by Michael BURDA* * Associate Professor of Economics, INSEAD ...

"SOME NEW INSIGHTS ON THE 

INTERINDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE FROM THE 

GERMAN SOCIO ECONOMIC PANEL" 

by 

Michael BURDA* 

N° 91/63/EP 

* Associate Professor of Economics, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 

Fontainebleau 77305 Cedex, France. 

Printed at INSEAD, 

Fontainebleau, France

Some New Insights on the Interindustry Wage Structure 

from the German Socioeconomic Panel 

Michael C. Burda* 

July 1991 

• INSEAD, F-77305 Fontainebieau France, and the Centre for Economic 

Policy Research. I am grateful to the Deutsches Institut fur 

Wirtschaftsforschung and 

generous hospitality, and 

the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin for 

to Michael Funke, Johannes Schwarze, 

David Soskice and Gert Wagner for dis;ussions and comments. Rainer 

Pischner's assistance with the German Socioeconomic Panel data set 

was especially invaluable. This project was supported by INSEAD's 

Research Department and grants from the Alfred P. Sloan and Ford 

Foundations.

Abstract 

This paper investigates the interindustry wage structure in the 

1985 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel. In addition to the 

usual controls, this survey contains detailed information on job 

characteristics and work conditions. Interaction of industry 

affiliation is significant with several individual attributes, 

especially job tenure; homogeneity of earnings equations across 

these attributes is decisively rejected. The industry wage 

structure is insignificant for workers with low job tenure. These 

results are consistent with the interpretation of interindustry 

wage differentials as shared rents from industry or firm-specific 

human capital.

1. Introduction 

This paper investigates the interindustry wage structure in 

the 1985 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (Deutsches 

Soziookonomisches Panel, hereafter SOEP), a representative 

cross-section of West German households. In addition to the usual 

controls, the 1985 survey contains several questions about 

workplace characteristics and worker qualifications. With 

responses to these questions it is possible to control for an 

extended set of factors in "Mincer equations" relating earnings to 

human capital and other individual characteristics. Inclusion of 

such controls can explain between 8-107. of wage variation beyond 

that explained in similar recent studies. 

Besides improving control for influences of workplace 

conditions and worker qualifications on pay, this paper 

investigates the stability of the interindustry wage structure 

across different groupings in the sample. To the extent that 

Mincer-style earnings equations differ across characteristics and 

these are correlated with industry, the estimated interindustry 

wage structure may merely reflects omitted variable bias. It is 

well-recognized that estimated coefficients are biased to the 

extent that excluded regressors are correlated with included ones. 

We pursue this issue one step further: could omitted, 

industry-specific inte-actions explain some part of the estimated 

interindustry wage structure? 

Industry wage differentials in the SOEP are significantly 

estimated in the full sample, but show some differences with those 

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estimated by Krueger and Summers (1988) in the US Current 

Population Survey. We also find that earnings functions are 

statistically different across sex, firm size, full versus 

part-time, and especially job tenure groupings. Tests for 

homogeneity of earnings equations across these groups are 

decisively rejected. When the sample is reduced to full-time 

workers with less than five years experience in their current job, 

industry wage differentials vanish, whereas they remain 

economically and statistically significant for workers with more 

than five years tenure. These results, which analyze only a 

fraction of all potential interactions, militate against 

overinterpretation of industry wage differentials. They are more 

consistent with workers and firms' sharing rents of industry or 

firm-specific human capital, which accumulates only over time. 

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 

literature on the interindustry wage structure and its 

interpretation. Section 3 elaborates one particular omitted 

variables interpretation of the interindustry wage structure. 

Section 4 describes the SOEP and its 1985 wave which includes 

detailed information on job characteristics and worker attitudes, 

and presents estimates the interindustry wage structure. Section 5 

explores the robustness of wage structures across different 

groupings of the working population. Section 6 offers an 

interpretation of the results. 

2. The Interindustry Wage Structure and its Interpretation: 

A Survey of the Literature 

The fact that observationally similar workers with comparable 

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skills and experience earn different wages in different industries 

has puzzled economists for a long time.' In the postwar period, 

labor economists around the world began to take particular notice 

of the durability of this wage structure. 2 Lebergott (1947) showed 

not only wages that wages were highly correlated across industries 

in the US, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden, but also the 

Soviet Union. These findings were later corroborated by Dunlop and 

Rothbaum (1955) in international comparisons, and more recently by 

Katz and Summers (1988). 

The suspicion that the wage structure merely reflected 

distribution of observable skills was dispelled by the pioneering 

work of Krueger and Summers (1988), who employed survey data on 

individual workers to identify and track the interindustry wage 

structure, estimated as coefficients on industry affiliation dummy 

variables in standard Mincer earnings equations. By projecting the 

wage structure on a variety of measurable individual 

characteristics including human capital proxies, they find a large 

component of variance remains "explained" by industry affiliation. 

The interindustry wage structure lends itself to several 

1 See Murphy and Topel (1987) for a particularly evocative 

reference to the phenomenon by Adam Smith; for an early attempt at 

a neoclassical justification, see John Bates Clark (1899). Thaler 

(1988) provides a useful summary of recent explanations of the 

interindustry wage structure. 

2 See Dunlop (1944), Lebergott (1947), Slichter (1950) and Cullen 

(1956) for the United States; Turner (1952) and Buddy ?nd Tolles 

(1957) for the United Kingdom; Reynolds and Taft (1956) for 

France; and Grumbach and Konig (1957) and Lampert (1968) for 

Germany. 

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economic interpretations. J.T. Dunlop (1944) and Sumner Slichter 

(1950) linked wages to ability to pay, that is, the profitability 

of the enterprise in question. Slichter (1950) wrote that "wages, 

within a considerable range, reflect managerial discretion, that 

where management can easily pay high wages they tend to do so, and 

that where managements are barely breaking even, they tend to keep 

wages down," p.88. This "ability to pay" view has been revived by 

recent work of Blanchflower and Oswald (1989) and Nickell and 

Wadhwani (1988). Alternatively, interindustry wage differences 

could derive from job characteristics (compensating differentials) 

or sorting on unobservable individual attributes. The first idea 

thus explains why the mining industry in this view pays higher 

wages than average, ceteris paribus, because miners work in dark 

places underground, while forestry workers earn less because they 

are outdoors. The second central idea says that the chemical 

industry pays more than the textile industry because certain 

unobservable characteristics are more valuable in that industry 

and are remunerated in equilibrium by higher wages. 

More recently, Katz (1986), Krueger and Summers (1988), and 

Katz and Summers (1988) have attributed industry pay differences 

to the broad heading of "efficiency wage considerations." In this 

-view managers set pay in order to solve an optimizing problem. 

Higher wages reduce job turnover (Pencavel 1972), spur worker 

effort by increasing the cost of job loss (Shapiro and Stiglitz 

1984), increase loyalt y and productivity (Akerlof 1984), and 

improve the quality of job applicants (Weiss 1980). To these can 

be added the "fair wage hypothesis" of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), 

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which stresses perceptions of fairness among workers. In addition, 

Lindbeck and Snower's (1986) work can be interpreted as a type of 

efficiency wage payment to prevent workers from disrupting the 

production process. 

Clearly, efficiency wages is not a single theory but rather a 

mosaic of ideas, some of which are more neoclassical than others. 

They share the common theme that firms set wages, and may find it 

against their profit maximizing interests to reduce them in the 

face of unemployment. To the extent that industries differ in the 

optimal efficiency wage that firms pay, an interindustry wage 

structure will arise. 

3. Omitted Variable Bias and the Industry Wage Structure 

The mere existence of significant coefficients on industry 

dummy variables is not conclusive evidence of efficiency wages. 

Estimated industry dummies may simply be a by-product of 

unobserved differences in worker quality as well as other 

characteristics which are correlated with particular industries. 

Cross-section and panel data sets can only obtain a limited amount 

of information about worker attributes. This can be seen in the 

large amount of variance in earnings that remains unexplained by 

measured variables such as age, experience, education, and other 

identifiable attributes. 3 

If verifiable characteristics unobservable to econometricians 

are more valuable to industry x than to others, and if workers 

3 

Katz and Summers (1°S°1 concede that some of this unexplainable 

variance is correlated with the effect of controls on the 

uncorrected interindustm age structure, suggesting that some of 

the former may be indeed ..:nmeasurable quality. 

-5-

possessing these attributes were indifferent between working in 

industry x and elsewhere, firms should offer higher wages to these 

workers to attract them from other industries. In equilibrium one 

would observe a premium for working in industry x as long as the 

characteristics in question were not included as a right had side 

variable. While Blackburn and Newmark (1988) show that 

intelligence --as measured by IQ-- is not positively associated 

with high wage industries, this does not rule out other forms of 

unobservable heterogeneity, including such unquantifiable traits 

as loyalty, perseverance, and carefulness, all of which are likely 

to be important to an employer. To the extent that these 

unobserved attributes are valued differently by different 

industries, they will surface in estimated industry dummy 

coefficients. 4 

The point is more general than this. Suppose that each 

employment relationship consists of a "match" of a worker and a 

firm. Each firm operates in one of k=1,...,K industries, each of 

which with a revenue function R K (x , y , t) where x is a list of 

I J 

worker attributes, y is a list of firm attributes, and t is the 

time the match has existed. Few restrictions are imposed on the 

derivatives of R except that aR K/at is positive for all K; that 

4 Following Griliches (1957) and Theil (1957), If the analyst 

estimates the model y=X0+u where the true specification l Is 

y=X13-1-Zy+u, the OLS estimate of 33 is given by b = (X'X) X'y = P + 

(X' X) 1X' (Zz+u), so Eb = 13 + P7, where P-a(X' X) -1X' Z is the matrix 

of "auxiliary regression- coefficients of left-out variables Z on 

the columns of X. The OLS estimator Is biased as long as the 

elements of Z are correlated with the j columns of X, and the bias 

of the ith element b. is equal to Z cov( X. ,Z . 

1 j 1 J j 

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is, there is an element of firm specific human capital in the 

production process. Workers have their own fallback or reservation 

wage w• , which may be determined by outside offers or the level of 

unemployment benefits. If the jth firm and ith worker set the wage 

according to a simple Nash bargaining rule, we have 

(1) w = ER K (X ,y ,t) + w*1/2 

To the extent that R's differ across industries, so in principle 

could the derivatives of R with respect to their arguments and 

thus the estimated earnings function as well. 

There are many reasons to believe that R might be different 

across industries. It is hard to understand, a priori, why the 

individual return to an additional year of schooling in the 

chemical industry is equal to that in the personal services 

sector. Moreover there may be interactions here, so that the 

effect of characteristics may depend on other other variables, 

such as tenure t. 

The common response to this line of reasoning is that labor 

should reallocate itself until these differences are eliminated 

at the margin, as would be the case if labor mobility is perfect 

across industries and R is characterized by decreasing return on 

all margins. Yet there are many potential reasons why, even under 

conditions of mobility, that industry dummies may be estimated 

with significant coefficients where there is in fact no "industry 

effect," but simply a misspecified wage equation. 

One is the desirability of the particular industry to 

particular workers. Women, because of an exogenously given option 

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of childbearing, may prefer industries in which long cumulative 

tenure or experience is unnecessary and work career interruptions 

are possible. An increased willingness of women to be in this 

group leads to lower bargained wages for them, vis-a-vis men. This 

will lead to an "industry sex effect". To the extent that women 

are actually concentrated in those industries, leaving out an 

interaction term for women in a wage equation with industry 

dummies will induce biased estimates of any industry effect. 

Simply controlling for sex will not solve this problem.5 

A second reason is discrimination. Suppose that certain 

industries discriminate against women. For example the 

construction industry is well-recognized as a male-dominated 

industry. Suppose further, in contrast, that other industries do 

not discriminate. If underpaid women are also underrepresented in 

the construction industry, then a construction dummy in the 

absence of a construction industry-sex interaction will be 

estimated with with a wage premium. 

A third reason is rent sharing. 6 Suppose that a certain match 

modelled in equation (1) has existed for a long time, and that 

aR K /at is positive. It may simply be the case that the firm does 

not want to replace i s worker with some other; there is simply 

5 A similar example sir s es in the case of residents of foreign 

nationality. Foreigners generally don't speak the language as well 

as natives. These Individuals may prefer industries where 

on-the-job communicate: n is less important, and be willing to 

accept lower pay, I other things equal. For given employer's 

preferences, a Nash 16 erg aMing outcome will lead to a lower wage 

for foreigners in particular industry. Thus an "industry 

effect" may be dete:-.e where it is really an nationality-industry 

interaction, and outcome of a voluntary matching 

process. 

6 This is stressed by Kat s• Summers (1989). 

-8-

too much value in the existing employment relationship. Thus 

neither of the two parties are willing to allow third parties to 

underbid, at least for some range of wages. To the extent that 

different industries value this firm or industry specific capital 

differently, aR K /at will vary across industries because there is 

no arbitrage opportunity across this margin, and industry 

dummey variables will simply pick up this effect in a misspecified 

wage equation. 

It is at least possible that the industry wage structure is 

simply a series of omitted interactions with sex, race, and other 

variables. To see this, consider the simple case in which the 

unconditional industry wage effect is in fact zero, but each 

industry i rewards binary attribute j, j=1...J differently by 71.1. 

The expected value of the coefficient of an industry dummy i in an 

otherwise correctly specified equation is approximately 

Eb = E (fraction of individuals in industry i with attribute DT„ 

i j 

Ii 

This ''wastebasket effect" should be distinguished from that 

suggested by Murphy and Topel (1987a,b), who stress voluntary 

sorting by workers into industries on the basis of unobserved 

ability and this sorting is highly correlated with that observed 

for measurable skills. Curiously, this possibility has not been 

raised in the heated debate over the industry wage structure. 

4. The Interindustry Wage Structure of the SOEP 

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The German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) is a representative 

annual survey of roughly 6000 households in the Federal Republic 

of Germany, involving more than 10,000 individuals. The SOEP 

offers a unique alternative to already extensively investigated US 

data sets. The design of the SOEP is similar to the Panel Survey 

of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Income and Program 

Partipation (SIPP) and as second mover to these panel studies has 

improved on some aspects of the former, for example, by 

interviewing all working individuals in a household. 7 Second, a 

variety of information has been gathered about quality of the 

workplace and workplace attitudes. In 1985 these included a set of 

thirteen questions regarding the quality of the workplace and 

worker attitudes. Furthermore the respondent was allowed to 

distinguish between "somewhat agree" and "fully agree" to the 

extent these characteristics were applicable. The attributes are 

listed in Table 1. 

Several of these questions in Table 1 are obvious proxies for 

attributes described in the literature on earnings determination. 

For example, the compensating differentials literature would 

predict positive signs for questions 2, 6, 7, 12, and 13 and 

possibly negative signs for 1, 3, 9, and 11. Question 5 is 

directly related to one interpretation of the efficiency wage 

hypothesis; workers who are supervised more should receive lower 

wages, whereas the unsupervised will receive supra-normal wages to 

deter shirking. 

7 For an excellent survey of the comparability of the SOEP and the 

US Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIP?), see Witte 

(1990). 

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There were 4599 individuals in the 1985 SOEP survey who 

responded that they were working and reported their gross income 

with complete data for all controls. Of these, 3422 were German 

citizens and 1177 were foreigners. Of the grand total, 4030 were 

working full time and of these, 2866 were of German nationality.8 

Using these data, OLS regressions of log hourly gross earnings on 

one-digit industry dummy variables were employed to obtain raw 

estimates of the interindustry wage structure for all employed 

individuals in the SOEP for hourly wages (gross of deductions and 

withholding). The results are reported in the first column of 

Table 2. Similar unreported results were obtained throughout this 

paper for hourly compensation, which included employer bonuses, 

but still excluded employee contributions to social insurance. The 

control group was the no response group. 

Following Krueger and Summers (1988), a Mincer wage equation 

was estimated that included the following controls: education and 

its square, age, experience, occupation dummies (10), regional 

dummies (8), a sex dummy, a central city dummy, a unionization 

dummy, an ever married dummy, interactions of sex with 

9 

ever-married, education, education squared, and a constant. 

Because education variables cannot be compared, foreign citizens 

are excluded. These results are presented in the second column of 

8 The distinction is important because key variables such as 

schooling are not comparable across German nationals and residents 

of foreign nationality. 

9 Krueger and Summers actually controlled for education and its 

square, 6 age dummies. 8 occupation dummies, 3 regional dummies, a 

sex dummy, a central city dummy, a unionization dummy, an ever 

married dummy, veteran status, interactions of sex with marriage, 

education squared, am: six wage brackets, and a constant (see 

Table 1, p. 264).

Table 2. 

Direct control for human capital and workplace conditions can 

be enhanced in the SOEP as a result of several questions in the 

1985 survey described above. The third column of Table 2 presents 

estimates of the wage structure after adding to the 

Krueger-Summers controls tenure on the current job, 

experience-squared, training/qualification dummies (6), guild 

membership, job characteristics (26), and dummies for 

self-employed and civil servant status. 

The last column of Table 2 displays the estimated industry 

wage structure given a set of "preferred controls," which simply 

drop from the extended controls the following interactions: 

sex-marriage, sex-education, sex-education-squared, and sexexperience. 

An F-test of the joint significance of estimated 

coefficients on the industry dummy variables confirms the 

existence of the interindustry wage structure. On the other hand, 

the weighted standard deviation of the estimated coefficients 

falls considerably. Furthermore the percentage of variance 

explained by the equation rises by 8-107 vis-a-vis the KS 

controls, suggesting that job quality can explain more variance in 

the wage structure than otherwise thought.'° 

The results in general confirm the hypothesis that the 

interindustry wage structure in Germany is tighter than in the 

United States, controlling for the same factors. These estimates 

10 

Edln and Zettenberg (1989) recently Investigated the 

interindustry wage structure using Swedish data with a detailed 

set of controls and reached similar conclusions. 

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are compared in Table 3. As in Krueger and Summers (1988), we find 

that in unreported results on "near 2-digit classifications," 

durables goods manufacturing and chemicals are high wage 

industries, whereas the trade sectors pay statistically 

significant lower wages." On the other hand the personal services 

sector in Germany and wholesale-retail trade seem to have changed 

places, ie the former paying considerably better than the latter. 

5. Testing for homogeneity in the earning equations 

The possibility of heterogeneous earnings functions suggested 

in Section 3 can be tested. 12 Two approaches are taken. First, a 

Chow test of subsample stability can be performed. Significant 

variability across estimated earnings functions, as detected by a 

statistically significant F-statistic, would signal a potential 

"wastebasket" function performed by industry dummies. Tests for 

homogeneity of the wage equation were performed across the 

following subgroupings: male versus female; full-time versus 

part-time; small versus large firms; and fewer than 5 years versus 

more than 5 years tenure at current job. The results are reported 

in Table 4. The test results allow the rejection at very low 

significance levels of the null that the wage equations are the 

same across the two groups. These results can only serve as a 

warning against potential interactions. 

11 

For aggregate evidence on West German industry wage differentials 

see Fels and Gundlach (199:: 

12 

Krueger and Summer s (1988) do not test for equality of 

coefficients across subgrours in their tables. 

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Despite the suggestive examples of the previous section, 

there is no compelling reason to believe that these interactions 

are correlated with industry grouping. 13 It is possible, of course, 

to test directly for interaction effects for the groupings 

analyzed above. Table 5 presents F-tests for exclusion 

restrictions for interactions of industry with sex, 

full-time/part-time, firm size, and job tenure (more or less than 

5 year affiliation with present f irm ). For sex, tenure, and full 

time/part time, the interaction effect is significant at the 

0.0001 level. It is also noteworthy that for full-time male 

employees of large firms with low current job tenure, the joint 

statistical significance of the industry dummies is attenuated 

significantly. 

In general It seems that the industry wage structure is less 

robust the finer the division applied to the data. This is 

consistent with "wastebasket" interpretation of the industry 

dummies. At the same time, the job quality variables remain 

consistently significant. Results to this effect presented in 

Table 6, especially with respect to tenure, suggest that the wage 

structure might be fruitfully estimated on a narrower sample. In 

Table 7 we present the interindustry wage structure for low (less 

than 60 months) and high (more than 60 months) job tenure for 

all employees. The confirms the suspicion that significant 

interaction exists between industry and tenure in the wage 

13 

Unfortunately there were insufficient observations to perform Chow 

tests for each industry grouping. 

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equation. While the interindustry wage structure is robust for 

workers of long tenure, it is statistically insignificant for 

workers with little experience within their current firm. 

That interindustry wage differentials are exhibited only for 

employees with extended tenure in a given enterprise, if robust 

for other data sets in other countries, has important implications 

for the interindustry wage structure. It seems to favor 

interpretations stressing sharing of rents from industry or firm 

specific human capital formation, both of which will be correlated 

with tenure. 14 

For example, it is reasonable that in-house 

experience is more valuable in chemical and metal industries than 

in trade or personal services, and as result apparently identical 

workers in different industries are not the same. 15 If such human 

capital has different productivity in different industries, then 

it will pay for high productivity industries to attempt to bid for 

this resource. As a state variable, job tenure cannot be simply 

purchased, but rather created in a time intensive process. Here 

the job turnover interpretation of the interindustry wage 

structure is closest to our point here: to increase firm or 

14 It should be remarked that the continuous variable tenure 

variable was invariably significant in the regression results, 

corroborating findings el of LOwenbein (1989), Hubler and Gerlach 

(1990) and Schwarze (1990). 

15 Slichter (1950) wrote: '..jobs and occupations which bear the 

same name do note necessarily involve the same kinds of duties or 

the same degree of responsibility. Machinists first-class in a 

candy factory do not necessarily need the same knowledge of the 

trade as machinists first-class in an oil refinery. Loom fixers 

may have essentially same duties in different mills, but the 

skill required of them may vary greatly depending upon the kind 

and quality of goods which ;he mill produces." (p.801 

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industry specific human capital, firms invest by paying higher 

wages and reducing the rate of attrition through quits into other 

jobs. The key difference is that turnover reduction is a 

determinant, rather than a byproduct of the process by which wages 

are set. 

The average tenure of workers in various industries in the 

1985 SOEP is shown in Table 8. Chi-squared tables for distribution 

of tenure (uncompleted spells) are also displayed in Table 9. 

Both reveal striking differences across both one and two digit 

industries. Clearly other things matter as well such as industry 

history and changes in hiring policies over time. While some 

industries indeed seem to possess workers of higher than average 

tenure while others need less tenure, the pattern of tenure 

concentration is less pronounced at the one-sector industry level. 

On this interpretation, it need not be the case that high 

wage industries necessarily have higher tenure profiles. When 

tenure is created it will be impossible for the firm not to share 

the rents with the worker, since such workers cannot be replaced 

overnight. As a result the very indispensibility of workers will 

contribute to the cost of tenure (firm specific human capital). It 

is not implausible that firms in these industries move up their 

demand curve for this "input." Thus, following the interpretation 

of Katz and Summers (1989), this form of rent sharing shows up as 

the interindustry wage structure. 

This interpretation is consistent with other aspects of the 

industry wage structure. Krueger and Summers (1988) found that 

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involuntary industry changers in the CPS Displaced Workers Survey 

sustained wage changes equivalent to those estimated in their 

equations. This is consistent with the wage differential as the 

rent from firm or industry-specific human capital formation; by 

definition, firm-specific capital disappears when the worker 

leaves the firm, and industry-specific capital is destroyed when a 

worker exits the industry. 16 On the other hand, the specific human 

capital explanation requires an extreme complementarity in the 

production function. Secretaries in the textile or wood/paper/pulp 

industries would require less firm or industry-specific training 

than say in the chemical industry. Yet, there is no compelling 

reason why this degree of complementarity should be constant 

across industries. The results suggest that this avenue of 

explaining the occupational wage structure should be explored, as 

a possible alternative to the "fairness" or sociological 

explanations popular in the literature.17 

6. Concluding Remarks 

As measured by the coefficients on industry dummy variables, 

The SOEP data set exhibits a similar interindustry wage structure 

as found in the US, albeit with tighter variance. 18 The addition of 

16 Our results are nct consistent with involuntary changers into 

high wage industries receiving immediately higher wages. This 

could be the case if workers received a wage that exceeeded the 

opportunity cost of their labor in industries with high 

productivity of firm-s: ecif ic human capital. Our suggest that 

workers must first accumulate the necessary experience before 

receiving tenure-related rents. 

17 See Akerlof (1982) and Al.::: ..?f and Yellen (1990). 

18 This confirms the aggregate findings i of Burda and Sachs (1988). 

-17-

etter controls for job quality, however, reduce significantly 

this variability within margins estimation error. The results of 

this investigation suggest that there are statistically 

significant differences in wage equations across groupings, and 

that industry interactions with- these groups are significant. This 

raises the prospect that the industry wage structure is merely a 

wastebasket for omitted interaction effects of various groupings 

with industry. 

Although we do not stress the result here, one version of 

the efficiency wage hypothesis finds support in our results. 

Estimated coefficients on "strict job supervision: fully agree" 

(question 5 in Table 1) were always statistically significant and 

negative in the regressions reported in this paper, ranging from 

9-157. of the gross wage. On the other hand, by controlling for 

this factor directly --based on individual's response to the 

questioner rather than matching job attributes from other data 

sets-- we reduce its plausibility as a the sole explanation of the 

interindustry wage structure. The results, especially those with 

respect to job tenure, are supportive of a shared-rent 

interpretation of interindustry wage differentials, with rents 

deriving from industry or firm-specific human capital which 

accumulates only over time. The robustness of these rents over 

time and space can be explained by that with which this human 

capital is employed. 

Perhaps the most durable conclusion of" the paper is that 

simple earnings equations, which are reduced forms anyway, may not 

be capably of capturing the rich economic processes that underly 

wage determination. There is simply not enough information in 

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existing surveys. The sensitivity of the earnings equation to the 

sample with which it is estimated should serve as a warning 

against overinterpretation of industry wage differentials. 

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Table 1 

Job Quality Questions in the 1985 SOEP 

1. Does your work involve variation in tasks? 

2. Is your work physically strenuous? 

3. Can you organize your work independently? 

4. Does your work vary with demand? 

5. Does your work involve strict supervision? 

6. Do you have to work variable shifts? 

7. Are you required to work nights regularly? 

8. Do you often have conflicts with your supervisors? 

9. Do you get along well with your colleagues on the job? 

10. Are you involved in decision making about the promotion and 

salaries of others? 

11. Are you able to acquire skills on the job that will help you 

advance in the future? 

12. Does your work involve usually bothersome or environmentally 

hazardous conditions? 

13. Does your job involve a high degree of mental concentration 

or nervous tension? 

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Table 2. The SOEP Interindustry Wage Structure (1-digit) 

(standard errors in parentheses) 

NO K-S EXTENDED PREFERRED 

Industry CONTROLS CONTROLS CONTROLS CONTROLS 

Agriculture -0.29 -0.19 -0.14 -0.17 

(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 

Mining 0.413 0.253 0.112 0.099 

(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 

Manufacturing 0.121 0.068 0.028 0.023 

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 0.03 

Construction 0.088 0.022 0.035 0.028 

(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 

Wholesale/Retail Trade -0.20 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 

Transport/Communication 0.104 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 

(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 

Finance/Insurance 0.242 0.115 0.101 0.086 

(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 

Other Services 0.114 0.000 -0.01 -0.01 

(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 

Unweighted std dev 0.211 0.130 0.091 0.093 

Adjustedt 0.198 0.102 0.051 0.054 

Weighted std dev 0.113 0.065 0.056 0.058 

Adjustedt 0.086 0.051 0.039 0.043 

F-test for industry 

dummies 

16.33* 5.057* 4.155* 4.345* 

R-squared 0.027 0.399 0.489 0.475 

Sample size 4598 3342 3342 3342 

Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings excl. fringes 

Reference Group: unclassified 

tAdjusted for estimation error 

*F-statistic significant at the 0.0001 level 

K-S controls: after Krueger and Summers (1988): education 

square, age, experience, occupation dummies (10), regional 

(8), sex dummy, central city dummy, unionization 

ever married dummy, interactions of sex 

education, education squared, and a constant 

264). Extended controls: K-S controls plus 

squared, training dummies (6), guild 

characteristics (26), self-employed 

dummy, 

Preferred controls: extended controls except 

and its 

dummies 

dummy, 

with ever-married, 

(see Table 1, p. 

tenure, experience 

membership, job 

civil servant. 

the interactions 

sex-marriage, sex-education, sex-education-squared, and sexexperience. 

-21-

Table 3. SOEP and CPS Interindustry Wage Structures Compared 

(1-digit) 

Industry 

SOEP 

K-S PREFERRED 

CONTROLS CONTROLS 

CPS 

KRUEGER- 

SUMMERSt 

Agriculture -0.19 -0.17 

(0.11) (0.11) 

Mining 0.253 0.099 0.222 

(0.16) (0.15) (0.75) 

Manufacturing 0.068 0.023 0.091 

(0.03) 0.03 0.03 

Construction 0.022 0.028 0.108 

Wholesale/Retail Trade 

(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 

-0.12 -0.14 -0.11 

(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 

Transport/Communication -0.02 -0.07 0.145 

(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 

Finance/Insurance 0.115 0.086 0.055 

(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 

Other Services 0.000 -0.01 -0.078 

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 

Weighted std dev 0.065 0.058 n.r. 

Adjusted 0.051 0.043 0.094 

F-test for industry 5.057* 4.345• n.r. 

dummies 

(p

Table 4 

F-tests for Homogeneity of Slope Coefficients in Wage Equations 

Grouping 

SSR u 

F:chow(72,3198) 

Men v Women 613.8 7.938 

Full-time v Part-time 593.7 9.683 

Firmsize>20 v

Table 5. F-tests for Industry Interactions 

Hourly wages, preferred controls, German citizens, full sample n=3342 

All employees 

Industry interacted with: 

F-statistic (8,3239) (MB009) 

Constant (Industry dummy) 8.0956 (p60 4.1429 (p20, TENURE

Table 6. F-tests for Industry and Job Quality Dummy 

Variables on Different Subsamples 

Hourly wages, preferred controls, German citizens 

Sample 

F-statistic 

All employees n=3342, no interactions 

Industry dummies F(8,3269)=4.3449 (p

Table 7. 

SOEP Interindustry Wage Structure By Employment Tenure, 

1-Digit industries, preferred Controls, all German employees 

(standard errors in parentheses) 

Industry 

Tenure 

60 months 

Agriculture -0.18 -0.09 

Mining 

(0.18) (0.13) 

0.390 0.034 

Manufacturing 

(0.38) (0.15) 

-0.01 0.060 

Construction 

(0.06) (0.04) 

0.051 0.065 

(0.07) (0.05) 

Wholesale/Retail Trade -0.12 -0.15 

Transport/Communication 

(0.07) (0.05) 

-0.07 -0.01 

Finance/Insurance 

(0.09) (0.05) 

-0.02 0.146 

Other Services 

(0.09) (0.06) 

-0.06 0.026 

(0.06) (0.04) 

Unweighted std err 0.164 0.090 

Adjusted* 0.024 0.037 

Weighted std err 0.054 0.071 

Adjusted* n.c. 0.055 

F-test for industry 

dummies 1.18 4.730 

p=0.3076 p

Table 8. Mean Tenure (incomplete spells) 

by Industry (months) 

"2-digit" 

Sector (number of individuals) 19 Mean 

-1 Unclassified (205) 128.4 

0 Insufficient info (32) 18.8 

1 Agriculture/Forestry (36) 159.8 

Std(Mean) 

7.2 

5.7 

26.9 

2 Fishing (2) 59.5 51.5 

3 Energy and Water (34) 156.4 24.7 

4 Mining (10) 176.5 43.9 

5 Chemicals (95) 144.1 12.1 

6 Plastics (34) 134.1 20.0 

7 Stone Clay and Glass (38) 170.1 21.9 

8 Primary Metals (188) 136.3 8.5 

9 Machine tools (213) 141.3 8.8 

10 Machinery, elec/prec (153) 112.8 8.6 

11 Wood, paper, printing (93) 114.3 11.3 

12 Apparel (83) 138.4 14.0 

13 Food, Drink and Tobacco (111) 112.7 9.8 

14 Construction: HAUPT (150) 119.3 9.0 

15 Construction: HILFS (80) 109.5 13.3 

16 Wholesale Trade (85) 98.8 11.1 

17 Brokering (4) 105.5 32.5 

18 Retail Trade (240) 94.7 6.0 

19 Federal Railroad (44) 252.7 18.9 

20 Federal Post (67) 194.0 15.7 

21 Other comm and transport (77) 113.9 12.0 

22 Banking (89) 124.9 10.1 

23 Insurance (44) 118.9 16.2 

24 Eating and drinking (56) 91.8 14.3 

25 Personal Services (21) 54.7 17.5 

26 Building maintenence, garb (15) 113.5 32.4 

27 Education (246) 125.7 6.3 

28 Medical services (164) 100.8 8.4 

29 Legal professions (81) 78.9 9.3 

30 Other services (9) 67.4 27.8 

31 Churches, clubs (102) 79.9 7.2 

32 Private Household (7) 61.4 23.5 

33 Government/Admin (338) 149.3 6.1 

34 Social Insurance (44) 150.6 19.7 

36 incorrect answers (55) 112.8 13.7 

Average Tenure, n=3422 123.7 

19 Industry 35 "other nonclassified branch" contained one 

observation who had worked at the company for 324 months. 

-27-

Table 9. ChiSquare 2X2 Contingency Tests, 

Concentration of Tenured Workers by industry 

1-digit: 

TENURE60 BY AGR 

1251 16 

2054 22 CHISQ: 0.289 (P=.591) 

TENURE60 BY MIN 

1265 2 

2068 8 CHISQ; 0.243 (p=.243) 

TENURE60 BY MAN 

905 362 

1430 646 CHISQ; 2.422 (p=.120) 

TENURE60 BY CON 

1166 101 

1947 129 CHISQ; 3.794 (p=.051) 

TENURE60 BY WRT 

1118 149 

1896 180 CHISQ; 8.464 (p=.004) 

TENURE60 BY TPU 

1208 59 

1913 163 CHISQ; 12.955 (p

Table 9. ChiSquare 2X2 Contingency Tests, 

Concentration of Tenured Workers by industry 

(continued) 

16 Wholesale Trade 3.108 0.078 

17 Brokering 0.283 0.595 

18 Retail Trade 5.538 0.019 

19 Federal Railroad 13.34 0.000 

20 Federal Post 11.608 0.001 

21 Other comm and transp 0.002 0.965 

22 Banking 1.611 0.204 

23 Insurance 0.528 0.467 

24 Eating and drinking 7.375 0.007 

25 Personal Services 20.528 0.000 

26 Building maintenence, garb 3.127 0.077 

27 Education 3.777 0.052 

28 Medical services 7.73 0.005 

29 Legal professions 6.865 0.009 

30 Other services 3.173 0.075 

31 Churches, clubs 4.595 0.032 

32 Private Household 3.35 0.067 

33 Government/Admin 28.477 0.000 

34 Social Insurance 1.314 0.252 

36 incorrect answers 0.002 0.965 

-29-

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Weiss A., (1980) "Job Queues and Layoffs in Markets with Flexible 

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-32-

INSEAD WORKING PAPERS SERIES 

88/12 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS "Business firms and managers in the 21st 

century", February 1988 

1988 

88/01 Michael LAWRENCE and "Factors affecting judgemental forecasts and 

Spyms MAKRIDAKIS confidence intervals", January 1988. 

88/13 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Alexithymia in organizational life: the 

organization man revisited", February 1988. 

88/14 Alain NOEL "The interpretation of strategies: a study of 

the impact of CEOs on the 

corporation", March 1988. 

88/02 Spyms MAKRIDAKIS "Predicting recessions and other turning 

points", January 1988. 

88/03 James TEBOUL "De-industrialize service for quality", January 

1988. 

88/04 Susan SCHNEIDER "National vs. corporate culture: implications 

for human resource management". January 

1988. 

88/05 Charles WYPLOSZ "The swinging dollar: is Europe out of 

step?", January 1988. 

S8/15 Anil DEOLALIKAR and "The production of and returns from 

Lars-Hendrik ROLLER 

industrial innovation: an econometric 

analysis for a developing country", December 

1987. 

88/16 Gabriel HAWAWINI "Market efficiency and equity pricing: 

international evidence and implications for 

global investing", March 1988. 

88/17 Michael BURDA "Monopolistic competition, costs of 

adjustment and the behavior of European 

employment", September 1987. 

88/06 Reinhard ANGELMAR "I,es minks dans les canaux de 

distribution", January 1988. 

88/07 Ingemar DIERICKX "Competitive advantage: a resource based 

and Karel COOL perspective", January 1988. 

88/08 Reinhard ANGELMAR "Issues in the study of organizational 

and Susan SCHNEIDER cognition", February 1988. 

88/09 Bernard SINCLAIR- "Price formation and product design through 

DESGAGNE bidding", February 1988. 

88/10 Bernard SINCLAIR- "The robustness of some standard auction 

DESGAGNE game forms", February 1988. 

88/11 Bernard SINCLAIR- "When stationary strategies are equilibrium 

DESGAGNE 

bidding strategy: The single-crossing 

property", February 1988. 

88/18 Michael BURDA "Reflections on "Wait Unemployment" in 

Europe", November 1987, revised February 

1988. 

88/19 M.J. LAWRENCE and "Individual bias in judgements of 

Spyros MAKRIDAKIS confidence", March 1988. 

88/20 Jean DERMINE, 

Damien NEVEN and 

J.F. THISSE 

"Portfolio selection by mutual funds, an 

equilibrium model", March 1988. 

88/21 James TEBOUL "De-industrialize service for quality", March 

1988 (88/03 Revised). 

88/22 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER "Proper Quadratic Functions with an 

Application to AT&T", May 1987 (Revised 

March 1988).

RR/23 Sjur Didrik ELAM 

811/24 B. Espen ECKBO and "Information disclosure, means of payment, 

Henvig LANGOHR and takeover premia. Public and Private 

tender offers in France", July 1985, Sixth 

revision, April 1988. 

811/25 Everette S. GARDNER "The future of forecasting", April 1988. 

and Spyros MAKRIDAKIS 

811/26 Sjur Didrik FLAM "Semi-competitive Cournot equilibrium in 

and Georges ZACCOUR multistage oligopolies", April 1988. 

88/27 Murugappa KRISHNAN "Entry game with resalable capacity", 

88/28 

88/29 

Lars-Hendrik ROLLER April 1988. 

Sumantra GHOSHAL and 

C. A. BARTLETT 

Naresh K. MALHOTRA, 

Christian PINSON and 

Arun K. JAIN 

"The multinational corporation as a network: 

perspectives from interorganizational 

theory", May 1988. 

"Consumer cognitive complexity and the 

dimensionality of multidimensional scaling 

configurations", May 1988. 

88/30 Catherine C. ECKEL "The financial fallout from Chernobyl: risk 

and Theo VERMAELEN 

perceptions and regulatory response", May 

1988. 

88/31 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Creation, adoption, and diffusion of 

Christopher BARTLETT 

"Equilibres de Nash-Cournot dans le marche 

and Georges ZACCOUR europtien du gaz: un cas oh les solutions en 

boucle ouverte et en feedback coincident", 

Mars 1988. 

innovations by subsidiaries of multinational 

corporations", June 1988. 

101/32 Kasra FERDOWS and "International manufacturing: positioning 

David SACKRIDER plants for success", June 1988. 

88/33 Mihkel M. TOMBAK "The importance of flexibility in 

manufacturing", June 1988. 

88/34 Mihkel M. TOMBAK "FlexibRity: an important dimension in 

manufacturing", June 1988. 

88/35 Mihkel M. TOMBAK "A strategic analysis of investment in flexible 

manufacturing systems", July 1988. 

88/36 Vikas TIBREWALA and "A Predictive Test of the NBD Model that 

Bruce BUCHANAN Controls for Non-stationarity", June 1988. 

RR/37 Murugappa KRISHNAN "Regulating Price-Liability Competition To 

Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Improve Welfare", July 1988. 

301/31 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "The Motivating Role of Envy : A Forgotten 

Factor in Management", April 88. 

88/39 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "The Leader as Mirror : Clinical 

Reflections", July 1988. 

RR/40 Josef LAKONISHOK and "Anomalous price behavior around 

Theo VERMAELEN repurchase tender offers", August 1988. 

88/41 Charles WYPLOSZ "Assymetry in the EMS: intentional or 

systemic?", August 1988. 

RR/42 Paul EVANS "Organizathmal development in the 

transnational enterprise", June 1988. 

88/43 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "Group decision support systems implement 

Bayesian rationality", September 1988. 

88/44 Essam MAHMOUD and "The state of the art and future directions 

Spyros MAKRIDAKIS in combining forecasts", September 1988. 

RR/45 Robert KORAJCZYK "An empirical investigation of international 

and Claude VIALLET 

asset pricing", November 1986, revised 

August 1988. 

88/46 Yves DOZ and "From intent to outcome: a process 

811/47 Alain BULTEZ, 

Amy SHUEN framework for paknerships", August 1988. 

Els GUSBRECHTS, 

"Asymmetric cannibalism between substitute 

items listed by retailers", September 1988.

Philippe NAERT and 

Piet VANDEN ABEELE 

88/59 Martin KILDUFF 

"The interpersonal structure of decision 

making: a social comparison approach to 

organizational choice", November 1988. 

88/48 

Michael BURDA 

"Reflections on 'Wait unemployment' in 

Europe, II", April 1988 revised September 

88/60 Michael BURDA 

"Is mismatch really the problem? Some 

1988. 

estimates of the Chelwood Gate II model 

with US data", September 1988. 

88/49 

Nathalie DIERKENS 

"Information asymmetry and equity issues", 

September 1988. 

88/61 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER 

"Modelling cost structure: the Bell System 

revisited", November 1988. 

88/50 Rob WEITZ and 

"Managing expert systems: from inception 

Amoud DE MEYER 

through updating", October 1987. 

88/62 Cynthia VAN HULLE, 

"Regulation, taxes and the market for 

Theo VERMAELEN and 

corporate control in Belgium", September 

R8/51 Rob WEITZ 

"Technology, work, and the organization: 

Paul DE WOUTERS 

1988. 

the impact of expert systems", July 1988. 

88/63 Fernando NASCIMENTO 

"Strategic pricing of differentiated consumer 

88/52 Susan SCHNEIDER and 

"Cognition and organizational analysis: 

and Wilfried R. 

durables in • dynamic duopoly: a numerical 

Reinhard ANGELMAR 

who's minding the store?", September 1988. 

VANHONACKER 

analysis", October 1988. 

88/53 Manfred KETS DE VRIES 

"Whatever happened to the philosopher- 

88/64 Kasra FERDOWS 

"Charting strategic roles for international 

king: the leader's addiction to power, 

September 1988. 

factories", December 1988 

88/65 Amoud DE MEYER 

"Quality up, technology down", October 1988 


"Strategic choice of flexible production 

and Kasra FERDOWS 

and Mihkel M. TOMBAK 

technologies and welfare implications", 

October 1988 

88/66 Nathalie DIERKENS 

"A discussion of exact measures of 

information assymetry: the example of Myers 

08/55 Peter BOSSAERTS 

"Method of moments tests of contingent 

and Mailer model or the importance of the 

and Pierre HILLION 

claims asset pricing modeh", October 1988. 

asset structure of the firm", December 1988. 

88/56 Pierre HILLION 

"Size-sorted portfolios and the violation of 

the random walk hypothesis: Additional 

88/67 Paul S. ADLER and 

Kasra FERDOWS 

"The chief technology officer", December 

1988. 

empirical evidence and implication for tests 

of asset pricing models", June 1988. 

1989 

88/57 Wilfried VANHONACKER 

and Lydia PRICE 

"Data transferability: estimating the response 

effect of future events based on historical 

analogy", October 1988. 

89/01 Joyce K. BYRER and 

Tawtik JELASSI 

"The impact of language theories on DSS 

dialog", January 1989. 

88/58 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE 

and Mihkel M. TOMBAK 

"Assessing economic inequality", November 

1988. 

89/02 Louis A. LE BLANC 

and Tawfik JELASSI 

"DSS software selection: a multiple criteria 

decision methodology", January 1989.

89/03 Beth H. JONES and 

Tawfik JELASSI 

"Negotiation support: the effects of computer 

intervention and conflict level on bargaining 

outcome", January 1989. 


"The impostor syndrome: a disquieting 

phenomenon in organizational life", February 

1989. 

89/04 Kasra FERDOWS and 

"Lasting improvement in manufacturing 

89/14 Reinhard ANGELMAR 

"Product innovation: a tool for competitive 

Amoud DE MEYER 

performance: hr search of a new theory", 

advantage", March 1989. 

January 1989. 

89/15 Reinhard ANGELMAR 

"Evaluating a firm's product innovation 

89/05 Martin KILDUFF and 

"Shared history or shared culture? The 

performance", March 1989. 

Reinhard ANGELMAR 

effects of time, culture, and performance on 

institutionalization in simulated 

89/16 Wilfried VANHONACKER, 

"Combining related and sparse data in linear 

organizations", January 1989. 

Donald LEHMANN and 

regression models", February 1989. 

Fareena SULTAN 

89/06 Mihkel M. TOMBAK and 

"Coordinating manufacturing and business 

B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE 

strategies: I", February 1989. 

89/17 Gilles AMADO, 

"Changement organisationnel et r6alites 

Claude FAUCHEUX and 

culturelles: coutrastes franco-amtricains", 

89/07 Damien J. NEVEN 

"Struchwal adjustment in European retail 

Andre LAURENT 

March 1989. 

banking. Some view from industrial 

organisation", January 1989. 

89/111 Srinivasan BALAK- 

"Information asymmetry, market failure and 

RISHNAN and 

joint-ventures: theory and evidence", 

89108 Amoud DE MEYER and 

"Trends in the development of technology 

Mitchell KOZA 

March 1989. 

HeIhmit SCHOTTE 

and their effects on the production structure 

in the European Community", January 1989. 

89/19 Wilfried VANHONACKER, 

"Combining related and sparse data in linear 

Donald LEHMANN and 

regression models", Revised March 1989. 

89/09 Damien NEVEN, 

"Brand proliferation and entry deterrence", 

Fareena SULTAN 

Carmen MATUTES and 

February 1989. 

Marcel CORSTJENS 


"A rational random behavior model of 

and Russell WINER 

choke", Revised March 1989. 

89/10 Nathalie DIERKENS, 

"A market based approach to the valuation 

Bruno GERARD and 

of the assets in place and the growth 

89/21 Arnoud de MEYER and 

"Influence of manufacturing improvement 

Pierre MILLION 

opportunities of the firm", December 1988. 

Kasra FERDOWS 

programmes on performance", April 1989. 


"Understanding the leader-strategy interface: 


"What is the role of character in 

and Alain NOEL 

application of the strategic relationship 

and Sydney PERZOW 

psychoanalysis?" April 1989. 

interview method", February 1989. 

/19/23 Robert KORAJCZYK and 

"Equity risk prenaia and the pricing of 


"Estimating dynamic response models when 

Claude VIALLET 

foreign exchange risk" April 1989. 

the data are subject to different temporal 

aggregation", January 1989. 

89/24 Martin KILDUFF and 

"The social destruction of reality: 

Mitchel ABOLAFIA 

Organisational conflict as social drama" 

zApril 1989.

89/25 Roger BETANCOURT and 

David GAUTSCHI 

"Two essential characteristics of retail 

markets and their economic consequences" 


"A dispositional approach to social networks: 

March 1989. 

the case of organizational choice", May 1989. 

89/26 Charles BEAN, 

Edmond MALINVAUD, 

"Macroeconomic policies for 1992: the 

transition and after". April 1989. 


"The organisational fool: balancing a 

leader's hubris", May 1989. 

Peter BERNHOLZ, 

Francesco GIAVAllI 


"The CFA blues", June 1989. 

and Charles WYPLOSZ 

89/39 Robert KORAJCZYK and 

"An empirical investigation of international 

89/27 David KRACKHARDT and 

"Friendship patterns and cultural 

Claude VIALLET 

suet pricing", (Revised June 1989). 

Martin KILDUFF 

attributions: the control of organizational 

diversity", April 1989. 

89/40 Balaji CHAKRAVARTHY 

"Management systems for innovation and 

productivity", June 1989. 


"The interpersonal structure of decision 

making: a social comparison approach to 

89/41 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE 

"The strategic supply of precisions", June 

organizational choice", Revised April 1989. 

and Nathalie DIERKENS 

1989. 

89/29 Robert GOGEL and 

Jean-Claude LARRECHE 

"The battlefield for 1992: product strength 

and geographic coverage", May 1989. 

89/42 Robert ANSON and 


"A development framework for computersupported 

conflict resolution", July 1989. 


and Mihkel M.TOMBAK 

"Competition and Investment in Flexible 

Technologies", May 1989. 

89/43 Michael BURDA 

"A note on firing costs and severance benefit, 

in equilibrium unemployment", June 1989. 

89/31 Michael C. BURDA and 

Stefan GERLACH 

"Intertemporal prices and the US trade 

balance in durable goods", July 1989. 

89/44 Balaji CHAKRAVARTHY 

and Peter LORANGE 

"Strategic adaptation in multi-business 

firms", June 1989. 

89/32 Peter HAUG and 


"Application and evaluation of a multicriteria 

decision support system for the 

89/45 Rob WEITZ and 

Arnoud DE MEYER 

"Managing expert systems: a framework and 

ease study", June 1989. 

dynamic selection of U.S. manufacturing 

locations', May 1989. 

89/46 Marcel CORSTJENS, 

"Entry Encouragement", July 1989. 

Carmen MATUTES and 

89/33 Bernard SINCLAIR- 

"Design flexibility in monopsonictic 

Damien NEVEN 

DESGAGNE 

89/34 Sumantra GHOSHAL and 

Nittin NOHRIA 

industries", May 1989. 

"Requisite variety versus shared values: 

managing corporate-division relationships in 


and Christine MEAD 

"The global dimension in leadership and 

organization: issues and controversies", April 

1989. 

the M-Form organisation", May 1989. 

89/48 Damien NEVEN and 

"European integration and trade flows", 

89/35 Jean DERMINE and 

Pierre HILLION 

"Deposit rate ceilings and the market value 

of banks: The case of France 1971-1981", 


August 1989. 

May 1989.

89/49 Jean DERMINE "Home country control and mutual 

recognition", July 1989. 89/62 Amoud DE MEYER 

89/50 Jean DERMINE "The specialization of financial institutions, 

89/51 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS "Sliding simulation: a new approach to time 

89/52 Arnoud DE MEYER "Shortening development cycle times: a 

89/53 Spyms MAKRIDAKIS "Why combining works?", July 1989. 

the EEC model", August 1989. 89/63 Enver YUCESAN and 

(TM) 

(TM) 

Lee SCHRUBEN 

series forecasting". July 1989. 89/64 Enver YUCESAN and 

(TM) 

Lee SCHRUBEN 

manufacturer's perspective", August 1989. 89/65 Soumitra DUTTA and 

(TM, 

AC, FIN) 

Piero BONISSONE 

"Technology strategy and international R&D 

operations", October 1989. 

"Equivalence of simulations: A graph 

approach", November 1989. 

"Complexity of simulation models: A graph 

theoretic approach", November 1989. 

"MARS: A mergers and acquisitions 

reasoning system", November 1989. 

89/54 S. BALAKRISHNAN "Organisation costs and a theory of joint 89/66 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE 

and Mitchell KOZA ventures", September 1989. (TM,EP) 

"On the regulation of procurement bids", 

November 1989. 

89/55 H. SCHUTTE "Euro-Japanese cooperation in information 89/67 Peter BOSSAERTS and 


and Lydia PRICE 

89/57 Taekwnn KIM, 


and Mihkel TOMBAK 

technology", September 1989. (FIN) Pierre HILLION 

"On the practical usefulness of meta-analysis 

results", September 1989. 

1990 

"Market growth and the diffusion of 

multiproduct technologies", September 1989. 90/01 

TM/EP/AC 


"Market microstructure effects of 

govennnent intervention in the foreign 

exchange market", December 1989. 

"Unavoidable Mechanisms", January 1990. 

89/58 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER "Strategic aspects of flexible production 90/02 Michael BURDA 

(EP,TM) and Mihkel TOMBAK technologies", October 1989. EP 

89/59 

(OR) 

Manfred KETS DE VRIES, 

Daphne ZEVADI, 

"Locus of control and entrepreneurship: a 

three-country comparative study", October 

90/03 Amoud DE MEYER 

Alain NOEL and 

1989. 

TM 

Mihkel TOMBAK 

"Monopolistic Competition, Costs of 

Adjustment, and the Behaviour of European 

Manufacturing Employment", January 1990. 

"Management of Communication in 

International Research and Development", 

January 1990. 

89/60 Enver YUCESAN and "Simulation graphs for design and analysis of 90/04 Gabriel HAWAWINI and 

(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN discrete event simulation models", October FIN/EP Eric RAJENDRA 

1989. 

"The Transformation of the European 

Financial Services Industry: From 

Fragmentation to Integration", January 1990. 

89/61 Susan SCHNEIDER and "Interpreting and responding to strategic 90/05 Gabriel HAWAWINI and 

(All) Arnoud DE MEYER issues: The impact of national culture", 

FIN/EP Bertrand JACQUILLAT 

October 1989. 

"European Equity Markets: Toward 1992 

and Beyond", January 1990.

90/06 Gabriel HAWAWINI and "Integration of European Equity Markets: 

FIN/EP Eric RAJENDRA Implications of Structural Change for Key 

Market Participants to and Beyond 1992", 

January 1990. 

90/17 

FIN 

Nathalie DIERKENS 

Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues", 

Revised January 1990. 

90/18 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Managerial Decision Rules and the 

90/07 Gabriel HAWAWINI "Stock Market Anomalies and the Pricing of MKT Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response 

FIN/EP 

90/08 

TM/EP 

Tawfik JELASSI and 


Equity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange", 

January 1990. 

"Modelling with MCDSS: What about 

Ethics?", January 1990. 

Models", Revised January 1990. 

90/19 Beth JONES and "The Effect of Computer Intervention and 

TM Tawfik JELASSI Task Structure on Bargaining Outcome", 


90/09 Alberto GIOVANNINI "Capital Controls and Internal' a Trade 90/20 Tawfik JELASSI, "An Introduction to Group Decision and 

EP/FIN and Jae WON PARK Finance", January 1990. TM Gregory KERSTEN and Negotiation Support", February 1990. 

Stanley ZIONTS 

90/10 Joyce BRYER and "The Impact of Language Theories on DSS 

TM Tawfik JELASSI Dialog", January 1990. 90/21 Roy SMITH and "Reconfiguration of the Global Securities 

FIN Ingo WALTER Industry in the 1990's", February 1990. 

90/11 Enver YUCESAN "An Overview of Frequency Domain 

TM Methodology for Simulation Sensitivity 90/22 Ingo WALTER "European Financial Integration and Its 

Analysis", January 1990. FIN Implications for the United States", February 

1990. 

90/12 Michael BURDA "Structural Change, Unemployment Benefits 

and Iligh Unemployment: A U.S.-European 90/23 Damien NEVEN "EEC Integration towards 1992: Some 

Comparison", January 1990. EP/SM Distributional Aspects", Revised December 

1989 

90/13 Soumitra DUTTA and "Approximate Reasoning about Temporal 

TM Shashi SHEKHAR Constraints in Real Time Planning and 90/24 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "Positive Prices in CAPM", January 1990. 

Search", January 1990. 

FIN/EP 

90/14 

TM 

Albert ANGEHRN and 

Hans-Jakob LOTH! 

"Visual Interactive Modelling and Intelligent 

DSS: Putting Theory Into Practice", January 

90/25 

FIN/EP 

Lars Tyge NIELSEN 

"Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM", 

January 1990. 

1990. 

90/26 Charles KADUSHIN and "Why networking Fails: Double Binds and 

90/15 

TM 

Arnoud DE MEYER, 

Dirk DESCHOOLMEESTER, 

"The Internal Technological Renewal of a 

Business Unit with a Mature Technology", 

011/BP Michael BRIMM the Limitations of Shadow Networks", 


Rudy MOENAERT and 

January 1990. 

Jan BARBE 90/27 Abbas FOROUGHI and "NSS Solutions to Major Negotiation 

TM Tawfik JELASSI Stumbling Blocks", February 1990. 

90/16 Richard LEVICH and "Tax-Driven Regulatory Drag: European 

FIN Ingo WALTER Financial Centers in the 1990's", January 90/28 Arnoud DE MEYER "The Manufacturing Contribution to 

1990. TM Innovation", February 1990.

90/40 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Leaden on the Couch: The case of Roberto 

90/29 Nathalie DIERKENS "A Discussion of Correct Measures of OR Cal vi", April 1990. 

FIN/AC Information Asymmetry", January 1990. 

90/30 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "The Expected Utility of Portfolios of 

90/41 

FIN/EP 

Gabriel HAWAWINI, 

Itzhak SWARY and 

"Capital Market Reaction to the 

Announcement of Interstate Banking 

FIN/EP Assets", March 1990. lk HWAN JANG Legislation", March 1990. 

90/31 David GAUTSCHI and "What Determines U.S. Retail Margins?", 90/42 Joel STECKEL and "Cross-Validating Regression Models in 

MKT/EP Roger BETANCOURT February 1990. MKT Wilfried VANHONACKER Marketing Research", (Revised April 1990). 

90/32 Srinivasan BALAK- "Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection 90/43 Robert KORAJCZYK and "Equity Risk Premia and the Pricing of 

SM 

RISHNAN and 

Mitchell KOZA 

and Joint-Ventures: Theory and Evidence", 

Revised, January 1990. 

Claude VIALLET Foreign Exchange Risk", May 1990. 

90/33 Caren SIEHL, "The Role of Rites of Integration in Service 90/44 Gilles AMADO, "Organisational Change and Cultural 

OR David BOWEN and Delivery", March 1990. OR Claude FAUCHEUX and Realities: Franco-American Contrasts", April 

Christine PEARSON Andre LAURENT 1990. 

90/34 

FIN/EP 

Jean DERMINE 

"The Gains from European Ranking 

Integration, a Can for a Pro-Active 

Competition Policy", April 1990. 

90/45 Soumitra DUTTA and "Integrating Case Based and Rule Based 

TM Piero BONISSONE Reasoning: The Possibilistic Connection", 

90/46 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS "Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of 

90/35 Jae Won PARK "Changing Uncertainty and the Time- TM and Michele HIBON Initial Values and Less Functions on Post- 

Varying Risk Pretnia in the Term Structure 

of Nominal Interest Rates", December 19118, 

Revised March 1990. 90/47 Lydia PRICE and 

May 1990. 

Sample Forecasting Accuracy". 

"Improper Sampling in Natural 

MKT Wilfried VANHONACKER Experiments: Limitations on the Use of 

90/36 Arnoud DE MEYER "An Empirical Investigation of Meta-Analysis Results in Bayesian 

TM Manufacturing Strategies in European Updating", Revised May 1990. 

90/37 

TM/OR/SM 

William CATS-BARIL 

Industry", April 1990. 

"Executive Information Systems: Developing 

an Approach to Open the Potsibles", April 

1990. 

90/48 Jae WON PARK "The Information in the Term Structure of 

EP 

Interest Rates: Out-of-Sample Forecasting 

Performance", June 1990. 

90/49 Soumitra DUTTA "Approximate Reasoning by Analogy to 

90/38 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Managerial Decision Behaviour and the TM Answer Null Queries", June 1990. 

MKT 

90/39 

TM 

Louis LE BLANC and 

Tawlik JELASSI 

Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response 

Models", (Revised February 1990). 90/50 Daniel COHEN and "Price and Trade Effects of Exchange Rates 

"An Evaluation and Selection Methodology 

for Expert System Shells", May 1990. 

EP Charles WYPLOSZ Fluctuations and die Design of Policy 

Coordination", April 1990.

90/51 Michael BURDA and "Gross Labour Market Flows in Europe: 90/63 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Organising Competitor Analysis Systems", 

EP Charles WYPLOSZ Some Stylized Facts", June 1990. SM Eleanor WESTNEY August 1990 

90/52 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "The Utility of Infinite Menus", June 1990. 90/64 Sumantra GHOSHAL "Internal Differentiation and Corporate 

FIN SM Performance: Case of the Multinational 

90/53 Michael Burda "The Consequences of German Economic 

Corporation", August 1990 

EP and Monetary Union", June 1990. 90/65 Charles WYPLOSZ "A Note on the Real Exchange Rate Effect of 

90/54 Damien NEVEN and "European Financial Regulation: A 

EP German Unification", August 1990 

EP Colin MEYER Framework for Policy Analysis", (Revised 90/66 Soumitra DUTTA and "Computer Support for Strategic and Tactical 

90/55 Michael BURDA and "Intertemporal Prices and the US Trade 

May 1990). TIM/SE/FIN Piero BONISSONE Planning in Mergers and Acquisitions", 

September 1990 

El' Stefan GERLACH Balance", (Revised July 1990). 90/67 Soumitra DUTTA and "Integrating Prior Cases and Expert Knowledge In 

90/56 Damien NEVEN and "The Structure and Determinants 

of East-West 

EP Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Trade: A Preliminary Analysis of the 

TM/SE/FIN Piero BONISSONE • Mergers and Acquisitions Reasoning System", 


Manufacturing Sector", July 1990 90/68 Soumitra DUTTA "A Framework ind Methodology for Enhancing the 

TM/SE 

Business Impact of Artificial Intelligence 

90/57 Lars Tyge NIELSEN Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Applications", September 1990 

FIN/EP/ Statistic", July 1990 

TM 90/69 Soumitra DUTTA "A Model for Temporal Reasoning in Medical 

90/58 Lars Type NIELSEN "Common Knowledge of Price and Expected Cost 

FIN/EP/TM in an Oligopolistic Market", August 1990 90/70 

90/59 Jean DERMINE and "Economies of Scale and 

TM Expert Systems", September 1990 

TM 

Albert ANGEHRN 

"'Triple C': A Visual Interactive MCDSS", 


FIN Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Scope in the French Mutual Funds (SICAV) 90/71 Philip PARKER end "Competitive Effects in Diffusion Models: An 

Industry", August 1990 MKT Hubert GATIGNON Empirical Analysis", September 1990 

90/60 Pen 1Z and "An Interactive Group Decision Aid for 90172 Enver YUCESAN "Analysis of Marko, Chains Using Simulation 

TM Tawfik JELASSI Multiohjective Problems: An Empirical TM Graph Models", October 1990 

Assessment", September 1990 

90/61 

TM 

Pankaj CHANDRA and 

Mihkel TOMBAK 

"Models for the Evlauation of Manufacturing 

flexibility", August 1990 

90/73 

TM 

Arnoud DE MEYER and 

Kasra FERDOWS 

"Removing the Barriers in Manufacturing", 

October 1990 

90/62 Damien NEVEN and "Public Policy Towards TV Broadcasting in the 90/74 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Requisite Complexity: Organising Headquarters- 

EP Menno VAN DUK Netherlands", August 1990 SM Nitin NOHRIA Subsidiary Relations in MNCs", October 1990

90/75 

MKT 

Roger BETANCOURT and 

David GAUTSCHI 

Me Outputs of Retail Activities: Concepts, 

Measuremest and Evidence', October 1990 

90/37 

FIN/EP 

Lan Tyge NIELSEN 

'Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM: Further 

Results', December 1990 

90/76 WiIfried VANHONACKER •Masegerial Decision Behaviour and the Estimation 90/113 Susan C. SCHNEIDER and 'audios in Organisational Analysis: Who's 

MKT 

of Dynamic Sales Response Models', 

On/MKT Reinhard ANGELMAR Minding the Store?* Revised. December 1990 

Revised October 1990 

90/89 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES Ms CEO Who Coati'. Talk Straight and Other 

90/77 Warned VANHONACKER "Takes the Kuck Scheme of Sales Response la 011 Tale feu lhe Board Room,* December 1990 

MKT 

Advernsisg: An Auregatios-Independest 

90/73 Michael BURDA and "Eschew Rate Dynamics and Currency 

Er 

90/79 

Stefan GERLACH 

Anil GABA 

Ardocorrelano. Test", October 1990 90/90 Philip PARKER *Peke Elasticity Dynamics ever the Adoption 

MKT Likcyde: An Empirical Study,* December 1990 

Unification: The Ostmark - DM Rote', 

October 1990 

misferesces with as Unknown Noise Level in a 

TM Bernoulli Process", October 1990 

90/80 Anil GABA and 'Usk( Survey Data in Inferences about Purchase 

TM Robert WINKLER Bekaviourm , October 1990 1991 

9041 Tawilik lELASSI 'Du Prised as Fakir: mks et Orientations des 

TM 

Spews Isteractifs d'Aide h In Minos,' 

October 1990 

9042 Charles WYPLOSZ 'Monetary Union and rural Policy Discipline.' 

Er November 1990 91/02 

91/01 

7744/S111 

TM/S7I4 

Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, 

Leonard FORTUIN and 

*Operational Research Can Do More for Managers 

Than They Meld; 

Paul VAN BEEK January 1991 


Leonard FORTUIN and 

90/83 Nathalie DIERKENS and misfortunes Asymmetry and Corporate Paul VAN BEEK 

FIN/7M Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE Communication: Results of a Pilot Study, 

90/84 Philip M. PARKER *The Effect of Advertising nu Price sad Quality: 

'Operational Research and Environment,' 

January 1991 

November 1990 91/03 Pekka HIETALA and 'An Implicit Dividend Increase is Rights Issues: 

FIN Timo LOYITYNIEMI Theory a ged Evidence,' January 1991 

MKT The Optometric Industry Revisited,• 91/04 Lars Tyge NIELSEN •Two-rml Severalties. Factor Structure and 

December 1990 FIN Robustness.' January 1991 

90/35 Avijit GHOSH and 'Optimal r...kis and Location in Competitive 91/05 Susan SCHNEIDER •Marsogimg Beasedaries is Organisations; 

MKT Vika. T1BREWALA Markets; November 1990 OB January 1991 

90/36 Olivier CADOT and 'Prudence and Success in Politics, November 1990 91/06 Manfred KETS DE VRIES, •Usderskieding the Leader-Strategy leterface: 

EP/TM Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE On Danny MILLER and Application of the Strategic Relationship Interview 

Alain NOEL Method,* January 1990 (19111, revised April 1990)

91/07 Olivier CADOT "Lending to Insolvent Countries: A Paradoxical 

El' Story," January 1991 91/19 

MKT 

Vikas TIBREWALA and "An Aggregate Test of Purchase Regularity", 

Bruce BUCHANAN March 1991 

91/08 Charles WYPLOSZ "Post-Reform East and West: Capital 

EP Accumulation and the Labour Mobility 91/20 Darius SABAVALA and "Monitoring Short-Run Changes in Purchasing 

Constraint," January 1991 MKT Vikas TIBREWALA Behaviour", March 1991 

91/09 Spyros MA KRIDAKIS "What can we Learn from Failure?", February 1991 91/21 Summitry GHOSHAL, "Intermit Comnsmica6on within MNCa: The 

TM SM Harry KORINE and Influence of Formal Structure Versus Integrative 

91/10 Luc Van WASSENHOVE and "Integrating Scheduling with Hatching and 

Gabriel SZULANSK1 Processes", April 1991 

TM C. N. POTTS Lot-Fazing: A Review of Algorithms and 91/22 David GOOD, "EC Integration and the Structure of the Franco- 

Complexity", February 1991 EP Lars-Hendrik ROLLER and American Airline Industries: Implications for 

Robin SICKLES Efficiency and Welfare", April 1991 

91/11 Luc VAN WASSENHOVE et al. "Multi-Item Lotsizing in Capacitated Multi-Stage 

TM Serial Systems", February 1991 91/23 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and "Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of Initial 

TM 

Michele HIBON Values and Lon Functions on Post-Sample 

91/12 Albert ANGEHRN "Interpretative Computer Intelligence: A Link Forecasting Accuracy", April 1991 (Revision of 

TM 

91/13 

EP 

Michael BURDA 

between Users, ModeLs and Methods in DSS", 

February 1991 

"Labor and Product Markets in Czechoslovakia and 

the Ex-GDR: A Twin Study", February 1991 

91/14 Roger BETANCOURT and "The Output of Retail Activities: French SM/TM Charles J. CORBETT 

MKT David GAUTSCHI Evidence", February 1991 

91/15 

OB 

Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES 

"Exploding the Myth about Rational Organisations 

and Executives", March 1991 

90/46) 

91/24 Louis LE BLANC and "An Empirical Assessment of Choice Models for 

TM Tawfik JELASSI Software Evaluation and Selection", May 1991 

91/25 Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and "Trade-Offal What Trade-Offs?" April 1991 

91/26 Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and "Single Machine Scheduling to Minimize Total Late 

TM C.N. POTTS Work", April 1991 

91/27 Nathalie DIERKENS "A Discussion of Correct Measures of Information 

91/16 Arnoud DE MEYER and "Factories of the Future: Executive Summary of FIN Asymmetry: The Example of Myers and Mapes 

TM Kasre FERDOWS et.al. the 1990 International Manufacturing Futures 

Survey", March 1991 

Model or the Importance of the Asset Structure of 

the Firm", May 1991 

91/17 Dirk CATTRYSSE, "Heuristics for the Discrete Lotsizing: and 91/28 Philip M. PARKER "A Note on: 'Advertising and the Price and Quality 

TM Roelof KUIK, 

Scheduling Problem with Setup Times", March 1991 MKT of Optometric Services', June 1991 

Marc SALOMON and 

Luk VAN WASSENHOVE 91/29 Tawfik JELASSI and "An Empirical Study of an Interactive, Session- 

TM Abbas FOROUGHI Oriented Computerised Negotiation Support System 

91/18 C.N. POTTS and "Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling a Single (NSS)", June 1991 

7M Luk VAN WASSENHOVE Machine to Minimize Total Late Work", 

March 1991

91/30 Wilfried R. VANHONACKER and "Using Meta-Analysis Results in Bayesian Updating: 

MKT Lydia I. PRICE The Empty Cell Problem", June 1991 91/43 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Building Transnational Capabilities: The 

SM Christopher BARTLETT Management Challenge", September 1991 

91/31 Reno! KABIR and "Insider Trading Restrictions and the Stock 

FIN Theo VERMAELEN Market", June 1991 91/44 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Distributed Innovation it the 'Differentiated 

91/32 Susan C. SCHNEIDER "Organisational Sememaking: 1992", June 1991 

SM Nitin NOHRIA Network' Multinational", September 1991 

OR 91/45 Philip M. PARKER "'llae Effect of Advetiising on Price and Quality: 

MKT 

An Empirical Study of Eye Examinations, Sweet 

91/33 Michael C. BURDA and "German Trade Unions after Unification - Third Lemons and Self-Deceivers", September 1991 

EP Michael FUNKE Degree Wage Discriminating Monopolists?", 

lune 1991 91/46 Philip M. PARKER "Pricing Strategies in Markets with Dynamic 

91/34 lean DERMINE "The BIS Proposal for the Measurement of Interest 

MKT Elasticities", October 1991 

FIN Rate Risk, Some Pitfalls", lune (991 91/47 Philip M. PARKER "A Study of Price Elasticity Dynamics Using 

91/35 

FIN 

Jean DERMINE 

"The Regulation of Financial Services in the EC, 

Centralization or National Autonomy?" lune 1991 

MKT 

Parsimonious Replacement/Multiple Purchase 

Diffusion Models", October 1991 

91/48 H. Landis GABEL and "Managerial Incentives and Environmental 

91/36 Albert ANGEHRN "Supporting Multicriteria Decision Making: New EP/TM Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE Compliance", October 1991 

TM Perspectives and New Systems", August 1991 

91/49 Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "The First-Order Appfeach to Multi-Task 

91/37 Ingo WALTER and "The Introduction of Universal Banking in Canada: TM Principsi-Agest Problems", October 1991 

EP Hugh THOMAS An Event Study", August 1991 

91/50 Luk VAN WASSENHOVE and "Row Green is Your Manufacturing Strategy?' 

91/38 Ingo WALTER and "National and Global Competitiveness of New York SM/TM Charles CORBETT October 1991 

EP Anthony SAUNDERS City as • Financial Center", August 1991 

91/39 

EP 

91/40 

TM 

91/41 

TM 

Ingo WALTER and 

Anthony SAUNDERS 


Dirk CATTRYSSE end 

"Reconfiguration of Banking and Capital Markets 

in Eastern Europe", August 1991 

"A Set Partitioning Heuristic for the Generalized 

Assignment Problem", August 1991 

91/51 Philip M. PARKER "Choosing Amass Diffusion Models: Some 

MKT Empirical Guidelines", October 1991 

91/52 Michael BURDA and "Human Capital, Investment and Migration in an 

Charles WYPLOSZ Integrated Europe", October 1991 

Marc SALOMON 91/53 Michael BURDA and "Labour Mobility and German Integration: Some 


"A Fully Polynomial Approximation Scheme for 

Charles WYPLOSZ Vignettes", October 1991 

M.Y. KOVALYOU and 

Scheduling a Single Machine to Minimize Total 91/54 Albert ANGEHRN "Stimulus Agents: An Alternative Framework for 

C.N. POTTS Weighted Late Work", August 1991 TM Computer-Aided Decision Making", October 1991 

91142 Rob R. WEITZ and "Solving A Multi-Criteria Allocation Problem: 

TM Tawfik IELASSI A Decision Support System Approach", 

August 1991

91/55 Robin HOGARTH, 

EP/SM Claude MICHAUD, 

Yves DOZ and 

Ludo VAN DER HEYDEN 

"Longevity of Business Finns: A Four-Stage 

Framework for Analysis", November 1991 

91/56 Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "Aspirations and Economic Development", 

TM/EP November 1991 

91/57 Lydia 1. PRICE "The Indirect Effects of Negative Information on 

MKT Attitude Change", November 1991 

91/58 Manfred F. R. KM'S DE VRIES "Leaders Who Go Crazy", November 1991 

OB 

91/59 Paul A. L. EVANS 

OB 

"Management Development as Glue Technology", 

November 1991 

91/60 Xavier DE GROOTE 

TM 

"Flexibility and Marketing/Manufacturing 

Coordination", November 1991 (revised) 

91161 Arnoud DE MEYER 

TM 

"Product Development in the Textile Machinery 

Industry", November 1991 

91/62 Philip PARKER and 

MKT Hubert GATIGNON 

"Specifying Competitive Effects in Diffusion 

Models: An Empirical Analysis", November 1991

by Michael BURDA* * Associate Professor of Economics, INSEAD ...

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