DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Petitioner - Supreme Court ...

First, the named plaintiffs are inadequate class representatives because they lack
an even facially cognizable claim. As Texas purchasers asserting “no injury” claims,
named plaintiffs are governed by Texas law.
Texas, like the majority of other
jurisdictions, does not recognize “no injury” claims under any legal theory.* Thus, class
adjudication based on the legally inadequate damage allegations of the named plaintiffs’
claims would drag down the claims of those other purchasers who potentially have viable
claims because they (unlike named plaintiffs) allegedly suffered personal injury, property
damage, or actual out-of-pocket money damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Lopez, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 1249, at *12-*12-*13, *I9 (Tex. Dec. 3,2004) (citing Cuwen v.
Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A decision that the claim of the
named plaintiffs lacks merit ordinarily . . . disqualifies the named plaintiffs as the proper
class representatives.”)).’
Second, given that a class judgment in this case, which by definition is brought
only on behalf of people who have not been injured, would bar any vehicle owner who
suffers personal injury or property damage in the future from bringing claims based on
the purported design defect in their vehicles, a “no injury” class action is not superior to
While this Court has not yet ruled on the “no injury” issue as currently presented, the lower courts of this state
tend to reject the idea that such claims are viable, see, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gana, No. 04-03-00702-CV, 2005
Tex. App. LEXIS 532, at *19 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 26,2005), and for this reason and the reasons that follow, the
Court should clarify Texas law by squarely rejecting “no injury” claims.
’ See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. WindJor, 521 US. 591, 625-27 (1997) (denying certification of class alleging both
risk of injury and manifested injury due to inadequacy of named plaintiffs because “’a class representative must . . .
possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members”); Robinson v. SherifofCook Cq., 167
F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1999) (“if [named plaintiffs] claim is a clear loser at the time he asks to be made class
representative, then approving him as class representative can only hurt the class”); Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 220
F.R.D. 459, 466-67 (W.D. La. 2004) (‘?t is this disparity of claims that prevents the plaintiffs from meeting the
commonality requirement, and it is the consequences of not recognizing the disparity of these claims that prevents
the class members from adequately representing the class.”); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco 11 Prod. Liab. Litig., 177
F.R.D. 360, 366-68 (E.D. La. 1997) (“by attempting to tailor their action in such a way as to improve their ability to
establish commonality, class representatives may in fact create an adequacy problem”).
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