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Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police

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<strong>Cops</strong> <strong>or</strong> <strong>Robbers</strong>? <strong>The</strong> <strong>Struggle</strong> <strong>to</strong> Ref<strong>or</strong>m <strong>the</strong> <strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>National</strong> <strong>Police</strong><br />

UNAMA’s role in police ref<strong>or</strong>m has grown as <strong>the</strong><br />

focus has expanded beyond training and equipping<br />

<strong>the</strong> ANP <strong>to</strong> a m<strong>or</strong>e comprehensive strategy<br />

of institutional ref<strong>or</strong>m. UNAMA has played a<br />

leading role in advocating f<strong>or</strong> <strong>the</strong> need <strong>to</strong> pri<strong>or</strong>itise<br />

MoI ref<strong>or</strong>m, and in vetting seni<strong>or</strong> police officers<br />

f<strong>or</strong> criminal and human rights violations as<br />

part of <strong>the</strong> pay and rank ref<strong>or</strong>m (discussed in<br />

m<strong>or</strong>e detail later in this paper). In this regard,<br />

UNAMA’s netw<strong>or</strong>k of regional and provincial offices,<br />

and its political and human rights officers,<br />

have proven <strong>to</strong> be a valuable resource f<strong>or</strong> police<br />

ref<strong>or</strong>m eff<strong>or</strong>ts. Finally, as co-chair of <strong>the</strong> JCMB,<br />

UNAMA also has a responsibility <strong>to</strong> ensure that<br />

police ref<strong>or</strong>m eff<strong>or</strong>ts are in line with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Afghan</strong>istan<br />

Compact.<br />

3.2 <strong>Police</strong> Sect<strong>or</strong> Co<strong>or</strong>dination<br />

One of Germany’s responsibilities as <strong>the</strong> key<br />

partner f<strong>or</strong> police ref<strong>or</strong>m, stipulated in its<br />

March 2002 Seat and Status Agreement with <strong>the</strong><br />

government of <strong>Afghan</strong>istan, was <strong>to</strong> co<strong>or</strong>dinate<br />

<strong>the</strong> international supp<strong>or</strong>t <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Afghan</strong> police<br />

f<strong>or</strong>ce. Germany appointed a Special Ambassad<strong>or</strong><br />

<strong>to</strong> head up this co<strong>or</strong>dination. It also established<br />

<strong>the</strong> Interagency <strong>Police</strong> Co<strong>or</strong>dinated Action<br />

Group (IPCAG), which serves as <strong>the</strong> main political<br />

and diplomatic body concerned with police<br />

ref<strong>or</strong>m issues. Chaired by Germany, IPCAG<br />

meets every three weeks and is attended by<br />

representatives of LOTFA don<strong>or</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> EUSR, <strong>the</strong><br />

EC, and UNAMA. Italy, <strong>the</strong> UK and Japan also<br />

participate <strong>to</strong> provide links <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r SSR<br />

pillars. Germany also <strong>or</strong>ganised two international<br />

conferences in May 2004 and February<br />

2006 <strong>to</strong> improve co<strong>or</strong>dination and develop a<br />

regional approach <strong>to</strong> police and b<strong>or</strong>der management<br />

issues between <strong>Afghan</strong>istan and its<br />

neighbours. 81<br />

Germany’s task of co<strong>or</strong>dinating police ref<strong>or</strong>m<br />

eff<strong>or</strong>ts has been challenging, in part because of<br />

<strong>the</strong> confusion generated by <strong>the</strong> term “lead don<strong>or</strong>”.<br />

While some countries unders<strong>to</strong>od lead don<strong>or</strong>s<br />

<strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> maj<strong>or</strong> don<strong>or</strong> and implementer of<br />

programmes in <strong>the</strong>ir respective SSR pillars, o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />

unders<strong>to</strong>od <strong>the</strong>ir role as co<strong>or</strong>dinating policymaking<br />

and don<strong>or</strong> supp<strong>or</strong>t in <strong>the</strong>ir sect<strong>or</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

US, f<strong>or</strong> example, adopted a relatively long-term<br />

strategy <strong>to</strong> design, build and pay f<strong>or</strong> <strong>the</strong> establishment<br />

of an entirely new <strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>National</strong><br />

Army (ANA), while Germany defined a fairly limited<br />

role f<strong>or</strong> itself in directly implementing and<br />

financing police ref<strong>or</strong>m activities.<br />

Germany did, however, take its responsibility<br />

f<strong>or</strong> leading police co<strong>or</strong>dination eff<strong>or</strong>ts very seriously.<br />

Acc<strong>or</strong>ding <strong>to</strong> one European official in Kabul,<br />

this created some confusion: “Germany was<br />

very vocal about its lead role so o<strong>the</strong>rs did not<br />

think <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>to</strong> w<strong>or</strong>ry about funding. <strong>The</strong> Germans<br />

were very quick <strong>to</strong> deploy, which also led<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> think <strong>the</strong>y did not have <strong>to</strong> w<strong>or</strong>ry about<br />

<strong>the</strong> sect<strong>or</strong>”. 82 When it became clear that <strong>the</strong><br />

German role in directly implementing and financing<br />

police ref<strong>or</strong>m eff<strong>or</strong>ts would be limited,<br />

<strong>the</strong> US became m<strong>or</strong>e active in <strong>the</strong> sect<strong>or</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

dramatic increase in US involvement in <strong>the</strong> police<br />

sect<strong>or</strong> from 2004 onward has created its<br />

own co<strong>or</strong>dination challenges, given <strong>the</strong> inherent<br />

tension in a situation where a lead don<strong>or</strong> is trying<br />

<strong>to</strong> manage ano<strong>the</strong>r don<strong>or</strong> that contributes 50<br />

<strong>to</strong> 100 times m<strong>or</strong>e financial resources and m<strong>or</strong>e<br />

than 10 times m<strong>or</strong>e personnel.<br />

This awkward situation has inevitably placed<br />

strains on <strong>the</strong> US-Germany relationship in <strong>the</strong><br />

police sect<strong>or</strong>, although during 2005-07 eff<strong>or</strong>ts <strong>to</strong><br />

co<strong>or</strong>dinate improved significantly. Initially, co<strong>or</strong>dination<br />

was fairly minimalist and consisted<br />

primarily of a division of labour, with <strong>the</strong> US<br />

80<br />

81<br />

82<br />

AREU interview with UN official, Kabul, 23 November 2006.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first conference in May 2004 ended with <strong>the</strong> “Doha Declaration on Regional <strong>Police</strong> Cooperation”, signed by <strong>Afghan</strong>istan and its<br />

neighbours, <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> Gulf Cooperation Council, and <strong>the</strong> lead don<strong>or</strong>s f<strong>or</strong> security sect<strong>or</strong> ref<strong>or</strong>m in <strong>Afghan</strong>istan. <strong>The</strong> second<br />

conference in February 2006 concluded with <strong>the</strong> “Doha II Declaration on B<strong>or</strong>der Management in <strong>Afghan</strong>istan — a Regional Approach”.<br />

This was subsequently included in <strong>the</strong> “Declaration on Closer Cooperation on B<strong>or</strong>der <strong>Police</strong> within <strong>the</strong> Framew<strong>or</strong>k of <strong>the</strong> Kabul Declaration<br />

and <strong>the</strong> Reconstruction of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Police</strong> in <strong>Afghan</strong>istan”, which has been signed by <strong>Afghan</strong>istan and <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries of<br />

Pakistan, Iran, China and Tajikistan. “Assistance in rebuilding <strong>the</strong> police f<strong>or</strong>ce in <strong>Afghan</strong>istan”, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/<br />

Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/<strong>Afghan</strong>istan/Polizeiaufbau.html.<br />

AREU interview, Kabul, 21 November 2006.<br />

25

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