(U) 1956-1957 NORAD CONAD History.pdf - US Northern Command

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~ General, Partridge agreed, reiterating his views that "CONAD re- ~
sponsibilities, initiall~y, should be limited to planning, requirements,
operational control and deployment of air defense forces and to insure
compatibility of air defense systems now under construction in all
areas. "4 In addition, he reminded USAF that "All our actions should be
guided by the ultimate aim of integrating the operational control of
the air defense of Canada and the U. s. "5
The JCS finished the revision by mid-1956 and the Secretary of Defense
approved it. The new Unified Command Plan gave CINCONAD the responsibility
of defending Alaska and the NOrtheast Area against air attack
as well as the United Sta·ces, and of assisting in the air defense
of Canada and Mexico. It also provided for the disestablishment of the
U. s. Northeast Command on 1 September 1956.
study of Separation of CONAD and ADC
In the meantime, a joint study was und~rway in Colorado Springs on
reorganization of.CONAD. In December 1955, CINCONAD bad directed that
a joint study group be formed of component and CONAD officers to gtudy
the feasibility and means of separating the CONAD and ADC staffs. '!he
reason for wanting to separate the starfs and appoint a separate commander
for ADC was that the ADC HeadqUB-~ers had not been able to function
effectively as a joint headquarters. '!he combined, two-hat arrangement
was not effective. It had been extremely difficult for the
Air Force officers serving in dual capacities to adequately handle both
positions. It had not been possible to clearly separate the functions
of CONAD and its component commands and to recognize commend channels.
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Separation was necessary to increase CINCONAD's capability to exercise
his major functions of pJanning and establishing air defe~e re- .
quirements and of operationally controlling the air defense forces.
General Partridge saw that the agency responsible for .Jair defense, the
agency having operational control of the forces, had to be a clearly
defined., separate organization. And the channels or means for exercising
operational control had to be sepa.!'ate,i.e., they had to be through
CONAD's channels an~ not ADe's or ARADCOM's.
'!he joint study group completed its work in March 1956.
Its study
prcposed a separate staff consisting of a commander; chief of staff;
secretariat; an., inf"ormation services; and deputies for plans and
operations, communications and electronics, and intelligence.1 A staff'
of 351 was proposed in the original study -- consisting of 118 officer"
.160 enlisted men, and 13 civilians. Of the 118 officers, 23 were ArIIr3J
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