1986 - The Exon Library

provide an independent forum where those most adversely
affected by the proposed merger can present their case. The
bill, as currently written, does not provide any due
process for those adversely affected by the
anti-competitive aspects of the written sale of Conrail.
Ordinarily, mergers are submitted to the Interstate
Commerce Commission for review and are subjected to a long
and public process. In this case, the review was not only
conducted in secret, but produced no conclusive results or
answers. While several divestiture plans have been offered
to remedy the anticompetitive aspects of the merger, none
satisfy normal Justice Department criteria. Further, the
Justice Department currently is opposing a merger of
similar size even though the Department's estimates of the
merger's anti-competitive effects are less than one-half as
large as in the Conrail merger. Although this amendment
would not prevent the sale of Conrail, it would give the
courts the right to review the relevant issue of
monopolization.
Opponents of the amendment declared that its adoption would
mark the first time in history that U.S. antitrust laws
were applied to railroad mergers. This amendment is not
only unnecessary, but also is against current
transportation policy. The Justice Department has examined
the merger issues and will decide between several
divestiture proposals which would restore competition
eliminated by the Conrail merger. The antitrust immunity
in S. 638 applies only to the merger--not to practices that
occur subsequently. This amendment, they claimed, would
allow shippers and competitors to challenge this
acquisition and keep it tied up in the courts for years.
That likely would cause Norfolk Southern to withdraw its
offer and block the transfer of Conrail from government
ownership to private operation.