1959 NORAD CONAD History Jan-Jun.pdf - US Northern Command

.'.oU~~CLASS\FIED :...• ' •• " J .....',,,".," : of }i.. _' " ':-', >-.1 ...i norad/conad.............................•...................•...••••.. HISTORICAl SUMMARY ( UNCUSSFI£D )JANUARY-JUNE 1959U~JCLASSIFIEDI '\ .~~,('I. ,..:;ified By:RI .• : I ~w:Multiple Sources1 November 1989

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/USSPACECOM/HOFROM: HQ NORAD/J3SUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories1. The CONAD histories for the January - June 1959 and July - December 1959periods have been reviewed and are now declassified except for the following sections:January - June Pages 67 -71, reason - similar to current rules of engagement Pages 72,73,74, reason - issues concerning nuclear capabilities/procedures July - December Pages 55 - 57, reason - issues concerning nuclear capabilities/procedures Pages 57 - 58, reason - DEFCONs are still classified at the SECRET level Pages 59 - 61, reason - similar to current rules of engagement Page 62, reason - similar to current procedures 2. If you have any questions, please contact my POC, Maj Bob Sneath, 4-5471.OW. ARTRAMMajor-General, CFDirector of OperationsFOR THE COMMON DEFENCEPOUR LA DEFENSE COMMUNE

'8HjEtHIAl.NORTH AMERICAN E PACE DEFENSE COMMAND", CANADA-U.S.MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/J3 25 June 1998FROM: HQ NORAD/USSPACECOM/HOSUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories1. Executive Order 12958 requires a review of classified documentation more than 25 years old.The NORAD /USSP ACECOM History Office (HO) maintains NORAD and Continental AirDefense Command histories, studies, and other documentation that falls into this category. Inorder to comply with the Executive Order, HO will forward these documents on a systematicbasis to functional experts within the NORAD staff to complete this review.2. During the review process, if any of the material within the documentation still requiresprotection, please mark those portions (e.g. words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, pages) withred brackets ([ D. Along with this, please provide the justification for retaining the securityclassification for these portions.3. Once the declassification review is completed, please prepare a memorandum for thedirector's/vice director's signature which states:a. The CONAD/ADC/ADCOM (as appropriate) history(ies) for the period(s) havebeen reviewed and are now declassified; orb. The CONAD/ADC/ADCOM (as appropriate) history(ies) for the period(s) havebeen reviewed and are now declassified except for the following sections: . The justification forretaining the classification is4. Request the NJ3 staff review the following documents per Executive Order 12958 and theinstructions in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Please complete the review by 6 August 1998.a. NORAD/CONAD, Historical Summary, January-June 1959b. NORAD/CONAD, Historical Summary, July-December 19595. HQ NORAD/HO POC is the undersigned to Mr. Schroeder, 4-5999/3385.~~JEROME E. SCHROEDERAssistant HistorianTHIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATCHS 1 & 2 ARE WITHDRAWN,I". 'rq ,]lnA t-U S •,"t..:\..J ~FOR THE COMMON DEFENCE/1,).\i / POUR LA DEFENSE COMMUNEI~\"

NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMIIAND and CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE £OMMAND HISTORICAL SUMMARY JANUARY - JUNE 1959Directorate of Command History Office of Information Services Headquarters NORAD/CONAD

PREFACE This historical summary is one of a series ofsemiannual reports on the North American Air DefenseCommand and Continental Air Defense Command.Its purpose is two-fold. First, it provides aready reference to NOHAD and CONAD activities bybringing together in a Single document the key datafound in several hundred documents. Secondly, itrecords for all time the activities of NORAD andCONAD during the period of the report. .The source materials from which this historywas written are on file in the historical officeand are available for use by all authorized person&For security reasons, a list of the documents isnot included with this history.Colorado Springs, ColoradoI November 1959L. H. BUSSDirector of CommandHistory

·." .. .... :CONTENTS PREFACEMAPSTABLESONE -- REORGANIZATION OF NORAD/CONAD HEADQUARTERSNORAD/CONAD PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION.....•..•......... 1 APPROVAL BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF...•...•.....•.. 5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION...•.......•...•• 7 TWO -- REGION/DIVISION ORGANIZATIONSAGE GEOGRAPHIC REORGANIZATION................•...... 12 Introduction........................... ........... 'I. 12 NORAO/CONAD Organizational Changes and Status (to 1 August 1959)............................... 12 INTEGRATION OF THE 25TH AND 5TH DIVISIONS.....•..•... 15 MANNING OF NORTHERN NORAD REGION AND CANADIAN/U. S. DIVISIONS......................... ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16 THE SUPER COMBAT CENTER PLAN ••.••.•..••...•.•....•..• 20 .'lil 11 "'~nm:1:---...:-­;Ii;"'~

'~.. . ..'I J.. ' ..."'~:~- .. ".,~~~ .' - ... /I .......~..............................................:~... , ............................................................ AIR DEFENSE AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL INTEGRATION .••• 21 BIlckground. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. .. .. . • • • • • • • • .. •. 21 Bequest for Canadian Participation....••••••••••• 23 Boundary Al igDJllen t. . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. 24 ALASKAN' HORAD RIGION. • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • .. • • •• 25 THREE -- COLLOCATION OF ARMY -AIR FORCE FACILITIBSCOLLOCATION OF MISSILE MASTER AND AN/GPA-37 •.••••.• 27 &ckground. • • . . . . • • .. . • • • • • • • . • • . . . . .. . . . . • . • • . • • •. 27 Impleme'Ittat1on Schedules and Problem Areas....... 28 HORAD Control Center Coordinators .••..••••••..••. 29 COLLOCATION OF AADCP'S AND ADDC'S IN THE CONTINENT-At u. S................................ '"' • • • • • • • • • •• 30 COLLOCATION AT THULE •••••••.•••••••••....••••.••••• 31 SUJDlARY OF COLLOCATION PLANS AND STATl;S .••••••••••• 33 SAGE-MISSILE MASTER INTEGRATION TESTS •..••••••••••• 33 Ba.ckground. . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. .. • • • .. .. .. • • • • ... 33 SAGE/Missile Master Implementation Test •••••••••• 34 FOUR -- THE StJRVEILLANCE SYSTEMSTATD'S. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 37 .C...,------­.-INTEGRATION OF AN/FPS-36 RADARS •••••.•.•••••••••.•. 40 ALASKAN RADAR ............................... I' • • • • • •• 42................. _.at._'_fIII.111­...'.. ... " ..'_.•'.~-•.•..•.-:.....111_.[ Vii:(J,Ii:f;A'-""s • •• I I 1.'CUI\tillllla.­

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •..r ........................................................~.,q. ........................ ".... ,............................... Improvement Program.............................. 42 Gulkana Radar•••••••••••••••••• t • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 42CANADIAN RADAR.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 42 CoIlOX. Ra dar. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~2 CADIN Gap Fillers for Nike Defenses•••••••••••••• 43 ]fORAD REQUIREMENT FOR OVE~THE-HORIZON RADAR•••••••44 NIKE HERCULES IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.••••••••••••••••• 44 PROPOSBD RELOCATION OF AEW AIRSHIP SQUADRON•••••••• 47 WESTERN DEW EXTENSION AND THE PACIFIC BARRIER......48 hetfie .Barrier..................... " ... t. • • •• •••• • ... • • 48 '!'he Aleut1an CIla in................. It49 PROPOSAL TO ABANDON THE SEA BARRIERS...............49 FIVE -- NORAD WEAPON FORCESTAroS............................. " • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 51 REGULAR FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE•••••••••••••••••• 52 USAF AOC............................ ' • • • • • • • • • • • • • 52 RCAF AOC Program............................. • • • • 53 Alaskan Program••••••••••••••••••••.•• .,.......... 54 THE MISSILE/GUN FORCE.............................. 57 Genera1•••••••••••••••••••••• " • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • 57 Greenland............................. ., • • • • • . • • • . • 58 Alaskan Hercules Defense••••••••••••••••••••••••• 58 AUGMENTATION FORCES................................ 60 NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN AIR DEFENSE••••.•••••••••••• 62·

-I • I I" .,.... ...••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1."CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE INTEGRATION NORTH•...•••... 64 SIX -- OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURESRULES OF ENGAGEMENT. . . . • . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . • • • • 67 Approval by JCS.................................. 67 Revision for Operations in Greenland............. 67 ALCOM's Supplement to NORADR 55·-6................ 68 ALERT. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 69 Change to Figh ter Alert Commi tmt-mt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Surface-to-Air lfE!ap'>Ds Al et' t:. • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • 71 NORAD i s Alert Force.............................. 72 ATOMIC EMPLOYMENT MATTERS.•.•.•............•••••••• 72 ArDling and Scrambling MS-l Equipped Aircraft inAlaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 Cross-Border Nike He,r{:ult:s Employment Policy..... 73 Overfl:1.ght of C'anada 'Id th the liB-I............... 73 NORAD/OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDJN~•..•.•••••.•.••••••••. 74 DISCONTINUANCE OF BROFIC·O~.........................NORAD/SHAPE EXCHANGE OF EARLY WARNIN:i INFORMATION..75 75 NORAD PLAN FOR CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS ..•...•.••.. 77 SAFE PASSAGE OF SAC EMER.:.rENCY WAR ORDER TRAFFIC THROUGH THE AIR DEFENSE S"'i'STEM................... 77 DESTRUCTION OF NON-HOSTILE AIRBORNE O~E~TS•••••••• 79 RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTION OE' FRIENDLY FLYINGOBJ"BCTS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • 80 _['tfllt . , . ..'. ~.':...-"

.,.................................................~b. I .. _1.1.IIIIIALINDIRECT BOMB DAMAGB ASSESSMENT SySTEM..••••••••••• 80 NUCLEAR DETONATION REPORTING SySTEM.•.••••••••.••.. 81 U. S. - CANADIAN CONELRAD, CONILLUM AND SCATER PROORAIIS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 83 U. S. CONBLRAD...................................... 85 U. S. CON'ILLUII..................................... 86 HORAD POLICY ON PRIORITIES FOR AIR MOVEMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT... • • • • • • . • • • . . • . . • . . . . . . • . . • . • • 87 DIVISION WARNING NETWORKS..•••••..•......•.••....•• 88 SEVEN -- PLANS AND PROORAMSNADO AND MAnOP..... . . • • . . • . . . • . . • . . . . . ,. . • • . . . • • • . • • 90 CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE PR~,RAM..•••....•..••..•••• 91 INTERIM BMEWS DISPLAY FACILITY..•.•••.....•.•.•••.• 93 MORAD HARDENED COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER...•.•••••.. 96 NATIONAL SPACE SURVEILLANCE CONTROL CENTER.•••••••• 101 -

MAPS & TABLESHeadquarters NORAn/CONAD Organization Chart.••••..•.• 10 , TheNORAn Division/Region Boundaries - 1 August 1959...•. 17 SAGE-FAA Air Division and Sector Boundaries••..•••.•. 22 The Surveillance Network - 30 June 1959...•..••..••.• 38 Weapons Structure - 1 July 1959.................. 51 Augmentation Force - 17 June 1959...•...•....•.•..... 52 NORAD Operational Interceptor Force - 1 July 1959.... 55 NORAn Operational Missile/Gun Force - ] July 1959.... 56 Alaskan Hercules...................................III • .. .. • .. ..59 NORAD Alert Force -30 June 1959.•........••.••..•... 72 xiii

............................ ,....................................·~CHAPTER 1Reorgiloizatiou of NORAD/imnD Headqoarters NORAD/CONAD PLAN FOR REORGANIZATIONJust before ~_Depar:~!!It:?!lt: o,f Defen;?e ~Q!'K!!.Il.!z.,!=tion Act of 1958, ~gaJ11.iL.,law .. .i!L.~.!I..&.':Ist I act10n was starteain Coloraao-Spr1ngs to draw up a NORAD/CONAD reorganizationplan.* On 24 July 1958, CINCNORAD directed theestablishment of an ad hoc committee of NORAD/CONAD andcomponent command representatives for this purpose. Thework of this and another group resulted in the completionon 20 October of the first reorganization plan.This plan divided the headquarters staff into aNORAD and a CONAD side. Each side was to have its ownchief of staff, under each of which there were to befour deputies.This plan was almost immediately dropped as toocumbersome and was never submitted to the Joint Chiefsof Staff. A plan for a staff structure was adopted thatprovided for a combined Headquarters NORAD/CONAD. Therewas to be a single staff that would handle both NORADand CONAD functions. The U. S. members of the staffwould handle the CONAD business. Thele were still to betwo chiefs of staff, one for administration and logisticsand one for operations. But they were to bebrought together to have authority flew through both.The number of deputies were to be red~ced to seven byconsolidating operations sections. ULder the first plan,each side had an operations section.* For details of this act and DOD and JCS implementingdirectives, such as the DOD Functions Directiv~Unified Command Plan, and CONAD Terms of Reference, seeNORAO/CONAD Historica1 Summary, July-December 1958, pp 1-"8.

·,·. ", .II •••• II II••• " ••••••••• , • ., 'I" II II 'I'" 11.11 ••• II II" 11'11 II" II" , II ••••••••A second reorganization plan was prepared, embodyinlthis staff structure idea, by It: December 1950 andsubmitted to the JCS.,NORAD'sThe seven-deputy staff proposed b:' this plan wasmodeled after the Joint Staff of the JCS. For exampl~the JCS Joint Staff had six "J" staff sections and ajoint programs office. The NORAD/CONAD staff wouldhave lunder this plan, six "J" staff sections and aDeputy for Programs. NORAD/CONAD Head(lUarters adoptedthis plan as the best suited to its neHds and as ameans of facilitating NORAD/CONA~JCS interstaff contact.The pa t tern of the Joint Sta f f \vas closely followedalso to establish a "selling" point for the reorganizationplan.NORAD was the predominant command in this plan.In it, NORAD stood out as the important part of the organizationhaving all the authority, t:lldng all the actions,and making all the plans.predominance was made clear to the JCS inthe cover letter to the second plan. Fcllowing are afew excerpts from this letter:NORAD will be predominant specificallythe NORAD commander wi 11 ha';'e unqaestionedauthority over all assibned forces ....Certain specific functions in the areasof operations, plans and requirements, communicationsand electronics, intelligence andsystems integration .. , will be consolidatedand absorbed by NORAD.U. S. Service responsibilities ... willbe handled by appropriate Service elements ina manner responsive to the needs of NORAD commandersat a 11 levels.,The JCS did not approve this plan so that a new o~ganization could be implemented on 1 January 1959. Abig stumbling block was that CONAD was all but ignoredin the plan and it was CONAD that came under the DOD

--.~.......:...........:......:".................·w·l·...-.,............."........................................ ··t.·§"Reorganization Act and the impl{,lllentinc directives thatfollowed.A third plan was prepareJ, therefore, which wassubmitted on 27 Karch 1950. T.~e staff structure proposedwas almost identical to that proposed in the precedingplan. This was true also of the responsibilitiesand functions to be handled by Headquarters NORAD/CONAn. The on13' noticeable difterence was the greateremphasis placed on CONAD and the downgrading of NORAD.The plan was submitted by CONAD rather than NORADas had been the previous plan. The cover letter notedthat the DOD Reorganization Act was concerned solelywith U. S. unified and specified commands and that theexercise of operational command was restricted to CIN­CONAD. In the places where HORAD was used in the Decembercover letter~ either CONAD or NORAD/CONAD wasnow used. This was true also, insola1 as applicable,of functional statements under the ';aI ious deputies.For example, there were numerous plac('!s in the earlierplan where the statement that (eputie~ would adviseCINCNORAD on a certain matte:, -~'_!at wele changed to advisingCINCONAD, or where it i'lad been stated that asection would have cognizance of a NORAD matter waschanged to a NORAD/CONAD matter"Otherwise, the basic plan rema 1 n~d essentia11y thesame. There were to be seven deputie-, and an office ofinformation services (see chart on pal;e ~(i". The planprovided for 30 directorates. The \.~u .'rent organizationhad three deputies, a secretariat .. an aff1ce of informationservices, and 18 directorates.The Headquarters explained its plan in the foreword.* -The gui4elines whlch Wel"e us:ed as a basis forpreparing the organizatIon and funct iO.lS were listed asfollows:* All changes directed by the JCS in approvingthe plan on 23 June are incorporated here.", - - .. -·.... ·- ... It .. ~

...~..........~.......~ ja. CINCNORAD/CONAD will have full authoritytt;'dtTect, control «rld'cc)ordfiiiurtheoperational activities of all forces a.si:gnt§a"ls well as the logistrcs esseiitTalto the accomplishment of the missions, actingwithin the framework of whichever authorityis appropriate to the task at hand.b. Operational and planning functionsnow beIng conducted by the components willbe reviewed and evaluated with a view towardtheir realignment, consolidation and absorptionby NORAD/CONAD Headquarters to precludeunwarranted duplication and to enhance theircohesive accomplishment.c. To the extent practicable, requirementsfor manpower spaces to accomplish thefunctions realigned and absorbed should remainwithin the current space authorizationsaccorded to the component and NORAD/CONADHeadquarters.d. Manpower spaces absorbed from thecomponents should be consistent with themagnitude of the functions absorbed.The plan stated that it had been determined aftera review of pertinent documents that the NORAD/CONADfunctional responsibilities included;a. The establishment of qualitativeand quantitative requirements for all force~weapons and equipment for air defense of theNorth American continent.b. PlannIng for the deployment and redeploymentof assigned forces and forces tobe made available..­~f!ef\EIc. The establishment of tactics, proceduresand methods. for exercising operatIonalcontrol of forces assIgned, attached or.,.:;':';i ·:~i·~~"r.!-fli·l:::;!:'..Yn:.,.,::.,.;:,:;l:;h;CJl! .·;5::. ~~::'~/",#"fff"'~':U''''{4 }"'

SESR.r .., ........................: ..........................~.~ ••••••••••••'lf7,"' .............................. , ... '.~I ... .,otherwise :!lade available and fOl' directingthe engag-er.lent and disen[a(;e;nent ofweapons; reco~~ending plans for the ope~ational use of all allocated forces,weapons and equ1pillents and makinr; reCOlilmendationsconcerninr:; present and/or proposedNorth American air defense concepts.d. Making recomillendations concerningthe technical compatibility of allair defense systems and the proper tillCphasedintegration of new or modifiedweapons into the ah~ defense env,ironmentAs for the actual organization i l;self, the NORADICONAD plan explained that:a. In addition to the normal staffelements of Intelligence, Operations,Plans, and Communications and Electronics,we ha'.;'e provided CINCONAD wi th thecapability for maintaining cognizance andfor pro';.iding necessary f:~idance in theareas of personnel, logistics~ programminganci. budget.b. Purely U. S. matters will beprocessed by CONAD personnel of appropriatestaff elements in compliance withdirectives applicable to CINCONAD as commanderof a U. 8. unified commandc. The staff structure has beeD intentionallypatterned after the staff ofthe JCS Joint 8taff, with the exceptionof the inclusion of the Oflice of InformationSen'ices.APPROVAL BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFA JCS memo dated 23 June 1959 approved, subject tocertain changes and guidance provided the March 1959_____ Sf!8RET

..~.......~~~...........w..~.~~, Baorganization Plan. Only a partial build-up of personnelwas authorized, however. The JCS authorized an initialincrease of fifty per cent over the currently authorizedpersonnel strength of the combined NORAD/CONADHeadquarters of 445 (which included 35 Canadians). Thismeant an increase of 223 to bring the total to 668.The Reorganization Plan had called for an increaseof 521 to bring the headquarters to a total of 966.*Of this total, the plan had proposed that 455 spaces beabsorbed from the components within the Ent complexalong with a transfer of functions. The other 66 wereto come from the outside. These were spaces that wereeither not available from the assets at Ent or were additivebecause functions would not be transferred.The JCS directed that the transfer of personnelfrom the components and the assumption of additionalfunctions were to be accomplished in phases and in coordinationwith the Services. They emphasized thatevery effort should be taken to save manpower by consolidationor elimination of functions. The JCS offeredthe services of a survey team to help in this. Finall~the JCS provided that when appropriate. NORAD/CONADcould reexamine the organization and recommend desiredmodifications and adjusted personnel cf~ilings.The Reorganization Plan had shown CINCNORAD as havingoperational command over the U. S. component commandsand their subordinate units. The JCS pointed outthat CINCNORAD exercised operational control over theU. S. component commands, the air defense forces ofthese commands, and the air defense forces in Alaska.They directed that command relationships be changed toreflect only an operational control channel from NORAD* USAF - 723 USA - 163 USN 41 RCAP - 39 lrntff '- ~ .

., '·SECRE1#~~........................................................ ~ ·t·!,-,to the U. S. component commands and their subordinateunits.~~ong other changes or guidance laid down by theJCS were the following. They stated that personnelfunctions of CONAD, with respect to the components,were limited to the establishment of policies to insureuniform standards of military conduct. Direct trainingresponsibility, the JCS stated, should be limited tojOint training. NORAD/CONAD functions in weapons andenvironment systems de"Jelopment and testing should belimited to preparing qualitative and quantitative requirements,making recommendations for resolution ofunsatisfactory situations to the JCS, and wor~ing withthe Service with development responsibility to includerepresentation at operations test conferences, provisionof observers during test operations, and review oftest reports. The JCS also directed that there be onechief of staff from the Army and an Assistant Chief ofStaff from the Air Force. This chan&ed the NORAD/CONADconcept of having two chiefs of staff -- one for operationsand one for administration and logistiCS.IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATIONFollowing approval of the Reorganization Plan,NORAD/CONAD formed an ad hoc committee to carry it out.This committee was established on 2 July 1959 and includedrepresentatives from NORAD/CONAD; ADC and ARAD­COM. Among the tasks given to it in its charter wereto specify the functions and manpower spaces to be absorbedand to reco,umend a time-phased plan for takingthe people and functions.In carrying out its responsibilities and instructionsfrom the JCS and interpreting responsibilities assignedto CINCNORAD/CI NCONAD, the co~~ittee agreed onthese guidelines. In the areas of personnel (J-l), 10­listics (J-4), and programs, the headquarters shouldconcern itself only with monitoring and providing broadcommand guidance and policy. This was not true in theremaining J staff areas, however, of intelligence (J-2),l . -.....•1----"U;J'i?lR~.lIi'IlIiO~"'~.~,"1'..~:rZtr":{L.,'~.fiiDFJI/{___"._ III ..n.'....J4;

operations (J-3), plans and policy (J-5) , and communicationsand electronics (J-8). The latter areas wereof primary concern to NORAD/CONAD.The committee presented its program to GeneralPartridge on 17 July 1959.* Included in the presentationswere manning requirements and the phased buildupof personnel. General Partridge approved the planand set 3 August 1959 as the date for implementation ofthe reorganization.The additional personnel authorized at this time,as noted above, totalled 223. The committee plan providedthat this would be broken down into 153 officers,30 enlisted men, and 40 civilians. Of the total of223, the Air Force was to provide 145, the Army 64, theNavy 13, and the RCAF one.The assignment of personnel was to be phased overa 90-day period (i.e., to be completed by 31 October1959). According to the schedule, the initial assignmenton O-Day (organization day), 3 August 1959, was tobe 113 people, 0 plus 45 an additional aO people, and 0plus 90 another 50 people.On 23 July 1959, USAF ADC, ARADCOM, and NAVFORCONADwere sent copies of the personnel assignment plan. Eachwas told to "arrange for the prOVision of the manpowerauthorizations and a~signment of personnel to NORAD/CO'NAD," accordingly.** The personnel assignment plan* General Laurence S. Kuter assumed command ofNORAD/CONAD on 1 August 1959. He advised in a letter toGeneral Partridge at the end of June that the staff neednot delay any reorganization actions on the premise thathis (Kuter's) views migbt differ from those of GeneralPartridge.** Not all 113 people scheduled for the first incrementcame in on 3 August, but they had arrived withinabout 30 days according to personnel records of the head.quarters.-~liiil,)r ...,F.l,',;···-, ,..~

,··'-.......·..·..··..·..·..........·....·..·.........w·~eGREr.,•••••••••••• t ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••specified the positions by service, grade, career fiel~and staff to which the positions were to be assigned.,The March 1959 Reorganization Plan showed the functionsthat HORAO/CONAO would perform and this plan wasapproved by the JCS, subject to the changes enumeratedearlier. But other than this~ t.he components were nottold what functions HORAD/CONAO would absorb and thecomponents would stop dOing or reduce in scope. The adjustmentof functional responsibil1tie~. I.e.: the gradualrelinquishment of a function in a camponent and thefull performance of the same function in NORAD/CONAD orsome in-between arrangement, was a matter that wouldtake some time to work out. The JCS had stated, in approvingthe reorganization plan on 23 June, that CONADshould make every effort to consolidate functions andeliminate non-essential activi Ues. Considerable reviewwould be necessary.It had been noted by the Reorganization Ad Hoc Committeeat its meeting on 10 July that one problem inbuilding up the J-3, J-5, and J-6 sections waf? that whatthe components were doing in these area~ was required byService directives. The component acti~ity could bestopped only by eliminatIon of these directives ..At any rat.e~ the new st.aff structure for Headqu~.rj;­ers HORAO/CONAO wasest-abli.shed ·00 3 August ·1f15~ in thel'Oriil-shoWIl on the foilo·wing page ..... Sepa r'ite'g-enera1 ordersestablished the staff structure for NORAD and CONAD.They were identical except for the position of DeputyCommander-in-Chief on the NORAD staff. This posit10nwas held by Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon~ RCAF.During the process of assigning personnel, the problemcame up of whether more than one Service would pro­Vide required c1vlU an spaceEo, The personna1 as~ignmentplan sent to the components on 23 July asked for- ten civilianspaces from the Army. The Army replied that sincethe Air Force had been assigned by OSD as the Service toprovide administrative and logistica 1 support" it shouldprovide all civilian posi.tions. This, ~he Army said, wasin consonance witb the procedure a taIl other uni fiedcommands.iE8R~-

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~ECRE""CONAD objected to the JCS, pointing out that oneService should not have to provide all the civilianspaces, that CONAD was unique in that an integratedheadquarters would be established at all CONAD levels,and that as many as 100 civilian authorizations mightbe required from the Army when the organization wasfully implemented. The JCS replied that it had beenthe practice to provide all civilians for the seniorheadquarters of each unified command from one Service.The Air Force was~ therefore, taking action to providethe ten civilian spaces asked of the Army for NOKAO/CONAO Headquarters. The JCS did not comment on thesituation in regard to integrated headquarters at subordinateCONAO/NORAO echelons.,'2,uum_lIIHiiillHfmllll!'ilW'U'~~H~~----- ---II }tji,t~'U:"~,,!,,, ';;";:II!t#~~flmj;;;it,'l?2Cj..

- ~_._.=. __ .1...~...............................................~.1. 'T/(II."",ThisCHAPTER 2Region/Division OrgilniziltionSAGE GEOGRAPHIC REORGANIZATIONIntroduction. By mid-1959, five SAGE direction~enters (New York, Boston, Syracuse, Washington, andBangor) and one SAGE combat center (the 26th Divisionat Syracuse) had become operational. For the next fewyears, SAGE direction centers and combat centers wouldcontinue to be phased into the air defense system untilthe manual system was replaced. To go from the manualto the ultimate SAGE system would require great changesin the geographic organization of the air defensesystem.reorganization was planned in phases. ForNORAD/CONAD, there would be a gradual change, in accordancewith SAGE phasing, from the current organizationto a seven-region structure and then to a nineregionstructure in the continental U. S. The finalconfiguration would also include a tenth SAGE region inCanada. USAF ADC had similar reorganization planswhich would bring first a seven-division structure andlater a nine-division structure in th~~ continental U. S.ARADCOM's plans were not definite at lllid-1959, but itprobably would establish a seven-region structure alongwith NORAD/CONAD and USAF ADC.The reason NORAD/CONAD and USAF ADC were to increasetheir region/division structure from seven tonine'in the U. S. was to accommodate an improved SAGEcomputer, the AN/FSQ-7A. This new computer was to beinstalled in ten combat centers (nine in the U. S. andone in Canada),. referred to as Super Combat Centers.NORAD/CONAD Organizational Changes and Status (to 1August 1959). In the progress toward the SAG! configuration,by the ~ of calendar year 1958, USAF ADC had-­

, /...- .'·~EGREr··~.......................................................···W·, .......................................................~I..............................................,inactivated four manual divisi.ons (the 9th, GeigerField; 32d, Syracuse; 35th, Dobbins; and 85th, Andrews)and reduced a fifth division to a one and one status(the 58th, Wright-Patterson, which was inactivated on IFebruary 1959). ADC had activated the 32d Air Division(SAGI) to take the place of the 35th manual division atDobbins and established the 26th Air Division (SAGE) totake the place of the 32d manual division at Syracuse.The latter was a redesignation of the 26th manual divisionlocated at Roslyn AFS, New YOl'k. Division boundarieswere appropriately changed.NORAD/CONAD followed suit by di~establishing fiveof their divisions (9th: 32d, 3~th, j8th, and 85th).These commands also re-established tne 26th Division atSyracuse and the 32d Division at Dobbins.. At the end of December 19()ci, NORAD was left with atotal of 19 divisions, 12 of which "ere within the continentalU. S. CONAD had the same number of divisionswithin the continental U. S. and onE outside (the 64th)!On 1 Apri1 1959 ~ ADC redesignated its 30th Air Division(Defense) as a SAGE divis.i.on and moved it fromWillow Run AFS, Michigan: to Truax AFB: Wisconsin. Itinactivated its 37th Air Dlvisi.on (Defense) which hadbeen at Truax and made the 30th res>,onslble for the areaof both divisions. ADC also redeSignated the 25th AirDivision (Defense) as a SAGE division on 1 March 1959.At mid-year, USAF ADC had four SAGE diVisions and sevenmanual divisions in the U. S.NORAD/CONAD relocated their 30th Divisi.ons fromWillow Run AFS to Truax AFB on i April 1959 and discontinuedtheir 37th Divisions. The 30th Divisions werethen made responsible for the area formerly encompassedby the 30th and 37th. No action WH~ necessary by NORADICONAD on the 25th Div1sion ..* CONAD divisions and regions and NORAD divisionsand regions had identical boundaries.'_Till" . - ...... --.~

~...~...·········..·....·......·.... ··..·..........·W.·l .......................•................••.•.........•..•..On 1 August 1959, NORAD/CONAD took the first actionto redesignate divisions as regions which was partof the plan to establish the seven-region structure.Bffective this date, the Bastern NORAD/CONAD Region wasdiscontinued. * On the same date, the 26th, 30th, and32d NORAD/CONAD Divis1.ons were redesignated Regions.These Dew regions assumed responsibility for the EasternRegion area and began reporting directly to NORAD/CONAD Headquarters. The geographical area formerly encompassedby the divisi.ons remained the same for theregions.,NORAD/CONAD &lso establisheod a sixth sector atCuster AFS, Michigall, on 1 April 1959, the Detroit Sector.The SAGE direction center at this location wasscheduled to become operational in August 1959. Asnoted previously, five SAGE DC's had become operationalearlier. At each, NORAD/CONAD had established sectors.In separate action having nothing to do with theSAGB reorganization, CONAD established t~e AlaskanCONAD Region and the 10th and 11th CONAD Divisions inAlaska effective 10 June 1958. NORAD had taken thisaction in 1958.The status as of 1 Augu~t 1959 W~~ as follows.NORAD had eight div1si{)n~ ~ithin the (;ontinenta1 U. S.,and seven outside (10th, 11th, 1st, 2d j 3d, 5th, and* Actually, the op~c;;,t.i.ona1 phase-out date ofEastern was 1 July 1959. On this date, i'or example,the opera tiona1 responsibi11ties for t.he Atlantic SeawardElement were transferT6d to the 26th NORAD/CONADDivision. Because of these ch:lngeR, the Navy disestablishedits NAVFOR Eastern CONAD R~gion on 15 August1959 and four naval billets were tran~ferred to thestaff of the 26th NORAD/CONAD Region (~s it waF> designatedon 1 August 1959). The addition~l month betweenthe operational phase-out date on J July and the effectivedate of discontinuance of the Eastern Regionwas for cleaning up administrative m:.tters.•,SIfel'd!' .~~,- - --~,_w

!~REt'bI~ ·~·..·..·........··..·..·........··......·..····....·~·l ......... ...... It64th), for a total of 15. CONAD also had eight divisionswithin the continental U. S. and bad three outside(10th, IIth, and 54th), for a total c';' 11. HORAD hadfive regions within the U. S. and::'~:,~ u! tside (Alaskanand Northern). CONAD also had fie 'eg:;'oDs in the U. S.and one outside (Alaskan),According to current planninb, 011 1 January 1960,the Central NORAD/CONAD Region would De discontinued.Two of the divisions within Central, the 29th and 33d,were to be redeSignated as regions and divide the areaof responsib1lity. Of the other thrt~e divisions currentlywi thin the Central area, two I,ere to be discontinuedand one was to be redes.ignated as a sector.,On 1 July 1960, Wes ter.n NORAOl(ONAD Region was tobe discontinued. Its area of re~pon~ibility was to bedivided between the 25th and 28th Di"isions whjch were,at the same time, to be redesig.nated as regions. Athird division within Western would be redeSignated asa sector. Thus, there would be hy ! July 1960 sevennumerically-designated regions wlthl!l the continentalUnited Sta tes.Tentative planning at NORAD Headquarters alsocalled for redesigna Hng t be Nort:hel'n :NOHAO Region inCanada as the 35th NORAO Region a~out 1 July 1960.INTEGRATION OF THE 25TH AND .jTH DIVISIONSIn November 1958 JWestern Region forwarded a jointproposal of the 5th and 25th NORAO Divisions for a shUtin control of radar units. Their pr~posal was to placethe 917th (C-19), 9l8th (C-20~ 919tn (C-21) and 825th(SM-153) ACW Squadrons under the cOiJlOand and operationalcontrol of the 25th tlORAD Di VI ~ i 0'1 These were USAF!­manned-and-operated units in Canada, currently under the5th NORAD Division.RCAF ADC/NNR concurred on ]9 December 1958 andNORAO approved the plan and dire

__ ~ !E's"iiT' ..~......... : ............................ .!.......·W·l· ,InFGllcwinB this, because of this shift in controland a later requirer.lent to expand the ~5th Division toits SAGB boundaries, North(;!rn and Westarn Regien:; recommendedthat the Lth HORAD Dhision ;n disbanded andits area of responsibility and ~cntrol of forces ~etransferred to the 2tith HORAD D1"ision. HORAD concurred.This change was planned :tn phases. It could netbe accomplished all at once because of ~nsufficientcommunications f~;.ei Iities. However, operational controlcould be taken in steps. The first step would oefor the 25th to assume operational control of the :curUSAF-manned radars, using existing circuitry. Thesecond step called for the 5th HORAD Division to ilephased out and the 25th NORAD Division to assume operationalcontrol of the ReAP air defense forces.The first step was taken on 2 March ISti9.the meantime, HORAD requested formal approYialof the over-all plan from the JCS and COSC. Includeuwas a requirement for joint mannin~. At this time andin amendments in May and July, the RCAF positions requiredon the staff of the 25th, which included tho, DeputyCommander position, were SUbmitted. The JCS withheldapproval pending consideration of the over-allregional plan. On 17 August 1959~ NORAD was advised bythe Executive Agent for the cose that the Canadian Cab­, inet Defence Committee had approved in principle theCanadian participation in the Region and Sector headquarterslocated in the U. S. (see i>elow for additionaldetails). It was further stated that Canada was endeavoringto man the 2~th Division in accordance withHORAD submiss.lons in May and July.MANNING OF NORTHERN HORAD REGIONAND CANADIAN/U. S. DIVISIONSIn 1908, preliminary manning proposals were SUDmittedto the JCS and cose for the Northern NORAD Regi.onHeadquarters. NORAD then heard informally that "';;l1e(., !!6REf -­

•"'0'!l::ioq\~ I.\rt,.,..~,'-.--.,"'"" .......J~.~R£GIOI BOI.WDARI:SDIVISIOI IOI.WDARI:S. SAG([J Ml'NlJAl"r----'I'I I

••",.5__ ......\3t!6R.X ..c;;:·······································....······W·...................•....•••..........••• ~ ................••JCS was delaying consideration of the manpower requirementuntil a proposal for all HORAD subordinate unitswas sUbmitted. NORAD wired the JCS that provision ofU. S. personnel for the Northern Region staff was u~ntlyrequired and that approval should not be delayed.On 24 December 1958, the JCS concurred in HORAD'sneed for the U. S. manpower spaces at NNR Headquarters(although they with-held approval of the overall proposal).Accordingly, the Army and Air Force were askedto provide the spaces.A total of 16 spaces were authorized, 14 officers(including two brigadier generals) and two enlisted men.Thirteen of the officers and the two enlisted men wereto come from the Air Force; one officer was to comefrom the Army. These personnel were to be provided toa U. S. element at Headquarters NNR, arriving on aphased basis beginning 15 Kay 1959.In the meantime, on 25 February 1959, HORAD advisedthe casc of the JCS action and urged early approvalof the Canadian manpower spaces for NNR. At the sametime, NORAD submitted its proposal for manning of jointU. S./Canadian divisions. The HORAD concept for thelatter was as follows. Those geographical areas lyingwholly in one country and containing forces of onlythat country should have a commander and staff from thatcountry; however, if forces of another country were tobe employed over the area, the commander should haveadequate staff assistance from the other country, Inthose geographical areas including territory and/orforces of both countries, the commander and his deputyshould not normally be from the same country. Thestaff should be joint. And national representation inthe NORAD organization should generally be based on thecomposition of forces and territory involved.HORAD proposed the following commanders and deputycommanders for border divisions:25th Division29th DivisionU. S. commander, Canadian deputyU. S. commander, U. S. deputy!d!d,.'.·______••I1_.....d_______llliijr- --- -~ ........ ( 18 J-- 5P__ I~ ft

..,········....···· ..·..····· .. ·······.. ·············~l 30th Division33th Division26th DivisionU. S. commander, Canadian depu~yCanadian commander, U. S. deputyU. S. commander., U. S. deputyOn 21 May 1939, NORAD advised the casc that theproposals submitted on 25 February were firm, at leastuntil the reorganization and boundary realignment requiredby the super combat center plan. NORAD said thatthere would be some delay in final implementation of thecomplete organization and m~nning of ~Jl of its subordinateorganizations in the U. S. and Canada. But therewas a pressing need for Canadi~.n I'E,preg~ntatlon at certainsubordinate organiztltlons. For this reason, NORADasked that as an interim arrangement Canadian liaisonofficers be authorized for certain organizations. Personnelwere needed i.mmediatl?ly at tht, 26th Divi.sion,Syracuse Sector, Bangor S€t(~tor, 29 th Divi810n, and theDetroit Sector; on 1 July 1959 at __ he 30th Division; on13 August 1939 at the Duluth Se(;t~T: (Il) 10 September1959 at the Grand Forks Sector; :and ()(. 15 M"rch 1960 atthe Sault Ste Marie Sect')r.On 17 August 1959, as noted ab?vt:, NORAD was advis­(, ed that on 4 August the Cang.di:!tn C':lb1net Defence Committeehad approved in principle the C .,.mldun p-..;rt.ic'.ipatlonin the joint region ,;tnd Eo4ect:or headquarters. It hadalso approved U. S. participation in L':.e NNR Headq,uartersand the 35th Region Headquart€l'E its NNR was laterto be redesignated).A few changes ",el"e requ

s!Cns..··,····························..····•..·....·······..w.f_, '''cd IIML30th Division35th Division26th DivisionU. S. commander, Canadian deputyCanadh.n COJlUll!!lnder, U. S. deputyU. S. commander., U. S. deputy,OnOn 21 May 1959, NORAD advised ~he cose that theproposals submitted on 25 February were firm, at leastuntil the reorganization and boundary realignment requiredby the super combat center plan. NORAD said thatthere would be some delay in final implementation of thecomplete organization and manning of ~ll of its subordinateorganizations in the U. S. and Canada. But therewas a pressing need for Canadi'a.n 1'&presHntation at certainsubordinate organizati.oDFl. For thi~ reason, NORADasked that as an interim arrangement Canadian liaisonofficers be authorized for cert.ain organizations. Personnelwere needed immediatf!ly at tht':' 26th Divi.sion,Syracuse Sector', Bangor Sec-tor, 29th DlviE,ion, and theDetr01.t Sector; on 1 July 1959 at the 30th Division; on15 August 1959 at the Duluth Se(~t'J:r: (Ill 10 September1959 at tbe Grand Forks Sector; ~nd ('){. 15 ll:trch 1960 atthe Sault Ste Marie Sector.17 August 1959, as noted ab?vt:, NORAD was advisedthat on 4 August the Cans..dHm C·ablnet. Defence Committeehad approved in principle the C ..,.n';dl.an p.,;rt:icipa tionin the joint region .:t.nd f'!ect:or htHtdquarters. It hadalso approved U. S. participation in t::.e NNR Headquartersand the 35th RegIon HeadquarterE ;' 'IS NNR was laterto be redesignated).A few changes w~re requ.ested. The eJt:ecut.ive agentletter stated that tbis eommitt~~ felt that C~nadian interestswould be bett~r s~rved if Con~dian o(ficers weraapPOinted to the Deputy Comm&.nder p\)si tiOD-J. l the 29thDivision Headquarter.s and a. t the- Df:l [,)i t'a.nd :}nlnd ForksSector Headquarters (thi':l. would be tn "ddlt!on to DeputyCommander pOAltinns aT: Lhe SE..~.tl·i:i :lnd Syr....cuse SectorHeadquarters proposed by NORAD:.Complete manning requ1.rem~nts \Hnc being prepared,it was stated. In the m{;'antim

eing made to provide RCAF officers in a liaison capacityto the positions asked in NORAD's 21 May letter.THE SUPER C0J4BA T CENTER PLAN,Approval of the USAF ADC plan to employ the ne~solid state computer, AN/FSQ-7A, by NORAD on 20 Decem._'­er 1958 and USAF on 5 February 1959 necessitated grea';';changes in the transition to SAGE.· The ADC plan providedthat the solid state computer would be employedin nine division combat centers in the U. S. and in onein Canada.In the months following publication of the original!DC plan on 5 November 1958 J a number of changesbecame necessary and a requirement was added for aligningair defense and air traffic control boundaries (seeseparate section below). A new plan was prepared(NORAD participated to insure inclusion of its operationalrequirements and concepts).*· This plan was dated19 June 1959. Fcllowing agreement on air defenseand air traffic control coincident boundaries J the SACEProject Office consolidated the old SAGE Schedule 7(Improved) and the coincident boundary schedule into anew SAGE Implementation Schedule, which was dated l.l.lly1959.There were to be ten Super Combat Centers (SCC's),one for each of ten divisions. Each was to employ asolid state computer. One additional AN/FSQ-7A computerwas planned for a direction center at the AlbuquerqueSAGE Sector. Five of the division SCC's were toperform a dual function, i e., in addition to operatingas an sec, they were to operate as a d~rection center(the 30th, 32d, 33d, 27th, and 35th).* For background, see NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary,Jul-Dec 1958, pp 23-29. ----­** other participating agencies: RCAP, SDC, FAA,MITRE, IBM, ADSID, USARADCOM, and SAGE Project Office.". ::!!i:';,a,~\i____._=___________,...I[ 20

..'SeCRE,. -....~...............................................w..(- ~ --.« .............................. ,............... .,......... "' .... "Each division was to encompass two to four sectorsIn all there were to be 27 air defense sectors. Ofthese, 21 were to be equipped with an AN/FSQ-7 computerin a "soft" structure. Five of the sectors were to becontrolled by the direction center portion Gf the sec.And one sector, Albuquerque, as noted above, was to havean AN/FSQ-7A.The operational employment plan provided that eachof the ten sec structures was to he "hardened tt to a minimumof 200 pounds per square inch overload. However,the Department of Defense-preparea Continental Air DefenseProgram (see Chapter Seven), apP'oved by the Secretaryof Defens.3 on 19 June 195(;;, rer~ced the numberof hardened sit~s to six in the U. S. und one in Canada.The three othe:i.1 sec's planned for the l!. S. (in thesouthcentra1 and central areas) we:.:n to be'built in a~ configuration.The new SAGE I .lflementa tion'4":Sd~.;:dule set the oper­ ,J, 'ational date of the first sec, which \lot.41d be in the i: "35th NORAD Region, il' June 1963; the j.ss'.: two SCC's,which would be in t~1e 20th and 33d Ret;i.ons, in July 1964.The Albuquerque Sector AN!FSQ-7A was scheduled to becomeoperational in September 1962.The boundaries planned for the sec configurationare shown on the map on the following page. As of :nidyear,the exact locations for the ten SCC's had not yetbeen determined.~. ,AIR DEFENSE AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL INTEGRATIONBackground. At each of the nine super combat centersin the U. S. there would be collocated Federal AviationAgency air traffic control facilities. EachAN/FSQ-7A computer would be jointly used for air defenseand air traffic control functions. In addition, the SCCboundary configuration would be coincident air defenselair traffic control boundaries.Back in January 1953, the Secretary of Commerce andc'1111~.''­~ ---. aSIiiGPE!

ceE6RET&"- ị.... ~r~\ ~ )-\(' SA.GE - P11.11. A.IR DIVISION ~~I/AND SECTOR BOUNDARIESI tJ29th Itl'North t DIV •. • nt",}U:GENO33rd. AIR 01'1.lSouth Centrallo aIJPP OOJIIIA.T CIIIITZII .,.. tt(lOIIIIAT CIIII'!OI 0D11lJCTlOll CSl4ft11-r~C'r··-.. '."

~'.w.,...................................................... .. ..•.•....•••.•..•••.....••••..•.....•.•....••.....•.•••..,the Secretary of Defense signed an ar:ree."::lent on jOintuse of certain facilities in th~ performance of commonfunctions in a:t.r traffic control and air defense. Thisagreement was formalized in a White House document dated9 January 1958.The agreei.lent provided that the Airways ModernizationBoard would conduct a program to determine how integrationcould be accomplished. On 22 July 1958, theAir Defense Systems Integration DivIsion was designatedthe Air Force agency to work wi tll AMB. On 29 July 1958,the ADSID was further designated as the Department ofDefense agency on this program. following this, on 22August 1958, USAF. CAA~ and AMB agr-eed that plans shouldbe made to collocate air route trafi'ic control centersand air defense facilities where prlcticable, considera hardened air traffic control fac] .~ty within each airdivision y and readjust a iT traff:ic .'!ontrol and air defenseboundaries so as to be COi!lcl·jent at the air divisionlevel.Both eAA and AMB were incorpOl'" ted wi thin a newagency, the Federal Aviation Agency w~1ch off1ciallybegan functioning on 31 December 19..>:).:· FAA~ therefore,took over the air h'a ffic cont rOJ PII r t of int.egrl:ttion.Request. for Canadian Pa r·t ic.i.pa·: ion, In January1959, in coininenting--o-n-a.nl"iiferTm;).ji:.iadary alignmentplan,. NORAD told ADSID t;ha t allOnt; r'1c considerationsthat had to be taken into account ~:l developing a finalplan was air traffic control in (anada, ADSID repliedin February tha t FAA was aw.i:i l'tj of the necessityfor Canadian participa1;ioD and wa,.; il the process of* The Federal AVlB rton Act)t 1953 provlded thatexcept for the crea tion,. staffing a nd organizing ofthe FAA, and for the transfer to ith Administ;rator ofcertain functions of other Gove:rtJlTl€I,( agencies) theAct would become effec.ti.ve "on tt:e ~i:)th day followingthe date on which the Adm.ini =;tra tor takes office."The Administrator's date of apPointLE'nt was 1 November1958.--- ..-....- ..,:-_..._-- ~-- ... --..SE8~ET

_~EORliil-F..~.............................. ~ ...........······W·i·t •..••......•...................•.........•..................[ettin(;, Canadian Departlilent c:i: T-··:••:spcrt and RCAF repl'esentation011 its staff.In the meantime, in October 10tiG, NORAD recommendedto the JCS that the studies on intt!t;'ration of functionalactivities common to air traffjc control and airdefense be expanded to include Canadian considerationsand participation. The JCS agreed in January 1959 torecommen,;!(;o the Secretary of Defense that an invitationbe :;:;;,tended. to the Government of Canada to participatein these studies.In April 195~, NORAD was informed that the FAA hadrequested the State Department to consider inviting canadato participate and in Febrcary 1959 the State Departmenthad sent an invitation to the Canadian Embassy.Boundary Alignment. On 22 May 195Q, USAF, DOD, andFAA signed a new agreement which reconfirmed earlieragreements and clarified the direction to be taken.Among the provisions of this acreement were these: enrouteair traffic control facilities should be locatedin the hardened stnlcture of the nine U. S. SCC's, theboundaries of air traffic control and air defenseshould be identical, and ADSID would represent USAF andthe Bureau of Research and Development would representFAA in the development of additional plans for integration.** Another part of this integration was joint use,where possible, of air defense and air traffic controlradars. A program for such had been underway for sometime. In March 1955, the Air Force had advised ADC thatit had established as a matter of policy the need forjOint use of Air Force and CAA radars and designatedADCas the agency to implement a joint use program. Thefollowing September, ADC and CAA formed a Joint RadarPlanning Group to carry out this program. Exactly howthis JRPG would work with or under ADSID was not madeclear as of mid-1959.

~[!CRE]:··············..·....················..····..·······..·w·(;-.....---­ -­--- .The exact and final details of system operationcould be developed only through an extensive period ofexperimentation, evaluation, and testing to find exactcapabilities, limitations, and desirable modifications.Initial studies of the joint use of the computer forairtraffic and air defense functions indicated the feasibilityand desirability of integration.In the meantime, while studies were under way onjoint computer use, it was necessary to make final commitmenton two critical areas -- boundaries and buildings-- because of lead times and the d.ifficulty of substantiallymodifying an underground structure once constructionwas underway. A building working groupreached agreement on building design which was beingstaffed at USAF and FAA at mid-year.'l'he boundary alignment work:Lng group developed afinal plan which was, contained in a report dated 30 April1959. The agreetupon coincident boundaries wereas shown on the SAGE/FAA map on page 22. On 2 July1959,USAF approved these boundaries for lmplement~ti.on.ALASKAH NORAD REC, (ONAlaskan Command issued a new regulation on 30 April1959 prescribing the organization for air defense of theAlaskan Command and outlining the policies and proceduresfor exercising operatio.nal control of forces madeavailable for air defense of the Alaskan NORAD Region.It continued instructions in pl'~vlous regulations thatCINCAL, as commander of the Alask&ll NORAD Region (ANR) ,was responsible to CINCNORAD for &11 a1r defense activitieswithin the region and eXercised operational controlof all air defense forces made available to him.It also continued thf:! a:['raDg~m~nt whereby the CommanderAlaskan Air Command exercised operr:.tional control forthe Commander AHa and conducted tre active air defenseof ANa.Among the operational air def~nse responsibilitiesof the Commander Alaskan NORAD Ra,sion listed by the newregulation were:........_-- ..-...- .-.. ­. 3!ef"!~~..,.,. "''''':M,-.t'ff~..,lqg~t~;If'''!'JilI#r.'.t''''lIlf'''l%'!',~ifM~;i!'.t-->~)P.''4: 2 5 l' .',

...­3r!eRET ., ­..~..................."..........·........·....···W.J ...........•.....................•.....•••...•..•....••..•.a. Responsible to CINCNORAD for allair defense activities within his assignedregion.b. Implements HORAD operations plansand directives and exercises such emergencypowers as may be delegated, when so directedby proper authority.c. Acts as advisor to CINCNORAD onall matters pertaining to air defense operationsin his region.Among the responsibilities assigned by the regulationto Commander Alaskan Air Command were:a. Bx~rcises, for the CANR, ,operationalcontrol of the Alaskan NORAD RegionAir Defense Force.b. Conducts active air defense ofANR.c. Provides early warning informationto CINCNORAD.d. Designates the conditions of(., readiness to be maintained in the ANR, orimplements the conditions designated byCANR or higher authority.e. Provides and maintains facilitiesas required for the ANRCC.And the responsibilities listed for the Commander,Alaskan NORAD Division included:a. Responsible to the Commander, AlaskanHORAn Region or his designated representativefor all air defense activitieswithin his assigned sector.b. Conducts the active air defenseof his sector.c. Provides early warning informationto the CANR or CINCNORAD.d. Exercises operational control ofall air defense forces within his NORAD di­Visional sector.--~-----.::~.......-- .. - ... -.••.----------------------~( 26~--~~~~1;~

~3ISSR§I ~........................................................Wt 'c.(, '''r~............ ~_.r- ........ .--- _",. - -_. -- - ....... , ........................................................ .......................................... ..CHAPTER 3Collocation of Army -Air Force Facilities IiI !!~-COLLOCATION OF MISSILE MASTER AND AN/GPA-37Background. Back in 1956, in seeking to achievecentralized control of air defense weapons systems,CONAD saw the necessity of integrating the Army's MissileMaster, AN/FSG-l, into the SAGE system. However,SAGE would not be implemented for some time and MissileMaster would be available in the near future. Therefore,CONAD saw that the first requirement was integrationof Missile Master with the manual system. Thiswould provide early integration of weapons systems andcontrol capability, and provide experience that wouldbe helpful in the later SAGE integration.In September 1956, CONAD proposed to the JCS thecollocation of the Missile Master and the Air Force's(; AN/GPA-37 in ten areas. The Office of the Secretaryof Defense concurred on 30 October 1956. These tenareas, the sites eventually selected for location ofthe collocated facility, and the ~adars chosen for thecollocated facility (HORAD Control Centers) were asfollows:Defense Area Facility Site RadarNew York Highlands, N. Y. (P-9) FP8-7Niagara-Buffalo Lockport AFS, N. Y. (P-21) FPS-7Detroit Selfridg'e AFB, Mich. (P-20) FPS-20Philadelphia Gibbsboro-Pedricktown, N. J. FPS-20(split site) (RP-63)• Chicago Arlington Hts, Ill. (RP-31) FPS-20,... - ...:. - .~f8RIii'

-­...........................................................................................SESREL-- -..-.-._. ...._......-- ...-~···~··············..·······················..·······W.l ,I ...... " ............ ..Defense Area Facility Site RadarWashington- Ft. Meade, Md. (RP-54) FPS-20BaltimoreBoston Ft. Heath, Mass. (MM-l) ARSR-IAPittsburgh Oakdale, PenD, (RP-62) ARSR-IASeattle Ft. La.wton, Wash. {RP-l) ARSR-IALos Angeles Ft. MacArthur-·San Pedro ARSR-IAHill (split site) (RP-39), DuringImplementation Schedules and Problem Areas. Theoriginal implementation schedues provided to NORADearly in 1958 by USAF ranged from May 1960 for the firstsite to April 1961 for the last site. NORAD complainedthat these were much too late and th~t all ten should beoperating by calendar year 1960.1958, as implementation progressed, many im­provements were made. And on 30 Janu~ry 1959, new dateswere presented to CINCNORAD by the Joint CollocationTechnical Steering Group whic:h showed a considerablespeed-up.* The foree.sst dares for 1Iissile MasterlAN/GPA-37 capability ranged from November 1959 for FortLawton (Seattle) to ()(~tobE,r 1960 :f.")r Gibbsboro (Philadelphia).NORAD would have '!In opera. Honal capability atthe NeC's when the Missile Mastel' and AN/GPA-37 becameoperati.onal.On 6 April 1959, NORAD advised the Army and AirForce tbat it concurred with these schedules if the JCTSGprovided for cE:rtain items. These included providing forsimultaneous installation of lIissile Master and AN/GPA-37eqU±pment and a manual ~apability for control of mannedinterceptors while SAGE was being installed and conversionbeing made from one system to the other, and assuring* The JCTSG was formed by the Army and Air Force inJuly 1957 to support imp1ementQtion of collocation.~ECRET--"

·~·......··......··......·......····......·..··..· ..W·I· , that MORAD would have an automatic data transmissionsystem by timely procurement and installation of automaticdata converters. NORAD also asked that continuousaction be taken to obtain better construction timefor the Air Force operations buildings so as to providean earlier capability.Each of these matters had been agreed to andsolved or was being worked on by mid-year. As implementationprogressed during this six-month period,problem areas and discrepancies arose on various sitesas was typical in carrying out a la"f,'e project with agreat many agencies involved.An example of these problems was a delay in releaseof construction funds for the Philadelphia siteand a resulting delay in installation of the Air Forceradar. This was still not settled at mid-year. At theNiagara-Buffalo site, the Missile Master operationsbuilding would be completed by August 1959. As thingsstood at mid-year. the Missile Master contractor, MartinCompany, could not begin installation of the equip.ment until I Ncve::niJer 1959, thus causing at least atwo month delay. For the Detroit site, an independenttelephone company was asking for an overly-long periodto install the commu~ications which. if the extendedtime was actually ~aken, would delay the operationsdate of the center.NORAD Control Center Coordinators.On 17 June1959, the JCTSG briefed the No~~sraff on progress ofthe NCC's. It was brought out at ~his meeting thatagencies working on the Nee's had indicated that manyof the problems at the sites arose because there wasinsufficient guidance and supervision by one centralagency, These agencies had stated that an operationalplan and concept for Nee's were essential and a NORADcommander for each site to resolve problems on the !1potwas required.In order to rectify this situation, it was recommendedthat:a. NORAD assume management d1rection of the... --­... -..-..:: .. ~ ..--...SECREt~ •••I...................................l~{ 29 ~~.~~.M........ s ............................

NORAD Control Center pr0l.r8iu and assumechairmanship of the JCTSG.b. A NORAD-approved operational planfor NORAD Control Centers be disseminatedto the field commanders assoon as possible.c. A NORAD commander be designated pr~to the operational dates of the NaMDControl Centers., NORAD agreed and planned to issue an operationalplan as soon as possible and to have NCC commanders appointedsix months prior to the target date for operationalcapability of each facility. To handle problemsin the meantime t on 14 July 1959. NORAD directed eachregion in the continental U. S. to appoint a NORAD coordinatorfor each NCC.NORAD proposed to Army and Air Force that tt as­sume chairmanship of the JCTSG. Neither concurred, how­ever. COLLOCATION OF AADCP's AND ADDC's IN THE CONTINENTAL U.S.Besides collocating ADOC's with Missile Master, NORADsought to collocate ADne's with other AADCP's whereverfeasible. Considera tion of this and preliminary surt"eysby NORAD were started in 1957. During 1958, a nu.nber ofconferences were held with USAF ADC and ARADCOM, siteswere proposed, and surveys were made. The only actual c0­llocation by the end of 19~;J, however, was at GeigerField, Washington. On 15 May 1953, opera tions of the firstNORAD Control Center began at this location.Collocation of the AADCP at the ADOC's in three o~erlocations was approved~underway. These were:however, and implementation wasARADCOM DefenseADDCDallas-Fort Worth Duncanville AFS, Texas........D8....................F......... ~II{ 30

·....(;·..·· ..··..····..·..··....·..···..·····....··....w·............. , NOHADARADCOI( DefenseKansas CitySt LouisADDCOlathe ArS, KansasBelleville AFS, IllinoisDuring 1959, studies and surveys of other sitescontinued. On 1 July 1959, NORAD issued a statement ofpolicy on the collocation of AADCP's and ADDC's as follows:a. That the operational functions of theAADCP's and ADDC's be collocated in thoseareas where at least two years operationalbenefits could be derived prior to SAGEb. That AADCP's and ADDC's not be collocatedin those areas where less than twoyears operational benefits will be derivedprior to SAGE.provided a list of 20 defenses which it rec­ommended for collocation under ~h1s policy. These includedthe three city defenses listed above. Shortlyafter this letter was issued, the JCS deleted seven ofthese sites.On 22 July 1959, ARADCOM submitted collocationplans for the 13 remaining defenses. Two types of collocationwere planned. At eight ADDC's,where the defenseswere sufficiently close to the appropriate ADDCfor the Army commander to be physically present at theADDC when necessary, operations personnel and in somecases the complete battalion, were to be permanentlystationed. Three of these were the city defenses listedabove. At the other five ADDC's, only the necessaryoperating personnel were to be permanently stationed.NORAD approved this collocaHon plan on 3 August1959.COLLOCATION AT THULECONAD directed USAF ADC and ARADCOM on 2 Augustr~--· ---- ..._ .. -._a, ---­rAl

(,...........•••...•............•••....••.•.......••, ........ ,1957 to report on the feasibility of collocating theThule AADCP and ADDC. ADC recommended collocation in anew facility to be built near Thule AFB, with the radardata remoted from Pinguassuit Mountain. ARADCOM agreedthat this was feasible. On 8 October 1957, CONAD approvedthe ADC recommendation and directed implementation.The 64th Air Division submitted two plans to ADC,which were forwarded to CONAD on 21 April 1958. The64th's Plan "A" provided for a collocated AADCP-ADDC.Plan "B" provided for a collocated AADCP-ADDC, plus ajoint command post which would include the SAC commander,and operational and administrative space for theSAC wing. CONAD approved Plan B on 30 June 1958 anddirected ADC and ARADCOM to implement it.SAC objected to Plan B on I Octooer 1958, statingthat because of a planned reduction in SAC activitiesat Thule, it considered available facilities adequatefor its mission. SAC thought Plan A was suitable andwould include the items in the FY 19aO YCP.CONAD concurred~ directing on J November 1950 thatADC and ARAOCOM implement Plan A.On 7 January 1959, USAF informed SAC that the Thulecollocation project, in competition with other highpriorityAir Force requirements, was not approved for inclusionin the FY 1960 MCP. CONAD sent a reclama to fueJCS on 24 February 1959. The USAF decision would seriouslyimpair the operational efficiency of the air defensesin the Thule area, CONAD said.The JCS referred CONAD's letter to the Air Force.On 1 June 1959, USAF directed ADC to investigate thepossibility of modifying an existing on-base facilityand any other possible course of action, short of newconstruction, to fulfill the CONAD requirement.,ADC then asked CONAD for guidance. CONAD repliedon 29 June that the collocation of facilities at Thulewas still a valid and urgent requirement. CONAD said­SE8REl»...~..............Bi._al............=..........~{32 }••~H~...."A.,.'__........................ .

WI --.·-.,,e' '\'.""...................................................... ... . it had no objection to using an available building ifit could be used for collocation without waiting forthe SAC departure. ADC was asked to go ahead with thesurvey to find a suitable building. CONAD also toldSAC that it had no objection to using an existing bWrrding,provided that it would make an aeeq~ate controlcenter.SUMMARY OF COLLOCATION PLANS AND STATUS,As planned at mid-1959, within the continental U. S.there were to be 24 collocated facilities. Ten of thesewould be the collocated Missile Master/ADDC facilities.Operations at the first of these was set for November1959 and all others within the following year. Thirteenof the total would be at the othar collocated AADCP/ADDCsites. Operations at three of these, the city defenseslisted prevIously, were scheduled for late 1959 or early1960. Dates for the other sites had not been set. Lastly,one NCC had begun operating on 15 May 1958 at GeigerField, Washington.Outside the continental U. S., there were to bethree collocated centers. Two of these, in Alaska 1 hadbecome operational -- Fire Island on 1 March 1959 andMurphy Dome on 10 May 1959. The third center was plannedfor Thule AFB, Greenland.SAGE-MISSILE MASTER INTEGRATION TESTSBackground. Collocation of Missile Master andAN/GPA-37 was one problem, integration of Missile Masterwith the SAGE system was another. CONAD's September1956 proposal for collocation, noted above, also containeda proposal for integration in the SAGE era. TheOSD concurrence of 30 October 1956 to collocation ofMissile Master and AN/GPA-37 at ten sites also statedthat a technical plan for integration of Missile Masterin the air defense system, both Manual and SAGE, was beingprepared.C...IUII &.... -' ­., -- ...... - .. --...1!IIf.Ir.lJ~~ 33 It¥y'~&G~''·,:,

,­-------- .. -_..hi......................••.......••••.•.••........•.....•~....................................................-.........A Secretary of Defense memo to the Secretaries ofthe Army and Air Force, dated 28 January 1957, advisedthat this technical plan was completed and directed theAir Force to ask CONAD to submit an overall test plan.The purpose of the test was to be a determination ofthe feasibility and operational desirability for centralizedcontrol of AA weapons through economical implementationof SAGE and Missile Master, or some modificationthereof, for the mora effe~tive use of AAunits. CONAD was to monitor the studies, programs, andcontract actions and tests outlined in the OSD technicalplan. The memo was forwarded to CONAD by the AirForce on 11 March 1957.A plan for testing SAGE/Missile Master integrationwas completed by CONAD on 5 September 1957 and sent tothe executive agency. DOD approved the plan for implementationin a memo to the Army and Air Force dated2 May 1958.NORAD formed a s~e~ial test group to manage thetests on 24 February 1958. Its membership consisted ofa chairman and assistant chairman from NORAD,and onemember from USAF ADC, ARADCOM, CONARC and ARDC. CINC­NORAD issued a lettc::l' f)f instruction!'" to the group on4 March 1958 requiring it to undert;ake immediately thenecessary implementing ~~t10n for the SAvE/Missile Mastertest program.It was decided at the first meeting that therewould be four categoriAs of tests: (1) ImplementationTesting, (2) Experiment~l Testing, (3) Operational Testing,and (4) Live Fire Testing.SAGE/Missile Ma£t~r Implementation Test. The first(Implementatron) tes-t"wa-:o;i- conduc t~een the SAGE DirectionCenter at F.)rt L.t-l08, Virgini.ll, and the MissileKaster a t Fort Meade, Maryland. II: was started on 8 September1958 and completl"!d on 29 January 1959. The testwas designed to provide data for certifying that the inter-connectedequipment was technically compatible.The NORAD report st~tedthat, on the basis of the$8P'f\

.. ·~.............·..··..···....·.......··....··..·..W·J----a _.w.' !IIIfindings of the test, "it can be saId that the equipmentsare technically compatible on an integrated systemsbasis."The conclusions supporting this finding, as expressedin the report, were as follows~, (1) reference data originated by SAGEcan be transmitted to Missile Master,(2) upon receipt Missile Master canprocess and disseminate this data to designatedFire Cnits.(3) FiTe Units can accept and displaytrack and command data,(4) repeat back data initiated at theFire Unit can be received at Missile Masterand subsequently processed and transmittedto SAGE with appropriate track and channelinformation, and(5) SAGE can properly recejve and pro­cess this repeat back data. The NORAD report also detailed a number of deficienciesuncovered in the interconnect€d operation ofthe two systems.The report also contained the comments of appropriateArmy and Air Force agencies invoL'ed. Importantamong these were the ARADCOM comments which stated adisagreement with certain of the conclusions. In regardto the conclusion of technical compatibility,ARADCOM commented that this =draws only technical conclusions andin so doing leaves the impression that exceptfor some matters the SAGE Missile Mastersystems can operate together effectively.This, in fact, is not the case. Whilethe Ft Lee/Ft Keade complex represents a-vast improvement over the manual system, itis a far cry from being an adequate air defensecapability.On the other hand:. USAF ADC concu.rred wi th the NORADreport..--­ --­-•

SEORE;··~··..:··:~····..··..W.·l•••••• 4 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••On 2 July 1959, CINCNORAD submitted the report, includingthe ARADCOM, ADC, and other agency comments, tothe Secretary of Defense for approval. The letter accompanyingthe report restated the basic conclusion that:"Based on the test results, it is concluded that thesesystems are compatible." It also stated that CINCNORADconcurred in the report as written.,iE8Rf! I IId

CHAPTER 4The SurveillilDve SystemSTATUS,On 30 June 1959, the operational land-based porofNORAD's surveillance system (excluding the DEWine and extensions and Mid-Canada Line) consisted of186 heavy and 89 gap filler radars. Thirty-five of theheavy radars and six gap fillers were in Canada. Alaskahad 18 heavy radars and the U. S. had 132 heavyand 83 gap filler radars. The remaining heavy radarwas at Thule, Greenland. Augmentation radar was reportedavailable to NORAD in an emergency in four Navyunits, two ANG AC&W Squadrons, two Alr Training Commandfighter wings, two Tactical Air Command AC&W squadrons.and one ARDC Test Group.3/-In addition to these land-based sites, NORAD forcesoperated ten picket ship stations (Five off eachcoast), seven AEW&C stations (four off the West Coastand three off the East Coast) and one airship stationand three Texas Towers off the East Cuast. SupportingNORAD also were nine picket ship stations (four in theAtlantic and five in the Pacific) and eight aircraftstations in sea barriers (four in each barrier) operatedby the Navy as extensions to th8 DEW Line.The DEW Line, less its extensions, was a line of57 radar stations extending from Cape Dyer, Baffin Island,to Cape Lisburne, Alaska. The Aleutian Extension,which became operational during the first six months af1959, contained an additional six stations. FUrthersouth, the Mid-Canada Line had 90 doppler detection andeight section control stations.(n: .,l.\ho~ 10')(" c~pC\. ~J .t ,11",_ItWP "'fhitII.N_.....IU...V~I'JW:tJ[ 37 }f.hSEe,,~, ~-

~E8flISI.,~·····~·I·................................•..•••••••••••.•......••••.TABLE IPROGRAMPer.anent(P-8ites)1st Ph Mobile(M-sites)2nd Ph Mobile(SII-aites)3d Ph Mobile(TII-sites)ZI Gap FillersPinetree(USAF Funded)Pinetree(RCAF Funded)CADINHeavy RadarsCADIliGap FillersThuleGreenlandTHE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK30 June 1959PROO OPaL OPERATIONAL PRIMESITES SITES SEARCHEquipmentNo.74 74 CPS-6B/FPS-10 24IIPS-7/FPS-3 15FPS-20 3531 31 IIPS-ll/FPS-8 10MPS-7/FPS-3 8FPS-20 1320 16 MPS-ll/FPS-8 5MPS-7/FPS-3 6FPS-20 521 13 FPS-3 8FPS-20 5236 83 FPS-14 58FPS-18 2522 22 FPS-3 14FPS-20 3CPS-6B 510 10 FPS-3 1CPS-6BFPS-5{)2217 045 01 1 FPS-20 1

, -PROGRAM PROG OPRL OPERATIONAL PRIIIESITES SITES SEARCHEquipment No.Alaska 20 18 FPS-20 11FPS-3/3A's 3FPS-8 4Texas Towers 3 3 FPS-20 3"East Coast 5 3AEW&Con StationsWest Coast 5 4AN/AP8-20East Coast 5 5Picket Ship Sta AN/SPS-17 or 28West Coast 5 5AEW AirshipsEast Coast 1 1 AN/AP8-20EDEW Line 57 57 FP8-23 57FP8-19 29Aleutian DEWExtension 6 6 FPS-19 6Greenland DEWExtension 4 0Mid-Canada Line 90 90 Doppler DetectionEquipment3 3 Surveillance Radarsat Section ControlStationsAtlantic Barrier4 DER's and 4 AlW aircraft operatingbetween Argent!a andthe AzoresPacific Barrier 5 DER's and an average of 4.5AlW aircraft operating betweenUmnak and Midwa~ Island----- -.... --.-........ --* . ~~,.-...IJ ~ .•'s. .'

-.. . M--· - .. _ .... _. .,SEQR'~ }uutl.'.....................................................~ ..:. ••• I ••••••• " ••••••••••• ~··········· .. ····,········· .. ~ ........ , ~INTEGRATION OF AN/FPS-36 RADARS, In October 1957, ARADCOM propos~d to relocate someof its AN/FPS-36' s so as to get bettel' coverage againstlow altitude targets. CINCNORAD replied that theyshould be used in places recommended by the Army, butalso that they should be placed where they would contributeto the overall surveillance system. NORAD issuedguidance in June 1958 for the location of FP5-36'sand integration into the system. Among the provisions:PP8-36's would be sited to temporarily fill gaps in thesurveillance system and when USAF ADC radar covered thegaps, the FP5-36's would be withdrawn; other FPS-36'smight be required to assist Hike acquisition radar butnot augment the system; and FPS-36 back-up capabilitymight be kept for Hike defenses, if feasible, withinthe resources allocated to ARADCOM, after the programmedsurveillance system was completed.By the end of 1958, NORAD had approved integration of these radars into the NORAD system at 14 locations, two of which were in C31i.&da. However, on 13 March 1959, NORAD rescinded its approval of the two Canadian sites(HamiltoD, Ontario, and Grand Falls, Hew Brunswick), infavor of recommending to C~nada that installation of gapfillers be expedited.In the meantime, study was being made of additionalFP8-36 sites in the U. S. and by 30 June 1959, NORAD hadapproved an additional eleven sites for integration,bringing the total to 23.Hine of the radArs were already pC')perly locatedand could be integratE::d immedbtel}':SiteL,oca lionCM-lArgyle, Wisc. CM-2Dixon, IlL. C11-3 Wenona, ILl. CII-4Rosseville, Ill. ,iEeftEJ. :,':'.' ~";.. !-.:.,~~-.~ ~:i.r,~~l-t,r~,;Jg.~·~':\.. ·!'.;~'.i::"~.,~·!',tt t~!"t::-f::'- >-~.~ :'~t,i")~'i·r.r,~~ :.-:.~'.,~.'~,.;:.~~."1'{ 40 ]'I"~>/'~' ~.' j • J~~'

....... :·~..··..···..··..··· ..·............................·W.1 [ .........., SiteCII-5CK-8CM-9ClI-lOClr-4Loea tion Bunker Hill, Ind. Tisch JUlls, Wisc. Ludington, Mich. Princeton, Wisc. Erie Ordnanc:e Depot, Ohio The remaining 14 were to be relocated.NB-lBarker, N. Y. CL-2Widowville, Ohio B-1 Terry Peak, So. Dak. B-2 Parker Peak, So. Dak. L-lIndio. CaUf. NY-6High Point State Park, N. J. WB-2 Hanging Roek, W. Va. PI-2Round Moun::ain, Pa. PI-3Uniontown, Pa. D-3 Lansing, Mich. D-4 Morenci, Mich. SF-1 Point Reyes. Calif.SF-3 Fort Ord, Calif.H-3 (kanogan, Wash.While NORAD and the components were evaluating thesites, ARADCO)f told NORAD that i. t had learned informallyfrom DA tha t funding for the re··I'lcation program had runinto a snag. ARADCOM st~t;ed 1:.r.at it had received informationthat all fuuds for suppor.t of the relocation programand for FPS-36 r a a t the new city defenses were beingdeleted from the F'f-1960 Budg~'t Execution Program becauseof a lack of support by the Bureau of the Budget.Further, it pOinted out that DA had requested funds andwas attempting to justify 22 FPS-36 sites, one for eachof the SAC base defenses, and thp.~ there was no indicationthat this request; w.)uld l"t'c€ive favorable consideration.On 1 May 1959, NORAD aaked ~he JCS to support theFPS-36 relocation program. NORAD explained its integrationprogram and stated th3t ~om~ of the radars had to" ... ".... ..,-- ...........- .. - ..... ''',' -'" . ' .SE8fitEfB _liiIJJIilJAll~l"IIiIiV"

.,••••••••••••••••••••••••0' •••••••••• 0 ••••••••••• O............ , ...•..................•.....••..••••..be moved to avoid duplicating coverage from Air Forceradars and to provide optimum coverage.In Alaska, on 4 December 1958, the decision wasmade to install one AN/FPS··36 radar at Nike site "Ji,g"in the .Fairbanks area. It was felt that this radarwould substantially improve low altitude coverage forthis area.ALASKAN RADAR,Gu1kanaImprovement Program. All 18 radar stations in Alaskawere to be converted to the AN/FPS-20 (either bymodification of existing radar or installation of anAN/FPS-20). This program was planned in two phases.The first phase, conversion of 11 of the sites, wasoompletedby 8 May 1959. At that time, three of the remainingsites were operating FPS-8's and four were operatingFPS-3's. These seven were to be converted toFPS-20's in the second phase by 1961.Radar. In 1958, CINCAL proposed adding aradar (an AN/FPS:S) at Gulkana to fill a gap in coveragein the area east of Anchorage. NORAD concurred inthis.Alaskan Air COlnmand then submitted it to USAF foremergency programming. USAF turned down the emergencyaction, but said that it had approved it for funding mthe FY 1960 MCP. This would produce an operational damin the second quarter of FY 1961~ USAF stated.CINCAL followed up with a protest to NORAD thatthis date was unsatisfactory. NORAD wrote to USAF on ~March 1959 that it agreed with CINCAL and recommendedconstruction and installation during the 1959 constructionseason. USAF replied on 11 April 1959 that it \\OU1dnot change its position.Comox Radar... ­CANADIAN RADAREarly in 1959, ReAF ADC changed the

BEQRiT....~................................................~.1. 'lf7~-role ot its radar at Comox , C-35, from a direction centerto a cap filler. Then on 18 June 1959, NorthernNORAD Region asked HORAD's permission to drop the capfiller role and cive the Comox radar the mission of approachcontrol and recovery. NNR said that Comox didnot provide low altitude coverage of sufficient qualityto warrant continuing this function.On 7 July 1559, NORAD approved the cbange. However,HORAD said that a capability had to be maintainedat Comox to provide low altitude coverage.CADIH Gap Fillers for Nike Defenses, Upon reviewingits surveillance requirements for Hike defenses,ARADCOM had found that there was insufficient low-altitudecoverage around the Loring and the Niagara-Buffalodefenses. ARADCOU had proposed deploying ANiFPS-36'sto these areas. NORAD had first approved this and thenlater rescinded its approval. NORAD proposed insteadthat there be a speed-up in the installation of certaingap fillers programmed for Canada under the ContinentalAir Defense Integration North program (see Chapter Five),(, i'liIch could provide coverage for these areas,On 27 April 1959, NORAD asked USAF ADC to establisha high priority for four CADIH gap fillers which, currently,were not to come in until 1!:62. The sites were:P-20F, London, Ontario; C-4-C, Brampton. Ontario; C-5-C,Mt Carleton, New Brunswick; and C-6-D, Les Etroits.Quebec.ADC requested the Air Defense Systems IntegrationDivision to make a study of the program, covering cost,construction time, and availability of equipment.RCAF, which bad been informed of the NORAD proposal,replied on 28 May lSS9 tbat the CADIN gap filler schedulewas based on the assumption. agreed to at an ADSID meetingon 16 April 1959, tbat gap fillers would not be requiredin any environment other than the Super CombatCenter complex. RCAF said it would walt for the ADSIDstudy initiated by USAi' ADC before giving a f:lnal answerto the HORAD proposal.@E!CRtr•

- _.... ­-- - j ••..~...................... :!J.~(::~.......~.j. ................•..•....................•...........••...MORAD REQUlREIIBNT FOR OVER-THE-HORIZON RADAR, NORAD had included a requirement for a long-range,land-based, over-the-horizon radar to extend the contiguousground environment outward from the peripheryof the main North American target areas in its requirementsplan, North American Air Defense Objectives 59-69(NADO 59-69). On 12 March 1959, NORAD re-emphasizedits requirement for such a radar to the JCS and advisedof NORAD's interest in equipment under development bythe Naval Research Laboratories. This was Project MADRE(Magnetic Drum Radar Equipment).NORAD said that although MADRE would not have theprecise data capability for employing BOUARC, as woulda follow-on AEW&C aircraft, it would provide informationof sufficient accuracy to permit employment of theF-I08 interceptor at its maximum range and also providea significant increase to the depth of the combat zone.NORAD added that the alternntive to MADRE was more AEW&rCaircraft which would cost more than the MADRE project.NORAD recommended that sufficient funds be provided todetermine the capabilities of MADRE.On 16 April 1959, the CNO advised NORAD that fundshad been requested to complete devE:'lopment of ProjectMADRE prototype equipment.NIKE HERCULES IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMDepartment of the Army wanted certain improvementsin the basic Hike Hercules 8ye.tem. These included: (1)a new, long-range, high-powered ~band acquiSition radar(BIPAR)j (2) a Dew Ku-band, range-only radar; (3) improvementsto the target tracking radar to give increasedcapability against small targE:'TS; and (4) changes inthe operating cOD801e$,The improvements were expected to provide the Herculessystem with a capability againe-:t small, high-speedtargets of the Rascal and Hound Dog type and to enablethe Hercules to work in I:) "heavy"' ECM environment. TheLC

·~E .~.. eRF' ............. ..c;...................................................w,.t •, DA~II ........................ II .............. .......................... . improvements were to be provided in retrofit improvementkits.When asked by DA for recommendations on Fte minimum.number of improvement kits needed, ARADCOM statedthat it wanted 79 complete kits, 17 kits less theHIPAR, and sufficient communications: for the latter 17so that they could receive HIPAR datA,CONAD would not concur in the ARADCOII requirementsbecause of reservations it held on potential mutualradar interference of the HIPAR with the Air Force FrequencyDiversity (PO) program and on the quantitiesproposed. CONAD stated that it was in favor of improvingthe Hercules, but it felt that much of the improvementcould be met within tht': approved FD program. further,it felt that any requl~ement fo)' Army BIPAR radarsshould be determined onl Y fafter leI 81te-by-si tesurvey to show just where the FD proglam would not meetthe Hercules surveillanCe requlrement~. This positionwas forwarded to the JCS and DA l.n thE· la t ter part of1958.replied that it felt that the duplication andinterference problems brought up by rONAD w~r~ over-emphasized.I t agreed, however', lha t a need exis ted fora detailed site survey ttl d.... ternanE n,·quirE;ments, WSEGwas directed by OBD to IS tudy the ques. t l':)J1S of interferencebetween the Army UIPAR a.nd the A.i r Force FD programand the .feas1bi 1. i t.y

SE8R•• ~~1...~......·........·......·..·..·....·..........·..·W.·I·t ......... "'""' ___ '.~-. 'fI ...•.........•.•..•..•...•..••..••.••..••.•..•..........•..statement of requIrements for the Improvement kIts.This new list proposed kits for batteries around 22 SACbases, adding 44 kits. The ARAOCOM requirement, forwardedto HORAD on 4 March 1959, was for kits for atotal of 140 batteries. Of these, it wanted 97 complete(BIPAR included) kits and 43 partial kits. For FY 1960procurement, it wanted 36 of the 97 complete kits.,On 17 March 1959, HORAD forwarded the ARADCOM listto the JCS stating that it would not concur in the specificnumber of kits proposed or the battery sites tobe modified. HORAD said it would not commit itself tothe program until a site-by-site study was conducted.NORAD recommended that: (1) DA initiate productionof the improvement kits with funds programmed inthe Army FY 1960 budget; (2) a competent agency underthe control of, or contracted by, the DOD conduct asite-by-site study; (3) the long-term total number ofkits required and the spacific batteries to receivecomplete kits be determined as a result of the site-bysitestudy; and (4) [1';' diversion or reduction of fundsbe made from the alr"ady approved Ail' Force FD radarprogram.ADC would not coordinate on NORAD's position. Itcontended that NORAD had assigned it the responsibilityfor providing the primary electronic environment forthe air defense system and that a more thorough and cautiousconsideration of the improvemenc program was needed,ADC asked that NORAD consider all aspects of theprogram, rather than limited technical features.On 20 April 1959, WSEG published a second report onacquisition radar requirements for the improved Herculessystem. It repeated that no signific~nt problems of mutualinterference between HIPAR?!-l and FD radars wouldresult from any practical deplo)'lIlent ~f the radars. Itrecommended that a feasibility study be conducted for remotingcorrected acquisition data to the Nike batteriesby modifying the existing system and that other equipmentfor remotingl_be investigated.l.lr;\!~~~~"'."""""""""'IJi.•M.Nin{C46.' ..~

___ ~EGRli.;···~..··..·....···..···..··..·..·..·..··..··....·..·W.·I·On 12 May 1959, the JCS directed CINCNORAD to conducta joint site-by-site survey of Nike Hercules fireunits to determine the total number of improvementkits required and the specific batter~es to be improved.HORAn in turn directed AnC and ARADCOM to appointrepresentatives to a study group to participate in thesite evaluations. The first meeting was set for 31July 1959." PROPOSED RELOCATION OF AEW AIRSHIP SQCADRONOn 2 February 1959, BRR proposed to NORAD the relocationof the Navy's Airship Airborne Early WarningSquadron One (ZW-l) from Lakehurst, New Jersey, toGlynco, Naval Air Station, Georgia. It pointed outthat the ZW-l, in operating from Lakehurst, was locatedsome 400 miles from the primary airborne contiguousstations and could not be used to man any of these.Instead, ZW-I was mann1.ng, on alternate days, a stationinside of the picket barrier which was part of theemergency stations to be manned only upon the declarationof a Maximum Readiness (Air Defense Emergency)condition. ENR proposed that ZW-I man a station justsouth of the picket lioe. This statton was about 250miles out from Glynco.NORAD replied that movement to Glynco did not appearto be a valid operational requirement because inall probability Sentinel aircraft when reequipped withnewer radar would cover the propoeo:ed airship stationand require further relocation.ERR felt that the move could be justified. It pointedout that of all the deployment concepts that had beenseriously conSidered, none had indicated a need for theairship station at Lakehurst. BNR concluded that therewas a valid operational. requirement to move the squadronto Glynco to provide coverage for th~ 32d Division areaand that such coverage would be used at least throughthe period 1959-1963.On 19 May 1959, at a seaward extension conferenceheld at Headquarters NORAD to examine the numerous-

§it'R' [ .~~.J.., ..................................................W-.J. ----..... ..........................................................." _.. -- ""I.' I, ,problems, it was proposed that two ot ENR's picketships be moved to Western NORAD Region. NORAD proposedsubstituting the airship squadron for the picket vessels.The factors favoring this proposal were (1) theexisting airship station provided radar coverage thatwas duplicated by other facilities; (2) overcrowded conditionsat Lakehurst would require either new constructionthere Dr movement to some other location; (3) theSan Diego area offered a more suitable environment forairship operations; and (4) the CNO decision on whetherto deploy airships or picket vessels would be basedmainly on the costs involved.On 30 June 1959, NORAD told ENR that war-gaming exercisesconducted at NORAD Headquarters indicated a lackof off-shore radar coverage trom Los Angeles southward.And on 14 July, NORAD asked the CNO to consider movingthe airships, based on the factors discussed at the 19llay conference.WESTERN DBW EXTENSION AND THE PACIFIC BARRIERPacific Barrier. The extension of early warningcoverage in the Pacific was based on a plan that calledfor land-based radars along the Aleuti.an Chain fromNaknek to Umnak and with a sea barrier of WV-2 aircraftand DER's from Umnak to Midway Island.On 31 December 1958, the sea barrier was operatingin a so-called "Bent Line" rather than directly betweenMidway and Umnak. This deployment was being used becausethe Aleutian land-based radars were not operatingand some method was needed to cover the exposed area.On 5 April 1959, NORAD was informed that the barrierforce had been reorientQd effective OOOlZ 1 April1959 between Midway and Umnak. The line between the .bolocations covered some 2,840 miles. There were five DIRstations along the line, each with a circle one-hundredmiles in radius. Within each station was a circularpatrol area thirty miles in radius. The ships were toleave Pearl Harbor and proceed to the northernmost station.Then at stated times, they were to work their waye!eRF pr

S!!6RET 7 ...-.....·~·..···...........·....................··......·~·I· down the line to each succeeding statiun from nOl'th tosouth and finally leave the southernmost st~tion forPearl Barbor. The alrcraft operated fl~Odl Midway andflew the 2,840 mile t!"~(;k in approxl.If!.ately 141 hours.The Aleutian Chain. On 5 .Janua.ry 1959, the Aleutianland-b~sed segment ce::&Bn limited operE. tto;ns. Itwas manned and operated at that time prim~rily by personnelof Western Electri.~ Corporation. Our'ing themonths of January, Febr~sry, and March, Air Force personnelwere gradually br~ught in and R~sum~d controlof the line., Tbe land-b~sed s~~gnt~nt had a total of sixAN/FP8-l9 radar stations between Nikol~kl on the westand King Sa lmon oc. i;ha t;!t?G'+;. Thj s ~.,:,".:,d included oneMain station at Cold BH,- :>md five l~te;~al ~uxl1iarystations (Driftwood &~., S~..ri-.::htd', Nikcolsl'.i, Port Moller,and Port Beide~).On 2 April, AAG ln~·orrued. NORAD t.:'n1: the AleutianSegment began full O}.lF.!~:":.i t;1f;ns within t'le Alaskan NORADRegion as of OOOlZ, 3. .Ap1, .. 1 1959.PROPOSAt, Til AB.l\NDON THE SEA BARRIERSIn Septembel· 19~, 1;h~ .-:-(!8 ask.:/d C:r.S('!ONAD, CINC­LiNT, CINCPAC and WS~I:, t.t) (:omruent on a prcposal for improvingthe earLY w2..('':''irag ::;ys t;~m with ;),:,rticular emphasison abandon:l.ng· th(';· s;"'~·"·)H'd f!x+:'.-;!.n~j,o:ns (If the D:3WLine and using th~ r...,lS!OUl.·(f';:o:: HI thf'! (' .., '.ttguous system.CONAD had repl:!.'d f::..... ~: l; it W:'::S tn [~. vor of redeployingthe b.1I'rie~ 1· ... ".": ;'1 1;0 :i''J.~m.;.mt t;·t::B (:.0Dtiguoussystem. It' fel t th:~..:t d::.s"'.::;nt f~'a.r j ....,. 'i/.>i CJ::;ing againstmanned bombers W0ulct r.t!G0m." It::lsS iun)'»)< '::

~.. -'" __ .I~ 6fIII!II/II-.,;":.~~~.~~?:....·W-·I ~..~...;................. ••• 4i .............................................." ••••••••••redeployinl the seaward extensions. They stated thatthere would continue to be a requirement for distantearly warninl of manned bombers at least for the "foreseeablefuture."CD 4 May 1959, the JCS informed CONAn that it hadbeen decided that: (1) the seaward barriers would notbe reoriented into the contiguous radar coverage natthis time," (2) when the Greenland-Iceland-United ICingdomline became operational the requirement for maintainingthe Argentia-Azores barrier would be re-evaluated;and (3) improvement and new developments recommendedin the baSic study would be incorporated intothe early warning systems as feasible.(, - -..---.~•

,......­W~·,f. 'J..................... ,. ..,..... ........................ .... ... "~I~..... tCHAPTER 5IORAD Weapon Force STATUSOn I July 1959, there were available to NORAD, 68fighter-interceptor squadrons, 256 Nike missile batteries,and six 75mm Skysweeper batteries. In addition,there was an augmentation force that consisted of 117aircraft squadrons, or their equivalents, with 2,665aircraft,and aircraft of six training wings (three ownedby ATe and three by TAC) possessing 965 aircraft.TABLE 2THE WEAPONS STRUCTURE - 1 JULY 1959, INTERCEPl'ORSNUMBER OF UNITS 26 Sqdns4 Sqdns4 Sqdns11 Sqdns7 Sqdns9 Sqdns2 Sqdns1 Sqdn1 SqdnI Sqdn1 Sqdn1 Sqdn88 sqQns TOTALEQUIPMENT F-I02AF-lOIBF-I04A/BF-89JF-86LCF-I00F-I06A(F-I02A)F-IOIB(F-89J)F-IOIB(F-86L)F-I06A(F-86L)F-89J(F-89U)1'-4DIlISSILES/GUNS202 BatteriesNike Ajax54 Batteries Nike Hercules258 TOTAL------ ---.,

..............•.........•........•..••••••••..••..••.......MISSILES/GUNS NUMBER OF UNITSEQUIPMENT6 Batteries 75mm guns(Skysweeper)TABLE 3 AUGMENTATION FORCE -17 JUNE 1959 OWNING AGENCY NUMBER OF UNITS EQUIPMENTANG 65 Sqdns F-84FF-86A/D/E/F/H/LF-89B/HF-lOOA/FF-94CNavy/Marine Corps29 Sqdns(Approximate)F-4D-lF3H-2FaU/lFllFFJIsF9FTAC22 Sqdns(Tacticalfighters)F-IOOC/D/FF-l05BF-86FF-84FRCAF ADC 1 Sqdn F-86 SabreATC3 Wings(Trainingaircraft)F-86LF-89DTAC3 Wings(Trainingaircraft)F-IOOA/C/D/FF-86F F-84FREGULAR FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR FORCEUSAF ADC. As of 31 December 1958, USAF ADC had 60fighter-interceptor squadrons. Four of these were&E8RF!T

.... ~S'pe:4 ..... .,...................................................W,·I·••••...•..•....•...••••..••....•.. .....,...... ~ ,........•••inactivated by or on I July 1959, leaving 56, One ofthe remaining squadrons was more like an augmentationun!t than a part of the regular force, however. It \'I8Snot standing alert and was available only for emergencies.This was the 49th FIS at L. G. Hanscom Field,Massachusetts, which, at USAF's direction, was supportingan A~Lincoln Laboratory project and was carriedin the ACC inventory as an overage.The peculiar status of this squadron and the inactivationof two others was related to a USAF-directedbudget cut in ADC funds. ADC had set a requirement for463 million dollars in its FY-1960 O&M Financial Plan.USAF had directed a reduction to 409 millions. As oneof the ways to meet this ceiling, ADC proposed inactivatingcertain F-86L squadrons. On 22 May 1959, USAFapproved the inactivation of three: the 49th; the 85that Scott AFB, Illinois; and the 330th at Stewart AFB,New York. ADC then asked NOHAD to lift the alert requirementfrom these squadrons as of .[ June 1959. NOHAnapproved this request on 29 May.On 1 July 1959, two of the three squadrons -- the85tb and the 330th were inactivated. The 49th wasleft as an overage in the ADC inventory, as noted abovaTwo other squadrons were inac:tivated also in separateactions. One, the 484th at K. I. Sawyer Airport,Michigan. wn..:l.nactlvated on 16 February 1959. Theother, the 518th at Kingsley Field, ~egon, was inactivatedon 1 July 1959. Neither bad crews or aircraft atthe time of their inactivation.RCAF ADO Program. Until late 1958, the RCAF badbeen plannIng to replaee its CF-IOO's with an aircraftbeing developed -- the CF-I05 "Arrow." On 23 September1958, Canada's Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker', announcedthat Canada would not put the CF-l05 into production.It would continue the development program untilabout March 1959, at which time the program wouldbe reviewed and a f1n~1 decision made.On 20 February 1959, the Prime Mlnister announcedto the House of Commons that the government had carefully(., ~ •

--· ~E8RFr ~~............. ··~··....···..···......·..··..··.................···W.·I· .........•...••.•....•...•.•.......•..•.••••.•.....••....• , Inexamined and re-examined the probable need for the CF­105 and had decided that development should be "terminatednow.·t He stated further that formal notice oftermination was being given to the contractors. Betold the Commons that the government had made no decisionto acquire other aircraft to rep1~ce the CF-IOOwhich was still considered an effective weapon againstthe manned bomber threat. He stated, however, thatvarious alternatives for improving Canadian defenseswere under stUdy.*Alaskan Program. In 1958, Commander-in-Chief, Alaska,learned that USAF planned to replace the AlaskanF-89J squadron (the 449th) with r-lOlB' s in FY-1962.The remaining Alaskan squadron, the 317th, would keepits F-l02A's. CINCAL did not like the program and proposedthat both squadron8 be re-equipped with F-l06Aaircraft in FY-1962. By having one t}pe aircraft, supportand training would be simplified. USAF would notagree to this proposal, however.July 1958, CINCAL learned that: F-l01B's wouldbe available earlier, by the fvurth quarter of FY-19Sl,than expected. CINCAL then asked USAF to consider anew proposal. He pointed out that hifol mfiin concern wasobtaining two squadrons ·:)f the same type aircraft havingan atomic capability at; t;he earllest possible date.He stated that his orlgin~l choice Qf the F-IOSA overthe F-I018 had been b&sed 'lD What he eonsidered superiorperformance and the (:omp::.lrative availability of bothtypes of aircraft. However, be~ause he had found thatthe availability date of the F-lOIB had be~n improved,he wanted USAF to r€placl:! the F,·89':;'s with F-IOlB's duringthe fourth quarter of FY-1959, or as soon thereafteras possible, and convert Pte F·-102A squadron to F-IOlB'sthe following quarter. Howeve!:-, ht-) asked tbat be begiven F-lOSA's if the 1'·-I('''lBr ..~ -Jic:!'i: Dot; avai.lable at thetime wanted.* See the CADIN Program, this chQpter.,._____••~.Q_R....__~ S[li___:_ 1=_.I_W[ 54 ~--.I---_.

~ e ~J.. .t.. '."~"I::)":..t ~ULV 19159NORAD....... III~~.~/:t~ .... ! .... ;L~ ...,."., dJ.....~~

~.\.'.'~q":r.......x:........:~:.~ / '( ~~I~ V(,,) ~ p ~... .",,"->' ....\ / ( • --il -­ ~ v ct;;;/.. ~;.NORAD OPERATIONl.:' MISSILE /OUN FORCE 1 .JULY 1959i NIICE 8AlTAlKWS~ NIIMBER a: BATTALKWS!GtJI 8AlTAlOlS..lIMBER a: BATTALlCNS!lRAVISSAN FRANCISCOklOS ANGElES,..... -l ~.. ~. .{-­ . \.. /~7.... \ ~ .. .., v "'\ """" -~I ~, ! ~~'-- -!­ t •! ~ -T­ .:. IJ\_~; ! II , tj \ I I\ i \. I(" .......U i \~\1~ :-'J-·---T-l_-\"~..-­FAIRCHILO \-1'\ I \) \\........,.. t L----l-~--1i -,_ _ ,ElLSWORtriC-­.iJ, I~-I I, \oJ 1_ ,,- ~ I I :!~ I I{\ ' r----; _­, " i Ir--\ , I I-~-, "';----t- I _-.....1.­\ I I ----1=--=1­I I I" I 1 '1­'·.~.lr\J _ ')I I '--..-l".~ "'-f '\.:..~.. .... ....0\ '.. '" .. _:t:1 ....,., J)..., V~'

,..•.•................., .•.••............•........• ,........ Air Force replied that a squadron of F-lOlB's ~arrive in the first quarter of FY-1961 and that the UEstrength would be only 18 aircraft. A second squadronof F-lOlB's, to replace the F-102A squadron, could notbe provided. But USAF planned to provide the F-I02Asquadron with a GA~ll atomic capability by the fourthquarter of lY-1961.On 11 lfarch 1959, CONAD asked USAF for current programmingdata. USAF replied that 18 F-lOlB's would besent to Ladd AFB beginning the fourth quarter of lY-lS60.In June 1959, CINCAL approached HORAD with a newidea on his aircraft program. He wanted to know howHORAn felt about F-I02 modifications, such as improvedengines, slotted wings, and providing additional internalfuel. These modifications, CINeAL continued, plusthose already programmed (i.e., extended range radar andmissile bay modernization to accommodate the atomic capableGAR-II) would satisfy Alaskan interceptor requirementsthrough FY-1964, if augmentation to the plannedF-lOlB squadron was not approved.HORAn replied that an evaluation of the F-102 modernizationprogram would be required befere NORAD committeditself. USAF ADC, i t

••••••••••••••••••1i,.iIL SteREr..••.....••••...•....................... ~ .....•....•... • ••••• to .............. •••••••••••••••••••• ,,On 31 December 1958, 236 of the 245 batteries wereKike Ajax units. The other nine were Hercules, eightof wbich were in the continental U. S. and one was atThule, Greenland. The 256 total on 1 July 1959 included54 Hercules units or a gain of 45 Hercules batteries.Bleven of the 45 batteries were new units: three atThule and eight in Alaska (see below). The remaining34 were converted Ajax units.Another change made to the Nike force during thefirst six months of 1959 was in manning of Ajax batteriesby National Guard personnel. By 31 December 1958,only one. National Guard unit -- thB 720th -- had assumedits role in the active defense. This unit had as­Bumed an operational mission in the Los Angeles defenseon 12 September 1958. On 24 June 1959, an additionaltwo National Guard ba.ttalions assumed an operationalrole. On this date, the 2nd and 3d ~lttalions of the205th Artillery, begsn operating two Ajax batterieseach (the equivalent of one battalion: .tn the Seattledefense.On 31 December 1958, there were also five operationalgun battalions~ two in Alaska (120mm.), two inthe U. S. (75mm) I and ,,)rl.e ~90mm) in GreenlAnd. By IJuly 1959, three of thesf:> ffun bd.ttd~;,>nS had been inactivatedleaving only t.~·o npel·ati,.>n~l SkYE'weeper (75mm)units. One was at Sault Ste :M.tiJ'ie, t.he other atSavannah River.Greenland. ARADCOM had kept four 90mm. gun batteries(one batt.alion) at Thule to augment the 4th MissileBattalion (Nike Herculefl':;, 55t:'! Ari' ..i.Uery, during thetransition from guns to fll.i.~sill:·s. As of 31 December1958, only one of the f()u:r,' lie:,C'cules b .. !~terle8 -- "B" -­was operational.A second Nike ba";';tex'7 {ItA"~} becalTi-i: operational on5 January 1959. These t'WQ wer·,,: f·.>] Ivwed by "D" and "e"batteries on 7 and 9 February rE"spectively. On 2811arch1959, the guns were ins,ctivated.Alaskan Hercules ~~fense. On 31 December 1958,8!el"!d i..... ~, -'I'. lib-,MElli

~scp~......~.................................................w..t ~, ALASKANAlaska had two 120mm gun battalions (less one battery)operating in its defenses. Both battalions were to bereplaced by Nike Hercules units. TO prepare for thearrival ot the Nike unit, USARAL relieved one batteryot the 96th Gun Battalion in the Elmendorf defense fromita active defense mission on 30 September 1958. Thebattery was to be used in preparing the Nike sites inthe Elmendorf area.Nine Hercules batteries were programmed -- four forIlmendorf and five for Eielson. The units, with the exceptionof the fifth battery for lielson, were expectedto become operational by June 1959. This schedule wasmet. light of the nine had become operational by Juneand the two gun battalions had been inactivated. Thefifth battery planned for the Eielson area was expectedto become operational in Karch 1960.SITE NO/NAME6W/Point WestTABLE 4HERCULESELMENDORF AREA (4th Missile Battalion, 43 Artillery) BATTERY"A"-One half of adouble batteryOPERATIONALDATi1800Z f12 Kar 19596S/Point South "A"-Second half of 0300Z, 10 Apr 1959the double battery90/Bay "e" 2000Z, 16 Apr 195915/Summit "D" 2300Z, 6 May 1959EIELSON AREA (2nd Missile Battalion, 562d Artillery) 24/Tare II AU 11800Z, 10 May 1959se!8P1fiirC-...II..& ..~NiIW~~Rh{ 59 ]'>'l'f, .• ~. " ··~f~¥AiIiI"'iJiIMiI'Ii_.IL ... II J ! I'll;

~E6R~1, , f.......~' - W" ........................................................ ·.. 1 t· •.........•.......................•••.•.•••.....•.•........EIELSON AREA (2nd Missile Battalion, 562d Artillery) SITE NO/NAME BATl'ERY OPERATIONAL DATE2l/Jig "D" IBOOZ, 11 lIay 195923/Peter " B" IBOOZ, 27 May 195922/11ike "c" l800Z, 3 Jun 1959, On 15 March 1959, the l20mm gun batteries in theElmendorf area were declared non-operational and beganturning in their guns and equipment. This had been completedby 11 April 1959. The 120mm guns in the Eielsonarea were declared non-operational on 11 May 1959, thesame date that the first Hercules unit became operational.AUGMENTATION FORCESOn 5 February 1959, NORAD directed the regions toreview the capabilities, roles and mission of all designatedaugmentation forces to determine futUre requirements.}fORAD stated that after the review was completed,it would prepare an augmentation operations plan.NORAD told the regions to place the augmentationforces into one of three categories and outlined detailedcriteria for each. In general, these criteria werethat Category 1 units had to (1) meet the altitude,range and armament requirements of the Regular air defenseforces, (2) be capable of reacting and assumingdefense poSitions the same as the Regular force, and (3)have enough trained personnel available to maintainsustained 24-hour operation. Category II units werethose which were not quite eligible for Category I, butstill did not fall into the criteria of Category III.Units failing to qualify as either Category I or lIwereplaced automatically in CQ,~gory III and were not to beaSSigned an air defense augmentation mission.,;!feHi:1•

--~t\ __~MR&T, ......................................................w.. ......~........................................•........•.•.......Units were category III if (1) they were so dispersedthat they could not assume a defense positionuntil D plus 4 hours after mobilization, (2) they couldnot maintain 24-hour operations because of insufficienttrained personnel, (3) ammunition storage facilities orammunition was not available, and (4) due to location,type of equipment, or level of proficiency of its members,the unit might impede air defense operations.,ShortlyReview results were furnished NORAD by April 1959.However, the reviews were incomplete in that the regionsfailed to consider all designated augmentation forceswhile making the survey. The r~views pointed up onefact. The regions wanted to keep as many of the augmentationforces in categories I and II (i.e., to be retained)as possible. Of all the aircraft units considered,only six were recommended tor removal from theforce structure (i.e., Category III). Also recommendedfor removal were seven radar squadrons/units and onemissile battalion.·after the review was finished, NORAD forwardedits proposed operation plan to the regions andcomponents for their comments. The regions were toldto check the force annexes Uipvelop( d fr.om their reviews)and to classify intercepto:: •.:.).1 is a~ either "Readytt(i.e., those that could be (:;!ffectivt'ly controlled) or"Back-up." NORAD stated that in dec'iding which classificationto use, the regions should follow criteria similiarto that laid down for theil- reviews. In addition,they were given the add!tional crtteria that (1) tIlewar would be of short duration (24-43 hours), (2) thenumber of augmentation fighters that could be used effectivelyin the time period specified had to be basedon the control capability within an area, and (3) thenumber of augmentation fi~hters list~d in the annexesfar exceeded the number that cotlld b~ properly used.• It was pOSSible, however, that this missile battalionwould be placed in category I, This depended uponapproval of a plan for its use._. .

--~.l...~..................... ~~~.~§I..····W.l ........................................................... Reception of the plan varied. ADC was of the opinionthat the plan was a duplication of its efforts. Itstated that it felt that detailed planning for the preparationand support of augmentation forces should be acomponent task. ALCOY concurred in the pl~n. ARADCOKsuggested minor changes but in general approved the plan.NAVFORCONAD re-wrote ~l.e section pertaining to itsforces. On 30 June l"a5';;, t.he phIl was still being workedon.Meanwhile, NORAD consolidated CH" egion reviewsmentioned above and on I June 1959 ~eDI each componentcommand a copy of the applicable f"Jn~eb recommended forretention and/or removal. NORAD directed each of thecomponents to take appropriate action to retain thoseunits shown as Category I and II and to remove CategoryIII units from an air defense augmentation role.NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN AIR DEFENSE" In December 1958, CINCNORAD had wY'ltten the Chairmanof the JCS that he was concerned witn the trend towardusing National Guard rather than Regular units toman first line air defense weapon£:!. Ht:· noted that DAwas starting to man t.ht'! Nike Aj elK wi th N.a tiondl Guardpersonnel. Also, he had l~i:U'n~d tha t there was considerationof using Guard personnel to man BOMARC, Hercules,and Hawk units. He urged tha t immedi.&> , ~. action be takento establish the policy thAt the equipping, manning, andoperation of North Amer ican H ir def~n(o~d units needed Oila full-time basis bt:' made a~"t..·gpon=ibi iily ot Em Regularmilitary establi5Mien: djJ t.hat National Guardunltsbe used as augmentation f.j:'eE;s only.On 11 April 1959, Gener;!l P~r-tridge sent memorandumsto the USAF ADC and ARADCOM CDlnmanjeI's asking themto try to establish hj~ policy with theu' Service Chiefs.On this same date, General Partri.dge also wroteGeneral Thomas D. White. USAF Chief of Staff, of hisconcern about turning over BOMARC to the Air NationalGuard. He said that experience in the air defense system6E8R!if ­,

·............................................................ . .- -. ~ -- -.... "." . *" ­L, indicated that operations were so complicated that eventhose people working full-time had t.remendous difficultyin keeping their squadrons fully ready. He believedit was wishful thinking to expect ANG units, which hadless time to devote to training and operations, to beas good as the regular squadrons. He felt that any planto convert surface-to-air missile units from Regularmanning to Guard manning constituted ~ reduction inforce.On 5 May 1959, General.White replied that, from astrictly operat10nal viewpoint, he tlgl'eed that it wasdesirable to have the air defense for('es equipped andoperated by the Regular Services. However, other aspectsof the problem had to be considered. He pointedout that Congress and the President expected the Reservesto perform a usefu:~ and active role in U. S. defense.Also, he could not overlook po~sible use of theGuard resources to meE;t Aome of thE: i.n(~reased demandson Air Force resources.In view of these fact~rs, General White stated thathe had directed a "pilot?! operation of .I':l BOMARC unit bythe ANG. FUrther us

~EGPr:t~(,..................•..................................... ...................•.....•..•........•••..•••••••....••••.,made until the results were evaluated. The U. S. Services,they stated, would continue to meet CINCNORAD'sreadiness objectives as practicable with existing U. S.national and service procedures.The matter did not end with the JCS answer, however.On 2 July, General Partridge wrote directly toMr. Heil McBlroy, Secretary of Defense. He pointed outthat he was opposed to turning over first line weaponsto Guard units and had presented his views to the Chai~man of the JCS and USAF's Chief of Staff. ARADCOM andADC, he continued, had voiced their objections to theirService chiefs also. Still, plans were proceeding toturn BOMARC over to the ANG, and the Army program formanning Ajax units by the Guard continued. He concluded,"It is my firm recommendation that a Department ofDefense policy be established clearly assigning to theRegular military establishment, responsibility for themanning and operation of all first line air defenseweapons. Any Army and Air Force National Guard unitshaving an air defense capabiU.ty must be clearly establishedand considered only as augmenta tion forces."CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE INTEGRATION NORTHOn 5 January 1959 t USAF informed NORAD that theGovernments of the U. S. and Canada had agreed in principleto a cost sharing arrangement for a joint air defenseprogram in Canada. This program was to providetwo thirty-missile BOMARC squadrons, seven heavy radars(two in the Ottawa-North Bay area and five in the Pinetreesystem), a SAGE Sec/DC in the Ottawa area, and 45gap fillers (12 in the Ottawa~North Bay area and 33 inthe Pinetree system). Canada was to be responsible forall construction and unit (TO&E) equipment, the U. S.for all technical equipment. The breakdown of capitalcost was two-thirds U. S., one-third Canada. The RCAFwas to man and operate the seven heavy radars and theSAGE and BOKARC units. USAF said that it and the RCAFhad agreed to the formation of a joint task group tostudy the various activities involved in implementingthe program (which became known as the Continental AirDefense Integration, North (CADIN) program).• \- 1.

(, On 11 March 1959, USAF directed, with RCAF concurrenoe"theAir Defense Systems Integration Division, inconjunction with RCAP and other USAF agencies, to writea master integration schedule for funding and implemen~ing CADIN. Tbe ADSID document was published on 19 Kay1959.ADSID (and the other preparing agencies) concludedthat it would be impossible to finish systems testingof the SAGE SCC before 1 July 1963. However, it wouldbe possible for RCAF personnel to man the SCC at the beginningof the systems testing late in 1962. If anemergency arose before the end of the testing, whateverair defense capability that existed at the time couldbBused.It was concluded that it was not advisable to establishan interim direction center at tbe Ottawa SectorSCC (which was to be located at North Bay, Ontario) foruse until the sec became operational. ADSID recommendedthat the &OHARC bases of LaMacaza and North Bay becomeoperational on 1 February and 1 March 1962. To controlthe BOMARC before the SCC became operational, ADSID recommendedextending the areas of adjacent U. S. SAGE sectors.To control manned interceptors until the SOC becameoperational, ADSID recommended continued use of theCanadian manual system.On 13 July 1959, a new CADIN document, approved byUSAF and RCAF and containing essentially all of theADSID, conclusions and recommendations, was issued as an RCAF­USAF CADIN Integration Program. All 'actions in the documentwere said to be directive in nature.The plan provided that RCAF would be responsiblefor constructing the Oth.wa sec bu ilding and for insuringa beneficial occupancy dat~ of 15 September 1961.The AN/FSQ-7A computer would be installed by IBM and bylate 1962 RCAF personnel would man the SCC under the directionof the responsible test agencies. The sec wasscheduled to become fully operational on 1 July 1963.The dates set for the BOMARe bases to become

..~..·......~fid8El'--·..·..·....·..·..·........·..·..··i.._. ,.....··W.·I· ......~ ...•.....•.....•••.......••.••••.•..•....,..,.,.....,, operational remained at 1 February 1962 for LaMacazaand 1 larch 1962 for North Bay. Until the Ottawa SCCbecame operational, the missile bases would be placedunder SAGB control by expanding the U. S. SAGE sectorMode I boundaries of Sault Ste Marie, Syracuse, andBangor to cover the major portion of the Ottawa ADS.The missile bases would be tied into the Syracuse DCand a cross-tell link added between Syracuse and SaultSte Marie to provide a handover capability. Surveillanceand communications coverage of all three U. S.sectors would be tied into appropriate Canadian radarand radio sites. Mode II capability would remain essentiallythe same except that Syracuse would not beexpanded into the Washington ADS and its display areawould be extended further northward.The first of the new seven heavy radars was scheduledto become operational in September 1962; all sevenwere to be operational by March 1963. The first of thegap fillers was scheduled for operations in April 1962,the last by December 1962. Schedules were also establishedfor tying into SAGE 32 heavy radars (25 existingand the seven programmed) &nd the 45 gap fillers and 32ground-to-air radio sites. The cost of the CADIN Programwas figured at $440.088 millions; $304.607 millionsbeing USAF's share, $135.481 millions RCAF~s share.sa CUSJillli .1 J11 ....~ 66 .]wIiParllU!fl

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..... ,. ............ "' ..................... ,. ..................c( ... r~.~~ plllSurface-to-Air Weapons Alert. The alert requirementsfor surface-to-air weapons fire units remained thesame, with one exception, as stipulated in NORAD Regulation55-3 -- 25 per cent on 15 minutes and 75 per centon three hours under Normal Readiness conditions.· Theone exception was a lowering of the requirement on 28January 1959 for 75mm gun un!ts to on(~-third on 30 minutesand two-thirds on three hours.However, a change was under consideration to increasethe alert for surface-to-air weapons. EasternNORAD Region proposed a change in March 1959 to bringthe requirement for the latter more in line with the requirementfor interceptorA. On 6 April, NORAD askedARADCOM to comment on a st.udy reade of increasing alertrequirements. NORAD said it wi:lnted to keep the Herculesfire units on a state of alert that would make theirIL\II• Increased Readiness conditions required increasedalert for all force~, see NORADR 55-3, 3 November 1958.- .b9RE,. q,

SE9n:li-.-. ~.,.........:..:......................................w..f.............UNCtASSIF~U· ..·······.. ·· capability available in a minimum of time in an emergency_ARADCOM opposed an increase and wanted to drop the15 a1nute requirement to one hour for Normal Readinessconditions. This would, ARADCOK felt, offer optimumtraining and maintenance opportunities consistent withthe threat and tactical mission.The subject was being staffed at NORAD at mid-yea~NORAD's Alert Force. On 30 June 1959, the followingforces were on alert at OOOlZ., TABLE 5FORCEALERT5-min IS-min 30-min l-hr 3-hr TotalInterceptors 134 8 24 184 657 1007lIissile FireUnits 1 66 -- 2 161 230Gun FireUnits·3 22 6 --- 56 87• Includes NavyATOMIC EMPLOYMENT IIATl'ERSArming and Scrambling MB-I Equipped Aircraft in Al­ It'aska. In February 1959, the Jea took exception to a P~'AAU directive (NORADR 55-3, dated 3 November 1958) that provided for arming and scrambling nuclear-equipped aircraft in Alaska during a condition of Increased Read­iness. The JCS informed NORAD that nuclear-capable air­craft would not be scrambled anywhere except during Air Defense Readiness or a higher condition of readiness. "db'ALCOM objected to this restriction, stating that :itwould impose such a delay on the use of MB-l equippedaircraft as to preclude their use against surprise attacks.iii9Rf!f

·..··,·····..·····································W.i~ ..9EC~EI - ~. --. ­...............On 18 March, the JCS replied that the matter wasunder consideration and a decision would be made aftera safety controls and procedures study was completed.Later, NORAD was told that the matter had gone beforethe Secretary of Defense on 18 June 1959 for a decision.Cross-Border Nike Hercules E~ployment Policy. On30 January 1959, USARADCOM asked CONAD to provIde guidanceon the employment of nuclear-armed surface-to-airmissiles over Canadian territory. CONAD issued a statementof guidance on 2 March 1959 to Component and Regioncommanders. This stated that until Canada was able toconsider CONAD's Air De.fense Atomic Employment Policy,which had not yet been released to Canada, interim procedureswould have to b~ followed. CONAD commandersshould, CONAD stated, in the event of an Air DefenseEmergency, order engagem~nts in accordance with theCONAD Atomic Employment Plem. However, if time permitted,interim clearance was to be requested from HeadquartersCONAD to fire the Hercules across the border.On the same date, CONAD told the JCS of these instructions.CONAD urlled that the Atomic Employment Policybe released to Canada as soon as possible so that itmight be approved or disapproved. Al80, CONAD urgedthat an agreement be made with Canada to permit the firingof Hercules across the bord~r, if such an agreementwas required."I__I--­-... 1

·....,·....·........·..,···..·..··....········....·wl ~ ........ ,.................................................. ' An agreement with Canada had been signed on 27June 1957 which was sl~ted to expire on 30 June 1953.In 1958, NORAn asked the executive agent to obtain anextension.USAF replied that a draft agreement for long-term ",rights to overfly Canada with the MB-I was in the finalstages of negotiations. It would remove all geographicalrestrictions during a period of Air Defense Readiness.Pending completion of this new agreE:ment, USAFhad obtained a one year extension of the 27 June 1957agreement through 30 June 1959., OnNORAn heard nothing morp-. In June 1959, NORADasked the JCS to advise it of the status of the longtermagreement. If this agreement would not be completedbefore 1 Ju'ly, NORAn wanted another extension ofthe old agreement.8 June, the JCS replied that the long-term agreement was still under consideration by Canada andthat the JCS would take action to extend the interim arrangementsif the long-tf::rm ag!"~emt:'!nt was not signed byI July. HORAD then heard int'ormally that the MB-lagreement had expired, but th~t ren~wal negotiationswere in progress. Until these were completed, an informalagreement with Car.ada existed.NORAD/OFFICE OF CIVJ L AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION MEMORANDGM OF UNDERSTANDING An OCDM/NORAD "M1;:~moT'~ndum uf Underst.anding" was issuedas HORAD Regulalion 55-23 on 19 February 1959. Itset forth the responsibilities, fun~t10ns, and workingrelationships between NORAD and I:he OCDM to insure thatthe civilian warning mission was accomplished in accordancewith existing laws and directives.. The regulationapplied to all NORAD echelons and military agencies underthe operational control of CINCNORAD except the,~CQEP'- --.~.

· ..,..,.'"................................................ :~.~.SEGRR'bI~iNorthern NORAD Region, and was for the guidance of othercomaands having collateral responsibilities in the conductof air defense.DISCONTINUANCE OF BROFICONOn 10 December 1958, ADC proposed to CONAD that theBROFICON (BRoadcast FIghter CONtrol using commercialradio facilities) program be discontinued. This programhad been started some years past as a back-up to lowpower VHF/UHF and as a countermeasure to communicationsjamming. ADC pointed out that the F-86L's and F-89J'swere the only interceptors equipped with receivers capableof receiving BROFICON transmissions and that theseinterceptors were being phased out of the inventory. Ifthe program were to continue, it would require retrofittingearly model F-IOI's and P-I06's and modifying theF-I02's. ADC stated further that new jamming techniquesmade BROFICON vulnerable and that UHF communications werebeing improved.CONAn favored dropping BROFICON, except in thoseareas where the F-89J was operating. In March 1959, ADCasked USAF to keep DROFICON facilities in those areaswhere the P-89J was operating and to phase the remainderout. USAF, however, felt that BROFICON had outlived itsusefulness. It asked ADC for further Justification toretain any part of the system.When told of USAF's reply, CONAn maintained its positionand asked that USAF be so informed. But in July1959, USAF stated that the proposal to retain DROFICON inareas where the F-89J was deployed was not approved. Thelimited capability to be kept did not justify the costsinvolved. It added, however, that contracts made betweenthe Air Force and the broadcast stations would remain ineffect and that the equipment of the program would be kepttor possible use with a future system.NORAD/SHAPE EXCHANGB OF EARLY WARNING INFORMATIONIn December 1958, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers.. .- --,. - ,ffill"" .-----... -­

. ..-c .Jl!!O'" .. ­ It Ell •- - ...bI•..•••••....•.. ~ ...••.........••••...••••••.....•.•.•••.~. ..........................••........•..•.........•••...•.., RepresentativesEurope (SHAPE) proposed to NORAD that the two commandsexchange early warning information. SHAPH said that itplanned to replace its voice-communicated "condition"messages with a semi-automatic data transmission system.SBAPB stated that this system would not provide detailedtrack information, but only "broadbrush" informationon selected raids with the "condition" status of each ofits 14 areas and the reasons for the condition status.Before going ahead with this system, it needed to knowif this type of EW information would meet NOBADls requirementsin the 1960 time-period and if the types ofequipment and standards of data transmission were acceptableto NORAn. Further, SHAPE was interested in knowingif NOBAD would provide EW information in the sameform so that the proposed equipment could receive it.NORAD replied that it felt that there was a requirementfor the exchange of EW information. The degree orlevel of information needed and the methods of transmissionwould have to be determined after a joint conference.of SHAPE and NORAD met at NORADHeadquarters in April 1959. Among the more importantconclusions reached by the conferees were the following.Exchange of EW information was desirable. Detailedstudies would be conducted by both commands to determinethe exact information that should be exchanged and thedesired communications and display facilities. SHAPEshould explore with SACLANT, through NATO channels, thepossibility of establishing communications between IcelandAir Defense Force and the NATO element on theFaeroes. The two commands also agreed to continue currentprocedures for transmitting EW information whennormal conditions were exceeded.In July 1959, SHAPE informed NORAO that it was investigatingthe possibility of setting up a trial transmissionto NORAD. Octo~r and November 1959 would beconsidered as a possible time for the trial.MeanWhile, the JCS had been monitoring this activitybetween SHAPE and NORAD and in June 1959 stated that'SEtkE in _d

~ ..~~....... .~...................................................~.!.~hey were planning to convene a second conference toeomplete requirements for communications needed betweenthe JCS, SBAPB, NORAD, SACLANT, USAF, and EUCOII. Itwas anticipated that this meeting would take place inJuly or August 1959." HORAD PLAN FOR CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONSA new HORAD plan was issued on 25 May 1959 establishingan alternate command post and providing forcontinuity of operational control over NORAD forcesduring periods of emergency. The plan was called "Continuityof Operations Plan North American Air DefenseCommand," or "COPHORAD", and superseded the NORAD ALCOPplan, dated 12 Hovember 1957.Central NORAn Region was designated the NORAD alternatecommand post. The commander of CRR was to activatethe ALCOP when ordered to do so by CINCHORAD,or when all communications (direct and indirect, militaryand civil), had been severed between NORAD Headquartersand the NORAn regions. Control was to revertto the primary COC when control facilities had beenrestored and when CINCHORAD so directed. The plan providedthat in the event both primary and alternate commandposts were knocked out, the rE~gions would operateindependently.SAFE PASSAGE OF SAC EMERGENCY WAR ORDER TRAFFICTHROUGH THE AIR DEFENSB SYSTEMFor some time, SAC and NORAD had been studying theproblem of how to get SAC aircraft through the defensesystem safely during an emergency. In July 1958, ajOint SAC, NORAn, ADO, and ARADCOM committee drew up a"SAC-HORAD Memorandum of Agreement for Emergency AirTraffic Control and Identification." It establishedcommon procedures for the NORAD-SAC forces to use toget SAC traffic through the system. The two commandsagreed to exchange liaison personnel for 24-hour moni­,toring of the NORAD COC and the SAC CoJllDland Post to'-'(

,.. ....-- .~.....-~ -­, .. !E8RiiT ~.......... ~ ....................................'........~.. ....~I...•...•...............•.•.....••.••..••..................,insure immediate identification and control of SAC traffic.*SAC BWO liaison personnel would be sent to theHQRAD regions to develop local identification and controlprocedures. FUrther, the commands agreed to thesetting up of a SAC-HORAD Coordinating Committee to reviewand revise the procedures established. SAC agreedto furnish strike route information t~ HORAD for prepositioningat appropriate HORAD units. The agreementwas approved by General Partridge for NORAD on 25 July1958 and by General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, on 30 July1958.Before final procedures could be issued, the MiddleEast cr.isis forced issuance of interim procedures (whichwere based on this agreement). The interim proceduresrequired NORAD units to continuously flight follow allSAC aircraft by radar from take-off to destination or tobeyond the area of surveillance. During normal conditions,SAC command posts were to use existing communicationsto notify HORAD of scheduled take-off times anddirection of flight.** Also after take-off, SAC aircndtwould contact the radar station and transmit Mode II MukX IFF codes continuously unless otherwise instructed.The interim procedures were left in effect untilApril 1959 when HORAD Manual 55-4, !'Procedures for SafePassage of SAC E"O Traffic," was issued. This manual wasconcerned solely with SAC no aircraft and their passagethrough the system during an emergency. The requirementfor day-to-day flight following of SAC peacetime airtraffic was dropped,* A SAC Liaison Team had been at NORAD since 1 February1958. HORAD se:nt no team to SAC, but agreed that aUSAF ADC officer stationed at SAC Headquarters would actfor it.*. In 1958 also, NORAD and SAC had agreed that a directland-line should run from SAC facilities to ADDe's.This program wast_discussed in CONAD/NORAD Historical SummaryJan-Jun 1958, pp 94-95., _.~""--"-----------------[78 ]~----~----------....------­

.'~,·····························....·..·················w.tThe requirement to evaluate the air defense system'scapability to continuously maintain flight surveillanceof SAC tactical traffic had not been dropped,however, On 23 June 1959, NOKAO directed ADC to recommendan area where testing of procedures could be conducted.Meanwhile, a series of tests had been conducted onthe West Coast in 1958 to determine if interceptor AIradar eqUipment could be used to interrogate the X-bandAN/APN-69 radar beacons installed in the SAC bomber/tanker fleet. If so, an air-to-air identification systemcould be worked out for the identification of SACEWO traffic.The tests proved that the APN-69 would reply to interrogationfrom a fighter AI radar and that the codedreply was easily recognized on the fighter scope. Thetest people -- SAC and ADela System Integration Office-- felt that this was as much as could be accomplishedat base level. They recommended that a continuingseries of air-to-air exercises be conducted to developoperational techniques to increase this identificationcapability.In February 1959, SAC wrote NORAD that it concurredin this recommendation. A conference was held betweenNORAD, SAC and ADC on 19 March at HeadquartersNORAD. It was agreed that additional testing was justified.It was proposed that this testing take place inSouth Dakota since there were B-52~s, an ADC fightersquadron, and a Nike unit available.By July 1959, a test directive had been agreed toby all parties. The jOint SAC-NORAD directive -- codenamedShining Light -- specified that test programswould be developed no later than ] SE:ptember 1959.DESTRUCTION OF NON-HOSTILE AIRBORNE OBJECTSOn 17 February 1959, CINCNORAD/CINCONAD establisheda command policy for engaging non-hostile airborne objects.,··.;:a-liHl..~':'"m~..'QJ~t'l!tlHilftUli~r..~~t!::.".:,'---- - . -- -_....,4

, .:' , hli..••.......••...............•.•........•.••.. ~ .•.•.•...~. ..~ _ ~ ~[GR~T....................•........••......•.•••....•........... .(i.e., balloons, derelict aircraft, drones, and othertypes of unmanned vehicles). This stated that HORAn/COHAn subordinate commanders would not authorize pr directdestruction of any aerial object not being employedin a recognized weapons training program unless theobject presented a threat to the air defense system asdefined in HORADR 55-6 (Rules of Engagement). Responsibilityfor recovery or destruction of non-hostile airborneobjects was considered a function of the agencywhich launched and owned the object. However, HORAD/COHAn commanders could request approval from NORAD/CONADHeadquarters to destroy an object whenever they feltsuch destruction was necessary or were asked to destroyan object by an outside agency.,RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTIONOF FRIENDLY FLYING OBJECTSOn 12 March 1959, NORAD recommended to the JCS andcose that they establish a policy to provide that alllaunchings of objects within the air space over theNORAn area of responsibility be coordinated with HORADHeadquarters. This was needed, NORAD felt, to insurethat such objects did not produce false alarms in theair defense system or in other agencies and commands towhich HORAn provided warnings.The casc notified CINCNORAD on 21 April that therecommendation had been approved in principle. It requestedthat a draft regulation covering the matter beforwarded for final approval. USAF advised that thematter had been referred to it by the JCS. USAF askedNORAn for specific requirements and notification procedures.INDIRECT BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT SYSTEMIn 1955, CONAD established a requirement with USAFfor an Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment System (IBDAS).The system wanted was one capable of providing data onbomb yield, ground zero, and time and type of burst.On the 23rd of Karch 1959, CONAD re-stated its~F

iiC~R~ ...., ).d........................................................~. ,requirement for an IBDAS to the JCS. CONAD stated thatit needed bomb detonation information to assess thepattern of the enemy's attack and to determine dama~e. to the defense system. Further, the system was neededto meet the JCS requirement of 1956 which made CONADresponsible for setting up a system to collect nucleardetonation information and pass this information tointerested a~eDcies.It was pointed out that the initial request fromCONAD had been passed to ARDC where experimental workhad been conducted. USAF had, in 1958, set up a requirementwith ARDC for a means of automatic detectionof a nuclear explosion and the immediate relay of detectionto central display systems. This had been followedon 15 January 1959 by a directive from USAF toARDC to establish a ZI Bomb Alarm network to become operationalby 1 July 1960.CONAD told the JCS th~t the USAF system would usethermo detectors and land-line communications and wouldprobably be limited to reporting only the initial enemyattack. CONAD felt that the system could not be expectedto survive initial bomb damage and, therefore, wasnot suitable.On 3 April 1959, the JCS informed CONAD that actionon the request for an IDDAS had been transferred to theChief of Staff, USAF. On 29 April, USAF informed CONADtbat it recognized CONAD's need, but had been unable tosatisfy that need. It pointed out that considerable researcbhad been done on a system, but that so far itcould not discriminate between the signals from an explodingbomb and lightning. It was anticipated, USAFcontinued, that another three or four years would be requiredbefore suitable circuits could be developed toaccomplish the discrimt.nation desired.NUCLEAR DETONATION REPORTING SYSTEMA probiem closely aligned with the IBDAS was thatof Nuclear IletOI~lIUDET). 'l1Ie JCS had'868RET- •• 0[ 811----......,• .­

--~ [' ".'-......:................................··········W·I· ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6 •••••assigned CONAn the responsibility for the establishmentand operation of an atomic detonation and fall-out reportingsystem. In carrying out this assignment, CONA~and later NORAD, had Bet up an interim collection systemconsisting primarily of observation reporting by installationsand units under its jurisdiction. Establishmentof a permanent system awaited development of an adequateremote-reading indirect bomb detonation detection system.,By early 1959, certain discrepancies in the directivesestablishing the system and its working arrangementshad become apparent. In April 1959, CONAD proposed tothe JCS a realignment of directives so as to abolish someof its obligations and bring others in line with its currentoperational techniques.One matter was the responsibility for establishmentand operation of the atomic detonation and fall-out reportingsystem. CONAD pointed out that the two JCS directivesassigning these responsibilities were in conflict.One gave CONAD thA over-all responsibility forboth tasks; the other made CONAD responsible only for thereporting of nuclear detonations. Fall-out reporting wasaSSigned to the USAF Weather Service.CONAn did not Viant the Job" of fall·-out reporting,however, for two reasons: (1) it felt that the fall-outplots produced by the currently-available detonation collectionsystem produced practically worthless intelligence,and (2) CONAD did not have the required communicationsto perform such an assignment.A second item bruught to tna JCS's attention was therequirement for and method of dissE-minating NUDET reportsto other commands. The JCS directive stated that suchreports would be sent over the alert status teletypewriternetwork. CONAD said Ol&t this imp] ied that only subscribersto the Alert No. 1 network would receive thesereports. This was a very restricted list with no Armyorganizations and only one Navy organization (CINCLANT).CONAD wanted to stop us.1ng Alert No. I network for theNUDEr reports. One thing brought out by CONAD was thatthere was little benefit to be gained by advising units, is Mil:$&Lri ?

·.. ·~···..·..................·........·..·..·........·wl~~~.,on the West Coast that a detonation oc.curred on theEast Coast. It would be bettsI' if the HORAD division,in wbose area the detonation occurred. notified the subscriberson its warning net and the adj~cent divisioncombat cenLers. The latter, in turn, could notify thekey points on their warning nets.CONAD proposed that this be the prucedure adoptedfor dissemination of NUDBT reports. CONAD said thatNUDET reports would be sent to the NORAO coe over thenormal surveillance circuits with a flash precedence.The }fORAD COC would not1ly th.:~ ";·oint. War Room (USAF,USA, and Navy) and R(~AF for t:he C'!h ief of the Air Staff.NORA» facilities having oeDM representatives assignedwould advise them of all detonations., U. S. - CANADIAN CONELR..AD, CONILV:r.. AND SCATER PROGRAMSOn 10 llarc.h 1959, ReaoiquartHrs [SAF asked NORAO toprovide it with NORAD~ 8> pO!!oil tion on tIlE' military requirementfor CONELRAO ~!'::-Jn+'rvl 0.1. Eh~ctromagnetic Radiations)to use in a Illt-:t;- r:tng wi.th FCC' and OCDY personnelto review the pr{.)gr ",m. NORAO ['epji~d that".•• CON­ELRAD is a requirelC'-l:fl ;": .. 0:1 ~ri.11 t',=,,1l~4! n ;:t requi!'ement forthe foreseeable fut.ur-t;." NOPAD f?tahd, hQwever, thatit was pla.nni.ng a j.:>i.n+- ..' )nf~:u::'"",n(:e -.vi '.h Canadiun officialsto work out a c

_..."""... SE~"iI··c;..···....·····:·······························..··..W·J•.......••••......•...•.•.••••....••••..•..•••...._........, '­The conferees agreed that the subject should bestudied by a scientific group, s!miliar to the C8nada­United States Scientific Advisory Team, to determinethe over-all objectives of CONELRAD. It was furtheragreed that, based upon the outcome of the evaluation,a study group should be established to formulate aNORAD position on CONELRAD.With respect to CONILLUU, the conferees agreedthat this subject should be reopened since illuminationmight provide assistance to infra-red detectors andmanned bombers making low-level attacks. Also, the subjectneeded more study, for HORAD's Terms of Referencemade it responsible forva.rious aspects of COHILLUIf.It was agreed that HORAD "'Would refer this problem to theJCS for resolution, recommending a study be made to determinethe validity of the requirement.The talks on security control of air traffic (U. S. - SCATER, Canada - ESCAT) found both countries' repre­sentatives agreeing that a HORAn plan was needed. The RCAF representative stated that RCAF had no objection to including Canada's CONELRAD requirement on naViga­tional aids in the ESCAT plan to coincide with the U. &SCATER plan. The RCAF also said that authority for implementationof ESCAT would be changed to provide forimplementation by CINCHORAD. It was concluded that untila NORAD plan was writt~n, the RCAr would continueto operate under the ESCAT procedures. The plan wouldbe amended, however, to conform to HORAD directives regardingauthority and procedures for implementing SCAT.Tb produce a workable NORAD SeATER plan, it wasagreed that a group consisting of representatives fromHORAD, RCAP, USAF, Federal Aviation Agency, Departmentof Transport, and other appropriate agenCies, would beorganized. This group would make recommendations tothe JCS and COSC.In June 1959, NORAD sent a copy of the conferencereport to the ReAF Chief of the Air Staff, pointing outthat the problem of unifying and/or standardizing Canadian- U. S. plans for CONELRAD was n~t solved. NORAD~i2CkEr , ·I.

, ~--.,.stated that a technical study had been initiated andwould provide the basis for determining operational objectivesfor CONBLRAD, p&rticularly those regarding theareas of the spectrum to be cOlltr::lIled. As for SCATER,HORAD stated that if the RCAF agreed with the findingsin the report it should design~te an RCAF member forthe working group and make arra~gements for DOT representation.NORAD would, it continued, request similiarmembership from USAF, FAA, and USAF ADC. As for CONIL­LUM, NOKAO stated that it had forwarded a letter to theJCS reflecting the viE'wS of thE: conferees.U. S. CONELRAD, While the Canadian - U. S. policy on CONELRAD wasbeing decided, NORAD wail also working on U. S. CONELBADmatters. One of these was a nf:W aL~rt.ing system.NORAD and ADC had f,yr- some tillt. been studying anAT&T proposal for a new CONELRAD alerting network knownas the uBell and Light" sy~t~D:. In March 1959, USAFasked NORAD for its comn~~,ntE on t:'lE: ad~quacy of the currentsystem in US13 and the requil"enlf:nts, justification,and recommendations fOl' ii>.n lll'l.pr':)vt"d I"'ystt:!m. NORAD, inturn, forwarded th€, rr.-'quE:sl: to Ar{~ f,"):r its comments.ADC replied that tht:c "Bell and Light" system appearedinadequate to m€'-et the CONELRAD alerting requirement.It said thAt the pr')p,)sE::d ~'

···,·········~········W.·I· many sufficiently outdated as to make their validityquestionable. It pOinted out that the DOD CONBLRADplan was dated 24 December 1952 and that the oreanizationalstructure of air defense had changed since then.KORAD also wanted the responsibilities of its divisionsin the CONBLRAD program reduced to tha~ of coordinatingon CONBLRAD plans and insuring that NORADelements accomplished their CONELRAD responsibilities.As matters stood with the existing plan, the divisionshad to review detailed plans of numerous government andmilitary units, Sites, facilities, and plants to ·insurethat such factors as alerting procedures, extent ofcontrol, and key alerting facilities were carried inthe plans. It was pointed out that the divisions actuallyhad no control over such factors. The extent ofcontrol and type of operation were responsibilities ofthe owning or operating agenc1es. Therefore, NORADconcluded, the logical ones to consider these factorswere the'prepari~ agencies.u. S. CONILLUM(,As noted above, at the joint C~nadian - U. S. conferenceheld in April, the NORAD representatives statedthat they would reopen the matter of Control of Illumination(CONILLOM) with the JCS sinc& illuminated areasmight provide assistance to infra-red detectors and lowlevelattackers.On 26 May 1959, NORAD wrote to the JeS, pointingout thattts Terms of Reference included a requirementfor CINCNORAD to coordinate with appropriate U. S. andCanadian agencies in the development of policy and broadplans for CONILLUK, and, when approprill.te, to initiateimplementing act10ns. But the r~quirement for the programwas in doubt, for the latest guidance available wasa messaee from USAF to ADC in 1956 that stated: " ••• theDepartment of Defense considers that further implementationof the CORILLUK plan is unwarranted•••• Accordingly.it has been decided to retain the CONILLUM plan in astand-by status, and its further implementation will beheld in abeyance."SE8RElf --',.. _.. -" _......•, Pl••aM I = • 11S.1a.{ 86 ]l1li_.

,..........................................,....... w.~,f\~...'~~.. ~ ...........---- ­ '.NORAD recommended that a study be made to determinethe validity of the CONILLUM requirement. If thestudy indicated that it was valid, NORAD wanted appropriateguidance. If the study showed that the programshould be discontinued, it wanted the requirement deletedtrom the NORAD Terms of Reference.,TheNORAD POLICY ON PRIORITIES FOR AIRMOVEMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFTOn 25 May 1959, CINCNORAD's policy on prioritiesfor the air movement of military aircraft was issued tothe field. It was pOinted out that the JCS had establishedthis policy at CINCNORAD's request. They hadalso authorized him to resolve conflicts in the movementof U. S. tactical air traffic during conditions of imminentor actual war, including Air Defense Emergency,in accordance with established priority listings.priorities established by the JCS and forwardedthrough the DOD to FAA were for the air movement of: (1)tactical aircraft during imminent or actual general warconditions including air defense emergency; (2) tacticaland non-tactical military aircraft during limited war orother emergencies; and (3) tactical and non-tacticalmilitary aircraft during normal peacetime military operations.NORAD stated that these movement prioritieswould be used by the JCS, CINCNORAD, the services, commands,and FAA.NORAD delegated its authorities and responsibilitiesin the policy letter to its region commanders who wereauthorized to delegate them in turn, to their NORAD divisioncommanders. NORAD directed that any appeal of decisionsof the NORAD commBnders which could not be resolvedat their levels was, if time permitted, to be referredto the next higher NORAD commander.Shortly after the policy had been promulgated, CNRpointed out that the letter implied that CINCNORAD hadthe authority to approve or disapprove certain tacticalflights during an air defense emergency, but that theII f.-'....... ­... .. - .••

'S!8RE* ..,.- hi •• , ••••••• ~ ••••••• n •••••••••••••••,."." ••".""~, ,method for exercising this authority by the NORAD commanderswas not clear. It asked for guidance and recommendedthat the provisions of the letter be incorporatedin the CONAD/CAA SCATER plan. NORAD replied thatits letter did delegate the authority to regulate airspace during an air defense emergency and specificallyprovided the authori ty to "controP' the air space concerned.Such regulation, NORAD continued, would be inaccordance with the priorities listed and at the discretionof the region and division commanders, dependingupon the tactical s1.tuation at the time.HORAD stated further that NORAD division commandersshould exercise control of air traffic through theFAA. Authority for control of civil and non-tacticalmilitary flights would be exercised in accordance withSCATER plans of 7 May 1957 and 1 February 1958. As forincluding the prOvisions of the policy in the SeATERplans, NORAD stated that it wus taklng action to amendthese documents.DIVISION WARNING NETWORKSOn 29 December 1958, NORAD issued a new policygoverning alerting procedures throughout the air defensesystem in NORADR 55-·12. The system establishedwas designed to not.ify the NORAD opera t ional forcesand other civil and military agencie~.The major di.fference in this system over that inuse before was the change in the Division Warning Networks,The regulation re-defined the networks and reducedthe number of key points to be alerted. NORADfelt that its past procedure of alert.ing a large numberof posts, camps, stat1t)n~, and bases throughout theU. S. was uDsatisfactory bec:.lolUSE:' the commitments foralerting far exceeded capabilities under battle conditions.To prevent the alerting responsibilities fromobstructing operations, the regulation provided thatwarninls and readiness condltlons were to be passed initiallyto a limited number ot: key pOints which wouldbe responsible for further dissemination of the information.[ 88]

,...........................................................~.>,.~: ,- - -~- - • ­\ ......... . ,On 7 January 1959, NORAD directed the region commandersto submit lists of recommended subscribers nolater than 15 February 1959. In addition, the regionswere told to indicate those stations on the currentlADY network that could be deleted.The three U. S. regions submitted their revisedlists in February. HNR stated that it could not meetthe deadline because the RCAF ADC Sectors had never beenrequired to warn other agencies. This was a function ofRCAP Headquarters. The matter had been referred to thatheadquarters for a decision. Later, NNR's recommendedlist was submitted in a NNR Supplement to NORAD 55-12,dated 23 March 1959.NORAD approved the revised subscriber lists inMarch with few exceptions. One change made in the listswas the retention of SAC Air Forces on the networks.In the meantime, NOKAO forwarded copies of its regulationto the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff, theCNO, and the Coast Guard Commandant. DA replied that itwanted implementation of the new networks delayed untilI May 1959. This would give it time to issue the necessaryinstructions to all elements of the Army affectedby the regulation. Air Force agreed with the concept expressedin the regulation and the reduction in key points.It stated that it unde,rstood that NORAO was ,to make furtherrevisions to the key list and it would wait untilsuch action was completed. At thgt time, USAF would takeaction through ADC to assure further disseminationthroughout appropriate Air Force cownands and installations.NOKAD replied that it did not want ADC to becomeinvolved in the dissemination to Air Force installations.If USAF wished to add other age~cies to the networks orto designate agencies other tha,n the lIilitary Flight ServiceCenters to act as key points, it should forward suchrecommendations to NORAD. The Navy and Coast Guard madeno comments.- '8E9RET ."'::;.:,;,!C,'\x'" ~ .-rr~ ..~.'f_"'~'i;:.. -, :·;,.":.JtJ*..!t:..a/:j~..:J...;il '. j~~:.7·\r ~(.,-,,~,~, ,.~.j:~e!,Ff-'!1n..~.!"#t:1~~t{~":';( 8 9 J' .' " . . ::. ".- ~-:(~P:::"..

(;;~;.....................................................~.tCHAPTER 78\I' \I ............... , .............. to •••••••••••• ,.,. ,................ . ,Plans & ProgramsNADO AND HADOPIn December 1958, NORAD submitted to the Canadianeose and the U. S. JeS a two-volume objectives plan:North American Air Defense Objectives 1959-1969 (NADO59-69) and Nortn-AmerIcan Air Defense ~ecttt~s Plan1959-1963 (NlDOp 59-63). NXDo 59-69 s a ed he cOO=cepts,pfiilosophies, and qualitative objectives for aten-year period. NADOP 59-63 set forth the qualitativeand quantitative force structures for a five-year period.These plans succeeded eOHAD's 1956-1966 ObjectivesPlan (CADOP 56-66), the first over-all air defense planever prepared. CADOP 56-66 was returned by the JCS inMay 1958, unapproved. The JCS estimated that implementationof this plan would cost over ten billion dollarsannually. They stated that an average yearly expenditureof around five and one half billions should be usedas the bas~s for planning for U. S. forces.HADOP was scaled down from what CADOP asked. Butthe cost of recommended forces to be provided by Canadaand the U. S. would total something under eight billionsyearly. However, this total included, for theyears 1961, 1962, and 1963, contingency funds of aroundone billion annually over and above the cost of the acceleratedHike Zeus program.HORAn received formal agreement or comments onlyon NADO 59-69 (the plan covering concepts and philosophies).In May 1959, HORAD was advised that the JCShad reviewed this plan and found it to be generally inconsonance with policy guidance issued by the JCS andCOSC. The JCS agreed that it would be considered bythem and the Services,­1n the preparation of long-range

...'-·..····..·....···..···....··....·············..~·t~. w~plans and programs. The annual submtssion of such aplan was not required. The COSC provided an identicalstatement on this plan on 12 June 1959.In the meantime, in January 1959, NORAD formed anad hoc committee to reconsider and revise NADOP 59-63.HORAn told the component commands that considerationsin Washington indicated that the foces, manpower, andfissionable material propos~d by NADOP might not be approvedand that a lesser program might. be required.The terms of reference for this group stated that theywere to determine a five to six billion dollar yearlyCanadian-U. S. air defense system beginning in FY 1960.The work of this group was in mid-passage in Junewhen new objectives for tl. S. a':'r defense forces wereprovided by the Secretary of Defense. These were containedin a new program, tgrmed the Continental Air DefenseProgram (CADP). As of mid-195'9':-lfAD'OP haefnot-­been commented upon formally by the ·JeS or COSC. Presumably,however, the CADP replaced applicable U. S.portions of NADOP and on the basis of the former, a newNADOP would be prepared.CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMOn 19 June 1959, the Secretary of Defense providedthe JCS with his approved objectives for certain air defenseequipment to be employed in def~nse of the continentalU. S. This pr~gram provided sp~cific guidance onsome air defense equlpm~nt, general guidance on otherequipment. Therefore, until a new NADOP was prepared onthe basis of this program, a figure-by-figure comparisonwith the proposed force st.ru~ture in NADOP 59-63 couldnot be made. In gen&ral 1 howevf-;r, the CADP directed areduction.The CADP emphasized a perimeter defense. It dividedthe continental U. S. into two areas: (1) the eastand west coast and the U. S.,-Canadian border area and(2) the south-central and central area. The former wasto have an "Improved SAGEn environment in support of the-- --..~!8R5r ·- I

~···,······:··..·..·..····..·····..······..·..····..W·f..........•••......•.....•............•..................BOJIARC deployment in that area; the latter area was tohave an "Austere SAGE" environment.Tbis concept of an Improved and Austere SAGE deploymentprovided the fallowing. The SAGE illprovementprogram was to be carried out along the U. S.-Canadianborder and the east and west coasts of the U. S. Thisprogram was to include Airborne Long Range Input Stationsoff the coasts, Frequency Diversity radars atprime sites, and enough gap tillers to provide, as anobjective, radar coverage down to an altitude of 500feet, for a minimum distance of 150 ml les forv;ard ofthe BOIlARC launching sitas. SA;';E Supt~r ('.omb"t Centersin a hard (underground) conflgur~Ul)n were to be complete'(i'""itsix sites in the U. S. and at one in Canada(see Chapter Two). These sit:~ locations were to bedetermined later by apprnpri.a t:(-! .a~enc ieto': and were toserve the SA~TE syst~m aloD6 ~:.b6 b..H-d(;lI' and coasts andto support the BOMARC deployment auttwr-jzed.In the Austere SAGE a~'E;a, im~l-ov,:"ments wel'e to belimited to those required t~ 1d(-!n-t:lf.,: S.4.C bOllbers infligbt, vector the currently 0P...'t'd t.loHa 1 family of interceptors,and p:{)vht~ ('.ap--tbili t.y ":)1 air b-aff1c eontrol.Gap fillers "l1d FD L."ld?H"~ W'.;.-t·.~ not: t(1 be installedexcept at si 1:*':·S pr-')gr&lllD"e-d f:w ex~-erilll.ent.a.l orprototype equipment. In thi.R ar'"",,: r·)oFider!:ltton wasto be given to inst::il1ing 1:!'t't'tt> SuPEH (:~)rn.bat Cent:ers ina ~oft configuration.Necessary equipment 9i'::lS t,., b~ PI' .(':ur€d for sixteenBOMARe squadrons within th·,. tT. s. 'l'ht:"y were to be deployedalong the northE"rn border iO'1d f;

,: S~8RE'~-~ .....-:··,···············································W·,·t············be deployed in fixed s1te defenses within the continentalU. 8.In regard to HIKE Zeus, the Department of the Armywas authorized to proceed with research development atthe maximum rate and to proceed with production feasibilitystudies and the engineering, tooling, and facilitiesnecessary to prepare the Zeus program for production.FY 1960 funding of $137 million for this preparationfor production, in addition to the funding previouslyprogrammed, was authorized, subject to Congressionalaction. The currently-approved BKEWS configurationwas to be completed and made operational at threesites: Thule, Greenland; Clear, Alaska; and Fylingsdale,England. Also, researcb and developm~nt on promisingmethods of ballistic missile det:eetion and warning wasto be strongly supported., INTERIM BllEWS DISPLAY FACILITYThe Thule, Greenland, 8MBWS site was scheduled toreach initial operational capability in September 1960;the Clear, Alaska, site a year later. The NORAD hardenedcae facility would not bal.?

1 ~···~..··:···....······..···..·..···..·······..···..·W.·l••••••••••••t •••••••••••••••••••••• ••• • ..................... .satellite prediction computer, if necessary. Whetherthis equipment would be required depended upon the dateof the hardened COCo If the latter slipped considerablybeyond January 1962, then duplexing and adding thecomputer would be necessary.These NORAD requirements, which were concurred inby USAF ADC and other agencles concerned, were providedto USAF by ADC in January 1959. On 18 lIarch 1959,USAF told the BMEWS Pl'oject Office to proceed with theinterim facility in all respects as NORAD required exceptone -- provision of floor space for a satellitecomputer. The interim facility was not to get a satellitecomputer. Computation was to be done initiallyby computers at each radar station. USAF stated thatthis was a departure from NORAn requirements, but thiswas in accordance with the latest program directionfrom the Department of Defense.USAF directed that there be an annex constructedat the NORAD cae to provide 1.nitial capability withSite 1 (Thule) in September 1960 and integrated datalink capability with this site in December 1960. Thefacility was to have a simplex system, but the buildingwas to have enough space for duplexing.Following thiS, on 20 April 195~, USAF ADC advisedthat USAF had informed it of changes 1n the 8MBWS program.Among the changes w~re that tracking radars forSites 1 and 2 (Thule and Clear) were to be deferred(scanning radars only were t.o be installed).On 4 Kay 1959, USAF i~sued a new BMEWS developmentdirectlve (Mo. leS) whi(.~h confirmed that trackers mightbe added later to Sites I and 2, but were not to be procuredat that time. On 28 lIay, CINCNORAD sent a messageto the USAF Chief of Staff asking whether the systemas now proposed would meet NORAD requirements. TheAir Force replied that its approved plan called for atwo-phase attainment of the interim auws configuration.Phase I required installation of scanners only at Sites1 and 2 and trackers only at Site 3 (UK). The secondphase would complete the interim configuration.~iE8n:- .'."I'M!t1IIt;~._U__""i\III!"!'-ft!Jt,~,. WJU,............,{ 94 p.n..~'!j""~.;.lI •.,~,;F ..•... c.. ...­

,···············..·······..········ ..···..····....··..w·l~'~ac~er ---:.:-: :::-::.~: =.,-­...-. ­MORAD protested to the JCS on 4 June 1959 that theminimum interim requirements approved by NORAD wouldnot be met by this Air FOrce development directive.MORAD also protested the fact that a change of thisBcope had been made in a weapons system and NORAD, theultimate user, had not been consulted.Shortly thereafter, MORAD learned that it was thedecision at the Department at Defense to indefinitelydefer tracking radars at the Thule and Clear sites. On7 July 1959, USAF advised NORAD tha t because of this decisionit would be necessary to consider changes in therequirements for the interim display facility. Some ofthe requirements could not be achieved during the scanners-onlyperiod and should be deferred or eliminated,USAF said.OSD representatives, briefed by USAF on the statusot the progra~, raised the following areas ot concern:a. the requirement for a computer ofany kind in the Zl,b. a detailed impact display was notconsistent with tbe (,apability of the detectionequipment,c. the possibility of locating theinterim display in an existing building notnecessarily at Ent AFB.·It was the DOD position, USAF stated, to oppose the expenditureof a great amount of monEiy for the interimBMEWS display.• OSD representatives raised ~he possibility oflocating at Strategic Air Command Headquarters with theNORAD requirement being met by a closed circuit televisionsystem. SAC, it was stated, would be the mainconsumer of the information during ~he time period thatthe interim facility was used.

sr~rH""" .;, ~I'~J: .. _~ hi'..,·..···········..···········.. ····················~·i·" ••••••••••• til •• til." ••• til.................. .......til ............. t •USAF called a conference to review the interim facilityrequirements. HORAD representatives stated thatHORAD did not object to reviewing the planned interimcomplex, but that this, in itself, did not change theNORA~.tated requirements. NORAD's primary concern wasthe problem of false alarms and having a system that .would provide sufficient information to allow practicalexperience for entry into the ballistic missile-spatialage.On 17 July 1959, USAF directed the BMEWS ProjectOffice to prepare an engineering proposal for an interimBIIElfS display facilit.y. It was preferably to be atBnt AFB, it was not to require any additional construction,and no threat evaluation equipment was to be installed.There was to be no provision for inputs fromtracking radars at Sites I and 2 and no provision forinputs at all from Site 3. In addition, ARne was directedto make a technical evaluation of the feasibilityof using the Fenske, Federick and Miller Companydisplay equipment to sat1.sfy the di.splay requirementsof the interim BMEWS facilit.y.HORAD protested these plans to USAF in a messageon 22 July. NOBAD representatives attended a meetingcalled by the BllEWS Pr'oject Office and ARDC to discussthe interim facili.ty and TE:!iterated the NORAD requirements.HORAD also pr~t~e~;ted to thE JCS on 28 July, bothin regard to el.imination of trackers at Thule and Clearand reduct.ion of the interim facilIty.HORAD HARDENED COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTERDuring 1958, numerou~ studies and surveys were madeto determine the most suitable location for a new HORADbardened COCo Location~ not only in Colorado Springs,but in ot.her areas were checked. The choice finallynarrowed down to two in the Colorado Springs area:Blodgett's Peak adjacent to the .Ai.r Force Academy (northof Colorado Springs) and Cheyenne Mountain just southof Colorado Springs. Sel€n~t.ion of a Ell te in the ColoradoSprings ar~a was fa,ored by NORAO.

...~·...·....··..·..····..···........········..·....W·l ~ SE8AIi,lIn March 1959, NORAD was informed that the Corpsof Engineers had recommended a site in Cheyenne Mountain.The JCS approved, on 18 Karch, the CheyenneMountain location.Prior to this time, on 14 October 1958, NoaAD hadwritten to the JCS that it believed one technically competentagency should assume responsibility for the developmentand production management of the entire newcoe complex. This would result, NORAD said, in a properlyintegrated system.HORAD said it was particularly concerned abouthaving a properly integrated ballistic missile defensesystem. NORAD felt that the best way to get an integratedBMDS was. to have the NORAD computation and displaycomplex treated as a separate development and procurementproject. This project should be concernedwith all facilities required for the central ZI complex.These included the integrated ICBM/IRBK situation display,automatic air-breathing (SAGE) situation display,satellite prediction computers, master computer and datahandling facilities, etc.In a paper dated 11 February 1959, the JCS chargedfirthe Air Force Chief of Staff with responsibility for thcae project. Be was to collaborate with CINCNORAD incarrying out these responsibilities.The initial phase of the project was to examine theprojected HORAD Command Control System (CCS) and determinecoe requirements, including estimates of the development,procurement, installation, and operational cost~and the scope of the development and production managementinvolved. When this was finished, a report on spacerequirements, upon which design and specific plans forimplementation could be b~sed, was to be submitted to theJCS for approval. Implementation was not to start untilthe JCS acted on the report. CINCNORAD~ the JCS stated,could express his views on the adequacy of the report tothe JCS.On 27 February 1959, USAF' directed its Air ResearchPI' ... --.....- ---­-.'.~"'-~- --_ ...3ECREt'

..•.....•..••••......•....•.....••...••.••.•••..and Development Command to assume full management responsibilityfor the NORAD COCo ARDC was directed toco.plete the study directed by the JCS by 1 July 1959.The JCB-required report was then to be prepared andsu~itted to USAF for submission to the JCS. In carryingout its responsibilities, ARDC was to collaboratewitb CINCNORAD.On 20 llay 1959, USAF told ARDe that the 21 Februarydirective was intended to give ARDC responsibilityfor systems engineering of the NORAD COC and that ARDCwas to develop COC requirements within parameters approvedby higher authority. These parameters were asfollows:a. Type of Facility. A deep undergroundstructure wil,-oe provided essentiallyas configured for site A, ChtlyenneMountain, in the "NORAD Site InvestigationFeasibility Rflport," dated January1959, prepared by the firm ofParsons, Brinckerhoff, Hall und MacDonaldfor the Army Corps of Engineers.b. Hardening. The structure will be locatedunder 800 to 1000 feat of coverin granite and will provide a bonus protectionwell in excess of 200 PSI. Entrances,however, will at this time behardened for an ovel"-·preSSUl"e of 200PSI only in acc()l'dance with (~urrent DCDdirectives.c. Scope. The structure will pr~vide atotal building area ot 266,4~O squarefeet exclusive of the area .reserved forthe power plant and water and fuel reservoirs.The pr.)wer plant wl.1l occupyan area of appr-:>xima t;i::

~..'- ··································..············w.T:.........-,,Neithere. OUtside Support Facilities. No administratIveor logIstic support functionswill be provided for within the coe structure.Support of this nature will befrom above-ground facilities and for thepresent will be provided from Ent AFB.f. Bstimated Construction Cost. The estimatedconstruction cost of the NORAD coeinstallation is $28,540,000.USAF also stated that while it was intended thatthe scope of the coe installation remain within the limitsof the approved configuration, consideration wouldbe given to expansion of the scope by extension of the.ain 45-foot tunnels or by proviSion of an additionaltunnel should the near-term operational requirements sodictate. Finally, USAF said that in order to avoid furtherslippage in the operational date, action was beingtaken to authorize initiation of design on the coe by 1June 1959. It was imperative, therefore, that ARne p.rovidethe functional layouts by I July.NORAD nor ARnC concurred with the degree ofhardness provided by the above parameters -- 800 to 1,000feet of cover and closures limited to 200 PSI.ARDC submitted its report (which was prepared incollaboration with NORAD) to USAF on 19 May 1959 on requirementsof the NORAD Command Control System. It coveredfunctions, space requirements, and costs. The reportstated that source selection board procedures wouldbe initiated to select the prime system contractor to develop,design, procure, install, and test the NORAD CCS.ARDC stressed that these procedures had to be startedbefore August 1959 for an estim.ated beneficial occupancydate of 1 April 1962. Systems hardware installationwould follow and system testing would be completedapproximately one year liter. The report also recommendedadditional hardening. NORAD informed the Air ForceChief of Staff of its concurrence of this report, includingthe requirement for additional hardening, on 16 June.Prior to submission of this report, ARDC had asked.. -- ........... -...- ­­~_w_.~.....a. _'I¥IIIIICW'Jmr!~'-;.IIl~ 99(.,11*........ -~

SIiiREf ......... ··~·········~:······W·I·USAF for authority to start source selection board proceduresto select a systems contractor for the NOKADees. USAF had said that it would not grant this untilthe JCS approved the Air Force report. On 26 Kay 1959,ARDC asked USAF to reconsider and also stated that itdid not concur with the parameters provided by USAF(above) because they did not provide the maximum protectionavailable within Cheyenne Mountain." On 10 July 1959, USAF asked NORAD whether it wantedto go ahead as currently planned and scheduled orget additional hardening which would delay the projectand increase the cost. USAF said that additional hardeningwould require more exploratory boring and feasibilitystudies, extension of the BOD by about 12 months,JCS approval of the revised concept, and Congressionalapproval of the increased costs.CINCNORAD replied on 14 July that while he agreedwith the soundness of the ARDC recommendation for maxi-·mum cover, he was mindful of the urgency of getting theearliest BOD. Therefore, his position was as follows:Recommend portal locations and generalconfiguration of the COO as proposed byParsons, Brinkerhoff feasibility study withthe structure of the COO in the mountain atthe greatest depth attainable with currentfunds approved.On 17 July 1959, USAF reversed its ~arlier decisionand authorized ARDC to select a systems contractor forthe NOHAD COO and award 3. contract. The contract was tobe carried out in two phases. Phase I was to be a studyphase to extend the current ARDC study, which would haveto be presented to the JCS for approval. This study wasto cover communications; coordination, integration, andtechnical compatibility of the electronic subsystems involved,including SAGE, BMEWS, MIDAS, and NIXE Zeus; andthe technical parameters, characteristics and quantitiesof equipment to meet these requirements. Emphasis wasto be on the near NOKAD requirements, rather than on futurerequirements, such as satellite defense, but~- ~

-,·······..····· ..·····..·········..·······..····..···w.·tlappropriate consideration was to be given the latter.Pbase II was to be an implementing phase, started afterJCB approval.As of mid-1959, it appeared that a contract forexcavation would be awarded about 1 December 1959, acontract for the building would be let about 1 October1960, excavation would be completed about 1 December1960, construction would be completed about 1 April1962, and systems checkout and testing would be conductedbetween July 1962 and July 1963.If this schedule was followed, the new COC wouldbecome operational in July 1963.NATIONAL SPACE SURVEILLANCE CONTROL CENTER, In July 1958, NORAD learned that the Advanced Re­search Projects Agency was trying to determine what organization should manage a soon-to,-be established in­terim satellite detection and tracking system. The Air Force recommended that HORAn be given operational con­trol of the interim, as well as the ultimate, system.ADC advised NORAn in October that it had learnedthat a decision might be made soon 1n DOD on management 'of the system. ADC recommended that NORAD back upUSAF's position with a letter to the JCS.HORAn wrote .1.~ ~:tl!~ "J9,S on 26 November 1958. NORADstated that the ultimate space track system had to beas inherently a part of the NORAD organiz'ation as theconventional radar network in the current system. IfWe'ultimate system was to be developed responsive toNORAn's requirements and properly integrated, there appearedto be no a 1 tern&tive to :Pi-BC ing th~ who~~_E;:~jectunder NORAD control in the ,mmeoiate fUture.On 19 December 1958, the Advanc~d Research ProjectsAgency (ARPA) directed ARDC to perform studies to serveas the basis for recommendations to be submitted by 30June 1960 on the functions of a national filter center.'-"IiiIII SE8Hef

SECJI{4'Il-..,."..............................................w...•.•....••.....•••.....••••.....•••••..••••.••...••....•.•,Its responsibility was to be that of cataloging allearth satellites and space vehicles and providing informationto appropriate agencies. In conjunction withthe above, between the date of the order and 1 July1960, experimental operations were to be conducted atProject Spacetrack to complete research and developmentof an interim national space surveillance control cente~The ARPA order stated that at the end of this period,it was envisioned that an appropriate command orother agency, as designated by the Secretary of Defense,would assume operational responsibility for the NSSCC ata location to be named by the Secretary. ARPA amendedthis order on 7 January with a directive to ARDC tobuild a research and development interim NSSCC at HanscomField, Massachusetts. It also provided that maximumparticipation by outside agencies with a need-toknow,such as NORAD, should be encouraged during the experimentaloperating period.ARne issued a development plan on 13 January 1959in which it stated that the interim NSSCC was a supportingsystem whose purpose was to provide service to alarge number of agencies. The system would be managedby a System Project Office (SPO) wit-htn HeadquartersARDC. The SPO would prov1.de the foc,al point for all actionspertaining to the INSSCC.At NORAD Headquarters, a space surveillance controlcenter committee was established on 12 February 1959.It was to do everything possible to assure integrationof the space surveillance control ce.nt.er into the NORADsystem, especially in regard to eonstruction of the newCOCo It was to maintai.n close relations with the COOcommittee at NORAD and to pass recommendations on integrationto the latter.Among the objectives assigned to the SSCC committeeby the NORAn Chief of Staff were thBs~:,B. Develop and produce a concept ofoperations for a space detection and surveillancecenter within the NORAD system.

, ~i'';'...............................................,~.J. ~..-.. ~ ~[~~~-f-'b. Determine the proper location andphysical characteristics for a Epace surveillancecontrol center respone.1,ve to CIN­CNORADt s mission.,d.c. Maintain liaison with the ARDCSpace Detection and Surveillance FilterCenter being established at Laurence G.Hanscom Field, Massachusetts for the purposeof: inserting NORAD requirements intothe developmental phase of the FUterCenter; insuring that the ARDC pilot modelremains responsive to NORAD requirements;establishing personnel training programsfor the operational use of the system; anddetermining the intelligence and operationalrequirements agai,nst which the systemwill collect.Monitor the proposed space detectionand surveillance systems in R&D andrecommend action to assure integration ofthese systems and components of systemswith other defense equipments to be operatedby NORAn and with weap,')n '~r~tem8.On 21 May 1959, NORAD advised the JCS that in theftfirm'"belleY"that NORAD should be designated as themilitary command to operate the National Space SurveillanceControl Center, we are pr~ceeding to plan for thefutu're integration of this function into our new, hardenedCombat Operations Canter•••• tt NORAD recommendedthat the JCS urge the Senrata,ry of Defense to confirmthat NORAD would be the command to oper~te the NSSce sothat more positive oper-~tional planntng could be done.-

DISTRIBUTION,HEADQUARTERS )fORADNHCR. 1NAPA. 1NINT. 1NICD•• 1NlRE•• ..... 1NIOL •• .. 1NOPS •• 1NOOP•• 2NOEV •• 1NOST. 1NOOA •• 1NOCC. ... 1NLOO. .. 2NPAP. ... .... 1NPPA. ... 1NPPP•• ... 1NPSD•• 1NPKO. ... 1NELC•• ... 1NEEC. 1NECO•••••• 1NEPP•• ..... 1NGAM•• 1NGFA. 1NGPM. .... 1liNCH. 31COMPONENT COMMANDSRCAF ADC (ATrN: Camp Commandant). .... 3USARADCOM •••• 3NAVFORCONAD. 2USAF ADC. 1NO. COPIESFIELDComdr ~ NORAD Re~ion•.....••. 3 (21)Comdr Each NORAD Division.. 3 (42)TOTAL DISTRIBUTION•••••••••••••130