Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization

More documents

Recommendations

Info

profit level. In such examples, small departures from rationality on the part of firms can be as important as much larger departures from rationality on the part of consumers. I look forward to seeing the literature on boundedly rational IO develop in the years to come. 38
References Abreu, Dilip and Ariel Rubinstein (1988), “The Structure of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Finite Automata,” Econometrica, 56, 1259-1282. Armstrong, Mark (2006), “Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress (ed. by Richard Bludell, Whitney Newey, and Torsten Persson ), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Banerjee, Abhijit V. (1992), “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 797-817. Banerjee, Abhijit and Drew Fudenberg (2004), “Word-of-Mouth Learning,” Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 1-22. Baye, Michael and John Morgan (2004), “Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 449-466. Baye, Michael, John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2005), “Information, Search, and Price Dispersion,” Handbook on Economics and Information Systems, Elsevier. Berk, Jonathan B. and Richard C. Green (2004), “Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 112, 1269-1295. Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch (1992), “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 992-1026. Bose, Subir, Gerhard Orosel, Marco Ottaviani, and Lise Vesterlund (2006), “Dynamic Monopoly Pricing and Herding,” RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming. Burdett, Kenneth and Kenneth L. Judd (1983), “Equilibrium Price Dispersion,” Econometrica, 51, 955-969. Chevalier Judith, and Glenn Ellison (1997), “Risk-Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives,” Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1167-1200. Chen, Yongmin (1997), “Paying Customers to Switch,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, 877-897. Cyert, R. M. and James G. March (1956), “Organizational Factors in the Theory of Oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 44-64. Della Vigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier (2004), “Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 353-402. Della Vigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier (2005), “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. 39
Page 1 and 2: Bounded Rationality in Industrial O
Page 3 and 4: 1 Introduction In the last few year
Page 5 and 6: 2 Early History It is impossible to
Page 7 and 8: course, implicit in the assumption
Page 9 and 10: can encompass a range of behaviors.
Page 11 and 12: fully rational thing to do in this
Page 13 and 14: optimizing some utility function or
Page 15 and 16: In his model, consumers and busines
Page 17 and 18: accepted if it sells itself as bein
Page 19 and 20: they received in the current period
Page 21 and 22: the firm would like to charge high-
Page 23 and 24: complex fee schedules in small prin
Page 25 and 26: in a standard imperfect competition
Page 27 and 28: e granted tenure? These decisions e
Page 29 and 30: One way to account for such a trend
Page 31 and 32: Hyperbolic Loss Self- Imperfect Dis
Page 33 and 34: overcome his or her self-control pr
Page 35 and 36: s.t. v(s; θ) − p ≥ 0 for all
Page 37 and 38: In the homogeneous population case,
Page 39: obvious opportunities for making co
Page 43 and 44: Change,” Econometrica 25, 501-522
Page 45: Spiegler, Ran (2006), “Competitio

Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?