11.11.2014 Views

Ethiopia and EPA Negotiation 2008 - FES Ethiopia

Ethiopia and EPA Negotiation 2008 - FES Ethiopia

Ethiopia and EPA Negotiation 2008 - FES Ethiopia

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Unilateral preference programs not falling within these two categories require a<br />

waiver to be consistent with WTO rules. Preference under Cotonou Partnership<br />

Agreement did not fall under either category. They were not generalized <strong>and</strong><br />

non-discriminatory since beneficiary status was closed to all countries that were<br />

not former European dependencies <strong>and</strong> /or were not located within Africa, the<br />

Caribbean or the Pacific. As such it didn’t qualify under GSP. Beneficiaries status<br />

went beyond least developed countries since many of the beneficiaries were<br />

non-LDCs. Thus, when the Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed in 2000,<br />

an underst<strong>and</strong>ing was reached the Lome - Cotonou Preference would be<br />

replaced by December 31, 2007 with <strong>EPA</strong>s, consistent with GATT Article XXIV.<br />

Article XXIV allows countries to maintain reciprocal “preferential” access for<br />

members of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) provided that duties are eliminated<br />

on substantially all products traded among the members of the FTA within a<br />

reasonable period of time.<br />

1.2 Weakness of Unilateral Preferences<br />

Another reason why the Cotonou Partnership Agreement needed to be<br />

replaced, at least according to the European Union, was the failure of the<br />

Lome- Cotonou preferential schemes to prompt diversification, competitiveness<br />

<strong>and</strong> growth in ACP countries although the schemes made it possible for 97% of<br />

exports from these countries to enter the EU free of customs duty. The European<br />

Commission argues that unilateral preferences did not tackle the main<br />

development problems in ACP countries. This is reflected in the share 2 <strong>and</strong> the<br />

composition of EU imports from ACP countries: in 2002, only 3% of EU imports<br />

originated from ACP against 6.7% in 1976. 65% of these imports consisted of raw<br />

materials. Also, only ten products made up for nearly 60% of EU imports from<br />

ACP. 3 On the other h<strong>and</strong>, some Asian countries, like China <strong>and</strong> South Korea,<br />

have shown spectacular growth over this period, due partly to the dynamism of<br />

their exports to the EU, without benefitting from a similarly advantageous trading<br />

regime. The declared objective of economic <strong>and</strong> trade cooperation is,<br />

therefore, “fostering the smooth <strong>and</strong> gradual integration of the ACP States into<br />

the world economy, with due regard for their political choices <strong>and</strong><br />

development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development <strong>and</strong><br />

contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries”. 4<br />

2 Critics rightly argue that although the share of ACP exports to EU might decline, the volume<br />

has actually increased. Contrary to the common perception, recent studies showed that the<br />

trade effect of Lome – Cotonou Preference was positive. The share of ACP exports has declined<br />

not because the ACP’s export declined but because Asian exporters have done much better.<br />

3 European Commission: Economic Partnership Agreements: Means <strong>and</strong> Objective(2005)<br />

4 Article 34 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement<br />

5 | P a g e

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!