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Source List 12.1 Reviewing Progress Source Description Davis, J. (2004). “Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia’s Water and Sanitaiton Sector, World Development, 32(1) 53–71 Howard, G. (2002). “Water Supply Surveillance: A Reference Manual” Water, Engineering and Development Centre Kusek, J. and Rist, R. (2004). “Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System”. Washington, DC: World Bank Mackay, K. (2007). “How to Build Monitoring & Evaluation Systems to Support Better Government”. World Bank. Olken, B. (2007). “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”. Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research Schacter, M. (2000). “Evaluation Capacity Development—Sub- Saharan Africa: Lessons from Experience in Supporting Sound Governance”. World Bank This paper provides interesting examples of monitoring and evaluation of pro-probity interventions in South East Asia. This book provides guidance on data collection and use of surveillance findings in improving water supplies. Although the focus is primarily on water quality, rather than governance, the book has useful examples of quantitative indicators that can be measured under a performance benchmarking exercise. It also advises on techniques for feeding back information from monitoring and evaluation into future project design. The guidance is derived from experience in Uganda, Ghana, and Bangladesh. a This toolkit explains the importance of monitoring and evaluation, and describes clearly what a good monitoring and evaluation system should achieve. It includes a full glossary of monitoring and evaluation terminology (based on OECD definitions) and an extensive reference list for further reading. The toolkit explains that an appropriate evaluative program can provide the context necessary for correctly interpreting information generated through the monitoring process, such as performance data. Explains how Governments can institute M&E to enhance transparency and support accountability relationships by revealing the extent to which government has attained its desired objectives. Strong accountability, in turn, can provide the incentives necessary to improve performance. To examine the success of different approaches (external monitoring versus community participation and monitoring) to monitoring levels of corruption, the author designed and conducted a randomized, controlled field experiment in 608 Indonesian villages. Traditionally, much of the empirical work on corruption has been based on perceptions of corruption rather than on direct measures of corruption. This paper, however, builds on a small but growing literature that examines corruption by comparing two measures of the same, physical quantity, one “before” and one “after” corruption has taken place. This allows for accurate measures of quality over time, and enables the author to determine the extent of losses due to corruption. This paper explains that M&E can support sound governance in several ways. However, substantial M&E achievements on the ground are rare in Sub-Saharan Africa. The binding constraint appears to be insufficient demand for M&E. Few leading bureaucrats and politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa accept the value of an evaluation culture that supports fact-based administrative and political accountability. The major lesson from two decades of governance support in Sub-Saharan Africa is the failure of the blueprint approach to reform. This failure is instructive. It demonstrates that future interventions, if they are to have a reasonable chance of success, must pay careful attention to: • The quality of local leadership for reform • Local capacity to design and implement reform programs • Features of the local incentive and accountability environment, particularly as they relate to the level of corruption in the public sector and the quality of public service delivery • Capacity-building needs of decentralized as well as centralized forms of governance • Forces external to the public service that support government reform. a http://www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/watermark/reference-manual/wss-ref-insides.pdf 154
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY Access to information Refers to the right of interested parties (the public, NGOs, the media, etc.) to receive information held by government. This right, protected by international and national laws, provides that official documents should be generally available, and that any exceptions should be limited and specific. Access to information increases government accountability to its citizens and reduces opportunities for corruption. Accountability Accountability denotes a relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right. One basic type of accountability relationship is that between a person or agency entrusted with a particular task or certain powers or resources, on the one hand, and the ‘principal’ on whose behalf the task is undertaken, on the other. Auditing Auditing refers to an official examination of an organization or institution’s accounts, to make sure money has been spent correctly, i.e. according to rules, regulations and norms. Audit institutions like national and regional Auditor Generals, Audit Offices, State Comptrollers, Ombudsmen, Tribunals de Cuentas, Cours de Comptes etc. make a vital contribution to good governance by detecting poor management and inappropriate use of public money. Auditing institutions can be considered the taxpayers’ independent and professional watchdogs. Bid rigging Occurs where officials or managers rig or interfere with the contract award to favor a particular bidder, or bidders (usually in return for a bribe or kickback payment). Bribes Payments to an official or utility staff member, paid in advance in return for a promise to act a certain way (for example, award a supply contract to a particular firm, or install a connection within a particular time frame). Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) A BOOT model involves a single organization or consortium designing, building, funding, owning, and operating a scheme for a define period of time (usually around 25 years) and then transferring the ownership across to an agreed party. Clientelism Clientelism is an informal relationship between people of different social and economic status: a ‘patron’ (boss, big man) and his ‘clients’ (dependents, followers, protégés). The relationship includes a mutual but unequal exchange of favors, which can be corrupt. Patrimonial and clientelist practices can institutionalize hegemonic elites and political corruption, often reaching the highest ranks of state power. Competitive bidding Competitive bidding is a selection process based on the principle of open and transparent advertisement of an item or service, which ensures that the best bidder wins according to qualifications, value and other objective criteria (and consequently not according to family or friendship ties, bribery or 155
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Public Disclosure Authorized 46829
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PREFACE In 1996, then World Bank Pr
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ..
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Tables Table 1.1: How to Use the So
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Box 11.1: Five Key Elements of an A
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In each section, corruption and gov
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2 UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION AND GOVE
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Box 2.2 Governance in the Literatur
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Corruption often involves a “mora
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When these conditions hold, a virtu
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This suggests that sector practitio
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spur increased local demand for acc
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Source List 2.1 Framework for Think
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• P rovider - Section 5 discusses
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That said, the interpretation of na
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Source List 3.1 Country Level Gover
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4 SECTOR ASSESSMENT This section in
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4.3 Informal Service Provision In m
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Media coverage of corruption can se
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Opportunities for corruption arise
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Table 4.2 Some Corruption and Poor
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Source List 4.1 Sector Assessment S
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Source List 4.1 Sector Assessment (
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Source List 4.1 Sector Assessment (
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Figure 5.1 Corruption in Procuring
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5.1.3 Problems with quality As disc
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• Utility unable to link billing
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5.3.1 Detecting corruption in human
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• Travel by utility staff at the
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6 PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING CAPITAL
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transferred from the government or
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sector staff might schedule mainten
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Practitioners can detect corruption
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• Increase the price of the contr
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7 IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT SECTOR
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Table 7.1 Five Variants of Private
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Box 7.2 An Example of Related Party
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• A reputation for corruption in
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Indicators of corruption risk in co
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• Management processes, for examp
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PART II INCREASING PROBITY AND IMPR
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Box 8.1 Improving Probity in Capita
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Applying the rules effectively is c
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sors and auditors can be appointed
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Box 8.6 Procurement Outsourcing to
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fective deterrents include debarrin
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Source List 8.1 Improving Project P
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9 INCREASING PROBITY AT THE PROVIDE
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Linking management controls to corr
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Box 9.2 Performance Incentives for
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Box 9.5 Performance Evaluation in a
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Source List 9.1 Improving Provider
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10 STRENGTHENING WATER SECTOR GOVER
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Government responses to citizen dem
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Page 156 and 157: 12 REVIEWING PROGRESS Monitoring an
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