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It Is Broken. Can It Be Fixed? A Look at the European Union's ...

It Is Broken. Can It Be Fixed? A Look at the European Union's ...

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• There should be clear parameters for each Member St<strong>at</strong>e’s fiscal policy against which its<br />

record can be judged.<br />

• There need to be channels through which n<strong>at</strong>ional finance ministers can be held to<br />

account when <strong>the</strong>y make (or break) such commitments.<br />

• There should be a political price to pay for Member St<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> breach agreed policies<br />

without good, economically defensible, reasons.<br />

There are obvious concerns with <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of <strong>Be</strong>gg and Schelkle’s proposed Eurogroup<br />

holding its finance ministers accountable. Their response is th<strong>at</strong><br />

Explicit political sanctions <strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU level, such as losing <strong>the</strong> right to vote on euro<br />

m<strong>at</strong>ters in Ecofin, might help to reinforce <strong>the</strong>se commitments, but <strong>the</strong> main sanction<br />

should be expected from <strong>the</strong> perception of failure in domestic politics (<strong>Be</strong>gg and<br />

Schelkle, 2005, p. 1055).<br />

In examining <strong>the</strong> behavior of larger member st<strong>at</strong>es compared to th<strong>at</strong> of smaller member<br />

st<strong>at</strong>es, Buti and Pench agreed with F<strong>at</strong>as, von Hagen, Hallett, Strauch, and Sibert in calling for<br />

gre<strong>at</strong>er flexibility. However, <strong>the</strong>y were equally as concerned as to <strong>the</strong> neg<strong>at</strong>ive results of gre<strong>at</strong>er<br />

flexibility without <strong>the</strong> ability to enforce <strong>the</strong> SGP.<br />

For any reform of <strong>the</strong> Pact to be credible, Member St<strong>at</strong>es, especially <strong>the</strong> larger ones, need<br />

to exhibit gre<strong>at</strong>er willingness to subordin<strong>at</strong>e short-term political gains to <strong>the</strong> long-term<br />

common good of protecting <strong>the</strong> monetary union from <strong>the</strong> risk of financial<br />

unsustainability. A powerful signal in this direction would be for <strong>the</strong> Member St<strong>at</strong>es<br />

against which an EDP is being initi<strong>at</strong>ed, to agree to abstain from voting <strong>at</strong> any step of <strong>the</strong><br />

procedure concerning any Member St<strong>at</strong>e. A self-denying ordinance of this kind,<br />

18

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