Remake, Remodel: The Evolution Of The Record Label
Remake, Remodel: The Evolution Of The Record Label
Remake, Remodel: The Evolution Of The Record Label
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This pre-draft version is strictly for review purposes only and is not for general dissemination or sharing.<br />
However, there is also a body of opinion that says that P2P isn’t really the issue, and that<br />
the problem is major corporations trying to defend traditional and outmoded business<br />
models and not developing sufficiently compelling new ones quickly enough .<br />
Meanwhile, the industry has experimented with a variety of digital business models<br />
since the advent of Napster 1.0.<br />
In 2001 AOL Time Warner, EMI and BMG teamed up to form MusicNet, described as a<br />
digital music platform. Around the same time, Sony and Universal Music created a joint<br />
venture in the shape of Pressplay – an online music store.<br />
Neither of these models got off the ground due to limited catalogue range, stumblings<br />
over the cross-licensing of catalogue and also because the labels had very little<br />
experience in retailing and consumer marketing (indeed their price points and usage<br />
terms, restricted by DRM, came in for huge criticism at the time).<br />
It was the launch of Apple’s iTunes Store in 2003 in the US (and 2004 in Europe) that<br />
provided the first commercial digital music offer to capture the imagination of the<br />
mainstream consumer.<br />
Fully integrated with Apple’s hardware (computers and iPods) through the iTunes<br />
ripping and music management software, the iTunes Store provided a compelling<br />
consumer experience in fixed-line downloads and part of the key to its success was its<br />
simplicity of use.<br />
<strong>The</strong> positive knock-on effects for the take up of Apple hardware from the music store<br />
enabled Apple to invest in iTunes with powerful marketing campaigns, the costs of<br />
which could be justified because of the cross-marketing benefits. It is unlikely that<br />
iTunes could have afforded to make such a big noise had it been a standalone digital<br />
store that wasn’t part of something bigger.<br />
<strong>The</strong> iTunes model has dominated the digital music market with an estimated share of<br />
over 70 per cent of the total market – despite a raft of new entrants and start-ups. In the<br />
UK alone, there are over 60 digital business models licensed by music labels – all<br />
offering access to music in a variety of ways.<br />
Despite this enormous diversity, in March 2011 a report by independent label trade<br />
body AIM showed that just three services made up over 94 per cent of total indies global<br />
digital revenues – iTunes, Amazon MP3 and Spotify 33 .<br />
Amazon’s service uses its massive consumer database to sell music as MP3 in direct<br />
competition to iTunes and uses price differentiation as a marketing tool, often<br />
undercutting iTunes (with tracks for as little as £0.29 compared to a general standard of<br />
£0.79 on iTunes). <strong>The</strong> Amazon download service dovetails very smoothly into the<br />
iTunes music management software but, despite this, it remains a distant second to the<br />
Apple service.<br />
33 AIM Submission To <strong>The</strong> Hargreaves Review, Mar 2011 – last accessed 09.05.11<br />
42