Petitioner's Brief on the Merits - Supreme Court of Texas

appeals here split hairs over language in the divorce decree, despite finding the language
“unambiguous.” 57
This approach endows individual words with far more meaning than the
trial court could have imagined and inevitably leads to inequitable results.
Treadway also harps on language differences in the divorce decrees in this case and
Reiss. Pet. Resp. at 5-6. First, Texas jurisprudence should not leave the fate of divorced
parties to hinge on the subtleties of wording differences in decades-old divorce decrees,
particularly given the difficulties inherent in the terminology of pension plans. 58
Second, language differences are often immaterial. For example, in Reiss the
divorce decree recites that it is dividing “community property.” Reiss, 40 S.W.3d at 607;
Reiss Pet. at Tab C. The decree in this case recites that it is dividing the “estate of the
parties” which means the same thing. CR 10. See Reiss, 40 S.W.3d at 609 (noting that
courts interpret “estate of the parties” to mean “community estate”) (citing TEX. FAM.
CODE § 7.001); Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 139 (“The only ‘estate of the parties’ is
community property.”) (discussing § 3.63, the predecessor statute to § 7.001).
(b)
The courts of appeals refuse to recognize the latent
ambiguity caused by applying an otherwise clear decree to a
complicated retirement plan.
57 E.g., slip op. at 7 & 7 n.4 (awarding Treadway 25% of the plan valued at the time of retirement because the decree
contained the words “such pension plan” rather than “such benefits” and “that existed” rather than “as it existed.”);
cf. Wilde, 949 S.W.2d at 333 (reading a divorce decree as a whole toward the end of harmonizing and giving effect to
the whole instrument and considering the entire record to clarify the decree’s provisions); Baxter, 794 S.W.2d at 763
(valuing plan at retirement where decree specified “gross amount . . . received each month” and noting that Ex Parte
Lucher contained a similar decree).
58 For example, in Baxter, the Court emphasized the presence of the word “gross” in the decree and discussed at
length the use of the same word in the decree in Ex Parte Lucher, 728 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, no writ). 794 S.W.2d at 762, 763. This word does not appear in the decree in this case. See also Brown, at 1151-
55 (cataloguing the misapplication of pension terminology in Texas jurisprudence).
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