprised that relations between nations aren’t any different<br />
from relations between two people. If you’re insulting to someone that you’re<br />
talking to, they’re going to remember that, regardless <strong>of</strong> what words you use, but it’s<br />
going to color your relationship. And nations are kind <strong>of</strong> the same way—perhaps a<br />
little more pragmatic in the sense that you have to work here and you have to work<br />
there—but the relationships are affected by the words you write, and the words you<br />
say, and the speeches you make.<br />
In a democracy as free as ours is, there are a lot <strong>of</strong> people saying a lot <strong>of</strong><br />
things, and it’s sometimes … a lot <strong>of</strong> people spend a lot <strong>of</strong> their time trying to figure<br />
out: What is the US policy?<br />
You know, one <strong>of</strong> the things that was interesting in the post‐Cold War dealing<br />
with our Russian contemporaries, they say “you all never followed your own<br />
doctrine.” And we said “that’s right, that was complete subterfuge, we don’t follow<br />
our doctrine, we write it for you so you can figure it out.” This open society has so<br />
many wonderful things to it, but one <strong>of</strong> the attributes is it can be a little confusing<br />
sometimes.<br />
As far as I’m concerned, I think the question with regard to Russia was, for<br />
the last half‐dozen years: Where do you want Russia to be in the next twenty or<br />
thirty years? Do you want them outside <strong>of</strong> inside <strong>of</strong> your Atlantic arc, and where do<br />
the Russians want to be? Do they want to be inside or outside?<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the characteristics, I think, <strong>of</strong> the National Security Advisor’s job is you<br />
should at least devote some time to understand how the other side—whoever<br />
you’re talking to—looks at this very same problem. How do they see things from<br />
their way? Whether they’re right or wrong and whether you agree with them or not,<br />
at least some part <strong>of</strong> your time should be to try to understand the other guy’s<br />
viewpoint.<br />
And where Russia was concerned, one <strong>of</strong> the catalysts <strong>of</strong> the reset was Iran.<br />
I’ll never forget the dialogue where the US and the Russians came together in<br />
London in early ’09 for the first meeting between our two Presidents. We had a brief<br />
interchange about Iran and President Medvedev, across the table to everybody’s<br />
shock—maybe even his own side—said “you know, on Iran, I think maybe you’re<br />
more correct than we are.”<br />
And that was the beginning <strong>of</strong> a relationship that ended … well it isn’t over<br />
yet … but it carried on into the cancellation <strong>of</strong> the sale <strong>of</strong> the S‐300s, our sharing<br />
intelligence with them about the Iranian’s secret nuclear facility, and on and on and<br />
on. It expanded into membership in the WTO and everything else. So it’s been a very<br />
positive development. It’s not blind, it’s not naïve, there are a lot <strong>of</strong> problems still
etween the two societies, but I think you can look back on the last couple <strong>of</strong> years<br />
and say, “you know, I think Russia has signaled”—especially by their performance in<br />
Portugal in the NATO Summit—“that they want to be inside the new Atlantic arc.”<br />
That’s certainly, I think, where we want them to be. So I think we continue to work<br />
together. You don’t put your blinders on, and you don’t be naïve, but I think this is a<br />
better direction than the path <strong>of</strong> confrontation.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: I’m trying to compare the productivity you describe in that<br />
dialogue with what you previously described with Congress.<br />
[Laughter]<br />
And the question I have is: Would it make any difference if there were a more sort‐<strong>of</strong><br />
simplified, robust, headline, banner‐level set <strong>of</strong> conclusions (we want Russia in the<br />
Euro‐Atlantic arc, they do as well, in the next five to ten years), to drive and inform,<br />
and set a magnetic field for the particular issues that come up between the<br />
branches?<br />
Is there space for more strategic‐level oomph or clarity on the simple things<br />
so that all the people that this institution and many others in Washington—all the<br />
people who are working so hard on one or two or three sets <strong>of</strong> issues or regions—<br />
have an idea that these are the big, big things that we’re all working toward?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I mean, the biggest challenge, I think, in our jobs, the more senior you<br />
get, is to resist the temptation to become tactical. And unfortunately, it’s the easiest<br />
thing to get sucked into.<br />
Staying strategic is really what you want to do as much as you can. <strong>The</strong>re are<br />
a lot <strong>of</strong> people out there who are quite good at implementing good strategy. Making<br />
good strategy is really the hard part. And if we can get better at doing that, I think<br />
that’s really, really important.<br />
I, like many others in this room, have felt the influence in our military careers<br />
<strong>of</strong> what we call the 12,000 mile screwdriver from Washington. You know, whether<br />
you’re out there trying to implement some strategy … [you’re] also being<br />
micromanaged in the implementation. And, I think, to our President’s credit, there’s<br />
very little <strong>of</strong> that micromanagement going on in the conduct <strong>of</strong> operations, which is<br />
quite good.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Let me ask you a little bit about NATO, and then a couple <strong>of</strong><br />
interventions and then we’ll let people who are very keen to ask you questions have<br />
the floor. You were the Supreme Allied Commander, NATO stepped out <strong>of</strong> area and<br />
went to Afghanistan … first major military operation … they’ve taken the lead in<br />
Libya. One could argue that these are major steps forward, there’s a lot <strong>of</strong><br />
operational—if you will—long‐term benefit from these engagements. One could also<br />
argue that it’s exhausting both the resources and the will <strong>of</strong> the NATO governments,
eing in these rather long engagements without a clear end in sight. How do you<br />
project the five‐year outlook for NATO based on their experiences?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: It’s going to be interesting. One <strong>of</strong> my favorite sayings is ‘a vision<br />
without resources is a hallucination.’ NATO has wonderful intentions. In the Prague<br />
summit <strong>of</strong> 2002, all <strong>of</strong> the NATO members signed up to minimum 2% <strong>of</strong> GDP for<br />
national security. I don’t know how many nations meet that threshold.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Secretary Gates had a few words on that last week.<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Yeah, and from the Prague summit came the vision <strong>of</strong> the NATO<br />
Response Force. And everybody was for the NATO Response Force until you … I, as<br />
NATO Commander, proposed using it in a humanitarian operation in Pakistan, and<br />
so we pulled <strong>of</strong>f the operation and then the countries that were on watch wanted to<br />
be refunded for their expenses, because they hadn’t budgeted for these things. Well,<br />
there’s another expression in NATO: “Costs fall where they lie.” Which means that if<br />
you’re on the dot, and you execute, you bite the bullet, and you absorb the [cost]. It<br />
caused chaos in the Alliance.<br />
<strong>The</strong> aspirations <strong>of</strong> the alliance are still very honorable and very good, but the<br />
realism that backs up those aspirations doesn’t really stand the test. I think it’s going<br />
to be a critical thing the Alliance is going to have to deal with. <strong>The</strong> first thing is, you<br />
have to do what you say you’re going to do. If you all agreed to it, 2% doesn’t mean<br />
1.5, doesn’t mean 1.6, it means 2%. And, if they get serious about it, and they …<br />
<strong>The</strong>re’s a difference between how much value we ascribe to the security part<br />
<strong>of</strong> the operation and the Europeans do. We’ve always taken the lead, we’ve always<br />
been the one to over—not over commit, but certainly take on the majority <strong>of</strong> the<br />
expense. If you need ammunition, go get it from the Americans. I remember a<br />
hilarious story during the Iraq war <strong>of</strong> some French … the French air force was<br />
running out <strong>of</strong> bombs, and their ship was on the way with bombs. So they went to<br />
see the American air force, and they plotted for three days as to how they were<br />
going to ask for two‐hundred, three‐hundred bombs. So the day came when he went<br />
up the American general and said, “Could we borrow three‐hundred bombs?” And<br />
the general said, “How many do you need?” And he said “three‐hundred.” “Give him<br />
three‐thousand.” And they walked away and said, “Wow, that’s unbelievable.”<br />
So we did a lot <strong>of</strong> this ourselves. If the Allies weren’t quite ready we’d say,<br />
“don’t worry about it, just bring your flag and whatever you can do, it’ll be fine.”<br />
Those days are a little bit different now, until we get our economic house in order.<br />
We’re going to need people to say what they mean, and do what they say more than<br />
we’ve seen in the past.<br />
So on the one hand, I think NATO did a good job in Libya by making a rapid<br />
decision, which is an organization that’s not known for doing that. And you have to<br />
give credit to the UN. <strong>The</strong>y came up with a policy statement—a mandate—that they
asked NATO to do, and all that was done in relatively short order compared to many<br />
other things. So I think there was some good, but also, we need to shore up some <strong>of</strong><br />
the realism and become more real about this.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Well, talking about the Libya intervention on a broader<br />
scale—with the NATO peace, with the UN peace, with the United States policy—<br />
what was striking, at least to me, about the going‐in position, was that there was a<br />
military mission, which was to help prevent the Benghazi massacre, to interdict the<br />
air attacks—take out the air assets—and to support NATO, and that we would pull<br />
back within a short period <strong>of</strong> time and be in support <strong>of</strong> the NATO mission.<br />
Whereas the President, who was traveling, if I’m not mistaken, in South<br />
America, made clear that we also have a policy that Qaddafi should go. And he said<br />
we have other ways that we’re interested in promoting that goal.<br />
Fast forward a fair amount <strong>of</strong> time, it’s still been going on, several other cities<br />
have gone into high combat. Bombing <strong>of</strong> downtown Tripoli by NATO has been a<br />
recent spectacle. I guess my question is—the big question is—should the military<br />
mission track with the political objective more than this one did? Why don’t I just<br />
leave you with that one? Can you have a military mission when it won’t really end<br />
unless the political goal is met … and so, why don’t you have a military mission that<br />
embraces the political goal—which is a regime change?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I’m a little bit at a disadvantage because I’m not in government and<br />
so this whole Libya thing came up after I left.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: So you’re free to speak.<br />
[Laughter.]<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Yeah, I know. No, but I mean in terms <strong>of</strong> just knowledge.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Understood.<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: As I understand it, the primary goal for American intervention<br />
initially was humanitarian—to save what we believed would be a probable<br />
massacre <strong>of</strong> innocent people. Unfortunately, once you put your foot in the bathtub,<br />
you can’t just take it out and say “okay, that’s all we’re going to do.”<br />
And then soon after the NATO mission launch … and it’s still going on … I<br />
think everybody understands that the longer Qaddafi holds out, the worse it is, both<br />
for our policy and also NATO. But NATO is carrying out the mandate that it was<br />
given by the United Nations. If you want them to do something different, then<br />
change the mandate. I think that there are … I’m sure there are a lot <strong>of</strong> other things<br />
going on and other ways to try to end this impasse with Qaddafi. But the longer it<br />
goes on, the worse it is.
BLOOMFIELD: Leaders get bloodier and bloodier. We could talk about Syria,<br />
we could talk about a lot <strong>of</strong> places. And yet the talk is, “Will he leave?” in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Qaddafi. If a country said, as a matter <strong>of</strong> policy, “we’d rather end the conflict than be<br />
perfect in terms <strong>of</strong> the administration <strong>of</strong> justice against this ruler” … In other words,<br />
if they <strong>of</strong>fered safe haven and lifelong immunity to a leader just to get him out <strong>of</strong><br />
there, maybe with his sons, are those tools relevant in the 21 st century or should<br />
everyone in every case face justice no matter what, even if it means they won’t leave<br />
until the bitter end, and the war goes on?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Ideally, that’s what you’d like. Maybe the world is moving towards a<br />
little bit more <strong>of</strong> a standard for rulers around the world. I personally believe that<br />
we’re not tough enough on these kinds <strong>of</strong> leadership—this kind <strong>of</strong> dictatorship, if<br />
you will—that brutally oppresses people as Assad is doing, and so on and so forth.<br />
I don’t understand why people like that should be seated at the international<br />
table, for example. Personally, I think there should be a standard. I think we’re<br />
moving towards a standard where world bodies will not accept the membership <strong>of</strong><br />
people like that, who brutalize their people and have a very repressive regime. It’s<br />
going to be selective and we’re not going to do it.<br />
We finally got General Mladic at the Hague. <strong>The</strong>re’s no question that Qaddafi<br />
does not want to visit Holland, and doesn’t ever want to see Holland, but we’ll just<br />
have to see what the final solution is. But you were asking me a broader question<br />
about leadership—about that kind <strong>of</strong> leadership. I think there’s more that the<br />
international bodies could do to make it pretty uncomfortable for those leaders in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> trade relations, in terms <strong>of</strong> international travel, in terms <strong>of</strong> indictments that<br />
would have the effect <strong>of</strong> restricting travel. But the world is going to have to be more<br />
cohesive before we get there, but I think it might be moving that way.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Let me give our audience a chance to ask a couple <strong>of</strong><br />
questions. Please identify yourself. Sir in the back row.<br />
ATTENDEE (Unidentified): [Speaking <strong>of</strong>f mic.]<br />
you.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Hold on one second, while Nicole gives you the mic. Thank<br />
ATTENDEE (Unidentified): Sir, I want to ask you a process question, please.<br />
I understand in the military, when you have a doctrine <strong>of</strong> strategy, but you have<br />
doubts, you have a Team B, or whatever you call it. You have a counter‐team, which<br />
tries to test your hypothesis.<br />
I wonder, where could we place one that would test your hypothesis that the<br />
Marshall Plan can be applied to the Middle East? Some <strong>of</strong> us feel that such a test<br />
would show that this is not transferrable, that … just to give one very short example,
we can’t create jobs in Los Angeles, in Columbus, Ohio, on a massive scale, I think we<br />
see that around us. Why would we think we could do it in Egypt?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: I’m sorry, I couldn’t hear that.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: If we can’t create jobs in Ohio or Los Angeles, how can we do<br />
it in Egypt? Can we test whether the Marshall Plan is applicable to the Middle East<br />
before we decide that that’s the solution?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Well, I think the question is one that cuts across the domestic policies<br />
that have resulted in a certain situation that we find ourselves in, that hopefully is<br />
correctable. That’s an internal problem that is very complex but obviously has to be<br />
resolved, and probably the next election is going to hinge on that particular<br />
question.<br />
On the other hand, the United States, I think, wants to continue—and<br />
Americans want the United States to continue—to be a nation <strong>of</strong> significant<br />
leadership and values and inspiration for the developing part <strong>of</strong> the world. What I’m<br />
suggesting is that, while we can’t do it alone and we can’t do everything, we can—as<br />
the world’s largest economy—shape and mold and bring into a new way <strong>of</strong> doing<br />
things, countries that previously, we never would have thought <strong>of</strong>, like Brazil, like<br />
India, like maybe even China.<br />
It seems to me that there has to be a convergence <strong>of</strong> the haves and the havenots<br />
if we’re to really triumph over the hopelessness that exists, and to try to move<br />
the world in a positive direction. We can’t do it alone, and we can’t be everywhere,<br />
but in those instances … and I cited Egypt as an example, but there are others,<br />
countries that are developing countries that need that kind <strong>of</strong> engagement … that<br />
the United States can play a dominant role. That’s not to say that we shouldn’t worry<br />
about jobs in Ohio. I think we should worry about jobs in Ohio, and I think you’re<br />
going to see that being probably the number one issue in this campaign.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: If I may, that rose well above the tactical level answer.<br />
[Laughter.]<br />
ATTENDEE (Gareth Porter): Thank you. General Jones, thank you for giving<br />
us the opportunity to interact with someone who’s been at the center <strong>of</strong> the policymaking<br />
process. I’d like to ask you—<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Could you identify yourself, please?<br />
ATTENDEE (Gareth Porter): Gareth Porter, Inter Press Service.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Thank you.
ATTENDEE (Gareth Porter): You were quoted by Bob Woodward, who<br />
obviously you spent a lot <strong>of</strong> time talking to, over a period <strong>of</strong> months, saying that<br />
Afghanistan is a clash <strong>of</strong> civilizations, among other things, and that the worst<br />
possible thing for the United States would be to allow the militants to win in<br />
Afghanistan, because then militants all over the Middle East and beyond would<br />
believe that they could defeat the United States, with terrible consequences. Now,<br />
obviously this is the <strong>of</strong>ficial position <strong>of</strong> the US military, it’s been articulated over the<br />
months.<br />
But I would like to ask you whether you agree that there is an alternative<br />
view <strong>of</strong> this question <strong>of</strong> the relationship between US military presence in<br />
Afghanistan and the impact that the outcome would have on Islamic populations<br />
across the Middle East (that alternative being that, in fact, what is far more<br />
important than how effective the US military is in a particular conflict, is whether<br />
the United States is occupying Islamic lands)? So I’d like to ask if you agree that<br />
there is that alternative view, was that thoroughly discussed in the policy‐making<br />
process in the Obama Administration before those critical decisions were made?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: <strong>The</strong> one thing that I think we did do well is—and we touched on this<br />
earlier in our conversation—the need to engage, as much as you can in different<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> the world, but on a regional aspect <strong>of</strong> things.<br />
When we started out in Afghanistan, it seems to me that we dealt with<br />
Afghanistan as Afghanistan, and Pakistan as Pakistan, and India as India. But we<br />
tried to basically take a strategic approach, and it’s turned out to be essentially<br />
correct, unfortunately, that you can’t really have a discussion about Afghanistan<br />
without talking about Pakistan.<br />
And frankly, <strong>of</strong> the two, the most worrisome one, to me, right now would be<br />
Pakistan. Afghanistan is, in my view, on the path <strong>of</strong> by 2014 <strong>of</strong> becoming whatever it<br />
can become between now and then. And it’s going to have to be, probably good<br />
enough, because not just the United States but the international community has<br />
basically said, in some way, that we can’t want for the Afghans that which they don’t<br />
want for themselves. We can’t want it worse than they do.<br />
So, between now and 2014, we’ve made some serious progress in the overall<br />
security environment in the country, particularly in the real troubled areas <strong>of</strong> the<br />
East and the South, we’ve tried to do our best with regard to catapulting economic<br />
programs, we’ve discovered potential vast resources in terms <strong>of</strong> copper and other<br />
minerals that exist in Afghanistan that could be very, very helpful for the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the Afghan economy. And we have pressed the government <strong>of</strong><br />
President Karzai on governance, the rule <strong>of</strong> law, corruption, ad nauseam.<br />
At the end <strong>of</strong> the day—and the end <strong>of</strong> the day is somewhere around 2014<br />
where we will have a major pivot to a new relationship where the Afghans are going<br />
to have to step up and as President Karzai said at the London conference over a year
ago, “I want to run my entire country by 2014.” And the world community at the<br />
NATO Summit in Portugal in December said “we agree.” So that’s where we’re<br />
headed, and so we’ll just have to see where it goes. But to your question I think, yes,<br />
I think there is, at the end <strong>of</strong> the day only so much you can do to give people—<br />
particularly the Afghans—a shot at a better existence. I think between now and then<br />
they’re going to have to decide for themselves how badly they want it.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Ladies and gentlemen, I think we’ve abused our guest’s time a<br />
little bit, and have run over, which I apologize for that. Please join me in thanking<br />
General Jones for a great discussion today.<br />
[Applause.]<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Thank you.<br />
BLOOMFIELD: Terrific. Thank you very much.<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: Thank you.