* Professor of Organisational Behaviour and Management ... - Insead

"THE CEO WHO COULDN'T TALK STRArGt1416141A
OTHER TALES FROM THE BOARD ROOM
by
Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES*
N° 90/89/0B
* Professor of Organisational Behaviour and Management Policy, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance,
Fontainebleau 77305 Cedex, France.
Printed at INSEAD,
Fontainebleau, France.

8/10/90
THE CEO WHO COULDN'T TALK STRAIGHT
AND OTHER TALES FROM THE BOARD ROOM
Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries*
* Raoul de Vitry d'Avaucourt Professor of Human Resource
Management, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France.

2
ABSTRACT
In this paper the case histories of three CEOs are presented,
illustrating the suspicious, alexithymic and narcissistic modes.
The ways in which the behavior of such top executives affects
their organizations are described. Connections are drawn between
early personality development and leadership styles, with
particular reference to the development of the self. Finally,
the paper ends with a number of recommendations to board members
on how to identify such troublesome executives.

3
THE MAN WHO COULDN'T TALK STRAIGHT
Frank Nelson had been CEO of Storex, a manufacturer and
distributor of automotive equipment, for two years and was
becoming increasingly uncertain about whether he was handling his
job his correctly. He kept up a good facade, but somehow nothing
felt right.
At the last board meeting, a lot of barely-veiled criticism
had been leveled against him following a missed business
opportunity in Eastern Europe. Frank's explanation -- that some
of his subordinates had arrived too late with their proposal --
had not gone down well. The board felt that he had been the one
stalling the deal. There had also been considerable tension over
the resignation of two of his senior executives.
The increasing vigilance of the board was making Frank
feel paranoid: the last thing he needed was a vote of noconfidence.
But Frank was really preoccupied with what he
saw as disturbing developments within the company. He felt
that his key executives were not committed to the direction in
which he thought the company should be going. The bungled
Eastern Europe affair was symptomatic. It suggested insufficient
cooperation and team work among the principal players in the
company.
If he were honest with himself, Frank had to admit that a lot
of energy was wasted on political infighting. Because of that,

4
certain things didn't get done -- decisions dragged on forever or
were not followed up. All too often committee meetings went
around in non-productive circles, each individual sticking to a
predictable position and accusing others of foul play. Everyone
seemed to be preoccupied with protecting his or her own turf.
Frank was also upset by an undefined impression that a number
of his vice presidents and directors did not respect him. He had
a feeling that some of them were making fun of him behind his
back. He even had a sneaking suspicion that one in particular
was maneuvering to take over his job. Overheard conversations,
furtive glances and occasional caustic remarks made at meetings
further undermined his peace of mind.
Frank had been trying to assess his own responsibility for
the troubled atmosphere in the company. It was not easy to put a
finger on the problem -- he was not sure what he did wrong. What
was it about his behavior that provoked these reactions?
He could acknowledge a few things which made him different
from other people. He had always been extremely careful about
revealing anything about himself -- you never knew how
that sort of information might be used. Closely related to this
was his difficulty in asking other people for help. He had
always suspected people's motives in offering him assistance. He
preferred to keep his independence, knowing all too well that
nothing came without a price.

5
Frank was also aware of his habit of wriggling out of making
unpleasant decisions, or making someone else do the dirty work.
When he had no choice but to do it himself he tended to
obfuscate the matter -- so much so, in fact, that he frequently
failed to put his message across clearly, causing initial
confusion and subsequent anger in the person to whom the message
was directed. Having to bite the bullet, and say how things
really were -- without "packaging" -- made Frank feel awful. He
was always afraid that the person concerned would get back at him
when his guard was down.
Having been the focus of many angry reactions, it gradually
dawned on Frank that there was a problem -- that his lack of
openness and his suspiciousness were not conducive to a smoothly
functioning organization. He began to realize that some of the
internal discontent could be a direct result of his own behavior.
One of the executives who had resigned told him that his
secretiveness made it very difficult for his people to know where
they stood and that, not surprisingly, this had led to paranoid
thinking, gamesmanship, power plays, information-hoarding and the
creation of political fiefdoms within the organization.
At home, things seemed better. There had been the usual
difficulties at the beginning of his marriage and it was some
time before Frank felt comfortable in his dealings with his wife.
Now she was probably the only person he really trusted and for
whom he had tender feelings.

6
His wife had had to make an effort, however, before she knew
how to interpret Frank's often cutting remarks. But now she
seemed to have a good understanding of his needs, despite his
talent for "packaging," and had become an expert translator of
his subtle signals. In many instances she had taken charge of
the dirty work. With this kind of complementarity, Frank's
specific mental blocks became less noticeable.
He had discussed with his wife a recent incident at work,
when one of his key employees had accused him of manipulative
practices before handing in his resignation. His wife pointed
out many parallels in his behavior at home and at the end of the
conversation suggested that he seek the help of a
psychotherapist.
The idea provoked Frank's instant opposition. Therapists
were supposed to deal with crazy people. Did that make him crazy?
What if the therapist made him lose control? Perhaps he did have
some small problems, but who hadn't? Personally, he felt
anything but crazy.
His wife insisted, however, and persuaded him that it would
be a good idea to talk to someone in a neutral atmosphere,
without the ties of family or friendship. Eventually, Frank
could only agree with her suggestion but nevertheless it was not
easy to take the first step.
Frank's relationship with the therapist was a stormy one.
Initially, Frank found the therapist threatening. He was

7
supposed to tell her everything, not an easy assignment for
someone who had such a hard time confiding in others. Could she
be trusted? Would she abuse the information she was given? Could
Frank stand having this sort of mirror placed in front of him,
being stripped of his defences, with all his faults and
inadequacies on show?
Frank's therapist did not make it easy for Frank to worm out
of difficult situations and, strangely, she also seemed oblivious
to Frank's subtle slights. Each time Frank tried to provoke the
woman, she would block whatever defensive maneuver he adopted.
The therapist wanted him not only to become more trusting but
also to call a spade a spade.
In spite of the early problems, Frank's discussions with the
therapist eventually started to pay off. He began to trust the
therapist and to develop a sense of confidence in her way of
dealing with him. He no longer disguised his feelings but let the
therapist know when he felt angry or upset. In addition, the
therapist helped him to understand better the continuity between
his present behavior and his past history. Most importantly,
their discussions led Frank to experiment with changing his deepseated
routines.
Frank did not have happy memories of his childhood.
He mentioned, with a certain amount of regret, that he had never
felt much warmth towards his parents. For reasons which he had
never completely understood there had always been bitterness
between his father and mother; life at home was characterized by

8
constant quarrels. He remembered how his mother used to complain
that her marriage had put a premature end to a promising career
in fashion. He recalled his father's repeated accusations about
his mother's "special" friendship with a distant cousin. He had
not been helped by the fact that his brother, who was two years
his junior, had been their parents' favorite. This had aroused a
great deal of jealousy in Frank.
Survival at home had meant making himself as unobtrusive as
possible. Frank always had to be on his guard. Asking for
something usually invited a litany of reproaches -- being told
that he was only interested in himself and didn't care for
others. All too quickly, his parents' anger at each other would
be redirected toward him, a situation his brother frequently
exploited by finding something for which Frank could be blamed.
Unsurprisingly, Frank decided that the wisest way to behave was
to keep quiet and not express his real wishes.
Frank remembered vividly one occasion when things had got
completely out of hand. He had tried to skip school by
pretending to be ill, managing to raise the temperature of the
thermometer to make his parents believe that he had a fever. The
next thing he knew -- despite all his protestations and even
confession of his deceit -- he found himself lying on an
operating table waiting to have his appendix removed. He could
still relive his sense of panic and the feeling that there was
nobody he could rely on or trust.

9
The appendix episode had taught Frank at a very early age
that the world was a dangerous place. This screen memory set the
tone for his later behavior. There were powers beyond his
control and people who would always try to get at him. No wonder
indirection became his way of expressing his wants. No wonder he
was reluctant to reveal much about himself -- that way it was
much more difficult for other people to get a hold on him and do
things to him. This way of behaving was much safer.
Understanding the symbolic meaning of the appendix
incident was essential in helping Frank make sense out of his
later behavior. The incident had taught him that it was safer to
play hide and seek with his real desires. In his position as
CEO, however, it was much harder to pass the buck -- he was much
more visible, and there were fewer places to hide. Frank's
inability to talk straight became more noticeable. His lack of
trust in others and his continual expectation of some form of
malicious action had a much greater impact. This was where he had
failed -- this was where he had created confusion and had a
negative effect on the organization.
The therapist helped Frank to understand that his
childhood experience had left him with a sense of suspiciousness
and distrust, and that this was not necessarily a conscious
process. In his intrapsychic world he retained the memory
that revealing his wants could have dreadful consequences. His
homework now was to realize psychologically that he was an adult,
that the situation was different, that the old childhood set-up
was no longer valid, and that he could make a new beginning.

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The Suspicious Mode
To some extent all of us possess an element of suspiciousness.
We have all probably had an unfortunate experience that took us
by surprise at one time or another. These memories may linger on
and create a certain amount of wariness when we are placed in a
similar situation. But for most of us this does not necessarily
become our predominant Weltanschauung.
For some people, however, suspiciousness may turn into a way
of life and completely color their outlook on the world. Such
individuals seem continually to look for confirmation of their
preconceived expectations, ignoring facts and dismissing
anything which fails to validate their persuasion.
Such people are always on their guard against an external
threat or danger; they are always imagining things (Shapiro,
1965; Meissner, 1978; Millon, 1981). They have lost their sense
of proportion, taking things out of context and making mountains
out of molehills. What others see as innocuous events are
for them clear indications of conspiracy; there is treachery
everywhere. Projection, the attribution of undesirable traits
and motives to others, is their preferred defense mechanism. It
must be said, however -- and this is a factor which makes this
type of behavior so hard to deal with -- that somehow they are
always able to demonstrate some element of reality in their
assertions.

11
Moreover, such people are normally blind to the fact that
they are acting in this peculiar manner. While they are quick to
deny that they manifest such behavior patterns themselves,
they tend to be very critical of such features in others. This
form of behavior -- always ascribing hidden motives to others --
leads to rigidity. Spontaneity and playfulness disappear. These
people are overly preoccupied with the dangers of external
influences and control and with the belief that somewhere out
there is a menacing force which is out to get them.
This paranoid response is very much a reaction to feelings of
deficiency and frailty. As we saw in Frank's case, a child's
sense of self-worth and self-esteem can easily get out of balance
when consequential relationships are missing. Shifts of
attention by the parents to a younger sibling, nonempathic
responses, or an oppressive home atmosphere where attack and
counterattack prevail, prevent the establishment of fruitful
relationships and can create feelings of devaluation and
inadequacy. A growing sense of resentment and disillusionment
may follow, leading to loss of trust in one's external
environment. The groundwork is laid for a distorted outlook on
life, where other people are viewed as potential enemies and
persecutors.
Frank's example demonstrates the extent to which this type of
behavior can affect the total organization -- a common phenomenon
when individuals occupy a key position. Paranoid thinking can be
contagious and may become the overriding pattern in the
organization. A fight/flight culture may then predominate, one

12
in which everyone is on guard against attack and where personal
threats and secrecy prevail. A lack of trust is a predictable
consequence. The hoarding of information becomes a weapon in the
arsenal of the power-seekers.
In their selection and evaluation of CEOs, board members
would do , well to look out for these behavior patterns. They
should be able to penetrate a candidate's particular style. Most
especially, they should ask themselves whether this is a person
who can build relationships of trust, and whether it would be
possible for him or her to create a corporate culture where there
is a frank exchange of ideas and respect for the individual,
where promises are kept and intellectual curiosity is encouraged.
Board members need to determine whether the candidate is able to
make tough decisions and at the same time be fair.
THE MAN WHO COULDN'T FEEL
P(sychotherapist): What do you do?
E(xecutive): I run a data processing firm. It is a
subsidiary of a large multinational.
P: Can you say something about your work?
E: I like the work. I like the office. It is rather big...in a
corner. I have a good view.

13
P: What can you say about the people you work with?
E: Not much... I find it hard to describe how I feel about them.
P: What career prospects do you have?
E: I don't know. A colleague of mine who used to work for me
got promoted recently to group vice president at head office.
P: Did you get upset about that? After all, he used to work for
you.
E: No, those are the breaks.
P: What is your relationship with your wife like?
E: All right. We have been married for fifteen years.
P: Have there never been any problems between the two of you?
E: She had an affair once with another man.
P: How did you deal with it? Did you feel hurt?
E: I didn't feel very much. When she told me about it, I said
it's all right... I think all this talk about feelings is
crazy. What's important is to get on with life.
P: How is your relationship with your wife now?

14
E: She sometimes screams at me for no reason.
P: Have you found out why she gets upset?
E: No.
P: Do you have children?
E: Yes.
P: Can you tell me something about them?
E: I have a boy and a girl. They are doing fine. I haven't
much contact with them, given my working hours.
P: How do you feel?
E: I have had stomach pains for three years. They got worse
but I discovered that if I held my body in a certain position
it hurt less. I managed until the ulcer perforated. Now I
take pills and watch my diet.
P: What do you usually do when you are at home?
E: I am not at home that much given my working hours. But when
I am there I watch television.
P: What was the last program you watched?

15
E: I don't remember. I usually forget the story line
immediately.
P: Do you ever dream?
E: No.
P: Do you ever fantasize or have day-dreams?
E: Not that I can remember.
P: Do you ever cry?
E: No.
P: Do you ever get excited about things?
E: No.
P: Are you anxious being here?
E: My wife told me I might.
P: What thoughts do you have now?
E: I don't know...none. What do you expect me to say? I find
it hard to describe how I feel... I am not much of a talker.

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The flat, matter-of-fact tone in which Bob Holden, the
executive in question, describes his life and problems is very
striking. Whatever else may be said about it, the dialogue is
certainly not characterized by a great outpouring of emotions.
The conversation contains very little affect, even when Bob talks
about what, for other people, would be highly-charged emotional
issues.
Surprisingly enough, after this unpromising start, Bob
returned to the psychotherapist. He was strongly encouraged to do
so by the Senior Vice President Executive Manpower of the parent
company, a man he very much respected, and who had been partially
responsible for Bob's being in his present position. The VP had
been impressed by Bob's ability to work hard but had recently
become concerned about whether Bob really had been the right
choice for the job. The inappropriateness of some of his
reactions, his startling lack of insight about people, his
absence of interest in them as human beings with individual
concerns, motivations, likes and dislikes, raised questions about
Bob's fitness to lead and motivate a team of executives. The VP
hoped that some work with a therapist, who at one point had been
a consultant to the company, would help Bob understand better his
particular leadership style and the effect it had on other
people.
In subsequent discussions the therapist learned more about
Bob's background. He was an only child whose parents had led a
very active working life which clearly left very little time for
him. His mother ran the household like clockwork. Every minute

17
seemed to be planned in advance; nothing was left to chance.
Given the particular set-up in the family, Bob felt he had never
had much say in running his own life. Stormy disapproval
followed each time he tried to deviate from the program. His
mother had given the developing child very little individual
leeway in the household. It was almost as if she had prescribed
what he had to feel, to do and to think. He was not allowed the
psychic space to daydream, to experiment with his own feelings
and fantasies.
When he was at high school Bob went through a short period of
rebelliousness; he stopped studying and had to repeat a year.
But given the kind of family pressure he was under at home, this
modest insurrection was short-lived. He discovered that it was
much less painful to give in and continue his dependency
relationship.
It was Bob's mother who pushed him on to engineering school,
even suggesting the area in which he subsequently specialized,
information systems. An educator herself, she was convinced that
this field of studies had a great future.
Bob mentioned that at times other people had pointed out
that he had a fatalistic view of things. He himself often felt
pushed by an unmovable force. Things had to be done in certain
ways; to do something differently would only lead to trouble. He
told the therapist that he sometimes felt like a robot devoid of
emotions. The fantasy that his mother still controlled his
intrapsychic world, his thoughts and his feelings, had lingered

18
on. Physical illness -- albeit a very primitive, non-verbal
choice -- seemed to have become his main outlet for communicating
his feelings and, even more, helped to make him feel alive.
Bob liked his job. He felt it gave him the structure he
needed to help him act in appropriate ways. However, his job had
seemed much easier before he became CEO. Before, given the kind
of work he was doing in data processing, his interface with other
people had been minimal. Now, in his role as CEO, he was
supposed to be an empathic facilitator for his subordinates, able
to empower, motivate and develop them. Since he had serious
difficulty in assessing his own feelings, dealing with those of
others did not come easily to him.
With the help of the therapist, Bob became more adept at
recognizing what he felt. Like a child learning how to walk, he
gradually became able to identify which feeling belonged to which
situation. He also became more spontaneous in expressing his own
wants -- less dependent on a prescribed program.
The Alexithymic Disposition
People who behave like Bob are sometimes called alexithymics, a
word constructed from the Greek, meaning having no words for
emotions (Sifneos, 1972). The psychoanalyst Krystal (1979)
compared the problem of alexithymics to the way color-blind
people manage in a world full of colors: they cope by picking up
clues which serve as indicators of emotions which they cannot
discern themselves. Superficially, they seem quite well adjusted

19
to reality and to function very successfully in work situations.
If we penetrate further, however, we encounter a wasteland of
ideas and imagination. Given their problems in feeling, it will
come as no surprise that these people have an impaired capacity
for empathy: they tend to treat others with detachment and
indifference. Love objects can be highly interchangeable. There
is an absence of the human quality in relationships. When
dealing with such individuals we are often left with a feeling of
dullness, boredom and frustration.
Alexithymic individuals have an extreme reality-based
cognitive style, an impoverished fantasy life and a paucity of
inner emotional experiences. They prefer to operate
ritualistically rather than reflectively. They also tend towards
stereotypical interpersonal behavior and a speech pattern
characterized by endless repetition of trivial details. This
last characteristic seems to be the outcome of the attempt to
find some kind of foothold in the external world, arising from
the internal difficulty these people experience in describing
what they feel. Whatever emotion they do feel tends to be of a
vague, diffuse nature.
Obviously, when placed in a senior executive's position,
people with this kind of mind-set create a very specific
corporate ambiance, seriously affecting the modus operandi of all
those around them. The alexithymic's factual, unemotional, and
unimaginative way of behaving and acting fits the prototypical
image of the organizational bureaucrat. The wooden quality of
their behavior, their obsession with facts, and their need for

20
structure all help to complete the picture. Their behavior
appears to be almost overadaptive.
Bob is a good example of an executive who experienced great
difficulty in dealing with emotions. Just as he was programmed
by his parents, he programmed his company. He set up a strict
hierarchy, insisting that others conform to highly
prescriptive rules and procedures.
While Frank confused others because of his suspicion and
evasiveness, Bob's inability to handle one of the most important
tasks of a senior executive, catering for the emotional needs of
his subordinates, led to widespread feelings of frustration and
disaffection. Moreover, without a nugget of passionate
feeling, it becomes much harder to generate commitment to a
shared vision of where a company should be going, resulting in
demotivation, bewilderment and interpersonal aggressiveness.
In Bob's company, a highly politicized organizational culture
developed, a playground for second-tier gamesmen. Warring and
uncooperative fiefdoms were rampant and barriers to the free flow
of information were erected. With such an organizational
culture, insufficient scanning of the external environment was to
be expected: the focus of the organization became more internal.
A vacillating, muddling-through type of strategy followed, its
orientation depending on which clique managed to get Bob's ear.
Like Bob, some people may disguise their interpersonal
difficulties by resorting to jobs which are thing-oriented.

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Abstractions, tasks, set ideas and inanimate objects become of
overriding importance; feelings become superfluous; what really
counts is the system. For such people contact with others will
be depersonalized and mechanical. Their attachment to
procedures, rules and regulations is their way of coping with the
sterility of their inner world. The initial interview with Bob
illustrates the mental state of such a person.
Organizations give alexithymics great opportunities to blend
into environments which camouflage what, in other situations,
might be regarded as strange behavior. In this way they give
relief to alexithymic individuals by providing a kind of
structure which not only makes their behavior less conspicuous
but may also appear to legitimize it. Hence, organizations can
take on a containing function for the malfunctioning individual
(Kets de Vries, 1990).
The current information revolution is a particularly
efficient facilitator for alexithymic behavior. The increasing
importance of the human/computer provides very efficient
protective cover for people with these inclinations. They
operate in an automaton-like way, clinging to fixed routines or
zealously advocating abstractions and thereby abolishing
relationships with real people. They are content with having
their pace directed by their computer screen, and with the
stimulus it provides. Such people seem to be perfectly
programmed. Unfortunately, their frequently mindless and rigid
pursuit of routines leaves little room for curiosity and
initiative. They may not possess an adaptive capacity sufficient

22
to cope with environmental change, a deficiency which can have
devastating consequences for an organization.
Board members would do well to identify such people in time
and be very careful about putting them in a top position. It is
not that hard to recognize signs of serious alexithymia. There
are usually sufficient opportunities to observe potential
candidates and see if they have "fire in their belly." We should
not forget that the inability to show emotions and the incapacity
to get close to other people can exact a high price in the form
of organizational disorientation, non-cooperation and stifled
creativity.
* * *
THE MAN WHO COULDN'T HEAR
When Tom Devon went to his board meeting he had some explaining
to do. In spite of his promise the year before that the reported
loss was only a temporary set-back, this year the company was
even deeper in the red. Stocks were selling at an all-time low.
A funereal atmosphere pervaded the company. Some of the better
people who had not yet left were thinking of leaving. How had
all this had happened? What had gone wrong?
Things certainly had not looked bad five years earlier when
Tom was made president of the Telar corporation, an established
company in the branded foods business. Older executives (who had
managed to hang on) still remembered how his predecessor had

23
specifically picked him for his talents as a team player and his
professed commitment to participatory management. But all these
talents had melted away the moment he became CEO. Many who knew
him before felt that he had changed into a different kind of
person. A common criticism was that Tom increasingly followed
his own path and was no longer interested in hearing what others
had to say.
As CEO he had embarked on a number of expensive projects.
His first scheme was to move the head office from the north of
the country to the east, supposedly to be closer to the market.
However, cynics within the company suggested that the real reason
for the move was so that Tom could be near his country estate.
Two costly jet airliners were acquired to fly Tom and his
entourage around the globe. An expensive yacht, allegedly to be
used to entertain customers, topped off his spending spree. In
fact, the boat was mostly used by Tom and his friends to go deepsea
fishing.
For the stated purpose of streamlining the company, changing
its image and making it more of a trend setter, two
reorganizations took place within four years. The only visible
results of the work of the armies of consultants hired during
this time were a serious destabilization of the company, the
exodus of a number of valuable long-term employees and
significant problems with morale. A number of questionable,
expensive acquisitions followed without much thought being given
to their fit with other parts of the company.

24
Tom's autocratic style and imperious way of acting
increasingly antagonized his original supporters. Frank
interchange was lost; good ideas were left by the wayside. It
was hard to stop Tom once he got going, as he seemed to have lost
the ability to listen.
In spite of the company's going into the red, Tom's salary
and perks remained unaffected. He appeared to be unperturbed by
the downward slide in profits, enthusiatically organizing an
extravagant planning conference in a castle near Paris at a
period when the company was in increasing financial difficulties.
No expense was spared, including the chartering of helicopters,
excessive speaker fees for a number of politicians, and the
hiring of a three-star French chef.
Finally, Tom approved a low-interest loan to a company of
which he was part owner, and this conflict of interests gave the
board the excuse to ask for his resignation. In spite of his
protestations that he did not see any potential conflict, since
he did not occupy a management position in the second company,
Tom was forced to resign.
After his separation from the company, Tom sank into a
serious depression. His sudden fall from grace had badly damaged
his self-esteem. At the same time, he developed a number of
stress symptoms which led to a visit to his family doctor. Since
there seemed to be nothing physically wrong with him, his doctor
suggested that he saw a psychotherapist. With his morale at an
all-time low, Tom felt he had nothing to lose. To be prepared

25
for the encounter, however, he armed himself beforehand by
reading a few books on psychotherapy.
At the first interview the psychotherapist was struck by the
impression Bob made. He was meticulously dressed, wearing an
Armani suit, Gucci shoes and a Patek Philippe watch. He
immediately demonstrated his familiarity with clinical terms. He
then pulled out of his attaché case a number of newspaper
clippings showing himself photographed with well-known people
from the worlds of politics and the arts.
Tom recalled how he had always been the center of attention
when he was growing up. His parents would show off his good
looks, dress him up and have him sing songs. He had vivid
memories of people watching and encouraging him. He was always
considered very talented, a person destined to have a great
future. His mother even succeeded in persuading his teachers to
let him skip a grade at grammar school. With hindsight he
wondered if that had been a wise move, since it had put a lot of
pressure on him. Moreover, it had made it more difficult for him
to relate to his playmates. He complained that his parents had
not seemed to care much about his personal desires but were more
interested in outward symbols of success, like degrees and looks.
Tom was a very good student at high school and at graduation
was listed in the year book as the person most likely to succeed.
Study at an Ivy League college had been more difficult due to the
amount of time he spent on women. Things no longer come as
easily to him; to obtain good grades he really had to work.

26
After taking his MBA degree, Tom had a problem choosing one
job from among the many job offers that came his way. He had
been a most successful interviewee, finding it extremely easy
to charm recruiters. Given his interest in the media and his
taste for glamour, advertising had been a logical choice of
direction. He had seemed to be well set for a brilliant career.
He recalled how contagious his enthusiasm and self-assurance had
instantly been within the firm, that they had led to a succession
of rapid promotions.
After gentle prompting by the therapist, Tom acknowledged
some of the darker sides of his personality. He recognized that
his relationships had probably always been somewhat lopsided. He
tended to take others' admiration for his work for granted -- he
felt he was entitled to it. He found it more difficult, however,
to show real rather than faked interest in the work of others.
Subordinate managers who failed to show enthusiasm for his ideas
could find themselves quickly out of favor. He admitted that
raising his anger could be dangerous for a person's career. He
recalled two occasions where he had gone out of his way to put
rivals in a bad light. Although he knew how to be subtle, he
could also be very vindictive.
Tom elaborated at length on his talent for taking in his
superiors with his charm. He was very good at playing games and
at showing his best side. And it had paid off. He had obtained
the top job -- at least for some time. But with the top job he
had lost his sense of boundaries; somehow he had got the idea
that the normal rules of conduct did not apply to him, that any

27
transgression was allowed. The havoc his attitude caused
to the organization, where people felt abused and stepped on,
resulted in its near-bankruptcy.
The Narcissistic Style
A narcissistic personality like Tom's is a type frequently
encountered in top management positions. Indeed, it is only to
be expected that many narcissistic personalities, with their need
for power, prestige and glamour, eventually end up in leadership
positions. Their sense of drama, their ability to manipulate
others, their knack for establishing quick, superficial
relationships serve them well in organizational life. They can
be quite successful, particularly in areas which allow them to
fulfill their ambition for greatness, fame and glory.
We must remember, however, that while a certain amount of
narcissistic behavior is essential for organizational success,
like everything else, it is all a matter of degree. A moderate
dose of grandiosity and idealization, expressed as selfconfidence
and shown in the leader's ability to identify with
senior executives and the organization, will contribute to
effective organizational functioning. The theatrical quality of
leaders' behavior -- their confidence and purposefulness -- can
be extremely contagious. In a faltering organization it may even
create much-desired group cohesion, as well as greater alertness
to internal and external danger signs. Furthermore, the manner
in which many executives use their subordinates as an extension
of themselves does not necessarily have to be viewed in a

28
negative way. The positive side is that these leaders let their
followers share their vision and expertise, thus offering great
opportunities for learning and career advancement. Obviously,
this kind of leadership behavior is particularly effective within
organizations in crisis where enthusiasm and purpose are needed
to generate motivation and momentum.
Unfortunately, this sense of excitement is frequently only
temporary; it easily wears off. Then the darker side of the
excessively narcissistic personality may be seen. Although the
narcissistic executive is usually heralded as a person with great
potential, over time it becomes clear that something is lacking -
- things do not seem to work out and their original promise is
never quite fulfilled. For them, power and prestige tend to be
more important than commitment to performance; their energy may
be diverted towards political expediency at the cost of long-term
goals. Their primary concern is usually the preservation of
their own position and importance, and they are contemptuous of
the needs of others and of the organization. Their uninhibited
behavior, self-righteousness, inattention to organizational
structure and processes, and inability to accept a real
interchange of ideas, impair organizational functioning and
prevent organizational adaptation to internal and external
changes. Their consequent exclusion of others from
policy-making, intolerance of positive criticism and
unwillingness to compromise will inevitably have serious negative
effects.

29
One of a leader's most important roles is to be aware of and
accommodate the emotional needs of his subordinates. Leaders
driven by the forces of excessive narcissism typically disregard
their subordinates' legitimate needs and take advantage of their
loyalty. They are exploitative, callous, and overcompetitive,
frequently resorting to excessive use of depreciation. This
behavior fosters submissiveness and passive dependency, stifling
the critical function of their managers.
Sadly, the executives themselves are rarely conscious of
their reasons for behaving the way they do. It usually takes the
onset of serious personal problems -- physical aging, career setbacks,
marital difficulties and an increasing feeling of
emptiness in their work and their relationships -- to make such
people begin to wonder what is happening to them and why.
Board members would do well to detect the symptoms of
excessive narcissism early on and create boundaries to check it.
They should be careful not to be swept away by the superficial
charm of these candidates and to assess the degree of realism in
what they are saying. However, detection and prevention are not
always easy, since narcissistic behavior usually only blossoms
fully when the executive in question has been in the top position
for some time.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF
Self-love is essential for survival. Without concern for the
self the organism will die. On the other hand, too great a

30
preoccupation with the self can become self-destructive. A
cohesive integration of the self is needed for adaptive
functioning. However, a sense of self is acquired only gradually
and changes throughout one's life. In order to become a person
in one's own right, transitional space is needed. But this is
not always an easy or straightforward process. Some parents use
their children as extensions of themselves and are unable to give
them the psychic space they need.
Each of our three examples demonstrates how a child's early
interactions with its immediate environment can take on a
patterning role. Obviously, a certain degree of frustration is
inevitable in the process of growing up. The intensity of these
feelings of frustration will vary, however. The "good-enough"
mother is the one who is successful in spontaneously reacting to
the full course of the infant's experiences (Winnicott, 1975). We
should remember that what makes for good-enough care is ageappropriate
frustration without traumatization: only a little
frustration can be dealt with at any one time. Only if children
sense that they mean something to others for their own sake will
they feel comfortable in their own skin and acquire a sense of
inner value and esteem.
As a way of coping with the shortcomings of parental care and
in an attempt to ward off feelings of helplessness, the
developing child retains the original experience of perfection
of its early years through the creation of an all-powerful,
grandiose, exhibitionistic image of itself and an all-powerful,
idealized image of its parent, the latter taking on the role of

31
savior and protector. These two narcissistic configurations can
be called the grandiose self and the idealized parent imago
(Kohut, 1971).
In normal circumstances the grandiosity and exhibitionism of
the grandiose self are gradually tamed by the forces of reality.
To begin with the parents reflect and reinforce the child's
grandiose self-image, confirming the latter's self-esteem. As
the child develops, parents' reactions modify this self-image
channeling grandiose fantasies of power in a realistic direction.
A basis is laid for sensible ambitions, down-to-earth activities
and a secure sense of self-esteem.
The same can be said about the idealized parent imago. In
situations of good-enough care the child's evaluation of the
parent becomes increasingly realistic; he or she will begin to
assimilate these more realistic elements into his or her
permanent personality structure, to be used as guidelines for his
or her ideals and ambitions. Gradually, a cohesive sense of self
develops.
When damage is caused to the grandiose self by parental
understimulation or overstimulation, overburdening, or
inconsistent intervention and discipline during a child's
vulnerable period of development, a completely different picture
may result. Our three examples suggest that on a superficial
level many of the parents involved seemed to treat their children
well. However, closer observation reveals how callous and
indifferent their treatment often was. These parents frequently

32
used their children as proxies in their own search for
admiration and greatness. Their behavior created only the
illusion of loving without taking the real needs of the children
into consideration. Both grandiose self and idealized parent
imago were not really modified and truly integrated, but
continued to exist in their unaltered forms, pursuing their
archaic aims. In all the examples we see an absence of
transitional space in which the child was allowed to experiment
and play. A cohesive sense of self was thus absent from the
adult, causing an imbalance in psychic structure, a danger of
fragmentation and problems in the regulation of selfesteem.
Each of these cases is an illustration of one of these
various forms of psychological injury and their repercussions on
organizational functioning.
THE ROLE OF THE BOARD
Like the proverbial monkeys who see no evil, hear no evil speak
no evil, the three types of CEOs described have difficulties in
speaking, feeling and hearing. Given the relationship between
personality, leadership style, corporate culture, organizational
structure and strategy (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1986, 1987), I
have argued that board members would do well to identify such
people at an early stage, given the harm they can do to
organizations.
The key function of a board of directors is the selection and
evaluation of CEOs. Selecting a new CEO requires an assessment

33
of the qualifications needed for the job in the light of the
environmental challenges which lie ahead. In such instances an
appraisal of the strategic mandate is required. A great deal of
psychological acumen is demanded in order to determine if a new
CEO fits this strategic mandate, has the qualities required for
the job and can handle its pressures. The strains a CEO will
undergo are many and include the sense of isolation which comes
with the office, the effects of aging, the fear of failure (and
success) and particularly the "leader-as-mirror effect" -- the
tendency of subordinates to idealize their leaders and project
their own fantasies on them and the resulting need for applause
on the part of the leaders themselves (Kets de Vries, 1989).
My examples have shown that surprises are not uncommon. The
insidious pressures which come with the top job are of a special
nature and as such are beyond the coping abilities of some
executives. The board should therefore show increased vigilance,
particularly in the early stages of the CEO's taking the job.
This is especially important when a CEO is brought in from
outside. Careful attention should be given to coaching the new
incumbent and periodically reviewing and evaluating strategy.
Board members should watch for some obvious red flags. Does
strategy seem incoherent? Is the CEO preoccupied with constant
reorganization? Does the CEO embark on unusual ventures? Is too
much attention being paid to outward symbols? Does the CEO
exhibit eccentric behavior? Are the CEO's actions uninspired,
lacking that germ of passion? Has suspiciousness crept into the
organization? Is the CEO becoming isolated and uncommunicative?
Does the CEO demonstrate a bizarre single mindedness? Is the

34
CEO listening to other people? Does the CEO act in an
erratic, arbitrary manner? Is the CEO prone to violent outbursts
for no apparent reason? Does the CEO procrastinate? Does he or
she show signs of workaholism? Are there too many unexplained
slip-ups? Are key, long-term executives leaving?
All these indications of trouble could be observed in our
three examples. They are danger signs the board should look out
for and be prepared to take appropriate steps to deal with. If a
CEO does not fulfil the strategic mandate outlined, it is the
responsibility of the board to replace that person.
For a number of reasons, boards all too often play a passive
role, behaving much like a rubber stamp. Frequently, board
members feel beholden to the CEO who picked them in the first
place. Many board members have a hard time admitting that they
may have selected the wrong person. Furthermore, many board
members are or have been CEOs themselves, making the notion of
firing one of their own kind very difficult, since such an act
cuts too deeply into the basic power fabric of CEO relations.
Given these impediments, it usually takes some kind of
catastrophe within an organization before a CEO is replaced.
The three cases I have described are a reminder that board
members can benefit from becoming psychologically more astute.
Paying attention to quantitative measures of CEO performance only
is not sufficent -- after all, CEOs make or break organizations.
It is essential that board members should be willing to play the
role of organizational detective and be sensitive to elements of

35
leadership style, so that they can be on the look-out for
potentially disruptive behavior.
As I have indicated, this is not going to be easy. More
often than not symptomatology is very well disguised. Board
members would be well advised not to limit their activities to
mere attendance at board meetings. Meeting other directors,
participating in exit interviews of key executives, and being
involved in top management succession planning sessions are ways
of keeping a finger on the pulse of the organization.
Moreover, as many board members will be CEOs themselves, they
are in a good position to understand the pressures which come
with being in the top job. When cracks in the armor start to
appear, they can help the CEO by counseling him or her and even
suggesting professional help. Of course, making such a process
possible necessitates a relationship of trust, mutual respect and
fair play. Here a healthy dose of humility, humanity and humor
will be an important asset. In the end, these qualities are the
only real protection against the pitfalls of leadership.

36
REFERENCES
Kets de Vries, Manfred F.R. (1989), Prisoners of Leadership, New
York: Wiley.
, (1990), "Fools, Impostors and Leaders", manuscript.
Kets de Vries, Manfred F.R. & Danny Miller (1986), "Personality,
Culture and Organization," The Academy of Management Review,
11 (2), 266-279.
, (1987), Unstable at the Top, New York: Mentor Books.
Kohut, Heinz (1971), The Analysis of the Self, New York:
International Universities Press.
Krystal, Henry (1979), "Alexithymia and Psychotherapy," American
Journal of Psychotherapy, 33, 17-31.
Meissner, William W. (1978), The Paranoid Process, New York:
Jason Aronson.
Millon, Theodore (1981), Disorders of Personality, New York:
Wiley.
Shapiro, David (1965), Neurotic Styles, New York: Basic Books.
Sifneos, Peter E. (1972), Short-Term Psychotherapy and Emotional
Crisis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Weber, Max (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Winnicott, Donald W. (1975), Through Pediatrics to
Psychoanalysis, New York: Basic Books.

INSEAD WORKING PAPERS SERIES 86/11
Philippe A. NAERT
and Alain BULTEZ
"From "Lydiametry" to "Pinkhamization":
misspecifying advertising dynamics rarely
affects profitability".
1986
86/12 Roger BETANCOURT
and David GAUTSCHI
"The economics of retail firms", Revised
April 1986.
86/01 Arnoud DE MEYER
86/02 Philippe A. NAERT
Marcel WEVERBERGH
"The R & D/Production interface".
"Subjective estimation in integrating
communication budget and allocation
86/13 S.P. ANDERSON
and Damien J. NEVEN
"Spatial competition k la Cournot".
and Guido VERSWUVEL
decisions: a case study", January 1986.
86/14 Charles WALDMAN
•Comparaison internationale des merges brutes du
commerce", June 1985.
86/03 Michael BRIMM
"Sponsorship and the diffusion of organizational
86/04 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
and Michele HIBON
innovation: a preliminary view".
"Confidence intervals: an empirical
investigation for the series in the M-Competition".
86/15 Mihkel TOMBAK and
Arnoud DE MEYER
"How the managerial attitudes of firms with
FMS differ from other manufacturing firms:
survey results", June 1986.
86/05 Charles A. WYPLOSZ
"A note on the reduction of the workweek",
July 1985.
86/16 B. Espen ECKBO and
Herwig M. LANGOHR
"Les primes des offres publiques, la note
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contrdle des societes".
86/06 Francesco GIAVAllI,
Jeff R. SHEEN and
Charles A. WYPLOSZ
"The real exchange rate and the fiscal
aspects of a natural resource discovery".
Revised version: February 1986.
86/17 David B. JEMISON
"Strategic capability transfer in acquisition
integration", May 1986.
86/07 Douglas L. MacLACHLAN
and Spyros MAI/AIDA/US
"Judgmental biases in sales forecasting",
February 1986.
86/18 James TEBOUL
and V. MALLERET
"Towards an operational definition of
services", 1986.
86/08 Jose de la TORRE and
David H.NECKAR
"Forecasting political risks for
international operations", Second Draft: March 3,
86/19 Rob R. WEITZ
"Nostradamus: • knowledge-based
forecasting advisor".
86/09 Philippe C. HASPESLAGH
1986.
"Conceptiudizing the strategic process in
86/20 Albert CORHAY,
Gabriel HAWAWINI
and Pierre A. MICHEL
"The pricing of equity on the London stock
exchange: seasonality and size premium",
June 1986.
diversified firms: the role and nature of the
corporate influence process", February 1986.
86/21 Albert CORHAY,
Gabriel A. HAWAWINI
"Risk-premia seasonality in U.S. and
European equity markets", February 1986.
86/10 R. MOENART,
Arnoud DE MEYER,
J. BARBE and
D. DESCHOOLMEESTER.
"Analysing the issues concerning
technological de-maturity".
and Pierre A. MICHEL
86/22 Albert CORHAY,
Gabriel A. HAWAWINI
"Seasonality in the risk-return relationships
some international evidence", July 1986.
and Pierre A. MICHEL

86/23 Amoud DE MEYER
"An exploratory study on the integration of
information systems in manufacturing",
July 1986.
86/34
Philippe HASPESLAGH
and David JEMISON
"Acquisitions: myths and reality", July 1986.
86/24 David GAUTSCHI
and Vithala IL RAO
"A methodology for specification and
aggregation in product concept testing",
86/35
Jean DERMINE
"Measuring the market value of a bank, a
primer", November 1986.
86/25 H. Peter GRAY
July 1986.
"Protection", August 1986.
86/36
Albert CORHAY and
Gabriel HAWAWINI
"Seasonality in the risk-return relationship:
sane international evidence", July 1986.
and Ingo WALTER
86/26 Barry EICHENGREEN
and Charles WYPLOSZ
"The economic consequences of the Franc
Dineen", September 1986.
86/37
86/38
David GAUTSCHI and
Roger BETANCOURT
Gabriel HAWAWINI
"The evolution of retailing: a suggested
economic interpretation".
"Financial innovation and recent
developments in the French capital markets",
86/27 Karel COOL
and Ingemar DIERICKX
"Negative risk-return relationships in
business strategy: paradox or truism?",
Updated: September 1986.
October 1986.
86/39
Gabriel HAWAWINI
"The pricing of common stocks on the
86/28 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
and Danny MILLER
"Interpreting organizational texts.
Pierre MICHEL
and Albert CORHAY
Brussels stock exchange: a re-examination of
the evidence", November 1986.
86/40
Charles WYPLOSZ
"Capital flows liberalization wad the EMS, a
86/29 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
"Why follow the leader?".
French perspective", December 1986.
86/30 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
86/31 Arnoud DE MEYER
86/31 Arnoud DE MEYER,
Jinichiro NAKANE,
Jeffrey G. MILLER
and Kama FERDOWS
"The succession game: the real story.
"Flexibility: the next competitive battle",
October 1986.
"Flexibility: the next competitive battle",
Revised Version: March 1987.
86/41
86/42
86/43
Kura FERDOWS
and Wickham SKINNER
Kasra FERDOWS
and Per LINDBERG
Damien NEVEN
"Manufacturing in a new perspective", July
1986.
*MS as indicator of manufacturing
strategy", December 1986.
"On the existence of equilibrium in
hotelling's model", November 1986.
86/44 Ingemar DIERICIOC "Value added tax and competition",
86/32 Karel COOL Performance differences among strategic Carmen MATUTES December 1986.
and Dan SCHENDEL group members", October 1986. and Damien NEVEN
86/33 Ernst BALTENSPERGER "The role of public policy in insuring
and Jean DERMINE financial stability: a cross-country, 1987
comparative perspective", August 1986,
Revised November 1986. 87/01 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Prisoners of leadership".

87/02 Claude VIALLET "An empirical investigation of international
asset pricing", November 1986.
87/15
Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
"METAFORECASTING: Ways of improving
Forecasting. Accuracy and Usefulness",
87/03 David GAUTSCHI "A methodology for specification and
May 1987.
and Vithala RAO
aggregation in product concept testing",
Revised Version: January 1987.
87/16
Susan SCHNEIDER
"Takeover attempts: what does the language
and Roger DUNBAR
tell us?, June 1987.
87/04 Sumantra GHOSHAL and
"Organizing for innovations: case of the
Christopher BARTLETT
multinational corporation", February 1987.
87/17
Andre LAURENT and
Fernando BARTOLOME
"Managers' cognitive maps for upward and
downward relationships", June 1987.
87/05 Arnoud DE MEYER
and Kura FERDOWS
"Managerial focal points in manufacturing
strategy", February 1987.
87/18
Reinhard ANGELMAR and
"Patents and the European biotechnology
Christoph LIEBSCHER
lag: • study of large European pharmaceutical
87/06 Arun K. JAIN,
"Customer loyalty as • construct in the
firms", June 1987.
Christian PINSON and
marketing of banking services", July 1986.
Naresh K. MALHOTRA
87/19
David BEGG and
"Why the EMS? Dynamic games and the
Charles WYPLOSZ
equilibrium policy regime", May 1987.
87/07 Rolf BANZ and
Gabriel HAWAWIN!
"Equity pricing and stock market
anomalies", February 1987.
87/20
Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
"A new approach to AM/stir-id forecasting",
June 1987.
87/08 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
"Leaders who can't manage", February 1987.
87/21
Susan SCHNEIDER
"Strategy formulation: the impact of national
87/09 Lister VICKERY,
Mark PILKINGTON
"Entrepreneurial activities of European
MBAs", March 1987.
culture", Revised: July 1987.
and Paul READ
87/22
Susan SCHNEIDER
"Conflicting ideologies: structural and
motivational consequences", August 1987.
87/10 Andre LAURENT
"A cultural view of organizational change",
March 1987
87/23
Roger BETANCOURT
"The demand for retail products and the
David GAUTSCHI
household production model: new views on
87/11 Robert FILDES and
"Forecasting and loss functions", March
complementarily and substitutability".
Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
1987.
87/24
C.B. DERR and
"The internal and external careers: •
87/12 Fernando BARTOLOME
and Andre LAURENT
"The Janus Head: learning from the superior
and subordinate faces of the manager's job",
Andre LAURENT
theoretical and cross-cultural perspective",
Spring 1987.
April 1987.
87/25
A. K. JAIN,
"The robustness of MDS configurations in
87/13 Sumantra GHOSHAL
"Multinational corporations as differentiated
N. K. MALHOTRA and
the face of incomplete data", March 1987,
and Nitin NOHRIA
networks", April 1987.
Christian PINSON
Revised: July 1987.
87/14 Landis GABEL
"Product Standards and Competitive
Strategy: An Analysis of the Principles", May
87/26
Roger BETANCOURT
and David GAUTSCHI
"Demand complementarities, household
production and retail assortments", July
1987.
1987.

87/27 Michael BURDA "Is there a capital shortage in Europe?",
August 1987.
87/39 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
"The dark side of CEO succession",
November 1987.
87/28 Gabriel HAWAWINI "Controlling the interest-rate risk of bonds:
87/40
87/29 Susan SCHNEIDER and
Paul SHRIVASTAVA
an introduction to duration analysis and
immunization strategies", September 1987.
"Interpreting strategic behavior: bask
assumptions themes in organizations",
September 1987
87/41
Carmen MATUTES and
Pierre REGIBEAU
Gabriel HAWAWINI and
Claude VIALLET
"Product compatibility and the scope of
entry", November 1987.
"Seasonality, size premium and the
relationship between the risk and the return
of French common Mocks", November 1987
87/42 Damien NEVEN and "Combining horizontal and vertical
87/30 Jonathan HAMILTON "Spatial competition and the Core", August Jacques-F. THISSE differentiation: the principle of max-min
W. Bentley MACLEOD 1987. differentiation", December 1987.
and F. THISSE
87/31 Meanie QUINZII and "On the optimality of central places", Jacques-F. THISSE
87/32
87/33
J. F. THISSE September 1987.
Arnoud DE MEYER
Yves DOZ and
Amy SHUEN
"German, French and British manufacturing
strategies less different than one thinks",
September 1987.
"A process framework for analyzing
cooperation between firms", September 1987.
87/43 Jean GABSZEWICZ and "Location", December 1987.
87/44 Jonathan HAMILTON,
Jacques-F. THISSE
and Anita WESKAMP
87/45 Karel COOL,
David JEMISON and
Ingemar DIERICKX
"Spatial discrimination: Bertrand vs.
Cournot in a model of location choice",
December 1987.
"Business strategy, market structure and
risk-micas relationships: a causal
interpretation", December 1987.
87/34
Kama FERDOWS and
Arnoud DE MEYER
`European manufacturers: the dangers of
complacency. Insights from the 1987
European manufacturing futures survey",
October 1987.
87/46 Ingemar DIERICKX
and Karel COOL
"Asset stock accumulation and sustainability
of competitive advantage", December 1987.
87/35
87/36
87/37
87/38
P. J. LEDERER and
J. F. THISSE
Manfred KETS DE VRIES
Landis GABEL
Susan SCHNEIDER
"Competitive location on networks under
discriminatory pricing", September 1987.
"Prisoners of leadership", Revised version
October 1987.
"Privatization: its motives and likely
consequences", October 1987.
"Strategy formulation: the impact of national
culture", October 1987.
1988
88/01 Michael LAWRENCE and
Spyros MAKRIDA1US
88/02 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
88/03 James TEBOUL
"Factors affecting judgemental forecasts and
confidence intervals", January 1988.
"Predicting recessions and other turning
points", January 1988.
'De-industrialize service for quality", January
1988.

88/04 Susan SCHNEIDER
"National vs. corporate culture: implications
for human resource management", January
88/16 Gabriel HAWAWINI
"Market efficiency and equity pricing:
international evidence and implications for
1988.
global investing", March 1988.
88/05 Charles WYPLOSZ
88/06 Reinhard ANGELMAR
"The swinging dollar: is Europe out of
step?", January 1988.
"Les tomtits dans les canary( de
/17 Michael BURDA
"Monopolistic competition, costs of
adjustment and the behavior of European
employment", September 1987.
distribution", January 1988.
88/18 Michael BURDA
"Reflections on "Wait Unemployment" in
88/07 Ingemar DIERICKX
"Competitive advantage: a resource based
Europe", November 1987, revised February
1988.
and Karel COOL
perspective", January 1988.
88/08 Reinhard ANGELMAR
' Issues in the study of organizational
88/19 MI LAWRENCE and
Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
"Individual bias in judgements of
confidence", March 1988.
and Susan SCHNEIDER
cognition", February 1988.
88/09 Bernard SINCLAIR-
"Price formation and product design through
88/20 Jean DERM1NE,
Damien NEVEN and
"Portfolio selection by mutual funds, an
equilibrium model*, March 1988.
DESGAGNE
bidding", February 1988.
J.F. THISSE
88/10 Bernard SINCLAIR-
"The robustness of some standard auction
/21 James TEBOUL
"De-industrialize service for quality", March
DESGAGNE
game forms", February 1988.
1988 (88/03 Revised).
88/11 Bernard SINCLAIR-
DESGAGNE
' When stationary strategies are equilibrium
bidding strategy: The single-crossing
property", February 1988.
/22 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
"Proper Quadratic Functions with an
Application to AT&T", May 1987 (Revised
March 1988).
88/23 88/12 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
"Business firms and managers in the 21st
Sjur Didrik FLAM
century", February 1988
and Georges ZACCOUR
88/13 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Alexithymia in organizational life: the
organization man revisited", February 1988.
"Equilibres de Nash-Cournot dans le 'much*
armpits' du gaz: an cm oil les solutions en
boucle ouverte et en feedback coincident",
Mars 1988.
88/24 88/14 Main NOEL
"The interpretation of strategies: a study of
B. Espen ECKBO and
the impact of CEOs on the
Herwig LANGOHR
corporation", March 1988.
88/15 Anil DEOLALIKAR and
Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
"The production of and returns from
industrial innovation: an econometric
analysis for a developing country", December
1987.
88/25 Everette S. GARDNER
and Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
88/26 Sjur Didrik FLAM
and Georges ZACCOUR
"Information disclosure, means of payment,
and takeover premia. Public and Private
tender offers in France", July 1985, Sixth
revision, April 1988.
"The future of forecasting", April 1988.
"Semi-competitive Comsat equilibrium in
multistage oligopolies", April 1988

88/39 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "The Leader as Mirror : Clinical
88/27 Murugappa KRISHNAN "Entry game with resalable capacity", Reflections", July 1988.
Lars-Hendrik ROLLER April 1988.
88/28 Sumantra GHOSHAL and
C. A. BARTLETT
88/29 Naresh K. MALHOTRA,
Christian PINSON and
Arun K. JAIN
"The multinational corporation as • network:
perspectives from interorganizational
theory", May 1988.
"Consumer cognitive complexity and the
dimensionality of multidimensional scaling
configurations", May 1988.
88/40 Josef LAKONISHOK and
Theo VERMAELEN
88/41 Charles WYPLOSZ
88/42 Paul EVANS
"Anomalous price behavior around
repurchase tender offers", August 1988.
"Assymetry in the EMS: intentional or
systemic?", August 1988.
"Organizational development in the
transnational enterprise", June 1988.
88/43 88/30 Catherine C. ECKEL
"The financial fallout from Chernobyl: risk
B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE
and Theo VERMAELEN
perceptions and regulatory response", May
1988.
44 Essam MAHMOUD and
88/31 Sumantra GHOSHAL and
Christopher BARTLETT
"Creation, adoption, and diffusion of
innovations by subsidiaries of multinational
Spyros MAKRIDAIUS
88/45 corporations", June 1988.
Robert KORAJCZYK
88/32 Kasra FERDOWS and
David SACKRIDER
88/33 Mihkel M. TOMBAK
"International manufacturing: positioning
plants for success", June 1988.
"The importance of flexibility in
manufacturing", June 1988.
88/47 Alain BULTEZ,
88/34 Mihkel M. TOMBAK
"flexibility: an important dimension in
manufacturing", June 1988.
Els GLISBRECHTS,
Philippe NAERT and
Net VANDEN ABEELE
88/35 Mihkel M. TOMBAK
"A strategic analysis of investment in flexible
88/48 manufacturing systems", July 1988.
Michael BURDA
88/36 Vikas TIBREWALA and
Bruce BUCHANAN
"A Predictive Test of the NBD Model that
Controls for Non-stationarity", June 1988.
88/49 Nathalie DIERKENS
88/37 Murugappa KRISHNAN
"Regulating Price-Liability Competition To
Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
88/38 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
Improve Welfare", July 1988.
"The Motivating Role of Envy : A Forgotten
Factor in Management", April 88.
and Claude VIALLET
46 Yves DOZ and
Amy SHUEN
88/50 Rob WEITZ and
Amoud DE MEYER
88/51 Rob WEITZ
'Group decision support systems implement
Bayesian rationality", September 1988.
'The state of the art and future directions
in combining forecasts", September 1988.
"An empirical investigation of international
asset pricing", November 1986, revised
August 1988.
"From intent to outcome: a process
framework for partners's**, August 1988.
"Asymmetric cannibalism between substitute
items listed by retailers", September 1988.
"Reflections on 'Wait unemployment' in
Europe, II", April 1988 revised September
1988.
"Information asymmetry and equity issues",
September 1988.
"Managing expert systems: from inception
through updating", October 1987.
"Technology, work, and the organization:
the impact of expert systems", July 1988.

88/52
Susan SCHNEIDER and
"Cognition and organizational analysis:
88/63 Fernando NASCIMENTO
and Wilfried R.
"Strategic pricing of differentiated consumer
durables in a dynamic duopoly: a numerical
Reinhard ANGELMAR
who's minding the store?", September 1988.
VANHONACKER
analysis", October 1988.
/64 88/53 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Whatever happened to the philosopherking:
Kane FERDOWS
the leader's addiction to power,
September 1988.
88/65 Arnoud DE MEYER
88/54 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
and Mihkel M. TOMBAK
"Strategic choice of flexible production
technologies and welfare implications",
and Kasra FERDOWS
October 1988
88/66 Nathalie DIERKENS
88/55 Peter BOSSAERTS
"Method of moments tests of contingent
and Pierre HILLION
claims asset pricing models", October 1988.
"Charting strategic roles for international
factories", December 1988.
"Quality up, technology down", October 1988
"A discussion of exact measures of
information assymetry: the example of Myers
and %Wu( model or the importance of the
asset structure of the firm", December 1988.
88/56
Pierre HILLION
"Size-sorted portfolios and the violation of
88/67 Paul S. ADLER and
"The chief technology officer", December
the random walk hypothesis: Additional
Kasra FERDOWS
1988.
empirical evidence and implication for tests
of asset pricing models", June 1988.
1989
88/57
Wilfried VANHONACKER
and Lydia PRICE
"Data transferability: estimating the response
effect of future events based on historical
analogy", October 1988.
89/01 Joyce K. BYRER and
Tawfik JELASSI
"The impact of language theories on DSS
dialog", January 1989.
89/02 88/58 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "Assessing economic inequality", November
Louis A. LE BLANC
and Mihkel M. TOMBAK
1988.
and Tawfik JELASSI
"DSS software selection: a multiple criteria
decision methodology", January 1989.
89/03 88/59 Martin KILDUFF
"The interpersonal structure of decision
Beth H. JONES and
making: • social comparison approach to
Tawfik JELASSI
organizational choke", November 1988.
"Negotiation support: the effects of computer
intervention and conflict level on bargaining
outcome", January 1989.
89/04 88/60 Michael BURDA
"Is mismatch really the problem? Some
Kasra FERDOWS and
estimates of the Cbelwood Gate II model
Arnoud DE MEYER
with US data", September 1988.
"Lasting improvement in manufacturing
performance: In search of a sew theory",
January 1989.
89/05 88/61 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
"Modelling cost structure: the Bell System
Martin KILDUFF and
revisited", November 1988.
Reinhard ANGELMAR
88/62
Cynthia VAN HULLE,
Theo VERMAELEN and
Paul DE WOUTERS
"Regulation, taxes and the market for
corporate control in Belgium", September
1988.
89/06 Mihkel M. TOMBAK and
"Shared history or shared culture? The
effects of time, culture, and performance on
institutionalization in simulated
organizations", January 1989.
"Coordinating manufacturing and business
B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE strategies: I", February 1989.

89/07 Damien 1. NEVEN
"Structural adjustment in European retail
89/18 Srinivasan BALAK-
"Information asymmetry, market failure and
banking. Some view from industrial
RISHNAN and
joint-ventures: theory and evidence",
organisation", January 1989.
Mitchell KOZA
March 1989.
89/08 Amoud DE MEYER and
"Trends in the development of technology
89/19 Wilfried VANHONACKER,
"Combining related and sparse data in linear
Hellmut SCHUTFE
and their effects on the production structure
Donald LEHMANN and
regression models", Revised March 1989.
in the European Community", January 1989.
Fareena SULTAN
89/09 Damien NEVEN,
"Brand proliferation and entry deterrence",
89/20 Wilfried VANHONACKER
"A rational random behavior model of
Carmen MATUTES and
February 1989.
and Russell WINER
choice", Revised March 1989.
Marcel CORSTJENS
89/21 Aenoud de MEYER and
"Influence of manufacturing improvement
89/10 Nathalie DIERKENS,
"A market based approach to the valuation
Kash FERDOWS
programmes on performance", April 1989.
Bruno GERARD and
of the assets in place and the growth
Pierre HILLION
opportunities of the firm", December 1988.
89/22 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
"What is the role of character in
and Sydney PERZOW
psychoanalysis?" April 1989.
89/11 Manfred KM'S DE VRIES
"Understanding the leader-strategy interface:
and Main NOEL
application of the strategic relationship
89/23 Robert KORAJCZYK and
"Equity risk premia and the pricing of
interview method", February 1989.
Claude VIALLET
foreign exchange risk" April 1989.
89/12 Wilfried VANHONACKER
"Estimating dynamic response models when
the data are subject to different temporal
aggregation", January 1989.
89/24 Martin KILDUFF and
Mitchel ABOLAFIA
"The social destruction of reality:
Organisational conflict as social drama"
zAmil 1989.
89/13 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
"The impostor syndrome: a disquieting
89/25 Roger BETANCOURT and
"Two essential characteristics of retail
phenomenon in organizational life", February
David GAUTSCHI
markets and their economic consequences"
1989.
March 1989.
89/14 Reinhard ANGELMAR
"Product innovation: a tool for competitive
advantage", March 1989.
89/26 Charles BEAN,
Edmond MALINVAUD,
"Macroeconomic policies for 1992: the
transition and after", April 1989.
Peter BERNHOLZ,
89/15 Reinhard ANGELMAR
"Evaluating a firm's product innovation
Francesco GIAVAllI
performance", March 1989.
and Charles WYPLOSZ
89/16 Wilfried VANHONACKER,
Donald LEHMANN and
"Combining related and sparse data in linear
regression models", February 1989.
89/27 David KRACKHARDT and
Martin KILDUFF
"Friendship patterns and cultural
attributions: the control of organizational
Fareena SULTAN
diversity", April 1989.
89/17 Gilles AMADO,
"Changement Organisational et realites
89/28 Martin KILDUFF
"The interpersonal structure of decision
Claude FAUCHEUX and
Andre LAURENT
cultureUes: contrastes franco-amdricaias",
March 1989.
making: a social comparison approach to
organizational choice", Revised April 1989.

89/29 Robert GOGEL and "The battlefield for 1992: product strength 89/42
Jean-Claude LARRECHE and geographic coverage", May 1989.
89/30 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER "Competition and Investment in flexible 89/43
and Mihkel M. TOMBAK Technologies", May 1989.
89/31 Michael C. BURDA and "Intertemporal prices and the US trade 89/44
Stefan GERLACH balance in durable goods", July 1989.
89/32 Peter HAUG and "Application and evaluation of a multi- 89/45
Tawfik JELASSI
criteria decision support system for the
dynamic selection of U.S. manufacturing
locations", May 1989. 89/46
89/33
89/34
Bernard SINCLAIR-
DESGAGNE
Sumantra GHOSHAL and
Nittin NOHRIA
89/35 Jean DERMINE and
Pierre HILLION
89/36 Martin KILDUFF
89/37 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
89/38 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
89/39 Robert KORAJCZYK and
Claude VIALLET
89/40 Balaji CHAKRAVARTHY
"Design flexibility in monopsonistic
industries", May 1989.
"Requisite variety versus shared values:
managing corporate-division relationships in
the M-Form organisation", May 1989.
"Deposit rate ceilings and the market value
of banks: The case of France 1971-1981",
May 1989.
"A dispositional approach to social networks:
the case of organizational choice", May 1989.
"The organisational fool: balancing a
leader's hubris", May 1989.
"The CEO blues", June 1989.
"An an piCicrd investigation of international
asset pricing", (Revised June 1989).
"Management systems for innovation and
productivity", June 1989.
89/41 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "The strategic supply of precisions", June
and Nathalie DIERKENS 1989.
89/47
89/48
89/49
89/50
89/51
89/52
89/53
89/54
Robert ANSON and
Tawfik JELASSI
Michael BURDA
Balaji CHAKRAVARTHY
and Peter LORANGE
Rob WEITZ and
Amoud DE MEYER
Marcel CORSTJENS,
Carmen MATUTES and
Damien NEVEN
Manfred KETS DE VRIES
and Christine MEAD
Damien NEVEN and
Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
lean DERMINE
Jean DERMINE
Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
Arnoud DE MEYER
Spyros MAKRIDAKIS
S. BALAKRISHNAN
and Mitchell KOZA
"A development framework for computersupported
conflict resolution", July 1989.
"A note on firing costs and severance benefits
in equilibrium unemployment", June 1989.
"Strategic adaptation in multi-business
firms", June 1989.
"Managing expert systems: a framework and
case study", June 1989.
"Entry Encouragement", July 1989.
"The global dimension in leadership and
organization: issues and controversies", April
1989.
"European integration and trade Rows",
August 1989.
"Home country control and mutual
recognition", July 1989.
"The specialization of financial institutions,
the EEC model", August 1989.
"Sliding simulation: a new approach to time
series forecasting", July 1989.
"Shortening development cycle times: a
manufacturer's perspective", August 1989.
"Why combining works?", July 1989.
"Organisation costs and a theory of joint
ventures", September 1989.

89/55 H. SCHUTTE "Euro-Japanese cooperation in information 89/67 Peter BOSSAERTS and "Market microstructure effects of
technology", September 1989. (FIN) Pierre HILLION government intervention in the foreign
89/56 Wilfried VANHONACKER
and Lydia PRICE
89/57 Taekwon KIM,
Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
and Mihkel TOMBAK
"On the practical usefulness of meta-analysis
results", September 1989.
1990
"Market growth and the diffusion of
multiproduct technologies", September 1989. 90/01
TM/EP/AC
exchange market", December 1989.
B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "Unavoidable Mechanivms", January 1990.
89/58 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER "Strategic aspects of flexible production 90/02 Michael BURDA "Monopolistic Competition, Costs of
(EP,TM) and Mihkel TOMBAK technologies", October 1989. EP Adjustment, and the Behaviour of European
89/59
(011)
Manfred KETS DE VRIES,
Daphne ZEVADI,
Alain NOEL. and
Mihkel TOMBAK
"Locus of control and entrepreneurship: a
three-country comparative study", October
1989.
90/03
TM
Arnoud DE MEYER
Manufacturing Employment", January 1990.
"Management of Communication in
International Research and Development",
January 1990.
89/60 Enver YUCESAN and "Simulation graphs for design and analysis of 90/04 Gabriel HAWAWINI and "The Transformation of the European
(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN discrete event simulation models", October FIN/EP Eric RAJENDRA Financial Services Industry: From
1989. Fragmentation to Integration", January 1990.
89/61 Susan SCHNEIDER and "Interpreting and responding to strategic 90/05 Gabriel HAWAWINI and "European Equity Markeb: Toward 1992
(AU) At/mud DE MEYER issues: The impact of national culture",
October 1989.
FIN/EP Bertrand JACQUILLAT and Beyond", January 1990.
90/06 Gabriel HAWAWINI and "Integration of European Equity Markets:
89/62 Amoud DE MEYER "Technology strategy and international R&D FIN/EP Eric RAJENDRA Implications of Structural Change for Key
(TM) operations", October 1989. Market Partic' ipants to and Beyond 1992",
89/63 Enver YUCESAN and "Equivalence of simulations: A graph
January 1990.
(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN approach", November 1989. 90/07 Gabriel HAWAWINI 'Stock Market Anomalies and the Pricing of
89/64 Enver YUCESAN and "Complexity of simulation models: A graph
(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN theoretic approach", November 1989.
FIN/EP
Equity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange",
January 1990.
90/08 Tawfik JELASSI and "Modelling with MCDSS: What about
89/65 Soumitra DUTTA and "MARS: A mergers and acquisitions TM/EP B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE Ethics?", January 1990.
(TM,
AC, FIN)
89/66
(TM,EP)
Piero BONISSONE reasoning system", November 1989.
B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "On the regulation of procurement bids",
90/09
EP/FIN
Alberto GIOVANNINI
and Jae WON PARK
"Capital Controls and International Trade
Finance", January 1990.
November 1989. 90/10 Joyce BRYER and "The Impact of Language Theories on DSS
TM Tawrik JELASS1 Dialog", January 1990.

90/21 Roy SMITH and "Reconfiguration of the Global Securities
90/11 Enver YUCESAN "An Overview of Frequency Domain FIN Ingo WALTER Industry in the 1990's", February 1990.
TM
Methodology for Simulation Sensitivity
Analysis", January 1990. 90/22 Ingo WALTER "European Financial Integration and Its
FIN
Implications for the United States", February
90/12 Michael BURDA
"Structural Change, Unemployment Benefits
1990.
EP
and High Unemployment: A U.S.-European
Comparison", January 1990. 90/23 Damien NEVEN "EEC Integration towards 1992: Some
EP/SM
Distributional Aspects", Revised December
90/13 Soumitra DUTTA and "Approximate Reasoning about Temporal 1989
TM Shashi SHEKHAR Constraints in Real Time Planning and
Search", January 1990. 90/24 Lan Tyge NIELSEN "Positive Prices in CAM", January 1990.
FIN/EP
90/14 Albert ANGEHRN and "Visual Interactive Modelling and Intelligent
TM Hans-Jakob LOTH' DSS: Putting Theory Into Practice", January
1990.
90/25
FIN/EP
Lan Tyge NIELSEN
"Existence of F.quilibriaun in CAPM",
January 1990.
90/15 Amoud DE MEYER, "Tbe Internal Technological Renewal of a 90/26 Charles KADUSHIN and "Why networking Fails: Double Binds and
TM
Dirk DESCHOOLMEESTER,
Rudy MOENAERT and
Besiness Unit with a Mature Technology",
January 1990.
011/BP Michael BRIMM the Limitations of Shadow Networks",
February 1990.
Jan BARBE
90/27 Abbas FOROUGHI and "NSS Solutions to Major Negotiation
90/16 Richard LEVICH and "Tax-Driven Regulatory Drag: European TM Tawfik JELASSI Stumbling Blocks", February 1990.
FIN Ingo WALTER Financial Centers in the 1990's", January
1990. 90/28 Arnaud DE MEYER "The Manufactaring Cootribution to
TM Innovation", February 1990.
90/17
FIN
Nathalie DIERKENS
"Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues",
Revised January 1990. 90/29 Nathalie DIERKENS "A Discussion of Correct Measures of
FIN/AC Information Asymmetry", January 1990.
90/18 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Managerial Decision Rules and the
MKT Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response 90/30 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "The Expected Utility of Portfolios of
Models", Revised January 1990. FIN/EP Assets", March 1990.
90/19 Beth JONES and "The Effect of Computer Intervention and 90/31 David GAUTSCHI and "What Determines U.S. Retail Margins?",
TM Tawfik JELASSI Task Structure on Bargaining Outcome",
MKT/EP Roger BETANCOURT February 1990.
February 1990.
90/32 Srinivaaan BALAK- "Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection
90/20
TM
Tawfik JELASSI,
Gregory KERSTEN and
"An Introduction to Group Decision and
Negotiation Support", February 1990.
SM
RISHNAN and
Mitchell KOZA
and Joint-Ventures: Theory and Evidence",
Revised, January 1990.
Slinky ZIONTS 90/33
011
Caren SIEHL,
David BOWEN and
"The Role of Rites of Integration in Service
Delivery", March 1990.
Christine PEARSON

90/34
FIN/EP
Jean DERMINE
'The Gains from European Banking
Integration, a Call for a Pro-Active
Competition Policy", April 1990.
90/45 Soumilra DUTTA and "Integrating Case Based and Rule Based
TM Piero BONISSONE Reasoning: The Possibilistic Connection",
90/46 Spyros MAKRIDAIUS "Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of
90/35 Jae Won PARK 'Changing Uncertainty and the Time- TM and Mich2Ie HIBON Initial Values and Loss Functions on Post-
EP
Varying Risk Premia in the Term Structure
of Nominal Interest Rates", December 1988,
Sample Forecasting Accuracy".
Revised March 1990. 90/47 Lydia PRICE and
"Improper Sampling in Natural
MKT Wilfried VANHONACKER Experiments: Limitations on the Use of
90/36 Arnaud DE MEYER "An Empirical Investigation of Meta-Analysis Results in Bayesian
TM Manufacturing Strategies in European Updating', Revised May 1990.
90/37
Th1/0B/SM
William CATS-BARIL
Industry", April 1990.
"Executive Information Systems: Developing
an Approach to Open the Possible,", April
1990.
May 1990.
90/48 Jae WON PARK "The Information in the Term Structure of
EP
Interest Rates: Out-of-Sample Forecasting
Performance", lune 1990.
90/49 Soumitra DUTTA "Approximate Reasoning by Analogy to
90/38 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Managerial Decision Behaviour and the TM Answer Null Queries", June 1990.
MKT
Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response
Modes", (Revised February 1990). 90/50 Daniel COHEN and "Price and Trade Effects of Exchange Rates
EP Charles WYPLOSZ Fluctuations and the Design of Policy
90/39
TM
Louis LE BLANC and
Tewfik JELASSI
"An Evaluation and Selection Methodology
for Expert System Shells", May 1990.
Coordination", April 1990.
90/51 Michael BURDA and "Gross Labour Market Flows in Europe:
90/40 Manfred KETS DE VRIES 'Leaden on the Couch: The case of Roberto EP Charles WYPLOSZ Some Stylized Facts", lune 1990.
OB Calvi", April 1990.
90/52 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "The Utility of Infinite Means", June 1990.
90/41 Gabriel HAWAWINI,
"Capital Market Reaction to the
FIN
FIN/EP Itzhak SWARY and
Announcement of Interstate Banking
lk HWAN JANG Legislation", March 1990. 90/53
EP
Michael Burda
"The Consequences of German Economic
and Monetary Union', June 1990.
90/42 Joel STECKEL and "Cross-Validating Regression Models in
MKT Wilfried VANHONACKER Marketing Researeb", (Revised April 1990). 90/54 Damien NEVEN and "European Financial Regulation: A
EP Colin MEYER Framework for Policy Analysis", (Revised
90/43 Robert KORAJCZYK and 'Equity Risk Preside and the Pricing of May 1990).
FIN Claude VIALLET Foreign Exchange Risk", May 1990.
90/44
OB
Gilles AMADO.
Claude FAUCHEUX and
Andre LAURENT 1990.
*Organisational Change and Cultural
Realities: Franco-American Contrasts", April
90/55 Michael BURDA and "Intertemporal Prices and the US Trade
EP Stefan GERLACH Balance', (Revised July 1990).

90/56 Damien NEVEN and "The Structure and Determinants of East-West
EP Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Trade: A Preliminary Analysis of the 90/68 Soumitra DUTTA "A Framework and Methodology for Enhancing the
Manufacturing Sector', July 1990 TM/SE Business Impact of Artificial Intelligence
Applications", September 1990
90/57 Lan Tyge NIELSEN Comma Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate
FIN/EP/ Statistic% July 1990 90/69 Soumitra DUTTA "A Model for Temporal Reasoning in Medical
TM TM Expert Systems", September 1900
90/58
FIN/EP/TM
Lan Tyge NIELSEN
'Cosmos Knowledge of Price and Expected Cost
in an Ofigopofistic Market", August 1990
90/70
TM
Albert ANGEHRN
C': A Visual Interactive MCDSS",
September 1990
90/59 Jean DERMINE and "Economies of Scale and 90/71 Philip PARKER and *Competitive Effects in Diffusion Models: An
FIN Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Scope is the French Mutual Funds (SICAV) MKT Hubert GATIGNON Empirical Analysis", September 1990
Industry", August 1990
90/71 Enver YUCESAN •Aoslysis of Marker Chains Using Simulation
90/60 Peri IZ and "An Interactive Group Decision Aid for TM Graph Models", October 1990
TM Tawfik JELASSI Multiobjective Problems: An Empirical
Aseessasen", September 1990 90/73
90/61 Pankaj CHANDRA and "Models for the Evlanation of Manufacturing
TM Mihkel TOMBAK Flembility% August 1990
TM
Arnaud DE MEYER and
Kam FERDOWS
"Removing the Berrien in Manufacturing",
October 1990
90/74 Sumentra GHOSHAL and •Requisite Compiesdly: Orgesisimg Headquarters-
90/62 Damien NEVEN and 'Public Policy Towards TV Broadcasting in the SM Nitin NOHRIA Sebeitfiery Religious la hINCs% October 1990
EP Memo VAN DIM Netherlands", August 1990
90/63
SM
90/64
SM
Summers GHOSHAL and
Eleanor WESTNEY
Sumantra GHOSHAL
*Organising Competitor Analysis Systems",
August 1990
"Wang Differentiation and Corporate
Performance: Case of the Multinational
Corporation", August 1990
90/75
MKT
Roger BETANCOURT and
David GAUTSCHI
"The Outputs of Retail Activities: Concepts,
Measurement and Evidence", October 1990
90/76 Wilfried VANHONACKER 'Managerial De 'mien Behaviour and the Estimation
MKT
of Dynamic Sales Response Models",
Revised October 1990
90/77 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Testing the Koyck Scheme of Sales Response to
90/65 Charles WYPLOSZ "A Note on the Real Exchange Rate Effect of MKT Advertising: An Aggregation-Independent
EP German Unification", August 1990 Autocorrelation Test", October 1990
90/66 Soumitn DUTTA and "Computer Support for Strategic and Tactical 90/78 Michael BURDA and "Exchange Rate Dynamics and Currency
TM/SE/FIN Piero BONISSONE Planning in Mergers and Acquisitions",
EP Stefan GERLACH Unification: The Ostmark - DM Rate",
September 1990
October 1990
90/67 Soumitra DUTTA and "integrating Prior Cases and Expert Knowledge In 90/79 Anil GABA "Inferences with an Unknown Noise Level in a
TM/SE/FIN Piero BONISSONE • Merger and Acquisitions Reasoning System",
TM Bernoulli Process•, October 1990
September 1990

90/80
TM
Anil GABA and
"Using Survey Data in Inferences about Purchase
Robert WINKLER Behaviour", October 1990
90/81
TM
Tawfik JELASSI
"Du Present au Futur: Bilan et Orientations des
Systimes Interactifs d'Aide it la Decision,"
October 1990
90/82
EP
Charles WYPLOSZ
"Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline,"
November 1990
90/83
FIN/TM
Nathalie DIERKENS and "Information Asymmetry and Corporate
Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE Communication: Results of a Pilot Study",
November 1990
90/84
MKT
Philip M. PARKER
"The Effect of Advertising on Price and Quality:
The Optometric Industry Revisited,"
December 1990
90/85
MKT
Avijit GHOSH and
"Optimal Timing and Location in Competitive
Vikas TIBREWALA Markets," November 1990
90/86
EP/TM
Olivier CADOT and "Prudence and Success in Politics," November 1990
Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE
90/87
FIN/EP
Lars Tyge NIELSEN
"Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM: Further
Results", December 1990
90/88
OB/MKT
Susan C. SCHNEIDER and
"Cognition in Organisational Analysis: Who's
Reinhard ANGELMAR Minding the Store?" Revised, December 1990