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CONTROLS AND AUDITING STANDARDS IN A<br />

COMPUTERISED ENVIRONMENT<br />

- A STUDY<br />

Thesis submitted lo<br />

Pondicherry University<br />

for the award of the degree of<br />

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN COMMERCE<br />

I~Y<br />

M. REVATHY SRIRAM<br />

Guide und Supervisor<br />

Pr0f.D. RAJAGOPALAN, P~.D.<br />

PONDICHERRY UNIVERSITY<br />

PONDICHERRY - 605 014


Dr.D.RAJAGOPAL4N<br />

Professor <strong>and</strong> Head<br />

Department of Commerce,<br />

PonJicherry University,<br />

Pondicherry - 605 014.<br />

CERTIFICATE<br />

This is to certify that the Ph.D.thesis entitled "Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

<strong>in</strong> a Computerised Environment - A Study" is based on the orig<strong>in</strong>al work done by<br />

M. Revathy Srirnm <strong>in</strong> the Department of Commerce, Pondicherry Un~versity,<br />

Pondicherry. The research work has not previously formed the basi\ for the award<br />

of any degree, diploma, associateship, fellowship or any other similar title. The entire<br />

work has been planned <strong>and</strong> carried out by the c<strong>and</strong>idate under my supervision <strong>and</strong><br />

guidance.<br />

D. Rajagopalan<br />

Place : Pondicheny<br />

Date: ,<br />

. 5


hi. Revathy Sriram<br />

Management Consultan1<br />

19, Second Ma<strong>in</strong> Road,<br />

CLT. Colony,<br />

Mylapore,<br />

Madr;'~ - 600 004.<br />

Research Scholar<br />

Department of Commerce<br />

Pondicherry University<br />

Pondicherry - 605 014<br />

DECLARATION<br />

1 hereby declare that the thesis entitled "Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>in</strong> a<br />

Cnmputerised Envimnment - A Study" for the award of the degree of Ph.D., is my<br />

orig<strong>in</strong>al work <strong>and</strong> it has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree,<br />

diploma, associateship, fellowship or any other similar title.<br />

M. Revathy Sriram<br />

Place : Pondicherry<br />

Date :


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT<br />

I ow a deep debt of gratitude to my supervisor <strong>and</strong> guide, Dr.D.Rllja&!opalan<br />

whose <strong>in</strong>valuable guidance <strong>and</strong> encouragement enabled the completion of the<br />

present study. His constant support has always been a source of <strong>in</strong>spiration.<br />

I am grateful to Dr. Amarch<strong>and</strong> of the University of Madras who has always<br />

been kjnd enough to spare his <strong>in</strong>valuable time to provide me helpful comments <strong>and</strong><br />

advice.<br />

I wish to express my s<strong>in</strong>cere thanks to Dr.T.V.Subramaniam, permanent<br />

Faculty of Bharathidasan University for his critical review. 1 am <strong>in</strong>debted to the<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> firms <strong>and</strong> the organisations for voluntarily co-operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g me the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation which forms the basis of my thesis. I wish to thank Flr.V.S.Ch<strong>and</strong>raseksr<br />

<strong>and</strong> Miss L. Chenchu Lakshmi for the secretarial assistance. My special thanks to<br />

Mr. K.Ramji for the special efforts <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g me support <strong>in</strong> extensive usage of<br />

word process<strong>in</strong>g. My thanks are also due to my nephew Mr.R. Venkatakrishna, who<br />

helped me to prepare the charts us<strong>in</strong>g the hanvard graphics.<br />

I wish to express my special thanks to Mr.D.Samb<strong>and</strong>am, Pondicherry <strong>and</strong><br />

all the members of his family for their constant support <strong>and</strong> encouragement.<br />

I wish to thank the members of my family <strong>and</strong> close family friends who were<br />

constant source of <strong>in</strong>spiration without which this work would not have been<br />

completed.<br />

, . I<br />

< .<br />

hl. Revathy Sriram


CONTENTS<br />

Page Nu.<br />

Certificate<br />

Declaration<br />

Acknowledgemenl<br />

Tahle of Charts <strong>and</strong> Diag~ams<br />

Chapter 1<br />

Chapter I1<br />

Chapter 111<br />

Chapter IV<br />

Chapter V<br />

Chapter V1<br />

Chapter VII<br />

Chapter VIll<br />

Chapter IX<br />

Introduction<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

End-User Comput<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Local Area Network (LAN)<br />

Data Base Management Sysreni<br />

Controls <strong>in</strong> UNlX Environment<br />

Disaster Recovery Plann~ng<br />

Audit Approach<br />

Summary, Conclusions <strong>and</strong><br />

Recclmmendations<br />

Appendix A to 1.i<br />

Bibliography<br />

222<br />

I<br />

XIX


TABLE OF CHARTS AND DIAGRAMS<br />

Figure 1.1 -<br />

Figure 1.2 -<br />

Response to Serious Security Incidents<br />

Average Annual Computer Ahuse Losses<br />

Figure 1.3 -<br />

Figure 1.4 -<br />

Figure 1.5 -<br />

Types of Computer Crime<br />

Relative Seriousness of Threats<br />

Computer Crime Losses<br />

Figure 1.6 -<br />

Results of California Arrests<br />

Figure 1.7 - Use of Technology / Products <strong>in</strong> 1985, 1988 <strong>and</strong> 1991<br />

(Chart 1)<br />

Figure 1.7 - Use of Technology / Products <strong>in</strong> 1985, 1988 <strong>and</strong> 1991<br />

(Chart 2)<br />

Figure 3.1 -<br />

End-User Comput<strong>in</strong>g Risk / Control Levels<br />

10. Figure 4.1 - On-L<strong>in</strong>e System Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit Problems


Computers were orig<strong>in</strong>ally used by organisations that could afford them. The<br />

<strong>in</strong>itial costs <strong>and</strong> the subsequent runn<strong>in</strong>g cmts were affordable only by a few. The<br />

reason of affordability of the computer only by a few is someth<strong>in</strong>g of the past<br />

The present scenerio is totally different Every organisation is own<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

computer of some type or the other. The other very few organisations usually are also<br />

utilis<strong>in</strong>g computers even if it be not theirs.<br />

The imm<strong>in</strong>ent need to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of data processed by the<br />

computers needs to be overemphasised. While controlled use of computers by<br />

management is an aid uncontrolled use of cornputrrs will <strong>and</strong> does have adverse<br />

impact on the organisations. This would result <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>accurate <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>complete<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation form<strong>in</strong>g the basis for decision mak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

It is <strong>in</strong> this background that one has to become aware of the need to have<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the usage of computers. With the extensive technological developments<br />

<strong>in</strong> the hardware <strong>and</strong> the sophisticated techniques <strong>in</strong> the development of software, the<br />

nonns of <strong>controls</strong> necessarily keep chang<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

As it is the primary responsibility of senior management to ensure that<br />

necessary <strong>controls</strong> are <strong>in</strong> place, they look up to auditors. Auditors have a<br />

responsibility to discharge their duty <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> professional st<strong>and</strong>ards. With


vary~lg types of computer <strong>environment</strong>s, then are appropriate control procedures<br />

to ensun that the data is processed correctly <strong>and</strong> completely.<br />

Nature of the problem<br />

Fit of the generally accepted <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards issued by the American<br />

Institute of Certified Public Accountants states that exam<strong>in</strong>ation of books of an<br />

organisation is to be performed by persons hav<strong>in</strong>g adequate technical tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

proficiency as an auditor. The second st<strong>and</strong>ard of a CPA field work specifies as<br />

follows: "A sufficient underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>in</strong>ternal control structure is to be obta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

to plan the audit <strong>and</strong> to dekrm<strong>in</strong>e the nature, tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> extent of tests to be<br />

verified".<br />

The Statement of Audit St<strong>and</strong>ards (SAS) further expects the auditor 'To<br />

consider ... complexity <strong>and</strong> sophistication of the entities operations <strong>and</strong> systems<br />

<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g whether the method of controll<strong>in</strong>g data process<strong>in</strong>g is based on manual<br />

procedures. As the entities operations <strong>and</strong> systems become more complex <strong>and</strong><br />

sophisticated, it may be necessary to devote more attention to <strong>in</strong>ternal control<br />

structure <strong>and</strong> elements to obta<strong>in</strong> the proper underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g so as to facilitate<br />

design<strong>in</strong>g effective subtantive tests.<br />

It further specifies that the auditor should obta<strong>in</strong> sufficient knowledge of the<br />

account<strong>in</strong>g system to underst<strong>and</strong>.. the Account<strong>in</strong>g process <strong>in</strong>volved from the <strong>in</strong>itiation<br />

of transaction to its <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g how the computer<br />

is used to process data.


The need for technical uprtire on the part of the auditor is due to the<br />

impact of ekctronic data p A g (wmputerisation of data)<br />

The objectives of audit have not changed It is only the means of achiev<strong>in</strong>g<br />

these objectives that have changed<br />

With the technological developments, them haw been changes <strong>in</strong> hardware<br />

<strong>and</strong> software. Consequently control concepts have necessarily changed. Hence audit<br />

approaches also need to change.<br />

HARDWARE<br />

Hardware have come a long way from unit record equipments. The first<br />

generation computers characterised by vaccum tubes gave place to second <strong>and</strong> third<br />

generation computers which utilised transistors <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated circuits. Subsequently,<br />

the fourth <strong>and</strong> fifth generation computers with more complex <strong>and</strong> sophisticated<br />

pheripcrals have appeared on the same.<br />

lhese changes <strong>in</strong> hardware brought, <strong>in</strong> their wake, the disappearance of<br />

"Audit trails". It is the audit trail which enables the auditor to trace a transaction<br />

from a source document to a report or a total produced by the computer. The same<br />

audit trail also enables the auditor to reverse the process <strong>and</strong> be able to f<strong>in</strong>d out the<br />

source background or other basic <strong>in</strong>formation which have figured <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al report<br />

or total. Computers with multi-programm<strong>in</strong>g or multi-process<strong>in</strong>g facilities have come<br />

<strong>in</strong>to the picture. With these concepts, it is possible to have a number of programs<br />

work<strong>in</strong>g simultaneously or a s<strong>in</strong>gle program to be process<strong>in</strong>g different files<br />

simultaneously.


On-l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> real time systems have much used facilities These facilitate<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g of data by transmitt<strong>in</strong>g them ovcr communication l<strong>in</strong>es. It is possible now<br />

for data be<strong>in</strong>g entered at om term<strong>in</strong>al, processed at other term<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> the results<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g made available at a third term<strong>in</strong>al. Real time systems enable updation of data<br />

immediately <strong>in</strong> as much as querry<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of such <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

<strong>in</strong>stantaneously is possible. Eg. Book<strong>in</strong>gs of air tickets from anyone office from any<br />

of the many flights on different routes also on different dates.<br />

Along with the advancement of technology <strong>in</strong> the field of ma<strong>in</strong> frame<br />

computers, there have been advanees <strong>in</strong> the development of small <strong>and</strong> smaller<br />

computers. The advent of small <strong>and</strong> smaller computers have been creat<strong>in</strong>g big <strong>and</strong><br />

bigger problems from the auditor's po<strong>in</strong>t of view. The auditor is not assured of<br />

certa<strong>in</strong> basic <strong>controls</strong> which he is assured of <strong>in</strong> a ma<strong>in</strong>-frame computer <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

SOFTWARE<br />

Software consists of progtams as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from hardware. These programs may<br />

be written by programmers with<strong>in</strong> the organisation or may be bought out from<br />

vendors of software packages. Rigorous discipl<strong>in</strong>e is needed <strong>in</strong> the development of<br />

software before it can be permitted to "Go live". Auditors need to firstly be aware of<br />

the associated discipl<strong>in</strong>e with regard to the development of software <strong>and</strong> secondly<br />

possess the knowledge to evaluate whether the discipl<strong>in</strong>e is be<strong>in</strong>g observed or not.<br />

Thirdly <strong>and</strong> most importantly he should be <strong>in</strong> a position to assess the possible risks<br />

<strong>and</strong> loss due to non-conformity of the discipl<strong>in</strong>e.


Operat<strong>in</strong>g sytems an also program but they an special type of program<br />

that are capabk of manag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> supervis<strong>in</strong>g the activities associated with the<br />

computer system They h<strong>and</strong>le all <strong>in</strong>put, output operations, scheduk jobs, allocate<br />

memory space etc. Operat<strong>in</strong>g systems while conferr<strong>in</strong>g a gnat deal of bcne6~ are<br />

also a cause for concern. Many weaknesses <strong>in</strong> the operat<strong>in</strong>g system can cause havoc<br />

<strong>in</strong> the <strong>controls</strong> that are associated with computer applications.<br />

DATA BASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS<br />

DBMS reduces redundancy of data submission. It L<strong>in</strong>ks various files <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>controls</strong> all of them. With the advantages of DBMS there are certa<strong>in</strong> audit concerns<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g reliability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the different files <strong>in</strong> the DBMS. In<br />

view of the difficulty of trac<strong>in</strong>g the transactions forwards <strong>and</strong> backwards, the auditor<br />

must have the capacity to test the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the DBMS package.<br />

LOCATION OF THE COMPUTER CENTRE<br />

The practice of <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g computers for perform<strong>in</strong>g account<strong>in</strong>g applications<br />

pnmanly <strong>and</strong> subsequently develop<strong>in</strong>g other <strong>in</strong>cidental applications was the caw for<br />

the computer corn<strong>in</strong>g under the purview of the f<strong>in</strong>ancial department The F<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

Controlkr generally was the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative head for the Data Process<strong>in</strong>g Department<br />

With the awareness created for computer usage <strong>and</strong> the eagerness of the user<br />

department to develop their own applications the concept of "End User Comput<strong>in</strong>g"<br />

has come <strong>in</strong>to existence. The <strong>controls</strong> that go with multiple term<strong>in</strong>als, multiple users,<br />

multiple system groups have a multi dimensional aspect <strong>and</strong> impact


AUDIT<br />

ignor<strong>in</strong>g the computer <strong>and</strong> treat<strong>in</strong>g it as a black box is no longer valid An<br />

auditor cannot effectively function by <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> around the computer <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> has<br />

come of age Auditor has to audit thro' the computer "if not with the computer".<br />

Whik <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>, th:ough the computer, auditor tests the client's computer programs<br />

by provid<strong>in</strong>g his own data <strong>and</strong> analys<strong>in</strong>g the results.<br />

While perform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> with the computer, the auditor has his own<br />

generalised audit software which performs the audit functions on the computer<br />

system. Computerisation is tak<strong>in</strong>g place utilis<strong>in</strong>g to full advantage the latest<br />

technological developments. It is presumed that the <strong>controls</strong> that are necessarily<br />

associated with each type of <strong>environment</strong> are built <strong>in</strong>to the system. An auditor, who<br />

has professional responsibility of giv<strong>in</strong>g his op<strong>in</strong>ion on the statements audited by him,<br />

should possess adequate skills <strong>and</strong> capabilities to do so irrespective of statements <strong>and</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards be<strong>in</strong>g pronounced by professional bodies or not.<br />

DISASTER RECOVER PLANNING OR CONTINGENCY PLANNING<br />

A fire accident which would char the edge of a leather-bound ledger is<br />

adequate to br<strong>in</strong>g down an entire computer <strong>in</strong>stallation. Organisations are no longer<br />

mere users of computers They are depend<strong>in</strong>g on them for their present existence<br />

<strong>and</strong> their survival <strong>in</strong> the future. Natural calamities like fire, floods, <strong>and</strong> other<br />

catostrophies, magnetic fields, viruses <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional sabotages from <strong>in</strong>siden <strong>and</strong><br />

outsiders of the organisation are dangers to be safeguarded aga<strong>in</strong>st. Specific<br />

procedures need to be followed by organisations.


It is necessary to have an elaborate workabk disaster recwery plan so that<br />

whik all preventive steps would be taken to prevent a disaster, there should be a<br />

plan to recover from the disaster, well with<strong>in</strong> the critical period, should it occur.<br />

Whik furnitures <strong>and</strong> futures would be <strong>in</strong>sured <strong>and</strong> the auditor checks the<br />

validity of the <strong>in</strong>surance pcJicy, there is generally no such procedure be<strong>in</strong>g adopted<br />

with regard to computers. Computers are at the most <strong>in</strong>sured for their actual cost.<br />

There has been no policy cowi-dered to cover the cost of develop<strong>in</strong>g the programs,<br />

cost of re-creat<strong>in</strong>g the data as also consequential loss to the bus<strong>in</strong>ess.<br />

The literature <strong>in</strong> the field of EDP audit <strong>and</strong> control is very extensive.<br />

Computerisation hav<strong>in</strong>g been <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the developed countries like USA, UK,<br />

Australia for more than five decades, the awareness for <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> the need for<br />

specific audit evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the adequacy or otherwise of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> particular<br />

<strong>environment</strong> has been <strong>in</strong> existence. Along with development of technology the<br />

<strong>controls</strong> have changed <strong>and</strong> necessarily the auditors have to keep pace with the same.<br />

SURVEY OF LITERATURE<br />

Over 50 publications, ma<strong>in</strong>ly from U.S.,U.K, Australia have been studied <strong>and</strong><br />

about 25 have been reviewed From the extent of survey conducted, surpris<strong>in</strong>gly, it<br />

is found that there has been no publication yet <strong>in</strong> India. This may be due to the fact<br />

that computerisation <strong>in</strong> our country has not been as long as <strong>in</strong> other countries to have<br />

reported cases of fraud!


None of the professional bodies <strong>in</strong> India seem to have even issued any<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ards or statemenls as nveakd by a review of the st<strong>and</strong>ards issued by the<br />

professional bodies <strong>in</strong> India.<br />

A practice manual by Brian Jenk<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Anthony] P<strong>in</strong>kney provides a<br />

practical approach to an auditor for express<strong>in</strong>g an audit op<strong>in</strong>ion on the f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

statement of companies where preparation of account<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation has been<br />

computerired Be<strong>in</strong>g a publication of a professional body, it is of particular nlevana<br />

to practis<strong>in</strong>g accountants who an perform<strong>in</strong>g audits <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong><br />

The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal objective of an audit is to ascerta<strong>in</strong> whether <strong>in</strong> his op<strong>in</strong>ion the f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

statements on which he is report<strong>in</strong>g show a true <strong>and</strong> fair view of the state of affairs.<br />

It is of importance to note the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal features of the audit approach as mentioned<br />

by the auditors. The features mentioned are:<br />

i) Each task undertaken by an auditor is a necessary part of the total work<br />

lead<strong>in</strong>g upto his report on the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement. Thus, the auditor has to<br />

concentrate his efforts <strong>in</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g these activities which would impact the<br />

truth <strong>and</strong> fairness of the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements.<br />

ii) All stages <strong>in</strong> the audit an related to each other. Thus, the audit work <strong>and</strong><br />

evaluation on <strong>controls</strong> is very closely related to the validation or verification<br />

of the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements.<br />

iii) The approach is designed to provide alternative audit procedures so as to<br />

enable most efficient audit <strong>in</strong> particular circumstances.<br />

Brian Jenk<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Anthony P<strong>in</strong>kney '%I audit approach to computers" Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

The Institute of Chartered Accountants Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales, 1978.


(iv)<br />

The approach <strong>and</strong> documentation are developed <strong>in</strong>ternationally. Howcnr, the<br />

statury requirements <strong>and</strong> policies a n based on U.K law.<br />

The kgal procedures <strong>and</strong> other statutory requirements an not nkvant to Our<br />

country. However, the fan that the auditor should underst<strong>and</strong> the account<strong>in</strong>g system<br />

<strong>and</strong> evaluate the systcrn of <strong>in</strong>ternal control <strong>and</strong> carry out functional test to satisfy<br />

himself with the <strong>controls</strong> arc <strong>in</strong> place <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g the way they should. This<br />

approach is the same whether it is a computer system or a non-computer system.<br />

Great emphasis is laid on underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> neard<strong>in</strong>g the systemThu book also<br />

recognises the usage of flow charts <strong>and</strong>/or narrative notes.<br />

While discuss<strong>in</strong>g Audit approach for evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> the audhor<br />

emphasises the fact that for an effective evaluation it is first necessary to underst<strong>and</strong><br />

the nature of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a computer system. The auditor is expected to be conversant<br />

with "user <strong>controls</strong>, programmed procedures <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity control". Programmed<br />

prwdures <strong>in</strong>clude process <strong>controls</strong>, while <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>controls</strong> are <strong>controls</strong> over<br />

programs <strong>and</strong> filer They deal with implementation procedures, program security,<br />

computer ciperations <strong>and</strong> data file security <strong>controls</strong>. As a means to evaluate <strong>controls</strong>,<br />

it is suggested that an <strong>in</strong>ternal control questionnaire based on control objectives be<br />

prepared <strong>and</strong> necessary <strong>in</strong>formation gathered It is emphasised control objectives do<br />

not change <strong>in</strong> any <strong>environment</strong>The means of achiev<strong>in</strong>g these objectives differ<br />

depend<strong>in</strong>g upon the <strong>environment</strong><br />

Chapter 1V has a detailed discussion on control program procedure. These<br />

procedures ensure that only valid transactions are processed <strong>and</strong> recorded completely<br />

<strong>and</strong> hccumtcly.


(hapter V <strong>and</strong> VI deal with <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> their evaluation The<br />

<strong>in</strong>tegrity contmls are divided <strong>in</strong>to<br />

(a)<br />

@)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

(e)<br />

Impkmcntation <strong>controls</strong><br />

Program security <strong>controls</strong><br />

Computer operation <strong>controls</strong><br />

Data fik security <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

System software<br />

Implementation <strong>controls</strong> deal with adequacy of prwdures for the programs<br />

expected to be implemented. This may consist of new programs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>clude systems<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g developed or exist<strong>in</strong>g systems <strong>and</strong> programs be<strong>in</strong>g changed. The more<br />

important of the procedures while implement<strong>in</strong>g a new system are<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

System design <strong>and</strong> program preparation<br />

Program <strong>and</strong> system test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Catalogu<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Catalogu<strong>in</strong>g is def<strong>in</strong>ed as procedures associated with mak<strong>in</strong>g the "test<br />

programs" <strong>in</strong>to live programs". Catalogu<strong>in</strong>g wil <strong>in</strong>clude both manual <strong>and</strong> software<br />

procedures. The concept of programmed security <strong>controls</strong> is discussed. These <strong>controls</strong><br />

ensure that unauthorised changes are not made to the production programs. This is<br />

of particular importance to the auditor, as an unauthorised change may be made by<br />

an <strong>in</strong>dividual so that he would benefit from the same. Example - receipt of <strong>in</strong>creased<br />

wages, excess drawal from his account balance.


Whik deal<strong>in</strong>g with mmpliana test which is refemd to 8s functional test - an<br />

exhaustive tabular statement illustrat<strong>in</strong>g a specimen test correspond<strong>in</strong>g to the nature<br />

of control is pmvided<br />

The Chapter "Audit Responsibility to <strong>in</strong>ternal control weakness" is of<br />

particular imporlance. The <strong>in</strong>itial step <strong>in</strong> the audit approach is that the auditor should<br />

be able to identify <strong>in</strong>ternal control weakness, if any, <strong>and</strong> thereafter, assess the impact<br />

of such a weakness on the hancial statement. He has to assess the materiality of<br />

such a weakness. Should the auditor decide based upon his assessment of the<br />

weakness that a material error could occur, he should take such steps as to satisfy<br />

himself whether such an error has arisen <strong>and</strong> if it has arisen, the extent of the same.<br />

This publication of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Wales drives home the po<strong>in</strong>t that a professional body has recognised the need for a<br />

different approach to audit <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from a manual<br />

system. In view of the book hav<strong>in</strong>g been published as early as <strong>in</strong> 1978, technology<br />

wise it is not upto date. However, it is of rekvancc to note that the professional body<br />

has deemed it neccrsary to publish a book of this nature to create an awareness <strong>and</strong><br />

provide guidance to the Membcn of the Institute.<br />

Objectives of Audit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> EDP <strong>environment</strong>' have been laid down as follows:-<br />

(i)<br />

To guide CPAs <strong>in</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess enterprises which use computers for<br />

record keep<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

I<br />

Gnrdon B. Davis 'Xudit<strong>in</strong>g & EDP'. New York, American Institute of Certified<br />

Public Accountants, 1968


(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

To provide a start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t for build<strong>in</strong>g a consensus of expert op<strong>in</strong>ion on an<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> practices for exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g such companies<br />

To suggest utility <strong>and</strong> applicability of different <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> methods when<br />

experiena is still lack<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

To provide soura materials for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formational purpose. It is of<br />

great importance to note that this publication is dated as early as 1968<br />

Specific mention is made of the fact that EDP does not lessen the need for<br />

an evaluation of the sptem of <strong>in</strong>ternal control. On the contrary, it appears that<br />

<strong>in</strong>creased emphasis must be given <strong>in</strong> the review of <strong>in</strong>ternal control to ascerta<strong>in</strong> that<br />

it is effective. It is pert<strong>in</strong>ent to quote that it is stated as early as <strong>in</strong> 1%8: "Computers<br />

have been commercially available for fifteen years <strong>and</strong> the recency of the major<br />

impact can be appreciated by not<strong>in</strong>g that it made <strong>in</strong> 1967 every use of all computers<br />

had betn done <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g year, the number was expected to double aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />

the succeed<strong>in</strong>g three years."<br />

This statement is very relevant to the fact that though the computers have<br />

been <strong>in</strong> existence <strong>in</strong> our country for more than 40 years <strong>in</strong> some form or the other,<br />

technological developments <strong>and</strong> usage of computers <strong>in</strong> the last ten years have more<br />

than doubled compared to that <strong>in</strong> the previous three decades. The technology<br />

referred to <strong>in</strong> the book though out-dated, the concepts are of great relevance. The<br />

<strong>in</strong>put process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> output <strong>controls</strong> are discussed at great length.<br />

In view of the technological importance <strong>in</strong> the computer medium, some of the<br />

concepts on hardware are not of relevance. However, presentation regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

programmed control over process<strong>in</strong>g, evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal control <strong>and</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g


of records <strong>and</strong> 6ks is of cumnt nkvance. Then is reference to three methods of<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> viz<br />

(a) Audit<strong>in</strong>g without computer<br />

(b) Audit<strong>in</strong>g through the computer<br />

(c) Audit<strong>in</strong>g with the computer<br />

In the current context of technological developments, <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> without the<br />

computer has no relevana. It is more appropriate to audit with the computer. In the<br />

absence of such skill <strong>and</strong> competence <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> through the computer may be<br />

acceptable st<strong>and</strong>ard for effective <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>.<br />

The questionnaire for evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal control is divided <strong>in</strong>to the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g significant paragraphs, each paragraph hav<strong>in</strong>g useful questions.<br />

(a) Background<br />

(b) Organisation<br />

(c) Control function<br />

(d) Contrnl over consol<br />

(e) Management praciices<br />

(f) Documentation<br />

(h) Program revisions<br />

(i) Hardware <strong>controls</strong><br />

fj) Control over <strong>in</strong>put <strong>and</strong> output data<br />

(k) Process control relevant to each application<br />

(1) Control over error <strong>in</strong>vestigation<br />

(m) Physical safeguards over files<br />

(n) Procedural <strong>controls</strong> for safeguard<strong>in</strong>g files


(0) Capability for fik nconstmction.<br />

The questronna<strong>in</strong> provides more than a start<strong>in</strong>g pa<strong>in</strong>t for the auditor who<br />

wishes to make a beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

The questions a n numbered as A, B, or C accord<strong>in</strong>g to the general control<br />

significance.<br />

A - represent<strong>in</strong>g con1101 element which may affect the auditor's evaluation of<br />

B -<br />

C -<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal control<br />

Control element which tends to affect data process<strong>in</strong>g safeguards, but is<br />

however not likely to affect the audit procedures<br />

Application affect<strong>in</strong>g operational effectiveness or efficiency. 'Elise G.Jancura<br />

<strong>and</strong> Robert Boos dealt with<br />

Controls <strong>in</strong> system design <strong>and</strong> development<br />

Controls <strong>in</strong> distributed <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated system.<br />

A detailed flow chan specify<strong>in</strong>g the operation, the designation of the person<br />

perform<strong>in</strong>g the operation <strong>and</strong> the process are expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> depth. Though the<br />

narration is curnbenomc, splitt<strong>in</strong>g up of the entire operations <strong>in</strong>to various <strong>in</strong>gredients<br />

<strong>and</strong> connect<strong>in</strong>g each step to the ma<strong>in</strong> flow chart is useful. The chapter on computer<br />

assisted <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> techniques deals with test data method, parallel simulation <strong>and</strong><br />

usage of other programs written for a specific purpose or generalised audit software.<br />

1. Elise G. Jancura <strong>and</strong> Robert Boos "Establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> the<br />

compuferised account<strong>in</strong>g system" New York, Van Nostr<strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>hold<br />

Company, 1981.


While this book makes an attempt <strong>in</strong> emphasis<strong>in</strong>g the need for establish<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>computerised</strong> account<strong>in</strong>g system, it does not specifically<br />

highlight the methodology to be adopted by EDP auditors.<br />

1W.Thomas Porter <strong>and</strong> William E Peny have discussed the impact of EDP<br />

on <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> control. They have discussed the concept of <strong>in</strong>formation as dist<strong>in</strong>ct<br />

from data. They have brought out the fact that one of the most difficult tasks an<br />

auditor has to perform while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> is comprehend<strong>in</strong>g the systems. Flow chart<strong>in</strong>g<br />

is one of the wry valuable tools that help the explanation of a system function. The<br />

concept of flow chart<strong>in</strong>g with detailed <strong>in</strong>structions <strong>and</strong> illustrations is well brought<br />

out. There is the problem of timel<strong>in</strong>ess. There are tendencies very often to modify<br />

the system without updat<strong>in</strong>g appropriate flow charts. This problem could be go\ over<br />

by utilis<strong>in</strong>g the facilities provided <strong>in</strong> the automatic flow-chart<strong>in</strong>g systems. Flow charts<br />

of a programme could be obta<strong>in</strong>ed froni the Source Code Statement. A specific<br />

mention is made of 'HIPO' - (Hierarchy plus Input, Process, Output) is a<br />

documentation aid. It has the ability not only to document the functions but also to<br />

show the hierarchical <strong>in</strong>ter- relationships between these two functions. This aspect is<br />

extremely useful to the auditor. The subsequent chapters deal with <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> EDP<br />

system under two categories:<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

General <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>controls</strong><br />

Application <strong>controls</strong><br />

Every system is liable to have an exposure. Exposures or risks are threats to<br />

a system. Controls are a means to reduce these risks. In a <strong>computerised</strong> system, there<br />

W.Thomas Porter <strong>and</strong> William E Peny "EDP Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g" - Third<br />

edition , Massachusetts, Kent Publish<strong>in</strong>g Company, Boston, 1981.


is conantration of duties <strong>and</strong> functions which kads to certa<strong>in</strong> mmpkety. Hena<br />

there are grcater potential for control problems'<br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istratiK <strong>controls</strong> deal with policies <strong>and</strong> procedures They cross<br />

application boundaries <strong>in</strong> view of the centralisation of the data process<strong>in</strong>g activities.<br />

There is conantration of many process<strong>in</strong>g steps In view of this,there needs to be<br />

segregation of duties specially <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>compatible functions like programm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

operation. A useful checklist for organisational control is provided. Organisation of<br />

EDP department is of utmost importance <strong>and</strong> special attention should be paid to the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

(e)<br />

System <strong>and</strong> programm<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>controls</strong><br />

Review <strong>and</strong> approval of new systems<br />

Programm<strong>in</strong>g-test<strong>in</strong>g procedurrs<br />

Programm<strong>in</strong>g-chanfc procedures<br />

Documentation st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

Thcse would ensure a high degree of process<strong>in</strong>g reliability. There should be<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards established for operat<strong>in</strong>g practices. They should <strong>in</strong>clude<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

(fj<br />

Access to computer room<br />

Library <strong>and</strong> file control st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

Data conversion st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

Physical security of files <strong>and</strong> equipment (c) Back-up facilities<br />

Passwords.<br />

WThomas Porter <strong>and</strong> William E Perry "EDP Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g" - Third<br />

edition , Massachusetts, Kent Publish<strong>in</strong>g Company, Boston, 1981.


Interest<strong>in</strong>g probkm of a live care has been presented It deals with Equity<br />

Fund<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>surance fraud.<br />

Application <strong>controls</strong> are designed to meet the specific control requirements<br />

of each process<strong>in</strong>g application. The <strong>controls</strong> are classified as preventive, detective <strong>and</strong><br />

corrective <strong>controls</strong>. Preventive <strong>controls</strong> arc congtrols which stop problems from<br />

mur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> expected to help "th<strong>in</strong>gs happen as they should". Preventive <strong>controls</strong> are<br />

located throughout the entire EDP System. These are executed before the data<br />

enters the system<br />

The more important of preventive <strong>controls</strong> as discussed' are<br />

(a) Source data authorisation<br />

(b) Data conversion<br />

(c) Turn around documents<br />

(d) Pre-numbered forms<br />

(e) Input validation<br />

(f) Controls over process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Detective <strong>controls</strong> are expected to br<strong>in</strong>g potential problems to the attention<br />

of <strong>in</strong>dividuals for appropriate action. Examples of detective <strong>controls</strong> are<br />

(a) Control Register<br />

(b) Control totals<br />

(c) Documentation <strong>and</strong> test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

(d) Labels<br />

(e) Output<br />

W.Thomas Poner <strong>and</strong> William E Perry "EDP Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g" - Third<br />

edition , Massachusetts, Kent Publish<strong>in</strong>g Company, Boston, 1981.


Corrective mntrols arise <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>and</strong> correction of cause of<br />

expower which have been detected Typical m p k s of comctive <strong>controls</strong> are<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

Audit trails<br />

Discrepancy reports<br />

Back up <strong>and</strong><br />

Recovery<br />

While discuss<strong>in</strong>g on Review <strong>and</strong> evaluation of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> EDP Audit system,<br />

it is recommended that underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> test<strong>in</strong>g of the system should be achieved<br />

through an analysis of the client's entire system of <strong>in</strong>ternal control. Once review <strong>and</strong><br />

test<strong>in</strong>g is over, it is possible to evaluate the adequacy or othenvise of the control<br />

system <strong>and</strong> make recommendations if any. There is an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g case study provided<br />

with a useful questionnaire with hypothetical answers.<br />

The audit approach when the client's use service centre is different from usage<br />

of a computer <strong>in</strong>-house. The audit approach when the client uses a service centre is<br />

discussed' A specific mention is made of advanced <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> techniques <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g test<br />

audit method, test case, system evaluation, <strong>in</strong>tegrity, test facility <strong>and</strong> parfallel<br />

simulation It is vcry well brought out that <strong>in</strong> an <strong>environment</strong> of accelerated changes<br />

<strong>in</strong> computer technology, newer <strong>and</strong> upto date <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> techniques are needed.<br />

' W.Thomas Porter <strong>and</strong> William E Peny '%DP Controla <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g" - Third<br />

edition , Massachusetts, Kent Publish<strong>in</strong>g Company, Boston, 1981.


lS.Rao Vallabhaneni, traces the importance of software <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> He mentions that 50 to 75% of the time of the system analysts <strong>and</strong><br />

programmers is spent <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the exist<strong>in</strong>g software <strong>and</strong> that more than 50%<br />

of the operat<strong>in</strong>g budget is for software. He br<strong>in</strong>gs out the fact that <strong>in</strong>spite of the<br />

abovc mentioned significant facts, auditors do not spend enough time review<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the application systems when they are <strong>in</strong> the<br />

process of k<strong>in</strong>g developed He correctly mentions that more time is spent on<br />

software development actlvitles than lor review<strong>in</strong>g software ma<strong>in</strong>tenance <strong>controls</strong>. He<br />

expla<strong>in</strong>s the difficulties faced by systems <strong>and</strong> programm<strong>in</strong>g staff who are under<br />

pressure from the users <strong>and</strong> suffer from lack of appreciation of concepts by senior<br />

management. Many a time software is developed without consider<strong>in</strong>g future<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. Very few programs <strong>and</strong> systems are developed us<strong>in</strong>g structured<br />

techniques. This results <strong>in</strong> great deal of patch work be<strong>in</strong>g done. He refers to<br />

"spaghetti code" which is diff~culto control, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>, modify or audit In view of the<br />

absence of usage of structured techniques the systems staff are constra<strong>in</strong>ed to use an<br />

adhoc approach.<br />

Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g software is a human activity which is error-prone <strong>and</strong> has a high<br />

risk Unless documentation is adequate a previously bug-free program may l<strong>and</strong> up<br />

with problems unless the modified program is thoroughly tested.<br />

The emphasis of this book is to highlight the importance of software<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance activities along with their associated risks <strong>and</strong> exposures <strong>and</strong> to provide<br />

guidance to auditors for evolv<strong>in</strong>g procedures <strong>and</strong> approaches. The focus of the book<br />

- --<br />

' S. Rao Vallabhaneni, 'Audit<strong>in</strong>g the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of software" New Jersey,<br />

Prentice-Hall Inc.1987.


is on the Internal Auditor <strong>and</strong> makes reference to SAS No.9, issued by the American<br />

Institute of Ccnificd Public Accountants - the <strong>in</strong>dependent external auditor should<br />

consider the procedures if any performed by the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />

nature, tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> extent of his own <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> procedures".<br />

Thus, it naturaliy follows that if the <strong>in</strong>ternal audit's review of software<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenana is more comprehensive, the external auditor's scope should be less<br />

comprehensive. The term software ma<strong>in</strong>tenance is used to describe all changes made<br />

to a computer program after it has been implemented <strong>in</strong> a live <strong>environment</strong> He<br />

refers to US General Account<strong>in</strong>g Offiar (GAO) Repon - Page 5, footnote :<br />

The GAO studied 15 computer sites <strong>in</strong> detail <strong>and</strong> received responses for<br />

mailed questionnaires from several hundreds. It is mentioned that though the study<br />

was relat<strong>in</strong>g to Government <strong>environment</strong>, it is equally applicable to private <strong>and</strong> public<br />

sectors. Some of the problems enumerated are:<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

(v)<br />

Software ma<strong>in</strong>tenance cells are not easily identifiable<br />

Expert user requested modifications are not always based on real need<br />

User requirements <strong>in</strong> the software development phase are not adequately<br />

def<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />

Application systems document is <strong>in</strong>adequate if not miss<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Gmputer programmer's attitude towards software ma<strong>in</strong>tenance is not<br />

enthusiastic.<br />

These po<strong>in</strong>ts are of relevance to the <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> our country also. The<br />

time <strong>and</strong> effort spent on system development phase is not always productive either<br />

because users do not def<strong>in</strong>e their requirements precisely or the systems staff decide


on thelr own on certaln requirements of the users As most of the appl~catlons are<br />

to be modified under pressure, documentation procedures are glvcn the go by<br />

Pnonty 1s for keeplng the system golng wth the modlficatlon In the ctrcumstances,<br />

the capaclty of the audltor to underst<strong>and</strong> the modlficatron <strong>and</strong> evaluate the <strong>controls</strong><br />

needs specla1 mentlon<br />

The author has d~nded the book Into three parts, the first part deallng wth<br />

ennronrnent, the second part wth control guldellnes <strong>and</strong> the th~rd one wth audit<br />

methodology; the fourth one belng on newng the future He explalns the software<br />

malntenancc 11fe cycles (SMLC) as d~stlnct from SDLC by d~vldlng the methodology<br />

Into different phases For each of the phases he lays down the ohject~ves <strong>and</strong><br />

actlntles <strong>and</strong> from the aud~tor's polnt of vlew the f<strong>in</strong>al dellverables for control revlew<br />

<strong>and</strong> flnal evaluat~on He h~ghl~ghts the polnt that aud~tors, spec~ally the ~nternal<br />

aud~tors w~th resources use for software malntenance are adequate <strong>and</strong> that they are<br />

used effectively <strong>and</strong> efficiently He hlghl~ghts In chapter IV that the audltor needs to<br />

be aware of what can go wrong m software malntenance, he hlghl~ghts three types<br />

of control, nz preventive, detectwe <strong>and</strong> correctlve wh~ch could prevent ~rregularlt~es<br />

<strong>and</strong> omlsslons dunng ,oftware malntenance He provldes a table of aud~tools <strong>and</strong><br />

techniques - use matrut<br />

The bwk 1s an excellent treatlse of the procedure to be followed In an Ideal<br />

srtuatlon Whlle 11 may not be possible to grve an deal, a readlng of the book by an<br />

aud~tor creates an awareness of the really of the problem <strong>and</strong> posslble practical steps<br />

he should take to ensure adequate <strong>controls</strong> are Introduced In the software<br />

rnatntenance phases


Technology is advanc<strong>in</strong>g important supportive functions that protect the<br />

technology from <strong>in</strong>tentional losses is not keep<strong>in</strong>g pace.' He makes reference to the<br />

systems auditability <strong>and</strong> control reports produced by Stanford Research Institute<br />

International of 1977 <strong>and</strong> observes that <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> which is an important supportive<br />

function is lagg<strong>in</strong>g far beh<strong>in</strong>d. In view of the auditors lack of sufficient knowledge of<br />

the technology, he is constra<strong>in</strong>ed to rely on the trustworth<strong>in</strong>ess of computers,<br />

computer programmers, operators <strong>and</strong> other computer staff. An auditor is expected<br />

to be <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>in</strong> attitude <strong>and</strong> appearance <strong>and</strong> the dependence of the auditor on<br />

data process<strong>in</strong>g staff is violative of basic audit pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. The author has very<br />

relevantly mentioned that the auditors perform<strong>in</strong>g their function <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> have realised that they have to acquire necessary skills to perform their<br />

lobs competently. Similarly, data process<strong>in</strong>g management are realis<strong>in</strong>g the need <strong>and</strong><br />

value of the services of the auditors who evaluate the adequacy of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. The book which has the focus on creat<strong>in</strong>g an awareness<br />

<strong>in</strong> the management of organisations which have <strong>in</strong>troduced computers deals with the<br />

subject <strong>in</strong> a non-technical manner. The authors make special reference to transmittal<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um 1 circular Ail1 on security of federal automated <strong>in</strong>formation systems<br />

issued by the US office of management. This memor<strong>and</strong>um establishes a<br />

comprehensive policy regard<strong>in</strong>g establishment of computer security programmes <strong>in</strong><br />

all non-defence computer centres also. The objective is to establish of procedures for<br />

adopt<strong>in</strong>g security st<strong>and</strong>ards, a requirement for security <strong>in</strong> all hardware <strong>and</strong> software<br />

procurements, guidance on conduct<strong>in</strong>g risk analysis, perform<strong>in</strong>g security audits,<br />

develop<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>gency plans <strong>and</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g personnel security policies.<br />

' Donn P.Parker1.k1onogers guide to Cornpuler&cutity". Reston, Virg<strong>in</strong>ia, Reston<br />

Publish<strong>in</strong>g Company Inc., A Prentice-Hall Company 1981.


'Ihis memor<strong>and</strong>um is considered a mile-stone for computer security even as<br />

early as 1978 One whole section is devoted to the nature of computer security. A<br />

useful table giv<strong>in</strong>g details of various types of security areas to be safeguarded <strong>and</strong><br />

how it could be safeguarded are expla<strong>in</strong>ed lucidly. Concepts of risks <strong>and</strong> threats an<br />

expla<strong>in</strong>ed The author 1s of the op<strong>in</strong>ion that what may appear as accidental <strong>and</strong><br />

un<strong>in</strong>tentional acts may not <strong>in</strong> reality be so. He drives home the po<strong>in</strong>t that one should<br />

be prepared for the worst <strong>and</strong> provide adequate security functions. While discuss<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the aspect of detterance which would be a preventive measure for the likelihood of<br />

security violations, the author makes special reference to audit. He very pert<strong>in</strong>ently<br />

po<strong>in</strong>ts out "one of the greatest values of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> is detterence". The aspects of<br />

preventive, detective, recovery <strong>and</strong> corrective <strong>controls</strong> are discussed with<br />

effectiveness. The importance of cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>and</strong> back up plans is discussed <strong>in</strong> detail.<br />

While discuss<strong>in</strong>g the recovery issues, the factors to be taken particular care of are<br />

mentioned as<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

Stafllng : the safety of people is of primary concern<br />

Facilities <strong>and</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g site : consider<strong>in</strong>g the risk factors <strong>in</strong> the<br />

neighbourhood of computer room is of immense importance.<br />

Utilities : automatic local telephone switch<strong>in</strong>g centres or automative<br />

underground cables would affect on- t<strong>in</strong>e systems. These need to be protected<br />

to the same extent as computer or power supply or air-condition<strong>in</strong>g<br />

equipment. Other important factors Iik documentation st<strong>and</strong>ards, stor<strong>in</strong>g of<br />

production programs, operation system utilities, <strong>and</strong> data <strong>in</strong> a place away from<br />

the ma<strong>in</strong> operation which are mentioned are helpful. The book deals also with<br />

security factors for a computer site selection.


The aspect of earthquake which seems a theoratical conapt <strong>in</strong> our country<br />

has been considered as a possible reality by the author <strong>and</strong> guidance provided.<br />

Suggestion regard<strong>in</strong>g consult<strong>in</strong>g geologists are made.<br />

There is an exclusive chapter on computer security <strong>and</strong> the law, malt<strong>in</strong>g special<br />

reference to the k'rivacy Act of 1974 <strong>and</strong> the Foreign Practias Act of 1977.<br />

Section 3 of the book deals with computer security program <strong>and</strong> deals <strong>in</strong> great<br />

detail on the follow<strong>in</strong>g subjects.<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

Identification <strong>and</strong> valuation of assets<br />

Identification of threats <strong>and</strong> risk assessment<br />

While deal<strong>in</strong>g with safeguards, special mention is made ofauditability. It<br />

mentions that safeguards must be testable for the purpose of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> its performance<br />

<strong>and</strong> compliance with specifications. While illustrat<strong>in</strong>g this po<strong>in</strong>t, an example is glven<br />

of an auditor visit<strong>in</strong>g a data process<strong>in</strong>g facility <strong>and</strong> ask<strong>in</strong>g to be shown recovery from<br />

remote back- up files. The EDP department sent a vehicle to collect the back-up<br />

files, programs <strong>and</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stmctions. It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>gly reported that at this<br />

po<strong>in</strong>t, the test was term<strong>in</strong>ated because if all the back up materials were returned to<br />

the computer centre, there will be no back up material at the remote site. This lead<br />

to the organisation hav<strong>in</strong>g two copies at the back-up site.<br />

While conclud<strong>in</strong>g that EDP <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> is an important activity for computer<br />

security, it is mentioned that <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> tools <strong>and</strong> techniques must be considered as one<br />

of the most important safeguards. An <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g matrix on EDP audit tools by<br />

occupation applicability is reveal<strong>in</strong>g.


"M<strong>in</strong>o computer security, auditabiiity <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong>" deals with the subject io<br />

three parts.'<br />

1. Microcomputers <strong>in</strong> general<br />

Z St<strong>and</strong>-alone microcomputer systems <strong>and</strong><br />

3. Micros connected to ma<strong>in</strong>frame systems.<br />

In Part I while deal<strong>in</strong>g generally with micro computers, the book provida<br />

statistics from a report regard<strong>in</strong>g the growth of micro computers. He quotes th<br />

market has gone from US $ 200 million <strong>in</strong> sales to a projected 426 billion dollars <strong>in</strong><br />

sales <strong>in</strong> 1983. In 1983 about one million units were sold <strong>and</strong> it is expected that 45<br />

million units may be sold by 1986 or 1987.<br />

A tabular statement provid<strong>in</strong>g !he prevail<strong>in</strong>g character~it~cs <strong>and</strong> associated<br />

threats are illustrated. Among the prevail<strong>in</strong>g character~vlics the follow<strong>in</strong>g are<br />

mentioned :<br />

* Prolifiration of application development<br />

* Staff limitation<br />

* Applications software<br />

Hardware<br />

Vendor system software, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> practices<br />

Physical <strong>environment</strong>s, file <strong>and</strong> media storage outside<br />

Uunauthorised access.<br />

' Javier F.Kuong, Gerald I. Isaacson, Chester M. W<strong>in</strong>ters "Microcomputer security.<br />

auditability <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong>" Wellesley Hills, Mass. Management Advisory<br />

Publications. 1985.


Under each of these heads, the conditions that are prevalent <strong>in</strong> a micro<br />

computer <strong>environment</strong> are discussed with the associated threat A detailed read<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of the above threats focuses attention on the fact that there is a clear need to have<br />

a well formulated set of control objectives with effective safeguards which provides<br />

solutions for a secure use of the microcomputers.<br />

Chapter 3 of the book deals with auditability considerations. A useful table<br />

giv<strong>in</strong>g the prevail<strong>in</strong>g condition <strong>and</strong> the correspond<strong>in</strong>g <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> concerns <strong>and</strong><br />

considerations is provided. To sum up, the problem generally faced by auditors are<br />

(1) When same application is processed on different computers, how is the<br />

<strong>in</strong>tegrity of the application to be decided unless all the units are aud~ted.<br />

(2) With paucity of staff, there is no seperation of duties.<br />

(3) Audit trails may be lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> view of lack of facility for logg<strong>in</strong>g. When<br />

software packages are developeJ lack of documentation exists. Information<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g what types of error h<strong>and</strong>l<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong> are <strong>in</strong>cluded is not easily<br />

available. The author proceeds to deal with the control system divid<strong>in</strong>g it to<br />

three zones as follows:<br />

(1) General <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>controls</strong><br />

(2) Micro computer system<br />

(3) Micro computer software<br />

follows :<br />

While deal<strong>in</strong>g with connected micro systems he deals under three zones as<br />

(a)<br />

@)<br />

(c)<br />

Data communication<br />

Micro computer<br />

Ma<strong>in</strong>frame penetration by Hack<strong>in</strong>g


The fact that security <strong>and</strong> protection of micro computers is as important if not<br />

more important as the security of log system is emphasised. While deal<strong>in</strong>g with<br />

general aspects of micro computer security, software <strong>and</strong> data <strong>in</strong>tegrity issues of<br />

concern are mentioned as follows:-<br />

* Who can excess the micros<br />

To what extent can they access<br />

How is the data protected from the unauthorised distribution<br />

* What is the possibility of loss of critical data<br />

How is data <strong>in</strong>tegrity to be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

What is the possibility of <strong>in</strong>trusion from outsiders.<br />

What steps are to be taken for ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>uity of operations.<br />

The book provides<br />

(1) sound framework for deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>and</strong> security <strong>controls</strong><br />

(2) An overall coverage of security auditability <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong><br />

(3) Acomplete set of management policies <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards for management control<br />

of this new technology<br />

(4) A comprehensive list of control objectives, control techniques for different<br />

types of micro computen.<br />

A set of specific objectives along with a list of specific control techniques<br />

which would meet the control objective are mentioned.'<br />

' Javier F. Kuong "ControLs for Advoncedlon- Z<strong>in</strong>elData-base systems", Part 1 <strong>and</strong><br />

Pan 2 - 44, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Street, Wellesley Hills, Mass.02181, Management Advisory<br />

Publications, 1983.


The author discusses as to what k<strong>in</strong>d of control the designer <strong>and</strong> the auditor<br />

should consider to build security <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>in</strong> the advanced on l<strong>in</strong>e systems. He<br />

also deals with audit approaches <strong>and</strong> techniques which would effectively <strong>and</strong><br />

efficiently audit <strong>and</strong> review the systems. A tabular statement dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g the various<br />

features of the systems with the respective implications of such a feature are well<br />

brought out While deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong>, the author classifies <strong>in</strong>tegrity under<br />

four categories:<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

Accuracy<br />

Securitylprivaq<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>uity<br />

Environment<br />

(9<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

(v)<br />

(vi)<br />

(W<br />

(viii)<br />

The author divides the control zones under 8 heads:<br />

Data entry<br />

Data communication<br />

Systems <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> general <strong>controls</strong><br />

On l<strong>in</strong>e application programs<br />

Data base<br />

Data base adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />

Environmental software<br />

Data base control zones <strong>and</strong> audit base development st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

Under each of these heads, the author deals with the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

General control objectives<br />

Various control po<strong>in</strong>ts


(iii)<br />

Under each of the control po<strong>in</strong>ts, the control objective <strong>and</strong> the correspond<strong>in</strong>g<br />

control techniques a n discussed <strong>in</strong> detail. The two pans of the book conta<strong>in</strong><br />

a precise presentation of the entire subject<br />

Computer Security<br />

Keith Heamdcn' presents a collection of 14 anicles on computer crime <strong>and</strong><br />

people, computer crime <strong>in</strong> the 1980r, risk management <strong>and</strong> computer security. While<br />

all the articles have special reference to the accepted procedures for security<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance, there is narration of live cases of crimes committed on computer. The<br />

importance of these article is that computer crimes <strong>and</strong> frauds are not academic<br />

issues, but are realities which have been perpetrated <strong>in</strong> most cases by computer<br />

literates. This has been possible by penetrat<strong>in</strong>g the vulnerable po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the control<br />

systems of computers.<br />

Security is the <strong>in</strong>tegral part of the design <strong>and</strong> implementation of an<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation system. V.P.Lane2 <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>gly br<strong>in</strong>gs out the fact because that <strong>in</strong> many<br />

<strong>in</strong>stances security <strong>in</strong>volves cost, the decision of the management may be to ignore<br />

certa<strong>in</strong> security requirements, consider<strong>in</strong>g only the cost factor, He highlights the fact<br />

that good security must be built <strong>in</strong>to the system software before <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />

applications are designed. He deals with physical security <strong>and</strong> data security. While<br />

discuss<strong>in</strong>g physical security, he classified it under two major heads viz(1) protection<br />

Keith Hearnden, A H<strong>and</strong>book ofComputer Security Centre for Ertension<br />

Studies. bughborough University.<br />

' V.P.Lane "Security of Computer Based Information' Systems-Houndmills,<br />

Bas<strong>in</strong>gstoke, Hampshire, Macmillan Education Ltd., 1985.


aga<strong>in</strong>st natural disasters like flood <strong>and</strong> fire (2) protection aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>truders. Under the<br />

head natural disasters, he places special importance to fire <strong>and</strong> discusses at length the<br />

advantages <strong>and</strong> disadvantages of carbon-di-oxide as aga<strong>in</strong>st Halon <strong>and</strong> water<br />

spr<strong>in</strong>klers.<br />

While discuss<strong>in</strong>g access control <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>truders, he highlights three ways of<br />

controll<strong>in</strong>g access.<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

By us<strong>in</strong>g receptionist <strong>and</strong> security officers<br />

By us<strong>in</strong>g mechanical devices such as locks <strong>and</strong> keys<br />

Electronic systems us<strong>in</strong>g identity cardslcard readers<br />

A systematic approach is necessary if a realistic plan for physical security has<br />

to be evolved.The author stresses the view that the management must assess what<br />

they are try<strong>in</strong>g to prevent <strong>and</strong> protect. To achieve this, he suggests the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

shouldbe performed :-<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

Identify undesirable events<br />

Evaluate physical threats <strong>and</strong> the probability of such an event occur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Estimate possible loss to which the computer/premises are exposed<br />

The expected annual loss.<br />

While discuss<strong>in</strong>g data security, it is stated that it could be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed by four<br />

k<strong>in</strong>ds of control viz<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

Access<br />

Information flow<br />

Inference<br />

Criptographic <strong>controls</strong>.


The author stresses the po<strong>in</strong>t that while these methods can reduce danger of<br />

compromise of data, they cannot totally elim<strong>in</strong>ate the possibility. The security role of<br />

components of computer configurations is highlighted by each of the aspects of<br />

hardware, systems software etc While discuss<strong>in</strong>g the system software i.e. the<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system, its security functions are classified under two heads vir Implicit<br />

security function <strong>and</strong> Explicit security functions. Under Implicit security functions are<br />

<strong>in</strong>cluded those security features that manage <strong>and</strong> control the system resources <strong>and</strong><br />

application programs. The explicit function <strong>in</strong>clude su~eilance <strong>and</strong> identification,<br />

access control <strong>and</strong> isolation. The chapter deal<strong>in</strong>g with people <strong>and</strong> security highlights<br />

the fact that sometimes the position of power exercised by a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>in</strong>dividual like<br />

system adm<strong>in</strong>istrator is both a weakness <strong>and</strong> a strength. He suggests remedial<br />

measures as<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

Job rotation<br />

Supervision by a superior<br />

Journalis<strong>in</strong>g i.e. record<strong>in</strong>g request from the adm<strong>in</strong>istrator or log to facilitate<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>e the log for unauthorised activities.<br />

Security aspects of the operation of computer facilities <strong>in</strong>clude tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />

computer operators, library management system as also short term recovely<br />

procedures. It is emphasised that management must highlight the fact that security<br />

is needed even dur<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>e operat<strong>in</strong>g of the system, to make the effort of plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

overall security aspects a success. Special topics like privacy <strong>and</strong> data protection<br />

legislation <strong>and</strong> protection of proprietary software are discussed. The author concludes<br />

that software is currency; It is essential that those who provide the currency are<br />

protected from counterfeit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> duplicity.


Chapter 11 of the book deals with a number of real life <strong>in</strong>cidents Amongst<br />

more <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g cases are that of a supervisor of a payments department <strong>in</strong> a local<br />

authority <strong>in</strong> London. He found a method of creat<strong>in</strong>g false documents. This resulted<br />

<strong>in</strong> a loss of approximately 40,000 pounds. Yet another case deals with how an<br />

executive officer utilised the <strong>computerised</strong> salary system to defraud health authority.<br />

A novel, yet a case of great conarn is where computer personnel stole the computer<br />

files <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>ed ransome for restor<strong>in</strong>g them. Fortunately, the culprits were caught<br />

The last case reported is regard<strong>in</strong>g a boiler explosion which destroyed the computer<br />

office site. The author concludes that the misfortune did not become a calamity<br />

because of the cont<strong>in</strong>gency plans of the company. The 1981 survey <strong>and</strong> the 1984<br />

survey regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g theft <strong>and</strong> misuse are very reveal<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

James Arl<strong>in</strong> Cooper' discusses early development <strong>and</strong> <strong>environment</strong>al aspects<br />

under the follow<strong>in</strong>g heads:<br />

* Physical security<br />

* Personnel security<br />

* Regulatory security<br />

Hardware security<br />

Software network security.<br />

Each of these <strong>environment</strong>s are discussed <strong>in</strong> great detail under various heads<br />

of prevention, detention <strong>and</strong> correction. It is of impurtance to note that a mention<br />

is made of the computer Act of 1987. The Act requires the establishment of security<br />

'<br />

James Arl<strong>in</strong> Coo~rNCompukr<strong>and</strong> Communications Security Strategies for the<br />

1990s". New ~brk, ~c&aw- ill Book Campany, 1221 c venue of the Americas,<br />

1989.


st<strong>and</strong>ards for Civilian agency computers <strong>and</strong> communication sperns. The author<br />

makes a comparative study of the regulatory requirements <strong>in</strong> different countries like<br />

UK, Canada, France <strong>and</strong> Sweden A read<strong>in</strong>g of these legislations <strong>and</strong> their<br />

development makes one realise that other countries from their experience have found<br />

that legislations arc neassary which makes us to th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>in</strong> view of the wide<br />

computerisation, it would not be too long before our country also feels the need.<br />

While discuss<strong>in</strong>g the software security <strong>environment</strong>, the author highlights the fact that<br />

the verification of system security features <strong>and</strong> system security performance can best<br />

bc achieved only by EDP auditor function. In the author's words,"EDP audit, if<br />

properly done, gives additional <strong>in</strong>sigh4 identi@ signals that po<strong>in</strong>t out security,<br />

weaknesses or failures <strong>and</strong> helps prevent security by-passes result<strong>in</strong>g from collusion!'<br />

He even goes to the extent of mention<strong>in</strong>g that a 30 million fraud which he dis( hisses<br />

<strong>in</strong> his book was possible because audit procedures were relared. He discusses<br />

amongst others 14 tools <strong>and</strong> techniques <strong>and</strong> concludes that audit procedures give a<br />

degree of protection aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>tentional attacks. They make a perpetrator's job<br />

difficult as the chances of detection are high. While discuss<strong>in</strong>g the current<br />

perspectives of computer security, he highlight^ the security strength by discuss<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

encryption techniques <strong>and</strong> also docs not lose sight of the negative side of the security<br />

i.e. weakness. The problems of controll<strong>in</strong>g access uniformly <strong>and</strong> reliably over widely<br />

dispersed locations is difficult. The author discusses the research perpespectives of<br />

the 1990s as also the outlook for the 1991s.


DISASTFX RECOVERY PLWNING<br />

The need for plann<strong>in</strong>g for disaster recovery <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong><br />

is expla<strong>in</strong>ed' The three areas of exposure that the management needs to review as<br />

described by the author arc f<strong>in</strong>ancial loss, legal responsibility <strong>and</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />

<strong>in</strong>terruption<br />

Part I deals with management considerations. A detailed questionnaire deals<br />

with disaster recovery priority concerns of management under the heads:<br />

(1) Staff protection <strong>and</strong> actions<br />

(2) Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of customer services <strong>and</strong><br />

(3) Cash flow ma<strong>in</strong>tenance.<br />

(4) Vital documi.nts protection<br />

(5) Facilities equipments,<br />

(6) Programs <strong>and</strong><br />

(7) Supplies.<br />

A reference is made to three levels of security <strong>and</strong> disaster recovery measures<br />

viz m<strong>and</strong>atory measures, necessary measures <strong>and</strong> desirable.<br />

M<strong>and</strong>atory measures are those needed by law. Necessary measures are those<br />

reasonable precautions which need to be taken.<br />

The desirable measures although necessary are not needed to be implemented<br />

as immediately as m<strong>and</strong>atory measures. Desirable measures are implemented as <strong>and</strong><br />

' The Chantico Series, ''Disaster Recovery Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Program<br />

Eualuation". Massachusetts, QED Information Sciences Inc. 1985.


when circumstances permit A cost benefit analysis is made tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to consideration<br />

the perceived <strong>and</strong> desirable needs.<br />

The second pan deals with conduct<strong>in</strong>g the review programme. It is considered<br />

necessary to establish disaster recovery review objectives. The first <strong>and</strong> foremost, the<br />

types of disaster need to bc identified followed by identify<strong>in</strong>g the areas which may be<br />

impacted by a disaster. It is necessary to review the disaster recovery <strong>controls</strong>. A<br />

useful workshop concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal back up site, checklist is very educative. A<br />

specimen typical agreement with time brokers vir those who would f<strong>in</strong>d another site<br />

that a company can use <strong>in</strong> the event of a disaster is <strong>in</strong>formative. The author gives<br />

procedure for test<strong>in</strong>g the disaster recovery programme <strong>and</strong> classifies the test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to,<br />

static test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> dynamic test<strong>in</strong>g. Ht: deals with different techniques for test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

giver the base for select<strong>in</strong>g the appropriate technique. The basis for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

basis for disaster recovery test are discussed. The importunt aspect regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>surance coverage is highlighted. The fact that extra <strong>in</strong>surance is needed on back<br />

up site is also mentioned.The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of <strong>in</strong>surance coverage, as is wellknown, is to<br />

transfer the risk of major loss to another organisation. There should be a competent<br />

person for decid<strong>in</strong>g the degree of risk to be <strong>in</strong>sured. It is recommended that the<br />

cover should be for each class of equipment, records, media, mention<strong>in</strong>g their<br />

replacement costs <strong>and</strong> actual cash value. The po<strong>in</strong>ts to be considered while discuss<strong>in</strong>g<br />

with the <strong>in</strong>surance manager <strong>in</strong>clude also extra emergency expense, third party liability,<br />

revenue bear<strong>in</strong>g data. The extra emergency expenses <strong>in</strong>clude rental of temporary<br />

facilities, back-up equipment, mov<strong>in</strong>g cost, tempor.iry <strong>in</strong>surance cost. The third party<br />

liability arises only <strong>in</strong> the case of service bureaus. The example of revenue bear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

data would be the data regard<strong>in</strong>g the outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g balances. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the test<strong>in</strong>g of


the disaster recovery program would be the procedure to evaluate the DRP. Various<br />

concerns <strong>and</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ions regard<strong>in</strong>g the adequacy of the disaster recovery programme<br />

need to be formed This op<strong>in</strong>ion is to be supported by sufficient evidence colketed<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g the review process. It is necessary to evaluate each concern <strong>in</strong>dividually <strong>and</strong><br />

then the totality of the <strong>in</strong>dividual evaluations should be reviewed <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g a f<strong>in</strong>al<br />

judgment A useful guidel<strong>in</strong>e regard<strong>in</strong>g writ<strong>in</strong>g disaster report is provided. It is<br />

recommended that it should have the follow<strong>in</strong>g chapters-<br />

(i) Management summary<br />

(ii) Scope of review<br />

(iii) Background<br />

(iv) F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

(v) Op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />

(n) Its impact of op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />

(vii) Recommendation.<br />

Robert R. Moellerl deals with computer audit, control <strong>and</strong> security aspects<br />

<strong>in</strong> a computcrised <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> the appropriate audit methodology. The <strong>controls</strong><br />

are considered under the follow<strong>in</strong>g three <strong>environment</strong>s viz<br />

(1) large computer centre,<br />

(2) m<strong>in</strong>i micro computer centres <strong>and</strong><br />

(3) distributed network.<br />

In Section 2, he deals with <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> data process<strong>in</strong>g applications. He deals with<br />

the methodology to be obsemd <strong>in</strong> select<strong>in</strong>g applications for review. He describes the<br />

' Robert R.Moeller, "Computer Audit, Control <strong>and</strong> Security" United States of<br />

America, John Wiky & Sons, 1989.


procedures to be followed Different test<strong>in</strong>g techniques <strong>and</strong> methods of evidence<br />

gather<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a paper kss <strong>environment</strong> arc discussed. The author emphasises the need<br />

for the auditor's role <strong>in</strong> review<strong>in</strong>g new applications <strong>and</strong> their development.<br />

In Section 3 he emphasises the need for<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

physical security<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation security <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong><br />

an effective disaster recovery plan.<br />

There is a special chapter on audit <strong>and</strong> control of end-user comput<strong>in</strong>g. The<br />

many forms of end-user comput<strong>in</strong>g, the <strong>controls</strong> associated with end-user comput<strong>in</strong>g<br />

are discussed. The author provides a list of control objectivvs <strong>and</strong> proccdures for<br />

review<strong>in</strong>g various <strong>controls</strong>. The tabular statements are extremely useful <strong>and</strong> are <strong>in</strong><br />

detail. The auditor can make a ready reference to anyone situation <strong>in</strong> which he may<br />

be placed <strong>and</strong> immediately have anexhaustive checklist. The author has provided this<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation also on a diskette. This can be used on an IBM PC This enables the<br />

auditor to carry the floppy <strong>and</strong> have a ready reference to the list immediately <strong>in</strong> any<br />

of the client's offices. The author discusses the successful modern <strong>in</strong>ternal audit<br />

function. He is of the view that an audit professional of the future would have to<br />

have strengths <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial, operational <strong>and</strong> computer <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. He concedes that<br />

while it is an ideal situation, an <strong>in</strong>dividual who possess all the qualifications may not<br />

be immediately available. His remarks are very significant. His description represents<br />

the audit of the future <strong>in</strong> the modern organisation <strong>and</strong> it should be .<strong>in</strong> audit<br />

organisation's goal to build personnel with these skills. He adds, that there is<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>ued need for special techniques for computer audit <strong>in</strong> new of the technical<br />

<strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> the organisation. While describ<strong>in</strong>g the audit department of the future,


he states that "the computer auditor specialist of today who spends much time<br />

look<strong>in</strong>g at the general <strong>controls</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the computer operations area docs not get <strong>in</strong>to<br />

user areas to evolve application <strong>controls</strong>, <strong>and</strong> assess possible risks, runs the danger<br />

of becom<strong>in</strong>g obselele <strong>in</strong> the era of modern data process<strong>in</strong>g procedure. The auditor<br />

should denlop f<strong>in</strong>ancial - or operational audit skills, as well as computer <strong>and</strong> audit<br />

skills to operate as the organisation's auditor of the future". This statement of the<br />

author takes <strong>in</strong>to consideration that the present day auditor is ;able to evaluate the<br />

general <strong>controls</strong>!<br />

It is of significance to note that <strong>in</strong> our country auditors are not even able to<br />

evaluate the general <strong>controls</strong>. In view of the wide gap of the expectation of the audit<br />

department of the future, <strong>in</strong> the present position <strong>in</strong> our country there needs to be<br />

realisation about tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g auditors to atta<strong>in</strong> better skills <strong>and</strong> competence to really<br />

operate as organisation's auditors of the future.<br />

William C Mair, Donald R.Wwd <strong>and</strong> Keagle W.Davisl have made a very<br />

comprehensive presentation of the various aspects of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

en\,ironment. The matrix presentation is the highlight of the book. There are four<br />

matrixes as follows:<br />

' William C.Mair, Donald R.Wood <strong>and</strong> Keagle W.Davis "Computer Control <strong>and</strong><br />

Audit" M<strong>in</strong>neapolis, M<strong>in</strong>nesota, Touche Ross & Co., 1978.


Application aMtml evnlnation table<br />

It dealswith application causes of exposures under the heads <strong>in</strong>put, process<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

output <strong>and</strong> others. For each of these muses, preventive, detective <strong>and</strong> corrective<br />

<strong>controls</strong> an considered.<br />

System development wntml evaluation table<br />

Under the causes of exposure, it deals with <strong>in</strong>compkte economic evaluation,<br />

management abdication, <strong>in</strong>adequate specifications, system design errors, <strong>in</strong>competent<br />

personnel, unmanageable application etc The <strong>controls</strong> aga<strong>in</strong> are classified under<br />

preventive, detective <strong>and</strong> corrective <strong>controls</strong>. The reliance on <strong>controls</strong> are classified<br />

as<br />

(1) useful but not especially effective<br />

(2) control cause but should be accompanied by additional <strong>controls</strong><br />

(3) Reliable <strong>controls</strong><br />

Computer abuse wntml evaluation table<br />

The abuse is classified under object tool <strong>and</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>controls</strong><br />

aga<strong>in</strong> are classified as preventive detective <strong>and</strong> corrective.<br />

The last table deals with <strong>in</strong>formation process<strong>in</strong>g facility control evaluation.<br />

Causes of Infomation Press<strong>in</strong>g Facility exposures are classified as human errors,<br />

hardware defects - software failures, computer abuse <strong>and</strong> catastrophy. The <strong>controls</strong><br />

are classifred under the heads preventive, detective <strong>and</strong> corrective. The authors have


achieved the objective of help<strong>in</strong>g the auditors to underst<strong>and</strong> as to what is meant by<br />

adequate control <strong>in</strong> data process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

Mr.Per Br<strong>in</strong>ch Hansen' provides a oveniew of operat<strong>in</strong>g systems <strong>and</strong> gives<br />

a technical description thereafter of the various aspects of the operation system.<br />

Ignor<strong>in</strong>g the technical contenf it provides a good underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the concept of an<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>and</strong> its capabilities <strong>and</strong> how it works.<br />

William E. Perry2 divides the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation system function <strong>in</strong>to 30<br />

tasks <strong>and</strong> classifies them under the follow<strong>in</strong>g functions:<br />

* Scop<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>environment</strong><br />

Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>formation system<br />

' Identify<strong>in</strong>g the audit risk<br />

Identify<strong>in</strong>g the audit evidences<br />

* Identify<strong>in</strong>g key control po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

' ldentify<strong>in</strong>g control weaknesses<br />

* Verify<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the computer files<br />

Conduct<strong>in</strong>g the audit <strong>and</strong> conclud<strong>in</strong>g the audit.<br />

The relevant tasks under each of these functions are discussed <strong>in</strong> great detail.<br />

The author provides an approach for audit of <strong>in</strong>formation systems by concentrat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

on the bus<strong>in</strong>ess process<strong>in</strong>g sections of <strong>in</strong>formation system. The analytical approach<br />

' Per Br<strong>in</strong>ch Hansen, "Operat<strong>in</strong>g System Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples", New Delhi, India, Prentice-Hall<br />

of India Private Limited, 1990.<br />

William E. Perry Yudit<strong>in</strong>g Information Systems - A step-by-step audit<br />

approach. Carol Stream, ED? Auditors Foundat~on, 1983.


is of immense use <strong>and</strong> this approach has been adopted by me <strong>in</strong> my questionnaire<br />

<strong>and</strong> discussion with the auditors.<br />

S.Rao Vallabhaneni,' while <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g the concept of software development<br />

process, presents both the management <strong>and</strong> the auditors concern over software. He<br />

discusses <strong>in</strong> detail the problems <strong>and</strong> issues that arise <strong>in</strong> development of application<br />

system whether it be developed <strong>in</strong>-house or by outsiders. He clarifies the<br />

responsibility of the senior management, data process<strong>in</strong>g management <strong>and</strong> the<br />

end-user <strong>in</strong> relation to the software development problems <strong>and</strong> issues. The fact that<br />

the auditor especially the <strong>in</strong>urnal auditor has a specific responsibility with regard to<br />

the software development process is highlighted The author discusses the audit<br />

strategies <strong>and</strong> the control guidel<strong>in</strong>es. He discusses <strong>in</strong> detail the audit methodology <strong>in</strong><br />

the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas.<br />

* Plann<strong>in</strong>g phase requirements,<br />

Design,<br />

* Programm<strong>in</strong>&<br />

' Test<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

* Conversion,<br />

' Post implementation.<br />

He concludes that if an <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> is undertaken of the software development,<br />

the chances of its be<strong>in</strong>g usable, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>able, auditable, controllable <strong>and</strong> securable<br />

are very high. The author discusses 15 case studies <strong>in</strong> different <strong>environment</strong>s. Under<br />

each of these case studies, he describes the system audit scope <strong>and</strong> objectives <strong>and</strong><br />

I<br />

S.Rao Vallabhaneni, "Audit<strong>in</strong>g Software Development - A manual with case<br />

Studies", New York, John Wiley & Sons 1990.


!itdiy mentions audit f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> ncommendations While summaris<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

of the 15 case studies, he concludes that lcnowlcdge of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> software development<br />

when practiced properly would make organisations more aware of system <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

<strong>and</strong> security <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

Michael A Murph) <strong>and</strong> Xenia Ley Parker1 of Coopers Lybr<strong>and</strong>, International<br />

authorities on EDP Audit<strong>in</strong>g deal with the impact of EDP on Audit<strong>in</strong>g as also the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation technology concepts. The entire book is written with the auditor <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d<br />

Even technical aspects an discussed <strong>in</strong> great detail <strong>in</strong> a manner which can be<br />

understood by an auditor. In their chapter of <strong>in</strong>formation systems, they deal with<br />

bus<strong>in</strong>ess systems to enable the auditors as also the technical personnel to get an<br />

oveniew of a computer application systems. A special chapter deals with application<br />

<strong>controls</strong>.The authors deal with methods for document<strong>in</strong>g systems <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g usage of<br />

flow charts.While discuss<strong>in</strong>g audit of systems development, they highlight the practice<br />

<strong>and</strong> methodologies to be adopted Then is a special chapter on End-user comput<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

It is of immense importance to ow current scenario with the proliferation of personal<br />

wmputcn The authors discuss the management risks <strong>and</strong> issues as also user control<br />

<strong>and</strong> risk While discuss<strong>in</strong>g the applications of end-user's, they make spccilic<br />

referena to usage of spreadsheets, <strong>and</strong> the associated risks <strong>and</strong> the specific <strong>controls</strong><br />

to be used. The auditors' role <strong>in</strong> end-user comput<strong>in</strong>g is discussed <strong>and</strong> a view is<br />

expressed that the auditor should evaluate the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g risk areas :-<br />

Software <strong>and</strong> data <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

Back-up <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

' Michael A Murphy <strong>and</strong> Xenia Ley Parker "H<strong>and</strong> book of EDPAudit<strong>in</strong>g" Coopers<br />

Lybr<strong>and</strong>, Boston, Massachussets, Warren, Gorharn & Lamong Inc. 1989.


Auditabiity<br />

Multi-user micro computer<br />

Communication security<br />

Controls <strong>in</strong> wMce bureau arc also discussed There is specific reference to<br />

third party review of se~vice bureau. Z\ detailed vmrkplan along with a specimen of<br />

a summary <strong>and</strong> third party review of application <strong>and</strong> data centres is of immense use.<br />

The chapter on test<strong>in</strong>g techniques by <strong>computerised</strong> systems <strong>in</strong>cludes the topic<br />

on use of computer assisted audit techniques (CAAT).<br />

The 1903 cumulative supplement deals with more current concepts like Expert<br />

Systems While discuss<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>formation technology, concepts, <strong>and</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g future<br />

needs the authors who have <strong>in</strong>ternational reputation have stated as follows:-<br />

"Future <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> impacts of new <strong>in</strong>formation technology is significantly alter<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the conduct of au ditf.. At a su<strong>in</strong>g to the credibility of management assertions has<br />

been om of the provisions major responsibilities dur<strong>in</strong>g its entire history. For years,<br />

the service has been epitomiscd by the annual audited f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement To-day,<br />

the annual f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement - while still sen<strong>in</strong>g a valuable role by becom<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

smaller pan of the <strong>in</strong>formation needed by management.lenders <strong>and</strong> stock holders to<br />

make <strong>in</strong>formed decisions ... As other sources of <strong>in</strong>formation become more <strong>and</strong> more<br />

important, there is a current need to develop ways to similarly assure their currency<br />

compktenesr, neutrality, freedom from bias <strong>and</strong> credibility.<br />

The challenge - <strong>and</strong> the opportunity for the public account<strong>in</strong>g profession is<br />

considerable. Professional st<strong>and</strong>ards will need to be developed to cover these possible


new senicer In addition, the responsibility that public accountants would assume <strong>and</strong><br />

the legal exposures they would <strong>in</strong>cur would need to be assessed. Most important,<br />

however, there is a clear <strong>in</strong>dication of need, <strong>and</strong> the profession is well situated to<br />

respond".<br />

It is important to note that the situation regard<strong>in</strong>g t~chnological developments<br />

<strong>and</strong> usage of computers have change <strong>in</strong> our country also. The profession <strong>in</strong> our<br />

country is not well equipped to respond <strong>and</strong> the management of organisations an not<br />

as yet ceased of the problem.<br />

Research publications<br />

The publication of the Institute of the Internal Auditors USA' reviews, risk,<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit techniques while describ<strong>in</strong>g the fast chang<strong>in</strong>g technology to help<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal auditors to perform their jobs better. The report consists of 11 modules as<br />

follows :-<br />

Executive summary<br />

Audit <strong>and</strong> control <strong>environment</strong><br />

Us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation technology <strong>in</strong> audit<br />

Manag<strong>in</strong>g computer resources<br />

Manag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> development systems<br />

Bus<strong>in</strong>ess systems<br />

End-user - departmental systems<br />

Telecommunications Security<br />

'<br />

Price Waterhouse, "Systems Audilabilily <strong>and</strong> Control", The Institute of Internal<br />

Auditors, Orl<strong>and</strong>o, 1991.


Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Emerg<strong>in</strong>g technologies<br />

The project was f<strong>in</strong>anced by IBM <strong>and</strong> Price Water Hons performed the work<br />

Thc report ckarly recogniscs that the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor's responsibility regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation technology has changed tremendously. The report concludes that as a<br />

major aspect of strategy plann<strong>in</strong>g, the auditor should have an overall assessment of<br />

associated risks <strong>and</strong> concerns, to cmphasise the fact that the auditors need to be<br />

current It is necessary for the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors to underst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

the technology, to enable them to <strong>in</strong>form the management correctly about the actual<br />

<strong>and</strong> potenticl risks <strong>and</strong> control concepts.<br />

Mr. Kamal Guptal Technical Director of the Institute of Chartered Institute<br />

of India while discuss<strong>in</strong>g various aspects of audit, devotes whole chapter on <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

EDP based accounts. A reference is made to the various st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong><br />

pronouncements of professional bodies abroad. It is recognised that the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />

use of computers has changed the approach <strong>and</strong> techniques of audit also". It is<br />

reliably learnt that <strong>in</strong> view of the <strong>in</strong>creased use of computers, the Institute of<br />

Chartered Accountants itself has made a start <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g guidel<strong>in</strong>es to its members<br />

for procedures to be followed while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> It is<br />

learnt that the Indian Institute also may be with<strong>in</strong> 2/3 years after the process of<br />

different committees, approv<strong>in</strong>g the same, is completed issue official professional<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards as a statement hopefully.<br />

' Kamal Gupta "Contemporary Audit<strong>in</strong>g", New Delhi, Tata McGraw-Hill Publish<strong>in</strong>g<br />

6. Ltd1986.


Professional bodits elsewhere <strong>in</strong> the world, haw issued st<strong>and</strong>ards for Audit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

practice <strong>in</strong> a wmputeriscd <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

S.Rao Vallabhanenil discusses the audit methodology <strong>and</strong> control guidel<strong>in</strong>es.<br />

He classiKcs the computer security under the follow<strong>in</strong>g heads:-<br />

* Physicalsecurity<br />

* Personnel security<br />

Data security<br />

Application software security<br />

System software security<br />

' Telecommunication security<br />

Computer operation security<br />

While critically analys<strong>in</strong>g the various concerns, he has prepared useful<br />

worksheets for risk assessments <strong>in</strong> the different areas. The criteria considered is very<br />

exhaustive <strong>and</strong> the methodology very practical. He has provided values for the risk<br />

<strong>and</strong> weightage for the criteria <strong>and</strong> anived at the total risk score. He has a very useful<br />

suggestion of prepar<strong>in</strong>g a risk rank<strong>in</strong>g worksheet which, from the data collected on<br />

each of the computer security areas, grades, the risk level as "low, medium <strong>and</strong> high".<br />

An analysis of this approach <strong>and</strong> his conclusions have a practical bear<strong>in</strong>g. The<br />

methodology adopted for risk assessments for the purpose of my study are similar to<br />

the one proposed by this author. A copy of the questionnaire for risk assessment<br />

under each area of security <strong>and</strong> risk assessment work sheet are enclosed (ReLAppendh).<br />

' S.Rao Vallabhaneni, "Audit<strong>in</strong>g Cornpuler Security -A manual with case<br />

studies". New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1989.


Wabley <strong>and</strong> Peter1 deal with computer <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> as a conceptual foundation<br />

The topic of <strong>in</strong>ternal control structure is presented under the heads of organisation<br />

<strong>controls</strong>, personnel practices, st<strong>and</strong>ard operat<strong>in</strong>g procedures as also systems<br />

development documentation <strong>controls</strong> Specific mention is made to the systems<br />

documentation st<strong>and</strong>ards. The documentation is expected to have the follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

Problem def<strong>in</strong>ition<br />

System documentation<br />

Program documentation<br />

Operations documentation<br />

User documentation<br />

While conced<strong>in</strong>g that ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g gwd st<strong>and</strong>ards of documentation is<br />

necessary, the author realiscs the difficulties <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the same. He makes<br />

specific reference to software aids to documentation. The section deal<strong>in</strong>g with<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> EDP systems is of importance <strong>and</strong> the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> is divided by authors <strong>in</strong>to the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g tasks :-<br />

Audit of computer programs<br />

Audit of data files <strong>and</strong> data bases<br />

Audit of computer process<strong>in</strong>g - general concepts<br />

Audit of computer process<strong>in</strong>g - user control systems<br />

Audit of computer process<strong>in</strong>g - third party systems<br />

I<br />

Donald AWatne <strong>and</strong> Peter B.B. Tumey, ']Audit<strong>in</strong>g EDP Systems" New Jersey,<br />

Prenticc-Hall International. Inc. 1984.


Mention is made to usage of expert systems <strong>and</strong> the role of auditor <strong>in</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

such an <strong>environment</strong> It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that the author mentions that the<br />

auditor should use the expen system as a twl to be more effective <strong>and</strong> efficient<br />

Ron Weber'sl book is a bible to auditors who wish to ga<strong>in</strong> basic knwrkdp<br />

of computericed <strong>environment</strong>, associated <strong>controls</strong>, evidence collection methodologies,<br />

<strong>and</strong> evidence evaluation procedures. There are important chapters on manag<strong>in</strong>g EDP<br />

audit function. The author highlights the importance of chang<strong>in</strong>g EDP audit function.<br />

With the advent of micro computers, growth of end- user comput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> impact of<br />

knowledge systems <strong>and</strong> the growth <strong>in</strong> data communications, the authors feel the EDP<br />

auditor should keep pace with the new technology. An <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g question posed by<br />

the author is as to how an auditor can determ<strong>in</strong>e what ciianges need to be made to<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit procedures when an organisation changes from its exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />

technology to new technology for its data process<strong>in</strong>g. He concludes that the role of<br />

EDP auditor <strong>and</strong> basic audit methodologies rema<strong>in</strong> unchanged. However, the EDP<br />

auditor must underst<strong>and</strong> the new technologies, be capable of determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g their<br />

impact on <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit procedures <strong>and</strong> ensure that appropriate evidence<br />

coUection twls <strong>and</strong> techniques have been developed<br />

Michael G. Grottola' elaborates on us<strong>in</strong>g UNIX to Audit Unix. He provides<br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es as to how the operat<strong>in</strong>g system UNlX can be controlled by its owners. His<br />

book deals with facts concern<strong>in</strong>g what to look for <strong>in</strong> an UNIX system, how to<br />

Ron Weber, "EDPAudit<strong>in</strong>g Conceptual foundations <strong>and</strong> pmctice" New York,<br />

Mcgraw-Hill Bwk Cn., 1988<br />

Michael G.Grottola, "The UVEaudit. Us<strong>in</strong>g UNM &Audit UN1X"', New York,<br />

McGraw-Hill Inc, 1993.


exam<strong>in</strong>e it <strong>and</strong> how to report its f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs. The author mentions that us<strong>in</strong>g a UNIX<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system to audit the <strong>environment</strong> thus require apart from audit experience,<br />

UNIX litracy. It provides useful guidel<strong>in</strong>es for the auditor to become "Unix Literate".<br />

There is a chapter on which it takes the auditor through the various process of<br />

<strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g the UNIX system. It gives a brief description of each of the comm<strong>and</strong>s. The<br />

book conta<strong>in</strong>s useful <strong>in</strong>formation on how an effective audit can be conducted <strong>in</strong> an<br />

UNIX <strong>environment</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g the UNIX comm<strong>and</strong>s themselves.<br />

Unix Security is an important subject. Mr.N.Derek Amold' while help<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

reader to learn about the UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system, concepts <strong>and</strong> securities, also helps<br />

the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g concepts of <strong>in</strong>formation control <strong>and</strong> security aspects. A special<br />

chapter on audit programs refer to the several ways the systems auditor can keep<br />

track of what is go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> the system. It highlights the fact that more the system<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrator knows about the activities of the system, better steps can be taken to<br />

secure the system. The importance of End- user ma<strong>in</strong>tenance is highlighted. The<br />

possibility of new user's mess<strong>in</strong>g up needs to be borne <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. The vulnerabilities<br />

because of <strong>in</strong>stallation of special devices are discussed. It is mentioned that devices<br />

which have the potential to bypass st<strong>and</strong>ard unix security are be<strong>in</strong>g built. On the face<br />

of it though the publication looks as if it is highly technical, it is of immense use to<br />

the auditor as it conta<strong>in</strong>s useful guidel<strong>in</strong>e for the usage of different comm<strong>and</strong>s. The<br />

ways of bypass<strong>in</strong>g security by us<strong>in</strong>g yet other comm<strong>and</strong>s are highlighted. There are<br />

special chapters on data base security <strong>in</strong> unix <strong>environment</strong>. The chapter of "break<strong>in</strong>g<br />

techniques" is very reveal<strong>in</strong>g as it describes the method used by an attacker. As the<br />

author mentioned, this is of particular use to the adm<strong>in</strong>istrator. The techniques<br />

N. Derek Arnold UNIX Security. New York, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1992


mentioned <strong>in</strong> the chapter are of immense importance, as the knowledge of the facts<br />

will help the auditor to know what could heppen. Yet another chapter on VIRUS<br />

<strong>in</strong>fection helps to get an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of how a virus works <strong>in</strong> a UNIX <strong>environment</strong><br />

This chapter provides some guidel<strong>in</strong>es on how viruses can be prevented <strong>and</strong> if<br />

prevention fails how to detect them. The problems associated with prevention <strong>and</strong><br />

detection discussed <strong>in</strong> this chapter gives an <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to the problem that one will face<br />

when a virus <strong>in</strong>filtrates <strong>in</strong> a computer system <strong>in</strong> a unix <strong>environment</strong><br />

Database management system <strong>and</strong> system functions are expla<strong>in</strong>ed lucidly by<br />

Gordon G.Everestl Specific chapters on data base <strong>in</strong>tegrity deal<strong>in</strong>g with back up <strong>and</strong><br />

recovery, quality control <strong>and</strong> concurrent update access control <strong>and</strong> encryption are of<br />

utmost importance to the auditor. The author expla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> simple language the<br />

concepts of data base, provides guidel<strong>in</strong>es for theauditor to acquire knowledge on the<br />

necessary <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a data base <strong>environment</strong>. The awareness of the knowledge of<br />

the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> the procedures which should be implemented <strong>in</strong> a data base system<br />

facilitates the auditor to test the adequacy of the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a data base management<br />

system <strong>environment</strong><br />

The literature surveyed deals with different computer <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit concerns associated with it Each of the technological<br />

developments have been dealt with <strong>in</strong> detail.<br />

However, a concerted study of what the auditor is expected to do <strong>in</strong> a<br />

Computerised <strong>environment</strong> as per the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards of different professional<br />

Gordon G. Everest "Data Base Management, Objectives System f<strong>in</strong>ctions. &<br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istration", New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1986.


odies tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to consideration control objectives <strong>and</strong> audit concerns <strong>in</strong> specific<br />

computcrised <strong>environment</strong>, specially as prevalent <strong>in</strong> India, is not available.<br />

The study has been undertaken to attempt to fill upthis gap. A sample survey<br />

ofcontrol<strong>and</strong> audit practices has been undertaken <strong>and</strong> analysis <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY<br />

The present study is an attempt at evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> different<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>s generally <strong>and</strong> specifically like End User Comput<strong>in</strong>g, net<br />

work<strong>in</strong>g, Data base management. A study of the <strong>controls</strong> that should exist <strong>in</strong> the<br />

different <strong>computerised</strong> enviroments has been made. This has been compared with the<br />

<strong>controls</strong> that are exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a sample set of organisations <strong>in</strong> different <strong>environment</strong>s.<br />

The audit concerns <strong>in</strong> each of the <strong>environment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> generally has been stated.An analysis of the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs has been reported<br />

with suggestions, based on the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />

A study of the professional statements <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards of different<br />

professional bodies has been made. An audit approach which has been well<br />

recognised has been described The audit procedures followed as described by the<br />

organisations which have ken <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the sample has been analysed. Similarly<br />

five lead<strong>in</strong>g firms of statutory auditon have been approached <strong>and</strong> the procedures that<br />

they follow while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> on a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> had been noted by way of<br />

answers obta<strong>in</strong>ed from them on the questionnaire provided to them. The hypothesis<br />

for this thesis is that the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> as prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> India is <strong>in</strong>adequate. The analysis of the control


procedures <strong>in</strong> organisations <strong>and</strong> the audit procedures followed as reported by the<br />

organisations <strong>and</strong> the audit approach as mentioned by lead<strong>in</strong>g auditors have been<br />

undertaken to verify the hypothesis.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>formation technology security probkmsbecome very vital <strong>and</strong> important<br />

as most organisations have automated their activities. Even electronic l<strong>in</strong>ks ari be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

established with their trade partners (ED1 EFD). Tak<strong>in</strong>g advantage of the<br />

technological developments organisations are computeris<strong>in</strong>g extensively. Along with<br />

this development the security problems are also on the <strong>in</strong>crease. Most of the<br />

companies have some <strong>in</strong>adequacy or the other <strong>in</strong> their IT security. Organisations are<br />

fail<strong>in</strong>g to wake upto this problem while as now <strong>in</strong> our country there have been no<br />

formally reported cases of fraud <strong>and</strong> loases.<br />

Tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to consideration the experience of other countries, it would be a<br />

matter of time before sophisticated crimes <strong>and</strong> frauds associated with computers<br />

would be as common place as frauds <strong>in</strong> a non-<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>in</strong>vironment.<br />

Macro Kapp, Director, hpers & Lybr<strong>and</strong>, London <strong>in</strong> his presentation "IT<br />

Security <strong>in</strong> a chang<strong>in</strong>g world" at the South EastAsia Regional Computer Conference,<br />

December 1989 discussed the possible problems <strong>and</strong> estimated that worldwide losses<br />

caused by IT security would be S 15-30 billion or so. A body of French Insurance<br />

Industry, APSAIRD has published data for France <strong>in</strong> the year 1987. The table below<br />

gives the detail. It is very shock<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> reveal<strong>in</strong>g to note that more than 72% of the<br />

losses are caused by<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

System Design Programm<strong>in</strong>g Errors<br />

Fraud Software Sabotage


(c)<br />

(d)<br />

Theft <strong>and</strong> disclosure of data<br />

Theft of software.<br />

Data regard<strong>in</strong>g losses due to IT security are available for countries other than<br />

India. In advanced countries,Audit<strong>in</strong>g Techniques are tyng to keep pace with<br />

technological development. In our country technological development have bern<br />

taken advantage of <strong>and</strong> specially dur<strong>in</strong>g the last decade. The impact of<br />

computerisation on organisations has been very very significant. However, the aspects<br />

of control <strong>and</strong> audit has been lost sight of under the impression, most probably that<br />

companies are falliable <strong>and</strong> hence personnel <strong>and</strong> systems associated with the<br />

computers have to be <strong>in</strong>falliable!!<br />

It is III this context that the aspect of mak<strong>in</strong>g a study of the control procedures<br />

that need to be implemented <strong>in</strong> different computer <strong>environment</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the<br />

correspond<strong>in</strong>g audit methodologies to be adopted has been undertaken to evaluate<br />

the adequacy of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> take preventive, detective <strong>and</strong> corrective steps to<br />

m<strong>in</strong>imise the impact of possible losses.<br />

SCENARIO IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD<br />

A new pattern of computer related crime is emerg<strong>in</strong>g. It is characterised by<br />

a shift from <strong>in</strong>siders to outsiders <strong>and</strong> from applications to systems. The risk is to<br />

management <strong>in</strong> general, but computer auditors <strong>in</strong> particular. In response to this<br />

pattern, computer auditors may wish to leave the audit of ;~pplications to others <strong>and</strong><br />

shift their focus to systems. In the earlier decades, it was speculated that there would<br />

be exploitation of system vulnerabilities. But what was actually seen was the


exploitation of application vulnerabilities. There was a concern about <strong>in</strong>terference<br />

with or contam<strong>in</strong>ation of the application programmes by unauthorised people. What<br />

was seen was manipulation of the <strong>in</strong>put by authorised people! The computer auditors<br />

emphasised shift to applications.'<br />

There was speculation about attacks from outsiders. What was actually<br />

happen<strong>in</strong>g was that there were attacks by <strong>in</strong>siders. It became clear that while system<br />

access <strong>controls</strong> were necessary, they were not sufficient. People could not be relied<br />

upon to behave safely. In such circumstances, access <strong>controls</strong> would not bc effective.<br />

The empahsis of the auditor shifted to such areas as password management,<br />

separation of duties <strong>and</strong> user accountability. It is reported that the traditionally<br />

managed systems are contribut<strong>in</strong>g to the vulnerability. The analysis of the attacks<br />

which had been studied demonstrate that serious problems would be caused <strong>and</strong> they<br />

are likely to be <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>crease.'<br />

The contribut<strong>in</strong>g factors :<br />

(i)<br />

There are large number of previlege users on the target systems. In some<br />

cases, all of the users are privileged. In many cases, privilege on one system<br />

transmits <strong>in</strong>to privilig<strong>in</strong>g on nearby system. The analysis proved that if a<br />

hacker is able to ga<strong>in</strong> previlege on a system, he is able to change passwords<br />

on dormant accounts <strong>and</strong> add "secret doorsn he can contam<strong>in</strong>ate the system<br />

' "Computer. related &me <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> the rn<strong>in</strong>eties" by William H.Murray<br />

1990 Volume I1 The EDP Auditor Journal.<br />

' "Computer - related d<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>eties" by William H.Murray<br />

1990 Volume 11 The EDP Auditor Journal.


<strong>in</strong> such a way that it will be impossible to exclude him without seriously<br />

disrupt<strong>in</strong>g operations.<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

The second factor is the cont<strong>in</strong>ued reliance on re-usable passwords. This leads<br />

to wlnerability to dictionary attacks.<br />

The presence on the system of active but rarely used passwords.<br />

The presence on the system of widely authorised <strong>and</strong> used, very general, fully<br />

previleged but otherwise <strong>in</strong>secured programmes. The statistics prove that the<br />

sample of 150 MVS systems 103 (67%) had one or twomore of these<br />

programmes <strong>and</strong> of these 88 (85%) still had the default lockwards <strong>in</strong> place.<br />

An analysis of various <strong>in</strong>stances of attacks on the computer suggests a shift <strong>in</strong><br />

the source <strong>and</strong> nature of the exposure. These exposures are so widely<br />

documented that any exploitation will be extraord<strong>in</strong>arily embarass<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

management <strong>and</strong> to computer audit. The study recommends that while<br />

auditors are not responsible for prevent<strong>in</strong>g computer related crime, they are<br />

responsible for identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g to management conditions which<br />

contribute to the crime.<br />

The recommendations of the study have been as follows :<br />

(i)<br />

Identify <strong>and</strong> report excessive previlege<br />

The auditor should identify all user profiles that conta<strong>in</strong> system management<br />

previleges. The presence of more than one should be reported.<br />

Identify <strong>and</strong> report programmes that run with system previleges. Application<br />

code <strong>and</strong> system management code should run <strong>in</strong> application state with the previlege<br />

of the user. The auditor should identify <strong>and</strong> report all such codes that run with the<br />

system previleges. The auditor should look for <strong>and</strong> report any evidence that these


programmes were available to others. The use of the default lockwords to one such<br />

evidence.<br />

Identify <strong>and</strong> rtvoke dormant profiles<br />

remedied.<br />

A large number of such profiles constitute a risk to the srjtem <strong>and</strong> should be<br />

Identib unused or unnecessary ports<br />

The auditor can contribute appropriate management consideration. Any<br />

evidence of unused or unnecessary codes were reconcil<strong>in</strong>g the presence of system<br />

codes to their use <strong>and</strong> also by exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the process by which such decisio~c are<br />

made.<br />

The recommendation reflect st<strong>and</strong>ards of practice that the auditor should<br />

expect. These practices are motivated by emerg<strong>in</strong>g exposure to outsider attack.<br />

However, these can be expected to reduce the exposure even more from the likely<br />

t!lreats from <strong>in</strong>siders.<br />

Statistics have been provided on the computer crime. The statistics has been<br />

collected from 3 discreet surveys. The 1986 computer crime survey consisted of<br />

contact<strong>in</strong>g 250 prosecutors' offices. 75 cases were reported.'<br />

' Computer m'me <strong>and</strong> abuse by J.J.Buck Blook Becker EDPAA Audit Journal,<br />

Volume 11, 1990,


US.<br />

In 1989 computer survey consisted of mail<strong>in</strong>g to 2500 prosecutors' offices <strong>in</strong><br />

The third survey conducted <strong>in</strong> late 1988 was with the cooperation of the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation systems security association. The survey went to 3500 computer security<br />

professionals. Approximately 14% responded.<br />

Computer crime availability of <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

On the basis of the three surveys, it was clear that very few computer crimes<br />

are reported to prosecution authorities. The chart (1.1) on responses to serious<br />

security <strong>in</strong>cidents shows that as aga<strong>in</strong>st 2% <strong>in</strong> 1987 it was 6% <strong>in</strong> 1988. The research<br />

further prove:\ that any study of reported computer crime cases may nor be<br />

representative of the universe of "serious security <strong>in</strong>cidents" known to the respondents<br />

<strong>in</strong> the centre survey. There was a survey conducted when computer security<br />

professionals were asked for "known <strong>in</strong>formation security losses" for 1988. The<br />

average loss reported was $1,09,000. Figure 1.2 represents average annual computer<br />

abuse loss.<br />

In 1986 theft of money represented almost half of all prosecuted computer<br />

crime cases <strong>and</strong> theft of services represented only 10%. By 1988 money theft<br />

exceeded theft of services only 36% to 34% (Figure 1.3).<br />

More than half of the cases <strong>in</strong> our natural sample of computer crime<br />

prosecutions <strong>in</strong>volved losses of S 10,000 or lcs only 125% <strong>in</strong>volved losses of $ 1,00,000<br />

or more (Figure 1.5).


The National Centre for Computer Crime Data (NCCCD) published an<br />

anlaysis for whic focused on the California (USA) data (Fig.l.6). Computer<br />

Professionals predicted phenomenal growth <strong>in</strong> software products to prevent virus<br />

attacks (Fig. 1.7).<br />

Trends <strong>in</strong> Computer abuse<br />

The National Centre for Computer Crime Data has the opportunity to<br />

compare the make up prosecuted cases before 1986 <strong>and</strong> after 1986. They have<br />

attempted to <strong>in</strong>fer some significance from the changes <strong>and</strong> they are as follows:<br />

No significant development is the grow<strong>in</strong>g evidence of the vulnerability of<br />

computer communication n,:tworks.<br />

Figure 1.4 deta~ls the types of the computer crimes. Computer security<br />

professionals predicts enormous growth <strong>in</strong> the use of software to prevent viruses.<br />

However, it was proved that v<strong>in</strong>rses are less of a concern than down time, destruction<br />

of data or extraord<strong>in</strong>ary disclosure of data.<br />

Implications of computer crime<br />

Computer crime become a media issue whenever a major case comes up. Wise<br />

computer security professionals <strong>and</strong> auditors have been able to convert public <strong>in</strong>terest<br />

<strong>in</strong> crime to enlarged budgets for computer security efforts. The survey f<strong>in</strong>ally<br />

concluded that controll<strong>in</strong>g computer systems to reduce computer crime is a serious<br />

challenge. The problem has been grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> the assets which can be broad to beer<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st computer crime have also grown. The authors have concluded that the key


I<br />

FIG 1.7 : USE OF TECHNOLOGY/PRODUCTS<br />

IN 1985, 1988 & 1991 (CHART 2)<br />

% Percentage of Users<br />

70 1 I<br />

Advanced Intrusion Audit Secure Secure Secure Anti-vlrur<br />

Encryption Detection Analysis Operat<strong>in</strong>g Networks DBMS's products<br />

Expert Aids Syatema<br />

Syatema<br />

Sources : NCCCD <strong>and</strong> RGC Associates<br />

Security Survey


to this problem is commitment. 'here is need for generat<strong>in</strong>g commitments to security.<br />

Technological solutions would not solve the problem.<br />

Computer abuse <strong>in</strong> Australia'<br />

Statistics recently released by Australian computer Abuse Research Bureau<br />

identify that reported computer abuse <strong>in</strong>cidents have <strong>in</strong>creased dramatically. N<strong>in</strong>e<br />

years the Bureau collected reports of 205 cases represent<strong>in</strong>g almost $ 11 million. In<br />

1989 alone, there were 51 reported cases represent<strong>in</strong>g $ 26 million. In the 10 years<br />

that the bureau has been <strong>in</strong> operation they have identified a number of ~nterest<strong>in</strong>g<br />

aspects relat<strong>in</strong>g to the TOP 9 TEST was a measur<strong>in</strong>g mechanism developed by<br />

Gerry Benboo <strong>and</strong> his friends. C appeidix top tests. Of the 392 respond<strong>in</strong>g<br />

organisations .02% pass the test with 60% of the respondents not receiv<strong>in</strong>g a rank<strong>in</strong>g<br />

at all. The study was reperformed recently with the same poor results.<br />

Industrial group<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

ACARP statistics confirm that approximately 36% of computer fraud by value<br />

is performed <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ancial sector.<br />

Fraud report<strong>in</strong>g<br />

There is an underst<strong>and</strong>able reluctancc to publicly disclose <strong>in</strong>formation which<br />

is considered confidential <strong>and</strong> computer abuse falls <strong>in</strong>to that category. In Australia<br />

it is observed that a computer crime is performed <strong>in</strong> 80% of <strong>in</strong>stances by <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

-<br />

' Computer Abuse <strong>in</strong> Australia by Garry Bonbow EDPAA Audit Journal 1990<br />

Volume 2


employees <strong>and</strong> yet only 20% of the organisations are prepared to perform security<br />

evaluations on prospective employees. It is reported that <strong>in</strong> 1984 the American<br />

Bank<strong>in</strong>g System electronically transmitted <strong>in</strong> excess of S 180 billion everyday. It is<br />

reported that "given the known statement of computer security this is not a surprise<br />

that computer experts around the world are on the edge wait<strong>in</strong>g for an organised<br />

attack which should spell disaster for corporate identities either to consider<br />

<strong>in</strong>v<strong>in</strong>cible".<br />

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY<br />

The basic hypothesis for this thesis is to prove or disprove that <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a<br />

computer <strong>environment</strong> as they exist now are <strong>in</strong>sufficient <strong>and</strong> that <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> practices<br />

followed to evaluate the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> report on them are well below the accepted<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

In specific terms, the objectives of this study are to:<br />

(1) Identify exist<strong>in</strong>g control systems select types of <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>s<br />

(Personal Computers, End User Comput<strong>in</strong>g, LAN, DBMS etc.) ;<br />

(2) Review the procedures which the selective auditors are adopt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> those<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>s to satisfy themselves that the <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> are<br />

adequate <strong>in</strong> terms of the completeness, accuracy <strong>and</strong> reliability of the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation which forms the basis of the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement of the<br />

organisation;<br />

(3) Exam<strong>in</strong>e the levels of efficiency of control procedures <strong>in</strong> the light of well-laid<br />

out st<strong>and</strong>ards of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> different <strong>environment</strong>s;


(4) Evaluate overall level of <strong>controls</strong> meant to ensure the appropriateness of audit<br />

requirements; <strong>and</strong><br />

(5) Suggest suitable control mechanism to improve effectiveness of audit practices<br />

<strong>in</strong> a computeriscd <strong>environment</strong><br />

SOURCES OF DATA<br />

Study is based both on primary <strong>and</strong> secondary data. The secondary data<br />

sources are well-known publications of studies effected <strong>in</strong> US4 <strong>and</strong> UK Primary<br />

data is that personally collected from organisations <strong>and</strong> auditors.<br />

Secondary data<br />

1. Systems Auditability & Control Reports published by Institute of Internal<br />

Auditors USA<br />

2 A H<strong>and</strong>book of Computer Security edited by Keith Heardnden.<br />

3. Audit<strong>in</strong>g computer security - A manual wityh case studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.<br />

To generate plausible hypothesis for study a focus group discussion was<br />

adopted with experts fully conversant with EdP <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> practices <strong>and</strong> then the<br />

consensus from the group was stated as an <strong>in</strong>itial hypothesis for further research<strong>in</strong><br />

this study.<br />

The actual methodology adopted for this research falls under the category of<br />

<strong>in</strong>depth case study method. There are two typical methods available for do<strong>in</strong>g


esearch with empirical data. One is large sample survey method <strong>and</strong> another <strong>in</strong>depth<br />

w e study method. Generally large sample survey method is resorted to when the<br />

system be<strong>in</strong>g studied or be<strong>in</strong>g researched is very familiar to the respondents <strong>and</strong> they<br />

can correctly <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>and</strong> answer the questions posed to them. Wherever for the<br />

first time a research is undertaken to study the performance of any system, it is<br />

preferable to have a detailed checklist of relevant questions perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the study<br />

which could be personally adm<strong>in</strong>istered by the researcher so that he/she can clarify<br />

the mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the questions to the various respondents. In that<br />

process, additional <strong>in</strong>sights can be obta<strong>in</strong>ed about the performance of the system<br />

thorugh personal discussions. Underst<strong>and</strong>ably, the umber of such cases cannot be too<br />

large to facilitate <strong>in</strong>depth discussion. So <strong>in</strong> this research, the study has the second<br />

method of <strong>in</strong>depth case study. Also <strong>in</strong> this method the number of organisations <strong>and</strong><br />

the number of respondents taken are not too large. Hence conventional statistical<br />

tests for validat<strong>in</strong>g the responses will not be mean<strong>in</strong>gful.<br />

Selective data which is not biased has been selected for sampl<strong>in</strong>g purposes.<br />

Lead<strong>in</strong>g audit firms who have extensive clientele both <strong>in</strong> public sector <strong>and</strong> private<br />

sector, operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> different areas of f<strong>in</strong>ancial, market<strong>in</strong>g, manufactur<strong>in</strong>g etc had<br />

been chosen. As regards organisations, which have been us<strong>in</strong>g computers a sample<br />

size of 30 was tested. As lead<strong>in</strong>g auditors were contacted for <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> methodology<br />

adopted by them, data would represent audit procedures adopted <strong>in</strong> more than 100<br />

organisations.<br />

As regards wmputerised <strong>environment</strong>, the sample size of 30 <strong>in</strong>stallations<br />

<strong>in</strong>clude different types of management like public sector, private sector, public limited<br />

companies, private limited companies, f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>stitutions, bank<strong>in</strong>g etc.


The methodology <strong>and</strong> sample size are defended on the follow<strong>in</strong>g grounds:<br />

1. The f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the study are though substantially based on the responses to<br />

the questionnaire still considerable personal <strong>in</strong>tervention has taken place with<br />

the Managers concerned to get deeper <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to their problems <strong>and</strong> state<br />

of affairs. This would not be possible if a larger sample is taken.<br />

2. (a) The organisations chosen for the study are typical of most of the Indian<br />

Commercial organisations.<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

The auditors <strong>in</strong>terviewed are also the reputed ones.<br />

The variation <strong>in</strong> the responses <strong>in</strong> the sample organisationslauditors is<br />

practically nil. This gives substantive credibility to the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><br />

hence generalisations also are valid.<br />

The fundamental pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> sampl<strong>in</strong>g theory that lesser the variation <strong>in</strong><br />

responses small sample will be adequate has been adopted.<br />

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY<br />

The study has the follow<strong>in</strong>g limitations:<br />

a) The data for the study is not volum<strong>in</strong>ous though illustrative. This is due to the<br />

fact that a representative sample which has not been subjective has been<br />

chosen.<br />

b) Throughout the study no dist<strong>in</strong>ction has been made between different<br />

management styles of the various organisations. This is due to the fact that<br />

though the style of management may vary the concept of basic accountability<br />

of top management does not cease.


c) The auditors selected are mostly seniors <strong>and</strong> well established <strong>in</strong> the profession.<br />

Juniors <strong>and</strong> freshen have not been many <strong>in</strong> the sample. This is due to the fact<br />

that larger organisation with wider computerisation are mostly audited by<br />

seniors. However, <strong>in</strong> the smaller organisations, it is mostly PC based <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> PC <strong>environment</strong>s have been fairly well covered <strong>in</strong> the samples.<br />

ARRANGEMENT OF TEE CHAPTERS<br />

The thesis has been divided <strong>in</strong>to n<strong>in</strong>e chapters. Chapter I1 deals with <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards where the need for st<strong>and</strong>ards is emphasised. The professional<br />

pronouncements <strong>in</strong> the form of St<strong>and</strong>ards of <strong>in</strong>ternational bodies like the American<br />

Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Institute of Chartered Accountants of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales, Institute of Internal Auditors, USA, EDP Auditors Association,<br />

USA are referred to with special reference to those st<strong>and</strong>ards which are applicable<br />

to <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. Reference is also made to 1SO-9000-3,<br />

where<strong>in</strong> quality st<strong>and</strong>ards required for software development are specifically<br />

mentioned.<br />

Chapters 111, IV, V <strong>and</strong> VI deal with <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> specific <strong>environment</strong>s. Four<br />

important <strong>and</strong> more commonly used <strong>environment</strong>s have been chosen. Chapter III<br />

deals with <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> Eud-User comput<strong>in</strong>g. The reasons for the rapid growth of<br />

End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g, control concerns <strong>and</strong> audit considerations are also highlighted.<br />

A copy of the questionnaire which was used to make a sample survey of five<br />

organisations hav<strong>in</strong>g End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g is enclosed. The f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs at the end of the<br />

chapter are based not only on the <strong>in</strong>formation collected from the responses to the


questionnaire, but also of the research team of the US of Institute of Internal Auditor<br />

as published <strong>in</strong> their Report, "Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control".<br />

Chapter IV deals with Local Area Network. A technology overview is<br />

provided. The current utilisation of LAN <strong>in</strong> different organisations are discussed.<br />

Accepted procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g the establishment of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> procedures<br />

are discussed. A sample questionnaire to evaluate the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> organisations hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

LAN is enclosed. This questionnaire was utilised to secure responses from five<br />

organisations <strong>and</strong> a comparison of exist<strong>in</strong>g practices for implementation of <strong>controls</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> audit procedures <strong>in</strong> these <strong>environment</strong> is compared with accepted <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

audit procedures <strong>in</strong> a local area <strong>environment</strong>. This is followed by analysis <strong>and</strong><br />

f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs. The f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>clude my own based on the lesponses from five organisations<br />

as also the IAA's f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs as reported <strong>in</strong> SAC The suggestions regard<strong>in</strong>g effective<br />

implementation of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a LAN <strong>and</strong> specific audit procedures needed form the<br />

subject matter of the section regard<strong>in</strong>g suggestions.<br />

Chapter V deals with the topic of Database Management System (DBMS).<br />

While expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the concept the specific vulnerabilities of the <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

steps to be taken to plug the loapholes are discussed. The procedures <strong>and</strong> systems<br />

as followed <strong>in</strong> organisations which have implemented the DBMS is discussed. The<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard accepted procedures, control objectives <strong>and</strong> audit guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> a database<br />

management system <strong>environment</strong> are stated. The <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit procedures as<br />

they exist are compared with norms. The results are analysed <strong>and</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

reported. The f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs also <strong>in</strong>clude those reported <strong>in</strong> SAC of IAA. The f<strong>in</strong>al section<br />

Conta<strong>in</strong>s suggestions regard<strong>in</strong>g implementation of <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> practices of the<br />

acceptable audit procedures.


Chapter VI deals with <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a UNIX<strong>environment</strong>. The operat<strong>in</strong>g systems<br />

UNIX had been the subject matter of controversy. It was even stated that "UNIX<br />

security" is a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms as the orig<strong>in</strong>al version of the operat<strong>in</strong>g system<br />

UNIX had a great deal of vulnerabilities. Over a period of time, later versions had<br />

attempted to plug the loopholes. Many proprietory operat<strong>in</strong>g systems of UNIX have<br />

also been supplied by vendors. A general discussion on UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system with<br />

possible loopholes <strong>and</strong> attempts made by subsequent versions of different vendors to<br />

plug the same are also discussed. Special audit concerns <strong>in</strong> this operat<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>and</strong><br />

how the auditor should audit the system by UNIX itself are discussed. Based on the<br />

questionnaire enclosed, responses have been obta<strong>in</strong>ed from five organisations <strong>and</strong><br />

analysis <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs have been reported. Suggestions for implementation of effective<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> proner procedures to be adopted hy auditors are discussed.<br />

Chap:er VII deals with Disaster Recovery Plan. The importance of Disaster<br />

Recovery Plan is highlighted <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stances of successful disaster recovery plan (DRP)<br />

<strong>and</strong> failures due to the absence of DRP are highlighted.<br />

The anticipation of possible exposures <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g for the same is<br />

duscussed. The contents of DRP, the method of implementation <strong>and</strong> review are<br />

highlighted. The role of the auditor with regard to the disaster recovery plan is<br />

discussed.<br />

A sample questionnaire for collect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation from a sample of 30<br />

organisations is enclosed. Analysis of the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs have been reported. Suggestions for<br />

effective implementation of DRP <strong>and</strong> the role of the auditor are also brought out.


The technological developments are cont<strong>in</strong>uously tak<strong>in</strong>g place <strong>in</strong> the area of<br />

development, storage, communication, database etc. Concepts of CASE tools,<br />

Recng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ED1 have been highlighted. Control objectives <strong>and</strong> audit concerns<br />

<strong>in</strong> these areas have been discussed <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the chapter "Summary,<br />

Conclusions <strong>and</strong> Recommendations".<br />

Chapter Vlll deals with an audit approach. Without consider<strong>in</strong>g any specific<br />

<strong>environment</strong>, a general approach which an auditor should have when <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> a<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> is highlighted.<br />

The current scenario is discussed briefly. A detailed discussion on<br />

well-accepted approaches for <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a computerisltd <strong>environment</strong> is attempted<br />

giv<strong>in</strong>g the various step5 <strong>and</strong> the tasks <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> each step. A sample questionnaire<br />

is enclosed to illustrate <strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g the approach of auditors as currently<br />

practised.<br />

Practis<strong>in</strong>g Auditors' responses for the questionnaire has been analysed. This<br />

is also supported by <strong>in</strong>formation gathered from a sample of 30 organisations<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g audit practices of their respective organisations.<br />

conclusion.<br />

Chapter IX presents a summary of the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> draws an overall


CHAPTER I1<br />

AUDITING STANDARDS<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards as the very name <strong>in</strong>dicates refers to St<strong>and</strong>ards for Audit<br />

performance. They are the measures of quality of performance of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> procedure<br />

<strong>and</strong> the objective to be atta<strong>in</strong>ed by us<strong>in</strong>g the procedures followed.<br />

The auditor's objective is to reach a conclusion on whether the f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

statements taken as a whole are materially mis-stated. The auditor is expected to<br />

accumulate the potential of such adjustments <strong>and</strong> evaluate the comb<strong>in</strong>ed effect. If he<br />

has concluded that the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements are materially affected by an irregularity<br />

he should either <strong>in</strong>sist on the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements be<strong>in</strong>g revised or if they are not<br />

revised he should qualify his op<strong>in</strong>ion on the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements. He should disclose<br />

substantive reasons for his op<strong>in</strong>ion.<br />

In a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> it is expected that the auditor should satisfy<br />

himself that the <strong>controls</strong> are adequate enough to produce accurate <strong>and</strong> complete<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements. Should he not have evaluated the <strong>controls</strong> or hav<strong>in</strong>g evaluated<br />

the <strong>controls</strong> he concludes that they are <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>and</strong> hence the likelihood of the<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements be<strong>in</strong>g materially misstated, the auditor is expected to qualify his<br />

op<strong>in</strong>ion.


American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issues st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

on Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards. (SAS) which concern the external Auditors responsibilities.<br />

Periodically new SASS are issued superced<strong>in</strong>g the earlier ones.<br />

SAS 31 deals with evidential matter.<br />

SAS No.31 (AU Section 326.12): as emended by SAS No. 48,makes it clear<br />

that audit evidence is not affected by the use of computer process<strong>in</strong>g. Only the<br />

method by which the auditor gathers that evidence can be affected.<br />

The auditor's specific audit objectives do not change whether account<strong>in</strong>g data<br />

is processed manually or by computer. However, the methods of apply<strong>in</strong>g audit<br />

procedures to gather evidence may he <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the method of data process<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

The auditor can use either manual audit procedures, computer-assisted audit<br />

techniques, or a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of both to obta<strong>in</strong> sufficient, competent evidential<br />

matter. However, <strong>in</strong> some account<strong>in</strong>g systems that use a computer for process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

significant account<strong>in</strong>g applications, it may be difficult or impossible for the auditor<br />

to obta<strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> data for <strong>in</strong>spection, <strong>in</strong>quiry, or confirmation without computer<br />

assistance.<br />

The American Institute of Certified Public Accounts Computer Audit<strong>in</strong>g subcommittee<br />

provides guidance on the effect of computerisation on the audit process.<br />

This committee advises the Audit St<strong>and</strong>ards Board <strong>and</strong> other NCPA Committees on<br />

matters relat<strong>in</strong>g to Audits that <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>computerised</strong> systems. The AICPA has come<br />

Out with several publications provid<strong>in</strong>g guidance related to the computer<br />

<strong>environment</strong>. However, these are not official pronouncements but only guidel<strong>in</strong>es.


1. Management Control <strong>and</strong> Audit of Advanced EDP systems was issued<br />

<strong>in</strong> 1983. This guidel<strong>in</strong>e describes the characteristics of advanced EDP<br />

systems. It discurses control mechanisms <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> of such systems.<br />

2 Audit & considerations <strong>in</strong> an "on-l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>environment</strong>" is another guidel<strong>in</strong>e<br />

published <strong>in</strong> 1983. This guidel<strong>in</strong>e conta<strong>in</strong>s a description of the various<br />

<strong>environment</strong>s that are encompassed by 'on-l<strong>in</strong>e systems'.<br />

This guidel<strong>in</strong>e identifies the impact of the 'on- l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>environment</strong>' on the<br />

auditor's study <strong>and</strong> evaluation of the system of <strong>in</strong>ternal account<strong>in</strong>g control.<br />

"Controls over us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g computer programmes is a guidel<strong>in</strong>e issued <strong>in</strong> 1979<br />

which provides guidance to ensure thatno unauthorised changes are made to the<br />

programme <strong>and</strong> that any changes are duly authorised by Management".<br />

"Computer-assisted audit techniques" .The guidel<strong>in</strong>e issued as early as <strong>in</strong> 1979<br />

describes audit tools <strong>and</strong> techniques that are relevant for <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> effectively <strong>in</strong> a<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

An Account<strong>in</strong>g Guide entitled "Audit of Service Centre" was orig<strong>in</strong>ally issued<br />

<strong>in</strong> 1974 <strong>and</strong> subsequently revised <strong>in</strong> 1987. This guide addresses the special problem<br />

for <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> organisations which utilise external service centre facility. The revised<br />

guide has <strong>in</strong>corporated all relevant <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> pronouncements as also the general<br />

guidance <strong>in</strong> SAS 44 "Special purpose reports on official account<strong>in</strong>g control by service<br />

organisations. The guide has three chapters as follows:<br />

i. Effect of an organisation's use of an EDP Service Centre on the<br />

auditor's study <strong>and</strong> evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal control.


ii. Repon<strong>in</strong>g of reviews on EDP Service Centre;<br />

iii. Us<strong>in</strong>g reports on <strong>in</strong>ternal control at EDP Service Centre on the<br />

auditor's study <strong>and</strong> evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal control.<br />

i. Effect of an organisation's use of EDP Sen<strong>in</strong> Centre on the auditor's study<br />

<strong>and</strong> evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal wntrol<br />

This Chapter discusses the impact of us<strong>in</strong>g EDP Service Centre on the system<br />

of <strong>in</strong>ternal account<strong>in</strong>g control <strong>and</strong> the user organisation. It also deals with the impact<br />

which it will have on the auditor's study <strong>and</strong> evaluation of the system of the<br />

organisation. It makes specific mention of the circumstances <strong>in</strong> which the auditor of<br />

such an organisation should <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong> the study control procedures at an EDP<br />

Service Centre.<br />

ii.<br />

Report<strong>in</strong>g of reviews on EDP Service Centres<br />

The EDP Service Centre would generally be used by different organisations<br />

who may be hav<strong>in</strong>g different auditors. It would be difficult for the service centre to<br />

subject itself for a review by aU the auditors. In this chapter, a reasonable alternative<br />

has been suggested by which a s<strong>in</strong>gle auditor specifically reviews the <strong>in</strong>ternal control<br />

procedures of the senice Centre <strong>and</strong> reports the results of other auditors.<br />

The guide describes the manner <strong>in</strong> which the auditor of the Service Centre<br />

would report the results of the Review of the SeM'ce Centre. The guide further<br />

provides that while the auditors use the report of the service centre auditor, they<br />

would cont<strong>in</strong>ue to reta<strong>in</strong> the responsibility for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>ternal control system<br />

at the senice centre.


Us<strong>in</strong>g reports on <strong>in</strong>ternal control at EDP Service Cent=<br />

The guide discusses how the service auditor's report can be utilised by the<br />

auditor of the organisation <strong>in</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements of<br />

the client.<br />

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, U.SA.<br />

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountant (AICPA) issues<br />

procedure studies which though not authoritative, provide practical assistance <strong>in</strong><br />

carry<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> procedures.<br />

Computer Audit sub committee of AICPA have five separate Task Forces for<br />

develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> procedure studies <strong>in</strong> <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. The studies<br />

which have been completed <strong>and</strong> released for member's benefit ;ire as follows:<br />

a) Auditors use of micro-computer published <strong>in</strong> 1986. This provides guidance to<br />

auditors to use micro-computers as an audit tool.<br />

b) Audit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a paperless <strong>environment</strong><br />

This study describes the benefit of a paperless environemnt on the audit<br />

approach, specially <strong>in</strong> view of the <strong>in</strong>herent risk when there is no paper trail to<br />

substantiate the transactions.<br />

c. Audit impact on small (micro-m<strong>in</strong>i) computer systems<br />

The study provides guidance when clients operate <strong>in</strong> the above <strong>environment</strong><br />

with special reference to the fact that reliance on computer <strong>controls</strong> unlikely.


d. Audit impact on mid-size (m<strong>in</strong>i/m<strong>in</strong>ilreme) computer systems<br />

This study will guide when clients use not so much complex a compute:<br />

systems but there is some reliance on computer <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

c Audit impact of large (complex) computer systems<br />

This study will provide guidance on follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>and</strong> control risks <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> an organisation <strong>in</strong> the above <strong>environment</strong>. There is greater likelihood of<br />

there be<strong>in</strong>g significant relevance on <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>ards Board has approved the issue of a set of general st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

called Attestation St<strong>and</strong>ards. These specifically affect some computer-related<br />

engagement They are u7itten broadly to apply to all attestation certificates <strong>in</strong> which<br />

a certified public accountant issues a report which conta~:ls conclusion on an assertion<br />

after exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g such assertion.<br />

Attestation st<strong>and</strong>ards deal with<br />

a) Technical competence<br />

b) Due care<br />

c) Adequate Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

d) Sufficient evidence<br />

e) Proper report<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Attestation st<strong>and</strong>ards are thus similar to the generally accepted <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards (GAAS).


INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, U.S.A.<br />

The Institute of Internal Auditors <strong>in</strong> 1977 published a Report (systems<br />

auditability <strong>and</strong> control report). IBM provided a grant to IIA <strong>and</strong> the study was<br />

conducted by Stanford Research Institute which published <strong>in</strong> three volumes as:<br />

i. Executive report<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Control Practices report<br />

Audit practices report.<br />

Though published almost two decades ago, many of the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><br />

conclusions of the study are relevant <strong>and</strong> proper to the audit <strong>and</strong> control of EDP<br />

Systems of the current day.<br />

Executive mport<br />

This provides an overview of the audit of EDP systems <strong>and</strong> the study has<br />

concluded that <strong>in</strong> spite of data process<strong>in</strong>g systems <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal audit techniques<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to evolve mrd<strong>in</strong>ation between the two discipl<strong>in</strong>es is not keep<strong>in</strong>g pace.<br />

Control practices report while discuss<strong>in</strong>g specific control techniques classifies<br />

the control as general control <strong>and</strong> application control. The study recommends that<br />

the auditor should be associated with pre-<strong>in</strong>stallation review so that better systems<br />

<strong>and</strong> effective <strong>controls</strong> could be applied.<br />

The Audit Practices Report conta<strong>in</strong>s a list of 28 audit tools <strong>and</strong> techniques for<br />

effective use by auditors while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.


The Institute of Internal Auditors aga<strong>in</strong> under a grant from IBM <strong>and</strong> research<br />

by Price Waterhouse published the systems auditability <strong>and</strong> control report <strong>in</strong> 1991.<br />

The grant was as large as US $500000 <strong>and</strong> over 150 volunteers participated <strong>in</strong> the<br />

development <strong>and</strong> review of the SAS report. The report consists of 12 modules as<br />

follows:<br />

Executive summary<br />

Audit <strong>and</strong> Control <strong>environment</strong><br />

Us<strong>in</strong>g Information Technology <strong>in</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Manag<strong>in</strong>g Computer Resources<br />

Manag<strong>in</strong>g Information <strong>and</strong> Develop<strong>in</strong>g systems<br />

Bus<strong>in</strong>ess systems<br />

End-user <strong>and</strong> department comput<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Telecommunications<br />

Security<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Emerg<strong>in</strong>g Technologies<br />

Index<br />

The Research Report <strong>in</strong> its Executive summary concludes as follows:<br />

"Professional <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors of the 1992 have the necessary underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>and</strong> skills to review <strong>controls</strong> over <strong>in</strong>formation technology. As control specialists,<br />

auditors assist management <strong>in</strong> its responsibility to implement cost-effective <strong>controls</strong><br />

to mitigate the risks associated with the use of <strong>in</strong>formation technology <strong>and</strong> to meet<br />

the objectives of the organisation.


Responsible <strong>in</strong>formation systems professionals <strong>and</strong> system users of the 1990s<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation technology risks, implement proper <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> ensure<br />

auditability of <strong>in</strong>formation systems The SAS Repon provides the guidanoc to<br />

management <strong>and</strong> practitioners <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal audit, <strong>in</strong>formation systems, user functions<br />

<strong>and</strong> other groups <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the control <strong>and</strong> audit of all areas of <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

system <strong>and</strong> technology.<br />

The EDP Auditors Association which has its headquarters <strong>in</strong> USA is the only<br />

professional Association dedicated solely to EDP <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. The EDP Auditors<br />

Association was established <strong>in</strong> 1985.<br />

EDP Auditors Foundation (EDPAF)<br />

The EDP Auditors Foundation develops <strong>and</strong> promulgates official <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards applicable to EDP <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. Its objectives as stated are:<br />

1. Develop <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> professional st<strong>and</strong>ards, provide credentials as<br />

Certified Information Systems Auditors (CISA) to <strong>in</strong>dividuals whose<br />

competence meets the organisation's st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

2 Provide education <strong>in</strong> EDP <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>.<br />

3. Conduct Rescarch <strong>in</strong> EDP <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> Controls<br />

4. Assist qualified <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> the study of EDP Audit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ETHICS AND STANDARDS<br />

EDP Auditors Foundation has established a code of professional conduct for<br />

Grtified Information Systems Auditors. The EDP Auditors Association published <strong>in</strong>


1987 a "General St<strong>and</strong>ards for Information Systems Audit<strong>in</strong>g". The EDP Auditors<br />

Association has a St<strong>and</strong>ards Board which is a St<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g Committee. The Board's<br />

formally adopted mission is as follows:<br />

'To advance the quality of <strong>in</strong>formation systems <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>, it is the responsibility<br />

of the St<strong>and</strong>ards Board to promulgate <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards of practices. These<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards apply to members of the EDPAA <strong>and</strong> to holders of the certification <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>formation systems <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>.<br />

The St<strong>and</strong>ards authority is derived from the code of professional ethics which<br />

provides that members of the EDPAA <strong>and</strong> holders of CISA will apply Information<br />

Systems Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards adopted by the EDPA Foundation. As is mentioned by<br />

the EDPAF, the authority of guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> procedures is secondary to the st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

themselves.<br />

The relationship between Information Systems Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> other<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards: The <strong>in</strong>formation systems <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards promulgated by the<br />

EDPA Foundation are <strong>in</strong>tended to supercede <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards developed by other<br />

professional bodies. However, where there is a situation when aconflict is perceived<br />

to exist between the St<strong>and</strong>ards of EDPA Foundation <strong>and</strong> any other professional<br />

body, it is the responsibility of the EDPA Association Foundation to use the<br />

professional judgment to resolve the matter.<br />

GENERAL STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AUDITING<br />

EDP Auditors foundation has stated that the follow<strong>in</strong>g ten st<strong>and</strong>ards are<br />

applicable to Information Systems <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:


Independence<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No. 1<br />

Attitude <strong>and</strong> Appearance: In all matters related to <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>, the <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

systems auditor is to be <strong>in</strong>dependent of the auditee <strong>in</strong> attitude <strong>and</strong> appearance.<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No.2<br />

Organisational Relationship- The <strong>in</strong>formation systems audit function is to be<br />

sufficiently <strong>in</strong>dependent of the area be<strong>in</strong>g audited to permit objective completion of<br />

the audit<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No3<br />

Code of Professional ethics - The <strong>in</strong>formation systems auditor is to adhere to<br />

the Code of Professional Ethics of the EDP Auditors Foundation.<br />

Technical competence<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No.4<br />

Skills <strong>and</strong> knowledge - The <strong>in</strong>formation systems auditor is to be technically<br />

competent, possess<strong>in</strong>g the skills <strong>and</strong> knowledge necessary <strong>in</strong> the performance of the<br />

auditor's work<br />

General st<strong>and</strong>ard No.5<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g Professional Education - The <strong>in</strong>formation systems auditor is to<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> technical competence through appropriate cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g education.


General St<strong>and</strong>ard Na6<br />

Plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Supervision: - Information Systems audits are to beplanned <strong>and</strong><br />

supervised to provide assurance that audit objectives are achieved <strong>and</strong> compliance<br />

with these st<strong>and</strong>ards is met<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No. 7<br />

Evidence Requirement - Dur<strong>in</strong>g the course of the audit, the <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

systems auditor is to obta<strong>in</strong> evidence of a nature <strong>and</strong> sufficiency to support f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

<strong>and</strong> conclusions reported.<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No.8<br />

Due Professional care - Due professional care is to be exercised <strong>in</strong> all aspects<br />

of the <strong>in</strong>formation systems auditor's work, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g observance of applicable <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

Report<strong>in</strong>g<br />

General St<strong>and</strong>ard No. 9<br />

Report<strong>in</strong>g of Audit Coverage - In prepar<strong>in</strong>g reports, the <strong>in</strong>formation systems<br />

auditor is to state the objectives of the audit, the period of coverage <strong>and</strong> the nature<br />

<strong>and</strong> extent of the audit work performed.


General St<strong>and</strong>ard No.10<br />

Report<strong>in</strong>g of F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> conclusions - In prepar<strong>in</strong>g reports, the <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

systems auditor is to state f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> conclusions concern<strong>in</strong>g the audit work<br />

performed <strong>and</strong> any reservations or qualifications that the auditor has with respect to<br />

the audit<br />

The effective date of the st<strong>and</strong>ards is from January 1, 1988.<br />

The two statements on <strong>in</strong>dependence issued by the Board of EDPA<br />

Foundation are effective from 1st July 1989.<br />

Statement No.1 deals with with <strong>in</strong>dependence, attitude <strong>and</strong> appearance -<br />

organisational relationship.<br />

It lays down the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

Information systems auditor should have an <strong>in</strong>dependent attitude<br />

towards audit<br />

If the auditor's <strong>in</strong>dependence is impaired, the auditor should not<br />

participate <strong>in</strong> the audit The auditor's <strong>in</strong>dependence is deemed to have<br />

been impaired if the auditor has expectation of f<strong>in</strong>ancial ga<strong>in</strong> or any<br />

other advantage due to his <strong>in</strong>fluence as an auditor.<br />

Perception of auditor's <strong>in</strong>dependence could affect the acceptance of<br />

auditor's work. For example, if the auditor becomes aware that a<br />

situation or relationship is perceived to impair his <strong>in</strong>dependence the


auditor is expected to <strong>in</strong>form the auditee management as early as<br />

possible of the perceived impairment.<br />

(d)<br />

(e)<br />

(f)<br />

(g)<br />

An auditor should be organisationally <strong>in</strong>dependent of the area be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

audited to ensure that the audit is objective <strong>and</strong> fair.<br />

When the auditor's <strong>in</strong>dependence is impaired <strong>and</strong> if he cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be<br />

associated with the audit a disclosure needs to be made.<br />

Independence of the auditor needs to be cont<strong>in</strong>uously assessed by the<br />

auditor <strong>and</strong> management.<br />

The auditor's work <strong>and</strong> report should represent a discharge of<br />

professional responsibility which exemplifies <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong> objectivity.<br />

Statement No.2<br />

This statement deals with <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the systems development process.<br />

This statement provides def<strong>in</strong>ition for the systems:<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

Application systems<br />

Systems development process<br />

Application development review<br />

This statement lays down that<br />

(a)<br />

the Auditor should ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> an attitude <strong>and</strong> appearance of<br />

<strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> conduct<strong>in</strong>g application development review.<br />

(b)<br />

The auditor should be <strong>in</strong>dependent of the project team. However, the<br />

auditor may recommend control <strong>and</strong> other systems <strong>in</strong>herent without<br />

impair<strong>in</strong>g his <strong>in</strong>dependence.


(c)<br />

(d)<br />

(e)<br />

The performance of application development review does not impair<br />

the auditor's ability to perform an <strong>in</strong>dependent evaluation of the<br />

application after its implementation;<br />

The <strong>in</strong>dependence of the auditor may be impaired if the auditor<br />

becomes actively <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the design <strong>and</strong> implementation of the<br />

application system; example, by becom<strong>in</strong>g a decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g member<br />

of the project team.<br />

The auditor's <strong>in</strong>volvement merely as a member of the Project Team<br />

(not as a decision mak<strong>in</strong>g member) <strong>in</strong> the design <strong>and</strong> implementation<br />

of audit tools <strong>and</strong> techniques, does not impair the auditor's<br />

<strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />

Statement Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 <strong>and</strong> 8 deal with performance of work.<br />

Statement No3<br />

Becomes effective €ram 1st July 1991. This statement deals with "evidence<br />

requirement" which def<strong>in</strong>es evidence as <strong>in</strong>formation used by the auditor to meet<br />

audit objectives. The nature of <strong>in</strong>formation used as evidence should be relevant <strong>and</strong><br />

reliable; it should also be sufficient to form an op<strong>in</strong>ion of support f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><br />

conclusions.<br />

conclusion.<br />

Evidence is relevant if it has a logical relationship to the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><br />

supportable.<br />

Evidence is reliable if <strong>in</strong> the auditor's op<strong>in</strong>ion it is valid, objective <strong>and</strong>


There an various types of evidences which <strong>in</strong>clude physical evidena,<br />

documentary cvidena, representations <strong>and</strong> analysis.<br />

Evidence should be sufficient to support the auditor's f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> conclusions<br />

<strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> A mere programme list<strong>in</strong>g is not sufficient evidence<br />

to verify that it represents the actual programme used <strong>in</strong> a production-run. If<br />

sufficient evidence is not obta<strong>in</strong>able the auditor should disclose this fact Procedures<br />

used to collect evidence <strong>in</strong>clude enquiry, observation, <strong>in</strong>spection, confnmation <strong>and</strong><br />

re-performance. These procedures may be manually audited procedures or computerassisted<br />

audit techniques (CAAT).<br />

Evidence gathered should be properly documented <strong>and</strong> organised to support<br />

audit f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />

Statement No.4<br />

Due professional care: The statement is effective from 1st July 1991. 'Due<br />

mre" is def<strong>in</strong>ed as that level of diligence which a prudent person would exercise <strong>in</strong><br />

a given set of circumstances. ''Duepm~bnoI are" applies to an <strong>in</strong>dividual who<br />

professes to exercise a special skill such as <strong>in</strong>formation systems <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>.<br />

"Due professional care" requires the <strong>in</strong>dividual to exercise that skill to a level<br />

commonly possessed by practitioners of that speciality.<br />

"Due professional care" does not imply that the professional is <strong>in</strong>fallible. If <strong>in</strong><br />

spite of exercise of "due professional care" <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity an <strong>in</strong>correct conclusion is<br />

drawn <strong>and</strong> subsequently it is discovered that the conclusion is <strong>in</strong>correct, it does not


<strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>in</strong>adequate professional judgment or lack of diligence on the pan of the<br />

auditor.<br />

Due professional care <strong>in</strong>cludes:<br />

(i) Evaluation of audit risk;<br />

(ii) Formulation of audit objectives;<br />

(iii) Establishment of audit scope;<br />

(iv) Selection of audit tests;<br />

(v) Evaluation of test results;<br />

The auditor should not accept an assignment unless adequate skills, knowledge<br />

<strong>and</strong> other resources are available to complete the assignment <strong>in</strong> a manner expected<br />

of a professional.<br />

The fact that the auditor has not complied with professional st<strong>and</strong>ards, the<br />

auditor should disclose the circumstances under which it was done.<br />

The use of risk assessment <strong>in</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<br />

The statement is effective from 1st November 1992. The statement def<strong>in</strong>es the<br />

terms, risk exposure <strong>and</strong> risk assessment as follows:<br />

"Risk.. The possibility of an act or event occur<strong>in</strong>g that would have an adverse<br />

effect on the organisation <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>formation systems"


Exposure: The potential loss to an area due to the occurence of an adverse<br />

event ... Exposure can be reduced by implementation of properly designed <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

Risk assessment<br />

A process used to identify <strong>and</strong> evaluate risks <strong>and</strong> their potential impact The<br />

statement lays down that the auditor should use risk assessment techniques <strong>in</strong><br />

develop<strong>in</strong>g overall audit plan <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g specific audits. The auditor should<br />

document risk assessment methodology used for specific audit. As no s<strong>in</strong>gle risk<br />

assessment methodology is appropriate for all situations the auditor should<br />

reevaluate the appropriateness of the particular methodology periodically.<br />

Statement No.6<br />

Audit documentation - The statement is effective from 1st November 1992.<br />

Documentation is a record of audit work performed <strong>and</strong> the evidence gathered.<br />

Documentation should <strong>in</strong>clude details of record of plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> preparation, audit<br />

programme, audit steps, audit f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, report <strong>and</strong> auditee's responses. The extent of<br />

auditor's documentation would <strong>in</strong>clude :<br />

i. Auditor's underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the area to be audited <strong>and</strong> its <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

ii.<br />

Auditor's underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>in</strong>formation process<strong>in</strong>g systems <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal control <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

...<br />

111. Documentation should <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>formation that is required by law or<br />

by any other statutory agency any applicable st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

Documentation regard<strong>in</strong>g audit f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> conclusions should be organised<br />

<strong>and</strong> stored <strong>and</strong> secured <strong>in</strong> a manner that is appropriate for the media on which it is<br />

reta<strong>in</strong>ed.


Statement Na8<br />

Deals with audit considerations for irregularities. The statement is effective<br />

from 1st September, 1993. The statement def<strong>in</strong>es irregularities "as <strong>in</strong>tentional<br />

violations of established management policy or wilful mis-statements or omissions of<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation of the area under audit or the organisatiom ..... Irregularities <strong>in</strong>clude but<br />

are not limited to, deliberate circumvention of <strong>controls</strong> with the <strong>in</strong>tent to conceal the<br />

purported commission of irregularities, fraud, unauthorised use of assets or services<br />

<strong>and</strong> abett<strong>in</strong>g or help<strong>in</strong>g to conceal these type of activities.<br />

The statement lays down that it is the responsibility of the management to<br />

have an effective system of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> to provide a reasonable assurance of<br />

prevent<strong>in</strong>g or detect<strong>in</strong>g irregularities.<br />

The auditor should assess the risk of occurences of irregularities connected<br />

with the area under audit. While prepar<strong>in</strong>g an assessment the auditor should<br />

consider:<br />

i. Organisational characteristics<br />

ii. The types of assets held<br />

iii. The system of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong><br />

iv. Applicable legal requirements<br />

v. Basis of risk assessment<br />

The auditor has the responsibility to such audit tests which would reasonably<br />

help to detect irregularities that could have a significant impact on the area under<br />

audit.


Audit cannot guarantee that irregularities will be detected. The detection of<br />

irregularities should be communicated to persons at the appropriate knl <strong>in</strong> the<br />

organisation. Further, if the auditor discovers fraudulent activities, he is required to<br />

report to appropriate Government agencies.<br />

Report<strong>in</strong>g: Statement No.7<br />

Deals with Audit Reports <strong>and</strong> is effective from 1st September 1993. The<br />

statement def<strong>in</strong>es the report as a formal means of communicat<strong>in</strong>g the objectives of<br />

the audit, audit scope <strong>and</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> conclusions.<br />

If any audit objective set out <strong>in</strong> the report was not met the auditor is expected<br />

to disclose this <strong>in</strong> the report. The report should identify specific professional<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards used <strong>in</strong> perform<strong>in</strong>g the audit <strong>and</strong> also report any professional st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

which should have been used, was not used.<br />

The report should <strong>in</strong>clude all significant audit f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />

IS0 STANDARDS<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ards issued by "International Organisation lor St<strong>and</strong>ards" (ISO):.<br />

IS0 has come out with st<strong>and</strong>ards for products. There are specific guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

given for the procedures to be adopted for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a certificate under ISO. To get<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternational recognition for the products, it has been a prestige issue for various<br />

organisations whether it be for products or for senices to obta<strong>in</strong> a certificate under<br />

IS0 9000.


It is of <strong>in</strong>terest to note that IS0 9000 <strong>in</strong> part 111 provides guidel<strong>in</strong>es for the<br />

application of IS0 9001 to the deoelopment. supply <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of<br />

software. It has been rcmgniscd that "process of development <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of<br />

software is different from that of most other types of <strong>in</strong>dustrial products. In such a<br />

rapidly evolv<strong>in</strong>g technology field, it has been found necessary to provide additional<br />

guidance for quality systems where software products are <strong>in</strong>volved tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account<br />

the present state of the technology". IS0 9000-3 deals with situations where specific<br />

software is developed as part of a contract accord<strong>in</strong>g to the purchaser's specifications.<br />

IS0 9000-3 is <strong>in</strong>tended to provide demonstration of a software supplier's<br />

capability to develop, supply <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> software products. In this connection,<br />

def<strong>in</strong>itions provided <strong>in</strong> the guidel<strong>in</strong>es are important <strong>and</strong> they are reproduced below:<br />

Software item<br />

Development<br />

Phase<br />

Verification<br />

Validation<br />

Para 4.1.1.1 def<strong>in</strong>es quality policy. 'The supplier's management shall def<strong>in</strong>e<br />

<strong>and</strong> document its policy <strong>and</strong> objectives for, <strong>and</strong> commitment to quality. The supplier<br />

shall ensure that this policy is understood, implemented <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed at all levels<br />

<strong>in</strong> the organisation".<br />

Paragraph 4.1.1.21 describes the responsibility <strong>and</strong> authority of the personnel,<br />

who manage, perform <strong>and</strong> verify work affect<strong>in</strong>g quality.


Paragraph 4.1.2 lays down the purchaser's management responsibility<br />

paragraph 4.1.2 is of particular importance. It mentions that the purchaser should<br />

co-oprate with the supplier to provide all necessary <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> a timely manner<br />

<strong>and</strong> resolve pend<strong>in</strong>g items.<br />

The purchaser should assign a representative with the responsibility for deal<strong>in</strong>g<br />

with the supplier on contractual matters. This representative should have the<br />

authority commensurate with the need to deal with contractual matters which <strong>in</strong>clude,<br />

but are not limited to the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

a) Def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the purchaser's requirements to supplier<br />

b) Answer<strong>in</strong>g questions from the supplier<br />

c) Approv<strong>in</strong>g the supplier's proposals<br />

d) Conclud<strong>in</strong>g agreements with the supplier<br />

e) Ensur<strong>in</strong>g the purchaser's organisation observes the agreements made<br />

with the supplier;<br />

f) Def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g acceptance criteria <strong>and</strong> procedures<br />

g) Deal<strong>in</strong>g with the purchascr-supplied software items that are found<br />

unsuitable for use.<br />

Paragraph 4.21 generally gives the description of the quality system. The<br />

supplier should establish <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>to<strong>in</strong> a documenled qwlity system. The<br />

quality system should be an <strong>in</strong>tegrated process throughout the entire life c~cI~, thus<br />

ensur<strong>in</strong>g that quality is be<strong>in</strong>g built <strong>in</strong> as development progresses rather than be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

distributed at the end of the process. Problem prevention should be emphasised


ather than depend<strong>in</strong>g on correction after occurrence. The supplier should ensure the<br />

effective implementation of the documented quality system.<br />

Paragraph 4.3 is ofparticular releoance to the research topic. It deals with<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal quality system audits. It is as follows:<br />

'The supplier shall carry out a comprehensive system of planned <strong>and</strong><br />

documented <strong>in</strong>ternal quality (system) audits to verify whether quality activities comply<br />

with planned arrangements <strong>and</strong> to determ<strong>in</strong>e the effectiveness of the quality system".<br />

"Audits shall be scheduled on the basis of the status <strong>and</strong> importance of the activity".<br />

'The audits <strong>and</strong> follow-up actions shall be carried out <strong>and</strong> brought to the attention<br />

of the personnel hav<strong>in</strong>g responsibility <strong>in</strong> the area audited. The management personnel<br />

responsible for the area shall take timely corrective action on the deficiencies found<br />

by the audit".<br />

Paragraph 4.4 deals with corrective action:<br />

'The supplier shall establish, document <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> procedures for<br />

a) Investigat<strong>in</strong>g the cause of non-conform<strong>in</strong>g product <strong>and</strong> the corrective<br />

action needed to prevent recurrence;<br />

b) Analys<strong>in</strong>g all processes, work operations, concessions, quality records,<br />

senice reports <strong>and</strong> customer compla<strong>in</strong>ts to detect <strong>and</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ate<br />

potential causes of non-conform<strong>in</strong>g product<br />

c) Initiat<strong>in</strong>g preventive actions to deal with problems to a level<br />

correspond<strong>in</strong>g to the risks encountered;


d) Apply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>controls</strong> to ensure that corrective actions an taken <strong>and</strong> that<br />

they arc effective<br />

e) Implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> record<strong>in</strong>g changes <strong>in</strong> proceduns result<strong>in</strong>g from<br />

corrective action".<br />

Paragraph deals with qualityof system-life-cycle activities The major po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

<strong>and</strong> activities listed are:<br />

1.<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

iv.<br />

v.<br />

vi.<br />

vii.<br />

viii.<br />

ix<br />

Contract review<br />

Purchaser requirement specification<br />

Development plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Qual~ty plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Design <strong>and</strong> implementation<br />

Test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> validation<br />

Acceptance<br />

Replication, delivery <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation<br />

Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />

The guidel<strong>in</strong>es spec@ very clearly the various procedures to be strictly<br />

adhered to under each of the above-mentioned items. Of particular importance to the<br />

auditor are the paragraphs deal<strong>in</strong>g with test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> validation.<br />

paid:<br />

Paragraph 5.7.3 deals with the aspects for which special attention should be<br />

a) The test results should be recorded as def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the relevant<br />

specification


) Any discovered probkms <strong>and</strong> their possible impacts to any other parts<br />

of the snfhvare should be noted <strong>and</strong> those responsible notified so the<br />

probkms can be tracked until they are solved<br />

c) Areas impacted by any modifications should be identified <strong>and</strong> retested.<br />

d) Test adeqauacy <strong>and</strong> relevancy should be evaluated;<br />

e) The hardware <strong>and</strong> software configuration should be considered <strong>and</strong><br />

documented.<br />

It is specifically mentioned that the supplier should validate the operation of<br />

the software as a complete product<br />

Paragraph 6 deals with quality system-- support<strong>in</strong>g activities. It deals with the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g aspects <strong>and</strong> lay down the procedure to be adhered to under each head:<br />

a) Configuration management<br />

b) Change control<br />

c) Document control<br />

d) Quality records<br />

e) Measurement of products<br />

It further deals with rules, practices <strong>and</strong> conventions <strong>and</strong> tools <strong>and</strong> techniques<br />

to be followed.<br />

ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS<br />

Professional bodies like AlCPA, IAA <strong>and</strong> EDPAA disclose that auditors have<br />

a special responsibility while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.


SPECIFIC STANDARDS WHICH NEED TO BE ADHERED TO<br />

The Institute of Chartered Accountants, we. reliably learn, are <strong>in</strong> the process<br />

of provid<strong>in</strong>g guidel<strong>in</strong>es which would eventually be formulated as st<strong>and</strong>ards. With<br />

globalisation <strong>and</strong> liberalisation policies of our Government, import as also export of<br />

software as also hardware, which is already on the <strong>in</strong>crease, would bc reach<strong>in</strong>g a peak<br />

very soon<br />

In view of IS0 9000-3 prescribed for software development organisations<br />

would be expected to conform to the same <strong>and</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> certification. It is of great<br />

importance to note that it is expected that there has to be an <strong>in</strong>ternal audit of the<br />

software development.<br />

It should not be mistaken that quality assurance for software is needed only<br />

<strong>in</strong> cases of export. IS0 9000-3 lays down the concept that software is a produce <strong>and</strong><br />

like other products it is necessary to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> quality. Therefore, it is of paramount<br />

importance to take cognisance of the fact that awareness has been created that audit<br />

should bc performed of the software before it becomes marketable product<br />

In these circumstances, the auditors duty <strong>and</strong> responsibility is of great<br />

importance for the implementation of the software <strong>in</strong> an organisation.<br />

PROFESSIONAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN INDIA<br />

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) issues different<br />

statements from time to time on specific matters of importance to its members. This<br />

has affected the work<strong>in</strong>g of the auditors <strong>in</strong> India. The statement of Audit Practices


issued by ICAI sets out practices which a n generally obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> other countries <strong>and</strong><br />

which the Council considers desirable <strong>in</strong> the light of prevail<strong>in</strong>g circumstances of India<br />

The provisions of the statement of Account<strong>in</strong>g Procedures issued <strong>in</strong> 1979 while<br />

expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the mpc <strong>and</strong> functions of the Account<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards Board has clarified<br />

that <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>itial years the St<strong>and</strong>ards will be nwmmendatory <strong>in</strong> character. It is<br />

accepted that once a general awareness for the need <strong>and</strong> utility of the st<strong>and</strong>ards has<br />

been agreed, steps will be taken to enforce compliance with them. It states, "that<br />

while discharg<strong>in</strong>g their functions, it will be the duty of the Members of the Institute<br />

to ensure that the account<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>ards are implemented <strong>in</strong> the presentation of<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements covered by their Audit Repor+.s. In the event of any deviation<br />

from the st<strong>and</strong>ards it will also be their duty to make adequate disclosures <strong>in</strong> their<br />

Reports so that the users of such statements may be aware of such deviation". The<br />

Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has issued a statement of basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />

which govern the audit. It lays down various pr<strong>in</strong>ciples which <strong>in</strong>clude:<br />

L<br />

ii<br />

iii.<br />

iv.<br />

Integrity, objectivity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence<br />

Coniidentiality<br />

Skills <strong>and</strong> competence;<br />

Documentation;<br />

v. Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

vi.<br />

Audit evidence<br />

The statement on Audit Practices was issued <strong>in</strong> 1964, for which a third edition<br />

was brought <strong>in</strong> 1977. In chapter I1 it deals with general considerations; the concept<br />

of materiality is discussed. It is mentioned that "Materiality" is also a matter of


importance <strong>in</strong> relation to items <strong>in</strong> the balance sheer It is added that "it is difficult to<br />

lay down anyst<strong>and</strong>ards by which materiality can be judged. It is a matter <strong>in</strong> which the<br />

decision is arrived at on the basis of the auditor's professional experience <strong>and</strong><br />

judgment".<br />

Para 210 deals with the objectives It lays down that the auditors objective<br />

both <strong>in</strong> regard to assets has to satisfy that they exist <strong>and</strong> belong to the client that they<br />

are recorded <strong>in</strong> the accounts. It is accepted that the audit procedure should be<br />

devised accord<strong>in</strong>gly".<br />

Chapter 217 which deals with that of computers, lays down:<br />

"While the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>and</strong> concepts of audit are applicable to computer-based<br />

account<strong>in</strong>g systems to the same degree as to manual systems the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> techniques<br />

<strong>and</strong> procedures will need modification depend<strong>in</strong>g upon:<br />

a) the extent to which electronic data process<strong>in</strong>g (EDP) are used to<br />

compile <strong>and</strong> analyse account<strong>in</strong>g records;<br />

b) the system of <strong>in</strong>ternal control <strong>in</strong> existence <strong>in</strong> the company <strong>in</strong> regard to:<br />

(i) flow of correct <strong>and</strong> complete data to the process<strong>in</strong>g centre<br />

(ii) process<strong>in</strong>g, analysis <strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g tasks undertaken <strong>in</strong> the<br />

<strong>in</strong>stallation <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally<br />

(iii) the impact of computer-based account<strong>in</strong>g system on the audit<br />

control that could othelwise be expccted to exist <strong>in</strong> an entirely<br />

manual system.


The guidel<strong>in</strong>e proceeds to expla<strong>in</strong> the fundamental concepts of a client who<br />

may be us<strong>in</strong>g his own computer-system or a semce bureau for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g management<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation. It will be of relevance to reproduce para "A".<br />

"A Where a computer is used for compil<strong>in</strong>g account<strong>in</strong>g records if the system<br />

developed is such a 'pr<strong>in</strong>t out' (L. a visible record) is available at every stage, as <strong>in</strong><br />

a manual system (e.g. Day books, statement of Journal entries, Ledger, Trial Balance<br />

<strong>and</strong> so on) the audit trail rema<strong>in</strong>s complete <strong>and</strong> Free of the EDP <strong>in</strong>fluence. This gives<br />

the auditor all the freedom he needs to determ<strong>in</strong>e the extent <strong>and</strong> manner of<br />

verification of transactions, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account the <strong>in</strong>ternal check <strong>and</strong> control that<br />

exists with<strong>in</strong> the organisation but outside of the Data Process<strong>in</strong>g Centre. Nevertheless<br />

it would be necessary for the auditor to make enquiries <strong>and</strong> particularly satisfy<br />

himself on the follow<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

a) Adeqauate procedures exist to ensure that the data transmitted is<br />

correct <strong>and</strong> complete.<br />

@) Cross verification of records, reconciliation statements <strong>and</strong> control<br />

systems between primary <strong>and</strong> subsidiary ledgers do exist <strong>and</strong> are<br />

operative <strong>and</strong> that accuracy of computer compiled records are not<br />

assumed<br />

Developments <strong>in</strong> Data Process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> India <strong>in</strong> so far as account<strong>in</strong>g records are<br />

concerned, have not yet materially threatened the audit trail s<strong>in</strong>ce extensive 'pr<strong>in</strong>t<br />

outs' are made available, but the future po<strong>in</strong>ts to the <strong>in</strong>evitable need for the auditor<br />

to acquire newer skills to deal with a computer <strong>environment</strong> when audit trails as are<br />

now known <strong>and</strong> accepted, might become expensive <strong>and</strong> even anachronistic.


Where audit trails have been affected, thc auditor will f<strong>in</strong>d that 'kisibility" has<br />

become poorer. This will force upon him the need to acquire skills to verify "<strong>in</strong>visible<br />

records". Depend<strong>in</strong>g upon the degree of "visibiiity" he can adopt one or two courses.<br />

(1) have the process<strong>in</strong>g part of the computer applications, but verify the systems<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong> that exist:<br />

(a) to ensure correct <strong>and</strong> complete data be<strong>in</strong>g made available for<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g;<br />

(b) to provide for error detection <strong>and</strong> correction<br />

(c) to restart compilation <strong>in</strong>terrupted by power, mechanical or process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

failures without duplicat<strong>in</strong>g the entries <strong>and</strong> records;<br />

(d) to ensure checks <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong> on output or accuracy <strong>and</strong> completeness;<br />

(e) to provide adequate data security aga<strong>in</strong>st fire <strong>and</strong> other calamities,<br />

wrong process<strong>in</strong>g, fraud;<br />

(q to prevent unauthorised amendments, corrections <strong>and</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>structions (Programmes) operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>structions as sequences; <strong>and</strong><br />

(g) to keep custody of the data files.<br />

Many more "peripheral" checks may be added but the above would be the<br />

pr<strong>in</strong>cipalones. This approach is referred to as <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> around the computer.<br />

(2) It is possible for the auditor to take the further logical steps to verify the<br />

programmes themselves <strong>and</strong> technically satisfy himself that systems, checks,<br />

<strong>controls</strong>, error detection <strong>and</strong> data security procedures are satisfactory. The<br />

auditor could also use test-checks to test the system <strong>in</strong> operation <strong>and</strong> ask for<br />

special pr<strong>in</strong>t outs by mak<strong>in</strong>g use of programm<strong>in</strong>g facilities available with<strong>in</strong> the


<strong>in</strong>stallation or at his comm<strong>and</strong> to improve the quality of hi own audit <strong>and</strong><br />

reduce time spent on detailed verification of transactions. This approach is<br />

referred to as <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> through the computer.<br />

Given the necessary skills, an auditor could, on request, audit the computer<br />

system itself'.' A study of the various st<strong>and</strong>ards pronounced by different authorities,<br />

discloses that all of them uniformly deal with<br />

1. Independence<br />

2 Due professional care<br />

3. Professional competence<br />

4. Plann<strong>in</strong>g the audit<br />

5. Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g Internal control<br />

6. Evidence collection<br />

7. Report<strong>in</strong>g<br />

' Page 284 - Contemporary Audit<strong>in</strong>g. Third Edition, Kamal Gupta.


CHAF'TER<br />

I11<br />

END-USER COMPUTING (EUC)<br />

The technological developments <strong>in</strong> the computer field have made computers<br />

"User friendly". Users tend to use local comput<strong>in</strong>g power which has resulted <strong>in</strong><br />

tremendous growth of End - User Comput<strong>in</strong>g. The user <strong>in</strong>stead of depend<strong>in</strong>g upon<br />

a central computer department <strong>and</strong> its staff to render assistance <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g computers<br />

for its department depends upon itself. End-User Comput<strong>in</strong>g as "user created or<br />

acquired sbstems that are ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> operated outside of traditional <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

systems (IS) <strong>controls</strong>.


Figure 3.1<br />

END-USER COMPUTING RISK CONTROL LEVELS'<br />

High<br />

Controls<br />

Requaed<br />

'Svsfems AudiiabrMy <strong>and</strong> ~onfroi Module 7, ~nd-user <strong>and</strong> Departmental Comput<strong>in</strong>g, lnstltute of Internal<br />

4udnors Research Foundation. Florida. 1991.


There are many masons for this rapid growth of this trend:-<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

There is always backlog of projects <strong>and</strong> the priorities which the user<br />

may have for its application may not be. the same for the centralised<br />

computer department.<br />

The user's desire to have direct control over their applications.<br />

There are different types of end user comput<strong>in</strong>g activities:-<br />

S<strong>in</strong>gle user<br />

(i)<br />

Multi-user<br />

St<strong>and</strong>-alone PC: This may be used by a s<strong>in</strong>gle department for rout<strong>in</strong>e<br />

preparation of some reports.<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

It may be used for prepar<strong>in</strong>g adhoc reports us<strong>in</strong>g software like spread<br />

sheet etc.<br />

Bus<strong>in</strong>ess applications may be developed which are of immediate use to<br />

the department.<br />

Different users may be utilis<strong>in</strong>g the services of the same PC.<br />

The PC may be one of the nodes <strong>in</strong> a LAN <strong>environment</strong> when the node may<br />

be used for not only develop<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>e reports but also to access commonly available<br />

data on the network<br />

Special reports useful for achiev<strong>in</strong>g the goals<br />

<strong>and</strong> objectives of the<br />

department


AUDIT RISKS AND CONTROLS TO BE EVALUATED'<br />

Bar 1 EUC Risks <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong><br />

Traditional IS Risks <strong>and</strong> Controls<br />

Level of Trechnical Support Required by Users<br />

Bar 2 Low Moderate High NI A<br />

Level of Control Required Over System<br />

Bar 3 Low Moderate High Very High<br />

Level of Technical Audit<strong>in</strong>g Expertise required<br />

Bar 4 Low Moderate High Very High<br />

The specific advantages of end user comput<strong>in</strong>g are that<br />

(i) It helps <strong>in</strong> satisfy<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>creased need for analysed data <strong>and</strong> respond<br />

to queries.<br />

(ii) It meets one time requirements by develop<strong>in</strong>g temporary systems<br />

(iii) It reduces the normal user <strong>and</strong> computer department conflicts by<br />

provid<strong>in</strong>g users with more direct operational control over the system.<br />

The development cycle is shortened, as the realisation of priorities by the user<br />

is more than the DP department.<br />

It is <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the general corporate policy to decentralise activities.<br />

As aga<strong>in</strong>st the advantages, there are certa<strong>in</strong> disadvantages. The follow<strong>in</strong>g are<br />

likely to occur:-<br />

-<br />

' "Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 7'. End-user <strong>and</strong> Departmental<br />

Comput<strong>in</strong>g, Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Florida, 1991.


(i)<br />

As there k no oentraliscd effort <strong>in</strong> pool<strong>in</strong>g resources experience <strong>and</strong><br />

skills, the end-user may not have appropriate appreciation of the<br />

associated risks. Users <strong>in</strong> their over enthusiasm tend to tackle tasks<br />

which are beyond their capability. With the desire to keep up with the<br />

latest technology, hardware <strong>and</strong> software may be acquired which does<br />

not justify the bus<strong>in</strong>ess needs.<br />

Delegation of decisions not <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with position of responsibility of<br />

<strong>in</strong>dividuals may take place.<br />

There are many control issues <strong>in</strong> the nature of<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

(e)<br />

(f)<br />

(g)<br />

<strong>in</strong>consistent data<br />

Incomplete <strong>in</strong>formation trails<br />

Poor system change <strong>controls</strong><br />

Poor documentation<br />

Poor security<br />

Inadequate back up <strong>and</strong> recovery procedures<br />

Software security.<br />

PROBLEM AREAS<br />

In view of the decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g costs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g importance of <strong>in</strong>formation on<br />

timely basis, the awareness <strong>and</strong> the need for end-users themselves to have the<br />

computer facility has been on the <strong>in</strong>crease. Users have become self-reliant <strong>and</strong> feel<br />

that they do not have to bear all the over-heads that are allocated to the department


for % services rendered by the antralised computer department The end-users<br />

make e*tewire use of spread-sheets <strong>and</strong> word process<strong>in</strong>g facilities.<br />

The more enterpris<strong>in</strong>g of the staff <strong>in</strong> user departments have acquired work<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Imowkdge of us<strong>in</strong>g the computer <strong>and</strong> the software. It cannot be claimed that the<br />

Imowkdge of such users b of a high level. The situation as it exists <strong>in</strong> many<br />

organisations b as follows:<br />

(i)<br />

Systems development<br />

Many sptems which the users feel <strong>in</strong> their limited knowledge would be useful<br />

are developed without adopt<strong>in</strong>g any of the st<strong>and</strong>ard prescribed procedures. The<br />

application while they may be usable immediately, it cannot be assured that they<br />

would be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>able, auditable <strong>and</strong> securable. Applications like budget<br />

preparation, consolidation of accounts, cost<strong>in</strong>g, pric<strong>in</strong>g, product-mix decisions are<br />

some of the more popular applications which the end-users have developed.<br />

ii.<br />

Change <strong>controls</strong><br />

As the end-users themselves are dewlop<strong>in</strong>g the programmes the programmes<br />

are changed at will without cornform<strong>in</strong>g to, aga<strong>in</strong>, any established procedures. The<br />

fact that the programme with the change implemented has gone live by their own<br />

efforts bl<strong>in</strong>ds them to the fact that established procedures have been given the go-by.


iii.<br />

Data consbtency<br />

As mentioned earlier then an data applications which an used <strong>in</strong> the<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ana department market<strong>in</strong>g department, manufactur<strong>in</strong>g department as slso the<br />

cost<strong>in</strong>g dcpartments. It is not uncommon to f<strong>in</strong>d that there an different versions of<br />

the same data Wig used <strong>in</strong> the various functional departments. The st<strong>and</strong>ard costs<br />

as orig<strong>in</strong>ally developed might have been updated by the cost<strong>in</strong>g department but still<br />

the old version may cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be used <strong>in</strong> the market<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance departments<br />

while the cost<strong>in</strong>g department uses the latest version This naturally leads to data<br />

which is not synchronised <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation which is neither reliable nor consistent<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g provided.<br />

iv.<br />

Documentation<br />

Documentation be<strong>in</strong>g a cumbersome process <strong>and</strong> a very limited number of<br />

staff be<strong>in</strong>g conversant with the usage of computers, it is generally felt that there is no<br />

requirement for documentation <strong>and</strong> the present practices are that there is total<br />

absence of documentation regard<strong>in</strong>g the systems <strong>and</strong> programmes, programme<br />

changes <strong>and</strong> trouble shoot<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

v. Software piracy<br />

There b no overall control on the programs that are used at the end-usen<br />

when the organisation be<strong>in</strong>g aware their own departments violate the Cow Rights<br />

Acts <strong>and</strong> are utili<strong>in</strong>g pirated copies of the more popular software.


Back-up <strong>and</strong> wnt<strong>in</strong>tmy plann<strong>in</strong>g for raovery<br />

In the absence of organisation's policies <strong>and</strong> proadwes there is no systematic<br />

back-up <strong>and</strong> rewry procedures, End-users due to lack of technical tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g an not<br />

completely unaware of the need to have adequate back up of data files <strong>and</strong><br />

programs In the absena of organisations not hav<strong>in</strong>g a disaster recovery plan or<br />

because end - usen are not planned end users do not have adequate cont<strong>in</strong>gency<br />

plann<strong>in</strong>g. It is not uncommon to f<strong>in</strong>d end user comput<strong>in</strong>g gett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terrupted for<br />

unusual kngths of time, this necessarily has its own impact on the organisation's<br />

operations.<br />

Back-up, at the utmost consists of hav<strong>in</strong>g copies of programs not necessarily..<br />

at a remore place. Back-ups if any are generally located <strong>in</strong> the same area as ma<strong>in</strong><br />

storage facility. It is not uncommon to f<strong>in</strong>d another floppy box conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g data <strong>and</strong><br />

programs be<strong>in</strong>g stored <strong>in</strong> another drawer of the computer table.<br />

Exposwe to virus<br />

Viruses get <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong>to the system <strong>in</strong> any of the follow<strong>in</strong>g situations.<br />

i To avoid gett<strong>in</strong>g approval to purchase the software unauthorised copies<br />

of the software are surreptiously used by the end user. This may result<br />

<strong>in</strong> virus contam<strong>in</strong>ation of the entire system.<br />

ii. In the absence of adequate back up <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g attack<br />

of a virus does run around program <strong>and</strong> wipe out tiles.<br />

The problems were generally the same <strong>in</strong> all the organisations with End-User<br />

comput<strong>in</strong>g. Five organisations were selected at r<strong>and</strong>om. All the organisations were


large public limited companies which were mak<strong>in</strong>g use extensively of LOTUS I, I1<br />

<strong>and</strong> III <strong>and</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> simple programs <strong>in</strong> D-Base. In one organisation, the market<strong>in</strong>g<br />

department was mak<strong>in</strong>g extensive use of Wl'VS I, I1 <strong>and</strong> 111 for pric<strong>in</strong>g decisions<br />

It was found that <strong>in</strong> view of their be<strong>in</strong>g no control procedures there were certa<strong>in</strong><br />

accidental changes to cell values In addition, <strong>in</strong> some cases, <strong>in</strong> view of the software<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g a pirated copy, the software itself contributed to certa<strong>in</strong> other problems of cell<br />

values gett<strong>in</strong>g altered without reason. The department staff were programmers,<br />

operatorsam-users, all rolled <strong>in</strong>to one. It was a common feature to f<strong>in</strong>d alterations<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g made "ON THE FLIGW i.e. even while the software was be<strong>in</strong>g used.<br />

In one organisation, a mere crisis situation arose as the s<strong>in</strong>gle staff <strong>in</strong> the user<br />

department resigned for bctter prospects. In the absence of documentation <strong>and</strong><br />

separation of duties <strong>and</strong> no systematic back up of programs <strong>and</strong> files, the operations<br />

came to a gr<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g halt<br />

STANDARD ACCEPTED PROCEDURES<br />

As on many organisations an EUC (End User Comput<strong>in</strong>g) represents<br />

siwcant <strong>in</strong>vestment, it is essential that it should be properly managed <strong>and</strong><br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istered.<br />

The St<strong>and</strong>ard Accepted Procedures could be considered under two heads:<br />

* Control Procedures<br />

Audit procedures


CONTROL PROCEDURES<br />

Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

End User Comput<strong>in</strong>g should be dealt with like any other bus<strong>in</strong>ess activity.<br />

The plann<strong>in</strong>g for EUC should address the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas:.<br />

(a)<br />

Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g organisation should have plans for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g personnel on any<br />

IT which should wver use of software <strong>and</strong> hardware <strong>and</strong> systems<br />

development<br />

Hardwarr acquisition<br />

Clear guidel<strong>in</strong>e should be given regard<strong>in</strong>g the type of hardware to be acquired<br />

<strong>and</strong> the procedure to be followed for such acquisition.<br />

The typt of applications to be developed <strong>and</strong> the method to be adopted for<br />

such development Eg. the language to be used -whether <strong>in</strong> house development or<br />

purchase from vendors.<br />

Utilisation of mourns<br />

It is necessary to underst<strong>and</strong> that end users form a part of a whok<br />

organisation. Hencc there should be coord<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-action amongst end users<br />

as also the data process<strong>in</strong>g department.


Intcsption with ~ t i w ' bus<strong>in</strong>tss s plan<br />

Then should be a central department at the corporate level which should<br />

decide on the follow<strong>in</strong>&-<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

What type of equipment to buy<br />

Whether to buy the equipment or lease it<br />

If a network<strong>in</strong>g system is already <strong>in</strong> existence, whether end user could<br />

be provided additional modes.<br />

Design<strong>in</strong>g of appropriate <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> EUC specially <strong>in</strong> areas where key<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation is produced to ensure its <strong>in</strong>tegrity is essential.<br />

The responsibility of the user with regard to EUC development <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

<strong>and</strong> security of data should form part of the overall long term plan of the<br />

organisation for IT development The hardware <strong>and</strong> software acquisition at EUC<br />

should fit <strong>in</strong>to the overall blue pr<strong>in</strong>t of the organisation.<br />

Organisational supporl<br />

Though end user may do its own comput<strong>in</strong>g the overall responsibility for its<br />

control exists with the organisation. It cannot, under any circumstanws, be delegated<br />

The organisation should provide the follow<strong>in</strong>g:-<br />

The organisation should have a small group of IT consultants <strong>and</strong> also an<br />

auditor which should provide guidance regard<strong>in</strong>g development of applications as


also clarify any technical doubts 'Ihe auditor component of the group should be abk<br />

to evaluate the <strong>controls</strong> of applications <strong>in</strong> EUC as also its impact on the overall<br />

organisation Thc EUC should be provided clear guidance on the follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

Operational system<br />

Documentation of systems <strong>and</strong> programs<br />

Programs changed procedure<br />

Data <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

Responsibility for <strong>controls</strong><br />

The ultimate responsibility for the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> EUC lies with the Head of the<br />

department. They should ensure<br />

(i) Organisational policies <strong>and</strong> procedures are be<strong>in</strong>g adhered to<br />

(ii) Discipl<strong>in</strong>e regard<strong>in</strong>g systems development, program changes, operations<br />

etc are be<strong>in</strong>g followed.<br />

To a great extent, <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> EUC <strong>environment</strong> depend on the effectiveness<br />

of the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>controls</strong>. As the end user has taken on the responsibility of<br />

adher<strong>in</strong>g to the control procedures onus passes on to the end-user.<br />

AUDIT<br />

In view of the extensive growth of EUC specially <strong>in</strong> view of the significant<br />

benefits that the end user would derive it is necessary for the auditors specially the<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal auditors <strong>and</strong> subsequently the external auditors to underst<strong>and</strong> the<br />

implications of EUC <strong>and</strong> its impact on <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong>. The auditors must pay<br />

special attention to the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas :


(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

(v)<br />

(vi)<br />

Organisational impact of user EUC<br />

Reasons associated with EUC<br />

The need for corporate policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

The awareness of management to EUC risks <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong><br />

The procedures be<strong>in</strong>g followed <strong>in</strong> department utilis<strong>in</strong>g EUC<br />

Study of the applications <strong>in</strong> EUC to evaluate its impact specially on<br />

management decision mak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Perform<strong>in</strong>g the audit<br />

The auditor should devote his attention to<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

Controls at organisational level <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>controls</strong> at application level<br />

(i)<br />

Organisational level<br />

Organisational level he should evaluate the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />

Policies <strong>and</strong> procedures<br />

End-user support<br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />

He should study the responsibilities associated with<br />

Data ownership<br />

Hardware <strong>and</strong> software compatibility<br />

Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

* Technical support


(ii)<br />

Policies <strong>and</strong> procedures<br />

The auditor should evaluate whether there are policies <strong>and</strong> procedures<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g EUC<br />

The policies <strong>and</strong> procedures should cover the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

Documentation<br />

Back up <strong>and</strong> recovery<br />

Security<br />

Hardware acquisition<br />

Software acquisition<br />

Development of applications<br />

Changes to life runn<strong>in</strong>g programs<br />

End-user support<br />

The End-users need support <strong>and</strong> the support if any provided should be<br />

reviewed to f<strong>in</strong>d out whether the follow<strong>in</strong>g are <strong>in</strong>cluded :<br />

Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

Availability of support<br />

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS<br />

Controls<br />

A sample of five organisations at r<strong>and</strong>om were chosen <strong>and</strong> a questionnaire<br />

(Table 3.1) was utilised to obta<strong>in</strong> responses. The practices currently prevalent are<br />

as follows :


(a)<br />

Segregation of duties h totally absent as the user is a programmer,<br />

systems analyst<strong>and</strong> an operator.<br />

@)<br />

The documentation was totally <strong>in</strong>adequate if not absent In their<br />

eagerness <strong>and</strong> enthusiasm to develop systems least importance was<br />

given 10 documentation. The situation did <strong>in</strong> some cases lead to<br />

confusion when the orig<strong>in</strong>al developer left the department or the<br />

organisation. The systems development life cycle procedure has been<br />

very rarely followed. There was no feasibility study. No documentation.<br />

No test results.<br />

With an attempt at "keep<strong>in</strong>g up with the Jonesses" expensive hardware not<br />

justify<strong>in</strong>g the usage of the user department was acquired <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>ed under utilixd.<br />

The systems that are developed did not bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the possible <strong>in</strong>tegration<br />

with other exist<strong>in</strong>g systems or future systems.<br />

"Change control procedures" i.e. the procedures that are needed to be strictly<br />

adhered to whenever an exist<strong>in</strong>g program is modified or be<strong>in</strong>g replaced. Change<br />

control procedures were of an <strong>in</strong>adequate st<strong>and</strong>ard. Aga<strong>in</strong>, the system was entirely<br />

dependent upon the present <strong>in</strong>dividual who was us<strong>in</strong>g it<br />

Back up <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency procedures were not<br />

adequate. The back up<br />

procedure consisted of a copy of the program be<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed separately <strong>in</strong> the<br />

same room. The usage of unauthorised software was very common. While the<br />

organisations might have purchased a licenced software, the end users were hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

different pirated copies.


The vulnerability for virus was very common. The viruses generally get spread<br />

either through the usage of unauthorised copies of software or the floppies which the<br />

Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance Eng<strong>in</strong>eers will be. br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

AUDIT<br />

Infonnation was gathered from a sample of 30 auditors regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

procedures they adopt <strong>in</strong> organisations where End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong> existence<br />

<strong>and</strong> utilised for important areas of operation.<br />

The auditors, either <strong>in</strong>ternal or external, were aware of the risks associated<br />

with End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong> There was no audit be<strong>in</strong>g performed. The<br />

auditors <strong>in</strong> spite of be<strong>in</strong>g aware that Personal Computers were <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> all the<br />

functional departments, they were ignorant of the type of applications. The audit <strong>in</strong><br />

that area was totally absent. Counter-check<strong>in</strong>g of this fact was made with the<br />

End-Users who confirmed the same.


TABLE 3.1<br />

Yes l No<br />

Are end-usen aware of organisational <strong>and</strong><br />

departmental <strong>in</strong>formation security policies<br />

<strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es?<br />

Are they adequqatc <strong>and</strong> upto date?<br />

Are computer systems passwords kept<br />

confidential by user-employees?<br />

2. General control<br />

Are then policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es available<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g:-<br />

Access security<br />

Systems Development<br />

Change Controls<br />

Date consistency<br />

Documentation<br />

Back-up<br />

Recovery<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Copyright violation<br />

Virus vulnerabilit


116<br />

Yes I No<br />

3. Access security<br />

Is there a security management function?<br />

Are visitors or unauthoriscd users hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

easy access to areas where EUC is<br />

performed?<br />

Are files conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sensitive data<br />

ennypted?<br />

4. Systems development<br />

Are there procedures <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong> for<br />

systems development?<br />

5. Change control<br />

Are there adequate documentation<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g any changes to the programs?<br />

6. Documentation<br />

Are there adequate documentation for<br />

programs, hardware, system configuration<br />

<strong>and</strong> procedures?<br />

7. Beck-up recovery <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency<br />

Plann<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

Are there procedures <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards for<br />

program<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> data back-up?<br />

Is there any tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g provided to End-usen<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g dangers of magnetic files static<br />

electricity, equipment failure etc.?<br />

If back-up <strong>and</strong> storage facilities are<br />

available, are they <strong>in</strong> the same area or at a<br />

different location?


117<br />

Yes I No<br />

8. Copy-right violation<br />

Are them written policies <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g<br />

End-users to the legal consequences of<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g un-authorised copies of software?<br />

Are there policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es issued on<br />

prevent<strong>in</strong>g an attack of virus, debugg<strong>in</strong>g it if<br />

it is attacked <strong>and</strong> consequential actions to<br />

be taken to nullify the attack of virus?<br />

Are there specific guidel<strong>in</strong>es given regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

usage of spread-sheet, specially when used<br />

for decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g?


The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation <strong>in</strong> their "Systems,<br />

Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control" report <strong>in</strong> Module 7 dealt with End-User <strong>and</strong> departmental<br />

comput<strong>in</strong>g. They have conducted a swey <strong>and</strong> the key survey f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><br />

observations are as follows :<br />

* Forty-one percent of the 249 respondents <strong>in</strong>dicated that one of the highest<br />

related risks is poor data accuracy or <strong>in</strong>tegrity. Of this 41% (101<br />

respondents), 63% felt the risk would <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the future, 25% felt there<br />

would be no change, <strong>and</strong> 12% said it would decrease.<br />

The most effective control mitigate this risk was thought to be policies,<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards, <strong>and</strong> procedures (27%), followed by <strong>in</strong>putloutput <strong>controls</strong> (19%)<br />

<strong>and</strong> systems test<strong>in</strong>g (9%). The respondents cit<strong>in</strong>g policies, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong><br />

procedures as the best control <strong>in</strong>dicated that the control is not used <strong>in</strong> 26%<br />

of the organizations, partially used <strong>in</strong> 70%, <strong>and</strong> fully used <strong>in</strong> 4%.<br />

* Other significant risks mentioned <strong>in</strong>cluded development of <strong>in</strong>compatible<br />

systems <strong>and</strong> unauthorized access or changes to data or systems. Related<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded policies, st<strong>and</strong>ards, <strong>and</strong> procedures, <strong>and</strong> access <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

security, respectively.<br />

Internal audit organizations of all sizes plan to <strong>in</strong>crease audit coverage of<br />

EUC' over the next three yeqars. Actual coverage <strong>in</strong> the past three years <strong>and</strong><br />

planned audit coverage <strong>in</strong> the next three yean are presented <strong>in</strong> Figure 1.2 for<br />

small (one to ten auditors), medium (eleven to sixty auditors) <strong>and</strong> large (over<br />

sixty auditors) <strong>in</strong>ternal audit organisations.


Percent of Respondents peffonn<strong>in</strong>g full or limited scope of EUC Audits<br />

Actual - Past<br />

Three Years<br />

Planned - Nut 91 %<br />

Three Years<br />

It is advisable to encourage development of End-User Comput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> view of<br />

the follow<strong>in</strong>g benefits:-<br />

i. Users become self-reliant <strong>and</strong> hence are more responsive to <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

needs <strong>and</strong> requirements.<br />

ii. Application development <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance costs are m<strong>in</strong>imal as departmental<br />

present needs <strong>and</strong> future requirements are properly understood.<br />

iii. Back-log of computer applications ate considerably reduced as there is clear<br />

prioritisation of the department's needs.<br />

It is advisable <strong>and</strong> hence recommended to take full advantage of the benefits<br />

of EUC Adequate steps need to be. taken to avoid associated risks <strong>in</strong> EUC The<br />

recommended steps would be. as follows:<br />

i. Set up a dedicated consult<strong>in</strong>g group with<strong>in</strong> the organisation It would be<br />

advisable to have a small plann<strong>in</strong>g cell of competent personnel who would<br />

provide the guidance for the end-users. The type of services they would<br />

provide <strong>in</strong>clude tra<strong>in</strong>ed end-users generally of traditional systems<br />

development as also provid<strong>in</strong>g knowledge of general <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> application<br />

<strong>controls</strong>.


LOCAL AREA NETWORK (LAN)<br />

Local Area Network (LAN) is def<strong>in</strong>ed as a data communication system that<br />

allows a number of <strong>in</strong>dependent devices to communicate directly with each other<br />

with<strong>in</strong> a moderately sized geographic area <strong>and</strong> offer a physical communications<br />

channel provid<strong>in</strong>g moderate transfer rates.<br />

Network comput<strong>in</strong>g provides the capability for users who are work<strong>in</strong>g on<br />

different personal computers, micro-computers or work stations to communicate with<br />

each other via network It is also possible for users to share network resources <strong>and</strong><br />

also use any of the services that the network provides. Network consists of a complex<br />

of hardware, software <strong>and</strong> communications with a number of components located<br />

over a large area. Major components <strong>in</strong> a network are<br />

i. Network filesemr <strong>and</strong> netware<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Network workstations<br />

Transmission media.<br />

Network file server <strong>and</strong> netware<br />

A file server is a micro computer. This runs on an operat<strong>in</strong>g system to control<br />

the network resources associated with the file server. Network operat<strong>in</strong>g system coord<strong>in</strong>ates<br />

LAN activities. This decides as to who can access which files, as to who can<br />

make changes to data <strong>and</strong> who can use the network pr<strong>in</strong>ters.


To network, files an stored on a hard disc drive located on the server.<br />

Naturally the hard disc drive capacity is very high.<br />

Network workstations<br />

Work stations are personal computers. Network users do their work on these<br />

computers. These work stations can process their own files <strong>and</strong> run their own<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g systems. However, the network workstations are capable of access<strong>in</strong>g files<br />

not only from the local drives but h m fles elsewhere <strong>in</strong> the network.<br />

They are:<br />

Workstations use two pieces of software to communicate with the file server.<br />

(a)<br />

@)<br />

The shell<br />

The protocol<br />

The shell redirects the requests from work stations across the network as<br />

necessary. The protocol lays down the rules <strong>and</strong> procedures <strong>and</strong> provides a common<br />

communication mechanism between the workstation <strong>and</strong> the fileserver.<br />

Transmission media<br />

The transmission media can be any of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

* Twisted pair <strong>and</strong> co-axial cable made of copper<br />

* Fibre optics or fibre plastics<br />

Wireless


Information flows between work stations <strong>and</strong> the servers File server which is<br />

a micro computer operates as a "host computer" with which other entities like pr<strong>in</strong>ter,<br />

other term<strong>in</strong>als etc <strong>in</strong>teract. Hardware <strong>and</strong> software components are put together to<br />

operate as a whole by the operat<strong>in</strong>g system of the network. Workstation <strong>in</strong> a network<br />

can be <strong>and</strong> may be W~ected to one or more file semrs.<br />

It is possible for one network to be connected to several other networks.<br />

Distributed or decentralised comput<strong>in</strong>g facilities can be set up <strong>in</strong> different<br />

geographical areas. However, <strong>in</strong> a distributed <strong>environment</strong> data is exposed to more<br />

threats. However, the risks can be m<strong>in</strong>imised by build<strong>in</strong>g "trusted network comput<strong>in</strong>g<br />

facility".<br />

PROBLEM AREAS<br />

Communication systems have become a vital strategic asset for many<br />

organisations. In the commercial organisations management has realised that<br />

network<strong>in</strong>g, market<strong>in</strong>g, production <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>and</strong> other vital functional areas gives<br />

them <strong>in</strong>formation power.<br />

With the dynamic market<strong>in</strong>g effort put <strong>in</strong> by vendor of network systems,<br />

coupled with "image creation", amongst others <strong>in</strong> the field has resulted <strong>in</strong><br />

proliferation, more <strong>and</strong> more organisations have started "network<strong>in</strong>g" their computer<br />

<strong>environment</strong>. An effective management of the organisations' telecommunication<br />

resources can no doubt offer substantial benefits, but sound control procedures are<br />

needed to enhance the network's ability to adapt <strong>and</strong> grow with the organisation. The<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal auditor <strong>in</strong> the normal circumstances should exam<strong>in</strong>e the policies <strong>and</strong>


procedures <strong>and</strong> the tekcommunication function iwlf to evaluate the effectiveness of<br />

the network<strong>in</strong>g function However, the present practices are not as expected There<br />

an no policies <strong>and</strong> procedures which are very essential for manag<strong>in</strong>g network<br />

operations. There an no procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g compatibility of hardware <strong>and</strong><br />

software, protection of confidential <strong>in</strong>formation, procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g procurement<br />

There is no detailed def<strong>in</strong>ition of requirements, detailed evaluation, contract terms<br />

<strong>and</strong> conditions.<br />

Communication network is an area where it is essential to have hardware <strong>and</strong><br />

software compatibility. The <strong>in</strong>troduction of new technology very often changes the<br />

def<strong>in</strong>ition of compatibility <strong>and</strong> hence it is necessary to constantly review the policies<br />

to ensure its currency.<br />

In the present day practices, there are no policies <strong>and</strong> procedures <strong>in</strong> most of<br />

the organisations with the result the question of its be<strong>in</strong>g current does not arise. It<br />

is not uncommon to f<strong>in</strong>d elaborate complicated arrangements which are quite<br />

unsatisfactory, be<strong>in</strong>g made to have the latest version of the software to work on an<br />

outdated hardware. Amongst the other, more important present practices are:<br />

i. Lack of systems development life cycle methodology.<br />

ii.<br />

In most organisations, the concept of SDLC is absent <strong>and</strong> when a network is<br />

implemented, the same culture is cont<strong>in</strong>ued, with the result there is total<br />

absence of established objectives, cost estimates, acceptance criteria, etc.<br />

Change management<br />

There are no welldocumented procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g alterations or<br />

modifications to hardware <strong>and</strong> software.


Security authorisation<br />

Then is no well-established corporate security policies <strong>in</strong> most of the cases<br />

In a few cases where it does exist, though vaguely, procedures for access<strong>in</strong>g network<br />

facilities, ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of audit trails, us<strong>in</strong>g diagnostic hardware are not clear <strong>and</strong><br />

well-laid down<br />

Problem report<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> anrveillann<br />

There are no well-laid down procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g preparation of reports<br />

connected with security violations or hardware problems. The organisations when an<br />

<strong>in</strong>dividual may be held responsible for follow-up iction on such reports, is also given<br />

other responsibilities. In the circumstances, perform<strong>in</strong>g the duty of system<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrator becomes <strong>in</strong>cidental. There is no supervision of the systems<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrator's work There has been a reported case of the system adm<strong>in</strong>istrator<br />

himself hav<strong>in</strong>g been a party to security violation.<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>and</strong> disaster recovery plan<br />

It is absolutely imperative to have well- documented st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g generally <strong>and</strong> more so when network<strong>in</strong>g is<br />

<strong>in</strong>troduced. A study of the present practices reveals that there is no such welldocumented<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards or guidel<strong>in</strong>es. It is only a case of crisis management While<br />

segregation of duties is an important element of system of <strong>in</strong>ternal control, <strong>in</strong> not so<br />

big organisations, it becomes difficult to implement this pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. In the<br />

circumstances, it becomes more important to have an effective cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan. In<br />

most of the organisations it is absent.


Five users were selected at r<strong>and</strong>om for study <strong>in</strong> a large public limited company<br />

with a turnover of several cram of rupees <strong>and</strong> a widely dispersed ofice where the<br />

concept of IAN was <strong>in</strong>troduad Discussions with the senior executive of the<br />

company <strong>in</strong>charge of computer operations revealed that users were permitted to<br />

make "sunple changes" to programs which were relevant to their departments <strong>in</strong><br />

violation of the generally accepted discipl<strong>in</strong>e that users should use the program only<br />

<strong>in</strong> the ''Execution Node". The programs were accessed from the file server <strong>and</strong><br />

modifications made at the user end The pr<strong>in</strong>t out at the file server node provided<br />

this <strong>in</strong>formation. It was <strong>in</strong>formed that there is a systems adm<strong>in</strong>istrator who<br />

periodically files the pr<strong>in</strong>tsuts. Further discussions revealed that most of the security<br />

considerations are be<strong>in</strong>g violated on the basis of the trust on the 'loyal staff'. In<br />

another organisation which was also a public limited company, access control<br />

procedures were <strong>in</strong>adequate. A member of the staff made an unauthorised access<br />

to a confidential file <strong>and</strong> obta<strong>in</strong>ed the <strong>in</strong>formation to use aga<strong>in</strong>st the organisation.<br />

This <strong>in</strong>stance was discovered after the <strong>in</strong>cident by a casual view<strong>in</strong>g of the pr<strong>in</strong>t-out<br />

at node which had an important file. Subsequently, steps were taken to review<br />

"Access Procedures".<br />

In a nationalid bank, the manager was provided with a Node to facilitate his<br />

giv<strong>in</strong>g the passward at appropriate situations, like "permitt<strong>in</strong>g overdraft to certa<strong>in</strong><br />

customers". It was found that us<strong>in</strong>g manager's password had been converted <strong>in</strong>to part<br />

of operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>structions. Discussion with the manager revealed that these<br />

procedures were violated aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> view of the trust they have on the staff. A<br />

programmer <strong>in</strong> a foreign country who opened an Account <strong>in</strong> the Bank <strong>and</strong> took<br />

advantage of the vulnerabilities <strong>in</strong> the procedures had absconded with a large sum


of money befoxc the same was discovered. In all the fivc cases, the auditors were<br />

blissfully ignorant of the risks <strong>and</strong> exposures<br />

STANDARD ACCEPTJD PROCEDURES<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> purpose of hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>controls</strong> is to m<strong>in</strong>imise the exposures. The<br />

additional <strong>controls</strong> that arc needed <strong>in</strong> an onl<strong>in</strong>e system are:<br />

k Security control<br />

Access<br />

Authentication<br />

Authorisation<br />

* Privacy<br />

* Process <strong>environment</strong><br />

Program changes<br />

Authoris<strong>in</strong>g execution of program<br />

Operat<strong>in</strong>g systems<br />

B. New components control<br />

Data communication<br />

Term<strong>in</strong>als<br />

C Controls to provide adequate trails<br />

Audit trail<br />

Documentation of magnetic medium<br />

Audit trails from transactional loss to create recovery <strong>controls</strong><br />

Figure given below highlights the. new <strong>controls</strong> that are needed.'<br />

' Adopted from Javier EKuong, "Controls for Advanced On-l<strong>in</strong>e Data Bue<br />

Systemsn, Management Advisory Publications.


ON-LINE SYSTEM CONTROLS AND AUDIT PROBLEMS<br />

lnpS Phase<br />

Process Phase<br />

Wu( Ph8e.e<br />

Onl<strong>in</strong>e<br />

User Repom<br />

;zl<br />

ONLINE<br />

Consde<br />

/"<br />

SYSTEM<br />

DB Dumps<br />

BACK UP 6 RECOVERY<br />

I Integrtty<br />

A Accuracy<br />

C Conbnuw<br />

Adopted from W s b On-L,ne WbSase Sjdmns by Jawr F Kuonp,<br />

MaruOemsnl Adnsoly Wbons. Mass


Prwid<strong>in</strong>g on-l<strong>in</strong>e qstcrns <strong>controls</strong><br />

Generally systems are designed to provide built <strong>in</strong> <strong>controls</strong> to enswe the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

Accuracy<br />

Security<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>uity<br />

In order to design appropriate <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> an oveniew of the design<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of the <strong>controls</strong> needs to be made. The control po<strong>in</strong>ts could be considered under the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g heads:<br />

i. Data entry<br />

ii. Data communication<br />

At the po<strong>in</strong>t of data ently control mechanisms are built <strong>in</strong> to m<strong>in</strong>imise<br />

consequences of the follow<strong>in</strong>g threats :<br />

Enter<strong>in</strong>g wrong transactions<br />

Enter<strong>in</strong>g unauthorised practices<br />

Improper adjustments by misus<strong>in</strong>g error matior, practices<br />

Absence of audit trails<br />

Loss of transactions<br />

To ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Access control, security <strong>and</strong> privacy, st<strong>and</strong>ard practices to be<br />

followed are as follows :


Then should be automatic sign off of all operaton when a major system<br />

failure is detected<br />

There should be restricted menu display for each user.<br />

Then should k specific passwords for users.<br />

There should be supervisory passwords for special functions.<br />

Automatic disabl<strong>in</strong>g of term<strong>in</strong>als after trials.<br />

Logg<strong>in</strong>g of unsuccessful trials <strong>and</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g count of the same.<br />

Disabl<strong>in</strong>g of term<strong>in</strong>als after work<strong>in</strong>g houn.<br />

Then should be logg<strong>in</strong>g after oftlour use of term<strong>in</strong>als <strong>and</strong> importance should<br />

be attahced to accountability of entries.<br />

There should be effective security surveillance procedures.<br />

Password control<br />

Password display on term<strong>in</strong>als should be suppressed.<br />

There should be separate password for identification <strong>and</strong> authentication<br />

Establish an effective adm<strong>in</strong>istrative procedures for password change <strong>and</strong><br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance as follows :<br />

All password changes should be reviewed <strong>and</strong> there should be a security<br />

surveillance.<br />

For sensitive positions there should be tightly accounted procedures for<br />

changes <strong>in</strong> passwords when there is change <strong>in</strong> the personnel.


Pawords should be <strong>in</strong>validated automatically after the lapse of a certa<strong>in</strong><br />

pn-determ<strong>in</strong>ed time.<br />

Paword tabks should be <strong>in</strong>accessible other than to the super user.<br />

objectives:<br />

Control procedures should be adequate to specify the follow<strong>in</strong>g contml<br />

The term<strong>in</strong>al should always be capable of be<strong>in</strong>g identified.<br />

* The user should be identified <strong>and</strong> authenticated.<br />

The user should be capable of only operat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> limits that he is<br />

authorised to do.<br />

The term<strong>in</strong>al should be capable of logg<strong>in</strong>g all deviations from normal<br />

operations.<br />

The operation at any term<strong>in</strong>al should be so designed to provide<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>uity of operations <strong>in</strong> case of breakdown or <strong>in</strong>terruption<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard prnctica - Audit procedures<br />

On l<strong>in</strong>e computer systems have an impact on the audit procedures. The matter<br />

is of particular importance to auditors <strong>in</strong> an onl<strong>in</strong>e system which are:<br />

Authorisation<br />

Completeness<br />

* Accuracy of onl<strong>in</strong>e transactions


Integrity of records <strong>and</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g specially <strong>in</strong> view of the fact that <strong>in</strong><br />

a networked system, the system is accessible to many users <strong>and</strong><br />

programmers.<br />

Chnpr <strong>in</strong> the performance of audit procedures due to the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

Transaction trails becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>visible<br />

The necessity for the auditon who have proper skills <strong>in</strong> an onl<strong>in</strong>e<br />

system.<br />

Adequate knowledge of procedures dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

Audit plann<strong>in</strong>g stage<br />

Concurrently with onl<strong>in</strong>e process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

After process<strong>in</strong>g has taken place.<br />

Generally <strong>in</strong> a well designed onl<strong>in</strong>e computer system, the auditor would rely<br />

more on <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong>. It is accepted that the auditor would have adequate<br />

knowledge of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> an onl<strong>in</strong>e system so that he will follow the<br />

appropriate audit procedures.<br />

Audit procedures performed concurrently with onl<strong>in</strong>e process<strong>in</strong>g would require<br />

test<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>controls</strong> on the l<strong>in</strong>e applications.<br />

<strong>in</strong>clude:<br />

Procedures associated with audit after process<strong>in</strong>g has been completed would<br />

Compliance test<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>controls</strong> for transactions already logged <strong>in</strong> for<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

Authorisation<br />

Completeness <strong>and</strong>


(c) Accuracy<br />

* Substantive test<strong>in</strong>g of transactions <strong>and</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g results<br />

Reprocess<strong>in</strong>g of certa<strong>in</strong> transactions where necessary.<br />

It is generally recommended <strong>and</strong> found more effective for an auditor to<br />

perform a pre- implementation review of new onl<strong>in</strong>e applications.<br />

Audit<br />

Information was gathered from a sample of 30 auditors regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

procedures they would adopt <strong>in</strong> organisations where computers were net-worked<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g LAN utilised for important areas of operations.<br />

The auditors neither <strong>in</strong>ternal nor external were aware of the risks associated<br />

with LAN <strong>environment</strong>. There was no audit be<strong>in</strong>g performed. The auditors <strong>in</strong> spite<br />

of be<strong>in</strong>g aware that computers were <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> all the functional departments <strong>and</strong><br />

networked, they were ignorant of the type of applications. The audit <strong>in</strong> that area was<br />

totally absenr Counter-check<strong>in</strong>g of this fact was made with organisations hav<strong>in</strong>g LAN<br />

who confirmed the fact that no audit was performed.<br />

Controls<br />

A r<strong>and</strong>om sample of 5 organisations which had <strong>in</strong>stalled LAN was taken to<br />

study the control aspects.


ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS<br />

Role of the auditor<br />

In the sample number of organisations chosen for sutvey of control <strong>and</strong> audit<br />

procedures, it was found neither the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor nor the external auditor was<br />

perform<strong>in</strong>g an audit of the LAN <strong>environment</strong> As a matter of fact, the audit<br />

operations did not <strong>in</strong>clude evaluation of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a wmputerised<br />

<strong>environment</strong> generally. The auditors are totally unaware of the risks associated with<br />

a LAN <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> the accepted well established <strong>controls</strong> which needs to be<br />

implemented to m<strong>in</strong>imise those risks. This fact of the auditors <strong>in</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a LAN <strong>environment</strong> was <strong>in</strong>dependently confirmed by the organisations<br />

which had a LAN <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

CONTROLS<br />

In none of the organisations, there were any documented procedures <strong>and</strong><br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es regard<strong>in</strong>g implementation of LAN. While <strong>in</strong> some of the organisations,<br />

there was a network diagram <strong>in</strong> other organisations, there was no network diagram.<br />

Even <strong>in</strong> the organisations which had the network diagram it was not updated <strong>and</strong><br />

hence <strong>in</strong>coned There was no specific term<strong>in</strong>al designated to monitor activity with<strong>in</strong><br />

the onl<strong>in</strong>e system. In one of the organisations, a user department was permitted to<br />

have access of program from his node make a change <strong>in</strong> the program <strong>and</strong> executed<br />

at its term<strong>in</strong>al. Though this situation was reflected <strong>in</strong> the pr<strong>in</strong>t out at the network<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrator's term<strong>in</strong>al, apart from the fact that the pr<strong>in</strong>t out was filed no further<br />

action was taken.


In most of the cases, no review of <strong>controls</strong> or procedures are undertaken. In<br />

one other organisation, it was discovered later that important management<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation which should be available only at one term<strong>in</strong>al was accessed at another<br />

term<strong>in</strong>al dur<strong>in</strong>g luch time. Much after the event, it was discwered <strong>and</strong> corrective<br />

action taken.<br />

The discipl<strong>in</strong>e associated with the password is not generally be<strong>in</strong>g adhered to.<br />

Passwords <strong>in</strong> many <strong>in</strong>stances have become part of operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>structions <strong>and</strong><br />

passwords <strong>in</strong> some cases are known to more than one person.<br />

In all the cases, there have been <strong>in</strong>stances of violation of security, lack of<br />

<strong>in</strong>tegrity, loss of data. Corrective action has been taken subsequent to its occurence.<br />

Even <strong>in</strong> organisations with LAN <strong>environment</strong> like other organisations, the<br />

Disaster Recovery Plann<strong>in</strong>g is totally <strong>in</strong>adequate. Othcr than hav<strong>in</strong>g a copy of the<br />

program <strong>and</strong> copy of important data stored <strong>in</strong> the same <strong>in</strong>stallation, there was no<br />

other evidence of an effective DRP. Diasten have occured <strong>and</strong> recovery had been<br />

made with much difficulty.<br />

SUGGESTIONS<br />

In view of the operations of an organisation be<strong>in</strong>g distributed, it becomes<br />

necessary to have computer operations located at the place of the operation.<br />

However, to have an overall control of the organisation, <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> at the same


timc dow<strong>in</strong>g each of the usen to haw a m for such <strong>in</strong>formation as may be<br />

neceuary it bewms imperative to have networbk<br />

Local Area Networks (LANS) have designed a new doma<strong>in</strong> of networks that<br />

can be <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>and</strong> managed by user groups The dynamic nature of the<br />

tekmmmunication envimnrncnt along with the strategic importance of networks<br />

ghs tekmmmunications high visibility. This necessitates the need for an effective<br />

control.<br />

In view of the importance of mntrols <strong>in</strong> LANS <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tegrity, security,<br />

coddentiality <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uity of <strong>in</strong>formations effective <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> of such system is very<br />

irnpottanL<br />

A study of st<strong>and</strong>ard accepted procedures for mntrols <strong>and</strong> audit <strong>in</strong> comparison<br />

to the actual practice as revealed by the survey conducted showed up a big gap.<br />

Tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to consideration the <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> India the follow<strong>in</strong>g suggestions<br />

need to be considered <strong>in</strong> the areas of control <strong>and</strong> audit <strong>in</strong> a LAN.<br />

Contml of completeness <strong>and</strong> accuracy<br />

There should be clear guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> procedures laid down by the<br />

Management regard<strong>in</strong>g usage of network additions of nodes, job responsibilities,<br />

security etc<br />

There should be corporate policy laiddown regard<strong>in</strong>g procedures to be<br />

followed <strong>in</strong> the communication systems to ensue data <strong>in</strong>kpity <strong>and</strong> completeness.


The procedure at its least should <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>controls</strong> regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

* Time <strong>and</strong> date stamp<br />

Sequence number check<strong>in</strong>g<br />

* Transaction term<strong>in</strong>al<br />

Periodic message reconciliation<br />

* Back up equipments <strong>and</strong> facilities<br />

Recovery procedures<br />

Network recurily<br />

Clear guidel<strong>in</strong>es should be provided regard<strong>in</strong>g classification of critical<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

There should be well documented security policies st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> procedures.<br />

Audit <strong>and</strong> legal department should be associated <strong>in</strong> security plann<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Acquisition of equipment sonware <strong>and</strong> semces<br />

There should be a central department who should have the knowledge of<br />

organisational <strong>in</strong>teresq who would be able to establish product specification <strong>and</strong><br />

bench marks.<br />

Auditors <strong>and</strong> users should have an important role <strong>in</strong> product acquisition.<br />

Change management<br />

There should be an authorised procedure for any tele communication change.<br />

The prwdure should <strong>in</strong>clude documentation requirements <strong>and</strong> approval. There<br />

should be a post implementation review of telecommunication changes.


Suggestions for audit procedum<br />

Analysis of the procedures <strong>in</strong> a sample of sumy of organisations hav<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

LAN <strong>environment</strong> revealed that there is no role performed by either the <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

auditor or an external auditor. While an external auditor as of now aay claim that<br />

EDP Audit is not part of the statutory audit, <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor would be fa~:.ng <strong>in</strong> his<br />

duty if he does not evaluate the <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the LAN <strong>environment</strong> of his<br />

organisation. Broadly the audit program should <strong>in</strong>clude the follow<strong>in</strong>g at its m<strong>in</strong>imum<br />

* Check the existence of policies <strong>and</strong> procedures from the management<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g implementation <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of LAN.<br />

* Check an <strong>in</strong>ventory of data communication equipment<br />

Verify whether there lr a network diagram which will clearly denote the<br />

physical <strong>and</strong> logical action between various communication equipment.<br />

Verily<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

Is any particular term<strong>in</strong>al designated specifically to monltor activity with<strong>in</strong> the<br />

Onl<strong>in</strong>e system?<br />

Is there any documentation of hardware failures <strong>and</strong> software failures?<br />

Are there any procedures to ensure that all transactions are received?<br />

What is the procedure regard<strong>in</strong>g transactions messages that may be deplicated<br />

unaccounted or lost? Thus, the software log of errors <strong>and</strong> re- transmission.<br />

Is there any review of such error logs?<br />

Physical security<br />

Is physical security for communication equipment adequate?


Access to test equipment restricted only to authorised personnel?<br />

Are cables adequately scheduled to prevent physical tamper<strong>in</strong>g?<br />

hgical security<br />

Are password systems <strong>in</strong> use?<br />

Are only authorised persons permitted to access communication software?<br />

Are the users prevented from mak<strong>in</strong>g unlimited number of unsuccessful<br />

attempts?


QUESTIONNAIRE - AUDIT<br />

CHECKLIST FOR AUDIT OF TELECOMhlUNICATION SYSTEM<br />

Yes i No<br />

GENERAL<br />

Have you checked whether there is any <strong>in</strong>ventory<br />

of audit communication equipmenf term<strong>in</strong>als,<br />

modems, etc?<br />

Have you checked network diagram <strong>in</strong> connection<br />

with physical <strong>and</strong> logical connections of<br />

communication equipment?<br />

Are there any written authorisations regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

connected physical <strong>and</strong> logical connections, the<br />

term<strong>in</strong>als?<br />

Is supenisor approval needed to use<br />

term<strong>in</strong>als outside authorised usage hours?<br />

Are there written guidel<strong>in</strong>es to determ<strong>in</strong>e any<br />

errors <strong>in</strong> the communication equipment?<br />

Are there established procedures that all<br />

transactions are recorded?<br />

Is there a review procedure for transaction which<br />

may not be accounted or corrupted?<br />

Is there accountability for review<strong>in</strong>g error logs?<br />

Is there a journal of messages <strong>and</strong> does the<br />

message have the follow<strong>in</strong>g?


139<br />

Yes I No<br />

Term<strong>in</strong>al, User, Data, Message No. end of<br />

message, end of Transmission<br />

Have you satisfied yourself with back-up facilities<br />

for the onl<strong>in</strong>e system is adequate?<br />

Have you verified the restart recovery procedure <strong>in</strong><br />

case of hardware, software failure?<br />

PHYSICAL SECURITY<br />

Are there policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

provid<strong>in</strong>g physical security for term<strong>in</strong>als?<br />

Are the cables electrically shielded to protect from<br />

physical tamper<strong>in</strong>g of other damage?<br />

Is test equipment <strong>and</strong> diagnostic software used only<br />

by authorised people?<br />

LOGICAL SECURITY<br />

Are only authorised personnel permitted to access<br />

communication software?<br />

Are users prevented from mak<strong>in</strong>g unlimited<br />

number of unsuccessful attempts?<br />

If sensntive <strong>in</strong>formation is be<strong>in</strong>g processed, are<br />

there adequate <strong>controls</strong> that they can be accessed<br />

only by authorised personnel?<br />

When was the last audit conducted?<br />

With<strong>in</strong> one year? With<strong>in</strong> two years?


QUESTIONNAIRE - GENERAL<br />

Yes I<br />

No<br />

Does your department have any policies <strong>and</strong><br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stallation of network, add<strong>in</strong>g<br />

nodes, job responsibility, report<strong>in</strong>g structures etc?<br />

Has an audit been ever conducted of the<br />

network<strong>in</strong>g configuration <strong>and</strong> the applications?<br />

COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY<br />

Do you employ built-<strong>in</strong> <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> your<br />

communication systems to ensure completeness<br />

<strong>and</strong> accuracy?<br />

NGIWORK SECURITY<br />

Do you have any well-laid out policies <strong>and</strong><br />

procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g the network security?<br />

Is the <strong>in</strong>formation classified accord<strong>in</strong>g to its<br />

criticality <strong>and</strong> sensitiveness?<br />

Has the auditor or the legal advisor been<br />

associated <strong>in</strong> security plann<strong>in</strong>g?<br />

In the last two years have there been any security<br />

lapses?<br />

ACCESS CONTROL<br />

Are all your term<strong>in</strong>als physically protected from<br />

unauthorised access?<br />

Do you have logg<strong>in</strong>g facilities?<br />

Do you have surveillance facilities?<br />

Is there a review of violation reports?


141<br />

Yes 1 No<br />

Have there been any violation <strong>in</strong> the<br />

years regard<strong>in</strong>g acocu?<br />

last two<br />

ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT<br />

Are there any established Benchmarks?<br />

Does the user have any role?<br />

Does the auditor have a role?<br />

CHANGES IN NEIWORK<br />

Are there any written procedures <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g change management?<br />

Are there any check lists, documentation request <strong>in</strong><br />

the change management procedure?<br />

Are there any post-implementation renew of the<br />

changes?


CHAPTER V<br />

DATA BASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM<br />

Overview<br />

Objectives of data basc management: The professional approach to<br />

application system development had a strong focus on application programmes <strong>and</strong><br />

processes. When the primary focus is on process naturally application systems<br />

develop separately <strong>and</strong> operate <strong>in</strong>dependently. Data files are established as a by<br />

product of application development. As a consequence, if two applications require<br />

same items of data they are duplicated result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> redundancy.<br />

To retrieve data that is stored urgently, the user has to decide as to which<br />

application to use to obta<strong>in</strong> the necessary data. This necessitates the coord<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />

data updat<strong>in</strong>g as regards the application systems. This is necessary to ensure that the<br />

same data is updated <strong>in</strong> the same way at the same time irrespective of the fact <strong>in</strong><br />

which file the data exists. To be able to obta<strong>in</strong> at all times <strong>in</strong>formation based on the<br />

latest version of data would <strong>in</strong>volve us<strong>in</strong>g additional programm<strong>in</strong>g which would<br />

periodically be similar data <strong>in</strong> different files so that all the files have the latest<br />

version of the data. This would delay obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation at request as a great deal<br />

of process<strong>in</strong>g is necessary before correct <strong>and</strong> latest <strong>in</strong>formation could be given. In the<br />

1960s, usage of a magnetic tape as a computer medium was prevalent which<br />

imposed a sequential structure of the file. In the early 1970s <strong>in</strong> countries like USA<br />

<strong>and</strong> Australia, the concept of data basc management systems emerged. In our own<br />

country only <strong>in</strong> the hst two or three years, that is from the 1990s the concept of data


ase management system has been catch<strong>in</strong>g on. Till recently, that is bcfon 1990s<br />

the high cost of equipment <strong>and</strong> the non-availability of skilled personnel necessitated<br />

centralised execution <strong>and</strong> control of system denloprnent This resulted <strong>in</strong> end-users<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g privately data manually so that at any po<strong>in</strong>t of time they would have<br />

upto date <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

The emergence of micro computers has made end-users ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g this<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation on the computers <strong>in</strong>stead of manually.<br />

Hav<strong>in</strong>g micro-computers at the users end did not solve the problems but only<br />

ended up <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation problems be<strong>in</strong>g transferred also to the end-users.<br />

The need for gett<strong>in</strong>g over these problems motivated organisations to seek for<br />

new solutions.<br />

MOTIVATION TOWARDS DATA BASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM<br />

The major problems which motivate data base management are:<br />

(i)<br />

Quick answers were not available for 'simple' adhoc questions<br />

(ii)<br />

High development costs as the efforts were duplicated both at the<br />

central process<strong>in</strong>g department as also the user department<br />

iii)<br />

Low responsiveness to change<br />

Once an application is developed <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>ed over to the user many th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

happen. Application system may require change either due to the changes<br />

<strong>in</strong>


statutory requirements or users own views for a different approach -after the system<br />

has been <strong>in</strong> use for some time. Mak<strong>in</strong>g changes to the system after the application<br />

has been developed requires great deal of costs <strong>and</strong> time by way of additional<br />

programm<strong>in</strong>g effon <strong>and</strong> computer time.<br />

It is reported that ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of exist<strong>in</strong>g programmes consumes 75% of the<br />

time of Systems Analysts <strong>and</strong> Programmers. This leads naturally to the management<br />

to study ways of reduc<strong>in</strong>g people - <strong>in</strong>tensive activities. Such reduction can be<br />

achieved only if a special effon is put <strong>in</strong> to develop a ... discipl<strong>in</strong>ed system.<br />

LOW DATA INTEGRITY AND QUALITY<br />

Incomplete <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>accurate data leads to lack of confidence <strong>in</strong> such data.<br />

However, should such data be used for mak<strong>in</strong>g important decisions, it would be<br />

detrimental to the <strong>in</strong>terests of the organisation. This leads to a situation when<br />

managers are constra<strong>in</strong>ed to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> their own files <strong>and</strong> of good quality <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

<strong>and</strong> unquestionable <strong>in</strong>tegrity.<br />

INADEQUATE DATA MODEL<br />

Complex data <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-file relationship make it difficult provide a formal<br />

def<strong>in</strong>ition to the system. There are limited tools<br />

for def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g data structures<br />

importance be<strong>in</strong>g given to the programm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> data structure be<strong>in</strong>g modified to suit<br />

the language. This necessitates a richer <strong>and</strong> better data structure writ<strong>in</strong>g capabilities.


While the problems discussed motivate a data base approach one should not<br />

lose sight of the fact that then an certa<strong>in</strong> anas to be borne <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d which would<br />

restra<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troduction of a data base management system.<br />

OBJEClWES OF DATA BASE MANAGEMENT<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> objeaives of the data base management are:<br />

a) Sharability<br />

b) Availability<br />

c) Evolvability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

a) Sharability<br />

The concept of sharability means that the same data would be used at the<br />

same time not only by different people but also <strong>in</strong> different processes. Data belongs<br />

to the whole organisation <strong>and</strong> not to any s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>in</strong>dividual. When data base is shared<br />

by several people it is necessary to have a central body to control the collection <strong>and</strong><br />

use of all data. When this is achieved the follow<strong>in</strong>g would result:<br />

a) Consistency of data<br />

b) Reduce redundancy of data<br />

c) Reduction <strong>in</strong> the effort needed<br />

d) Capture <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of data<br />

Shar<strong>in</strong>g of data has its own ramifications <strong>and</strong> it would become necessary to<br />

arrive at a compromise between conflict<strong>in</strong>g needs of different users.


By the concept of availability we mean that data should be made available<br />

when <strong>and</strong> where it is needed <strong>and</strong> also <strong>in</strong> a form <strong>and</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which it is needed.<br />

Then are two dimensions to the concept of availability objective <strong>and</strong> they an:<br />

i) Function <strong>and</strong> ii) Form<br />

i. Function<br />

The function of data base is to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> create a data base <strong>and</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

relevant data <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> out of the data base as per the requirements of users.<br />

ii.<br />

Form<br />

The DBMS system should be <strong>in</strong> a position to economically <strong>and</strong> effectively.<br />

a) Store diverse data<br />

b) In an <strong>environment</strong> of diverse users<br />

c) Operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> diverse modes<br />

d) Us<strong>in</strong>g diverse language<br />

e) Satisfy<strong>in</strong>g diverse patterns of usage.<br />

If DBMS were to h<strong>and</strong>le only a very narrow range of diversity users could feel<br />

disillusioned as it has fallen short of expectations or has not become as responsive<br />

as was anticipated.


c) Evolvability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

The characteristic of evolvability of DBMS is its ability to change <strong>in</strong> response<br />

to the usen needs as also the advanc<strong>in</strong>g technology. Evolvability is dist<strong>in</strong>ct from<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>ability or extensibility. Evolvability <strong>in</strong>creases the possibility of the future<br />

availability of data resources.<br />

PROBLEM AREAS<br />

The technological developments <strong>in</strong> the Information Technology field have<br />

been grow<strong>in</strong>g very fast. The software <strong>and</strong> the hardware have been y<strong>in</strong>g with each<br />

other <strong>in</strong> their growth. There has been the realisation that <strong>in</strong>formation is power. As<br />

the organisations grow larger the need to have an effective <strong>in</strong>formation system has<br />

been greatly appreciated.<br />

The concepts of data base has been spoken of <strong>in</strong> many sem<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>and</strong><br />

workshops. Hence it has become an "<strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g" <strong>in</strong> larger organisations to try <strong>and</strong><br />

implement a data base management system. There have been products like<br />

ORACLE, SYBASE, INGRESS etc. There have been tremendous market<strong>in</strong>g efforts<br />

with each vendor claim<strong>in</strong>g that theirs is the product Organisations have had to make<br />

a study of their user needs <strong>and</strong> the appropriate DBMS package. However, <strong>in</strong> view<br />

of the concept not be<strong>in</strong>g very old there has not been enough experience, the<br />

organisations have had to depend upon their senior data process<strong>in</strong>g staff <strong>and</strong> outside<br />

consultants. In the present context, executive turnover is very high generally <strong>and</strong> more<br />

so <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

technology field. This has resulted <strong>in</strong> the organisations<br />

depend<strong>in</strong>g more on outside help from consultants. In most organisations there is no


<strong>in</strong>dividual specifically designated as a data base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator or data adm<strong>in</strong>istrator.<br />

It is absolutely necessary that one <strong>in</strong>dividual should be responsible for data base<br />

design, defmition <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. However, this aspect is not present <strong>in</strong> most of<br />

the organisations as a group of two or three people have to play this role of DBA<br />

In the circumstances, determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g proper access permissions for application<br />

programs <strong>and</strong> users <strong>and</strong> result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> conflict among users oi the data does create<br />

contradictions.<br />

Creation of data dictionary <strong>in</strong> many <strong>in</strong>stances is not comprehensive. Most<br />

importantly back-up <strong>and</strong> recovery procedures are not satisfactory. There are no<br />

well-settled policies <strong>and</strong> procedures. Each of the data base products like ORACLE,<br />

SYBASE <strong>and</strong> INGRESS have their own functions <strong>and</strong> security aspects. Unless the<br />

security aspects of each of the data base packages are completely understood <strong>and</strong><br />

implemented, the possibility of the system be<strong>in</strong>g exposed to security violations is<br />

immense. Lack of knowledge to implement the concept without the associated<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>and</strong> organisational support is lead<strong>in</strong>g to a situation <strong>in</strong> many<br />

organisations spend<strong>in</strong>g the whole time <strong>in</strong> unravell<strong>in</strong>g the mysteries of the data base<br />

management system package which they have implemented. The benefits that were<br />

expected to be reaped have not yet been completely achieved. In most of the cases,<br />

the cost benefit analysis after the project has been implemented would never have<br />

justified the implementation of the DBMS <strong>in</strong> the first place. The situation is not due<br />

to the fact that the concept is not implementable. The DBMS is an extremely useful<br />

<strong>and</strong> effective tool. Special efforts necd to be put <strong>in</strong>, for the creation of a perfect data<br />

dictionary allocat<strong>in</strong>g specific responsibility for data base adm<strong>in</strong>istration. In the<br />

absence of such a foundation, the data base system gets rocked. Users access needs


to be controlled which is achieved by grant<strong>in</strong>g them the privilege or by select<strong>in</strong>g<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>s that they can use. As these procedures are not streaml<strong>in</strong>ed the <strong>in</strong>creased<br />

<strong>and</strong> important advantages of DBMS is not achieved.<br />

Three large public limited companies were selected at r<strong>and</strong>om. A popular<br />

DBMS package was <strong>in</strong>troduced. While the package was ~ntroduced no precautions<br />

have been taken about ensur<strong>in</strong>g that a specific <strong>in</strong>dividual was designated as the data<br />

base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator who would take total responsibility for creat<strong>in</strong>g a data dictionary<br />

<strong>and</strong> ensure that discipl<strong>in</strong>e associated with the implementation of D.B.M.S. package<br />

is followed. The organisations concurred with me that they are not violat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

required discipl<strong>in</strong>es associated with implement<strong>in</strong>g security considerations <strong>in</strong> a<br />

D.B.M.S. <strong>environment</strong>. The organ~sations were still struggl<strong>in</strong>g with problems of<br />

deadlock <strong>and</strong> relational <strong>in</strong>tegrity which was of grcater concern. The data was not<br />

gett<strong>in</strong>g updated <strong>in</strong> all the files which is a basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> a D.B.M.S. <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

PRESENT PRACTICES<br />

AUDIT<br />

As <strong>in</strong> all other areas of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, the present<br />

day presence of the audit function is totally absent. Verify<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>formati011<br />

technology control <strong>in</strong> a data base <strong>environment</strong> does not figure <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

auditors audit programme of the organisation. Procedures associated with data access,<br />

passwords system <strong>and</strong> term<strong>in</strong>al security are never audited for the senior management<br />

of the organisation to know whether the <strong>controls</strong> are <strong>in</strong> place <strong>and</strong> effective.


SMNDARD ACCEPTED PROCEDURES<br />

Controls<br />

There an three ma<strong>in</strong> data base structures, viz hierarchical network <strong>and</strong><br />

relationat The figures given below represent the pictorial representation of the<br />

structure of the different data bases. The more popular <strong>and</strong> useful data base<br />

structure is the relational data base. Relational data base are <strong>in</strong> the structure of a<br />

table. As mentioned earlier, relational data bases are more popular because they are<br />

easier to set up <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>. The data base concept seperates the data requirements<br />

from the application requirements. Both the requirements of data <strong>and</strong> application are<br />

a constantly evolv<strong>in</strong>g process. But these requirements need not necessarily be<br />

compatible. In a data base approach <strong>in</strong>tegration is provided by shar<strong>in</strong>g of common<br />

data among different programs. The data elements are stored with very litt'c<br />

redundancy. The physical file structure may not have resemblance to logical records<br />

<strong>and</strong> files. Data base system helps <strong>in</strong> ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g flexibility by creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependent data<br />

<strong>and</strong> application programs. A data base management system satisfies the needs of an<br />

organisation by a shared collection of <strong>in</strong>formation. The data base management system<br />

executes functions on behalf of application programs. St<strong>and</strong>ard accepted procedures<br />

<strong>in</strong> a data base management system <strong>in</strong>clude the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

* Creation of a data dictionary<br />

* Creation of a post of data base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator<br />

* Lay<strong>in</strong>g down procedures<br />

File consistency<br />

Avoid<strong>in</strong>g deadlock<br />

* Enor recovery <strong>and</strong> reliability


Data dictionary describes the various attniutes of data ekment. In many data<br />

base packages, <strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g physical location of the data is also <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />

The other details <strong>in</strong>cluded would be the data name, the segment on which it occurs,<br />

the programs us<strong>in</strong>g the file. The ma<strong>in</strong> advantage of hav<strong>in</strong>g a data dictionary is that<br />

data is def<strong>in</strong>ed uniformly. Information as to what data is available <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> which data<br />

base it is located is also furnished by the data dictionary. In an active data base, data<br />

dictionaries are updated automatically when there is a change. In a passive data<br />

dictionary it does not happen automatically.<br />

Data base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator as its very name <strong>in</strong>dicates is the manager of the data<br />

base. The ma<strong>in</strong> responsibilities of the data base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator are data base design,<br />

def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. He is also responsible for sett<strong>in</strong>g up policies <strong>and</strong><br />

procedures for back up <strong>and</strong> recovery. He determ<strong>in</strong>es appropriate access permissions<br />

for users as also applications programs. Whenever any conflict arises among the<br />

users of the data, the responsibility for resolv<strong>in</strong>g the conflict devolves on the data<br />

base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator.<br />

Lay<strong>in</strong>g down procedures<br />

It is possible that an application may be updat<strong>in</strong>g at more than one node.<br />

Also it is possible that a file at one Node may be updated by more than one<br />

application. In the absence of procedures it is very likely that data consistency will<br />

be lost. There should be procedures to void <strong>in</strong>consistencies. This could be done to<br />

locate a record when it is be<strong>in</strong>g updated. However, if the file action is to "read only",<br />

there is no possibility of an update <strong>and</strong> hence the record need not be located for


such purpose% Yet another method is to allow files to be updated only by<br />

processors located at the Node where the file rests.<br />

Deadlock<br />

A deadlock situation arises if two or more processes bid for the same<br />

resources <strong>in</strong> a mutually exclusive manner. In such a situation, the file may not be<br />

released as none of the processes would be completed. This would naturally cause<br />

an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite impasse. This situation is called deadlock It is necessary to ensure that<br />

DBMS packages provided for such a situation be identified <strong>and</strong> controlled. There<br />

should be a wellestablished machanism for the recovery of lost files <strong>and</strong> for<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>uation of operations even though certa<strong>in</strong> nodes are unavailable. It is necessary<br />

to ensure that there is cont<strong>in</strong>uous availability of files. This can be achieved by<br />

duplicat<strong>in</strong>g such of the files that are critical to system operation.<br />

AUDITINCPROCEDURES<br />

The auditor is to have a clear underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the situation, identify <strong>controls</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> design proper tests.<br />

The auditor should review exist<strong>in</strong>g procedures <strong>and</strong> policy manuals. He should<br />

identify data elements which are significant from the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> angle <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>e<br />

their relationship with<strong>in</strong> the data structure.<br />

The auditor should refer to the audit dictionary <strong>and</strong> with support from data<br />

base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator underst<strong>and</strong> logically relationship between important data elements,


programs <strong>and</strong> transaction types. The auditor should underst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternal control<br />

system of the DBMS package with special reference to the follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

Who can access data elements?<br />

Who can add, change or delete?<br />

The auditor should establish as to who are identified as authorised usen <strong>and</strong><br />

as to what are their capabilities.<br />

The auditor should have a detailed discussion with the data base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator<br />

to ga<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation :<br />

As to how the data base is used <strong>and</strong> what <strong>controls</strong> are employed for different<br />

purposes?<br />

In a data base envirorlnent absence of an <strong>in</strong>dividual by whatever name he is<br />

called who performs the duties of a DBA would amount to a serious control<br />

weakness?<br />

The auditor's concern for access control should be under the follow<strong>in</strong>g heads:<br />

* Data element access<br />

* Pass word systems<br />

Term<strong>in</strong>al security<br />

The auditor should ensure that programs access only such data elements which<br />

they are authorised to access while execut<strong>in</strong>g their process<strong>in</strong>g tasks. Unnecessary or<br />

uncontrolled access would expose sensitive data to exposure. He should ensure that<br />

there is a dist<strong>in</strong>ction between test data base <strong>and</strong> production data base.


While develop<strong>in</strong>g applications access may not be restricted to, but then should<br />

be built-<strong>in</strong> mntrols to amid unauthorised access to production data base.<br />

Password systems<br />

Auditors should study the password system to evaluate its adequacy. Tk pass<br />

word system should be effective <strong>and</strong> should be monitored on an on-go<strong>in</strong>g basis. This<br />

<strong>in</strong>volves ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of accurate <strong>and</strong> secure records \~f users <strong>and</strong> their associated<br />

problems. Deletion of pass words allocated to employees who have s<strong>in</strong>ce left service<br />

is an important audit concern.<br />

Term<strong>in</strong>al security<br />

The term<strong>in</strong>al should not only be physically secure but also logically secure.<br />

Effective term<strong>in</strong>al security st<strong>and</strong>ards will ensure that only authorised trans~ctions can<br />

be entered only through authorised term<strong>in</strong>als.<br />

Test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

An audit should test the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of security aspects of data bases by verify<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>and</strong> how concurrent update references are h<strong>and</strong>led, how the DBMS is ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed,<br />

how the DBA functions <strong>and</strong> what are the disaster recovery <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency<br />

procedures thought of.<br />

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS<br />

The specimen audit program questionnaire which is enclosed was utilised for<br />

gather<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g audit procedures followed <strong>in</strong> a DBMS <strong>environment</strong>.


Neither the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors nor the external auditors had a positive answer for any<br />

of the questions <strong>in</strong> the specimen audit programme. The auditors were not even aware<br />

of the name of the DBMS package be<strong>in</strong>g utiliscd <strong>in</strong> the organisation. The auditors<br />

<strong>in</strong> the organisation <strong>in</strong> the sample survey were blissfully ignorant of the audit concern<br />

<strong>in</strong> a DBMS <strong>environment</strong>, viz security <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity.<br />

There were no well laid out policies <strong>and</strong> procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g the file<br />

consistency, deadlock, error recovery or reliability. The documentation was<br />

unsatisfactory. The systems are function<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the organisation, though not<br />

satisfactorily, only due to the dedication <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of a couple of members of the<br />

staff of the data process<strong>in</strong>g team. Accidental <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional access to unauthorised<br />

data, usage of comm<strong>and</strong>s associated with logical term<strong>in</strong>als were not<br />

<strong>in</strong> order.<br />

However, by a process of development <strong>and</strong> by trial <strong>and</strong> error procedures are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

developed.<br />

Audit<br />

Information was gathered from a sample of 30 auditors regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

procedures they adopt <strong>in</strong> organisations where End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong> existence<br />

<strong>and</strong> utilised for important areas of operation.<br />

The auditors either <strong>in</strong>ternal or external were aware of the risks associated with<br />

End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong>. There was no audit be<strong>in</strong>g performed. The auditors<br />

<strong>in</strong> spite of be<strong>in</strong>g aware that Personal Computers were <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> all the functional<br />

departments, they were ignorant of the type of applications. The audit <strong>in</strong> that area


was totally absent Counter-check<strong>in</strong>g of this fact was made with the End-users who<br />

confirmed the same.<br />

SUGGESTIONS<br />

CONTROLS<br />

Even though a data base management system package might have already<br />

been <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> an organiso:ion, 11 would be necessary to issue policies <strong>and</strong><br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es for the follow<strong>in</strong>g aspects:<br />

Creation of data dictionary<br />

Duties <strong>and</strong> responsibilities of data base adm<strong>in</strong>istrator with a specific<br />

<strong>in</strong>dividual or <strong>in</strong>dividuals be<strong>in</strong>g held responsible.<br />

File consistency<br />

Deadlock<br />

Enor recovery<br />

Control over access<br />

Password systems<br />

Tenn<strong>in</strong>al security.<br />

AUDIT<br />

Even though the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor might not have been associated <strong>in</strong> the<br />

earlier stages, it would be advisable to have the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditorlaudit depanment<br />

review the <strong>controls</strong> to satisfy themselves that they are adequate. The present state<br />

of knowledge of the auditors is not adequate to discharge his duty. However, lack<br />

of knowledge would not be an excuse for not perform<strong>in</strong>g a duty <strong>and</strong> discharg<strong>in</strong>g


their responsibilities. In the circumstances, it would be necessary for the auditor to<br />

set out the control objectives <strong>and</strong> have an <strong>in</strong>dependent authority (not part of the<br />

computer department) to help them. The auditors have to satisfy themselves<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g the data base, security <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity. He should be able to assure himself:<br />

Tile users can only access data that they are authorised to access on a need<br />

to know basis.<br />

Log on IDS <strong>and</strong> password procedures should be evaluated.<br />

Are the concurrent updates h<strong>and</strong>led properly?<br />

Are there proper procedures for the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of DBMS?


QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AUDIT PROCEDURE<br />

Yes 1 No<br />

Do you identify data elements that are of<br />

particular significance to the data?<br />

Do you f<strong>in</strong>d out whether there is a DBA?<br />

Do )ou discuss with the DBA the follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

To satisfy yourself about adequacy of security -<br />

security <strong>in</strong>tegrity, Have you verified ?<br />

The segments where data of f<strong>in</strong>ancial significance<br />

is located.<br />

The users who have access to identified<br />

transactions<br />

The specific term<strong>in</strong>als from which these<br />

transactions can be executed<br />

The users who have direct access to the<br />

segments <strong>and</strong> the type of access they have<br />

11. Have you tested the <strong>controls</strong> for its<br />

effectiveness?<br />

Have you reviewed the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />

<strong>controls</strong> for DBMS?<br />

Have you exam<strong>in</strong>ed the procedures to<br />

ensure that any changes to DBMS are<br />

appropriate <strong>and</strong> function<strong>in</strong>g as expected?<br />

Have you checked whether logg<strong>in</strong>g facilities<br />

are <strong>in</strong> place to facilitate to DBA to recover<br />

lost or corrupted data?<br />

Do you analyse the results of test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

form your op<strong>in</strong>ion regard<strong>in</strong>g adequacy of<br />

<strong>controls</strong>?<br />

Have you ever presented a report to the<br />

Management regard<strong>in</strong>g audit <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong>?


CONTROLS IN UNIX ENVIRONMENT<br />

Overview<br />

Unix operat<strong>in</strong>g system has developed over the last twenty years. It was<br />

developed at BELL laboratories <strong>in</strong> Ne jersy by Ken Thomson <strong>and</strong> others. .l'homson<br />

had just left a research project on operat<strong>in</strong>g systems design which implemented an<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system called Multics-(Multiplex Information <strong>and</strong> Comput<strong>in</strong>g System).<br />

After a certa<strong>in</strong> time, Bell laboratories pulled out of Multics project Thomson <strong>and</strong><br />

D:nis Richie vaguely sketched the operat<strong>in</strong>g system Multics. Thomson actually<br />

formed the system, PDP-VII Computer. He realised that the operat<strong>in</strong>g system did<br />

not follow any design but seemed to just grow. It permitted the users to work <strong>in</strong> an<br />

<strong>in</strong>teractive utilisation manner which resulted <strong>in</strong> a more effective utilisation of the<br />

resources. This operat<strong>in</strong>g system was called UNIX by Brian Kernigham as a pun on<br />

the Multics name. The expansion for UNIX is UNIPLEX INFORMATION AND<br />

COMPUTING SYSTEM-UNICS. It is reported that due to a typographical enor<br />

it was further shortened to UNIX<br />

Unix Operat<strong>in</strong>g system when orig<strong>in</strong>ally designed had no security as it was felt<br />

it would be an impediment to efficient production.<br />

Thereafter there have been various editions of UNIX with many people<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g modifications as it was very easy to do so. F<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> the market place, there<br />

are many many versions, editions <strong>and</strong> variations of UNIX.


The objectives to be achieved <strong>in</strong> the further development <strong>and</strong> modification<br />

of Unix have been :<br />

(1) Real time operation;<br />

(2) Parallel CPU operation <strong>and</strong><br />

(3) Secure operat<strong>in</strong>g system.<br />

There were many major computer security violations <strong>and</strong> quite a few of them<br />

were published This led to the Department of Defence of USA to create a set of<br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> categories to evaluate the systems for computer security. The criteria<br />

for evaluation was published <strong>in</strong> "department of Defence Trusted Computer System<br />

Evaluation Criteria". This was orig<strong>in</strong>ally called Orange Book because of the colour<br />

of the cover of the Publication <strong>and</strong> subsequently there have been many other capital<br />

Department or Defence publications each with a different colour. These are known<br />

as the Ra<strong>in</strong>bow books. The categories of security are based on both hardware <strong>and</strong><br />

software. They have been classified as A, B, C, D -A is the highest rank<strong>in</strong>g with D<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g the lowest.<br />

Orange Book def<strong>in</strong>es D-rat<strong>in</strong>g as "that resources for these systems that have<br />

been evaluated but have failed to meet the requirements for a higher evaluation<br />

clause". It is reported that general manufacturers do not submit their products for<br />

this classification which is the lowest. It is always presumed that no rat<strong>in</strong>g is D.<br />

rat<strong>in</strong>g.


Division-C<br />

, Discretionary protection to quote the Orange book "clauses <strong>in</strong> this Division<br />

provide for discretionary (need to know) protection <strong>and</strong>, therefore the <strong>in</strong>clusion of<br />

added capabilities for accountability of subjects <strong>and</strong> action they <strong>in</strong>itiated.<br />

Orange Book states as follows: "systems <strong>in</strong> this division must carry sensitivity<br />

labels that measure data structures <strong>in</strong> the system. The system developer also<br />

provides the security policy model on which the TCB (Trusted Computer Base) is<br />

based <strong>and</strong> furnishes a specification of the TCB. Evidence must be provided to<br />

demonstrate that the reference monitor concept has been implemented<br />

Certa<strong>in</strong> criteria <strong>in</strong> addition to those required for rat<strong>in</strong>g C <strong>and</strong> B are added.<br />

The Orange Book states<br />

'This division is characterised by the use of formal security vtrification<br />

methods to assure that the m<strong>and</strong>atory <strong>and</strong> discretionary security <strong>controls</strong> employed<br />

<strong>in</strong> the system can effectively protect the classified or other sensitive <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

stored are processed by the system", extensive documentation is required to<br />

demonstrate that the 'TCB" meets the security requirements <strong>in</strong> all aspects of design<br />

development <strong>and</strong> implementation.


Hardly one or two computer systems have earned the A-l security<br />

classification.<br />

Some developers haw released certa<strong>in</strong> versions of UNIX that do not have<br />

a super user; their contention has been that all of the powen of the super-user<br />

should not be put <strong>in</strong>to one basket <strong>and</strong> it would be some hir. ,~rchical group authority<br />

has been developed, as Mr.Derek N. Arnold has mentioned. Their powers will still<br />

be powerful, 'abuseable <strong>and</strong> mis'useable'. Attempts have been made to have the<br />

password file hidden <strong>and</strong> not be available to all the users.<br />

Proprietary versions of UNIX are be<strong>in</strong>g marketed by different hardware<br />

manufacturers, each one mak<strong>in</strong>g thelr own claim. It is necessary to underst<strong>and</strong> one's<br />

system <strong>and</strong> design proper security <strong>controls</strong>. It is necessary that after such <strong>controls</strong><br />

are developed they should be meticulously enforced.<br />

PROBLEM AREAS<br />

It is a well known fact that most security violations are not from outside<br />

sources. It is generally from users of the system who exceed their authorisation.<br />

Security has many dist<strong>in</strong>ct pans. There has to be security for :<br />

a) Hardware<br />

b) Software<br />

c) Data<br />

Hardware requires to be protected from destruction, unauthorised changes<br />

<strong>and</strong> unauthorised use. Software needs to be protected so that valuable programmes<br />

are not destroyed. Software also needs to be protected from unauthorised changes


<strong>and</strong> use. Data - specially valuable data should be protected from destruction,<br />

unauthorised changes <strong>and</strong> un-use.<br />

UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system has three "Doma<strong>in</strong>s Security". They are:<br />

i) Owner of the file or i'\er (U)<br />

ii) The group that owns the fil- (G)<br />

iii) The general public or others (0)<br />

Each of these doma<strong>in</strong>s has a Unix permission set associated with it. UNIX<br />

permits three functions of all file operations as :<br />

i) Read permission<br />

ii)<br />

iii)<br />

Write permission<br />

Execute or search permission<br />

The permissions <strong>and</strong> the file type are the stored "Mode" word of the <strong>in</strong>itial<br />

record. This <strong>in</strong>itial record holds the attributes of the file. The permissions can be<br />

"altered us<strong>in</strong>g the comm<strong>and</strong> called "CH MOD"--Change-MOD.<br />

Each of the permissions has an octol value as follows:<br />

Read permission 4<br />

Write permission 2<br />

Execute 1<br />

The comm<strong>and</strong> Is--1 would display the permissions of a file. The first set of<br />

"w" permission is for the owner of the file. The second set of "M" permission is<br />

for the group that owns the file. The f<strong>in</strong>al set is for all other users.


Each of these domans is exclusive of the others. 'The fact that a user is part<br />

of a group would not permit him to have all permissions that the group has got<br />

though he may be a pan of the group. Only if as a user or owner he is permitted<br />

he would be able to exercise his right.<br />

It should be noted that the permissions are tested <strong>in</strong> a hierarchy. To prevent<br />

accidental erasure of files, it is necessary to remove owner - write permission.<br />

The implications of doma<strong>in</strong> permissions<br />

It is necessary to exam<strong>in</strong>e all types of operations <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

underst<strong>and</strong> the associated problems which would enable or display them. It is<br />

necessary to protect the system aga<strong>in</strong>st any mis- user, yet permit the legitimate user<br />

of authorised access. It is necessary to put a great deal of effort to achieve this.<br />

DEFAULT PERMISSIONS<br />

Normally LJNIX creates a test with default permissions of 66-6 (I-nv-nv-nv)<br />

<strong>and</strong> executable programmes with default permission of 7-7-7 (rwx, % rwx).<br />

Directories are created with a default permission of 7-7-7 (drwx, rwx, rwx)<br />

"UNMASK is a comm<strong>and</strong> which could alter the default permissions already used<br />

<strong>in</strong> the creation of files. The system adm<strong>in</strong>istrator normally sets up the "UNMASK<br />

comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Start up shell script.<br />

It should be noted that the "UNMASK affects only new files <strong>and</strong> not exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />

one. Thus, however, UNMASK comm<strong>and</strong> is specified before a copy comm<strong>and</strong> is


executed. The orig<strong>in</strong>al permissions of the file will not change. Hence, it is necessary<br />

to use CH MOD comm<strong>and</strong> to change the permissions of an exist<strong>in</strong>g file.<br />

Under UNIX then an three special permission bits. They are:<br />

Set User ID (SU ID)<br />

Set Group ID (SG ID).<br />

STICKY BIT.<br />

There are different versions of UNIX. In some cases, the permissions are<br />

coupled with executable programmes. This could lead to<br />

violations.<br />

vulnerable security<br />

SET-USER ID (SU ID)<br />

This permission bit is used to allow one user to temporarily take on the use1<br />

identify of another person. This enables another user to utilise file <strong>and</strong> directory<br />

permissions <strong>in</strong> the same manner as the orig<strong>in</strong>al owner of the comm<strong>and</strong>.<br />

This permission bit allows the user to temporarily take on the group identify<br />

of another group. It is reported that there is a common UNIX bug which allows an<br />

<strong>in</strong>dividual to become pan of any group. Hence care should be taken that the current<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system does not have this bug.


STICKY BIT (COMPUED PROGRAMS)<br />

The sticky bit causes a compiled program to stick <strong>in</strong> the swap area of the disc<br />

It has the advantage of load<strong>in</strong>g the program faster while there is the disadvantage<br />

of permanently us<strong>in</strong>g up space <strong>in</strong> the swap area. In System V UNIX sticky bit has<br />

been given an additional facility by which files <strong>in</strong> a public directory cannot be<br />

removed except by the owner himself or the super user.<br />

Audit<br />

Information was gathered from a sample of 30 auditors regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

procedures they adopt <strong>in</strong> organisations where End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong> L,xistence<br />

<strong>and</strong> utilised for important areas of operation.<br />

The auditors either <strong>in</strong>ternal or external were aware of the risks associated<br />

with End-User comput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong>. There was no audit be<strong>in</strong>g performed. The<br />

auditors <strong>in</strong> spite of be<strong>in</strong>g aware that Personal Computers were <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> all the<br />

functional departments, they were ignorant of the type of applications. The audit <strong>in</strong><br />

that area was totally absent. Counter-check<strong>in</strong>g of this fact was made with the<br />

End-Users who confirmed the same.<br />

STANDARD ACCEPTED PRACTICES<br />

System adm<strong>in</strong>istrators should provide users with security <strong>in</strong>formation which will<br />

assist them <strong>in</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g their directories <strong>and</strong> files. The earlier versions of UNIX have<br />

been hav<strong>in</strong>g a number of security holes. Hence it is necessary to have latest versions<br />

from vendors The management should issue policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es regard<strong>in</strong>g the


procedures to be followed <strong>in</strong> a UNIX <strong>environment</strong> It should make the system<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrator responsible for assign<strong>in</strong>g such guidel<strong>in</strong>es with their approval. The<br />

system adm<strong>in</strong>istrator's functions should be considered under the follow<strong>in</strong>g heads:<br />

Access<br />

Log <strong>in</strong>s<br />

Passwords<br />

* Loy <strong>in</strong> <strong>environment</strong> from the access<br />

* File protection<br />

* System monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />

* Firmware keys<br />

Backup <strong>and</strong> recovery<br />

* Physical security<br />

Access<br />

A shell should be designed such that it will control the user access to specific<br />

directories <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>s. All shells should be. checked to identify exits.<br />

Every log <strong>in</strong> must necessarily have a password. All log <strong>in</strong>s should be verified<br />

at reasonably periodic <strong>in</strong>tervals. Users such as consultants etc. should be identified<br />

by a unique log <strong>in</strong> assignment. Unattended term<strong>in</strong>als should be logged off soon after<br />

a pre-determ<strong>in</strong>ed period of <strong>in</strong>activity.


All log <strong>in</strong>s should have a password. All system based passwords should either<br />

be removed or changed. System adm<strong>in</strong>istrators should use different passwords on<br />

systems which are ~ttached to their <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

Super user passwords should be known only on a "need-to-know basis" <strong>and</strong><br />

only by the system adm<strong>in</strong>istrator. Super user passwords should be changed frequently.<br />

Log <strong>in</strong> <strong>environment</strong><br />

Home directory of a user should not be readable by others. User profile<br />

should not be readable, writeable or executable by others.<br />

The m<strong>in</strong>imum un-mask sett<strong>in</strong>g for general purpose users should be set at 022.<br />

The use of read, log<strong>in</strong> should be limited to the console only.<br />

Remote access<br />

A default should be such to allow least privilege. UUCP system should be<br />

def<strong>in</strong>ed to restrict access to remote users.<br />

File protection<br />

Important system directories <strong>and</strong> files should be provided with highest level<br />

of protection. A directory should not have <strong>in</strong>secure read permissions.<br />

Privilege comm<strong>and</strong>s such as Mount, FSCK, should have only restricted use.


System monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />

System should be monitored for unauthorised LOGINS or LOGINS with no<br />

passwords. System like files which conta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation about system activity need to<br />

he reviewed periodically. Other than the owner of LOGFILE nobody else should<br />

have ,;ad <strong>and</strong> write capabilities.<br />

The "F<strong>in</strong>d" "S.F<strong>in</strong>dU or "N.CheckU comm<strong>and</strong><br />

should be executed daily to<br />

ensure that all 'UTD' <strong>and</strong> 'GID' programs are protected adequately.<br />

A system log should be record<strong>in</strong>g of sensitive comm<strong>and</strong>s for review <strong>and</strong><br />

monitor<strong>in</strong>g of unusual activity. There should be documentation of all system updates<br />

<strong>and</strong> such updates should be compared with authorisations.<br />

Firmwear keys - (3-B-2 Computer family)<br />

Many 3-B-<br />

2 computers, it is reported, were given the same firmwear<br />

password at the factory as acceu to the computer is through the computer firmwear.<br />

The firmwear should be changed soon after <strong>in</strong>stallation. The firmwear password<br />

facilities change of Roots password.<br />

Back-up <strong>and</strong> recovery<br />

Like all other systems, but more particularly <strong>in</strong> an organisation with UNIX<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system back up <strong>and</strong> recovery procedures are very important. They should<br />

be well- documented; applications should be prioritised <strong>and</strong> offsite storage should<br />

be adequate.


ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS<br />

AUDIT<br />

Auditors both external <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal of the organisations which had the<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system UNIX were blissfully ignorant of the special features of the<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g SYSTEM. They were not aware <strong>in</strong> most cases of the concept of operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

system, let alone the UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system. Hence there was no awareness of the<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> weaknesses associated with the operat<strong>in</strong>g system UNIX<br />

Controls from the organisations' po<strong>in</strong>t of view<br />

There were no security policies or guidel<strong>in</strong>es issued either by the<br />

Management or the Data Process<strong>in</strong>g Department. There was no identifi~ation of<br />

any <strong>in</strong>dividual specifically as the Security Adm<strong>in</strong>istrator.<br />

The US Department of Defence had issued through the National Computer<br />

Security Centre six key regulations for security as follows :<br />

i. The system must enforce a precise <strong>and</strong> explicit security policy<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

iv.<br />

Every object associated with that policy must be marked with an Access<br />

Control Label.<br />

Individual users must be identified.<br />

The system must ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a protected audit control of action relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

security.<br />

v. The system must be open to <strong>in</strong>dependent security evaluation.<br />

vi.<br />

The system must be permanently protected aga<strong>in</strong>st re-configuration from any<br />

other method of alteration.


In practice atleast four out of the six factors were absent <strong>in</strong> all the cases. In<br />

many organisations the logg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> "USR/ADM/LOG IN LOG is not turned on with<br />

the result the facility for monitor<strong>in</strong>g unauthorised logg<strong>in</strong>g attempts is disabled<br />

In a UNIX system the "root" is most important <strong>and</strong> all powerful. Only the<br />

super user should normally have this privilege as the facility will enable bypass<strong>in</strong>g of<br />

all security <strong>controls</strong>. No special efforts have been put <strong>in</strong> for decid<strong>in</strong>g on the access<br />

privileges of read, write <strong>and</strong> execute for the owner group or other users. Only <strong>in</strong> a<br />

few cases, the facility of "UNMASK' has been used.<br />

The comm<strong>and</strong>s of SET UID <strong>and</strong> SET GID <strong>in</strong> a UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system<br />

allows normal users to access restricted files. This is done on a temporary basis for<br />

a specific purpose. These comm<strong>and</strong>s are not strictly controlled. Absence or violation<br />

of security hav<strong>in</strong>g taken place is primarily due to lack of knowledge on the part of<br />

dishonest staff. The Security has been ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed due to the loyalty of the concerned<br />

staff. There was a reported case of a member of staff access<strong>in</strong>g unauthorised<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation for use by union members. A casual exam<strong>in</strong>ation of the console log<br />

revealed this <strong>in</strong>cident Corrective <strong>and</strong> preventive action was taken thereafter.<br />

"UNIX SECURITr"' as has been said several times is a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms,<br />

unless special efforts are taken to build security shell. Great deal of efforts are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

put <strong>in</strong> on a "crisis management basis" by the more responsible staff of the data<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g department. Neither the senior management nor the auditors are aware<br />

of the implications of hav<strong>in</strong>g a UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system with appropriate <strong>controls</strong>.


Though subsequent versions of UNIX have been made available,<br />

organisations which had implemented UNIX with earlier versions with great diEticulty<br />

have not been able to implement the latest version <strong>in</strong> view of hav<strong>in</strong>g to make fast<br />

changes <strong>in</strong> the runn<strong>in</strong>g programs with the already a great detail of backlog for<br />

tak<strong>in</strong>g up new applications. In many of the organisations mask<strong>in</strong>g has not been<br />

properly implemented. The users were totally unaware of the exposure that their<br />

sensitive files were fac<strong>in</strong>g. There have been reported <strong>in</strong>stances when unauthorised<br />

access has been easily available to files to which there should have been no access<br />

specially <strong>in</strong> a multi user <strong>environment</strong> the situation has been very volatile with no<br />

<strong>controls</strong> to access on a "need to know basis".<br />

SUGGESTIONS<br />

It is often said that UNIX security is a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms. From the<br />

organisation's po<strong>in</strong>t of view<br />

- All other passwords should be changed periodically without fail<br />

- Access to file should not be permitted without owner's permission<br />

- Depend<strong>in</strong>g upon the particular version of UNIX, the follow<strong>in</strong>g should<br />

be <strong>in</strong>cluded:<br />

Unmask 007<br />

to the file.<br />

This will ensure only the file owner will have read, write <strong>and</strong> execute access<br />

A network file system (NFS): In most cases it is <strong>in</strong>stalled without any security<br />

features be<strong>in</strong>g enabled. As NFS enables several UNIX hosts to share files on the


network <strong>and</strong> if NFS is <strong>in</strong>stalled without adequate security features <strong>in</strong> any UNIX host<br />

can access the network <strong>and</strong> through the network any of the files. The best method<br />

to avoid such a situation would be that for each file listed <strong>in</strong>/etc.lexperts, it is<br />

necessary to use the option access-keyword. The keyword should conta<strong>in</strong> the list of<br />

hosts that may access the particular file. It is necessary that all files should have a<br />

pre-determ<strong>in</strong>ed list of hosts that may access it. The organisation should issue policy<br />

<strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es for protection of <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

From the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of view<br />

For an auditor to perform an effective audit <strong>in</strong> a UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system, it<br />

is necessaly for him to be UNIX literate. A few basic steps that the auditor should<br />

perform while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a UNIX <strong>environment</strong> would be :<br />

- F<strong>in</strong>d out which version of the UNIX operat<strong>in</strong>g system is <strong>in</strong> use<br />

- Make out a list of the known loopholes <strong>in</strong> the particular version<br />

- Check whether the procedures to plug loopholes have been followed<br />

<strong>and</strong> implemented.<br />

- Check whether the default sett<strong>in</strong>g of the UNIX which permits Read<br />

<strong>and</strong> Execute access by all users has been changed to facilitate access<br />

to the file by the owner only.<br />

- Test whether <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> procedures which are supposed to be <strong>in</strong> use<br />

are really <strong>in</strong> existence.<br />

- Report to management on the state of the <strong>controls</strong> as exist<strong>in</strong>g, the<br />

loopholes if any <strong>and</strong> the possible impact of the weaknesses on the<br />

organisation <strong>and</strong> suggest remedial measures for implementation.


CHAPTER VII<br />

DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING<br />

Most organisations who have <strong>computerised</strong> their operations are no longer<br />

mere users of computers. They have become dependent on it <strong>and</strong> the failure of the<br />

computer operation would result <strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong>terruption. It is always generally<br />

believed that catastrophies <strong>and</strong> disasters will affect other enterprises <strong>and</strong> not us!<br />

There are any number of <strong>in</strong>stances where unanticipated crmt<strong>in</strong>gencies have<br />

occurred <strong>and</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>esses have got <strong>in</strong>terrupted. The importance of disaster recovery<br />

plan <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>~ can never be over-emphasised. To take the example<br />

nearer home, <strong>in</strong> February 1994, the Reserve Bank of India's National Clear<strong>in</strong>g Centre<br />

at Nariman Po<strong>in</strong>t had a breakdown of the computer system. The press report stated<br />

that "accord<strong>in</strong>g to sources, the breakdm <strong>in</strong> IBM's micm-process<strong>in</strong>g-stated to be<br />

major <strong>in</strong> nature, was reported on Wednesday afternoon <strong>and</strong> necessitated a total<br />

shutdown of the sophisticated system. S<strong>in</strong>ce the system cannot be said to be set right<br />

tiIl Thursday, Banks all over Bombay were advkd aga<strong>in</strong>st send<strong>in</strong>g more cheques for<br />

Clear<strong>in</strong>g of cheques of more than Rs.1500 crores came to a st<strong>and</strong>still follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

a two-day old breakdown <strong>in</strong> the computer system. Oral requests were made to<br />

representatives of various banks <strong>in</strong> the city arriv<strong>in</strong>g with bundles of more than<br />

10,00000 of cheques to take them back but without sett<strong>in</strong>g any reason for the same,


mystify<strong>in</strong>g the bank<strong>in</strong>g circk <strong>in</strong> the city. It was reported that a team of eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />

were be<strong>in</strong>g flown from Calcutta. Till Friday even<strong>in</strong>g, no progress was made other<br />

than detect<strong>in</strong>g thc fault While other matters of detail are of no relevance, it is of<br />

significance to note that even an <strong>in</strong>stitution like Reserve Bank of India had no<br />

disaster recovery plann<strong>in</strong>g!<br />

Whether a disaster is natural such as earth- quake or a humcane or unnatural<br />

event such as an electrical overload<strong>in</strong>g spark<strong>in</strong>g a fire or normally anticipated<br />

situations of failure of hardware or failure of <strong>environment</strong>al support services.<br />

Management of those who have the responsibility for process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation on<br />

computers should have a well-tested plan for meet<strong>in</strong>g such emergencies.<br />

PROBLEM AREAS<br />

The <strong>in</strong>formation technology at tremendous pace <strong>and</strong> the awareness of the<br />

advantages of utilis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation technology for decision mak<strong>in</strong>g purpose, apart<br />

from obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation from vast volume of data, all organisations have gone <strong>in</strong><br />

for computerisation of different types. This has made organisations dependent on<br />

computers with the result, that such organisations would be h<strong>and</strong>icapped <strong>in</strong> some way<br />

or the other, should a disaster occur.<br />

In our country also the job opportunities <strong>and</strong> career possibilities <strong>in</strong> the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation technology is occur<strong>in</strong>g so rapidly with the result, turnover of personnel<br />

has become more a rule than an exception.<br />

A study of the present scenario <strong>in</strong> general rebeak that white oqpukhm ltad<br />

realised that disasters can occur, there is a certa<strong>in</strong> sense of complacency, aris<strong>in</strong>g out


of the illusion that calamities will strike only their neighbours. The documentation<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards for systems <strong>and</strong> programmes an generally <strong>in</strong>complete if not outdated. With<br />

the documentation st<strong>and</strong>ards, be<strong>in</strong>g unsatisfactory <strong>and</strong> the peronnel turnover factor<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g high, organisations do face problems. It is due to a few dedicated old h<strong>and</strong>s<br />

that the systems are runn<strong>in</strong>g. Added to this common problem, there is no attempt<br />

made to plan for a cont<strong>in</strong>gency. There are no studies made as to how long an<br />

crganisation can cont<strong>in</strong>ue without a computer before bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong>terruption occurs.<br />

Should the problem persist longer than organisations can withst<strong>and</strong>, what are the<br />

arrangements to be made. There have been no attempts made to prioritise critical<br />

applications. The utmost recovery plan that is <strong>in</strong> existence is copies of most of the<br />

programmes are made <strong>and</strong> that too stored <strong>in</strong> a separate cupboard. The cupboard is<br />

mostly <strong>in</strong> the same computer room <strong>and</strong> sometimes with the manager of the<br />

department <strong>in</strong> his cab<strong>in</strong> which is located <strong>in</strong> the same build<strong>in</strong>g, if not <strong>in</strong> the same<br />

floor.<br />

Un<strong>in</strong>terrupted power supply systems (UPS) are <strong>in</strong> existence. Fire ext<strong>in</strong>guishers<br />

are fixed <strong>in</strong> different locations of the computer room. Pitifully there is no cont<strong>in</strong>uous<br />

tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g given to personnel <strong>in</strong> fire-f%ht<strong>in</strong>g. Internal auditors do not even consider it<br />

as part of their duty to see whether the fire eximpishen have been refilled.<br />

The basic precautian of ensur<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>flammable material is not stored mar<br />

or around the computer room is not observed Thermacole boxes or thermocole<br />

material which arrive as pack<strong>in</strong>g material for the hardware <strong>and</strong> $oftware is stored <strong>in</strong><br />

the computer room itself if not <strong>in</strong> the computer library. Computer rooms <strong>in</strong> many<br />

<strong>in</strong>stances do not have amiakrised air-condition<strong>in</strong>g. The same airemdition<strong>in</strong>g ducts<br />

run through the build<strong>in</strong>g as also the computer room <strong>in</strong> many <strong>in</strong>stances. While open


fire may not exist <strong>in</strong> the computer room, burn<strong>in</strong>g of camphor on Friday even<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><br />

different parts of the offices is not an uncommon situation.<br />

For convenience the computer division <strong>in</strong> many <strong>in</strong>stances is situated <strong>in</strong> the<br />

ground floor. While precautions are taken that water does not flow through the dra<strong>in</strong><br />

pipes <strong>and</strong> water culverts, the possibility of water <strong>in</strong>undat<strong>in</strong>g the computer room from<br />

clogged culverts of neighbour<strong>in</strong>g organisations dur<strong>in</strong>g ra<strong>in</strong>y season is not taken care<br />

of.<br />

The necessity for hav<strong>in</strong>g a documented plan for disaster recovery is not<br />

appreciated, as spend<strong>in</strong>g effort <strong>and</strong> time "on an unlikely event" seems <strong>in</strong> their op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />

futile.<br />

The concept of <strong>in</strong>surance cover <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> as it exists now<br />

is to pmvide an <strong>in</strong>surance cover to the extent of the cost of the hardware purchased.<br />

In some <strong>in</strong>stances, if expensive software has been purchased that cost also is <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />

However, the total cover for <strong>in</strong>surance <strong>in</strong> the eventuality of<br />

i) Program be<strong>in</strong>g lost<br />

ii) Program data be<strong>in</strong>g corrupted<br />

iii) Fraud occur<strong>in</strong>g due to failure of software<br />

iv) Connected costs of restructur<strong>in</strong>g data files<br />

v) Loss of blls<strong>in</strong>ess due to nnn-function<strong>in</strong>g of the computer whether due to<br />

hardware or software fault<br />

Amongst other disaster due importance should be given also to the impact of an<br />

attack from virus, specially <strong>in</strong> a PC <strong>environment</strong> or a net-worked <strong>environment</strong>. There<br />

is a great vulnerability to attacks from virus. While there is knowledge about the


existence of virus, steps necessary to prevent attacks from viruses is not adequate.<br />

Instances are many when some steps are taken after an attack of virus. While the<br />

systems department does take some steps though not adequate to prevent viruses<br />

auditors are totally ignorant <strong>in</strong> their knowledge of viruses, its impact of attack of virus<br />

on computer <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> programmes <strong>and</strong> steps to be taken as a precautionary<br />

measure.<br />

In the data collected, on the assurance that anonimity will be obta<strong>in</strong>ed. The<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation was available.<br />

In one of the large public limited organisations which had offices all over<br />

India, the computer room was flooded with water due to overflow<strong>in</strong>g of the dra<strong>in</strong>age<br />

<strong>in</strong> the neighbour<strong>in</strong>g build<strong>in</strong>g due to ra<strong>in</strong>. The water level under the false floor<strong>in</strong>g was<br />

namely 5 to 6 <strong>in</strong>ches. The organisation bailed out the water with mugs <strong>and</strong> buckets.<br />

As already the computer <strong>in</strong>stallation was down for three days soon after the bail<strong>in</strong>g<br />

out of the water was completed, the current was switched on want<strong>in</strong>g to use the<br />

computer henceforth. There was a short circuit due to the dampness <strong>and</strong> there was<br />

damage to the hardware <strong>and</strong> of the programs which was on the hard disk The<br />

organisation struggled for a week to ten days recreat<strong>in</strong>g software <strong>and</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g with<br />

hardware suppliers for repfacement.<br />

In one of the lead<strong>in</strong>g foreign banks <strong>in</strong> Mount Road, Madras certa<strong>in</strong> modems<br />

<strong>and</strong> about 40 term<strong>in</strong>als were burnt out due to lightn<strong>in</strong>g strik<strong>in</strong>g one of the cables<br />

runn<strong>in</strong>g through the open yard of the bank It is needless to mention the crisis that<br />

the bank had to manage.<br />

In another organisation data used to be entered <strong>in</strong>to the floppy at the flock<br />

free <strong>and</strong> sent for process<strong>in</strong>g to the head office 25 kms away. Several days data was


lost as the data was be<strong>in</strong>g transported without adequate protection <strong>in</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary card<br />

board boxes <strong>in</strong> an auto rickshaw which had the motor on the reverse. The magnetic<br />

field created by the motor erased all the data which was realised only much later.<br />

In yet another organisation which prided over the fact that it has got back up<br />

for all its programs <strong>and</strong> files, the entire operation was paralised for more than two<br />

months. This was due to the fact the sudden ra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>undated the computer room<br />

which also used the duplicate copies of the programs <strong>and</strong> files!<br />

In another organisation due to uncontrolled <strong>and</strong> unexpected power supply<br />

problems the disk was scratched. The organisation immediately unloaded the disk<br />

open<strong>in</strong>g the duplicate copy of the programs <strong>and</strong> files. The source of the problem not<br />

hav<strong>in</strong>g been set right the disk which conta<strong>in</strong>ed the duplicate copy was also scratched<br />

Loss of files due to attack of virus were very many. In most of the cases where<br />

disaster strike, there was no recovery plan. The problems <strong>and</strong> crisis were only<br />

discussed <strong>in</strong> private as organisations felt that there will be loss of image. It was<br />

officially reported.<br />

STANDARD ACCEFED PROCEDURES<br />

When a disaster occurs, an organisation which is well equipped to face it is<br />

able to resume normal operations by follow<strong>in</strong>g a pre-determ<strong>in</strong>ed recovery strategy.<br />

It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to recall the California Federal when a disastrous earthquake struck<br />

California. Internal Auditor, Mr. John G. Burch, <strong>in</strong> his article Disaster Recovery Plan<br />

on moral <strong>and</strong> professional responsibility describes the experience "CALFEDERAL".<br />

Therewas no time for <strong>in</strong>stallation to have a graceful degradation, the system is


eported to have gonedown <strong>in</strong>elegantly; they were taken totally by surprise. It is<br />

reported that CAL FEDERAL employees under the direction of Senior Vice<br />

President of Comput<strong>in</strong>g & Communications of CAL FEDERAL were able to activate<br />

the Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plan with<strong>in</strong> one hour after 29 hour non-stop recovely work;<br />

everyth<strong>in</strong>g was back to normal. Soon thereafter there was a second earthquake; the<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan had <strong>in</strong>cluded a "HOT SITE". Hot site is a back facility which is a<br />

computer <strong>in</strong>stallation which is fully equipped <strong>and</strong> is more or less a duplicate of the<br />

exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stallation. CAL FEDERAL after its second disaster recovery plan<br />

recovered <strong>in</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e hours. It is reported that the Vice-President stated that a lot of<br />

data process<strong>in</strong>g Managers, thought it won't happen to them, but I was not s<strong>in</strong>gled out<br />

by God; It is a moral responsibility to have a plan.<br />

Yet another reported case is of a Computer Centre which survived <strong>in</strong> 1992<br />

Los Angles riots due to the existence of an effective disastcr recovery plan. Riots had<br />

started <strong>in</strong> Los Angles; there was extensive loot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> fires were widespread. It is<br />

reported that.. the data process<strong>in</strong>g centre survived the emergency unscathed".<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

Analys<strong>in</strong>g the reasons for a successful SUMV~~<br />

of the Datacentre:<br />

Data Process<strong>in</strong>g M re bad plan for emergencies<br />

Had a comprehensive <strong>and</strong> well documented cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan to be used <strong>in</strong> the<br />

course of a major earthquake, as after all earthquake war another hlpe of<br />

emergency. This cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan worked out even <strong>in</strong> this type of emergency.<br />

The plan even <strong>in</strong>cluded stock<strong>in</strong>gUearthquake bags" which conta<strong>in</strong>ed food <strong>and</strong><br />

ohr essentials for the employees".<br />

(c) The computer site had effective security. The fust two fbBl% !m <strong>and</strong><br />

it had no public lobby. No casual visitors were allowed entry <strong>in</strong>to the build<strong>in</strong>g.


L<strong>in</strong>da Larsens concludes that the Los Angles Data Process<strong>in</strong>g Centre survived<br />

a major urban riot because they were well prepared for an emergency.<br />

As aga<strong>in</strong>st the above two <strong>in</strong>stances, an example nearer home highlights a<br />

situation with<strong>in</strong> our country. The Reserve Bank of India's National Clear<strong>in</strong>g Centre<br />

at Nariman Po<strong>in</strong>t, Bombay had a breakdown of their computer for four to five days.<br />

The system could not be set right <strong>and</strong> several la!& cheques worth several crores<br />

rema<strong>in</strong>ed stagnant. Instructions were given to bankers to prepare themselves for<br />

manual clear<strong>in</strong>g as the "Clear<strong>in</strong>g system was malfunction<strong>in</strong>g". It is not always that a<br />

disaster occurs but one should be prepared for the same with an effective disaster<br />

recovery <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan. There should be st<strong>and</strong>ard policies <strong>and</strong> procedures<br />

issued by the Management cover<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g aspects:<br />

i. Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g Process<br />

ii. Risk analysis<br />

iii. Strategy for cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

iv. Documentation<br />

v. Test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

vi Risks <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong><br />

vii Audit consideratioas<br />

Tbe need for Management's awarw for a cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan should <strong>and</strong> is<br />

aris<strong>in</strong>g out of the follaw<strong>in</strong>g factors:<br />

i) Information is a valuable asset of the organisation<br />

ii) Unlike previously computers are spread all over the organisation.<br />

iii) Organisations arc depend<strong>in</strong>g upon amputen <strong>and</strong> not men usen.<br />

(iv) Computers capability to contribute to decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g process


CONTINGENCY PLANNING PROCESS<br />

As the adage "Prevention is better than cure" goes, it is better to have<br />

preventive measures to avoid a disaster rather than strugll<strong>in</strong>g after a disaster to br<strong>in</strong>g<br />

normalcy. The preventive steps may be classified under the fcllow<strong>in</strong>g three heads.<br />

(a)<br />

@)<br />

(c)<br />

Organisation<br />

User <strong>in</strong>volvement<br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative procedures<br />

(a)<br />

Organisation<br />

The most important step is to have a team which has:<br />

(a)<br />

@)<br />

(c)<br />

Centralised responsibility<br />

Adequate visibility<br />

Appropriate authority<br />

It is necessary that there should be one leader who is the primary responsible<br />

authority for coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan. It is essential that<br />

all the departments <strong>in</strong> the organisation are made aware of the fact that the<br />

organisation is <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to develop a cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan. As the users <strong>and</strong><br />

thedepartments are made awarefor the need to have a cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan, awareness<br />

for potential risks is spread. As the project leader has to liaise with the different<br />

departments, senior management should vest the project leader with appropriate<br />

authority <strong>and</strong> communicate the same to others <strong>in</strong> the organisation.


(b)<br />

User <strong>in</strong>volvement<br />

Users should be closely associated with the development of cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan.<br />

They should be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g the risk result<strong>in</strong>g from a disruption as users arc<br />

the best judges <strong>and</strong> they would be able to assess the associated risks better. The<br />

useful functions that the users wuld perfom would be<br />

(i)<br />

Make analysis<br />

The users should evaluate the impact of the failure of computer systems on<br />

their bus<strong>in</strong>ess function. They should make a fair assessment of their time when they<br />

can manage without computer process<strong>in</strong>g. Users must be closely associated <strong>in</strong> the<br />

process of identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> prioritis<strong>in</strong>g critical applications.<br />

Users <strong>and</strong> the system staff need to work very closely to decide on procedures<br />

<strong>in</strong> the case of a computer breakdown <strong>and</strong> also the procedures which need to be<br />

adopted to get back to the computer systems.<br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />

As already mentioned one penon should be selected as the leader; his<br />

responsibility should <strong>in</strong>clude develop<strong>in</strong>g a plann<strong>in</strong>g methodology, develop plans to<br />

implement the policy especially an organisational structure, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the staff,<br />

review<strong>in</strong>g the process <strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g to the management, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the plan,<br />

CO-ord<strong>in</strong>ate the others <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> decid<strong>in</strong>g the plan. A plann<strong>in</strong>g methodolog should<br />

be used to ensure quality, security, consistency, comprehensiveness <strong>and</strong><br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ability".


Risk Analysis<br />

It is extremely important to identify <strong>and</strong> prioritise critical applications. The<br />

applications which need to be restored <strong>and</strong> the order <strong>in</strong> which they need to be<br />

restored should be settled.<br />

The factors which contribute to the criticality of the applications a n need to<br />

be studied carefull).<br />

facility.<br />

The next step would be to evaluate the threat of disaster to the computer<br />

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS<br />

A sample survey of 30 organisations was conducted. The questionnaire utilised<br />

for this purpose is enclosed. (Table 8.1) The response irom all the 30 organisations<br />

was analysed. The <strong>in</strong>formation was personally gathered by me from the organisations.<br />

In addition, had a discussion with the five lead<strong>in</strong>g firms of auditors to ascerta<strong>in</strong> the<br />

audit procedures followed <strong>in</strong> connection with the Disaster Recovery Plan of their<br />

clients' organisations which were extensively us<strong>in</strong>g computers for preparation of<br />

management <strong>in</strong>formation as also f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements for audit certification (Table<br />

8.2) The hdqs as gathered from the sample of organisations surveyed are as<br />

follows:-<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

There were no st<strong>and</strong>ard policies or guidel<strong>in</strong>es for the organisation regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan or DRP.<br />

None of the organisations hadanyremote safe backgronnd storage vault for<br />

stor<strong>in</strong>g the programs systems, documentation or important data.


(iii)<br />

None of the organisations had an <strong>in</strong>surancy policy whichcoveredanyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />

other than the cost of the hardware.<br />

(iv) None of the organisations had applied their m<strong>in</strong>d regard<strong>in</strong>g the legal<br />

responsibility that may arise for non-performance should a disaster strike the<br />

organisation. In the absence of any DRP or policies or procedures provided<br />

by the management, there was no documentation for DRP.<br />

(v) All the organisations had copies of the programs backed up. However, these<br />

programs were not stored <strong>in</strong> most of the cases <strong>in</strong> a remote place away from<br />

the computer <strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />

(vi) In most of the cases, the computer programs <strong>and</strong> critical data were copied<br />

<strong>and</strong> stored <strong>in</strong> the systems manager'scab<strong>in</strong> which was part of the computer<br />

department.<br />

(vii) In most cases it was also found that thermocole pack<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> card board<br />

boxes which were arrived with peripherals or computer stationary were<br />

stacked near or around the computer <strong>in</strong>stallation without the least awareness<br />

that these be<strong>in</strong>g combustible material should never be stacked near the<br />

computer <strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />

(viii) There were no documented evidence regard<strong>in</strong>g key personnelto be contacted<br />

<strong>in</strong> case of a disaster.<br />

Informal discussions provided the <strong>in</strong>formation that the organisations did have<br />

situations when disasters did strike them <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas:-<br />

* Disk crash<br />

* Virus attack<br />

* Water leakage<br />

* Hardware failure


Software gett<strong>in</strong>g conupted.<br />

In all the above situations, the organisations did have problems <strong>and</strong> they<br />

resorted to a "Crisis Management". Strangely this had not resulted <strong>in</strong> any permanent<br />

action be<strong>in</strong>g taken by way of formalis<strong>in</strong>g the DRP <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan.<br />

Apan from these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, survey results of Messrs Coopers Lybr<strong>and</strong> are enclosed.<br />

(Table ) These f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs are no reported cases <strong>in</strong> our country. There are no reported<br />

cases as yet of loss <strong>in</strong>curred due to disasters strik<strong>in</strong>g the organisations. However, it<br />

should be noted that there were blasts <strong>in</strong> Delhi, big fire <strong>in</strong> multi- storeyed build<strong>in</strong>g<br />

which affected amongst other organisations Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited,<br />

earthquake <strong>in</strong> Bombay <strong>and</strong> bomb blast <strong>in</strong> Bombay which affected any number of<br />

organisations <strong>and</strong> the11 computer operations. In Madras, lightn<strong>in</strong>g struck a multi<br />

national company which affected more than forty term<strong>in</strong>als. More recently hardware<br />

problems <strong>in</strong> the Reserve Bank of India clear<strong>in</strong>g House operations is a case <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t.<br />

AUDIT<br />

The discussions with the auditors revealed that their areas of operation <strong>and</strong><br />

activity did not <strong>in</strong>clude evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the adequacy of a DRP.. This has been confirmed<br />

also by an the 30 organisations which were <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the survey. The auditors have<br />

been ignorant of the need to review the adequacy of a DRP. The auditors while they<br />

are aware that they need to value aU the assets <strong>and</strong> certify their existence, somehow<br />

as yet have not realised the value of <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> computer support for their<br />

organisations.


SUGGESTIONS FROM TEE POINT OF VIEW OF TEE ORGANISATIONS<br />

The organisation should realise that cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

systems is an important element of <strong>in</strong>ternal control to ensure computer data <strong>and</strong><br />

resources would be available <strong>in</strong> case there is dismption of any nature to computer<br />

operations. Cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g is an important management plann<strong>in</strong>g. The<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g process should <strong>in</strong>clude the follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>gency plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

* The plan should ensure the cont<strong>in</strong>uity of the organisation's operations.<br />

* Should m<strong>in</strong>imise recovery times<br />

Must support the Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Recovery Plan<br />

* Fulfill legal obligations<br />

Risk analysis<br />

This <strong>in</strong>volves identification of exposures <strong>and</strong> threats that the organisations may<br />

be exposed. Hurricanes, earthquakes, bomb blasts <strong>in</strong> our own country are no longer<br />

an unlikely probability. These aspects need to be provided for.<br />

Critical applications need to be identified by evaluat<strong>in</strong>g its impact on the<br />

organisations from the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

Legal obligations<br />

Interruption to senice to customers<br />

Potential loss of revenue


Assess <strong>in</strong>surance cover<br />

Insurance cover should not just be only for the cost of hardware. The<br />

exposures that the computer organisations is likely to have needs to be studied <strong>and</strong><br />

covered.<br />

Document<strong>in</strong>g the plan<br />

It is unanimously accepted that the success of a cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan depends to<br />

a great extent on the quality of documentation. The documentation should clearly<br />

have the follow<strong>in</strong>g:-<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

The names <strong>and</strong> contact addresses of the ma<strong>in</strong> members of the recovery team<br />

The details of recovery plan.<br />

These plans should <strong>in</strong>clude the specific activities that need to be met~culously<br />

performed to m<strong>in</strong>imise recovery time loss from disruption. List of important files that<br />

need to be restored to cont<strong>in</strong>ue process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> procedures for recover<strong>in</strong>g those files<br />

from back up tapes <strong>and</strong> disks.<br />

It is not uncommon to have problems on pay rol or dividend warrant runs at<br />

the most critical period It would be advisable for such critical applications to have<br />

even hard copies nf impartant data<br />

The details of all equipment that would be needed to fully rebuild <strong>and</strong><br />

reprocess needs to be <strong>in</strong>ventories.


Forms <strong>and</strong> supplies<br />

The cont<strong>in</strong>gency plans should have full details regard<strong>in</strong>g specific forms that<br />

would be needed to cont<strong>in</strong>ue critical applications.<br />

Ewemple : Pay slips, dividend warrants, <strong>in</strong>voice forms, contract forms etc The<br />

importance of cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan lies <strong>in</strong> its periodic test<strong>in</strong>g. It is necessary that the plan<br />

should be tested. However, it should be realised that unless the plan 1s fool-proof,<br />

test<strong>in</strong>g of the plan may result <strong>in</strong> the disaster itself. Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan is<br />

an on-go<strong>in</strong>g process. It should be cont<strong>in</strong>ually ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed, tested, evaluated <strong>and</strong><br />

updated.<br />

Review of <strong>in</strong>surance coverage<br />

The <strong>in</strong>surance coverage should be adequate <strong>and</strong> upto date. The more<br />

important aspects for which the <strong>in</strong>surance should have cover would be<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

(iv)<br />

Cost of equipment whether purchased or leased<br />

Coverage for mechanical <strong>and</strong> electrical breakdowns which may result <strong>in</strong> loss<br />

of data or programs<br />

Coverage for fraudulent or dishonest acts of employees<br />

Cawrage for loss of data <strong>and</strong> software<br />

The policy should preferably cover the equipment at its replacement cost. It<br />

would be advisable also to provide for coverage for the follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

(iii)<br />

Loss of documents<br />

Cost of reproduc<strong>in</strong>g data<br />

Injuries of personnel


AUDIT<br />

The auditor should necessarily verify whether there is cont<strong>in</strong>gency or a DRP.<br />

If there is a DRP, he should br<strong>in</strong>g with the contents to ensure that the st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

accepted contents as discussed under documentation are all <strong>in</strong>cluded. The auditor<br />

should pay special attention to the follow<strong>in</strong>g aspects :<br />

(i) Accuracy<br />

While the plan may be <strong>in</strong> existence as to how accurate it is needs to be<br />

verified.<br />

(ii) Currency<br />

It is extremely important that the cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan is current as an out dated<br />

plan is no plan.<br />

(iii)<br />

Test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

It would be advisable for an auditor to test a plan. It would be more effective<br />

if it is comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a scheduled test<strong>in</strong>g of the organisations. This would give him<br />

an opportunity to personally evaluate the effectiveness of the plan. In the absence of<br />

test<strong>in</strong>g a thorough walk- through of the important aspects of the test plan would be<br />

adequate.<br />

AUDIT OF DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN<br />

More organisations have ceased to be mere users of audit process<strong>in</strong>g facilities.<br />

The appreciation of changes of Information Technology has been so great that most


organisations are dependent upon <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation. They are no longer<br />

mere users.<br />

In view of dependence <strong>and</strong> reliance on computers <strong>and</strong> computer <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

it is not unlikely that should disaster strike the computer, the organisations may run<br />

around. Information is an asset <strong>and</strong> it requires to be safeguarded. Computer<br />

<strong>in</strong>stallations may be struck by disaster - human or by an act of God. The human<br />

element may be by way of <strong>in</strong>tentional or un-<strong>in</strong>tentional corruption of data <strong>and</strong><br />

programs, fraud, sabotage etc. Fire, fraud, earthquake, lightn<strong>in</strong>g are other situations<br />

which affect the computer operations <strong>and</strong> disable it totally or partly. It is the<br />

responsibility of the auditor to verify the adequacy of the disaster recovey plan. He<br />

should ensure that there is a written documented plan which lays down the various<br />

procedures which would enable the organisation to recover from the disaster with<strong>in</strong><br />

a critical time-frame.<br />

Eg. Reserve Bank of India <strong>in</strong>cident, earthquake at California.<br />

It is necessary for the auditor to be aware of what are the <strong>in</strong>gredients of DRP<br />

or a cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan with specific reference to the particular <strong>environment</strong> he is<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. Be<strong>in</strong>g aware, he is expected to evaluate the adequacy or otherwise <strong>and</strong> give<br />

a report on the same.


TABLE 73<br />

DISASI'ER RECOVERY PLAN<br />

1. Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es regard<strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan or DRP<br />

available? If so, are they adequate?<br />

( ) Yes - adequate <strong>and</strong> upto date<br />

( ) Yes - Reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> upto date but need improvement<br />

( ) No - Not available.<br />

2. Have you checked whether the organisation has a remote, safe documents<br />

storage vault <strong>and</strong> valuable documents stored <strong>in</strong> the same?<br />

( ) Yes - verified <strong>and</strong> found to be <strong>in</strong> order<br />

( ) Yes - the vault does not have a latest <strong>and</strong> important documents.<br />

( ) No - No such check made.<br />

3. Have you checked whether there is an <strong>in</strong>surance policy to cover the computer<br />

hardware <strong>and</strong> software?<br />

( ) Yes - checked the policy. It covers both<br />

( ) Yes - only the hardware<br />

( )No<br />

4. Have you checked from the angle of legal responsibility to ensure that the<br />

vital documents are h<strong>and</strong>led satisfactorily <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>ed for sufficient time?<br />

( ) Yes - checked with the legal department<br />

( ) Yes - from my judgment<br />

( )No<br />

5. Have you checked the existence of any cont<strong>in</strong>gency plan? Is it<br />

well-documented?<br />

( ) Yes - well documented<br />

( ) Yes - discussed with EDP staff<br />

( )No


CHArnR VIII<br />

AUDIT APPROACH<br />

Ovemew<br />

Approach to audit <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, as already mentioned, is<br />

different from the approach <strong>in</strong> a manual system. While specific <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit<br />

concerns are associated with each <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, there is a general<br />

approach recommended for a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. In this chapter, that aspect<br />

is discussed.<br />

The exam<strong>in</strong>ation upon which the report of attestation is based is known as<br />

Audit. The <strong>in</strong>dividual do<strong>in</strong>g such work is usually referred to as auditor. An auditor<br />

may be an <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor or an external auditor. The <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor is appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />

by the Management <strong>and</strong> he reports to them. External auditor or a statutory auditor<br />

<strong>in</strong> companies is appo<strong>in</strong>ted by the shareholders, at the annual general meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

under the Campany Law. The auditor gives his report under the statute to the<br />

shareholders.<br />

'The Statement of responsibilities of the Internal Auditors" was issued by the<br />

Institute of Internal Auditors orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> 1947. Subsequently <strong>in</strong> 1978, "St<strong>and</strong>ards for<br />

the professional practice of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>" was issued.<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts covered were:<br />

' Independence<br />

* Professional proficiency


* Scope of work<br />

* Performance of audit work<br />

* Management of the Internal Audit Departments.<br />

The more important aspects under this head are as follows :<br />

Independence<br />

Internal auditors should be <strong>in</strong>dependent of the activities they audit.<br />

Objectivity<br />

Internal auditors should be objective <strong>in</strong> perform<strong>in</strong>g audits.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> department's Knowledge, skills <strong>and</strong> discipl<strong>in</strong>es -The<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> department should possess or should obta<strong>in</strong> the knowledge, skills<br />

<strong>and</strong> discipl<strong>in</strong>es needed to cany out its audit responsibilities.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> department should provide assurance that <strong>in</strong>ternal audits<br />

are properly supenised.


The Internal auditor<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g Education<br />

Internal auditors should ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> their technical competence through<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g education.<br />

Due professional cart<br />

audits.<br />

Internal auditors should exercise due professional care <strong>in</strong> perform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

Reliability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

Internal auditors shoulu review the reliability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>and</strong><br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> the means used to identify measure classify <strong>and</strong> repon<br />

such <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

Compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws <strong>and</strong> regulations: Internal<br />

auditors should review the systems established to ensure compliance with those<br />

policies, plans, procedures, laws <strong>and</strong> regulations which could haw a significant impact<br />

on operations <strong>and</strong> reports <strong>and</strong> should determ<strong>in</strong>e whether the organisation is <strong>in</strong><br />

compliance.<br />

Safeguard<strong>in</strong>g of assets<br />

Internal auditors should review tht means of safeguard<strong>in</strong>g assets <strong>and</strong> as<br />

appropriate verify the existence of such assets.


Exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

Internal auditors should collect, analyse, <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>and</strong> document <strong>in</strong>ionnation<br />

to support audit results.<br />

Quality assurance<br />

The director of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> should establish <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a quality<br />

assurance program to evaluate the operations of the <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> department.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>ternal audit department provides assistance to Management by analys<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g on the activities reviewed by them. Internal auditors can be concerned<br />

with any phase of the bus<strong>in</strong>ess activity oi the organisation. Information systems is an<br />

important activity of the organisation which also forms the basis for account<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement. So to atta<strong>in</strong> the objective of render<strong>in</strong>g assistance to management<br />

<strong>in</strong> the effective discharge of the responsibilities, auditors activities will <strong>in</strong>clude the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g :<br />

- Review<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the soundness, adequacy of <strong>controls</strong><br />

associated with account<strong>in</strong>g, f<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>and</strong><br />

other activities satismg<br />

himself regard<strong>in</strong>g the extent of compliance with established policies <strong>and</strong><br />

procedures.<br />

- Evaluat<strong>in</strong>g reliability of management data <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation developed,<br />

review<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation systems, record <strong>and</strong> process f<strong>in</strong>ancial data.<br />

The <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards pronounced by the professional bodies are discussed<br />

<strong>in</strong> greater detail <strong>in</strong> the Chapter on Audit<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>ards. SAS No.47 addresses audit<br />

risk. Audit risk is def<strong>in</strong>ed at the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement level as "the risk that the auditor


may unknow<strong>in</strong>gly fail to appropriately modify his op<strong>in</strong>ion on f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements that<br />

are materially rnis-stated".<br />

The risk that material error exists is divided <strong>in</strong>to:<br />

(i)<br />

(ii)<br />

Inherent risk <strong>and</strong><br />

Control risk<br />

The components of audit risk could be described as follows :<br />

OVERALL AUDIT RISK<br />

+,<br />

Risk that balance of account<br />

About Detection<br />

The <strong>in</strong>herent risk could be identified with a knowledge of the bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> an<br />

underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of its transactions.<br />

Internal control risk<br />

The <strong>in</strong>ternal control risk is assessed when the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor by establish<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the effectiveness of the control system. The basic objective of any <strong>in</strong>ternal account<strong>in</strong>g<br />

control system is to provide assurance that all transactions are complete <strong>and</strong> accurate.


In a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, the auditor needs to review <strong>and</strong> evaluate the<br />

associated <strong>in</strong>ternal control systems to determ<strong>in</strong>e whether adequate <strong>controls</strong> exist to<br />

assure the auditor that all transactions are processed correctly <strong>and</strong> completeiy.<br />

It is <strong>in</strong> this background when an auditor is perform<strong>in</strong>g his duty <strong>in</strong> a<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, unless he is aware of acceptable st<strong>and</strong>ards for <strong>controls</strong><br />

associated with a particular <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, he would not be able to<br />

evaluate its adequacy. Consequently his assur<strong>in</strong>g himself that all transactions are<br />

processed correctly <strong>and</strong> completely does not arise.<br />

In large organisations auditors are permitted to rely on the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors<br />

op<strong>in</strong>ion under certa<strong>in</strong> circumstances. In addition they have their own responsibility<br />

as they are certify<strong>in</strong>g the correctness of f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements which themselves are<br />

prepared on the computer. It will thus be observed that an auditor, whether he be<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal or external, he should be knowledgeable about specific <strong>controls</strong>. Specific<br />

<strong>controls</strong> would be different depend<strong>in</strong>g upon the specific <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

The objectives of the audit <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> are only the same.<br />

However, <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> new of the <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

different, the audit mechanism for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g such <strong>controls</strong> has to be different too.<br />

PROBLEM AREAS<br />

All organisations - small <strong>and</strong> big - have <strong>computerised</strong> their account<strong>in</strong>g system.<br />

Larger organisations are hav<strong>in</strong>g sophisticated management <strong>in</strong>formation systems. The<br />

technological developments have been grow<strong>in</strong>g very fast. Audit<strong>in</strong>g skills have<br />

rema<strong>in</strong>ed stagnant. The <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors do not have <strong>in</strong> their team any staff member


who possess the necessary skills <strong>and</strong> knowledge to audit <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> The position regard<strong>in</strong>g external auditors who are big firms of long<br />

st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> who have amongst their clients large organisations with very high<br />

turnover are also not hav<strong>in</strong>g necessary skills <strong>and</strong> knowledge to perform an effective<br />

audit<br />

The present practices adopted by the auditors is limited to extensive check<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of hard copies of computer statements. While extensive check<strong>in</strong>g of the contents of<br />

the computer statements is undertaken, no attempts are be<strong>in</strong>g made to satisfy<br />

themselves about the basic correctness <strong>and</strong> completeness of the Statements. In a<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> is generally divided <strong>in</strong>to three categories:<br />

i. Aud~t<strong>in</strong>g around the computer<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g through the computer<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g with the computer<br />

i. Audit<strong>in</strong>g around the computer could be resorted to when the computer could<br />

be dealt with like a Black Box <strong>and</strong> the pr<strong>in</strong>t outs are exhaustive <strong>and</strong><br />

comprehensive so that every <strong>in</strong>put transactions can be traced to an output<br />

document.<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g through the computer is a situation when computer cannot be<br />

treated as a Black Box. Transactions are sometimes visible <strong>and</strong> sometimes<br />

<strong>in</strong>visible. The audit trail itself becomes a bit more complex. In such situations,<br />

the program logic should be tested.<br />

In <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> with the computer, auditors' skills <strong>and</strong> knowledge are so high that<br />

he takes advantage of the capabilities of a computer <strong>and</strong> uses his own<br />

program or a software to evaluate the correctness <strong>and</strong> the completeness of


computer statements In the present day computer technology has developed<br />

to such an extent that it would be most appropriate for an auditor to perform<br />

an audit with the computer. However, the methodology adopted by all the<br />

auditors without exception is to adopt the approach of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> around the<br />

computer while the situation dem<strong>and</strong>s an <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> with the computer. The<br />

auditors are not perform<strong>in</strong>g any of the functions.<br />

i. Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the computer system i.e. to know thetype of hardware <strong>and</strong><br />

softwareused <strong>and</strong>the operat<strong>in</strong>g system used.<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

A list of applications<br />

Study<strong>in</strong>g the system flow-charts.<br />

Verify<strong>in</strong>g whether there is adequate documentation for programs, whether<br />

there are any formal procedures documented for changes <strong>and</strong> programs,<br />

underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the built-<strong>in</strong> <strong>controls</strong> as also the compensat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>controls</strong> for each of the<br />

applications, test<strong>in</strong>g the programs <strong>and</strong> other procedures to evaluate the existence <strong>and</strong><br />

adequacy of <strong>controls</strong>, disaster recovery plan, report<strong>in</strong>g to the management regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

their op<strong>in</strong>ion on the audit performed.<br />

In the absence of awareness of the management regard<strong>in</strong>g the necessity to<br />

have an audit of the <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, they do not have the <strong>in</strong>ternal audit<br />

to perform audit of the <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong><br />

In the absence of official statements from the professional bodies, external<br />

auditors are not perform<strong>in</strong>g the audit of the <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.


There are reported <strong>and</strong> unreported cases of frauds occur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong>.<br />

Due to lack of knowledge, competence <strong>and</strong> skills <strong>and</strong> also as so far neither the<br />

Management nor the auditor has been sued by a third party for dereliction of duty<br />

for not evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> the present outdated<br />

practices <strong>and</strong> methods of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> are cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a sophisticated <strong>environment</strong> of<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g the latest <strong>in</strong>formation technology.<br />

Lack of awareness of the risks <strong>and</strong> vulnerablities associated with<br />

computerisation generally <strong>and</strong> specifically with certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>environment</strong>s was apparent <strong>in</strong><br />

very many examples. Infalliability of the computer is confused with the notion that<br />

all computer output will be error free <strong>and</strong> complete <strong>and</strong> correct <strong>and</strong> so no questions<br />

need be asked.<br />

There have been <strong>in</strong>stances when the accountants with<strong>in</strong> the company with the<br />

cooperation of the computer staff have been able to produce computer pr<strong>in</strong>g outs to<br />

suit the audit requirements <strong>and</strong> auditon of the particular concern certified the<br />

accounts based on such statements <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>n belief that they have checked<br />

"computer outputs".<br />

In another organisation while there was supposedly a cnntrol on the total<br />

entries to be passed undder each category there was no creation of a suspense file<br />

for entries which were rejected. Letters were written to the concerned departments<br />

with a copy to <strong>in</strong>ternal audit regard<strong>in</strong>g the entries rejected. It was a shock<strong>in</strong>g<br />

revelation to note that the matter ended there. In the same organisation the


vulnerability was exploited by collusion between a staff member of the computer<br />

department <strong>in</strong>charge of control totals <strong>and</strong> a clerk is one of the outstation depots. A<br />

cash entry was passed, supposeedly, to support a deposit <strong>in</strong> the ban of the depot.<br />

Bank reconciliations done six months later, did not help to reveal the <strong>in</strong>termediary<br />

frauds. Even the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors as also the external auditors were totally unaware<br />

of the go<strong>in</strong>gs on. Neither of them had any knowledge of the approach to audit when<br />

the accounts are computtrised.<br />

In another organisation preparation of <strong>in</strong>voices were <strong>computerised</strong> with the<br />

built <strong>in</strong> control to reject such records which did not comply with the control<br />

supposedly built <strong>in</strong>to the program regrdign type of product, sales tax classification,<br />

excise duty classification etc. Surpris<strong>in</strong>gly the computer system staff had built the logic<br />

that once the record was rejected, the rejected records would be rectified by the user<br />

department <strong>and</strong> fed <strong>in</strong>to the comuter <strong>and</strong> hence it would be waste of computer<br />

efficiency to check aga<strong>in</strong> ! This led to a situation when if a computer record had to<br />

bypass the supposedly built <strong>in</strong> <strong>controls</strong> they must have it rejected <strong>in</strong>itially. In a<br />

discussion on <strong>controls</strong>, with F<strong>in</strong>ance Controller this po<strong>in</strong>t was brought out when the<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ancial Controller was surprised of the loophole <strong>in</strong> the control. He hastened to<br />

have it corrected. Aga<strong>in</strong>, however, neight the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors nor external auditors<br />

were aware of this situation.<br />

In yet another organisation while prepar<strong>in</strong>g stock valuation reports on the<br />

computer, the wrong master file regard<strong>in</strong>g the market value was loaded which was<br />

compared with correct master file of costs. The logic of compar<strong>in</strong>g the cost or market<br />

value whichever is lower was no doubt correctly applied. But the stock valuation was<br />

wrong as wrong market file was loaded.


STANDARD ACCEPTED PRACTICES<br />

The objective of an audit is to evaluate the adequacy or othenvisc of the<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> to report on the same. The objective of an audit does not<br />

change irrespective whether the <strong>environment</strong> is manual or <strong>computerised</strong>. The method<br />

of satisfy<strong>in</strong>g onself with <strong>controls</strong> that need to exist do exist <strong>and</strong> they are adequate,<br />

however change when the <strong>environment</strong> changes from the manual.<br />

In a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> different situations may arise:<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

While the data orig<strong>in</strong>ates from the user department, the record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

process<strong>in</strong>g of the same takes place <strong>in</strong> a separate department, normally called<br />

the data procest<strong>in</strong>g department.<br />

The user departments may be provided with term<strong>in</strong>als, either <strong>in</strong>telligent or<br />

dumb. AIl these term<strong>in</strong>als are net-worked <strong>and</strong> a file server or two is<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a separate department under the control of a separate manager.<br />

A Database Management System might have been <strong>in</strong>troduced add<strong>in</strong>g yet<br />

another complexity to a local area network.<br />

Whatever may be the method that is adopted, there are certa<strong>in</strong> changes which<br />

have taken place as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from the manual system:<br />

i. Transactions are not always visible<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>put for certa<strong>in</strong> computer runs or the output of certa<strong>in</strong> other computer<br />

with the result <strong>in</strong>termediary results may not be always available <strong>in</strong> a hard<br />

COPY.<br />

With each type of computerisation, there are certa<strong>in</strong><strong>controls</strong> associated with<br />

them to ensure accuracy, completeness, <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong> security of the system.


In view of the above the auditor necessarily will have to be knowledgeable<br />

about the relevant <strong>controls</strong> that are applicable to a specific computeriscd<br />

<strong>environment</strong> so that he is <strong>in</strong> a position to evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of the<br />

same. He would thus be able to give a comprehensive report about his op<strong>in</strong>ion of the<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>controls</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation system which is be<strong>in</strong>g used by the<br />

organisation.The auditor, either <strong>in</strong>ternal or external, is expected to report either to<br />

the management or to the shareholders as the case may be, about he be<strong>in</strong>g satisfied<br />

or otherwise about the adequacy of the <strong>controls</strong>. In the case of adequacy, he should<br />

be <strong>in</strong> a position to quantify the consequences or the magnitude of such a weakness.<br />

To achieve the above mentioned objectives, the auditor should adopt the proper<br />

approach, as mentioned by William E.Perry.'<br />

STEP 1<br />

The <strong>in</strong>itial step that the auditor should take would be to scope the<br />

<strong>environment</strong>, primarily to underst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> which the computer<br />

applications run <strong>and</strong> also to assess the audit scope <strong>and</strong> decide on the areas <strong>in</strong> which<br />

the audit will bc conducted. Scop<strong>in</strong>g helps the auditor to collect adequate background<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation to perform an effective audit function. The various tasks that the auditor<br />

would be required to perform are:<br />

(a) Underst<strong>and</strong> the audit objective<br />

(b) Def<strong>in</strong>e the scopeofthe assignment to obta<strong>in</strong> necessary background<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

I<br />

William E.Perry Audit<strong>in</strong>g Information Systems A step by step audit approach<br />

EDP Auditors Foundation Audit Guide Series.


given blow:<br />

The above tasks may be effectively performed by follow<strong>in</strong>g the procedures<br />

l%e audit objective should be very clearly stated giv<strong>in</strong>g no room for any<br />

ambiguity. The scope of the assignment may be constra<strong>in</strong>ed as mentioned by William<br />

EPerry, by four Ts-vk Time, Talent, Tools <strong>and</strong> Travel. As is obvious, if the time is<br />

<strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>and</strong> the effort of travel is more than reasonable, the scope cannot<br />

necessarily be extensive. In addition, if the concerned staff do not have the necessary<br />

talent or though the staff may have the talent, if the necessary tools <strong>in</strong> the form of<br />

the software packages or utilities are not available or usable at the computer<br />

<strong>in</strong>stallation, the auditor would be constra<strong>in</strong>ed. This would be a contributoly factor for<br />

decid<strong>in</strong>g on the scope of the assignment.<br />

The auditor should necessarily obta<strong>in</strong> the background <strong>in</strong>formation; this would<br />

enable him to put the objective of the audit <strong>in</strong> the proper perspective. The auditor<br />

should meet the concerned key personnel <strong>in</strong> the computer department as also the<br />

user's department, he should acquire some knowledge if he does not already possess,<br />

so as to enable him to assess the possibility of any potential problems. The auditor<br />

should prepare suitable questionnaire which, when completed, would give him<br />

necessary <strong>in</strong>formation about the auditee be<strong>in</strong>g evaluated as also the <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong><br />

STEP 2<br />

Underst<strong>and</strong> the Information System<br />

An <strong>in</strong>formation system would generally have the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>gredients: (a)<br />

Manual process; (b) Basic documenu; (c) Computer process<strong>in</strong>g; (d) Computer files


held <strong>in</strong> either <strong>in</strong> the hard disdfloppies, various <strong>in</strong>puts <strong>and</strong> outputs; the auditor must<br />

first obta<strong>in</strong> a overview of the <strong>in</strong>formation system by concentrat<strong>in</strong>g on the system<br />

objectives <strong>and</strong> identify flow of audit evidence. The procedures he could usefully<br />

follow to underst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation is stated below :<br />

The <strong>in</strong>formation system would encompass both manual <strong>and</strong> automated<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g. Hence, it is necessary to study the systems <strong>in</strong> the basic manual<br />

<strong>environment</strong>, the f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> the l<strong>in</strong>kage between the two.<br />

A method which has been generally found effective to underst<strong>and</strong> an <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

system is for the auditor to conduct a "systems walkthrough". This <strong>in</strong>volves<br />

identification of all <strong>in</strong>put transactions by the auditor <strong>and</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g these transactions<br />

through the various computer process. This <strong>in</strong>formation should generally be available<br />

<strong>in</strong> the documentation that the computer department is expected to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>. The<br />

documentation would <strong>in</strong>clude a list of the various authorised applications with a<br />

systems flow-chart for the different applictions like the payroll, <strong>in</strong>ventory, f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

account<strong>in</strong>g etc. Each of the systems documentation should have (a)program<br />

specifications (b) List<strong>in</strong>g of the source code, user manuals, operations procedure etc<br />

The auditor may obta<strong>in</strong> an application flow- chart from the organisation or<br />

develop one himself. A flow-chart is a pictorial representation of the computer<br />

process. The flow-chart helps <strong>in</strong> simplify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> present<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a concise form large<br />

amounts of complex computer process<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

It is recommended that when the auditor prepares application flow-charts, they<br />

should be reviewed with the organisation's data process<strong>in</strong>g department to ensure its<br />

accuracy <strong>and</strong> completeness.


m p 3<br />

Identify the audit risks<br />

A risk can be def<strong>in</strong>ed as a potential loss or damage to an organisation. This<br />

is present <strong>in</strong> any <strong>environment</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> is more vulnerable to<br />

risk if adequate steps are not taken to implement effectively. The functions that the<br />

auditor has to perform for identify<strong>in</strong>g the audit risk would be by (a) identify<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

possible risk <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation systems (b) evaluate the magnitude of the<br />

risk <strong>and</strong> (c) prioritise the risk with reference to the importance from the auditor's<br />

po<strong>in</strong>t of view.<br />

Identify<strong>in</strong>g the risks<br />

It would be possible to identify the risks <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> only<br />

if the auditor <strong>and</strong> his team are familiar with the <strong>in</strong>formation system as also the<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> which the particular <strong>in</strong>formation system operates. As<br />

mentioned earlier, a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> has additional risks as compared to<br />

manual process<strong>in</strong>g. It is necessary for the auditor to identify these risks. An<br />

illustrative but not necessarily an exhaustive list of all the risks generally associated<br />

with the <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> is as mentioned below:<br />

Repetition of emrs<br />

While <strong>in</strong> a manual process errors are made <strong>in</strong>dividually, <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> if there is an error <strong>in</strong> a program, the error would be committed<br />

consistently for any number of transactions with greater speed.


Cascad<strong>in</strong>g of emrs<br />

An error <strong>in</strong> a particular part of a program may trigger an unrelated error <strong>in</strong><br />

another part of the programme or applications systems may <strong>in</strong> its turn trigger yet<br />

another error; this type of error becomes more complicated when there is an<br />

<strong>in</strong>tegrated system.<br />

Unreasonable process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

In the absence of human judgment, certa<strong>in</strong> unreasonable process<strong>in</strong>g is likely<br />

to take place. A junior <strong>in</strong>dividual on a very low salary may be given a computer job<br />

the value of which is ten times or hundred his entitlement There may be an<br />

<strong>in</strong>ventory application <strong>in</strong> which a quantity for a particul,ir item may be- denoted with<br />

a negative figure. Similarly due to wrong process<strong>in</strong>g a cash account may also denote<br />

a negative balance.<br />

Incomt entiy of data<br />

Though properly prepared, may be wrongly entered <strong>in</strong>to the computer. Even<br />

when data is generated <strong>and</strong> entered <strong>in</strong>to the computer, at the same time, there is a<br />

possibility of errors creep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>.<br />

Concentration of data<br />

Unlike <strong>in</strong> a manual system when volum<strong>in</strong>ous data is stored <strong>in</strong> different places,<br />

<strong>in</strong> a computeriscd <strong>environment</strong> the data is concentrated <strong>in</strong> a computer file. This gives<br />

room for the possibility of data be<strong>in</strong>g copied without even the owners of the data


e<strong>in</strong>g aware of the same. Sometimes this may result <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong>al data be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

modified or deleted. When more <strong>and</strong> more data are stored <strong>in</strong> a centralised place, the<br />

greater is the value for the data <strong>and</strong> greater is the vulnerability. The <strong>in</strong>ability to<br />

substantiate process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the absence of proper audit it may be difficult to<br />

substantiate the process<strong>in</strong>g. It should be possible to trace the sources of transactions<br />

<strong>and</strong> establish its <strong>in</strong>tegrity by means of control totals.<br />

Concentration of responsibilities<br />

Responsibilities which might have been separated for control purposes <strong>in</strong> a<br />

nontomputerised <strong>environment</strong> may get merged <strong>and</strong> get concentrated <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />

application. This necessitates the substitution of new <strong>controls</strong> to make up for the<br />

previous separation of duties.<br />

Determ<strong>in</strong>e the magnitude of risk<br />

While quantitative rank<strong>in</strong>g of the risk like whether it is high, medium or low<br />

is adequate, it may be useful to quantify the same to facilitate effective presentation<br />

to the management.<br />

Prioritis<strong>in</strong>g the risks<br />

It is important that the risks should be prioritised so that the auditor would<br />

be able to prioritise his risks <strong>and</strong> suitably divide the resources among the various<br />

risks.


STEP 4<br />

Identify<strong>in</strong>g audit evidence<br />

Electronic evidence as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from the paper evidence has had a significant<br />

impact on the control process as also the audit process. As more <strong>and</strong> more evidence<br />

is becom<strong>in</strong>g electronic to substantiate the evidence, it is necessary that not only the<br />

electronic evidence should be available, but it should be supported by adequate <strong>and</strong><br />

relevant <strong>controls</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g its orig<strong>in</strong>ation, record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> storage. The follow<strong>in</strong>g table<br />

provides details regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation systems audit evidence :<br />

INFORMATION SYSTEM AUDIT EVIDENCE1<br />

Types of Evidence<br />

Authorization<br />

Record<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Access to assets<br />

Asset accountability<br />

Operational Performance<br />

Satisfy goals <strong>and</strong><br />

objectives<br />

Examples of Evidence <strong>in</strong> Automated System<br />

Supervisor key<br />

* Automated authorization mles<br />

* User signoff<br />

Data filesldata bases<br />

* Systemlprogram documentation<br />

Communication logs<br />

* Passwords<br />

Security Systems<br />

* Communication logs<br />

Operator log<br />

* DBMS log<br />

* Program change control<br />

* Job accouunt<strong>in</strong>g log<br />

Softwarehardware monitors<br />

Failurelcompla<strong>in</strong>t reports<br />

Quality assurance reports<br />

Metrics<br />

Post-implementation review reports<br />

-<br />

William E.Perry, Audit<strong>in</strong>g Information Systems a Step-by-step Audit Approach, p.46.<br />

ZDP Auditors Foundation Audit Guide Series, 1983.


It is very important to note that it is not only the computer technology but also<br />

the use to which the technology is put which decides the type of evidence that the<br />

auditor will need to look <strong>in</strong>to. The auditor would be better advised <strong>in</strong> this connection<br />

to (i) make an exaustive list of all the evidence produced by the <strong>computerised</strong><br />

application system; most of the <strong>in</strong>formation should be available even at the stage<br />

when the auditor spends time to underst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation system <strong>and</strong> (ii)<br />

document the audit evidence. When document<strong>in</strong>g the evidence the major po<strong>in</strong>ts that<br />

the auditor should note would be (1) Medium: It may be stored on a floppy or a hard<br />

disc or tape; (2) Location; the place where the computer media is stored. (3) Size<br />

<strong>and</strong> format: the size of the file as also the format of the records are important (4)<br />

Period: the time for which the evidence would be stored before be<strong>in</strong>g discarded is<br />

very important. The auditor should ensure that the evidence is capable of be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

reta<strong>in</strong>ed till such time he requires. The auditor should collect adequate <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

so that he would be able to develop his own software programme or use a computer<br />

utility so that he can analyse <strong>and</strong> list the electronic evidence for audit purposes.<br />

STEP5<br />

Identify key control po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

Key control po<strong>in</strong>ts are po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> a computer system where the risk is greatest<br />

<strong>and</strong> naturally control is most important The generally accepted <strong>and</strong> easily usable<br />

strategies which can be adopted by the auditors are as follows:<br />

i. Checklist<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Control flow chart<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Matrices


The questionnaires have many disadvantages as they tend to be very long <strong>and</strong><br />

hence make it difficult to analyse. The Matrix is a good <strong>and</strong> effective stragety. This<br />

matrix provides list of <strong>controls</strong> to protect <strong>in</strong>formation systems aga<strong>in</strong>st possible<br />

vulnerabilities. Control flow-charts are most effective. The tasks <strong>in</strong>volved are: (1)<br />

Locate the risks on the control flow chart; (2) Document the key <strong>controls</strong> on the<br />

control charts, (3) Locat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>controls</strong> on the control flow chart: The auditor who<br />

would have already identified the possible risks must match these risks with that part<br />

of the <strong>in</strong>formation systems <strong>in</strong> which the risk is the greatest. This match<strong>in</strong>g would help<br />

<strong>in</strong> identiFy<strong>in</strong>g the po<strong>in</strong>ts where the risks need to be controlled or where the key<br />

control po<strong>in</strong>ts are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> system.<br />

Document key control on the application flow chart<br />

It would be necessary for the auditor to document the computer systems<br />

<strong>controls</strong> by concentrat<strong>in</strong>g on the key <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

STEP 6<br />

IDENTIFYING CONTROL WEAlCNESSES<br />

A weakness is a condition which <strong>in</strong> the auditor's op<strong>in</strong>ion could result <strong>in</strong> a loss;<br />

once it is identified, it can be tested to determ<strong>in</strong>e the magnitude of the potential<br />

control weaknesses.


Document<strong>in</strong>g for control weakness identification<br />

Unlike manual systems which are <strong>in</strong>consistent, <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

systems are pre-determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> consistent. The three methods which could be used<br />

for document<strong>in</strong>g of control weaknesses are (a) control flow chart<strong>in</strong>g; @) conflict<br />

matrix <strong>and</strong> (c) transactions-control matrices.<br />

Preparation of a conflict matrix<br />

This is an easy method for identify<strong>in</strong>g when a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>in</strong>dividual is vested with<br />

too much responsibility. The process <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>g the conflict matrix consists<br />

of identify<strong>in</strong>g the people who have <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation system <strong>and</strong> secondly<br />

identify<strong>in</strong>g conflict<strong>in</strong>g connections by means of the ability they have to manipulate.<br />

Process<strong>in</strong>g the matrix is prepared by list<strong>in</strong>g of the connections of one access of the<br />

people <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation systems <strong>in</strong> the other access.<br />

Preparation of transactions control matrix<br />

Transactions which <strong>in</strong>volve economic events like cash, bank, receipts <strong>and</strong><br />

payments should be considered for this matrix. The economic events are recorded on<br />

one access of the matrix while the <strong>in</strong>formation systems are recorded <strong>in</strong> the other<br />

access. Controls codify<strong>in</strong>g each of these transactions are listed at the matrix <strong>in</strong>tersection.<br />

This type of the matrix has the advantage of document<strong>in</strong>g the compensat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>controls</strong>.


Analysis <strong>and</strong> document potential control weeknesses<br />

The control assessment consists of four <strong>in</strong>gredients.<br />

First, identify the risk; control flow chart could help <strong>in</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g the risk.<br />

Second, determ<strong>in</strong>e the magnitude of the risk;<br />

Third, determ<strong>in</strong>e the strength of the <strong>controls</strong>; each of the <strong>controls</strong> should be<br />

assessed <strong>in</strong>dividually to enable the auditor to assess how strong it is.<br />

Fourth, identify control weakness <strong>and</strong> document the same. The auditor should<br />

make cost-benefit analysis to ensure that cost of the control is not more than thc<br />

magnitude of the loss due to the weakness.<br />

Verify<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the computer files<br />

The various steps <strong>in</strong> verify<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the computer files are:<br />

i. Identify<strong>in</strong>g the files for exam<strong>in</strong>ation; this could be done by study<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

systems flow chart. The files generally selected are those that would be needed<br />

to test control weaknesses.<br />

ii.<br />

File documents.


File documents<br />

Save the needed computer files. It is necessary for the auditor after hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

decided which file is needed to ensure that the file will be available at the time he<br />

plans to take or conduct the test.<br />

iii.<br />

Verify the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the file<br />

This is done to ensure that the data on file is reconcilable to an <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />

control - the total or equivalent. Examples - control figures of subsidiary ledgers,<br />

overstatement of assets, understatements of liabilities. The file <strong>in</strong>tegrity may be<br />

performed <strong>in</strong>dependently or <strong>in</strong> conjunction with other audit tests. It is very important<br />

to note that the file <strong>in</strong>tegrity test should be personally performed by the auditors.<br />

Auditor's <strong>in</strong>dependence would be lost if the tests were developed <strong>and</strong> performed<br />

bythe data process<strong>in</strong>g people or by the user department. However, where the auditor<br />

does not have the necessary skills, he could rely on a third party.<br />

iv.<br />

Verify the <strong>in</strong>tegrit: of the data on the file<br />

The auditor may use the software or utility <strong>and</strong> have the data on the file <strong>and</strong><br />

have the same classified accord<strong>in</strong>g to their requirements. Example: Accounts<br />

receivable file, classified as more than six months, less than six months; the balances<br />

which are beyond credit limits authorised etc; <strong>in</strong>ventories as items which have not<br />

moved for more than a year or as A, B, C analysis.


STEP 8<br />

CONDUCT Ah' AUDIT TEST<br />

In countries where computerisation has been <strong>in</strong> existence for more than 50<br />

years, as <strong>in</strong> the case of United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, etc. there are<br />

software <strong>in</strong> the category of generalised computer audit software. However, <strong>in</strong> our<br />

country we do not have the availability of such a software <strong>and</strong> also the necessary<br />

knowledge <strong>and</strong> skills to use such software is absent. However, the auditors are not<br />

h<strong>and</strong>icapped by the absence of such a software. The <strong>controls</strong> used by the<br />

programmers <strong>and</strong> systems analysts to build <strong>in</strong> <strong>controls</strong> could be used by the auditors<br />

to conduct such tests.<br />

STEP 9<br />

CONCLUDING THE AUDIT<br />

The objective of the audit is to evaluate the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> give <strong>in</strong>formation on<br />

the adequacy or otherwise of the same. Hence, while conclud<strong>in</strong>g audit the auditor<br />

should determ<strong>in</strong>e the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, develop recommendations <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g out the details<br />

for the acceptance of those recommendations. The steps <strong>in</strong>volved are :<br />

(1) Develop audit f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs; a f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g is a comparison of exist<strong>in</strong>g situation with an<br />

ideal situation. A f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g should conta<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation:<br />

(i) factual situation observed by the auditor


(2) criteria for judgment. The criteria <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> are the<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> well-def<strong>in</strong>ed implementable <strong>controls</strong> specific to<br />

each environmenq<br />

(3) Effect of the condition<br />

The auditor should compare the condition as it exists with the condition as it<br />

should exist <strong>and</strong> give an op<strong>in</strong>ion on the effect it would have. (4) Develop audit<br />

recommendations: It is advisable that the auditor should discuss his recommendations<br />

with the auditee. It is well said that the best recommendation is the one that has been<br />

accepted prior to its be<strong>in</strong>g presented.<br />

Writ<strong>in</strong>g the Audit Report<br />

The audit report should be short, be bereft of term<strong>in</strong>ology <strong>and</strong> jargcn; it<br />

should conta<strong>in</strong> a summary with explanatory material attached. The report should be<br />

positive <strong>and</strong> effective, giv<strong>in</strong>g suggestions about corrective actions to be taken <strong>in</strong> areas<br />

which have been prioritised.<br />

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS<br />

A questionnaire based on st<strong>and</strong>ard literature of audit approach was prepared.<br />

Lead<strong>in</strong>g firms of Chartered Accountants were also selected with sample. All the firms<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual auditors have a wide variety of clients which <strong>in</strong>clude public limited<br />

companies, nationalised banks etc. Almost all their clients have computers <strong>in</strong> their


organisation. All the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements which are certified by these firms are<br />

prepared on the computer. A total sample of 30 auditors was selected.<br />

The response to the questionnaire was personally collected. A summary of the<br />

response received on the questionnaire is enclosed.<br />

An analysis discloses that none of the auditors are at present hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

confidence or the skills to perform an audit <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. Further,<br />

they certified that the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements which are outputs from computers<br />

represent a true <strong>and</strong> fair view of the affairs of the company. A detailed discussion<br />

with them reveal that they are ignorant of specific <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> each types of the<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>; they rely on the management personnel of their clients'<br />

organisation for the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

A further sample of 30 companies who are clients of one particular auditor's<br />

firm was chosen. These firms are dealt with by different partners who have their own<br />

assistants who are qualified chartered accountants. A more detailed study based on<br />

the questionnaire was performed. It was reveal<strong>in</strong>g to note that neither the juniors of<br />

the firm nor the seniors have made any attempt to study the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> of their clients. In all the cases the auditors were not even<br />

aware of the type of computer that was <strong>in</strong> their client's organisation.<br />

Information is an important asset of the organisation <strong>and</strong> the organisations are<br />

entirely dependent on the <strong>in</strong>formation produced by the computer. In all the<br />

organisations computerisation has been <strong>in</strong> existence for more than I5 years. The


auditors were not aware of the possible risks <strong>in</strong>volved. They claim that the <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />

of the people associated with computers <strong>in</strong> their client's organisation was<br />

unquestionable <strong>and</strong> hence they have no reason to feel concerned. It was also claimed<br />

that they had not come across any fraud situation. I conducted an <strong>in</strong>dependent study<br />

of a sample of 30 organisations <strong>and</strong> had personal discussions with the senior members<br />

of the staff, both <strong>in</strong> the computer division as also the f<strong>in</strong>ance departments. A<br />

statement is enclosed giv<strong>in</strong>g the risk factor <strong>in</strong>volved. The computer-risk assessment<br />

procedure <strong>and</strong> the questionnaire have been adopted, as suggested <strong>in</strong> the book "Audit<br />

computer Security - A manual with case studies" by S. Rao Vallabhaneni, the data<br />

was gathered by provid<strong>in</strong>g the questionnaire to them earlier <strong>and</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g them later.<br />

The questionnaire wa, jo<strong>in</strong>tly compiled by me <strong>and</strong> the senior member of the<br />

computer department who did it with the approval <strong>and</strong> knowledge of the F<strong>in</strong>ance<br />

Controller.<br />

The risk value <strong>and</strong> the criterion weight are not based on any scientific<br />

evidence; they are based on <strong>in</strong>tuition <strong>and</strong> graded accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>in</strong>tensity of the<br />

risk. The risk rank<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>g sheet was prepared (Annexure H).<br />

SUGGESTIONS FOR ORGANISATIONS<br />

Knowledge of appropriate <strong>controls</strong> associated with specific <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong>s should be acquired by the auditors, whether they be <strong>in</strong>ternal or<br />

external. Managements who have the primary responsibility for <strong>controls</strong> should issue<br />

policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> consultation with competent people, from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> from


outside consultants. The policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es should clearly lay down the<br />

procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

- Organisational <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>controls</strong><br />

- Documentation st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

- Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of security <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of files <strong>and</strong> data<br />

- Procedures for disaster recovery plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />

- Nom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g a group for constantly monitor<strong>in</strong>g the implementation of<br />

policies <strong>and</strong> procedures <strong>and</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g that they are updated <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g<br />

with the changed circumstances.<br />

SUGGESTIONS FOR AUDITORS<br />

It is long overdue for the auditors to become computer-literate. It is essential<br />

for them to have a thorough knowledge of control <strong>and</strong> security aspects associated<br />

with each <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. This need for knowledge is immediate <strong>and</strong> long<br />

overdue. It would be desirable to have a EDP cell <strong>in</strong> all large audit firms. The staff<br />

of the EDP Cell needs to be tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> kept upto date on current techno lo^ <strong>in</strong><br />

computers.<br />

Where it is not possible to have a separate cell it would be advisable to rope<br />

<strong>in</strong> a consultant who has the necessary knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience. However, the<br />

auditor's basic responsibility regard<strong>in</strong>g the need for satisfy<strong>in</strong>g himself about the<br />

adequacy of <strong>controls</strong> cannot be relegated or delegated due to non-availability of<br />

competent staff. With knowledge adequate to meet the situation, it is recommended


outside assistance can be sought. In special circumstances, when evaluation of assets<br />

needs to be done <strong>and</strong> certified, it is not uncommon to get a third party who is<br />

competent to do so to give a certificate based upon which the auditors themselves<br />

authenticate the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement. The same procedure needs to be adopted<br />

immediately.<br />

If auditors <strong>and</strong> organisations do not wake up to the situation, frauds of serious<br />

consequence would take place. The chapter describ<strong>in</strong>g the "scenario" <strong>in</strong> other parts<br />

of the world has a short description of the crimes <strong>and</strong> frauds that have been reported<br />

<strong>in</strong> countries such as USA. UK <strong>and</strong> Australia.<br />

Various charts depict<strong>in</strong>g the average annual computer abuse, loss <strong>and</strong><br />

computer crime loss, relative seriousness of frauds have been enclosed. These charts<br />

<strong>and</strong> reports should be eye-openers for managements of organisations <strong>and</strong> auditors to<br />

implement post-haste audit of <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.


CHAPTER IX<br />

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

This Chapter presents a summary of conclusion <strong>and</strong> recommendations of the<br />

study besides mak<strong>in</strong>g useful recommendations <strong>in</strong> control st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

procedures <strong>in</strong> a wmputerised <strong>environment</strong><br />

AUDITING STANDARDS<br />

International bodies like the American Institute of Certified Public<br />

Accountanq Institute of Internal Auditors, USA, the Institute of Chartered<br />

Accountants of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales, United K<strong>in</strong>gdom, EDPAA Foundation, USA,<br />

have issued official pronouncements regard<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards to be observed<br />

<strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> Though there may be no enforc<strong>in</strong>g authority <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g<br />

on the auditors obsemng certa<strong>in</strong> procedures it is quite necessary for the auditors to<br />

change their approach <strong>and</strong> adopt appropriate tools <strong>and</strong> techniques while <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />

a wmputerised <strong>environment</strong><br />

The <strong>in</strong>numerable <strong>in</strong>stances of frauds which have occured <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> reported elsewhere <strong>in</strong> the world (as mentioned <strong>in</strong> Chapter I) proves<br />

beyond doubt that it is absolutely imperative for the auditor to acquire adequate skills<br />

<strong>and</strong> competence. In the absence of such skill <strong>and</strong> competence to certify that<br />

adequate <strong>controls</strong> commensurate with size <strong>and</strong> nature of the organisation exist is<br />

mean<strong>in</strong>gless. In addition, <strong>in</strong> the absence of adequate knowledge of necessary <strong>in</strong>ternal


<strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> different <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>, the auditor will not be able to satisfy<br />

himself that they represent a uue <strong>and</strong> fair view.<br />

CONTROLS IN END-USER COMPUTING<br />

The practice of end-user comput<strong>in</strong>g has been proliferat<strong>in</strong>g due to the fact that<br />

the cost of hardware <strong>and</strong> software has been fall<strong>in</strong>g significantly <strong>and</strong> they have been<br />

becom<strong>in</strong>g very user-friendly. In addition, more <strong>and</strong> more users have become more<br />

computer-literate <strong>and</strong> hence usage of computers, specially PCs by functional<br />

departments, has become very common. However, the study reveals that there are<br />

no policies <strong>and</strong> procedures regard<strong>in</strong>g the control <strong>and</strong> security <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong> Well-accepted control procedures are absent Neither the management<br />

nor the user is <strong>in</strong> full realisation of the consequences of <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g end-user<br />

comput<strong>in</strong>g without implement<strong>in</strong>g the necessary discipl<strong>in</strong>e which comes with it<br />

Neither the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors nor the external auditors are seized with the<br />

responsibility of the accepted procedures if audit review have not been followed.<br />

CONTROLS IN L9N<br />

With the development of <strong>in</strong>formation technology <strong>and</strong> communication <strong>and</strong> with<br />

the availability of communication software, many organisations have taken advantage<br />

of this concept Needless to say there are additional control features which need to<br />

be adhered to <strong>in</strong> a net-worked <strong>environment</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g advance communication facilities.<br />

The net-work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong> is a few further steps <strong>in</strong> technological development<br />

The auditors have not acquired adequate skills <strong>and</strong> competence <strong>in</strong> our country even<br />

for <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a basic <strong>computerised</strong> environmenr In view of this, they are not even


aware of the necessary <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a net-worked <strong>environment</strong>. Hence the adequacy<br />

of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> practices does not ark. The <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards as practised now are<br />

totally <strong>in</strong>adequate.<br />

CONTROLS IN DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM<br />

Database management sptem is an extremely useful technology <strong>and</strong> many<br />

vendor packages like ORACLE, INGRESS <strong>and</strong> SYBASE are <strong>in</strong> the market vie<strong>in</strong>g<br />

with each other ; after real'i<strong>in</strong>g the utility of DBMS certa<strong>in</strong> large organisations have<br />

implemented the same. However, a study of a sample number of organisations<br />

reveals that the control procedures <strong>and</strong> practices are <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the accepted norms<br />

<strong>in</strong> toto. As regards the audit procedures apart from the organisations report<strong>in</strong>g that<br />

neither the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditor nor the external auditor have ever reviewed their<br />

<strong>controls</strong>, the auditors themselves ave conceded that they are not even aware of the<br />

control objectives <strong>and</strong> audit concerns, thus prov<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong> that control practices <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>.<br />

UNM ENVIRONMENT<br />

This particular operat<strong>in</strong>g system can be chosen as when it was <strong>in</strong>troduced it<br />

had a number of loopholes. The organisations who <strong>in</strong>troduced the system realised it<br />

after <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>and</strong> even by a process of control trial <strong>and</strong> error, are try<strong>in</strong>g to plug<br />

the loopholes. A study of the practices <strong>in</strong> the organisations which have implemented<br />

UNIX reveals that all of them have had an unpleasant experience or two when the<br />

vulnerabilities <strong>in</strong> the operat<strong>in</strong>g systems have been exploited by a process of<br />

evaluation, securities are be<strong>in</strong>g built <strong>in</strong>to this <strong>environment</strong>, However, <strong>in</strong> most of the


organisations the system is not fool-proof. As regards the auditors they are totally<br />

unaware of the concept of operat<strong>in</strong>g system vulnerabilities <strong>in</strong> general <strong>and</strong> UNIX<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>in</strong> particular.<br />

DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN (DRP)<br />

It is extremely important that once the systems have been <strong>computerised</strong> there<br />

should be a disaster recovery plan. There are well-established procedures <strong>and</strong><br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es for evolv<strong>in</strong>g a plan, implement<strong>in</strong>g it, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g it <strong>and</strong> constantly<br />

renew<strong>in</strong>g it; It is an on-go<strong>in</strong>g process. However, <strong>in</strong> practice the organisations, mostly,<br />

do not go beyond ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a copy of the programme <strong>and</strong> data, that too <strong>in</strong> the<br />

same build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the same computer department, mostly <strong>in</strong> the cab<strong>in</strong> of the Systems<br />

Manager. The organisation, specially the computer department is aware of the risks<br />

<strong>in</strong>volved. However, the study reveals that neither the management nor the data<br />

personnel departments have seriously done any th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of evolv<strong>in</strong>g an effective<br />

disaster recovery plan. Auditors do not realise that <strong>in</strong>formation is an asset While<br />

evaluat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> verify<strong>in</strong>g the existence of assets <strong>in</strong>formation is left out of count The<br />

fact that there is no <strong>in</strong>surance coverage other than for the hardware is totally lost<br />

sight of. In the absence of any knowledge of the contents of disaster recovery plan<br />

<strong>and</strong> also the absence of any awareness for the necessity of disaster recovery plan,<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the existence of disaster recovely plan <strong>and</strong> its<br />

adequacy is totally absent.<br />

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS<br />

An analysis of the appropriate <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> specific <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong><br />

reveals that it is far below acceptable norms. The concerned auditors, both <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

<strong>and</strong> external are totally ignorant The analysis of the f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs


substantiate the NULL hypothesis that control st<strong>and</strong>ards are <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>visible <strong>and</strong> hence <strong>in</strong>efficient<br />

Questionnaires for Physical security (Appendix A), for Personal Security<br />

(Appendix B), Data security (Appendix C), Application software security (Appendix<br />

D), Systems software security (Appendii E), Telecommunication security (Appendix<br />

F), Computer operation security (Appendix G) were used to collect data <strong>and</strong> quantify<br />

the risk assessment under each of the areas. The results as obta<strong>in</strong>ed are given <strong>in</strong><br />

table 10.1.'<br />

The table as given below conta<strong>in</strong>s risk rank<strong>in</strong>g worksheet was utilised.<br />

Table - Risk-Rank<strong>in</strong>g Worksheet<br />

r<br />

Computer Security Area<br />

Physical Security<br />

Personnel Security<br />

Data Security<br />

Applications Software Security<br />

Systems Software Security<br />

Telecommunications Security<br />

Computer Operation Security<br />

Lovv<br />

0-26<br />

0-34<br />

0-44<br />

0-64<br />

0-42<br />

0-39<br />

0-33<br />

Risk Level<br />

Medium<br />

27-52<br />

35-68<br />

45-88<br />

65-128<br />

43-84<br />

40-78<br />

34-66<br />

High<br />

53-96<br />

53-129<br />

89-172<br />

129-263<br />

85-152<br />

79-138<br />

67-124<br />

The data obta<strong>in</strong>ed was anlalysed utilis<strong>in</strong>g the norms provided the above table. The<br />

analysis of the sample survey if 30 organisations was as given <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g table:<br />

Audit<strong>in</strong>g Computer Secuirt - A Manual with Case Studies<br />

by S.Rao Vallabhaneni, J O Wiley ~ & Sons, New York.


Type of Security<br />

Physical Security<br />

Personnel Security<br />

Data Security<br />

Application Software Security<br />

System Sohware Security<br />

Telecommunication Sobre Security<br />

Computer Operations Security<br />

It will be observed that out of the 30 organisations, 29 organisations were <strong>in</strong> the high<br />

risk category <strong>in</strong> areas of systems software security, telecommunication software<br />

security <strong>and</strong> computer operation security. 28 of the 30 organisations were <strong>in</strong> the high<br />

risk category <strong>and</strong> two <strong>in</strong> the medium risk category <strong>in</strong> the areas of Personnel security,<br />

data security <strong>and</strong> application saftware security. There was only one organisation <strong>in</strong><br />

the low risk category <strong>and</strong> 2 organisations <strong>in</strong> the medium risk category <strong>and</strong> the balance<br />

of the 27 <strong>in</strong> the high risk category under the category of Physical security. It is of<br />

significance to note that out of the 30 organisations one organisation which had low<br />

risk <strong>in</strong> 2 areas <strong>and</strong> medium risk <strong>in</strong> 6 areas was a multi national company which had<br />

auditors com<strong>in</strong>g from abroad. The head office of the organisation <strong>in</strong> U.S. which had<br />

offices al! over the world bad laid down st<strong>and</strong>ard procedures <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es for<br />

security aspects <strong>and</strong> audit procedures.<br />

Total Na<br />

Of<br />

'-''%ahation<br />

30<br />

30<br />

30<br />

30<br />

30<br />

30<br />

30<br />

' Low<br />

Risk<br />

1<br />

1<br />

Numben <strong>in</strong><br />

Medium<br />

Risk<br />

2<br />

2<br />

2<br />

2<br />

1<br />

1<br />

High<br />

Risk<br />

27<br />

28<br />

28<br />

28<br />

29<br />

29<br />

29


228<br />

ANALYSIS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT (Table 10.1)<br />

~1.<br />

N~.<br />

1.<br />

2.<br />

3.<br />

4.<br />

5.<br />

6.<br />

7.<br />

8.<br />

9.<br />

10.<br />

11.<br />

12.<br />

13.<br />

14.<br />

15.<br />

16.<br />

17.<br />

18.<br />

19.<br />

20.<br />

21.<br />

22.<br />

23.<br />

24.<br />

25.<br />

26.<br />

27.<br />

28.<br />

29.<br />

30.<br />

Physical<br />

Security<br />

1<br />

28<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

50<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

60<br />

Computer<br />

Operations<br />

Security<br />

7<br />

43<br />

86<br />

%<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

Personnel<br />

Security<br />

2<br />

58<br />

103<br />

103<br />

93<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

103<br />

Data<br />

Security<br />

3<br />

49<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

96<br />

Teleeommu<br />

nication<br />

System<br />

Security<br />

6<br />

43<br />

86<br />

8h<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

86<br />

Security<br />

Application<br />

Software<br />

Security<br />

4<br />

68<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

182<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

172<br />

Systems<br />

Sohn<br />

Security<br />

5<br />

42<br />

100<br />

90<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

1W<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

I0<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100<br />

100


AUDIT APPROACH<br />

AND<br />

RECOMMENDATION


AUDIT APPROACH<br />

A study of the general approach <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> reveal that<br />

auditors of large organisations which have complex computer <strong>environment</strong> have not<br />

followed any of the accepted procedures. As a matter of fact, the <strong>controls</strong> of the<br />

general questionnaire seemed <strong>in</strong>comprehensible responses to them. Questionnarie <strong>in</strong><br />

Appendix I was negative <strong>in</strong> all the cases. The general new expressed was that senior<br />

executive <strong>in</strong> charge of computer operations <strong>in</strong> their client's offices were very<br />

competent <strong>and</strong> reliable. Aga<strong>in</strong> apan from the support<strong>in</strong>g evidence collected from<br />

well known auditors it was supported by their clients also. They had no hesitation <strong>in</strong><br />

stat<strong>in</strong>g that the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> have never been evaluated<br />

either by the <strong>in</strong>ternal auditors or the external auditors. A study of the <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

the <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards supports the NULL hypothesis, <strong>controls</strong> are <strong>in</strong>sufficient <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards are woefully <strong>in</strong>adequate.<br />

RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

It is more than overdue that the management <strong>and</strong> the auditors should realise<br />

the impact of computerisation on <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. While the objectives of <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> have not<br />

changed the means of achiev<strong>in</strong>g those goals <strong>and</strong> objectives have def<strong>in</strong>itely changed.<br />

Hence, it is necessary for the management to ensure that <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> their organisation are adequate. They should<br />

also be seized with the necessity for a disaster recovery plan. With these objectives,<br />

they should equip their <strong>in</strong>ternal audit depanment with staff competent to evaluate<br />

the adequacy of <strong>controls</strong>. In case it is not possible for them to immediately tra<strong>in</strong><br />

the personnel of the <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

audit department to acquire adequate skills <strong>and</strong>


competence they should <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong> the audit team an <strong>in</strong>formation technologist, who<br />

is competent <strong>and</strong> knowledgeable of the specific <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> <strong>in</strong> their<br />

organisation. In the absence of such a staff, the possibility of frauds associated with<br />

<strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong> cannot be ruled out. It is better to take preventive steps.<br />

As the computers are sophisticated, knowledgeable computer personnel with<br />

fraudulent <strong>in</strong>tentions may hold the organisation to ransom. Apart from f<strong>in</strong>ancial loss<br />

the organisation would also suffer loss of image.<br />

The statutory auditors cannot hope to protect themselves for improper<br />

discharge of their duties as auditors <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>. Absence of<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards which make it obligatory to observe certa<strong>in</strong> procedures may not<br />

preclude their be<strong>in</strong>g sued for negligence. The auditors should equip themselves to<br />

meet the challenges of fast-chang<strong>in</strong>g technology. It is recommended that large<br />

<strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> firms should have an EDP Cell. The personnel should consist of people<br />

knowledgeable about general <strong>and</strong> application <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>computerised</strong><br />

<strong>environment</strong>, as also of <strong>controls</strong> specific to certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>computerised</strong> <strong>environment</strong>s.<br />

Their skills with the experience of auditon would help to discharge the responsibility<br />

to the management, the shareholders <strong>and</strong> the public. They should also consider<br />

seek<strong>in</strong>g the senices of specialists <strong>in</strong> the field <strong>and</strong> rely<strong>in</strong>g on the specialists' op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g adequacy of <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

The technology is develop<strong>in</strong>g very fast. In the exist<strong>in</strong>g computer <strong>environment</strong><br />

itself <strong>controls</strong> are not satibfactory <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> methods <strong>in</strong>appropriate. In the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g pages, a brief review of the Emerg<strong>in</strong>g Technologies is provided to highlight


the widen<strong>in</strong>g gap between development of technology <strong>and</strong> <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

EMERGING TECHh'0U)GIES<br />

To rema<strong>in</strong> competitive <strong>and</strong> be able to respond quickly to global markets<br />

organisation need to change <strong>and</strong> they are chang<strong>in</strong>g. The concept of tele- commut<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from anywhere <strong>in</strong> the world to any other place <strong>in</strong> the world <strong>and</strong> to his olfice <strong>in</strong> the<br />

home town has become a reality <strong>and</strong> a necessity. It is possible to have a personal<br />

computer net-worked <strong>in</strong>to the office systems. This <strong>in</strong> turn would have access to<br />

electronic mail <strong>and</strong> support of fax facility. This gives enormous power to the user;<br />

he is able to obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation from the system. Along with the advantage there is<br />

a disadvantage <strong>in</strong> that it provides the user with the capacity to destroy or modify any<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation. This leads to a situation when data security becomes a major issue. The<br />

Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation of United States of America <strong>in</strong><br />

its research project "Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Report" as reported <strong>in</strong><br />

Appendix A of Module II, has analysed the most frequently reported risk for<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation technology components. One of the components that has been<br />

considered is emerg<strong>in</strong>g technologies ; the given survey f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> observations<br />

relat<strong>in</strong>g to emerg<strong>in</strong>g technologies are as follows:<br />

Most frequently reported risks for Information Technology Components:<br />

* Forty six per cent of the 254 respondents <strong>in</strong>dicated that one of the<br />

highest risks is unauthorised access or changes to data or systems. Of<br />

this 46% (117 respondents), 30% felt the risk would decrease <strong>in</strong> the


future, 25% felt there would be no change, <strong>and</strong> 45% said it would<br />

<strong>in</strong>crease".<br />

Emerg<strong>in</strong>g technologies has been classified under the follow<strong>in</strong>g heads:<br />

i. Development<br />

ii. Storage<br />

iii. Personnel<br />

iv. Communications<br />

v. Data base<br />

vi. Interface<br />

vii. Knowledge based systems<br />

Development methodology<br />

Exam<strong>in</strong>ation has been made of the emerg<strong>in</strong>g technologies that support<br />

applications system development; i.e. the technology which facilitates development<br />

of systems <strong>and</strong> the correspond<strong>in</strong>g programmes. The two ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts which have been<br />

considered are :<br />

i. CASE (Computer Aided Software Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong><br />

ii. OOP (Object Oriented Programm<strong>in</strong>g)<br />

i. CASE<br />

It is a software technology which has been developed to <strong>in</strong>crease productivity<br />

<strong>and</strong> improve software quality. This has been achieved by <strong>in</strong>troduction of product<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> analysis. The usage of CASE technology is also expected to decrease<br />

the cause of documentation <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of application systems.


Generally the CASE products are classified under two heads:<br />

i. Upper a e : This deals with a strategic plann<strong>in</strong>g to requirements def<strong>in</strong>ition,<br />

proto-typ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> systems module design<br />

ii. h r esse : This deals with code design<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> code generation, test<strong>in</strong>g for<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance.<br />

It is reported that the most widely used case tools are analysis, work benches,<br />

auditors, debuggers, compilers <strong>and</strong> test tools It is reported further that the code<br />

generators are very specified <strong>and</strong> may even produce upto 85% of the code for a<br />

given application. It is reported that great sav<strong>in</strong>g will be realised <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance.<br />

Automatic production of documentation is a much appreciated <strong>in</strong>centive where large<br />

products of system development are <strong>in</strong>volved. It is reported that this has been<br />

greatly appreciated by the US department of Defence Programmers. Us<strong>in</strong>g of CASE<br />

te~hnology has been found to be useful <strong>in</strong> re-eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. Reeng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g is a process<br />

by which the exist<strong>in</strong>g software systems are modernised so that their functional lives<br />

could be prolonged as also preserved. The value of the exist<strong>in</strong>g system of re-<br />

eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g consists of three components, viz<br />

i. Reverse eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Foryard eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Code generation<br />

In the first phase, viz reverse eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, the system as it exists is analysed<br />

<strong>in</strong> detail <strong>and</strong> categorised <strong>in</strong>to its component def<strong>in</strong>itions. In the forward eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

the exist<strong>in</strong>g system is functionally enhanced to a new technology platform. In the f<strong>in</strong>al<br />

phase, viz code generation the programmer generates the needed codes from the<br />

component def<strong>in</strong>itions.


While <strong>in</strong> America, it is reported that CASE tools are extensively used It<br />

must be observed that even <strong>in</strong> our own country, lead<strong>in</strong>g software consultants are<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g extensiw use of these tools while offer<strong>in</strong>g their senices to the various<br />

organisations for software development The tool has certa<strong>in</strong> risks, <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit<br />

considerations associated with its usage. They are as follows:<br />

i. Auditabiiity<br />

ii.<br />

iii.<br />

Accuracy<br />

Integrity<br />

The CASE envimnment <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />

Certa<strong>in</strong> tools for data <strong>in</strong>tegrity by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g validation <strong>and</strong> authorised acwss.<br />

If these tools are not properly managed, it would result <strong>in</strong> loss of data <strong>in</strong>tegrity.<br />

CASE tools need to be consistently used. If it is <strong>in</strong>consistently used to def<strong>in</strong>e<br />

bus<strong>in</strong>ess tools, it would lead to development of improper systems which <strong>in</strong> turn would<br />

lead to significant bus<strong>in</strong>ess risk.<br />

SECURITY<br />

It is very important to protect proprietary data from unauthorised access. If<br />

such a protection is not there, it would lead to proprietary <strong>and</strong> strategic data be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

disclosed to unauthorised people which may result <strong>in</strong> a bus<strong>in</strong>ess risk.


STANDARDS<br />

There are no common st<strong>and</strong>ards for all CASE tools. This may lead to a<br />

situation when different CASE tools with differ<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>ards be<strong>in</strong>g used <strong>in</strong> the same<br />

<strong>environment</strong> This may cause <strong>in</strong>compatibility <strong>and</strong> duplication of efforts.<br />

ADMINISTRATION<br />

Proper use of CASE <strong>in</strong>formation is absolutely necessary. To achieve this,<br />

there has to be effective adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>and</strong> control of user access. When CASE tools<br />

are used for Reverse Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g the ma<strong>in</strong> objective is to create new <strong>and</strong> important<br />

versions of software. In the absence of adequate adm<strong>in</strong>istrative procedures there is<br />

a possibility of risk that multiple versions of the same software may be created which<br />

may result <strong>in</strong> confusion.<br />

Costs associated with implementation of CASE should bc justified from the<br />

angle of the benefits aris<strong>in</strong>g therefrom.<br />

CONTROLS<br />

CASE tools themselves have facilities <strong>and</strong> features for control purposes.<br />

These could be effectively utilised for implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a CASE <strong>environment</strong> Some<br />

of the <strong>controls</strong> are as follows :<br />

To obta<strong>in</strong> accurate <strong>and</strong> complete documentation the repository can be utilised<br />

as an effective control tool. CASE tools have their own access control features. These


can be utilised to enforce only authorised access to the <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> a CASE<br />

<strong>environment</strong>.<br />

The risk of <strong>in</strong>advertent data corruption <strong>and</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g productivity can be<br />

achieved by us<strong>in</strong>g the functions of CASE tools which have their own mles for<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g data <strong>in</strong>tegrity, validation <strong>and</strong> access.<br />

Risks associated with data accuracy <strong>and</strong> ~ntegrity could be mitigated by hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

end-user <strong>in</strong>volvement while the systems are be<strong>in</strong>g developed.<br />

Use of change management procedures <strong>in</strong> the systems development process<br />

is another important control <strong>in</strong> the CASE <strong>environment</strong>. Many CASE tools have<br />

version control features as well as authorisation <strong>and</strong> sign off functions.<br />

CASE tools for auditors<br />

An auditor could perform specific audit tasks by utilis<strong>in</strong>g CASE features <strong>and</strong><br />

functions. Given below are some of the examples of situations <strong>in</strong> which the auditor<br />

could use CASE tools.<br />

i. System can be understood <strong>and</strong> the <strong>controls</strong> could be documented by mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

use of the repository as an <strong>in</strong>formation source. When the question of '%re<br />

use" arises the repository could be used as an audit trail. It is necessary for<br />

the auditor to become familiar with CASE tools as these tools represent<br />

possible <strong>in</strong>creased risks. However, by underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> master<strong>in</strong>gihese tools<br />

the auditor could use them as control <strong>and</strong> <strong>audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> tools.


OBJECT ORIENTED SOFTWARE<br />

In the conventional programm<strong>in</strong>g the object of problem solv<strong>in</strong>g was<br />

procedural while <strong>in</strong> object oriented programm<strong>in</strong>g it is not so. Mr. Grady Booch, an<br />

ADA expert sums up the difference between object oriented programm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />

procedural programm<strong>in</strong>g as follows : "Write the specifications of the sofhvare you<br />

want to build, underl<strong>in</strong>e the verbs if you are after procedural code; nouns if you aim<br />

for an object oriented program.<br />

RISKS AND CONTROLS<br />

Object oriented software is a totally new technology; there are certa<strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>herent risks; some of the risks are: There is concern regard<strong>in</strong>g accuracy <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>tegrity of the contents of the objectives as the implementation of OOPS stress that<br />

the content of an object can be "hidden" from the program.<br />

If careful management procedures are not applied, there is a risk that the<br />

accuracy <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the libraries associated with the OOPS may become<br />

questionable. It is likely that the implementation of OOP then may be a degradation<br />

of performance.<br />

However, these new technologies provide possibility for apply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>novative<br />

approaches <strong>and</strong> implement new <strong>and</strong> more reliable <strong>controls</strong>.<br />

The techniques for implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> OOP <strong>environment</strong> are totally<br />

different from those <strong>in</strong> traditional programm<strong>in</strong>g objects. The auditor must have<br />

adequate knowledge to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> evaluate <strong>controls</strong> <strong>in</strong> this new technology.


SM)RAGE TECHNOLOGY<br />

Magnetic storage have been the traditional medium of storage. Recent<br />

developments have provedthat optical storage is technically better <strong>and</strong> provide many<br />

more attrative benefits like greater storage capacity, longer storage life <strong>and</strong> better<br />

error detection <strong>and</strong> correction mechanism. However, there are certa<strong>in</strong> reasons<br />

associated with this technology like <strong>in</strong>creased exposure to data loss or theft This is<br />

due to the smaller size of the medium.<br />

PROCESS TECHNOLOGY<br />

Even <strong>in</strong> the area of process<strong>in</strong>g technology there have been emerg<strong>in</strong>g trends<br />

<strong>and</strong> the two ma<strong>in</strong> technologies are (i) Co-operative process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> fault tolerant<br />

computers.<br />

i. Co-operative pmcess<strong>in</strong>g<br />

In co-operative process<strong>in</strong>g mach<strong>in</strong>es have separate portions of application.<br />

However, they work together to accomplish common process<strong>in</strong>g objective.<br />

Data that resides on computers <strong>in</strong> different locations is accessed. In a<br />

co-operative process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong> the process<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>and</strong> data are distributed<br />

across a computer network.


Risks, <strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit considerations<br />

Cooperative process<strong>in</strong>g technology works <strong>in</strong> a multi-processor or multiple<br />

mach<strong>in</strong>e <strong>environment</strong> which leads to the boundaries of the applications be<strong>in</strong>g less<br />

discreet than those of traditional process<strong>in</strong>g applications.<br />

Audit accuracy <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity: Because many <strong>and</strong> different hardware <strong>and</strong><br />

software <strong>environment</strong>s are <strong>in</strong>volved, there is a possibility of risk of <strong>in</strong>compatible<br />

versions <strong>and</strong> unsatisfactory change management procedures.<br />

In view of different locations be<strong>in</strong>g used there is a replication of data <strong>and</strong><br />

files. If there is a possibility of risk of these files not be<strong>in</strong>g properly synchronisedwith<br />

the master copy.<br />

In a cooperative process<strong>in</strong>g data is<br />

moved from the ma<strong>in</strong> frame to<br />

microcomputers. These microcomputers may not have adequate CASE <strong>controls</strong> to<br />

protect data from unauthorised use.<br />

RECOVERYANDBACKUP<br />

Recovery <strong>and</strong> back up procedures require more detailed plann<strong>in</strong>g.


ERROR HANDLING AM) ADMINISTRATION<br />

Enor h<strong>and</strong>l<strong>in</strong>g process would be compromised if there are not sufficient<br />

<strong>controls</strong>. However, there are <strong>controls</strong> which could m<strong>in</strong>imise, if not elim<strong>in</strong>ate these<br />

risks. Some of them are as follows :<br />

When an <strong>in</strong>formation system spans multiple comput<strong>in</strong>g <strong>environment</strong>s special<br />

care should be taken to ensure adequate co-ord<strong>in</strong>ation of activity. The designers<br />

<strong>and</strong> implementors should take adequate steps to m<strong>in</strong>imise the risk of un-co-ord<strong>in</strong>ated<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g to mitigate the risk of absence of synchronisation. Special software could<br />

be designed. It should automatically modify all tables <strong>and</strong> files at periodical <strong>in</strong>tervals.<br />

Change management procedures should be controlled strictly.<br />

As restart <strong>and</strong> recovery procedures are complicated the designers <strong>and</strong><br />

developers <strong>and</strong> usen should ensure that the co-operative process<strong>in</strong>g sohare has<br />

features <strong>and</strong> functions which will facilitate recoverability.<br />

AUDITORS<br />

Auditor should be aware of the <strong>in</strong>herent risks <strong>and</strong> assure himself that there<br />

are adequate <strong>controls</strong> which would m<strong>in</strong>imise the risks.<br />

<strong>controls</strong>.<br />

Co-operative process<strong>in</strong>g will require new audit trail <strong>and</strong> system recoverability


APPENDIX - A<br />

CompanyDivisionNnit<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet tor Physical Security1<br />

Name of the Organisation<br />

Date:<br />

Criterion<br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weight<br />

-<br />

Total risk<br />

,core<br />

1.<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about physical security distributed to<br />

employees? If so, are they adequate<br />

<strong>and</strong> up-to-date?<br />

( ) Yes-Fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

( ) Yes-Reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> upto-date<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed-Inadequate <strong>and</strong> not<br />

up-to-date<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

20 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

2.<br />

Are physical access <strong>controls</strong> (e.g. locks<br />

cards, badges, security guards,<br />

television monitors) available? If so,<br />

are the, adequate <strong>and</strong> effective?<br />

( ) Yes-Fully adequate <strong>and</strong> effective<br />

( ) Yes-Reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong><br />

effective but needs improvement<br />

( ) YesNo-Totally <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>effective<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

I<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Manual with Case Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


Criterion<br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weight<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

score<br />

3.<br />

Status of <strong>environment</strong>al Controls<br />

(Aircondition<strong>in</strong>g, heat, dust, humidity)<br />

( ) Always <strong>in</strong> compliance with<br />

suggested guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

( ) Not always <strong>in</strong> compliance with<br />

suggested guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

( ) Not monitored most of the time<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

20 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

-<br />

-<br />

=<br />

4.<br />

Are good housekeep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> security<br />

related procedures distributed to<br />

employees? If so, are they up-to-date<br />

<strong>and</strong> followed?<br />

( ) Yes-up-to-date <strong>and</strong> followed<br />

( ) Yes-Reasonably up-to-date<br />

followed most of the time<br />

( ) Not distributed not up-to-date <strong>and</strong><br />

not followed<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

5.<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit:<br />

( ) Less than one year<br />

( ) Less thari two years<br />

( ) Two yean or more<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

6.<br />

Last audit results:<br />

( ) Good <strong>controls</strong><br />

( ) Adequate <strong>controls</strong>, but need<br />

improvement<br />

( ) Inadequate <strong>controls</strong><br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total score for physical security categoy


APPENDIX - B<br />

Company/Division/Unit<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet for Personnel Security1<br />

Name of the Organisation Date :<br />

1.<br />

2.<br />

3.<br />

4.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about personne: securlty distributed to<br />

employees? If so, are they adequate<br />

<strong>and</strong> up-to-date?<br />

( ) Yes-Fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

( ) Yes-Reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> upto-date<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed-Inadequate <strong>and</strong> not<br />

up-to-date<br />

Are employment verifications<br />

performed prior to hire?<br />

1 { $~~:%~~~ective<br />

basis<br />

) Yes-No-only when time <strong>and</strong><br />

memory permit<br />

Are legal, education, credit, <strong>and</strong> police<br />

verifications performed prior to hire?<br />

t 1 Yes-Always<br />

Yes-On selective basis<br />

( ) Yeslno-only when time <strong>and</strong><br />

memory permit<br />

Are employees required to sign conflict<br />

of-<strong>in</strong>terest or code-of-conduct statement<br />

at the time of hire?<br />

( ) Yes-Always<br />

( ) Yes-On selective basis<br />

( ) YesMo-only when time <strong>and</strong><br />

memory permit<br />

Risk<br />

Value<br />

Criterion<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

Weight<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 3.0<br />

2.0 x 3.0<br />

4.0 x 3.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

'Ore<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Manual with Case Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


5.<br />

6.<br />

7.<br />

8.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are employees required to sign nondisclosure<br />

statements with respect to<br />

passwords <strong>and</strong> other sysiem <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

at the time of hire?<br />

i j Yes-Always<br />

Yes-On selective basis<br />

( ) Yes/h'o-Only when time <strong>and</strong><br />

memory permit<br />

Are all employees frequently rem<strong>in</strong>ded<br />

of their responsibilities <strong>in</strong> the area of<br />

computer security?<br />

t ) Periodically<br />

) Not regularly<br />

( ) Only on an <strong>in</strong>dividual basis when<br />

an improper action is taken by that<br />

employee<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit:<br />

( ) Less than one year<br />

( ) Less than two years<br />

( ) Two years or more<br />

Last audit results:<br />

( Good <strong>controls</strong><br />

ti Adequate <strong>controls</strong>, but need<br />

improvement<br />

( ) Inadequate <strong>controls</strong><br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weieht<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1.0 x 3.0<br />

2.0 x 3.0<br />

3.0 x 3.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

scan


APPENDIX. C<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet far Data Security1<br />

CampanyDivisionAJ~t<br />

Name of the Organisarion<br />

Date<br />

1.<br />

2.<br />

3.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about personnel security distributed to<br />

employees? If so, are they adequate <strong>and</strong><br />

up-to-date?<br />

( ) Yes-Fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

( ) Yes-Reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> up-todate<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed-Inadequate <strong>and</strong> not up.<br />

to-udte<br />

Is access control security systems software<br />

<strong>in</strong> place, <strong>and</strong> is it used effectively to control<br />

access to data files?<br />

) Yes-Used effectively<br />

I ) Yes-Not used effectively<br />

( ) Not <strong>in</strong> place<br />

Are the access rules or privileges<br />

established <strong>in</strong> the security software for<br />

access<strong>in</strong>g data files always <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with<br />

employee job duties.<br />

I1 Usually-Not Yes-Always<br />

a major problem<br />

( ) No-A major problem from an<br />

operations viewpo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

Risk<br />

Value<br />

Criterion<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

20 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

20 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

Weight<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Afanual with Case Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


4.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are datalsystem owners established for all<br />

critical <strong>and</strong> sensitive data files?<br />

Risk<br />

Value<br />

Criterion<br />

x<br />

Weieht<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

score<br />

7<br />

5.<br />

Yes-Always<br />

Usually-Not a major problem<br />

( ) No-A nlajor problem from an<br />

operation viewpo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

Are datafsystem custodians established for<br />

all critical <strong>and</strong> sensitive data files?<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

20 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

6.<br />

( ) Yes-Always<br />

a major problem<br />

o-A major problem from an<br />

operations vievo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

Are datalsystem users established for all<br />

critical <strong>and</strong> sensitive data files?<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

7.<br />

( ) Yes-Alwavs<br />

( ) ~sually-~'>t a major proolem<br />

( ) No-A major problem from an<br />

operations view po<strong>in</strong>t<br />

Do datalsystem users need permission from<br />

datalsystem owners before mak<strong>in</strong>g changes<br />

to all critical <strong>and</strong> sensitive data files <strong>and</strong><br />

programs?<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

8.<br />

( ) Yes-Always<br />

( Yes-permission is delegated<br />

( Permission is not obta<strong>in</strong>ed-A major<br />

problem from an operations viewpoi~t.<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit:<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

( ) Less than one year<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

improvement 2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

Total score for data security category


APPENDIX - D<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet for Application SoPhvare Security1<br />

CompanylDirisionRTnit<br />

vii<br />

Name of the Organisation<br />

Date<br />

1.<br />

2.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about personnel security distniuted to<br />

employees? If so, are they adequate<br />

<strong>and</strong> up-to-date?<br />

) Yes-Fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

I ) Yes-Reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> upto-date<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed-Inadequate <strong>and</strong> not<br />

up-to-date<br />

Is access control security systems<br />

software <strong>in</strong> place, <strong>and</strong> is it used<br />

effectively to control access to program<br />

files?<br />

Risk<br />

Criterion<br />

Value 'Weight<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

"<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

"Ore<br />

3.<br />

( ) Yes-Used effectively<br />

( ) Yes-Not used effectively<br />

( ) Not <strong>in</strong> place<br />

Are the access mles or privilege<br />

established <strong>in</strong> the security software for<br />

access<strong>in</strong>g program files always <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e<br />

with employee job duties?<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

20 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

( ) Yes-Alwa)s<br />

( ) Usual$-not a major problem<br />

( ) No-A major problem from an<br />

operations viewpo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0x6.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Manual with Case Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


4.<br />

5.<br />

6.<br />

7.<br />

8.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are computer security requirements<br />

made explicit dur<strong>in</strong>g new system<br />

development <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance work?<br />

Yes-But not always<br />

No-Only when time <strong>and</strong> memory<br />

emit<br />

Do functional users, auditors, EDP<br />

quality assurance staff, <strong>and</strong> EDP<br />

security staff participate <strong>in</strong> system<br />

development <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance?<br />

( ) Yes-Users, auditors, EDP quality<br />

assurance staff, <strong>and</strong> EDP security<br />

staff participate<br />

( ) Usually only users participate-Not<br />

others<br />

( ) No user, auditor, or EDP quality<br />

assurance staff, or EDP security<br />

staff participation<br />

Is a system development <strong>and</strong><br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance methodology used?<br />

( ) Followed consistently<br />

ot followed at all<br />

Is purchased software used?<br />

( Yes-With no major changes<br />

( Yes-With m<strong>in</strong>or changes<br />

( ) yes-With major changes <strong>and</strong><br />

comb<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>in</strong> house<br />

development<br />

Are systems planned to be developed<br />

<strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed by end-users us<strong>in</strong>g<br />

fourth generation languages,application/<br />

program generator, or other methods?<br />

I { N Yes-With o the help of DP staff<br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weieht<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

20xs.o<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

20xS.O<br />

4.0~ 5.0<br />

1<br />

11.0x7.01=1<br />

2.0x7.0 =<br />

( ) Yes-Without the help of DP staff 5.0 x 7.0 =<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

score


9.<br />

10.<br />

11.<br />

12.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are<br />

r;<br />

the systems planned to bc<br />

prototype?<br />

Or later discarded<br />

Yes-with fullscale implementation<br />

of system development life cycle<br />

(SDLC)<br />

( ) Yes-Later moved to production<br />

mthout follow<strong>in</strong>g SDLC procedures<br />

Are regulatory agency requirements for<br />

the systems met?<br />

I<br />

( ) No reports sent to agency<br />

) One agency gets reports<br />

) More than one agency gets reports<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit:<br />

( Less than one year<br />

(1 Le ss than two years<br />

( ) Two years or more<br />

Last audit results:<br />

( ) Good <strong>controls</strong><br />

( ) Adequate <strong>controls</strong>, but need<br />

improvement<br />

( ) Inadequate <strong>controls</strong><br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value We<strong>in</strong>ht<br />

1.0 x 8.0<br />

2.0 x 8.0<br />

5.0 x 8.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total risk<br />

SCOW<br />

Total score for applications software security category


APPENDIX E<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet for Systems Software Security1<br />

Company/Llivision/Unit<br />

Name of the organisaiton assessed Date :<br />

1.<br />

2<br />

3.<br />

,<br />

4.<br />

I<br />

Criterion<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about systems sohare security<br />

distributed to employees? If so, are they<br />

adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

I<br />

Yes - fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

Yes - reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> up-todate<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed-<strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>and</strong> not<br />

up-to-date<br />

Is access control security systems software<br />

<strong>in</strong> place, <strong>and</strong> is it used effectively to<br />

control access to operat<strong>in</strong>g system, data<br />

base programs, <strong>and</strong> dadsystem files?<br />

( Yes used effectively<br />

ti Yes - not used effectively<br />

( ) Not <strong>in</strong> place<br />

Are appropriate system management<br />

facility (SMF) records logged by the<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g system to support the security<br />

software, <strong>and</strong> arc the logs renewed?<br />

I<br />

Logged <strong>and</strong> reviewed<br />

Logged <strong>and</strong> not reviewed<br />

( ) Not logged at all<br />

Are the access rules or privileges<br />

established <strong>in</strong> the security software for<br />

access<strong>in</strong>g operat<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>and</strong> data base<br />

programs <strong>and</strong> data files always <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e<br />

with employee job duties ?<br />

Yes - Always<br />

Usually - Not a major problem<br />

IUsk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weight<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

20 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1 0 x 4.0<br />

20 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

( ) No - A major problem from an<br />

LO x 6.0<br />

operations newpo<strong>in</strong>t 4.0 x 6.0<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

Total<br />

Risk<br />

Score<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Manual with Case Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


5.<br />

6.<br />

7.<br />

8.<br />

9.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are user exits employed <strong>in</strong> the systems<br />

software implementation <strong>and</strong> operation?<br />

0 No<br />

( Yes - <strong>in</strong> a few cases<br />

( { Yes - <strong>in</strong> many cases<br />

Are powerful utility pro rams protected<br />

<strong>and</strong> controlled properly!<br />

[ { E:ally yes<br />

() No<br />

Are options <strong>and</strong> parameters <strong>in</strong> systems<br />

software products propertly selected,<br />

used, <strong>and</strong> logged?<br />

( ) yes<br />

( ) Usually yes<br />

0 No<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit:<br />

( ) Less than one year<br />

( ) Less than two years<br />

( ) More than two years<br />

Last audit results :<br />

( ) Good <strong>controls</strong><br />

( ) Adequate <strong>controls</strong>, but need<br />

improvement<br />

( ) Inadequate <strong>controls</strong><br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weieht<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

20 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

20 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

Total<br />

Risk<br />

Score<br />

Total score for systems sohare security category.


APPENDIX F<br />

xii<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet for Telecommuoicstions Security1<br />

CompanyDivisionlUnit<br />

Name of the organisation assessed<br />

1.<br />

2.<br />

3.<br />

4.<br />

-- -<br />

Criterion<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about telecommunications security<br />

distributed to employees? If so, are they<br />

adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date?<br />

I1<br />

Yes - fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

Yes - reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> up-todate<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed - <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>and</strong> not<br />

up-to-date<br />

Is access control security systems software<br />

<strong>in</strong> place, <strong>and</strong> is it used effectively to<br />

control access to telecommunications<br />

programs <strong>and</strong> data files ?<br />

( ) Yes - used effectively<br />

( ) Yes - not used effectively<br />

( ) Not <strong>in</strong> place<br />

Are the access rules or privileges<br />

established <strong>in</strong> the security software for<br />

access<strong>in</strong>g telecommunications programs<br />

<strong>and</strong> data files always <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with<br />

employee job duties ?<br />

l i yes ' a'"<br />

Usually not a major problem<br />

No - a major problem from an<br />

operations viewpo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

Are term<strong>in</strong>al IDS part of the user<br />

identification <strong>and</strong> authentication process?<br />

( ) Yes - always<br />

( ) Yes - not always<br />

0 No<br />

Date :<br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weight<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

3.0 x 6.0<br />

"<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total<br />

Risk<br />

Score<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Manual with Cose Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


5.<br />

6.<br />

7.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are security - related cotnrols over<br />

program data, <strong>and</strong> message transmission<br />

activities adequate <strong>and</strong> effective (e.g.,<br />

encryption with key management,<br />

message sequence numbers, bit counts,<br />

call-back?)<br />

( ) Yes - fuly adequate <strong>and</strong> effective<br />

( ) Yes - reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong><br />

effective but need improvement<br />

( ) Not at all adequate or effective<br />

I I<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit :<br />

Less than one year<br />

Less than two years<br />

( ) Two years or more<br />

Last audit results :<br />

( ) Good <strong>controls</strong><br />

( ) Adequate <strong>controls</strong>, but need<br />

improvement<br />

( ) Inadequate <strong>controls</strong><br />

Total score for telecommunications security category<br />

Risk Criterion<br />

x<br />

Value Weight<br />

1.0 x 8.0<br />

20x 80<br />

3.0 x 8.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

Total<br />

Risk<br />

Score


xiv<br />

APPENDIX G<br />

Risk Assessment Worksheet for Computer Operations Security'<br />

CompanyDivisionNnit<br />

Name of the organisation assessed Date :<br />

1.<br />

Criterion<br />

Are st<strong>and</strong>ards, policies, <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />

about computer operations security<br />

distributed to employees? If so, are they<br />

adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date?<br />

Risk<br />

Value<br />

Criterion<br />

x<br />

Weight<br />

=<br />

Total<br />

Risk<br />

Score<br />

2.<br />

3.<br />

( ) Yes - fully adequate <strong>and</strong> up-to-date<br />

( ) Yes - reasonably adequate <strong>and</strong> up-todate<br />

but need improvement<br />

( ) Not distributed - <strong>in</strong>adeuate <strong>and</strong> not<br />

up-to-date<br />

Is access control security systems software<br />

<strong>in</strong> place, <strong>and</strong> is it used effectively to<br />

control computer operations staffs access<br />

to applications <strong>and</strong> systems software<br />

program <strong>and</strong> data files?<br />

( ) Yes - used effectively<br />

( ) Yes - not used effectively<br />

( ) Not <strong>in</strong> place<br />

Are the access rules or privileges<br />

established <strong>in</strong> the security software for<br />

computer operations staff access<strong>in</strong>g<br />

applications <strong>and</strong> systems software<br />

programs <strong>and</strong> data files always <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e<br />

with employee job duties ?<br />

( ) Yes - always<br />

( ) Usually not a major problem<br />

( ) No - a major problem from an<br />

operations viewpo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

1.0 x 6.0<br />

2.0 x 6.0<br />

4.0 x 6.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

-<br />

Adapted from Computer Security - A Manual wilh Case Studies by S.Rao<br />

Vallabhaneni.


Criterion<br />

Risk<br />

Value<br />

Criterion<br />

x<br />

Weight<br />

=<br />

Total<br />

Risk<br />

Score<br />

4.<br />

5.<br />

What is the degree of sophistication of<br />

computer hardware <strong>and</strong> peripheral<br />

equipment?<br />

( High<br />

( ) Medium<br />

0 L.Ow<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last fire drill <strong>and</strong> other<br />

emergency tests conducted :<br />

( ) Six months<br />

( ) One year<br />

( ) Two years<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

3.0 x 4.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

6.<br />

7.<br />

Time s<strong>in</strong>ce last audit :<br />

( ) Less than one year<br />

( ) Less than two years<br />

( ) Two years or more<br />

Last audit results :<br />

( ) Good <strong>controls</strong><br />

( ) Adequate <strong>controls</strong>, but need<br />

improvement<br />

( ) Inadequate <strong>controls</strong><br />

1.0 x 4.0<br />

2.0 x 4.0<br />

4.0 x 4.0<br />

1.0 x 5.0<br />

2.0 x 5.0<br />

4.0 x 5.0<br />

=<br />

=<br />

=<br />

-<br />

=<br />

=<br />

'otal score for computer operations security category.


APPENDIX H<br />

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF<br />

THE AUDIT APPROACH, GENERALLY IN A COMPUTERISED<br />

ENVIRONMENT<br />

Scop<strong>in</strong>g the Environment<br />

Yes / Nn<br />

1. Is there a full underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the audit<br />

objectives?<br />

2. Is there an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g as to where the<br />

audit is to be conducted, the resources<br />

needed. etc.?<br />

3. Is an entrance conference conducted to<br />

expla<strong>in</strong> to the auditees the objective of<br />

computer audit to establish work<strong>in</strong>g ground<br />

rules?<br />

4. Is background <strong>in</strong>formation obta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g the ove~ew<br />

of the auditee <strong>and</strong><br />

data process<strong>in</strong>g function?<br />

Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>formation system<br />

5. Do you <strong>in</strong>terview the computer department<br />

staff <strong>and</strong> gather documents about the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation system?<br />

5. Do you prepare an application flowchart to<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> who is responsible for evidential<br />

matters (both paper <strong>and</strong> electronic) <strong>and</strong><br />

also to know the storage location of the<br />

evidence?


xvii<br />

Yes / No<br />

7. Do you review the application flowchart<br />

with the data process<strong>in</strong>g project team to<br />

ensure proper underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation system?<br />

Identifj the audit risks<br />

8. Do you create a risk analysis team to help<br />

<strong>in</strong> the risk assessment process?<br />

9. Are risks associated with a specific<br />

<strong>environment</strong> identified?<br />

10. Is any attempt made to determ<strong>in</strong>e the<br />

magnitude of risks (example high, medium,<br />

low)?<br />

11. Are the risks prioritised so as to determ<strong>in</strong>e<br />

the sequence <strong>in</strong> which audit resources will<br />

be exp<strong>and</strong>ed?<br />

Identify audit evidence<br />

12. Is all the evidence produced by the<br />

Information systems listed out?<br />

13. Is the audit evidence documented, specially<br />

<strong>in</strong> view of the evidence be<strong>in</strong>g electronic?<br />

Identify key cnntml po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

14. Is the application flow-chart reviewed to<br />

locate possible risk areas?<br />

15. Is the application flow-chart exam<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

critically to document key <strong>controls</strong>?<br />

'dentify the contml weaknesses<br />

6. Is the associated manual operations <strong>and</strong><br />

computer process<strong>in</strong>g reviewed to identify<br />

<strong>in</strong>stances when too much responsibility is<br />

vested <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>in</strong>dividual?


xv~ii<br />

Yes 1 No<br />

17. Is there any review of preparation of<br />

transactions/control matrix to evaluate<br />

<strong>controls</strong> <strong>and</strong> weaknesses?<br />

18. Is there any analysis <strong>and</strong> documentation of<br />

potential control weaknesses?<br />

VeriPy the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of computer files<br />

19. With a view to decide on perform<strong>in</strong>g<br />

substantive test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> compliance test<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

are computer files identified for<br />

exam<strong>in</strong>ation?<br />

20. Are steps taken to save such of those files<br />

which have been selected for perform<strong>in</strong>g an<br />

audit?<br />

21. Are steps taken to veriFy <strong>in</strong>tegrity of<br />

computer file?<br />

22. Are steps taken to verity the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of<br />

data on the file?<br />

Conduct the audit tests<br />

23. Are steps taken to design the audit tests?<br />

24. Is a proper test tool selected <strong>and</strong> prepared?<br />

25. Is the audit tool so selected extensively<br />

tested to ensure that it performs well?<br />

26. Are the test results along with other<br />

relevant material used to ensure accuracy of<br />

computer process<strong>in</strong>g?<br />

Conclude the audit<br />

27. Based on the tasks performed are the audit<br />

f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs developed?<br />

28. Are suitable audit recommendations<br />

developed?<br />

29. Is an appropriate audit report prepared?<br />

30. Are steps taken to ensure that proper<br />

action is taken on the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><br />

recommendations?


BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

BOOKS<br />

1. Andrew S. Tanabaum -Operat<strong>in</strong>g System, Design &Implementation, Prentice<br />

Hall of India Pvt Ltd., New Delhi, 990.<br />

2 Brian Jenk<strong>in</strong>s & Anthony P<strong>in</strong>kney - An Audit Approach to Computers - A<br />

New Practice Manual, Thc Institute of Chartered Accountants <strong>in</strong><br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> & Wales, 1978.<br />

3. Charlotte Eudy Mcconn, M.S.CDP - Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Computer Systems - Design,<br />

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5. Donald k Watne & Peter B.B. Turney - Audit<strong>in</strong>g EDP Systmes - Second<br />

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7. Dimitris N. Chorafas - Design<strong>in</strong>g & Implement<strong>in</strong>g Local Area Networks -<br />

McGRAW HILL Inc. 1984.<br />

8. Elise G. Jancura Robert Boos - Establish<strong>in</strong>g Controls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

Computersied Account<strong>in</strong>g System - Van Nostr<strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>hold Company,<br />

1981<br />

9. Elise G. Jancura - Audit <strong>and</strong> Control of Computer Systems - 1974.<br />

10. Graeme Ward & Denis Marshall - Internal Audit H<strong>and</strong> Book -<br />

Recommended Codes <strong>and</strong> Practices for the audit of Data Process<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Activities - The Institute of Internal Auditors UK, 1980.<br />

11. Gordon B. Davis - Audit<strong>in</strong>g & EDP - American Institute of Certified Public<br />

Accountants, New York, 1968.


Gordon C Everst - Database Management Objectives, Systems Function <strong>and</strong><br />

Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, MGRAW Hill, New York, USA, 1986.<br />

Javier F. Kuong, Gerald LIsaacson, Chester M.W<strong>in</strong>ters - Microcomputer<br />

Security, Auditability <strong>and</strong> Controls - Management Advisory<br />

Publications? P.O.Box 151, Wellesley Hills MASS. 02181, 1985.<br />

Javier F. Kuong - Controls for Advanced on-I<strong>in</strong>eData Base System -<br />

Management Advisory Publications, MASS. 02181, 1983.<br />

James Arl<strong>in</strong> Cooper - Computer & Communications Security - Strategies for<br />

1990s - McGRAW HALL Company, 1989.<br />

Jason Lamb, Stanley (STOSH) R. Jarocki & Anna M.Seijas - Netware<br />

Security: Configur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g a Trusted Environment - A Novell<br />

Cooperative Research Report, 1991.<br />

John Muster, Peter Birn <strong>and</strong> Lumix - Unk Power utilities for power users,<br />

BPB Publications, New Delhi, 1989.<br />

T, Perry, Joseph G. Lateer - Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g Oracle BPB Publications, Delhi,<br />

India. 1989.<br />

R.V. Jacobson - PC Vim Contorl H<strong>and</strong>book, Miller Freeman Publications,<br />

San Francisco, U.S.A, 1990.<br />

Keith Heamden - A h<strong>and</strong> book of Computer Security - Kogan Page.<br />

Kamal Gupta - Contemporary Audit<strong>in</strong>g - Third Edition - Tata McGRAW HIll<br />

publish<strong>in</strong>g Company Ltd., New Delhi, 1986.<br />

Kishor Shah S. T<strong>and</strong>on A Bane ji & P<strong>in</strong>ki Shah - Guide to Computer Data<br />

Process<strong>in</strong>g for Accountants <strong>and</strong> Auditors. Wadhwa <strong>and</strong> Company,<br />

Nagpur, India, 1987.<br />

V.P. Lane - Security of Computer Based Information Systems - Macmillan<br />

Education Ltd., 1985.


Michael A. Murphy, Xenia Ley Parker - H<strong>and</strong> Book of EDP Audit<strong>in</strong>g -<br />

Second Edition Coopers & Lybr<strong>and</strong>, Warren Gorham & Lamond,<br />

Boston, New York, 1989.<br />

Michael G. Grottola - The Unix Audit - Us<strong>in</strong>g Unix to Audit Unix, 1993.<br />

Per Br<strong>in</strong>ch Hansen - Operat<strong>in</strong>g System Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples -Eastern Economy Edition,<br />

1990.<br />

Paul J. Rutternan & Arthur Young McClell <strong>in</strong>d - Flowchart<strong>in</strong>g for Auditors<br />

(Moors & Co), 1976.<br />

S. Rao Vallabhaneni - Audit<strong>in</strong>g the Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of Software - Prentice Hall,<br />

Inc. Englewood Clifts, NJ 07632, 1987.<br />

S. Rao Vallabhaneni - Audit<strong>in</strong>g Operational Application Systems on Large<br />

Computers - A Step-By-Step Audit Approach - The EDP Auditors<br />

Foundation A'idit Guide Series, 1985.<br />

S. Rao Vallabhaneni - Audit<strong>in</strong>g Computer Security - A manual with case<br />

studies - John wiley & Sons, New York, 1990.<br />

S. Rao Vallabhaneni - Audit<strong>in</strong>g Computer Security - A manual with case<br />

studies - John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1989.<br />

Roben T. Mwller, - Computer Audit, Control <strong>and</strong> Security - John Wiley &<br />

Sons, New York, 1989.<br />

Ron Webber - EDP Audit<strong>in</strong>g - Conceptual Foundations <strong>and</strong> Practice - I1<br />

Edition - MCGRAH HALL International Editions, 1980.<br />

Ruth Ashley - Judi N.Fern<strong>and</strong>ez - Teach<strong>in</strong>g Yourself Unix - BPB Publications,<br />

1990.<br />

Sybil P. Parker - McGRAW HILL Dictionary of Computers - McGRAW<br />

HILL Book Company, 1989.<br />

AJ. Thomas & LJ. Douglas - Audit of Computer Systems - Ncc Publications,<br />

Manchester, Engl<strong>and</strong>, 1983.


W. Thomas Porter, William E Perry - EDP Contmls <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g - Third<br />

Edition - Touche Ross & Co., William E Peny Enterprises Inc Kent<br />

Publish<strong>in</strong>g Company, Boston, MASS, 1981.<br />

Ulless Black - Computer Networks - Protocols, St<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> Interfaces -<br />

Prentice Hall International Inc. New Jersey, U.S.A., 1987.<br />

kK Vanwasi - A Dicitionary of Computers - Khanna Publishers, Delhi - 6.<br />

William C Mair : Donald Wood; Keagle W. Davis -Computer Control Audit<br />

- M<strong>in</strong>nesota - Partners : Touche Ross & Co., 1978.<br />

William E Peny - Audit<strong>in</strong>g Information Systems - A step by step audit<br />

approach - EDP Auditors Foundation Audit Guide Series, 1983.<br />

William E. Perry - Report writ<strong>in</strong>g for EDP Auditors, Quality Assurance<br />

Institute, Florida, U.S.A., 1982.<br />

Advanced Computer Assisted Audit Techniques - Monograph Seies - The<br />

EDP Auditors Foundation Inc. The Information Systems Control<br />

Foundation. 1987.<br />

Disaster Recovery : Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g & Program Evaluation - The<br />

Chantico Series - Information Sciences Inc. MASS, 1985.<br />

Advanced Netware - Theory of Operations - Version 2.1, Novell Inc. Provo,<br />

UTAH, U.S.A., 1987.<br />

A critical Review of the Certified Information Systems Auditor's Job Doma<strong>in</strong>-<br />

First Edition Cisa - Exam<strong>in</strong>ation Review Book - Vo1.2 Practice. 1994.<br />

Illustrated Novell Netware - BPM Publish<strong>in</strong>g Inc., Delhi, India, 1989.<br />

ED1 Control Guide - ED1 Council of Australia <strong>and</strong> EDP Auditors Association.<br />

Guidel<strong>in</strong>es to <strong>controls</strong> for Data Process<strong>in</strong>g Environment - The Institute of<br />

Internal Auditors, 1983.<br />

Computer Security Published by Computer Society of India, 1980.<br />

Establish<strong>in</strong>g the Internal Audit Function <strong>in</strong> EDP by the Institute of Internal<br />

Auditors Inc.


RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS<br />

1. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 8<br />

Audit <strong>and</strong> Control Environment.<br />

2. Institute of Intenal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 3<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g Information Technology <strong>in</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

3. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 4<br />

Manag<strong>in</strong>g Computer Resources.<br />

4. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 5<br />

Manag<strong>in</strong>g Information <strong>and</strong> Develop<strong>in</strong>g Systems.<br />

5. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 6<br />

Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Systems.<br />

6. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 7<br />

End-User <strong>and</strong> Departmental Comput<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

7. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Auditability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 8<br />

Telecommunications.<br />

8. Institute of Internal Auditors - Systems Adifability <strong>and</strong> Control Module 9<br />

Security.<br />

9. Institute of Internal Auditors -Systems Auditdility <strong>and</strong> Control Module 10<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>gency Plann<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

10. Institute of Internal Auditors -Systems Auditdility <strong>and</strong> Control Module 11<br />

Emerg<strong>in</strong>g Technologies.


ARTICLES<br />

* Tommie S<strong>in</strong>gleton, Dale Litisher <strong>and</strong> Judith Cassidy "Pioneers of EDP Audit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong> North America" EDP Auditor Journal, Vol. Ill, 1993.<br />

* Howard N. Glassman "LANS are nor JS secure as you th<strong>in</strong>k" EDP Auditor<br />

Journal, Vol. IV, 1993.<br />

Zabi Rezaee 'The Possible Impact of the Coso Report on an Entity's Internal<br />

audit function" EDP Auditor Journal, Vol. IV, 1993.<br />

* Owen D. West <strong>and</strong> Christopher Zoladz "Microcomputer Security - Is your<br />

organisation at Risk?" EDP Auditors Journal, Vol. IV, 1993.<br />

* Peggy D. Dwyer anu two other "It can Happer Here : The Importance of<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>uity Plann<strong>in</strong>g" EDP Auditors Journal, Vol I, 1994.<br />

* L<strong>in</strong>da Lee Larson "Data Centre Survives the 1992 Los Angeles Riots" EDP<br />

Auditor Journal, Vol. I, 1994.<br />

Sherrie Stickl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Norma C Powell "Microcomputers <strong>and</strong> the Internal Audit<br />

Function : Rhetoric Vs Action" EDP Auditors Journal, Vol. I, 1989.<br />

David A Crowell <strong>and</strong> Andrew Sundene "Data Communications Audit Concerns"<br />

EDP Auditors Journal, Vol. ILI, 1989.<br />

* Christopher J Calabrese "A Brief Introduction to the Unix Operation System,<br />

EDP Auditors, Journal Vol 111. 1991.<br />

Miklos A Vasarhelvi, Fern B. Halper <strong>and</strong> Kazuo J. Ezawa 'The cont<strong>in</strong>uous<br />

Process Audit System : A Unix-Based Audit<strong>in</strong>g tool" EDPA Auditors Journal,<br />

Vol 111, 1991.


Michael J. Cerullo <strong>and</strong> M. Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Cerullo "Controll<strong>in</strong>g St<strong>and</strong>-Alone<br />

Microcomputer Systems", EDP Auditors Journal Vol. IV, 1991.<br />

Hal McDonald "ED1 Implementation Consideratons EDPA Auditors Journal,<br />

Vol. I. 1990.<br />

Benjam<strong>in</strong> Wright "Auditor shold be Aware of EDI's legal issues" EDPAAuditors<br />

Journal, Vo. I, 1990.<br />

William H. Murray "Computer - Related Crime <strong>and</strong> Audit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the N<strong>in</strong>eties",<br />

EDP Auditors Journal, VoLII, 1990.<br />

J.1. "Buck" Bloom Becker "Computer Crime <strong>and</strong> Abuse (U.S.A)" EDP Auditors<br />

Journal Vol. 11, 1990.<br />

Robert Bigelow "Legal dimensions of Computer Crime" the EDP Auditors<br />

Journal, Vol.11, 1990.<br />

Jarlath O'Neil-Dunne "Computer Aided Software Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g (Case)" EDP<br />

Auditors Journal, Vol. 111, 1990.<br />

Peter Sfoglia "Sybase Security" The EDP Auditors Journal, Vol.111, 1993.<br />

James Norwal "Audit<strong>in</strong>g Adabas Version 5 The EDP Auditor Journal, Vol.11,<br />

1993.

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