Ethiopia and EPA Negotiation 2008 - FES Ethiopia

egional trade arrangements envisaged by an EPA. In line with the provisions in
Article 37:3 of the Cotonou Agreement, both sides agreed that EPAs need to be
accompanied by appropriate development support measures in order to allow
ACP countries and regions to maximize the benefits they should be deriving from
EPAs.
Negotiations on the ESA-EC EPA began formally on 7 February 2004 in Mauritius
with the adoption of the official roadmap for the talks. The ESA side consists of
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Europe is the most important trade and investment partner for the ESA region as
a whole as well as for nearly all the countries in the region.
The ESA region opted to negotiate in six clusters, these being: Development
Issues, Market Access, Agriculture, Fisheries, Trade in Services, and Trade-Related
Issues. Negotiations with EC are conducted at the level of Ministers and level of
Ambassadors. The ESA group has selected six Ambassadors (based in Brussels)
and six Ministers to lead the negotiation at the two levels. Ethiopia was an
Ambassadorial Lead Spokesperson for Development Issues, and Ministerial
Alternate spokesperson for Agriculture cluster.
At the beginning of the negotiation, the negotiators had an ambitious vision
and agenda. There was a sincere hope that the EPAs would give ESA countries
the chance to reduce poverty by reforming their infrastructure and adjusting
their production capacities. Moreover, the negotiation was considered as an
instrument for the creation of bigger regional markets that will ultimately
stimulate trade and investment. Over the years, however, more pragmatic
considerations, such as making the Cotonou Partnership Agreement compatible
with WTO rules and preventing trade disruptions, replaced the original ambitious
visions and objectives of the EPA agenda. Most ESA countries engaged in EPA
negotiations with reluctance, minimalist and mercantilist approach. The prime
objective had been to maintain their preferential market access to the EU while
making minimal commitments in terms of opening markets or regulatory reforms.
Understandably most ESA countries perceived EPAs, not as an opportunity but
as cost to be paid to continue to export to the Europe. If anything, WTO
compatible preferential regimes for LDCs such as EBA served as perverse
incentives not to fully engage in the EPA negotiations.
The final shape of the EPA negotiation emerged only in the last few months of
2007. The EPA negotiations in Brussels during November 2007 resulted in the
irrevocable split of the ESA group. After the negotiations in Madagascar it
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