The-Polyester-Prince

his advice to ‘Keep out under all circumstances until 15th August’. Then, on the day
of the transfer of British power, the Government of Junagadh announced its
accession to Pakistan. Hodson believes Jinnah never actually thought Junagadh
would be allowed to join Pakistan. The objective of the exercise was to set
uncomfortable precedents for Nehru in the more pressing contest for Kashmir and
perhaps Hyderabad. If Nehru agreed to a plebiscite in Junagadh, which he eventually
did, it would help Pakistan’s case for a popular vote in Muslim-majority Kashmir. If
the Junagadh ruler’s decision was accepted, over the wishes of his people, the same
could apply in Hyderabad. If the Indians simply marched into Junagadh, protests
against a similar Pakistan, use of force in Kashmir would be greatly weakened. Nehru
adopted the course of negotiation while throwing a military noose around Junagadh
in the neighbouring Hindu-ruled states, which had all acceded to India. Two subordinate
territories of Junagadh, the enclaves of Babariawad and Mangrol, were
taken by Indian troops on 1 November 1947 without bloodshed.
Meanwhile, Indian nationalists began agitating within and without Junagadh for the
overthrow of the Nawab. In Bombay on 25 September, they declared an Arazi
Hakumat or Parallel Government under the presidency of Samaldas Gandhi, a
relative of Gandhi who was editor of the newspaper Vande Mataram. From a
temporary base in Rajkot, Gandhi kept in touch with supporters inside Junagadh by
human couriers simply walking across the open frontiers of the isolated state. Other
nationalist journalists, including the editors of the Gujarati newspaper janmabhoomi
in Bombay, called for volunteers to gather in Bhavnagar and other cities close to
Junagadh for a non-violent invasion.
The students in the Junagadh Vidyarti Sangh threw their limited weight against the
Nawab also. ‘we were too scared to carry out physical sabotage like attacking power
stations,’ said Vakharia. ‘our sabotage consisted of spreading false rumours to cause
panic, and supplying information back to the provisional government. We used to
send someone to Jetalsur or Jedpur in the Indian union to pass on the information.
In Junagadh, as in many other parts of India, the partition steadily developed a
murderous communal nature. Two Muslim communities, called the Sodhana and
Vadhana, had taken a militant position in support of accession to Pakistan and
mounted big pro-cessions through Junagadh, threatening Hindus with retribution if
they opposed it. As it became clear that Pakistan was in no position to support the
Nawab, Hindus turned on the Muslim minority and massacred whole communities in
some outlying villages.
Food shortages developed, and the Nawab’s revenues dried up. As his administration
lost its grip, the Nawab decided the game was up and made a hasty departure for
Karachi, taking with him all the cash and negotiable assets of the treasury, his family
and many of his dogs (though his consort, the Begum, forgot her youngest child in
the royal nursery and had to turn back to collect the infant). On 8 November, after
an earlier meeting of the State Council, Bhutto wrote to the Indian Government’s
representative at Rajkot asking India to take over the state to avoid a complete
administrative break down, pending a honourable settlement of the accession issues.
The Indian Army moved into Junagadh without incident on 9 November, and the
communal tension quickly settled down. However, Vakharia recalls a small communal
riot breaking out in Junagadh soon after independence, when some shoe shops
belonging to Muslims at Panch Hatadi (Five Shops Area) were looted by Hindus. The
students of the Junagadh Vidyarti Sangh went to the area to protect the Muslim
shops, but their presence was misunderstood by the police.