Exegetical Fallacies - D. A. Carson

world cannot show they are in fact compatible. But if he here uses "logic" in the third sense, to refer to an
argument that is structured by logical categories that may involve fallacies owing to improper steps,
inconclusive evidence, or the like, then the data may be judged incompatible by "this logical argument"
(i.e., by this form of structured argument) while still in fact being logical in the first sense. Aesthetics nrnv
help us suspect that the data are in fact logical (first sense) despite the fact that logic (third sense) says
they are not. But Dahms confuses the two senses of "logic" repeatedly. I have argued elsewhere that Jack
B. Rogers and Donald McKim make exactly the same error when they say that John Calvin pits faith
against logic (first sense).' Calvin does nothing of the kind. Rather, he pits faith against a particular
logical argument (third sense) that he shows to be in fact fallacious.
The point is that logic in the first sense is universal. It is not to be dismissed as the peculiar debatable
theory of Aristotle. Rather, it is the set of relationships (nicely formulated by Aristotle and others) that
must apply if any knowledge is possible and if any communication of propositional knowledge is
possible. Even peoples who prefer to communicate in largely picture categories use logic in this sense;
and a dialectical theologian either holds that his apparently contradictory beliefs are ultimately logically
compatible or he is talking nonsense. That is why, for instance, a person who holds that Jesus is both God
and man goes to considerable trouble to formulate this truth in ways that are not demonstrably illogical,
even if the explanation of this God-man's nature is not exhaustive. The necessarv substratum of all
coherent knowledge and of all rational communication is simple logic in this first sense. The fundamental
"laws" of logic, such as the law of noncontradiction and the law of the excluded middle, are universally
true.
We are now in a better position to survey various logical fallacies. In the list I am providing, other
fallacies may supplement the particular logical fallacy under discussion, but it is the logical fallacy that
remains in focus in this list. Moreover, some of the entries reflect the same error in logic as some other
entry, but because they are different applications of that error, I have sometimes introduced distinct
labels.
A Select List of Logical Fallacies
1. False disjunctions: an improper appeal to the law of the excluded
middle
We have already considered semantic disjunctions (chap. 1, entry 11); but false disjunctions-a false
either/or requirement when complementarity might be acceptable-are extraordinarily common and
potentially very destructive of fair-minded, evenhanded exegesis. For instance, in listing various methods
of interpretation, John D. Grassmick begins by mentioning what he calls the allegorical method;) and as
an illustration he refers to Leon Morris's view that the 144,000 in Revelation 7 are to be identified with
the Christian church.7 Grassmick goes on to list several other methods, and comes to his own preference,
"the grammatical-historical-contextual approach to interpreta- tion."8 Quite apart from the suitability of
labeling Morris's approach "allegorical," Grassmick leaves the impression that Morris's method and his
own method are disjunctive. In fact, whether or not we accept Morris's interpretation, every step he takes
to reach his conclusion could be subsumed under Grassmick's method. The number 144,000 might be
judged intentionally symbolic in a book of apocalyptic literature in which (all sides agree) numbers often
have symbolic force. And Morris might want to make a case that in Revelation 7 the twelve tribes each
providing 12,000 people constitute a typological symbol that is hermeneutically no different from