(U) 1962 NORAD CONAD History Jan-Jun.pdf - US Northern ...

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NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND MEMORANDUM FOR HO NORAD/USNORTHCOM/HO FROM: HO NORAD/J3SUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories1. The NORAD/CONAD histories for the periods specified in your 30 October2006 memo have been reviewed and are now declassified except for thefollowing sections below. The justification for retaining the classification followseach description.a. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1958, page 65.Document still has information based on today's concepts tactics and objectives.b. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1958, pages110-111. Document describes readiness conditions that are still valid today.c. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1959, pages 67­71. Document describes some current rules of engagement.d. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1959, pages 73and 74. Document describes some current tactics and rules of engagement.e. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1959, pages55-58. Document describes some current capabilities and procedures.f. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1959, pages 59­61. Document describes current rules of engagement.g. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1960, pages 37­39. Document describes readiness conditions that are still valid today.h. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1961, pages 23­26. Document describes some current tactics and rules of engagement and also ·could reveal information that would impact the application of state of the arttechnology.i. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1961, page 37.Document describes information that would impact the application of state of theart technology.j. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1962, pages 35and 36. Document describes information that would seriously and demonstrablyimpair relations between the United States and a foreign government.k. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1962, pages 47and 48. Document describes current tactics.I. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1963, pages 59and 60. N/J3 does not have the authority to declassify these pages.Recommend deferring to NSA for resolution.m. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, July-December 1963, pages63-65. Document describes current capabilities and tactics.n. NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, January-June 1964, pages 57­

58. Document describes capabilities, limitations and deficiencies of warningsystems.o. CONAD Command History, 1968, pages 111 and 112. Documentdescribes current limitations, tactics, and capabilities.p. CONAD Command History, 1968, page 117. Document reveals currentvulnerabilities of systems or projects relating to the national security.q. CONAD Command History, 1968, pages 171-173. N/J3 doesn't havethe technical expertise to evaluate the classification of Chapter VII,Communications. Please refer to N-NC/J6.2. The POC for this review is Mr. Michael Allen, 4-3607.BRETT D. CAIRNSMajor-General, CFDirector of Operations

~/!F--2-~~NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMANDANDUNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND9 DEC 1997NORAD/USSPACECOM Office of the Joint Secretary 250 S. Peterson Blvd Ste 116 Peterson AFB CO 80914-3010 Mr. Hans M. Kristensen 6435 Hazel Avenue Richmond, CA 94805 Dear Mr. KristensenThis correspondence is in response to your most recent request of September 22 toreview, declassify and release the NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary for the period,January - June 1962... ." ., For YOI,Jr infprrOaUon, Title 5 United states Code (U.S.C.)., Section 552, the Freedomof Information Act (FOIA), is a United States (US) statute and is only applicable to US~, agencies as defined in Title 5 U.S.C., sections 551 and 552. NORAD is a binationalcommand established by Volume 33, United States Treaties (UST), page 1277, subjectto control of both Canadian and US Government agencies as defined in the Act andconsequently is not subject to the US FOIA.'However, it is our,policy under NORAD Instruction 35-17, Processing Requests forNORAD Records, to release records or information where documents or information arenot security Classified 'or consi~red "NORAD Sensitive" and are cost efficient toprovide. In this case, we are pleased to provide you with the attached declassifiedNORAD/CONAD Historical Summary Jan - Jun 62. The only items still consideredsecurity classified are page 35 and a continuing p~raph on page 36, which havebeen removed. We hope this historical summary helps you with your research effortsas a DoD Category Two (educational/news media) writer.If you have any further questions and/or comments, please contact Major JamieRobertson, Deputy Director of NORAD Public Affairs at (719) 554-5816 or Mr. ScottJohnson, Chief, Plans/Products Branch; at extension 3714. -­

Thank you for your continuing interest in the North American Aerospace DefenseCommand. " .SincerelyAttachment: NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary January - June 1962 (less one page and a continuing paragraph) cc:NJ3HO' ...

---FROM: N/J3 Security Manager 24 Sep 93SUBJ:TO:Public Information Request (Mr Robert Gates)PAX (Attn: S.W. Johnson)1. A review for public release of several classified NORADhistorical papers was conducted per your 25 Aug 93 I tr. Thefollowing historical papers were reviewed:a. Air Defense of Alaska, 1940-1957, Hist Ref Paper #2 (S)b. Fifteen Years of Air Defense, 1946-1961, Hist Ref Paper #3(C)c. NORAD's Quest for Nike Zeus and Long Range Interceptor, HistRef Paper #6 (S)d. seventeen Years of Air Defense, 1946-63, Hist Ref Paper 9(S)e. NORAD's Underground Combat Operations Center, 1956-66, HistRef Paper 12 (S)f. 1962 NORAD History (2 parts), Jan-Jun 1962; Jul-Dec 1962 (S)2. All of these historical papers are over 30 years old, markedclassified, and are either without paragraph markings ordowngrading instructions. AFR 205-1 states that cognizantauthority within the Command has declassification authority. DrTorn Fuller, NORAD Historian (HO), and Mr Mark Carlson, Freedom ofInformation Act Officer (N/SPJ2CM) are deemed as cognizantauthority and assisted in the declassification process.3. Dr Fuller's and Mr Carlson's findings are that all thedocuments, in their judgment, can be declassified with thefollowing recommendations/comments:Historical Reference Paper #2:Historical Reference Paper #5:(Carlson) Is unclassified.(Carlson) Is unclassified.Hjstorjcal Reference Paper #6: (carlson) Is unclassi f ied butrecommend USSPACECOM/J3 review the ASAT statements on page 20.Historical Reference Paper #9:(Carlson) Is unclassified.Historical Reference Paper # 12: (Fuller) Most of the documenttalks about the old ENT Bldg and can be declassified. However,there are some descriptions concerning Cheyenne Mtn that shouldremain sensitive/classified. N/J3 Security Manager concurs.Recommend the document be declassified with the exception of those

·.pages (see document) that should be sanitized prior to publicrelease.1962 NORAD History (2 parts), Jan-Jun 1962; Jul-Dec 1962:(Carlson) The document can be unclassified with the followingexceptions: cannot determine declassification for page 35, NSASystem (Part 1), and for pages 47-48, NUDET/Bomb Alarm (Part II).Sanitize these pages prior to public release.4. Our recommendation is to approve for public release thosehistorical reference papers, except those recommendations/commentsalready mentioned, identified in para 1. HQ NORAD POC is CaptBruder, J30S, 4-3988.ROBERT M. BRUDER, Capt, USAFHQ NORAD J3 Security Manager1st Ind, NORAD HOConcur. NOTE: HO recommends PA verify above procedures arecorrect before final release of historical papers. Also, HO doesnot have declassification authority.DR THOMAS FULLER HQ NORAD Historian 2nd Ind, N/SPJ2CMConcur.MARK A. CARLSON Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Officer

MEMO FOR RECORD 12 Dec 97SUBJ: NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, Jan-Jun 62Reference the map located between pages 35-36, "NORAD Missile Force," 1 July 1962.This page is actually a duplicate of a map at page 65 of the history. The map waspreviously declassified during the 1993 review.~JEROME E. SCHROEDERAssistant Historian

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMANDANDUNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND24 November 1997MEMORANDUM FOR USSPACECOM/JSFROM: JASUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request -Mr. Kristensen1. I have reviewed the proposed response to Mr. Hans M. Kristensen's request for thehistorical summary from NORAD/CONAD for the period January - June 1962. I concurwith the proposed response releasing all but "page 35 and a continuing paragraph onpage 36." As an administrative note, the volume provided for our reivew contains apage between pages 34 and 36 which was a map on an unnumbered page. You maywish to ensure that this page is not page 35 and is unclassified before the file isdispatched. Upon verification that the document is unclassified, I recommend that theproposed letter be signed.2. Please feel free to contact me at 4-9193 if you wish to discuss this matter further.~~J.MO~AHAN, Lt Col, USAFAssistant Staff Judge Advocate

MEMORANDUM FROM HQ NORAD/USSPACECOM OFFICE OF HISTORY 16 Oct 97MEMO TO HQ NORAD/PA (MR JOHNSON)SUBJ: Review of NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 History1. Mr. Kristensen requested a copy of the NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 history. Thishistory, less page 35, was previously released to Mr. Robert Gates in Sep 93. I askedHQ NORAD/J3 staff to look at page 35 toward declassifying it. They responded thatsince it deal with the National Security Agency (NSA), that the NSA FOIA Officeshould review that page for declassification and release.2. Recommend that the NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 history be released to Mr.Kristensen without page 35 of the history with an explanation that NSA mustreview page 35 for release.~ JEROME E. SCHROEDERAssistant Historian5 Atch1. Kristensen Ltr (U), 22 Sep 97 rC ) _2. NJ3 Sec Mgr Ltr (U), 24 Sep 93~ .~ ~ S ( . lJ·4. HQ NORAD/J3W Memo (U), 15 Oct 97 HQ NORAD/CONAD ~-Jun 62 History, ~ page 35r'~k cw-J mi. Page 35 (C), NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62. l' -t rY'~THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATCH #5 IS WITHDRAWNRELEASEABLE TO CANADA-U.S.250 S. Peterson Blvd, Ste 116Peterson AFB CO 80914-3160Comm Voice: 719-554-5999,Comm Fax: 719-554-5389DSN: 692-XXXX-_ .. ,. ......._.. ­----......11-,••• ---._-- ~= . ..

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND1 5 OCT 1997MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/USSPACECOM OFFICE OF HISTORYFROM: N/J3WSUBJECT: Review of Page 35, NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 History1. We have reviewed the document and talked with the local National Security Agency(NSA) representative. He informed us that the proper office to perform thedeclassification review is NSA's office for Freedom of Information.2. If you have any questions please contact TSgt Odenweller, N/J3W, 4-5480.-C~M.W~CHARLES M. WHITEHURST, Lt Col, USAFChief, Aerospace Warning DivisionFOR THE COMMON DEFENCE. POUR LA DEFENSE COMMUNE

RELEASEABLE TO CANADA-U.S.. ­RELEASEABLE TO CANADA-U.S.MEMORANDUM FROM HQ NORADIUSSPACECOM OFFICE OF HISTORY 07 Oct 97MEMO FOR HQ NORAD/PAHQ NORAD1J3EIN TURNSUBJ: Review of Page 35, NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 History1. Back in Sep 93, the NORAD staff reviewed the NORAD /CONAD Jan-Jun 62 history inconjunction with a FOIA request. At that time, the NJ3 staff determined that the history wasdeclassified except for page 35. We've received a request for the document from Mr. Kristensendated 22 Sep 97. Request the appropriate J3 staff element review the attached page 35 todetermine if it can be declassified. If it can be declassified, please indicate in the replymemorandum that the NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 history is declassified. If page 35 needs toremain classified, please indicate the reasons in the reply memorandum.2. Please address any questions to the undersigned at 4-3385.'&" -•JEROME E. SCHROEDERAssistant Historian2 Atch1. Kristensen Ltr (0), 22 Sep 972. Pg 35 (S), NORAD/CONAD Jan-Jun 62 History250 S. Peter.son Blvd, Ste 116Peterson AFB CO 80914-3160Comm Voice: 719-554-.5999,Comm Fax: 719-554-5389DSN: 692-XXXX

. - .I " . :'., .. -;- ': 1 ' :. : .. 'I .J "It'\ ! .': J..- '. ~ .' .' '. , .' ,:. \NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE CDMHAND and CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE eOMM.AND I. ! ---..i I ..i .' "~HISTORICAL! ,SUMMARYI .!--~--- . .~:..' - ' . . ~ . f '"JANUARY-JUNE 1962. 1 NOVEMBER 1962':t'.'''Directorate of Command HistoryOffice of Information. Headquarters NORAD/CONAD- ' --- - - ....

FOREWORD This historical swrunary is

FOREWORDMAPS AND CHARTSSUMMARY OF THE FORCESv x CHAPTER-- - -I ORGANIZATION 1 REGION ORGANIZATIONI-Organization of the Alaskan NORAD/CONAD Region Head­quartersI NNR Transition to SAGE 4 Collocation of ARADCOM/NORADRegion HeadquartersNORAD Alternate Command Post - Manning 7 SECTOR ORGANIZATIONReassignment of Bangor Sec­tor to NNRTransfer of Dye Sector to Goose NORAD/CONAD SectorOther Sector Changes----6_ --8 8 11 13 MANPOWER CHANGES14 II SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS17MANNED BOMBER DETECTION SYSTEMS 17 Gap Filler Program and Status17 AEW&C Force20 Texas Towers23 Mid-Canada Line25 -;. 'vii·-- .-.

BALLISTIC MISSILE AND SPACEWEAPONS DETECTION SYSTEMSBallistic Missile EarlyWarning SystemSpace Detection and TrackingSystemMissile Defense Alarm SystemSubmarine Launched MissileDetection System2626~ .293638NUDET AND Blc REPORTING SYSTEMSNUDET Reporting SystemBomb Alarm SystemBiological · anct-ChemicalRapid Warning System39394040~"";:::o;-"$J"'"IIIIVCOMMUNICATIONSNORAD/SAC Northern Area CommunicationsObjectives PlanCOMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTUREWEAPONSPRIMARY FACILITIESNORAD Underground COCBACK-UP FACILITIESAI~ernate Conunand PostBa~k-up - interceptor ControlCOMMUNICATIONSConunand and Control TeleconununicationsRequirements. ,MAKNED BOMBER WEAPONS SYSTEMSInterceptor ForcesBOMARC ForcesNike ForcesLong-Range InterceptorMissile Dispersal andDeployment PlansInterceptor Dispersal PlansIncreased Alert PostureLong-Range Airborne PassiveHoming SystemviiiIt t ", .. : . , ~- .. I, .~ . ~ "'...... • ~. 1· c.. • " I.~ r. , ; , . t- ._.......... ':'_ to "." " of. ~ . ~ • w "43---,.,43464646474750---:-­58-58606060 --.. - --~-63636669707273- -.­

BALLISTIC MISSILE AND SPACEWEAPONS DEFENS~ SYSTEMS 74 Niko Zeus74 Interire Sate~iite Intercept Capability75Manned Maneuverable AerospaceDefense ~ystem - - 76V OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND POLICIES 77 TRAINING AND EVALUATION77 ECM-l'raining,,77 Low-Level Intercept Training~ Operational Evaluatioit""6f ­NORAD Forces ~80-----IDENTIFICATION AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL81 ·Air Defense and Air Traffic Control Integration81 Integration of Canadian-U.S. Plans for SCATER82 Canadian Priorities for Movement Of Civil and Mil­ --­itary Aircraft84 IFF Mark XIIsr­WARNING AND READINESS86 CONELRAD 86Canadian Attack Warning System . 87 NORAD Alerting Syst'em 88 Automatic Ballistic Missile Attack Warning System 89 Defense Conditions in j1as}i§___91 Changes in DEW Lirie Proce- ­dures91 Mid-Canada Line Procedures 92 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS97'" ., "'J.:i' y:.... .. ~... ;'.'~ .. 1; ... .:- .. -" ... , .••W, ... : '.' ,- - ----

MAPS ANDCHARTS ALASKAN NORAD REGION HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION ­CHART 3NORAD BOUNDARIES, 1 JULY 1962 12NORAD GAP FILLERS, 1 JULY 196'2 18'$.­....a-~NORAD PRIME RADARS, 1 JULY 1962 24 ""­NORAD INTERCEPTOR FORCE, 1 JULY 1962 61~- -NORAD MISSILE FORCE, 1 JULY 1962 65.-:"j.:,.-'.. ----=-­x

, '.-'0.' .'. ~ .. ;,~... : --.,• ; 1 t • I . \ •~ '" t. ~ f I ) 'l I...:' ~' , ~ \ ,I ~, '. -~ , .. ,SUMMARY OF THE FORCES-.( A sof 1 July 1 9 6 2 . } ' - .MISSILE FORCERegular2 BOMARC A '"Squadrons .,.....4 BOMARC B Squadrons ....a-.~ :-3 BOMARC A & B SquadronsMissiles Authorized - 210 A, _223 BMissiles Assigned - 210 A, l~B139 Hercules Fire UnitsMissiles Authorized - 1846Army National Guard69 Aj ax .Fire UnitsMissiles Authorized - 1661i ,INTERCEPTOfr FORCERegular48 Fighter Interceptor Squadrons ~ 960aircraft authorized, 1007 aircraftassignedSquadrons: 17 11 14 1 . 5F-lOl F-I02 F-I06 ~4D--CF-IOT"-~ ':.Augmentation23 ADC/ANG - 575 aircraft550-600 aircraft from Navy/Marines (24­33 Squadrons) as available56 aircraft from TAC Regular Force asavailable (D-Day through D+30) ,[ xi].~. ...; . '.:",',., . .-- - - ....

. ! ~ .:'42 aircraft from TAC Regular Force asavailable (D-Day through D+5)~. "14 TAC/ANG Squadrons as available75 aircraft from USAF ADC20 aircraft from USAF ATC12 aircraft from RCAF ADCAircraft ' from RCN Shearwater as available ­SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROLSurveillance183 Prime Radar Sites 101 Gap Filler Radars Distant Early Warning Line: Land based segment - 6 main, 28intermediate and 23 auxiliarystationsAleutian segment - 1 main and 5auxiliary stationsGreenland segment - 4 auxiliarystationsMid-Canada "Line: 8 section control and90 doppler detection stations11 Picket Ship Stations authorized, 10~ .manned' ..:...- - "11 AEW&C Stations authorized, 7 mannedPacific Barrier and G-I-UK Barrier(under operational control of CINCPACand CINCLANT) "Pacific Barrier - average of 4! WV-2aircraft on station; 2 DER stations(early warning secondary mission)G-I-UK Barrier - average of l~ aircrafton station; 1 DER on station ~----2 Ballistic Missile Early Warning Stations1 Space Detection and Tracking System..... ~.. _.Control1 Combat Operations Center1 .NORAD ALCOP8 NORAD Region Combat 'Centers "(3SAGE-, 5Manual)[ xii]. , .... ... , ... . ~--- -

25 NORAD Sector Direction Centers (21SAGE, 4 Manual)_3 NORAD Sectors without direction centers28 NORAD Control Centers1 CONAD Control Center (Thule AB, Greenland)MANPOWERAuthorizedNORAD and Components - 145,760 _ALCOM 3,418Navy Barriers6, 96~"'""'=National Guard 38,192Total 194,334 --.~Augmentation 14,352GRAND TOTAL - 208,686~..---=- --­[xii:iJ",. .' .' ...:. . , " , .---~. .::. . !

" ."- ..., ",:;,~ .. -t'-,-~~: I ., . ~~; ";, '; ~.., :t.,. .,.. • t. !,.CHAPTER 1ORGANIZATION REGION ORGANIZATIONORGANIZATION OF THE ALASKAN NORAD/CONAD REGION HEADQUARTERS . ~-The Alaskan NORAD/CONAD Region was~ .ablishedback in 1958 by NORAD general order an~the Commander-in-Chief, Alaskan Command '(a JCSunified commander) designated Commander of~NR.CINCAL delegated authority for operational controlof the Alaskan air defense forces to theCommander, Alaskan Air Command. The latter usedhisstaff to perform the planning and operatingfunctions of ANR. In effect, thus, COMAAC was inthe position of controlling the air defense forcesof -the other component commanders.Because of the peculiar nature of the Alaskanarea,i.e. ~. being under a JCS unified commander, ,­NORAD made no further effort to organize the AlaskanRegion. ' Its region organizational plans, in- ..-­cluding the 1 April 1961 plan which was approvedfor implementation by the JCS, excluded ANR. The1 April plan carried the statement that ANR wasorganized in accordance with the desires of CINCAL.A report of an operational evaluation, madeof ANR in October 1961, pointed out that ....~.'nn~-- ·planning required by ANR had not been accomplishedto a degree comparable with other NORAD regions. .It further pointed out that there was no ANR organization,per se, at the time of the evaluation.The report recommended that CINCAL, as CommanderANR, establish a region staff and that this staff,in conjunction with component staffs, perform the--planning and operating functions for the air...._.­_ ~ _=~" . " ~ ':'[ 1 ]," " ~ .'. " ,, .- - A

. :'.defense of Alaska. The same recommendations madein person to CINCAL and COMAAC by NORAD personnelat this time were well received. ALCOM advised- - -~ - _in November that establishment of an ANR headquarterswas being studied based on CINCAL's approvalof a concept for establishment.The upshot was that on 19 January, ALCOM issueda plan for the organization of Alaskan NORAD/CONAD Region and it was put into effect on 1 February1962. An ANR general order established thestaff structure effective this date.The NORAD region plan of 1 April 1961 was -a.=.-:-­used as a guide to set up the ANR Headquarters--­structure (shown on the chart on the following ,--.page). ANR Headquarters staff totalled 32 (notincluding the Commander, i.e., CINCAL), consistingof 18 Air Force and 14 Army personnel. Allpositions, except that of the commander, weremanned by personnel from AAC and U.S. Army Alaska,the component commands, in a dual capacity. However,the ALCOMplan provided that when desiredby the component commander, certain of these personnelcould be furnished from his resources onaprimary duty basis f--ANR continued under the command of CINCAL inhis dual capacity. CINCAL was the only ALCOM officeron the region staff. The Vice Commander ofthe region was the Commander of Alaskan Air Command.The Deputy Commander was the senior Armyofficer present for duty and assigned to the staffof ANR in a dual capacity. The Deputy for Operationswas an Air Force officer and the AssistantDeputy an Army officer. The remainder of the --.- - -~staffstructure was also integrated with thesenior officer, regardless of service, acting aschief. Since all personnel in the headquartersstaff structure were U.S. nationals, they performedboth NORAD and CONAD functions.-'­[ 2 ] -- _.-- .- . ­. '. '. " - . 1- --

.;. I ;~: .." ...\ '.'J ~ .. ...~_4,•.~ .... .' .. ', ­ALASKAN NORAD REGION HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION CHART r--------------. --~ -COMMANDOFFICEOFINFORMATION -DIRECTORATEOFADMINISTRAHON-­- ...........,..DEPUTYFOROPERATIONS• • • ••••••••... ~~ ..DIRECTORATEOFOPERATIONS• • ---­.• -­ -DIRECTORATE"'r--­OF EXERCISEAND EVALUATION.-..- . -COMBATCENTER~-"'--IDIRECTORATEOFINTELLIGENCE.---- OPERATIONAL CONTROLRESPONSIBLE TO COMMANDER, ANR, FOR EVALUATIONS••••••••3--..­

j It.~" ~ . .. r ~ 1IO . _ . , . \J '"... , I . I \ ; • , • .l ~\ ;. ' ,I" I, , '. ," , .. 'Because ANR was superimposed on the AAC structureand used its facilities, including the combat _ .center, ANR Headquarters was collocated with AAC-- ­Headquarters. The AAC Director of the region combatcenter was responsible to the region Deputyfor Operations for those functions of the combatcenter coming under the responsibility of theregion commander.In a special order dated 24 January, ALCOMtransferred region functions performed by HeadquartersALCOM to the region headquarters effective1 February. ALCOM orders and regulations onoperation of the region were to remain in effect~~~until superseded by region directives.,­NNR TRANSITION TO SAGECurrent planning called for the NorthernNORAD Region (NNR) and the ottawa NORAD Sector tobecome SAGE-operational in July 1963. The changeoverfrom a manual to a SAGE operation for bothNNR and the Ottawa Sector was to begin about 1- -:"""" ­September 1962. During the period of the changeover,both the Regi6n and Sector Headquarterswere to move from St~ Hubert, Quebec, to North­Bay, Ontario. While the move and the changeoverto SAGE was in progress, NNR would continue toconduct its air defense operations from the manualcombat center at St. Hubert.Manpower problems connected with the shiftwere eliminated when NORAD got JCS approval inJanuary 1962 for an additional 55 U.S. manpower "'-~.. ­' ':'~-- -- ........ -=spacesto provide the SAGE capability at NorthBay in 1963. Soon after, in April, NNR suggestedto NORAD a means for organization during theshift from one location to the other. NNR proposedit establish a Detachment 1 at North Bay tobe composed of personnel coming in to fill theNorth Bay NNR and Ottawa Sector positions. Thisdetachment would be responsible to the NNR--[4 ] .... ';. ~ ., ,"" ..- - .­

• • • 4 ffl' .' ~ " :r. .,,~~Vi," ~ ~ :;: ':' ,": "'",;,, , t !", •Commander. Detachment 1 would become Hea~artersNNR when the two centers became SAGE operational.At this time, if necessary, an overlap manualcapability could be provided by switching thedesignation "Detachment 1" to the manual combatcenter at St. Hubert .NORAD approved the NNR proposal with minormodifications. Instead of one detachment at NorthBay, NORAD wanted two: Detachment A to be composedof incoming regjon personnel; Det~chment»of incoming sector personnel. When the units~ecameSAGE operational, it would be a sltipie matterto redesignate Detachment A as HeadquartersNNR (SAGE) and Detacrune'nt B as Headquarte~~LOttawaNORAD Sector (SAGE). In the meantime, both detachmentswould be directly responsible to NNR Headquartersat St. Hubert. NNR accepted NORAD's modification.Because of the move of NNR Headquarters fromSt. Hubert to North Bay, there would be a precedentin .NORAD region. command organization. Up to 6­ ~­this time, NORAD region commanders served in thedual capa~ "ity- as component commanders also. In-:-­the case o~ NNR, the commander was also comma~derof the RCAF ADC. " This arrangement was possiblebecause RCAF ADC Headquarters and NNR Headquarterswere both located at St. Hubert. But with themove of NNR Headquarters to North Bay, the RCAFsaw a need for a separate NNR Commander. Accordingly,they asked NORAD to change its generalorders designating the RCAF ADC commander the NNRcommander. NORAD did so with General O~_ i ~ :.:."""'~dated 2 August 1962, and the RCAF assigned Air ­Vice Marshal James B. Harvey as commander of NNReffective 15 September 1962. Air Vice MarshalHarvey would thus become the first and only NORADRegion commander whose sole responsibility was toNORAD..... '. ~~ ~ ~'! " ..• I :. :. .,_ •• ' ~ l --- - ~""' I'

'. '''''__ ''''~:1'':~'~~':~'' .:.. ~ \',:. ......,...,. ... -- "\:!i \0 • ' ':",,' ;" .,COLLOCATION OF ARADCOM/NORAD REGION HEADQUARTERSNORAD policy called for the collocation ofARADCOM Region Headquarters with NORAD Regionheadquarters by 1965. By 1 August 1961, ARADCOMhad readjusted its region boundaries to coincidewith those of NORAD/CONAD and USAF ADC. Thisleft NORAD/CONAD, USAF ADC and ARADCOM with sixmajor subordinate commands each in the U.S., withcommon boundaries.But by 1 August 1961 only~wo ARADCOM region 'headquarters had been collocated with NORAD regi~;-~headquarters. The first to be collocated, the 7thARADCOM Region Headquarters, had been collocatedwith the 25th NORAD/CONAD Region Headquarters atMcChord AFB, Washington, since its establishmenton 26 July 1960. The second, the 2d ARADCOMRegion Headquarters, was moved from Fort Meade,Maryland, to Oklahoma City on 1 August 1961,where it joined company with the 32d NORAD/CONADRegion Headquarters.This still left something like three and ahalf years to collo~ate the remaining four ARADCOMregion headquartersi~ Before any more collocatingwas done, however, ARADCOMbegan reassessing thecost and operational factors involved . In itsanalysis, ARADCOM found that construction of thefacilities needed by the region headquarters attheir new locations would cost in the neighborhoodof four million dollars, not including communicationscosts. Furthermore, ARADCOM decidedthat a relocation of the 1st and 5th ARADCOM RegionHeadquarters would seriously hamper the re- --- ­gion commanders in carrying out their primarymission, that of insuring the combat readiness oftheir Nike fire units. In addition, ARADCOMstated they had been told informally by NORADstaff officers that NORAD Aerospace Control Centerswere scheduled for activation in the 1968­1970 period which might cause major changes inNORAD region alignments. This would mean that~ ' --oc.:-_..... :.[ 6 ]- ... 'to.. ~ ' _..,. '" . -- .- - ~• 6. • 'r."

the collocation of the remaining four ARADCOMregion headquarters would be good for onl¥-threeor four years.ARADCOM recommended, therefore, that of theremaining four ARADCOM region headquarters the4th and 6th be collocated, but not the ~st and5th. This would cost around two million dollars.NORAD, deciding the anticipated gains in NORADoperational effectiveness were outweighed by thecost, temporary nature, and attendant operationaldisadvantages of mo~ing the 1st and 5th ARADqQMRegion Headquarters, agreed to the ARA~M proposal.NORAD ALTERNATE COMMAND POST MANNINGOn 30 January 1962, the 29th Region sent 'NORAD its proposed plan for manning the NORADAlternate Command Post at Richards-Gebaur AFB,Missouri. The plan called for eight officers, 60airmen, and one civilian, all to be provided byUSAF ADC. NORAD approved the plan on 5 March 1962-.-­ADC;'came' up with four officers and 60 airmen,then asked NORAD for help in providing the remainingfour officers and one civilian. Pointing out --­that the alternate command post was a NORAD operation,ADC said it did not see why it should provideall the manpower. ADC asked NORAD to requireother component forces to share the burden.NORAD thereupon discussed the request withARADCOM and NAVFORCONAD • NAVFORCONAD Q.tfeN!d- ~o ... -:-~...::.-:-;:assistance, but ARADCOM agreed to man the fourremaining officer spaces. NORAD then discussedthis with 29th Region, and learned that it stillfelt that ADC should provide all the manning.29th Region also conveyed this feeling to ADC,whereupon ADC relented and agreed to man the remainingfive spaces. In view of ADC's change ofheart and the Region's insistence on 100% ADC[ 7 ]• " • • t •r. ' " '. •",:"' .

manning of the ALCOP, NORAD told ARADCOM it wouldnot have to man the four spaces for which it ha~ ~ .volunteered.SECTOR ORGANIZATIONREASSIGNMENT OF BANGOR SECTOR TO NNRBackground. Originally, the Bangor NORAD/CONAD Sector was to be reassigned from the 26thRegion to Northern NORAD Region (NNR) in January­1963. In December 1961, however, NORAD approve~~~anNNR proposal to make the change on 1 August1962. Accompanying this shift were a number ofother changes:1. The Bangor Sector would transferfrom 26th Region to NNR on 1 August 1962.2. The Fredericton Sector would bephased out and its area turned over to the BangorSector.3. The MQ~treal Sector would be phasedout and its area divided temporarily between theBangor and Ottawa Sectors. The Ottawa Sector­would take over the southern portion of the MontrealSector assigned to the Bangor Sector whenthe Ottawa Sector became SAGE operational aroundthe middle of 1963.4. The Bqston Sector would change overfrom a Model 8.1 to a Model 9.1 computer programand expand its boundaries accordingly. This __ ----­would bring the Boston Sector's boundaries out totheir final SAGE configuration.5. The Goose Sector boundaries would beset at their final configuration.6. The Sault Sainte Marie Sector boundarywould be extended eastward to include the.." [ 8 ]~ ~ .~~ • ~ "1 '. ", 1 • : :.,: • ~.. ~ :..

':·7/~~>:.~

•'( ~ ~, t ! ; : ' "': I, l:: 1;!' j I :, '( : t f .• I~ ~ .. } : : 't' ( ~t I' • I 1 \ ~Next came a change in the date of the BangorSector transfer to NNR from 1 August 1962 to 15September 1962. As noted, the date had first been -~ ­moved back from January 1963 to August 1962 topermit the early phase-out of the Fredericton Sector,which would permit personnel and communicationsfacilities to be moved over to the phasing-in SAGE ­operation at North Bay.* For the same reason, theMontreal Sector phase-out was tied in with the complexof moves. Because of exercises taking placein the area during the period 1 August - 14 September,however, the NNR Commauder asked that theeffective date of the Bangor transfer be changed ­to 15 September. ~~ ~-­NORAD agreed to the delay, but this caused--another problem. The Bangor Sector reassignment,as mentioned above, was to include boundarychanges made necessary by the changeover to theModel 9.1 computer program on 1 August. Theseboundary changes would partly involve the BostonSector's expanding into the present Bangor Sector.This posed the question of whether the Boston Sec­tor's Model 9.1 computer programming (and the consequentboundary change) should be delayed alongwith the transfer ~f the Bangor Sector, or go intoeffect on 1 August as planned. NORAD decided to-go ahead with the Boston Sector Model 9.1 programmingas scheduled, at least as far as possiblewithout changing NNR and 26th Region boundaries. Since the discontinuance of the Fredericton and Montreal Sectors was also being delayed to 15 September to coincide with the transfer of the Bangor Sector, the Boston expansion would reduce the size of the Bangor Sector during the six weeks _ - _ following 1 August. But NORAD considered this ----- -- ~ ­better than re-adapting the computers. The transfer of the Bangor Sector to NNR jurisdictionand the accompanying change in boundaries---;:-:._.* See NNR Transition to SAGE.[ 10 ], , . ~ ,> ••I • • ••• : •••--.­

gave rise to a question of Bangor and Boston CONAD Region assignments and boundaries. Whent~ NORAD boundary changes went into effect on 15 'September 1962 they would leave the northern part of Maine and the northern tip of New Hampshire within NNR's area of responsibility. They would also ~eave the southern tip of Nova Scotia in tpe Boston NORAD Sector's area of responsibility. Since CONAD boundaries had to end at the U.S.-Canadian border, Boston and Bangor CONAD Sector boundaries were left up in the air. NORAD met the situation by assigning to the Boston and Bangor CONAD Sect~_ all U.S. territory and all adjacent U.~;t.erritor­ial waters and international waters containe~within the Boston and Bangor NORAD Sectors.TRANSFER OF DYE SECTOR TO GOOSE NORAD/CONAD SECTORIn February, the Goose NORAD Sector brought to the attention of CONAD and NNR a problem in connection with the exercise of operational con­trol of DEW East. The latter was under the oper­ational control of the Commander Goose CONAD Sec­tor. However, Goose Sector pointed out that DEW East was,in effect, under the direct operational-. control o~Dye' Main. And since Dye Main was re­sponsible directly to NNR rather than Goose, ·there was no effective way that the Goose CONAD Sector Commander could exercise operational control as required. To solve this, the Goose Commander asked that the Dye Sector be placed under the operational control of the Goose NORAD/CONAD .Sec­tor. NNR agreed with the complaint and ~tith-~~~ority to place the Dye Sector, in its entirety,under the operational control of the Goose NORADSector. In April, NORAD approved NNR's request,but only for that portion of the Dye Sector whichlay within NNR. This provided the Commander, Goose CONAD Sector with a link at Dye Main (USAFofficer) to exercise his DEW East responsibilities.',-­- _., .. . ~'l~.J:" ,',I. ~ . . ~:. I : ~' .,:. • I " ~'. , .- ,..~,{.....'"'.•. ~I• • I .• • ---- - ~

'iQPlflIErnl"tNORADBOUNDARIES29 Region OesignalionGOOSESector O••ignationSector Boundary*Combat Operation. C"nta' (COC) NORAD CONTROL CENTER (NCC)"* ® Raglon Headquarter!. and Raglon Combat Center-SAGE (RCC-S).. Intarlm Nee (to be discontinuedo Re~ i on l-':eadqua'ler. end Region Combat Center.Manual (RCC- M) undor ttl. BUIC Plan)Altarnal, Command Po.t (ALCOP) [~~"'.••h~wn}t ~.o~ .ame •• S!lctor (~g Alexandria >]Manual Nee•• CONAO Control Cente, (CCe)5."0' Direction Cent.,· SAGE (SOC.S)o Sector Clfactton Center-ManuAl (SDC-M) m::J Seclor who•• Seclor Olrection C."n••, 'e SAGE (SOC-S)

, , " • ,r 1 ~ -; -.:,.,,~ , · ~ 'T" .. '" · ', l- ~ j ~ • ~ • ! \ I • ... ' I •OTHER SECTOR CHANGESKansas City - Sioux City Sector. · - TIie --KansasCity NoRAb Sector, replaced by the-Sioux CityNORAD Sector, was officially relieved of all airdefense responsibilities on 15 January 19~2.Detroit and Chicago Sector Boundaries.NORAD published general orders assigning the finalprogrammed area of responsibility to the Detroitand Chicago NORAD/CONAD Sectors, effective 25 May1962. Originally, the boundary change was to~~keplace on 5 May, but it was held up by ~~clay ingetting the Cincinnati BIRDIE system operat±o~al.Goose Sector Headquarters Location. ~ORAD/CONAD general orders issued on 30 March 1960 hadplaced the Goose NORAD/CONAD Sector Headquartersat Melville Air Station, Labrador. On 13 June ­1962, NORAD/CONAD issued general orders placingthe Goose Sector Headquarters instead at nearbyGoose Air Base, Labrador. The Goose Sector Headquartershad actually been collocated at Goosewit~ the Goose Air Defense Sector Headquartersall the time, an arrangement that had facilitate.J!..the use o~the dual staff principle.Sector Designations. To avoid divulging or ~implying the capability of sectors in sectortitles, NORAD issued a general order in June 1962deleting the parenthetical designation (manual)from the Goose NORAD Sector title. By this timethe parenthetical designations of all other non-SAGE sectors programmed for continuation had alreadybeen dropped. This left Ottawa S~s _ ~ -~the only non-SAGE sector still carrying its (manual)designation, a disparity that would be correctedwhen the Ottawa Sector converted to SAGEin 1963.~ ? . ~: ' .~::~-i. ', ','.[ 13 ]

MANPOWER CHANGESNORAD submitted its manpower requirementsfor Fiscal Year 1963 to the Joint Chiefs ofStaff on 29 January 1962, requesting in the processan additional 37 people for NORAD/CONAD Headquarters. At the t ,ime of submission, NORAD wasstill evaluating a possible requirement for - a CommunicationsStatus Center in the NORAD COCo Decidingthe function was needed, NORAD supplementedits 29 January submission on 5 March with a requestfor five senior master se~eants to man the .new center. This brought the NORAD Headquarters ­request total to 42 additional spaces. ~~~In an effort to keep sporadic requests foradditional manpower to a minimum, NORAD also includedthe NORAD-approved adjustments requestedby the -region commanders in the annual manpowersubmission to the JCS. These included 15 peoplefor region/sector headquarters and 6 for the GooseSector Headquarters (4 Canadian, 2 U.S.).NORAD's final manpower requests had beenscaled down considerably from those of the NORADHeadquarters staff 's~ctions and region/sectorheadquarters. NORAD - ~eadquarters staff sectionshad asked for 56 spaces, as opposed to the 37requested in the official submission to the JCS.NORAD region/sector headquarters requests werereduced by NORAD from 29 to 15, and the proposedmanning for the Goose Sector Headquarters wasdropped from 10 to 6 (RCAF Headquarters hadoriginally suggested 4 Canadian and 6 U.S. spaces).--,..---....­-In spite of this, the JCS further reduced the--- ----­additional requirements. Their reply of 23 April1962 granted only 22 of the 42 spaces NORAD hadasked for for its headquarters. The regions andsectors did better. The six spaces requested forthe Goose Sector Headquarters were granted, andof the 15 other additional region/sector spacesrequested by NORAD, 13 were granted. Thismaoe- a[ 14 ] --A

t" .... 'i'"' 'J.: ..":," ." • , • 't _ ! 'tI' , J­I' _ ": r ~ ;; l' • . ~ ;• i , . .. . ' ! ,I !..:._ '" - > " •total of 41 spaces, but the net increase forNORAD over-all, was only 40 because one exi~ingUSMC colonel space was deleted (from the 26th­Region).* Increases authorized by the JCS wereprimarily in operational functions, while thoseturned down were mainly administrative in nature.These changes were incorporated in the 1 ~uly1962 JTD. .The new authorizations added a total of fivenew RCAF spaces. In addition to the 4 RCAF spacesslated for the Goose S,ector Headquarters, NORADacquired an additional flight lieutenant for tire25th ~egion, as requested by the region~'"1iurthermore,in a separate action, NORAD traded back 1:0the RCAF its Canadian Civilian Defence ResearchBoard physicist slot on the NORAD Headquartersstaff for an RCAF flight lieutenant slot for J-5(Directorate of M&O). The physicist position hadbeen allotted to the discontinued Office of ChiefScientist and had been vacant for some time.In the meantime, NORAD .also had been thinkingabout approximately 10 more spaces it needed within ~ """' .­the headquarters - 5 general-duty officers for theComba~ Op~ations Center (COC) and five officers _~fora NORADlADC Joint Communications Center . . AsNORAD moved into the missile age, the command felt ___more and more a need to provide full-time seniorrepresentation in the COC, a ranking officer thoroughlyfamiliar with all procedures, directives,and systems. An attempt had been made to meet therequirement on a roster basis, but this onlypointed up the need for senior controllers workingin the COC environment on a ' regular basi~ JWRAD --=:-=:-;:stated its requirement as one Army Colonel, two ­Air Force Colonels, and one Navy Captain.* Actually two USMC colonel spaces were deleted,including one from the 28th Region, but thelatter was . restDre~ by the JCS after a NORADprotest until July 1963 when it was to become aUSAF colonel space.'i -',' ;-, ,_ .. , ,', ~ ,. . ~ , ... ·- t .... . . 2!t:,~.-- -~

~ ••• -: n (~rr , -'r~·r·.~ !~~!!, J.. . ~. .;:1 I. ,; ~ ;.! ': ),: ;~. 1,This same advance in weapons technology madeCINCNORAD feel he needed fUll-time officers in theNORAD/ADC Joint Communications Center. The Com- -munications Center was presently staffed entirelyby USAF ADC personnel who were neither directlyresponsible nor responsive to CINCNORAD.~.Mindful of JCS concern over the steadily increasingmanpower requirements of joint headquarters,however, NORAD intended to obtain the spacesas far as possible from within its own resources.Deciding the spaces could best he obtained througha reorganization of the staff, NORAD launched _early in 1962 a manpower and organizational revie~ .of the headquarters.The headquarters JTD was screened and themanpower and organization review studied, then themajor staff sections were approached in an attemptto locate the seven colonel or colonel-equivalentspaces for the COCo As a result, J-3 agreed torelease one space, J-4 two spaces, J-5 three spaces,J-6 one space, and DCS/Programs one space. At theend of June, approval was being sought from theNORAD Chief of Staff to transfer the spaces to theCOC. ~.­The transfer of five spaces to the Joint CommunicationsCenter was expected to be a little moredifficult to achieve, largely because it looked asif they would have to come from higher grade authorizationsand hence would have to be forwarded tothe JCS for approval.NORAD Headquarters as of 30 June 1962 was .-.'authorized 699 spaces - 106 USA, 43 USN, 509 USAF,39 RCAF, and 2 USMC. These figures did not includechanges to the JTD going into ~ffect on 1July 1962 (i.e., an increase of 22 spaces).----- .- . -l. ,. ":""''ft_[ 16J.. . - ~ " '.­--.­

. ICHAPTER 2SU RVEILLANCE SYSTEMS MANNED BOMBER DETECTION SYSTEMSGAP FILLER PROGRAM AND STATUSBackground. A pxogram was establi~hed inOctober 1960 by USAF to modernize all existing....SAGE gap filler sites and equip all protrarnmedSAGE gap filler sites (a total of 182 -".. 137 rnthe U.S. and 45 in Canada) with the AN/FP~Z~.At other than new sites where this radar set wasto be installed, the existing radar (AN/FPS-14 orAN/FPS-18) was to be converted to this radar withmodification kits. A total of 12 non-SAGE gapfiller sites, located in the interior of the U.S.,were to have AN/FPS-18's, making an over-all totalof 194 gap fillers.But this program soon changed. For one thing,in order ~o pr~vide a SAGE back-up (see Chapter:-­Three), reorientation of the 416L System was _necessaryto get the funds. One of the cuts in 416L­established by USAF in November 1961, and agreedto by NORAD and ADC, was fifty AN/FPS-74 modificationkits from the FY 1962 buy.* By this time,the program had changed to a total of 170 FPS-74'sand 15 FPS-18's. The latter had increased from12 because of the addition of three gap fillers inthe program for Florida.--. '--~- ­Status. After deletion of the FPS-74 modificationkits and a number of other shifts, additions,-~-* See NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, Jul-Dec 1961,pp. 26-33, for details .• I..[ 17 -]'," .....• " . I ~ .' ., . • • • , I' " ~ r: t \ • ) .. " \ "'~'. ,- - .",- - ~

J ... .., -"5J:~~~~//--:-­-101 TOTAL(l1 STANDBY)---.­

and cuts, the program on 30 June 1962 was for atotal of 174 gap fillers in the U.S. and Can~da.This included 124 FPS-74's (45 for Canada-a~d-79for the U.S.) and 50 FPS-IB's (for the U.S.).Thus, of the 174 sites, 129 would be in the U.S.There were 101 gap fillers (11 on standby) as of1 July 1962, all FPS-IB's or FPS-14's (and-all inthe U.S.). The first FPS-74's were scheduled forinstallation and operation in CY 1963.As noted above, 45 gap fillers were programmedfor Canada under' the ~ADIN program. All were to beFPS-74's. Contracts for construction of' 12 sfteshad been let by April, one site was to~~uilt bythe RCAF Construction Maintenance Unit"and cO'ntractsfor the other sites were to be let {Lejorethe end of May.Program Re-evaluation. At mid-year, howev~r;the gap filler program was again in need of reevaluatingand rescheduling. There was forecasta six month slippage in the FPS-74 program becauseof the -inability of the contractor to produceequipment on schedule. It was felt that any furtherslippage, because of the contractor, couldcause the ~ontFact to be given to a new contract§?which woul~result in another year's delay, i.e.,-installation in 1964. 'Then on 4 July, RCAF Headquarters indicatedto NORAD that the gap filler program in Canadawould be deferred because of financial stringenciesand the current difficulties in the FPS-74 prbgram.In a message to Air Marshal SIemon, Air MarshalCampbell, Chief of the Air Staff, RCAF, ~*~~lor ~~~confirmation that CINCNORAD agreed to ,tli1s defer;:.menteNORAD replied that in its view there was nolessening of the need for a NORAD capability tomeet the threat of a low level attack and, accordingly,the requirement for gap fillers remainedfirm. However, NORAD continued, it was understood[19 ].' "'.," '­" I :" ,I 1 • , .- - .­. ' , 'o'. r '

that because of financial stringencies, the defermentof the gap filler program was selected as the ~.least undesirable means by which Canadian expendi~ ­tures on NORAD could be reduced. Said NORAD,"This national decision is aGknowledged by NORAD."A few days later, USAF advised ADC and NORADofa message just received from RCAF Headquartersstating its plan to defer the FPS-74 program forCanada until Canadian fiscal year 1964-1965.*USAF stated that the RCAF message explained thata Canadian Government decision-to curtail expendi~tures necessitated examination of all programs. ~ _This one had been selected because the current ~ --- ­slippage of six months, plus the Electronic SystemsDivision estimate of probable further ind'e­ --- -.terminate delays, made it a logical choice. RCAFsaid it would appreciate concurrence.--:-­AEW&C FORCEUSAF told ADC and NORAD it agreed this was alogical selection and saw no alternative to concurrence.And further, USAF said that because ofthe difficulties in the FPS-74 program there wasneed to re-examine the total gap filler program.Additional delays could not be tolerated and analternate course of ~.'act -i-on had to be developed incase more difficulties prevented the delivery-schedule from being met.Change in Employment Procedures. Considerablestudy was given to employment of the airborneearly warning and control (AEW&C) force beginning.-.-. -.-_- -,_in 1961 as a vital element in continuing an airdefense capability against a follow-on mannedbomber attack. The assumption was that an attackagainst the North American continent would consistof an initial ballistic missile attack* This was modified at a conference in August toCanadian fiscal year 1963-64.[20 ].' ~ -,,'~..... .; ,.:.. ~ . , -- - ~

, ;" ;' I ,. 'i ~ ~ I~ f "I :r\! I~I I,A :: t:•• ~ "I • • • \1• I ~ • • i ,,:'. . 'i ; ; ~ •followed by a manned bomber attack.,_a.Another problem to consider was what -to do inthe face of a tremendous drain on AEW&c resourcesbecause of the withdrawal of RC-121 aircraft forsupport of special projects. RC-121's were usedto support Projects Discoverer and Samosr -Threeaircraft were taken for Proj ect B-lue Straw fromFebruary through June 1962. Seven planes went forten days to Operation Stairstep, a TAC movement ofaircraft to Europe. For air defense of the southernFlorida area, a full~ime AEW&C station _had to~~esupported. And the ALRI (airborne long r~~ge ~nputs)retrofit and test programs resulted in~rther reductionof available aircraft. ~----In February, the JCS were advised by messageof CINCNORAD's concern over what was termed "theincreasing degradation of the early warning andsurveillance radar coverage caused by the continuingreduction of available resources." Becauseof the many projects, the message said, the stationmanning capability was cut to less than six of the--:--­required eleven AEW&c stations (one off southernFlorida, five off each coast). CINCNORAD urgedthat specxal projects be supported from other thanair defense resources and that there be an ea~lytransfer and retrofit of Navy WV-2 aircraft forair defense (see below) .Along with this, NORAD called a conferencewith ADC and region representatives in Februaryto find the best employment of AEW&C aircraft. Astaff study prepared by NORAD on this problem inconnection with the conference made a m~~;(conclusions; among which were the follow~ng:(1) The AEW&c aircraft do not con­tribute to the active air defense capa­bility against a ballistic missile attack. However, they are required during a manned bomber attack. ·t· A"':' .~[ 21 ], . -.. .0" • •.tt~ ~'\·r ~ \ I j~ , , It;. • L;, ~ - .- - ~

(2) During peacetime, full AffiVstation manning is not required except ~..for the "Southern Tip" station. Randommanning of these stations is desirable.(3) The AEW&C aircraft can be usedto provide:(a) Radar coverage(b) Interceptor control(c) Ajrborn~ ALCOPld) Communications links(e) Reconnaissa~~e(f) Seaward extension of contiguousradar coverage(4) These aircraft cannot be fully--- -­utilized unless they survive. A work­able dispersal plan is needed to "save"these aircraft for use after the initialmissile attack.-·NORAD recommended discontinuance of the attempt toman all currently designated AEW&C stations on aday-to~day basis and that instead 30 percent of --­the stations be manned on a random basis.This was the poricy that was eventually established.On 11 July 1962, NORAD told the regions­concerned that all primary AEW&C stations need notbe manned continuously on a day-to-day basis, butthat a capability had to be maintained to man allprimary stations when required. NORAD directedthat this concept be implemented as soon as possible~nd stated that primary stations, with theexception of the southern Florida station (whichhad to be manned full time), were to be manned on.-"·a rotating, random basis 30 percent of the time.The manning schedule was to be established by theregion commander concerned. The regions were tohave plans to man all primary stations when soordered by CINCNORAD.NORAD ·-also directed the regions to developplans to insure the survival of as many aircraft[ 22 ]Ir1.\' : ..... . . ._, '. r' .. : '. ,! :,",:') --.­

as possible from an initial ballistic missileattack. NORAD suggested that a combinatio~fstanding alert, lIflushll and rotation of-aircraftto dispersal bases be used.Transfer of WV-2's. Seven Navy WV-2's (radarequippedSuper Constellations) were transferred tothe Air Force during the period April through June1962. At mid-year, these aircraft were undergoingretrofit in California to the RC-121 configuration.When completed, during the period December 1962through March 1963, these aircraft were -to be ~­signed to ADC which would then send the~~ beALRI equipped. - =­Seven of the current ADC RC-121's wo~bekept for manual operations, i.e., not equippedwith ALRI. These seven planes would eventuallybe placed at McCoy AFB, Florida, for manning of .the station off southern Florida.This station was being manned full time by asquadron, the 966th AEW&C Squadron, which, afteractivation and assignment to ADC, was assigned tothe 551st AEW&C Wing for organization at McCoyAFB, 1 Feo!:-.uary 1962. Currently, aircraft forthe squadron's use were being made available by­rotating about seven planes from the East Coast.The strength of the East Coast force was partiallymade up by the transfer of four planes from theWest Coast.TEXAS TOWERS~ ... ~-~-- - ' ~~~Because of the collapse of Texas Tower Number4 in January 1961, measures were established toevacuate the remaining two towers (Numbers 2 and 3)whenever severe storms threatened. The first evacuationof the towers was made on 19 September 1961under the threat of Hurricane Esther. During the .winter, from November to March, both towers wereevacuated nine times. Tower 2 was unoccupied for[ 23 ]. 1 r ., ~ , - ~).: .. '.., "\ ~.. ~, -i: ;.~) ;~ \ :.' ,. I ~ ~.,..- .

---:--.--12922 ANG SITES01 a total of 11 .u:w.C aircraft _t"UoG. au t hori:z.cd, 7 are ...noed - 4 on the Ea.t eoa.t 11 USN~Kff- SHlP--=~ and 3 on the Weet eo... t ,. 18 ALASKASTATIONS Of a total at 11 pick.t .bip .tatioD. authorized, 10 are ...nn.d .. 5 ot~ .acb coa.t .31 CANADA11 USAF AEW&C Si nce 15 Feb , the picket .hipe aU the E••t Co••t haye been deployed O4.Itboard of tbeTHULE.u:""C aircraft st..tions tor te.t and evaluation STATIONS 183 TOT ALof this deploy-.eGt concept. The duration 01 the test period ba. Got beeD deter.iHd . - - - .­

.. 0' ... . ,. ' ...... ' ... '• OJ , .~ \;' j' '. 1. . .: f~~' . ~ . 1·;~~ 0; '" 0 0 0 (J,I," 0a total of 43 days and Tower 3 for 35 days. Itwas estimated, on the basis of four years oJweatherdata, that the towers would haveto ' b~evacuated one to two times per month during winterstorms and in addition that the towers would benon-operational around twenty days per year becauseof hurricanes.Evacuation was expensive and caused a degradationof surveillance. In January 1962, NORADadvised the JCS that AEW&C aircraft were stationedin the vicinity of the towers whenever they wereevacuated. Primary AEW&C station manni~had ~-be reduced to provide these aircraft. ~-The Texas Towers would not be necessa~ __eventually, however, and would be phased out. TheAEW&C aircraft in the off-shore force were to beoperating with ALRI equipment soon. NORAD told,ADC back in September that operational ALRI wouldduplicate the radar coverage capabilities of thetowers with an automatic radar input to SAGE anda voice/digital relay of UHF communications. Becauseof this, NORAD said it planned to delete therequirement for the towers when ALRI became fullyoperationa~. and. had demonstrated reliable detec- -:- .tion, trackIng, and weapon control capabiliti~s. :­In January 1962, NORADtold the JCS that when this'stage was reached it planned to re-evaluate thetower requirement.When this time would be reached was not certain.It was expected that enough ALRI-equippedaircraft would be available by October 1962 topermit an interim operational capability. Pr~~ably there would remain a requirement for-thetowers until sometime in 1963.MID-CANADA LINEBack in February 1961, NNR recommended thatthe -Mid-Canada Line . {MeL) be c-losed--dow-n--whenI " , " - " •. , ,. } -...--~f", : . . •

I • • ~ . ~ c.. -I " •" ~ ) J j', r~ ,.. II :.... \ . '.

", ': ~ ': . ~ :'BMEWS Gaps. At the beginning of 1962, NORADrecognized several deficiencies in the p~e~~tlyplanned BMEWS system.* One of the most seriousof these were the gaps in BMEWS that. would permitthe USSR to evade the net by firing extremely lowangleICBM shots. Of the three primary holes inNORAD's missile defense (the second and third involvingthe submarine-launched ballistic missileand global range ballistic missile), NORAD consideredthe low-angle ICBM possibility the mostthreatening.~"..With low-angle ICBM shots, both sur~~e .andeffectiveness could be attained. With only slightreductions in effectiveness (lower accuracy beingcompensated for by high-yield warheads), t~ -USSRcould fire a ballistic missile from its own territory.at a trajectory giving it a re-entry angle aslow as 7 0 • Since BMEWS was designed and deployedto detect missiles with re-entry angles between15 0 and 65 0 only, the missiles would slip rightunder the net. A great many soft SAC and air defensesites, as well as key industrial areas,were vulnerable to such an attack.-- -', .... ~.;;: ..NORAD ~!-huS'considered it highly important to"plug these gaps. In May 1962, the command developeda program to fill the gaps between Sites I-and II and Sites I and III, the latter being themore serious of the two. The program called fora gap-filler radar on the northern coast of Icelandto take care of the Sites I-III gap and atracking radar at Site II to cover the Sites I-IIgap. The program also called for the use of the·Shemya radar in a manual mode to scan to ~ - west_of Site II. This program was forwarded to USAFand the Secretary of Defense for their consideration.* For BMEWS rearward communications improvements,-- - -see- section entitled NORAD/SACNo.rthern .Ar-ea . ... ­Communications Objectives Plan, this chapter,pages 43 to 45.. [ 27]: • :. ~ .. ~ I I. • r I• " • 'J" l' • , . : J- .- - --=,. .

BMEWS Tracking Radars. The decision to ask for just one more tracklng radar for BMEWS, and that as a ~ap-filler, represented a considerable ­change frr.m NORAD's former position. Originally, NORAD wanted two trackers at each site and the USAF interim configuration for BMEWS, announced in May 1958, called for two tracking radars at both Thule and Clear. A year later, however, all four trackers were deferred. Then, in June 1960, DDR&E agreed to permit a tracker for SitesI and II as soon as the Air Force was satisfied the equipment was reliable. On 4 August 1960, USAF approved a tracker for Thule, but on 12 June 1961 ruled out the tracker for Clear.~~ ~ Throughout these changes, NORAD had continued to urge two trackers for both stations. It based its requirement on expectations that the BMEWS would be subject to a great deal of background noise, thus reducing sensitivity and increasing the false report rate. NORAD also wanted trackers to increase the over-all system reliability. By late 1961, however, NORAD found the two sites suffering from far less background noise than expected and r~liability was meeting design objectives. Consequently, NORAD decided to re­evaluate its tracker requirement. A study was launched in late 1961 that tookinto consideration such factors as probable Russianlaunch areas, missile inventori'es, launchcapabilities, and probable target areas. It alsoconsidered the probable superiority of a trackingradar over a detection radar in an ECM environment .--­The study concluded that the need for a tracker at'-=--­Clear was "extremely marginal." NORAD also concludedthat a tracker would be needed at Clear inan ECM environment only in the unlikely event thatthe USSR launched its missiles in such a way as toavoid the trackers at Thule and Fylingdales completely.By mid-1962, therefore, the NORAD require­- m-ertt for additional BMEWS trackers -had shrunk toone at Site II, Clear, as a gap-filler.-- -""­[ 28J• r ~. '. _. p -, ' .,.. '\ - '"-- .- ­-­

: t ~ ~ .. ':- ......,' 'i: 1- • .., f. I,, ~ ~. ".'. " I} " fJ' ; ! .: " I ~ ~. ", " . , \ ~BMEWS ECM Vulnerability. A second BMEWS deficiencyfacing NORAD at the beginning of ~62was the vulnerability of the system to RCM. InOctober 1961, USAF had authorized $160,000 for"quick fixes" to give BMEWS a limited ability torecognize when it was being jammed. ESD p1.:esentedto the USAF Systems Review Board and the-Air Councilin February a complete $45 million ECCMpro~gram that would give BMEWS some ability to operatein an ECMenvironment. The program was approvedby USAF in March and sent to DOD for approval andfunding. USAF directed AFSC to go ahead.with ~project in the meantime. The ·final pro~ approvedby USAF was for $43.5 million. Meanwh~e,the "quick fixes" had been installed at 'Sites Iand II. ~--BMEWS Range Deficiency. A BMEWS deficiencythat was not headed toward solution by mid-1962was one concerning range. The probability ofBMEWS detecting objects at ranges beyond 1,500nautical miles was low. This deficiency greatlyincreased the possibility that ballistic missileslaunched from the southern part of the SovietUnion or launched at high angles would escapeBMEWS dete~·tion. · A request for equipment to cor....rect this deficiency was included in the NORAD-BMEWS improvement program submitted to USAF andDOD in the summer of 1962.-- -SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKING SYSTEMBackground. In memoranda dated 7 November ·1960, the JCS directed CINCONAD to assum~- _. ~tional command and CINCNORAD to exercise operationalcontrol of the Space Detection and TrackingSystem (SPADATS). This system consisted at the timeof the Air Force Spacetrack System and the NavySPASUR (Space Surveillance) System.The Secretary of Defense had directed in October1960that CINCONAD define the operation and[ 29 ],." - : q'. ' , ."~ :" I" ~ ,, ", .. 1 _. \ ' • .,' . 1. -- .­, ,~ :"" ., .' iii;' ,"

further development of SPADATS, and that NORAD developSPADATS operational procedures. NORAD submittedits operational ~equirements to USAF inDecember 1960. CONAD obtained the requirements ofall user organizations and submitted a compositerequirements document to the JC~~n 20 April 1961.The JCS approved the requirements _ w~th-~lnqrchanges on f6'-J-une- a"ii-a--forward'ed them to tlie Secre­-~-IDyo-f-Deien:se --- _.._...._. ... . . ...-- - _. - --- ­In the meantime, the Air Force had prepareda detailed SPADATS development-and funding plan.The plan called for a phased-array radar as a ~_prime sensor for the SPADATS-Improved system, anr--­the development of an electro-optical sensor toextend the surveillance range beyond that of con- ~ ___ventional radar. It was turned down by DDR&E becauseof excessive cost (up to $1.5 billion).In the fall of 1961, however, NORAD learnedthat $2.1 million had been approved for the developmentof an electro-optical system. Later, inNovember, $14 million was approved to start developinga phased-array radar and to start or continuework on other SPADATS-Improved R&D programs.An additional $16 mIllion was promised for fiscalyear 1963. The two year total was about the amount­USAF had requested for SPADATS-Improved for fiscalyear 1962.SPADATS-Improved. By June 1962, two stepstoward an improved SPADATS had been taken. Bythat time, contracts for ~evelopmental prototypesof both a long-range phased-array radar and adeep-space automatic electro-optical detection an

a single-face R&D model phased-array radar, thedates quoted by Bendix were about one yea~arlierthan previously expected. Bendix promised a-contractorturn-on within two years of the signing ofthe contract, and a turn-over to the Air Force ayear later. This would put the radar in NORAD'shands around April 1965.The Bendix radar would be the first majorradar sensor specifically designed, oriented, andbuilt for near-space surveillance. It would permitthe detection and tracking of sateI-Iites -Q,.+"­biting at low inclination angles not c~~ed bypresent full-time spacetrack sensors. It woqJdalso provide much better surveillance of satellitesin higher inclination angles at altitudes~elow2,000 nautical miles.The first phased-array radar would be positionedin Florida. From there, it would have anominal detection range of 3,200 nautical milesfor a one-square-meter object. The system wouldtrack continually up to 50 random objects at one- ~ ­time without interrupting the search operation.Simultaneous tracking would be restricted to abQl!t20 obj ect~ if-all were near the radar' s maximum ~ ­range, however.--­A contract negotiated with the Radio Corporationof America (RCA) was a start in covering theNORAD objectives for far-space surveillance. Thecontract, signed on 15 June 1962, called for_RCAto develop a prototype of an automatic electroopticaldeep space surveillance and tracking system.The prototype, to be built at Clo~rG£t,_ ~~~New Mexico, would consist of one station. Constructionwas expected to be completed in 1964and when completed the station would provide analtitude coverage in its area of from 3,000 to300,000 miles. Just as the Bendix system wouldbe the first major sensor designed from the startfor near-space surveillance, the RCA system wouldbe the first designed specifically forfar-sp-a:ce - ­surveillance.[31 ]. :~. -; ." . • { " 1 : ~-.: ~ .:! ~ ~.. ,,~ • t .', ' .. - , ' < ---~1 I '. ~. • J •

Meanwhile, NORAD, through NADOP 64-73, hadagain stated its obj ectives for a SPADATS-Improved _­system. In the NADOP, NORAD said it wanted a sys~- -­tern of sensors and computers giving surveillancecoverage from 75 up to 20,000 nautical miles. Italso asked for a North American Space Defense ZonesUbsystem by fiscal year 1968 that would p~ovide ­coverage from 75 to at least 3,000 miles in altitudeextending out about 3,000 nautical miles fromthe continent. The NADOP also asked for an earlywarning subsystem employing sensors in the Pacificand Indian Oceans.Additional Sensors. Until an advanced elec~6:optical sensor system was developed for SPADATS,NORAD wanted the use of Baker-Nunn cameras to pro- ~ __vide data on satellites and space vehicles. TheAir Force, in support of Project Spacetrack, hadprocured five of the cameras for satellite tracking.These were placed in Chile, Canada, Norway,the Boston area (in storage), and at Edwards AFB.In 1961, the Director of Defense Research and Engineeringhad directed the transfer of these camerasto NASA. In December 1961, NORAD made a re­ --­quest to the JCS to _have the Air Force keep thosecameras not committ~d to foreign countries. NORADfelt that transfer to NASA would be detrimental to­their use for SPADATS. NASA would agree only toprovide data on a non-interference basis, was reluctantto operate the system on a classifiedbasis except occasionally, and indicated that itssupport of the operation would continue only untilJuly 1963.In further justification of its position, -~.... ­NORAD told the JCS that conferees at a recentoptical sensor conference had agreed that theBaker-Nunn cameras were the most advanced opticalinstrumentation currently available. _ Radar wouldbe limited to a maximum height of 3,000 miles inthe immediate future, NORAD continued, but theBaker-Nunn cameras could track a one square metertarget to almost ten times that -distance. -- -Baker-­[32 l. -.,- ~ ~), i -! '" • (. • • 1\ .- it _i. ' to,. •• , • I ' . ' -- - ~

, .... 1 •• '. ._ ­( I ~ I ".' ,,' t •• ' t , , •• ~ ••, ~. ....' " , ,Nunn camera tracking accuracy exceeded that ofradar. And, finally, NORAD said that Baker~unncameras could be used in the tracking of lunar andinterplanetary vehicles up to about 48 hours afterlaunch.The JCS agreed and asked the .DDR&E, in January1962, to reconsider its decision to transfer thecameras. The Air Force concurred with this requestthe JCS said. Actually, only three of thecameras were involved, for two, those in Chileand Canada, had been o£fered to those countrie~~with no strings attached.....a...=....",.. ~In March 1962, NORAD learned that DDR&E wasconsidering leaving the three cameras not 6Gmmittedto foreign countries with the Air Force,with operational control to be delegated to NORAD.In considering the request, DDR&E asked where thecameras would be located. NORAD replied that itwould keep the Edwards AFB camera at Edwards,move the Oslo camera to Bermuda, and move theBoston area camera to Samoa.In th~ meantime, NORAD was investigating the__possibility' of-getting some use out of the cameras .given to Chile and Canada through soliciting thecooperation of those two countries. Negotiations ~~had begun in January through NASA to transferownership of the Baker-Nunn camera at the ChileanNational Astronomical Observatory officially tothat institution. NORAD asked USAF to study thepossibility of providing funding and technicalsupport to the Chileans for operating the camera.The official transfer of the camera was ~~p, e___--:::­however, when it was learned that the Russianswere going to send observers down to watch theChileans work it and the camera still had notbeen transferred by June 1962.The Canadian camera at Cold Lake, Alberta,was turned over to the RCAF, however, and thelatter asked NORAD for details concerning the[33 ]~ ,~-~ :~ : ~ ! :. : ~-~~~II? ' .,',~:.t. ',\ t.. - ~ . r' '' " "',,-- '. - - ..-:

kind of space object information it would like to receive. The RCAF also made arrangements with the DRB for use of the Prince Albert Radar Laboratory (PARL) for SPADATS. On 30 January, NORAD provided the RCAF with its detailed requirements for the Baker-Nunn camera at Cold Lake and the radar at Prince Albert. By'the end of April, the RCAF was ­assigning additional people to Cold Lake to carry out the SPADATS mission and was setting up a com­munications system between NORAD and Cold Lake and PARL. By mid-year, the camera at Cold Lake was supplying data to the NORAD SPADATS Center. In order to increase further its SPADATS coverage, NORAD in the fall of 1961 had asked also for operational control of the Shemya, Alaska, radar site; the Moorestown, New Jersey AN/FPS-49 radar site; and the Pincushion Pacific Island AN/ FPS-62 radar site proposed for the Hawaiian Islands. The JCS, on 7 December 1961, confirmed the transfer of the Shemya radar from USAF Secur­ity Service to USAF ADC, previously arranged for by ADC with USAF. The JCS also said that the tracking radar for Shemya was installed and would be operational by 1 February 1962. The Moorestown radar, the JCS said;~would provide data to SPADATS on a part-time basis and within a year would be improved to make it more responsive to SPADATS' needs. NORAD's bid for the Pincushion radar, how­ever, was turned down by the JCS because the cost of its completion and deployment could not be justified by its value. The Shemya radar facility was reassigned toUSAF ADC on 2 February to function under the oper~-~ >I ational control of NORAD. In recognition of the ability of the Shemya facility to provide techni­1 J cal intelligence information on Soviet ICBM's, and• the great need for that type of information, CONADand the Air Force Chief of Intelligence worked outan arrangement whereby such information would beprovided when possible and necessary.[ 34 ] ,. -­• .' ~ I• _ " 1'10 ' t... _\._. _ _ •

W ~CUS~IFlED. Ii , [ 35], •..••• ."

----- - ­ - ..--. - - . ­W;ClASSiflEO MISSILE DEFENSE ALARM SYSTEM (MIDAS)In the fall of 1961, the Secretary of Defen~-::=:set up a MIDAS Ad Hoc Group " chaired by Dr. ' J. P.Ruina (Director of the Advanced Research Proj ects "Agency), to study the MIDAS program. In December, ~­the Ruina group issued the following conclusions:a. MIDAS can probably be made ef­fective against liquid fuel rockets, though this is not certain. b. There is doubt that MIDAS can--:-­be made effective against solid 'fuel missiles in th~ next few years, if ever.: .' - -. . ­.­c. The present MIDAS design is socomplicated that it probably will not~e reliable enough to warrant deployment.d. ·The system's need for more re­search and technological development rules out an early operational date. e. MIDAS will not be available before1966, and perhaps not even then.Still: the Ruina group thought a MIDAS systemwould meet significant military and politicalneeds. It thought, too, that it was probablypossibl~ to develop a re-designed, simplifiedMIDAS that would be effective against mass ICBM ,a t tacks. They recolnmended, therefore, the ' " - --0---- ­[36 ]UNCtASSIFlfDa? fI!!!II!I b , 6) . 5--.­

~ J ~ '" .', ,.~ : 1 r ~ 'I = : 1 ~ .~" I: ~ .: : . ~ ..0\ :;' . : ..... ; J;. "'""t:\ It r :designing, but not the fabricating, of a simplifiedMIDAS. They also recommended that an~erationaldate not be established untiiih-e researchand development program had inspired a proper degreeof confidence.-Meanwhile, budget considerations forced theOffice of the Secretary of the Air Force on 28October to direct AFSC to defer the MIDAS programin favor of SAMOS. Fiscal year 1963 funds forMIDAS had been reduced from $185 million to $100million, and the operational date re-establis~at 1966.NORAD protested the decision and in Decemberjoined with SAC, ADC, and AFSC to descend ~n -- theUSAF Air Council with a joint briefing on theoperational requirement for MIDAS. The briefingstressed the need for an immediate go-ahead toachieve a late 1964 operational capability.As a result of the briefing, AFSC was directedto prepare several plans for possible MIDAS devel- _~opment. AFSC prepared three plans and presentedthem to USAF Headquarters late in February. Plan-A called f9J:' l~rge funding in fiscal years 19~and 1964 to achieve an operational status in late1964, an advanced payload capability for detecting-'-­solid propellant boosters in mid-1966, and a worldwidedetection capability in mid-1967. Plan Bcalled for limited funding in fiscal year 1963,which would result in all operational dates slippingone year. Plane suggested no operationaldate, but called for further research and development.This last plan supported the _Ruin,a-reper--t... ~~~USAF Headquarters accepted, in general, PlanC. NORAD, SAC, and USAF ADC reluctantly agreea-­with Plan C, providing Headquarters USAF wouldtry for an operational date of mid-1965 and defendthe operational and R&D funds needed in the fiscalyear 1964 budget to meet this date.[37 ] • " ... l! ' .'."~ '. I ", .... d ~ "; ...! .... : ' "".'----

While recognizing the technical problems involved,NORAD in NADOP 64-73 again stated its need ~for a MIDAS-type system. NORAD also recommendedthat the MIDAS-type system development be expandedto provide for detecting IRBM's .launched from land,sea, air,or space, including the tracking of coldbody missiles (after burnout).SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE DETECTIONSYSTEMNORAD submitted to the JCS on 24 Febru~ry1962 aq-ualltatIv'e-r'equirement 'tor an automatic ~early warning system against short to intermediate,range missiles (ballistic or cruise types) thatcould be launched against the North American Continent.NORAD said in a letter accompanying thisNQR that a lack of such capability presented anincreasingly grave situation. Many key NorthAmerican targets were within range of'submarinelaunchedweapons.,­-- --NORAD said it knew of the research' on modificationof certain prime radars along the coasts asa means of overcomint' this ~eficiency. Such warningwould be minimal,-however, NORAD . pointed out,­and would have to be supplemented by surveillancecoverage at an earlier segment in the traj ectorythan provided by line-of-sight radar. One developmentNORAD was interested in was MADRE (MagneticDrum Radar Equipment), over-the-horizon, radar.In its NQR, NORAD proposed that there beaninitial operational capability for early warning -"...---'-=---­for submarine launched missiles of 500 nauticalmiles by the end of calendar year 1963, with agrowth to 1500 nautical miles by the end of calendaryear 1964, and up to 2500 nautical miles inearly 1967.NORAD put a requirement in its NADOP 64-73for ' an SLBM detection system. In this, NORAD-~-[ 3,8]" .' I r~'.. ., j .. t ~P)o' •,j \ ' " .. ,:'. ": -oj; -.oJ; I ~••( : ~ t' j . ;t' - - .­

" ~ "i " ... i 1 ~\ I~ } ~. ,.. ,.' ,.. ol r' • I~. r '-~ .. '\ ~ I '}; ~ r., • : ~ ' ," , ,..' - )k.": ; ~ >,...I • I .. •recommended both the modification of selected ANIFPS-24 and AN/FPS-35 FD radars and the emp~ymentof MADRE. Both were required, NORAD- st-ated, forthe most effective warning against the SLBM. Modificationsto eight existing radars were recommended.This would provide warning from alldirections.USAF's revised Specific Operational Requirement(SOR) 79, issued on 16 April 1962, included,as one of its purposes, the support of that portionof NADOP 64-73 wkich established a ~equir~pment for increasing the detection capab~y toinclude sea surface and/or submarine launched~missiles. USAF's SOR stated a requirement forSLBM detection range to 1000 nautical miles--- bythe end of 1965.USAF advised on 28 June that the only proposedplan under consideration by it to meet thisSOR requirement was modification of the AN/FPS-35.ADC was asked to provide an operational employmentconcept to AFSC, but USAF emphasized that develop­---:-­ment of an FPS-35 SLBM OEC was not to be construedas a decision to implement the program. No such __decision Kiid been made, USAF stated.Sperry-Rand Corporation was testing, under -.-­Air Force contract, two AN/FPS-35 FD radars todetermine the feasibility of these radars to detectSLBM's at ranges up to 1000 nautical miles.The tests were to be completed by 1 August 1962.ESD was then to evaluate these tests and a GeneralElectric FPS-24 modification proposal. No implementationaction was to be taken until ~~~a~-~~~uation had been completed.NUDET AND B/C REPORTING SYSTEMSNUDET REPORTING SYSTEMEarly in 1960, DOD instructed USAF to develop,procure and install an automatic nuclear detonation[39 ],•",.." .......' "I,.I.".,\ ~ _ .. ,_,--.­

eporting system. An Air Force development planwas approved by the Secretary of Defense for implementationin October 1960.On 5 February 1962, the Air Force awarded a 'contract to General Electric for installation andtesting of a prototype system and for development - ­of the basic design for the final system. ' Theprototype system, which had an interim operationalcapability date of February 1963, would providecoverage for the Washington-Norfolk area. Sensorswere to be located at three si;t.es: P-30, Benton _,AFS, Pennsylvania; M-121, Bedford AFS, Virginia;and P-56A, Temperanceville, Virginia. ' NORAD wou~ 'be provided with a hard copy printout from theprototype system.A final NUDET reporting system, covering theU.S. and southern Canada, had a tentative operationaldate of 1 July 1964 .~ __BOMB ALARM SYSTEMA bomb alarm slstem was developed for the AirForce by the Weste~~ Union Telegraph Company whichwould automatically report the time and locationof nuclear detonations to Headquarters NORAD andother key military and civilian agencies. The sys­ ­tem was to consist of sensors at 98 sites in thecontinental U.S. and at the BMEWS sites at Thuleand Clear (3 sensors at each location for a totalof 300 sensors).The system was scheduled to be completed an~ _. _---..;..._­operational on 28 March 1962. Installation was completed; however, USAF reported on 11 March that reliability of ~he system to date was so poor that command decisions could not be based on its readout.For this reason, a decision was made to delayoperational acceptance pending improvement of .sy~tem 9:~s .i~n and reliability and further testing.[ 40 ]--.­

. :, . ~ :'.When the system did become operationa~ CINCNORAD was to exercise operational confrol~*This had been approved by the JCS in September 1960. BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL RAPID WARNING SYSTEM'" ~Interim System. NORAD submitted a require­ment to the JCS in May 1961 for an automatic biological and chemical rapid warning system ~_ be operational on or before 31 December~~3. In October 1961, the JCS notified CINCNORAD tqat his requirement had been approved, and that the Department of the Army had been assigned t"Se-­responsibility for providing this system as soon as possible. The JCS also stated that the system, in itsentirety, could not be completed by the end of1963; however, a modified system capable of providing"presumptive non-specific warning of biologicalattack" and of detecting nerve-type chemical.agents could possibly be operational by that­~ . . .t1me. ,~- ­~--The JCS directed the Chief of Staff, U.S. ~Army, in January 1962 to establish an interimsystem, pending availability of an automaticsystem, for the detection, identification and reportingof enemy employment of biological/chemicalweapons in or adjacent to the CONUS, Alaska andthe DEW Line and its extensions. CINCNORAD was toassume and exercise operational control ...fi}Ncer~-he~e---..,,; '"':.systems as they became operational.An informal meeting was held on 13-14 March at NORAD to discuss the Department of the Army's --*--!f-es-ts -were completed on 10 August and after evaluationof results, the system was declared operationalon 1 September 1962.-[ 41 ].- . . t ,: - .•, .'. ;: ," , - --.­" .:. , . .';'': .",', ~ .' - ..

., . '. , ~". ': .' ; .' ' ..?! ~l' !'."" . .; ~}:- t. ~ " ,' ~ ~.~plan to establish a BW/CW Interim Warning Systemfor CINCNORAD. The interim system would be a man- ~ual one, dependent upon trained BW/CW teams, ~h{~6 -would report information generated at the sourceby the most expeditious means to a NORAD controlcenter. Once in the NORAD communications network,the responsibility ' for evaluation of reports wouldrest with CINCNORAD. Medical or Public HealthService facilities and laboratories would be usedto determine the validity of enemy employment ofbiological and chemical agents; the range of enemyagents to be considered would ~e determined by intelligencereports and estimates of Soviet activ~in this type of warfare.In May, NORAD was advised that the ChemicalCorps had completed its plan for the interim systemand copies were being forwarded for comments.A briefing was held 8 June to review the ChemicalCorps plan, which was found not suitable for theintended purpose. The Army directed the ChemicalCorps to re-do the plan, coordinating its formulation"closely with NORAD.Automatic System. In May 1962, NORAD was advisedthat the Dep~tmertt of the Army had released-FY-62 funds in the amount .of $50,000 to the ChemicalCorps to start the automatic system developmentprogram. The Chemical Corps contracting officerhad been directed to prepare invitations toindustry to bid for this program.- "'7""­In compliance with JCSdirective, HeadquartersNORAD queried the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committeeon 24 May on Canada's desire to participate ~------ "~"the B/C Rapid Warning System Program. No replyhad been received by mid-year.- _[ 42J. . ,~,' .~ . \..J, ~ ~ \ • r •--.-.

COMMUNICATIONSNORAD/SAC NORTHERN AREA COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVESPLAN (NACOM)In January 1960, the JCS asked NORAD foprepare,in coordination with SAC, a NORAD/SAC northernarea communications plan for JCS consideration.A plan was prepared but not submitted. One reasonwas that NORAD was waiting for USAF action on improvementsto main D~ Line communications. T~plan was also delayed because of numero~~visionsto air defense programs made in the spring of ,).960.Also, it had to be 'revised because of a 'number ofnorthern area communications improvements 't-ha·t cameabout in the meantime as a result of BMEWS andWhite Alice programs. Finally, further delay resultedfrom extensive coordination and the resultingadditional revisions.At any rate, the plan was finally issued inMay 1962 and sent to the JCS. In a message to allregions and components in mid-July, NORAD advisedthat on 10 July the JCS approved the plan and fo~.warded i t ~ 'o the ' Defense Communications Agency(DCA) for action. DCA was to determine whether-the requirements could be met within the defensecommunications system. For those which could not,the DCA was to prepare systems plans which wouldbe sent to the JCS for review and approval.A number of actions had already been takento satisfy the objectives, according to the plan,which were listed in seven basic segment~.. -.:~: ~(1) Provision of a 24-channel troposphericscatter radio system, such as theAN/FRC­47, from Thule, Greenland, to Station FOX (HallLake) on the DEW Line.USAF had programmed and funded this system withFY 1962 and advanced FY 1963 funds. Constructionrequirements were in the FY 1963 military[43 ]( --.­

• ~ \ ~. ( - _ • ~v '''i-ry~:.;, ,:' ~I • ,. ........, .. ,:," \ tconstruction program. The operational date was _._ ,...­programmed for 1964.(2) Lateral upgrading of the DEW Linecommunications from BAR Main (Barter Island) toDYE Main (Cape Dyer').The current USAF Program Conununications-Electronics Document (PC 64-1) stated that lateral DEW Line improvements had been deferred, but the Electronic Systems Division was writing a ~rogram for DEW ~ Line lateral upgrading for FY 1963 and 1964 fund-~~ ing. "'.(3) Provision of a wideband high-quality -- -­voice capability from Station CAM (Cambridge Bay)on the DEW Line via PIN 3 (Lady Franklin Point)and Port Radium to Hay River (Northwest Territory).Action was being taken to interest commercial communicationscompanies in this venture. Using FY1962 funds, a contract was planned to be signed ..by July 1962. A tentative operational date wasFebruary 1964.J...-(4) Expansion and. upgrading of thepresent existing AN/FRC-47 tropospheric system (DEWDrop Communications) from the current capability ofnine reliable channels to a full 24 reliable channelcapacity.USAF had concurred in an AFSC propos~l for improvement.If the action proposed gave reliable communications,this requirement would be satisfied . .-'. ---=-----­(5) Provision of a best-available, highfrequencysingle sideband (HF SSB) radio networkto serve as backup to the existing BMffiVS RearwardCommunications System (RCS).USAF ADC submitted this requirement through AirFor~e channels. An f~terim HF SSB facility forThule was operational on an on-call basis. An~ - ---..­

...'Y"f .." \,--,~.-.,.0;1 ~ t J".., ~ • \ I , I I I •.~.~ " ...,:. ',,', . ~:,: ~ ' fl~-' ,,1';1,'t l \. l • ;; I J I ~ . ,,'' 1' interim HF SSB facility for Clear was tentativelyto be operational on 1 June 1962. Normal CQmmunicationsprogram action was being taken'-fbr theFylingdales and ALCOP facilities.(6) Provision of a full-period voice orfull-period teletype circuit, sho~ld a vo~ce circuitbe impracticable, to serve as backup to theexisting BMEWS RCS.USAF ADC had submitted this requirement throughAir Force channels an~action had been taken t~satisfy it. In December 1961, a Route ~teletypecircuit was established with Thule. 'In - _February 1962 a Route "C" voice circuit ·was es:'tablished with Clear. ~ ­(7) Provision of a low-frequency pointto-pointradio system to fill the immediate need·for a long-range survivable national communicationssystem.A requirement for such a facility was containedin USAF Specific Operational Requirement No.193, 29 September 1961. This SOR stated that an_inl.tial ope.tational capability was required byAugust 1963 and a.complete capability by July .1964. USAF also had advised that the three BMEWSsites would be provided with a transmit and receivecapability.4 __-----. --'.=-.­[45 ], ,. \ .. .,.' 't, I ... - • :--.­

1'). . 1.., ' , ,~~ ) :0. ':0, .. ! .', ,.: •'t" " ' '{ _, ", t • ( ,; ~ ~ ,., ~l i !'CHAPTER 3COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE NORAD UNDERGROUND COC. PRIMARY FACILITIESStatus. By mid-year, the e9Ccavation for the ­underground facility, in Cheyenne Mountain south ~cof Colorado Springs, was nearly completed. Besidesclean-up and the installation of wire mesh,;­one item unfinished was tunneling for two radio~ -- .adits. These adits were scheduled to be completedby October 1962. In all other aspects, the 425Lproject was progressing satisfactorily. The buildingdesign was expected to be completed by Octoberand construction of the operations building to beginin December and to be completed in 13 months.Equipment testing was to start in the BurroughsCorporation Group II facility at Ent AFB in Octoberand installation of equipment and additionaltesting to start in the u-nderground facility in-October 1963.* As of mid-year, the prospectswere rated good that the operational date ofDecember 1964 would be met.--- -* For an explanation of this Group II facility,see NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, Jul-Dec1961, pp. 40-42.~'[ 46]". -' - ..-, . " .:. " I425L Costs. Early in April, the 425L SystemProgram Director, Colonel Carl A. Retzer, briefedADC and NORAD stating that the total cost of the425L System would be $105.9 million. However,the USAF directed ceiling was $65.9 million. On ---....",. .. - --~-18 April, Colonel Retzer briefed the Air DefensePanel at the Pentagon on the 425L cost. ThePanel would not- concur with the presentation and--..­

I ~, ," rr'''''eo.; ~\ ~ l.!" t{ .'\ I, : ('.;.' ••~ 1 . , • 7 ~• ( i ' ~ l J -"1' t , •deferred endorsing it to any higher echelon untilit was redone. Colonel Retzer was direct~ · toprepare a presentation which would show two approaches:(A) a COC configuration with a $68.1million funding ceiling (the cost estimated in aCOC study date 1 August 1960), and (B) a COC configurationmeeting user, operator, and SOR requirementsthat could be provided for less than $105.9million.Two studies were made by the SPO director inconjunction with NORXD and ADC staffs and th~ITRE ­Corporation. The first was called SPQ....aP;ian "A"which provided a system costing $68.1 millio~ Thisplan was unacceptable to NORAD/ADC becausy it didnot meet user/operator requirements. The-SPO Plan"B," as eventually worked out and accepted by NORAD/ADC, would provide a system costing $81.8 million.The latter plan was presented by Colonel Retzerto the Air Defense Panel on 17 May and the USAFSystems Review Board on 28 May. The Board approvedthe new configuration and costs .- __:t. ,BACK-UP FACILITIES-ALTERNATE COMMAND POSTBackground. In December 1954, shortly afterCONAD was formed, the Joint Eastern Air DefenseForce at Stewart AFB, New York, was designated asthe CONAD alternate command post. This waschanged in May 1955 to the Joint Central Air DefenseForce at Kansas City, Missouri. ~~ctes.;.,~~ ·ignated the Central CONAD Region (the new designa-­tion for the JCADF), Richards-Gebaur AFB, as itsalternate command post in November 1957. NORADissued a new plan in May 1959 designating theCentral NORAD Region (same location) as its ALCOP.When CNR was discontinued on 1 January 1960 and__ the 33d NORAD _Regj,ontook its place, the latterwas designated as the NORAD ALCOP. Finally, the[ 47.]! : -', '.H·:' .J . " .~. ". '" -' .. ,\ - ., • I I- - ..­.. , . ~ ; - .' '.. .' ~.

. ~ , .• .,, '(L,~ ~,~ r:.t~~,.~ ~~ ~1 t ." : i ' v• 'Ii , h fJ ,....; ~ , • -l I., t.o: , .. 1 ,~ I ­33d Region was replaced at Richards-Gebaur AFB bythe 29th NORAD Region on 1 July 1961 and the lat- ~­ter was designated as the NORAD ALCOP.In October 1960, the JCS directed all unifiedand specified commands and the services to have,by 1 July 1961, pre-located alternate command ele-­ments in hardened, dispersed, or mobile facilitiesas deemed best fitted to insure survivability andexercise of command under conditions prevailing a:the outset of general war. The JCS also directedthat plans be prepared that in~uded organization-,of the ALCOP element, terms of reference, and pr~ :_location plans. In response, NORAD revised theALCOP portion of its plan called "Air Defense ofthe North American Cont inent (ADNAC)," 1-60, in ~ .,.May 1961. In this portion, Annex G, "Continuityof Operations," NORAD included ALCOP organization,terms of reference, and a means for reconstitutionof Headquarters NORAD at the ALCOP through a strategicalert cadre from NORAD. Also, in June 1961,NORAD and ADC prepared a plan for improving theALCOP.Strategic Alert Cadre. An up-dated ADNAC,1-61, was issued in :!'August 1961, including a newAnnex G. The portions of the latter on communicationsand the strategic alert cadre were revised­in April 1962 and on the concept of operations inJuly 1962.Instructions to and the composition of thestrategic alert cadre were issued by NORAD inFebruary 1962. As provided at this time, personneldesignated for thE cadre were to be k~pt on ___ -~ ­an up-to-date list by the deputies concerned andforwarded to the COCo The latter was to furnishthe DeS/Personnel and Administration a currentroster and any changes. The decision to activatethe cadre was to be made by CINCNORAD. Notificationto assemble was to be made by the Director ofthe NORAD COCo-~­[ 48 ]- ~ ~ " ~ ~ , ,~ • • J ; t, .... 1.. . /- -'!n--.­

· -,)....... After notification, according to the revisedportions of Annex G, ADNAC 1-61, cadre mem~swere to proceed to Peterson Field and assemble inthe visitors lounge. The DCS/p&A was to verifythe presence of all members who would then beflown to the ALCOP. Upon arrival, they were toproceed in accordance with the 29th Region-Commander'sinstructions. Sixteen officers comprisedthe cadre, fifteen from NORAD staff sections andone from NAVFORCONAD •ALCOP Improvement. As noted, to improve theALCOP at Richards-Gebaur AFB, NORAD and~C pr1r~pared a plan in June 1961 which calle~I-· automationof the ALCOP function by modification ofthe training facility AN/FSQ-7 at Kansas CiXy.USAF did not concur with this proposal, however,feeling that the ALCOP did not meet the requirementsof the JCS directive contained in theirOctober lQ60 message for an adequate hardened,dispersed, or mobile facility.NORAD disagreed with the USAF view and reaffirmedits requirement to ADC for forwarding toUSAF to modernize the ALCOP at the 29th Region.NORAD saicf' in -a letter in February 1962 that it ,-:-­believed tnat this facility met the JCS requirementfrom the stindpoint of being dispersed fromthe primary cae and also it was not collocated ­with a SAC facility or other high-priority target.USAF stated in a message to ADC on 15 May,however, that becauss . o£ the questionable sur~vivability of t~&Richirds-Gebaur facility, ithad begun a study to provide a more sui t..ilJ

told ADC early in July that no further actionwould be taken until the RCAF response was receivedand until NORAD and ADC made recommenda~ "tions on a MITRE Corporation study. The latterwas a study underway on Survivable NORAD EmergencyCapabilities (called SNOCAP).In the meantime, the 29th NORAD Region askedand received permission to collocate the ALCOPand the Region remote combat center in what wasformerly the SAGE direction center building atRichards-Gebaur AFB. The Region... RCC was to belocated in the weapons room, the ALCOP in the com-__mand post. The two activities were to operate ~,--.separately, each with its own personnel and communicationsfacilities. This was made effective1 August 1962, the date that the 29th Region RCCachieved a SAGE capability as a remoted fun"ctionof the modified AN/FSQ-7 at Sioux City AFS, Iowa(Sioux City Sector, SDC-22).--.­Secondary ALCOP. As a further effort to assurecontinuity of command and control, on 10 April1962, NORAD designated the 30th NORADRegion, TruaxField, Wisconsin, as its secondary ALCOP. NORADadvised that the secondary "ALCOP would not be providedwith the same surveillance, display or com­­munications facilities possessed by the ALCOP.But a manual plot capability would be establishedto provide an air situation display should takeoverfrom the ALCOP become necessary. Selectedfiles were to be prepositioned and maintained.The July 1962 change to Annex G, ADNAC 1-61, includedestablishment of this secondary ALCOP.BACKUP INTERCEPTOR CONTROL (BUIC)Background. In a memorandum sent by theSecretary of Defense to the JCS in June 1961, theSecretary stated that USAF and DOD studies hadagreed that the peacetime and pre-battle advantagesof the SAGE system should be retained~ ""But­[50 ]• ~ " 1 • • ,,~ : .:-'~ - ~. \• -;. .. 7 ~ ­--..­

~ ~ If"} \! I .. ~ p ..1. " J". '~i.·,,,.•~ ~ I.. '1, 1 \( '- c 1 ~. J'J .~ 1,.;4 ,\ f , ....~ ~ .. i ..these studies had agreed that a missile attack onSAGE and other vital elements of the-curr~nt_systerncould destroy NORAD's ability to carry out itsmission. Accordingly, he directed that furtherSAGE air battle augmentation be stopped and themoney saved and subsequent funding be u§ed to providea survivable backup contror system.*Thus, two actions were necessary: provisionof a backup control system and, to get the funds,reorientation of the 4l6L System (the USAF forcesand facilities that provided aircraft cbntrol~dwarning for the North Ameri'can contin~ _InSeptember 1961, the Secretary of Defen~e approved,for planning purposes, the Air Force FY 1963 budgetsubmittal for 416L. And he directed the systemto be reoriented to the maximum feasible withinthese budget limits to survive ICBM attack andto defend against relatively small bomber raids(200-bombers or less) after an ICBM attack by provisionof backup control.On 1 November 1961, USAF advised that the -~backupproject would be implemented in two phases.Phase I wpu14be a manual operational mode simi~to the ola-manual type operation that existed-prior to SAGE. Phase II would provide equipmentfor semiautomatic control at selected radar sites.A maximum of 34 automated control sites had beenauthorized. The capital investment for Phase IIwas to be kept to approximately 98 million do11ars.*** See NORAD/CONAD .Historica1 Summary, J~D~-1~6~__-~for further background and details.**Faci1ities deleted from the 416L program forbackup funding were five FPS~27's, 26 FPS-26's,50 FPS-74 modification kits, 39 FRA-37's, SARAH,ALDRI, and the 32d Region combat center display.',~.[51 ]• . : '--:-!J !'_~!; ~'1",. ...' .j " ~ ~ ! _. • I ' " - - " - - JIIIl., .. - t ' . ! (' ~ ".: I.r

:~·~,\." '~·1 ~I (;-'"·:·'·;r..i~,~~~,: ~:~ ~I ,,~.1 ~ ... i r I • I ; r- .. I ~ _. ... ~.... n ~_!_~_':..-....::.....',. J..~:'!~,,,::: "NORAD wanted 70 automated NORAD Control Centers(NCC's) and a much larger capability (up to .~40 simultaneous intercepts and 160 surveillancetracks) than the USAF program provided. But becauseof fund limitations, the USAF program stuck.In January 1~62, USAF told NORAD that the computerspecifications woul~ initially call for a nettingof five stations, ten SI and 40 track capability.USAF said, however, that there could be a modulardesign to permit possible future expansion. Ofthe 34 automated NCC's, four were to be in Canada.Implementation of Phase I (Manual). NORAD ~~ ~initiated action on the Mode III phase I on 19January 1962. NORAD requested USAF ADC to takeaction to implement the Phase I system as it ap~plied to ADC's area of responsibility. Implementing-­ - --instructions were sent by ADC to its div­isions on 20 January. RCAF ADC was asked by NORADto support the backup configuration under parametersdiscussed on 10-11 January at L. G. HanscomField. This answered an RCAF message which requesteda formal statement of requirement for abackup system from CINCNORAD. RCAF ADC had--:--. - ..pointed out that at ij~nscom, agreement in principlehad been given t6~ Phase I configuration.But before any definite programming action couldbe taken by the RCAF, the latter had to have thisstatement from CINCNORAD. However, as of July-1962, the extent of RCAF participation in Phase Iwas still under study at RCAF Headquarters/governmentlevel.NORAD's implementing message stated that communicationswere to be initially based on a point-.-" .. - -~to-pointrequirement. However, NORAD said, astudy was being initiated by Western .Electric AirDefense Engineering Services to use switching centersfor both SAGE and the backup system. Ifswitched communications proved to be survivable,adequate and reliable, NORAD would support achange to switching centers (see below) .~­[ 52J--.­

:--..;..... ~:'....On 15 February, NORAD provided further guidancefor implementation and operations under PhaseI by issuing Operation Plan 1-62, BUIC-System(Modes III and IV, Phase I Manual) .. This plan includedall the sites involved in Phase I and thepriorities. It stated that Phase I would be fully·implemented during CY 1962. NORAD's plan-listed27 prime NCC's and 39 NGCI's (NORAD Ground ControlIntercept Station) under Phase 1.*Phase II. The JCS advised NORAD in Marchthat on the 13th, th~ Secretary of Defense ap~~proved the two-phased reorientation of~~ 4l6Lprogram and the cancellation of procurement-~tionsof approximately $93 million of P-800 funds in the4l6L program. He directed implementation-of PhaseI as soon as possible and gave authority to proceedon Phase II assuming that approximately 34NCC's would be implemented at a total cost of notover $100 million. The initial procurement wasto be limited to equipment for 17 NCC's.NORAD laid down deployment priorities for.... -:-- ­NCC's in Phase II in a reply to USAF ADC on 27April 1962. ADC had submitted a priority list ~r~NORAD's approval before forwarding to USAF. ADG's­priority was for one computer in each air defensesector before starting to put in any alternateNCC's. NORAD made a number of changes and sentback a new list of priorities, stating that itslist was to be supported by all agencies. NORADsaid its changes were based on vulnerability ofNORAD direction centers collocated with SAC bases,the decision (reached at the L. G. Hanscom Fieldmeeting in January) to install the fir~ig'b.t- _ ~~sets in the U.S., and the semiautomatic operations ­* NGCI's would assist the NCC in control of AirForce weapons. In event the NCC was inoperative,the NGCI would assume control of the Air Forceweapons and be required to -coordinate target engagementwith Nike fire units, if applicable.[ 53]-- - - ~

at sites designated to control BOMARC's duringMode III. ~NORAD did not want to spread out the initialbuy of computers, one to a sector, but to concentrateequipment in the BOMARC, Northeast, area.As noted above, the ' JCS memorandum in March hadstated that the initial procurement would be forequipment for 17 NCC's. The same memorandum hadasked for NORAD plans concerning strengtheningnorthern perimeter defenses including redeploymentand dispersal of a portion of t1le existing BOMARC "squadrons. NORAD had recommended, in reply, that~~_-.,BOMARC's be dispersed in the Northeast and not beredeployed to the Northern tier.Therefore, NORAD told ADC, the first 16 BUICsites to become operational had to be in supportof these weapons since manual control of BOMARC'swas not considered feasible. The remaining sites,not controlling BOMARC's, were given prioritiescommensurate with the threat and vital areas leftto be defended.NORAD said it realized that Phase---a.-.. __ _I (manual) operations would have to satisfy thebackup capability iP. all other sectors untilenough sets were available. NORAD concluded thatif BOMARC's were to be dispersed along the Northerntier before BUIC facilities were programmed to becomeoperational in these sectors, the priorities ­for the NCC's would be reviewed.USAF issued a revised Specific OperationalRequirement (SOR) 79' on 16 April 1962. This SOR,"Continental Air Defense Control and Warning System,"included support of that portion of t .he __ '.'---­NADOP 64-73 which established a requirement forincreasing the survivability of the current continentalaircraft control and warning system.Specifically, it provided for the BUIC System.It stated that the solid state BUIC computerwould have the capability to process periodicallya 15-second period) a minimum of40 aircraft - 'fr'acks -'t'o ' 'include the conduct bf 10________~ appro~imately.... ---­[ 54] ", , ~ i.'. u~ f ­.-.,..... . -.:. - ,--~

simultaneous intercepts. It also provided thatthe computer program would be modular in it~ubunits.The SOR stated that the improvem~ntsspecified would be fully implemented by the endof 1965. The latter was similar to NADOP 64-73which stated that the 34 automated NCC's would beoperational in fiscal year 1964-6~.The Air Force announced at the end of Junethe selection of the Burroughs Corporation as thesource of the BUIC system. A contract for thefirst increment of BUlC was expected to b,e neg9.,,;_tiated in the near future. Four NORAD re~sentativeswere on the evaluation group-tITpportingthe Source Selection Board as full voting ~members. This was the first time NORAD re~e_­sentatives participated thusly in the selectionof USAF-procured equipment.Mode "X" Communications. In January 1962,the.Western Electric Air Defense Engineering Servicesproposed a system of switched communications- for all SAGE backup. WE ADES proposed toleave in only one of the existing SAGE routes ona full period point-to-point service and convertall backup ~routes and circuits to an automaticswitching system. . This switched system would,­then serve as backup to SAGE Mode I and also providecommunications for Mode II and Mode III(both Phase I and Phase II). Initially (forPhase I), it would be for voice primarily.On 12 February, NORAD wrote to the Chief ofthe Air Staff, RCAF, and to USAF ADC to indicateNORAD's interest and to stimulate comman~u~rtin this proposal. NORAD said that the concept ­was consistent with the principle of the NORADSwitching Plan currently being implemented in thefirst phase by ADC. This was the plan approvedin July 1961 by the JCS to provide nine switchingcenters in the first phase serving NORAD regionsfor operation by September 1963 and eighteen moreswitching centers in the second phase to extend[55 ]---),.,..:.~ • ....-\,;. ..... ., . t·~ ·•. '... . ... 5 It ." ,""1..:. 1I,:.- - - ..ac.

} ,~ . " I ,: {:" ~ .. ~ ~~~ • t! ~~ . ~ . ., • f , It; .. } I ~ "' I~, I.~:' 1 ~the service to sectors and other defense unitsfor completion by the operational date of 425L ·.~The WE ADES proposal was therefore, NORADsaid, in effect an extension of this plan belowregion and sector level to serve all elements ofthe active air defe~se system. The feasibil~tyof obtaining greater communications flexibility,essentially within current leased communicationsbudgets, merited investigation. ADC was askedfor various feasibility assessments for review.The RCAF was asked to make a study to para1- "';'-'","::,:::-.­leI that taking place in the U.S. to determine thefeasibility of applying this concept .. RCAF re­.-.plied that to carry out such a study it would have --- -­to convene the representatives of various independenttelephone companies to insure complete coverageof the CADIN area. NORAD agreed that thismethod of making the study would be most satisfactory,but recommended a delay until NORAD couldassess American Telephone and Telegraph Companyproposals. USAF ADC had replied to NORAD's Februaryletter that AT&T studies were currently underwayand their propos~s were expected by June.The RCAF agreed. NORiD l1ad - not been able to evaluatethe proposals and reply- to RCAF Headquarters-by mid-year.Future of Missile Master. NORAD advisedARADCOM in December 1961 that DOD approval of 34semiautomatic NCC's would, in the fiscal year1964 time period, eliminate the NCC function fromthe ten existing Army Missile Master (AN/FSG-l)stations. * The purpose of these automated .NCC's, .-.- ---~.- _ ~~NORAD said, was to provide a backup to the soft* An account of the Missile Master program may befound in NORAD/CONAD Historical Summaries fromJuly 1956 to December 1959.[56 ] ~ ,,;\ .,' - ; ~ • ~ - 'I-'~'~' ~ ~ J'. . . .., • .' I' I •• '---

,,. .SAGE direction centers and so would be in nontargetareas. Since the ten Missile Mast~werelocated within primary ICBM target areas; the NCCconcept eliminated these existing Missile Masterlocations as future NCC's.Thus, NORAD continued, the~e was now-a questionof keeping the Missile Masters in their vulnerablelocations or of moving them. ARADCOM'sviews were requested.ARADCOM replied-that it had furnished a ~ftto NORAD on NADOP 64-73 which proposed~~ctivationof the Missile Masters that would controlless than nine fire units whentthe Ajax .phase-outwas complete. Replacement would be with 'a-morecompact fire coordination system in a more survivablelocation.NORAD pointed out in answer that sinceARADCOM's reply, staff coordination had resultedin a proposal to phase out all Missile Masters.However, this was contingent upon a replacementsemiautomatic .fire coordination system.- ~ ­In the meantime, NORAD's Phase I (Mode IllS­Plan, issued on 15 February, placed the collocatedMissile Master NCC's (M/NCC) , plus the BIRDIE NCCat San Francisco (P-38), in an interim category.* ­It stated that they would be interim NCC's untilsuch time as the designated prime NCC for the complexcould assume NCC responsibilities. The NCCfunction of the M/NCC's would then be phased out •* BIRDIE (Battery Integration and Radar DisplayEquipment), AN/GSG-5 was for large defenses andAN/GSG-6 for small defenses. This equipmentwas selected in 1959 for employment in non­Missile Master defenses........~ ­.- ....: "=­[57 ]. ~ "":"~ ;~"f ;· ··.f.'· .--- ~

NADOP 64-73 proposed to repla.cethe MissileMaster systems gradually with a BIRDIE-type systemlocated at more survivable sites. Dependent up6navailability of survivable communications, NADOPcontinued, consideration could be given to collocatingthese BIRDIE-type equipments with selectedNCC's.~.The requirements and plans were being studiedby the Army and ARADCOM at mid-year.COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS*NORAD submitted to the JCS on 22 May 1962 fourrequirements to meet its near future needs with offthe-shelfitems in the general areas of increasingsurvivability and reliability of NORAD communications.These were as follows:---,... . " :,.. ~ . .(1) NORAD ALCOP By-pass Route~ NORADrequested that its ALCOP be tied into the KansasCity by-pass route at LaCygne, Missouri, by placing~a micro-wave link betW-eeri -Richards-Gebaur AFB andLaCygne.(2) Automatic Ballistic Missile AttackWarning System.** NORAD requested a system,either manually or automatically activated byalarms from BMEWS, Bomb Alarm, NUDET, and MIDAS,to provide warning of a billistic missile attackfrom the NORAD COC to all subordinate units downto the lowest combat element.-~---* For Mode "X" Communications, see pages 55-56.** See also Chapter Five, pages 89-90.[ 58]. .. ~ • ''1: ' I. ~ '" t": I .', •.."" ~. , h .. ~ . _ i- ~ .,- - .­,; '. 'I'" .,,'-.; ." .

, ,;. ..~., -; ~ ~ 1-, .~ ~I" ': , ~", ..:::~ ~.' ~ .- ;. : ~ ,(3) NORAD Diversity Routing for NORADEnvironment. NORAD requested a minimum o'#=twogeographically separated routes for voice, aataand teletype circuits between NORAD and its ALCOP;NORAD and its regions; NORAD and the regionALCOP's; NORAD ALCOP and the regions and the regionALCOPts; and NORAD and the;JCS, SAe,-and RCAF.(4) Status Indication and AutomaticTransfer of NORAD Circuits. NORAD requested amodification of existing voice circuits betweenthe COC and the ALCOP to all regions andr.eg~ALCOP's to permit automatic transfer ~e~e· .circuits from a destroyed or inoperat1ve" COC=to. ~ .the ALCOP or to.a region ALCOP should th~ regioncombat center be destroyed or inoperativ&.::.··:No approval had been received from the JCSby mid-year.."~- ".~ .." ~ "-"- - ..-.--.-.

­CHAPTER 4WEAPONS INTERCEPTOR FORCESMANNED BOMBER WEAPONS SYSTEMSRegular Force. During the~irst half of 19b2the NORAD regular interceptor force remained at ~~=;;squadrons. The assigned aircraft strength was>--.=­down from 1,053 to 1,007.Air National Guard. The Air National Guardsquadrons, which provided first-line augmentationfor the regular forces, were down from 25 to 23squadrons. Five squadrons were equipped with F-86's, nine with F-89's, three with F-lOO's, andsix with F-l02's. Authorized strength was 575aircraft.The l58th FIS, t~av~s .Airport, Georgia, andthe l03rd FIS, Philadelphia, were dropped from theNORAD first-line augmentation inventory in April1962 when they began converting to air transport.These two squadrons had not been on 24-hour alertsince january because of preparation for thechange in role. As programmed, there would beonly 23 ANG squadrons on 24-hour.alert until thefirst quarter FY 1963 when the number would returnto 25 'squadrons and remain at that level ....... ~ ....-~through FY 1966.-......~ . ­"'-:""""- ­-Also during April; the l24th FIS, Des Moines,Iowa, converted from F-86L to F-89J aircraft.Canadian Conversion to CF-lOl's. During thefirst half of 1962, one more Canadian squadron,the '4l4 AW(F) Squadron, became operational .withCF":lOl aircraft. This completed the conversio'n~- .- - ....-- - - --...

..,;;~ ;,' ~ '1J'fjH}~ f:~ ,; :" ~ :.; ";NORAO INTERCEPTOR FORCE "" ;~'",t&--,•-.. •~102t1., •\HAI""ON~!?j, ,- '~..1'1(~l:.o • VAl. d'Oft * '0, \ =~'O,• CF'O' C~'O, ,,'el/~8g~ . '~, ~. ' c~'o1i ·_..tN " ,••;;..-- • iA>IJ~!lg,1 ..• V.F102 . __ . • ___ ......... ~ , .." ......"..-j·.~'06 ..;;i;?oe ----!f:~'T----r-ll......... '~ ,r "':f'01l~ ~_'.. ~~2.""O1-.-b ~'02 . ~Flig F,O' . ' -".,."""®~.!~'06 .\~'O, -",I, "'..... ~~ ~'. \d.:f'100­......"au.·O ........,... I .....,.... @:lF8~ '-~'7:;F..-. ~101 ~rI01_..... _.fragII'! "'\-~-~ OF8g( . 1&'II-·lJ~I\0~'--J\ '~8g L ..u,......... t.o. ~"-'~".M ..". -' , ..... -I. " 0 -........., ,~--.;.. P ,,'o'",~ _I .­:--- f;:::' or' \ ~, 0, )'\.....T.j,r,o..",1,~"~r'o~_r-..-_, L ____,_..... ~8g t;ii'~ • ~n-. ,.~10' ~,e -'-/ ' I ~'024 __- ~~~02 ,!"O~ tl~'..2~,.i~..!.OI_•(~,o, I ir:;,.-i · I ~8~ ...!l.... \ '06~--" i ,!1"~,F'O, I I IJ ,- ---.1_ . 0\--- \ ' .-;;;.~..- ••• ~ .F'02 I r L_-.!-~~ ,'I'-_/ .)r ...... \ I ' [ ,.~'02 _~.,."un.... Floe I I __ - ~/ ____ ...... 1"••.-o~86, I I -l I _ .. .f..-t...". UIIoO

I "...,..·Y'l~'.I ... ~r''.I.........,.~ f '; ~ ~ : :.l ~ :' ~ ~ t ~;~: :: rt'> ~.from CF-IOO's to CF-IOI's of four of the five programmedsquadrons. The remaining squadron, the ." _:;:::. _ 409th, was to complete conversion training by October. Three of the squadrons were located at Uplands, Ontario; one was at Namao, Alberta. This was only a temporary deployment pending completion of support facilities and runway con­struction. The 414th was scheduled to move to North Bay, Ontario, in September, and the 416th to Bagotville, Quebec, in July and then to Chat­ham, N.B., at the end of the yea~. The 425th at Namao was to move to Bagotville in July and con­...a...,~ ~tinue its primary role of conversion training for ~~RCAF crews until October. This squadron would not fulfill alert requirements until the conversiontraining program was completed. It would be available, however, as an augmentation squadron upon declaration of DEFCON Four. Requirement for Additional Canadian Interceptors.In .line with the concept of initiating>- ~ .. ---. .- ­the air battle as far from the target areas aspossible, NORAD required an increase in Canadiansquadrons from five to nine and an increase in UEfrom 12 to 18 aircraft.. : .:"" " " -­Reduction of F-I02 Airc~aft at Thule. Be­cause of the critical shortage of F-lo2 aircraft, USAF ADC studied the possibility of reducing the number of aircraft at Thule from twelve to six. NORAD's opiniori was asked on 31 May 1962. ADC concluded that a detachment of six air­c~aft could not adequately fulfill the Thule air d~fense mission of defending U.S. installations in Greenland, as outlined in CONAD Operations Order 1-61.' The study noted, however, that be­cause of the limited radar coverage at Thule, no adequate air defense could be achieved in any case, regardless of the size of the fighter force. - - ~-Altho-ugh ie"duced to six aircraft";.:.ADC "would "­have the 332nd FrS at Thule continue its identity[ 62 ]•--.­- - .­

.. .,..as a squadron under the operational contro~fthe Goose CONAD Conunander, rather than-.:as.:iftl ~attachment to the 59th FIS at Goose Bay •NORAD's reply on 11 June 1962 stated thatthe JCS had directed, on 17 June 1960, tha~ afighter interceptor unit of not more than 12 aircraftbe maintained at Thule. But NORAD expressedno objections to the cut provided USAF obtain JCSconcurrence and that a minimum of two aircraft onfive-minute alert be !!1,aintained.BOMARC FORCES,......--.. - ­Status. NORAD's BOMARC force on 30 Jlnle 1962consisted of nine squadrons:two with A missiles,four with B missiles, and three with a mixture ofA and B missiles. All were located in the easternpart of the continent. During this period, theforce had increased by one on 1 March 1962 whenthe first Canadian BOMARC squadron, 446 SAM Squad- ~ron; North Bay, Ontario, be.came operational. -The . :-~-­447 SAM Squadron, LaMacaza, Quebec, was programmedto become JPPera:tional by 1 December 1962. This 7would complete-the ten-squadron BOMARC programexcept for additional BOMARC B launchers and mis- ·siles at Otis and McGuire Air Force Bases. -­ -Agreement for Operational Control of 446 SAMSquadron. An agreement between the Commanders of 'NNR and 30th NORAD Region, on 9 March 1~62, gaveinterim operational control of the 446 SAM Squadronto the 30th NR u~til the Ott~wa NORAD --S~GlL~· _ I:;"" - ~~_­Sector became operatl.onal. Tactl.cal con4iFbrin-a-:- .=employmentof missiles were assigned. by the 30thRegion to the Sault SteMarie NORAD Sector.NIKE FORCES.. . . _.. Regul,ar Force. NORAD's Nike H~:r:'~u),es forceremained at 139 fl.re units with an authorized[63 ]---r '" .,;. ...' : ••: ... _ L.. • • L::·i,c:-..; , --- ....." .. :.. ' .­ ~ ' . . ..' ~: • ~ r·

missile strength of 1846.This program had been completed in November 1961 when the Regular Army::::::F = force co~pleted conversion from Nike Ajax to Hercules.The FY 1963 Budget provided for an increase from 12 to 18 missiles per fire unit. This programwas to get underway in the third quarter of FY 1963. ' ; A program was also in swing to increase the capability of the Hercules. This was the HIPAR (High-Powered Acquisition Radarj Hercules improve~ · ment kit. Out of a programmed-06 HIPAR's, 25 had" been installed and were operating by mid-year.Included in the program were ECCM improvement kits. Sixty-seven had been installed out of aprogram of 139 kits.~ -.-­ --.---Army National Guard. The Army NationalGuard currently manned 69 Nike Ajax fire units asopposed to 76 at the end of .1961. On 16 May 1962,seven ARNG fire units in the Washington-Baltimorearea were relieved of their NORAD mission. Followingtheir training, the personnel ·from theseunits were to take over fourRA Nike Herculessites in this area.t:Th~.operational ready datewas set for 14 Decerl1.trer ·).962.Eight moreAj ax­-units were to be phased out of the ARNG in July.These changes were the beginning of a program totransfer 48 of the 139 Hercules sites to the ARNG.It was to be completed in FY 1965.Maiming of Hercules Units. In connection ·with this program, ARADCOM asked for NORAD'p concurrencein a proposal to man more than half theHercules fire units in six defenses with ARNG. ;;:!. ... :---- ­This was contrary to previous policy which set50% National Guard manning of Hercules units asthe limit in anyone defense.NORAD concurred in ARADCOM's revised plan on11 January 1962 with the understanding that thefire units would maintain maximumeffectiveness during conversion and an -a-cfvanced ·.AR,NG H~r_cJl,l,e~[ 64 ].,, . ~ .~ ~ ......'!.! 0·..... ".:.. ~. r ....... . . ' .' .,.r' _ ._-..­-- - - ..­'. " ;- -, :.,~ ¥ • • •~ I' •.... _"'­ ... ~-

. .... . . NORAD JULY1962 ,.­----- ...~..._.---•2• I!!OMAftC ABOMAftC "A"8QONS­• BOMAftC "B" SQDNS:s I!!OMAftC All!! SQDN'\I!!OMARC I!!'" ..... f"; ~ .•. ". ,..; : • 4 ~ •

. :... . =-- .. :.. . "..~ t ' . : : •state of alert identical to the RA units.Hercules in SLBM Defense .Role. Because NORAIFdid not have the means to combat a submarinelaunchedmissile threat, it recommended modifyingthe Nike Hercules system to provide a limitedcapability against short-range ballistic mis~iles.NORAD wanted all the Hercules deployed alongcoastal areas, which were equipped with HIPAR,modified to assume an SLBM defense role. However,NORAD stipulated in NADOP 64-73 that this addedrole must not degrade the Hercul.e.s capabilityagainst the air-supported threat~,~-F.=-. .... ..'!:...•In consonance with this requirement, the Departmentof the Army was authorized to modifyseven .Nike Hercules complexes on both coasts toprovide an SLBM intercept capability. In thisconnection, USAF had asked ADC and NORAD to preparean OEP for modification of the AN/FPS-35radar to provide l,OOO-mile detection and warningagainst SLBM's by end of CY 1965 (see pp.38-39).The OEP was to consider provision of acquisitiondata to the Hercules complexes •l:LONG RANGE INTERCEPTOlf"Background. From its establishment, NORADhad expressed a need for a long range interceptorand included the F-I08 in its objectives plansfrom the time the first one was issued in. Decem:'"ber 1958. The requirement was based on °aeontinuingmanned bomber threat to North Anierica overthe foreseeable future with increasingly higherperformance bombers and weapons systems.----.._~...-..---........-~~-..... -. ._- . =..Notwithstanding NORAD's pleas and JCS support,the main ' part of the. USAFF~108prograJti. wascancelled in September 1959. However, in recognitionof the requirement for an ' LRIX, ' it was decidedto continue development of the ASG-'l8,fire-control system and the GAR-9 air-to-:-air missil-e: ~:, ~ , _:[66 ]- ..-- ~--.....

• ~ ." : ~ ...r: .:~. . . ~ :. :.-, ,,, ~on a reduced basis.. They w 7re the hea~t _~ theLRIX concept. Fund~ng cont~nued each ~earandcurrently $24 million was being spent on the R&Dfor these two systems for FY 1963. Although theprospect of reviving the F-108 grew dimmer as timepassed, the idea of using the AS9-18/GAR-9 in anexisting airframe remained a br~ght spot on theLRIX horizon (see below) .. NORAD continued to support the F-108, per se,until March 1961 whell it issued NADOP 63-67. __NORAD then asked for~an improved inte~~or~erthe F-108. The Commander-in-Chief st - -that,"Since the last NADOP was pub1ishedwe..,have -Positiveevidence of Soviet development and test of asupersonic . bomber ... '1 This NADOP called for aweapon that would have "a quick reaction time andpossess sufficient speed and range to engage th~enemy far out over the north1ands of Canada andthe waters bordering the North American continent."NORAD asked for two squadrons of the LRIX by 1966and six by 1967.--- --:--­Current Efforts to Get a Long Range Inter- __ceptor. 4·n t{S. current objectives plan, NADOP ~64-73 iss~d on 1 March 1962, NORAD stated a re~quirement for two long range interceptors. The ___first, called an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI),--­was needed "to compensate for the attrition andobsolescence of current USAF interceptors." Norequir.ement was stated for additional USAF aircraft .of current types. The IMI was to incorporate themaximum state-of-the-art available in the 1966time period. It was to be a Mach 3, 1,gg,Q=:mtJ e_/:>;-;;' ,-_radius-of-action, · interceptor ·and have 1f'""'capab-il- :-=ity beyond the ASG-18 fire control system. The ­plan envisaged 12 squadrons by 1968 (UE of 18 aircraft)..The second long range interceptor NORADwanted was called the Advanced Manned Interceptor(AMI). The requirement was stated for vigorousR&D to provide an AMI against the future mannedbomber threat. The characteristics of the AMI[ 67 ]

were (1) ability to operate with a lesser degree of close control, (2) a sophisticated fire contro~_system (infrared capability out to 800 nm and radar of 500 om), (3) employ a 500 nm weapon (effectivefrom ground up to 200 nm), (4) operate at a sustained speed of Mach 3, 4.5 dash at altitudes _ ­of 90,000 to 100,000 feet. NADOP 64-73 recornmended­16 squadrons (UE of 18 aircraft) -- 13 squadrons for the u.s. and 3 for Canada -- during the latter period of the plan. -_.fF.": _ Events during the first haFt' of 1962 contin- -: ued to give NORAD some hope that its long sought-~~ after need would eventually be satisfied, at least to some degree. On 19. March, the JCS told NORAD ..: . ___ they had been directed by the Secretary of Defense ~- ' ­to ·"devise plans to strengthen northern perimeter d~fenses, which will provide additional protection to hardened ICBM bases, considering the following: ..•.Additional augmentation of the interceptor for~es at dispersed bases by limited procurement of advanced inter­ ... ---~ ~­~ceptor configurations of existing air­frames giving empha~~s to range and endur­ - -ance, low altit~ ahd long range fire . control capabilities .•.• NORAn was to prepare plans to implement the above.In the plans submitted· to the JCS on l~ April, NORAD said:" "Within the limitations of utilizing an existini airframe, the A-3J modified to carry the ASG~18/GAR-9 system appears to come closer to meeting our current operational requirements than ~ _ -~­. any other existing airframe." NORADts plan calledfor eight A-3J squadrons to provide·area defensealong the northern perimeter. It emphasized thatthis number would be only a modicum of the requirementto defendthe'entire NORADarea, however.NORADts _plan went on to compare the A-3J with the -IMI described in NADOP 64-73 . . A major [ 68 ]....'. . ~ ... -­ - JtI£--.-.a ••• _._ _.

. . . '" -~' ..... ,..... ,­,. ,t, ',,;, ~, .., ...• ... t .: ~ • I. '.:., lit .. • .' .•', ,. \ :.: .I ~difference was in speed. The A-3J would have acruise speed of Mach 0.9 and would belimi:t;6- ~oa dash speed of 1.6 (when configured with theASG-18 and GAR-9). " On the other hand, the IMIwould be Mach 3 throughout. Moreover, the stateof-the-artwould enable production of the_IMI by1967 as compared to 1965 for the A-3J. ­NORAD learned that USAF was planning ondirecting AFSC to go to industry with a study contracton a comparison of AMI versus IMI and EagleAerie.* In the meanti~e, USAF and ADCeach pr~pared independent studies on the relati~pabilitiesof the IMI and the A-3J. The USAFstud~~which also included the F-110 and the TF~Xdlr~lll),was presented to the DOD in late June. USA7" -wasstrongly backing the IMI.MISSILE DISPERSAL AND DEPLOYMENT PLANSIn March 1962, when the JCS asked NORAD forplans to strengthen northern perimeter defensesfor additional protection to hardened ICBM bases,as well as ~ep16yment of an LRIX (see above), " the~plans were ':to consider: .a. Deployment of additional NikeHercules batteries from forces now assignedfor training purposes. Installationscosts are not to exceed $10 or $15million.--.--­ --:---­-""= '~.-- - _.. - .­- -; ,' --=---- - ­* The Aerie concept was using a large, long rangeaircraft (such as a modified KC-135) carryingsomething like 30 high speed ·missiles (EagleMach 3), which could be launched rapidly anddirected against different targets. The Aeriecould provide its own radar cover or accept anddisplay information from the ground environment,and oper"atefroin airfields on a tenant basis ·with minimum support.[ 69] ... .. ~ ::~\~,...... ~ "~" ._ ;.r ~.. ii, . J .- - - ~. ':~?f{; - - .- - ~....... • - ........ "'," ~ I ...

./".;.b. Redeployment and dispersal of aportion of the existing BOMARC squadrons.Installation costs are not to exceed $40million ....­NORAD's plans, submitted in April, called forplacing eight Nike Hercules fire units from trainingstocks in defense of the Lowry AFB Titan I complex.NORAD considered the Lowry Titan complex tobe the most important for it contained two squad~rons, whereas all others had only one. Moreover,incidental protection would be P%Ovided for the ~NORAD COC and the Denver population. ~: _For BOMARC, within the $40 million limitation,NORAD recommended withdrawing 56 B missilesfrom six present locations and dispersing themalong the Northern Tier from Malmstrom AFB toGrand Forks AFB, in flights of seven missileseach. However, NORAD considered a reduction ofthe presently thinly scattered BOMARC defenses inthe eastern part of the U.S. unwarranted. Rather,it preferred BOMARC dispersal as recommended inNADOP 64-73. This plan would disperse the pro­ ---­.......;. ,:. grammed BOMARC B's in increments of seven launcherseach to 21 separ~~~ s~tes located approximately50 miles from ~e presently establishedsites. No dispersal was contemplated for BOMARCA's.... --:-0'_INTERCEPTOR DISPERSAL PLANSThe JCS directed NORAD in June 1961 to developplans to increase the survivability of the .air de- .;;:;.~~=::;:;;-.~":. __fense system against a ballistic missile attack,combined with a follow-on bomber attack. Theplans were also to include provision for interceptordispersal.:._u.....-~­-.~""~"­-"", .=.NORAD outlined its requirements to USAF ADCin July, and asked ADC to prepare an interceptordispersal plan. ·Accordingly, ADC issued Operations[ 70 ]~ ~,..... - -;........ .' ~ - - - ....J ':·1; f • . ~: •. ~ ':,.~. . --- - ....

Plan 20-61, on 30 November 1961, entitled FighterDispersal/Increased Alert Plan.* Headquart~sUSAF reviewed the plan and recommended dispersalof one-third of the fighter interceptor force,which resulted in a revised ADC Operations Plan20-62, issued 1 May 1962.Phase I now provided for one-third of allunits on a 15-minute or less alert at home base,a two-hour turnaround capability at 26 dispersalbases, and a one-sortie capability per aircraftdispersed with original armament. Phase II pro-_vided for one-third of all units on 15-m~~e o~less alert at home base, a two-hour turnar6und_capability at designated dispersal bases) and ~two-sortie capability per aircraft disperseQ _(oneconventional armament reload) during a 24-hourperiod. Phase III provided for two aircraft onfive-minute alert at home base, four to six aircraft(based on 18 or 24 UE) on 15-minute alertat designated dispersal bases, and an eightsortiecapability per aircraft dispersed (nuclearreloading) during a five-day- period. In theevent that strategic warning was received (12hours), ADC Operations Plan 20-62 required dispersalof '. ....,".. r 'r- ~••' ~.', . ..' ~ I. _ '. ~-' .---~

ases for all Category I interceptor units withintwo hours of missile attack warning.* Fourteenof these dispersal bases had this capability atmid-year.A survey of Canadian dispersal bases wasunderway by ADC and the results were to be submittedto USAF for completion of final arrangementsand agreements as necessary. NORAD alsohad a requirement for USN dispersal bases whichhad been sent to the Navy.INCREASED ALERT POSTURE--.NORAD/CONAD Regulation 55-3, "Defense Readi­ ---ness Conditions, States of Alert, Alert Requirementsand Air Defense Warnings," was revised on 9March 1962. The revised regulation provided forgreater numbers of weapons on a normal readinessstatus to enhance weapons survivability. Itbrought the regulation in line with DOD conceptsfor weapons dispersal and survivability under a ~--ballistic missile attack.J_The revision prOvided that the minimum alert--requirements for normal readiness status (DEFCON5, ALPHA) would be as follows. Interceptor squadronswere to maintain two aircraft on five-minutealert and one-third of the aircraft possessed on15-minute alert. The rest of the combat-readyaircraft were to be on three-hour alert status.Nike Hercules fire units (manned by RA) were tohave 25% of their combat-ready fire units on 15­. --~minutealert status and 50% on 30-minute, except---­where there were only two fire units in a defenseand then it was to be 50% on 15-minute alert.The remainder of the fire units were to be onthree-hour alert. Nike Ajax fire units (manned* Category'- I were regUlar force interceptor unitscollocated on SAC bases.[72 ]::: OJ,' ~.' I L' ~•• "'. \ ., • ' :.;:;,... \,. . ....... ~ ~--.­. -' " ..... ~ ~~ . ...,

y ARNG) were to have 25% of their combat-ready'fire units on 15-minute alert until mobiliu:td.The remainder would be on three-hour alert~There was no change in the BOMARC two-minutealert status.LONG RANGE AIRBORNE PASSIVE HOMING SYSTEMA NORAD Qualitative Requirement for a Long Range Airborne Passive Homing System (LRAPH), dated 1 November 1961;c- was sent to USAF ADC f0:L3-.... implementation. The LRAPH System would~prise a broad band receiver, antenna and display eqUiP­ment to provide relative azimuth and height of the hostile aircraft jamming the ground en~ron­ment. The receiver would be tuned within the basic NORAD radar frequency bands. The LRAPH system was directed to the basic purpose -- kill­ing the jamming aircraft -- as opposed to the ground environment intermediate purpose of track­ing the jamming aircraft. On 26 April 1962, USAF-directed AFSC to be­gin prototlpe development of the NORAD LRAPH Sys~ tern for F-Un ,- F-I02, and F-I06 interceptors. ­For this program,USAF provided $475,000 QRC funds (FY 62). It was to be achieved in two phases. The first phase was to start in January1963 and last for about one year. This phase would include a redesigned antenna, anti-chaff, and IR search and track modifications. The second phase was to start about one year later. It was to include parametric amplifiers and rapid tuning (pulse-to-pulse frequency shifting). _ ._''- _-_______ _ USAF was also taking separate action to pro­vide funds for a LRAPH System development for the BOMARC B missile. ---,--.­. ' I ~ :.~ , ~: I, ',' / ; - -- ....._ "' .." !.,

::"60\ 'p J~,\,:."...&~"L':! ' .;.'.:': ~ ~ \'~ 1 t.l~' .'(.~ ~ lj ~ ~ ,BALLISTIC MISSILE AND SPACE WEAPONS DEFENSE SYSTEMS*NIKE ZEUSBackground. Since 1958, NORAD had put a requirementfor Nike Zeus, as one of its primaryobjectives, in each'of its annual objectivea plans.­From 1960 on, the requirement for an active AICBMsystem was placed in first priority in NORAD objectivesplans. However, the Zeus program never advancedbeyond the R&D stage and the initial employmentdate, which NORAD had first... aimed for in its "objectives -- 1962, had currently slipped to 1967~~ __Status of Zeus Program at Mid-Year. During-­,-.the first half of 1962, Nike Zeus remained in aresearch, development and testing stage. It wasstill the only AICBM system available and continuedto be NORAD's first priority requirement.~-NADOP 64-73 called for two Zeus defense centersand eight fire units at four firing sites byFY 1967, and 31 centers and 75 fire units at 55firing sites by 1970. In the foreword, CINCNORADsaid:--.­­An analysis using war gaming techniqueswas made to determine the effectivenessof the NORAD defense capabilityover the time period of the plan, if programmedaerospace defense forces shouldremain at the levels provided by currentfunding. The results clearly point outthat the defense capability of this continentwill be intolerable after 1964.To close this growing gap betweenSoviet offensive missile capability andNorth American defenses we must have a* See page 66 for Nike Hercules SLBM modification.----

: j toY I) I ,.J ~ 9 ~ ~. \ f,. ~ Ii,. " ~ I ; ,. f ! l­ • I;, '. \. ( ~.' ~, '~. J. w l .!·t ·· ··· • \family of weapons ranging from an areadefense system to a terminal system. .~The only AICBMsystem now available isNIKE-ZEUS and we emphasize, as our firstpriority, its early deployment. Concurrently,we urge that increased emphasi~be given an R&D program to p~ovide anadvanced ballistic missile defense sys~tern which has an area defense capabilityIn the meantime, ·~he Army proposed an evo~_tionary process for the development of ~ikeZeus system. It was approved by the Secretary~fthe Army and was to be submitted to the DOD. Theevolution covered three phases and was inteactedto improve both the radar and missile capabilities.The first phase was the configuration currently ineffect at Kwajalein with a prototype at WhiteSands Proving Grounds. The second phase was toinclude radar improvements and utilization of a"sprint" missile capable of acceleration tolerancesup to 160 GIS. It was expected that thismissile would be capable of intercepting ballisticmissile warheads in the vicinity of 70,000 to90,000 feet~ The third phase of the evolutionwas to provide a phased-array type of radarcapable of acquiring a target, discriminating betweentarget and decoys, calculating slant range,tracking the target, and guiding the missile tothe target. It was expected that this capabilitywould be realized in the 1969-1970 period.~ - -INTERIM SATELLITE INTERCEPT CAPABILITY----~. .. '~ -On 27 April 1962, the Secretary of Defenseapproved an Army recommendation to develop aninterim satellite intercept capability by modifyingthe Zeus Kwajalein facility by May 1963. Thedevelopment was to parallel the current and futureAICBM program, but was to be accomplished on anon-interference basis.. c . .. ' .[ 75 ]~ r~' 'f:f ' ~ . ' : ~ : " I: '... ,J• t '" ~ .. -1,. I ~ ~. ..~ - - .­

The system was to have intercept capabilityfor satellites of 200 nautical miles altitude,acquisition and track of satellites of at leasttwo square meter cross sectional areas at rangesto 1,000 nautical miles, and multi-pass capability.Fifteen million dollars was allocated fromemergency OSD funds ' during FY 1963 to providefor this capability at Kwajalein.o-r'According to the NORAD Deputy Chief of Stafffor Plans and Policy, the end result of this programwould be the potential to d~onstrate anoperational intercept capability against satellitesfrom 100 to 200 nautical miles altitudeshould the political situation indicate such ademonstration to be desirable. --­MANNED MANEUVERABLE AEROSPACE DEFENSE SYSTEM- -Another requirement which NORAD stated inNADOP 64-73, dated 1 March 1962, was for a defenseweapon system to counter space vehicles up to analtitud~ of at least 20,000 nautical miles. Inparticular, NORAD waf\ ,interested in the DYNASOARR&D project and recommended that the capabilitiesof manned space vehicles be ~ully investigatedand exploited.---In follow-up action, on 6 June 1962, NORADrecommended to the JCS that the DYNASOAR programbe broadened to 'include study of those areas essentialto the achievement of an operational aerospacedefense system.---[ 76 ]. -~---.­

CHAPTER 5 OPERATIONAL POLICIES ANDPROCEDURES TRAINING AND EVALUATION:':.ECM TRAININGi:Background. One o.f NORAD's maj or problems "'SO....was its inability to provide adequate ele~~?nicwarfare training for its forces. Needed was an_airborne el,ectronic jamming system. A NORAD ­Qualitative Requirement (NQR) was sent to USA.FADC in June 1961 for submission to Headquarters1USAF. The NQR called for the development of ~CMpods with interchangeable jammers to cover allten frequency bands used by NORAD forces. Theywere to be self-contained, detachable pods capableof being carried by any faker target aircraft,including UE interceptors.USAF APC concurred in the NQR and, along with__it, submittld its own ECM!ECCM requirements toHeadquarters~USAF in July 1961. However, ADC's.individual needs differed somewhat from NORAD's.For example, ADC did not want UE interceptorsmodified for ECM pods and assigned faker targetroles.USAF Program.On 24 March 1962, Headquarters~ :,~ ~ i ' . USAF advised NORAD and ADC that it "recognizes theworld wide deficiencies in air defense sys~~Mtraining capabilities which preclude exercise ofpossessed ECCM equipments on a frequent and regularbasis." To alleviate this situation, USAFsaid, an Operational Support Requirement (OSR) forair defense system ECM training equipments was beingprepared. Its purpose was to a 1 ig n developmentaleffort with training requireMents on a prioritybasis and to provide a single-reference. ... _-­[77 ]-- - ~

source to document and control future requirements.To this end, USAF was realigning current ECMmodification programs. A program to modify thecentury series aircraft and T-33's with the ALQ-31ECM Training Pod was cancelled. A program toequip ADC, AAC, and PACAF B-57 ECM target forceaircraft with three-phase engine-driven 20 KVAconstant speed alternators and wiring was approvedand funded. Finally, three hundred QRC-160 X-, S-,and L-band training pods for ADC, AAC, PACAF, USAFE,and ATC were funded by USAF to provide initial minimumsquadron training capability. For purposes ~:-:__uniform worldwide distribution, allotments were tobe made according to UE squadron strengths.,--:ADC and AAC were to get 260 QRC-160-type jammingpods. Currently, seven million dollars wereallocated for FY-1963 procurement of approximately200 pods. These pods would provide capabilityagainst two (X-band and middle S-band) of the tenNORAD radar frequency bands. To satisfy the wholeNORAD requirement, USAF ADC would -have to initiateseparate QRC action for development of pod jammingequipment for the re,~in~~g radar frequency bands.---~- --The proposed USAF OSR was passed to NORAD on14 June 1962 for review and comment. NORAD generallyconcurred in the OSR and made a number ofrecommendations to USAF to bring it in line withthe NQR submitted in July of the previous year.Earlier in the year, USAF authorized $50,000of FY 1962 funds to evaluate a proposed monopulseMelpar X-band automatic jamming technique. ---­-~ -NORAD had recommended procurement for investigation,under the QRC program, of certain items ofequipment to fulfill its ECM pod requirement.The Melpar funding satisfied one of NORAD's requests.This proposed system, if proved effective,would have a number of advantages over existing[ 78 ]. 1 - - --.. : ~ ~ - ~ ~ ...~ ~~ ~,... . , . .1!. : ' :: ; " I~ ~ .~. ~" l- - .

, t:. . ' " {.:;, :, I , ,.I'! , ' .,, ' J ,\ " ' ,,.:.. i.' ~ '. ~ ~, u,J ~ , r, )\ECM techniques; e.g., it would require a simpleECM receiver and jamming would be done on f~quenciesseparated from those transmitted by theradar. It would be applicable to NORAD's pod requirementagainst mono-pulse tracking radars andhave broad application to various weapons systemsagainst a wide variety of threats.LOW LEVEL INTERCEPT TRAININGAnother of NORADJ.s maj or problems was the~....limited low-level capability of the air~~nseweapons system. This deficiency, revealed bi wargame analysis, was critical in light of -the estimatethat at least 30% of the Soviet bombers - ­could make low-level attacks.In recognition of this weakness, NORAD hadbeen seeking ways to develop a low-level interceptcapability. Budget limitations prevented the developmentof elaborate ground environment and improvedweapons systems, so NORAD sought improvementwith existing equipment. Sky Shield andSioux Arro~- exercises confirmed that the present __system had;'j;he-potential to counter low-levelattacks through new or modified tactics and techniquesand emphasis on related training.This approach was passed to USAF ADC in July1961 with the proposal to start a low-level intercepttraining program with SAC. NORAD noted thatARADCOM and SAC, with NORAD assistance, had developedan extensive low-altitude training program;This program, which had received FAA app:DQo¥aF=i-ri _ e-:.::...~:;::principle, was to be expanded to include exerciseof the ground environment and interceptors.USAF ADC's reply of August was strongly insupport of using low-level SAC bombers. ADC wascurrently emphasizing low-level training withinits own means. This had resulted in a slightincrease in capability, particularly in aircrew[ 79] . ~ ~~ ":"'~:4rr ';---.­

,"'" ,-, J "t ,, ..... ~ f.. J JI.,. TY·I~l-!.~·~tJ. ·'. ,~ ,'- '. fproficiency. The USAF Interceptor ImprovementProgram, presently in progress, would also increaseinterceptor low-level capability. However,ADC asserted that lithe main limiting factor in theattainment of a significant low-level capabilityis the limited cap~bility of the ground environmentto adequately track low level targets."*NORAD approached SAC in August with a proposalfor a joint low-level interceptor/bombertraining program. SAC agreed to the need andrecommended a conference with Nffi:tAD, FAA, and DOT."~The conference was held at Headquart.ers NORADon 6-7 February 1962. Out of it came a test direc~tive prepared jointly by NORAD and SAC. It was~- -­signed by NORAD and forwarded to SAC on 26 March1962 for approval.OPERATIONAL EVALUATION OF NORAD FORCES....;.. .....Background. The NORAD operationa~ evaluation .. _- ­program was first introduced in March 1959. Itspurpose was to eval~te ,the capability of theNORAD regions to per'rerm -their missions in accordancewith policies and procedures prescribed by-CINCNORAD. In each evaluation, the best fakerstrike forces available were employed to simUlatethe NORAD estimate of the threat. Following anevaluation exercise, a report on the results wassent to the region co~nander to initiate correctivemeasures on observed deficiencies. In thisway, NORAD improved the operational readiness and ,combat effectiveness of air defense forces .as- .-.' , -C__signed or available.* Current service programs were gradually improvingthe low-altitude radar coverage.[ 80 ] --.­

Program. Since the start of the program,NOHAD had conducted 14 operational evaJu~~ns.Each NORAD region had been evaluated at leastonce, except NNR which was to be evaluated duringSky Shield III in September 1962. In the firsthalf of 1962, one region was evaluated, tbe 32nd,on 8 and 9 February. During FY ~963, NORADplanned seven evaluations, including five regions,the COC and the ALCOP.NOHAD/USAF ADC Agreement. On 13 April 1962,NOHAD and USAF ADC signed an agreement 'on a d~sionof responsibilities in planning ~xecutingNORAD operational evaluation exercises. Thi~agreement was later expanded to include 'all forcesproviding faker aircraft in NORADevaluat~n exercises-- CINCSAC, CINCLANT, and RCAF ADC, as wellas FAA and DOT. Appropriate addenda to the originalNORAD/ADC agreement was sent out to these 'commands for their approval on 2 July.IDENTIFICATION AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLAIR DEF~E AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL INTEGRATION__. . -,' . .---Background., In 1956, USAF had establishedthe policy of integrating common air defense and ~air traffic control functions. ADC was designatedas the implementing agency. In January 1958, theSecretaries of Commerce and Defense signed anagreement calling for joint use of facilities toavoid duplication and provide an air traffic controlsystem compatible with the nation's defenserequirements in peace and war.FAA and DOD reaffirmed the policy of functionalintegration to the maximum degree possible. Accordingly,a number of radars were currently injoint use in the FAA ARTC's and SAGE network.Also, studies and test projects for further i~tegrationwere carried out.SubseqUQfttl~f-bot~~~l $.: ".... ,~::' .[ 81]0;. .. Co.' -. o.-..~ I. l": . , ~ . :: ~ ~ i : ~ !;: ;r; ~;' "

At the direction of the President in March1961, the FAA conducted studies to improve theair traffic control system. As . a result of thesestudies, the President directed the FAA Administratorin November "to utilize those elements ofthe air defense system which you believe can beadvantageously used in meeting air traffic cqntrolrequirements ... and to consult with the Secretaryof Defense and those responsible for the air defensesystem ...."*Northern Tier Integration Pl~n. By·early1962, DOD and FAA had agreed to use the-SAGE DC'sat Great Falls, Minot, and Grand Forks for air ...,a....- -.traffic control. The DOD was to continue to main­~tain a SAGE system air defense capability, as wellas develop with FAA procedures and techniques forthe integration of air defense and air trafficcontrol functions. The FAA would in effect use theDC's as ARTC's. The SAGE computers were to bemodified to provide the ATC functions, but withoutdegrading the air defense mission. Modification- _.and construction were·to start during the latter 6._._ ..part of the year.A formal DOD/FAAfagreBment on the joint useof the Northern Tier DC's was signed on 23 July1962. The agreement was to be in effect for notless than five years. After three years of opera­ -­tion, a phaseout by either party would be basedupon a notification of two years unless mutuallyagreed. .--- INTEGRATION OF CANADIAN-U.S. PLANS FOR SCATER ---­. ..,.-....­Background. NORAD had been trying to integrateCanadian and U.S. plans for SCATER (Security* See NORAD/CONAD Historical Sununary, Jul-Dec 1961,pp. 56-59.[82 ],I> ~. r.~#1 •••• 'J • ,.1• .. I'..-~." ':. ~ ., "; - . -.. ~ ~~ --.­

.Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations).However, legal problems had preve~ddevelopment of a common NORAD ·SCATER plan: NORADthen adopted the approach of setting out its ~equirementsand asking the FAA and DOD, and theDOT and DND in Canada, to make their own agreementscovering plans and procedures for SCATER.Finally in May 1961, NORAD submitted its requirementsplan for SCATER to FAA and RCAF.NORAD SCATER Requirements. The NORAD SCATERDocument covered control of all aeronautical ~munications, since this was required by~cutiveOrder 10312 and by public law. But the Canad~nposition was that control of all aeronauticalcommunications would restrict civil defens~communicationwith the public during an attack. Thus,RCAF approval of the NORAD Document, on 29 January1962, was subject to the deletion of all referenceto aeronautical communications. The RCAF statedit understood that control of aeronautical communicationsmight no longer apply in the U.S. If so,the RCAF continued, it was 'possible to amend theNORAD Requirements Document so as to achievestandard application by both Canadian and U.S.agencies . '.;.Als'o, · the RCAF recommended changingthe title of the document from SCATER to SCATANA(Security Control of Air Traffic and Air NavigationalAids).-- -As it turned out, the following day, on 30January, the JCS advised NORAD that the DOD wasrevising CONELRAD so that control of aeronauticalcommunications would apply only to governmentemitters providing . navigational aids. * ..Bence-i-· _ ~ ~~~NORAD told the RCAF it would withhold publicationof its SCATER requirements pending final actionon the U.S. CONELRAD revision. Then, control of* See section this chapter on CONELRAD, p. 86.[ 83]. .-- - Jatc\ ."~.t:\f; I., "'I, ' .. ,

, I . . ' ' • ii, .. "\ ~ , . .,aeronautical communications could be deleted fromthe document and the title changed to SCATANA, as ,~~suggested by the RCAF.CANADIAN PRIORITIES FOR MOVEMENT OF CIVIL AND MIL­ITARY AIRCRAFTNORAD had another problem closely allied toSCATER -- to develop a common Canadian-U.S. listof priorities for movement of aircraft duringnational emergency. The DOD ancr~ FAA had agreedin 1959 to a system of priorities for the U.S.that had been established by the JCS at NORAD'srequest. After using these priorities fora shorttime, it became apparent that a compatible Canada­U.S. ~ystem was essential for cross-border operations.To this end, during 1961, NORAD negotiatedwith the RCAF and DOT to set up a compatible prioritylist.In January 1962, the RCAF informed NORAD thatCategory Three peacetime priorities would be pub­.... -- ­lished. Later, on 14 May, the RCAF said that U.S.Categories One and 'I"f~ had been accepted for Canada,subject to Category-One being expanded to includethe Prime Minister and President. The RCAF-anticipated that there might be a requirement forcertain very senior government officials to moveby air in the early stages of a national emergency.NORAD concurred in the recommendation, butthought the priority for high-ranking governmentoffi~ials should be raised to Category One, PriorityOne. The JCS were asked to consider changing __ -~-­the U.S. priorities accordingly.IFF MARK XIIIn December 1960, NORAD asked the JCS for alimited implementation of the IFF Mark XII system.NORAD's earlier bid for the full system lost out. . ,;, . .I' .... 1' .~.:>~':.:" ~.. • ' '!I --.­'r \.,',. '. ,,'. t '[ 84 ]

in tne 1960 program reductions. The system wasneeded to increase NORAD's capability to prQN4desafe passage to the SAC EWO force and to- identIfyother essential traffic during hostilities. Thepresent Mark X SIF had proved inadequate in NORADfull-scale exercises, although some strides _hadbeen made in improving procedures._SAC gave support to the IFF Mark XII systemproposed by NORAD, in July 1961, following satisfactorytest results. However, SAC was reluctantto place the Mark XI I -program in fundingcompet~7>otion with other programs designed to inc~eSAC's operational capability.The IFF Mark XII system was still in ts.e--R&Dstage and as of 1 April 1962, $24.5 million hadbeen spent on the program. However, USAF statedin its Program Communications 64-1 that it had nointentionof pursuing the research program anyfurther.The JCS, on 17 January 1962, directed NORADand SAC to provide additional information to substantiatet~e requirement and to establish a joint­SAC/NORAD position on the need for the Mark XII.The JCS said that a Joint Staff/Joint Services­Working Group had been unable to formulate anagreed recommendation to the JCSfor implementationof the program. Moreover, none of the militaryservices had included Mark XII in budgetprograms through FY 1962 or budget proposals forFY 1963. In fact, the Air Force long range plansdid not include Mark XII implementation. SAC andADC had placed other funding requirements--irt _ ---~nhigher priority for approved and future programmoney. Thus, the low priority afforded Mark XIIin budget programming did not support the urgencyof the requirement to justify the JCS takingextraordinary measures. In short, the JCS neededmore supporting data to proceed further.*'--- ­on 16-April, NORAD and SAC sent a joint replyto the·JCS. They recommended earliest implementation[ 85 J~--.­

of the IFF Mark XII. This submission stressed thelimited identification capability of the groundenvironment in a degraded condition following aninitial ICBM attack. As to funding, they assertedthat Mark XII was a joint service responsibilityand should not compete with other programs whichwere of single servi'ce or single command interest. ­Thus, the cost should be shared proportionately byeach service.CONELRADWARNING AND READIN'ESS, . ~In July 1959, NORAD recommended to the JCSthat the CONELRAD plans published back in 1952 bereviewed and brought up to date. Then in March1961, the JCS directed NORAD to prepare a CONELRADplan for the CONUS. Later, however, they toldNORAD to defer submission of the plan since theyhad decided to re-evaluate the CONELRAD requirement.'In the meantime, they asked for NORAD's.. -:---­evaluation.j ' ,In NORAD' s view_ tlieimportance of CONELRADwas diminishing because guidance systems of modernweapons were relying less on navigational aidsoperating in the low-frequency spectrum. In addi­ ­tion, NORAD pointed out that CONELRAD had somedrawbacks for civil defense, for restrictions tobroadcasting stations would result in the publicreceiving less attack warning information.On 30 January 1962, the JCS advised tn,at . they.-- '~" ~ ::..~had forwarded the following recommendation to theSecretary of Defense on 26 June 1961: "That themilitary requirement for CONELRAD be applied onlyto those emitters installed, operated and maintainedby agencies of the government, ' includingthe military services, for the sole purpose ofproviding aids to navigation and that all otherCONELRAD restrictions now imposed be cancelled so .. - -- " - - '[ 86 ]. ~ ......... o-!­. :o!. & .~ ":~ ." ~I,' . : ~ ~ --...­,~ ,,"', ~~f.' • ,'"

" J 't::',y(,-.; (....:-:. ;'7;~:-~".~ . ~ .Ii'.. , . .. ~ .. ; .'~ ~ft... -,-" ....that defense and military communications capabil­ities can be enhanced." The JCS said that the Secretary of Defense had approved their recommendation on 3 August and the revised military requirement for CONELRAD was passed to the Chairman, U.S. SeG,tion, Mil.itary Co-operation Committee (MCC) with the request that COSC approval be solicited. Subsequently, the MCC referred the matter to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. This resulted i~ Canadian governm~~app~val of the revised CONELRAD requirement in early_1962. The JCS informed NORAD on 12 June 19:62_thatthey no longer required the CONELRAD plan requestedthe previous year. They said that a DOD directiveidentifying remaining military and civil requir.ementsfor the control of electromagnetic radiationsof non-military government transmitters was currentlyunder preparation. When approved, thisdirective would define responsibilities and functionswithin DOD for the remaining CONELRAD activ--~ities. The JCS expected that the Permanent DOD~FCC Advi~~ry-Committee, currently chaired by NORAD,would be reorganized to provide the full co-ordinationessential to the modified CONELRAD require- ___ments and that the chairmanship of the committeewould be reassigned to the Defense CommunicationsAgency.CANADIAN ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM~~--'- ~ " --::-Background. In 1959, the Canadian Army took _~ ­over the National Survival Attack Warning System.A Regional Warning Information Center (RWIC) wasset up at NNR Headquarters. The following year,RWIC's were established at the 25th, 29th, and30th NR's. Procedures were set up to insure effectivewarning to the Canadian public of impend­-ing attack and the exchange of nuclear detonation[ 87] - - .­

and radiation fallout reports between NORAD andthe Canadian Army. Also, attack warning informa- ~tion was passed manually from the NORAD cae to ­the Federal Warning Center (FWC) in Ottawa. ACanadian Army Liaison Officer was established atHeadquarters NORAD in August 1961.Current Status. The FWC was relocated tothe Canadian Army Signal System, Carp, Ontario,and began operation on 16 March 1962. The CanadianArmy Regional Warning Information Center,at NNR St. Hubert, Quebec, assumed the role ofalternate FWC.In 1961, the COSC approved the purchase ofICONORAMA display equipment for the FWC to receive - -­automatic inputs from the NORAD COCo This equipmentwas operating by the end of January 1962.Thus, the Canadian Army received surveillance datasimultaneously with the JCS and SAC. Also, a twoway,full-time telephone connecting the NORAD tacticalswitchboard to the FWC was installed inMarch.In addition, tpe Canadian Army procured amessage composer caPable' of forward-telling notonly air-breathing surveillance, but also missile,NUDET, vessel-sighting, communications outages andECM information. NORAD proposed, and the Canadian ­Army agreed, to SUbstitute this for the presentNORAD composer and use it as the manual back-upsystem for the NORAD ICONORAMA disp"la'y. , Accordingly,modifications were being made to the Pentagonand SAC systems. Installation was to be completedin August. .-.__ -- --­~ - -NORAD ALERTING SYSTEMNORAD had a requirement to replace the existingreadiness and warning teletype network, AlertNet Number One, with an improved voice alertingsystem. The -network and associated - equipment · was•'. .... .•[ 88 ]. . .1"..w1 • ~. I .. I -. '".. ~ ;: I"r1 : .; ... , r ."- ---

· r."-, 'Tr ' . " ,cIt " (, , i'1 , , " r '. • ~ I • \ ~. '. . ~ , :"~..\ .} i~_' ..~designed and developed for an air breathing threat.Even under the most favorable conditions,~~ tookmore than three minutes to alert the NOHAD systemand other agencies concerned. This was not acceptableto NOHAD in light of the ICBM threat withonly 20 minutes warning provided. The pr2posedvoice alerting system would pro~ide alerting inless than thirty seconds, including acknowledgment.NOHAD started action in March 1961 to get avoice alerting system. A submission was made tothe JCS in September-~ By the end of the year$_NORAD's requirement was approved in P~J?Y theJCS and implementation of the system was,.­--.sta~edthe beginning of 1962.However, USAF advised NOHAD, on 15 April 1962,that NOHAD's requirements for leased communicationsservices would exceed the Air Force's financial·plan for FY 1963 by $4 million, of which the voicealerting system would take $1.0 million .. Thus,further justification was required to obtain OSDapproval for release of funds for the voice alertingsystem. Accordingly,on 16 May, NORAD ·re- .- - ­stated th.e requirement to the JCS and included _supportirt[t technical Ciata.o 'As matters stood at mid-year, the tentative

·~ - .. ~.,. . .....f,;l'. '!J.~ ,.~ t' ·~ ~'~' •• , :'". I '*,l'lJ;;~~...i .,,1•~quadrons, radar and ACW squadrons, and Nike units.NORAD asked ADC to work up a study of the feasibilityof providing such a system.While this system was being developed, NORADset up an interim manual system using the existingreadiness and warning network (Alert 1). The warn~ing would be sent by pre-cut teletype messages fromthe COC to the regions. The regions then would fanout the warning to their sectors and subordinateunits. This interim system was known as Phase I(of 4 . phases) .Phase II, also manual, was an- improvementover Phase I in that it called for additionalteletype equipment to permit the storage of a pre- ~cut message tape so the message could be dispatchedinstantly. USAF ADC was also asked to provide theauxiliary teletype equipment needed.Meanwhile, ADC had turned the problem of thedevelopment of the automatic system (Phases IIIand IV) over to the "American Telephone and TelegraphCompany (AT&T), and they produced a communicationsplan on 3 March 1962. The plan showedthe system to be technically feasible. Furthermore,ADC stated that funds were available to buythe system. AT&T estimated the system would cost$23,000 to install and $26,000 per month to rent.There would be no termination charge ..... -.­.- NORAD accepted the AT&T plan in principle andgave ADC detailed requirements to be worked intothe plan. AT&T presented another plan in June1962 recognizing these requirements, but no fur- ~~ ,_ , ...... . -- ­theraction had been taken by NORAD by mid-year.In the meantime, NORAD had gone into Phase II ofits interim manual system, installing equipmentin the COC containing a stored pre-cut messagetape of a warning that could be dispatched instantly.[90 ] ---- - J/IIIl.

DEFENSE READINESS CONDITIONS IN ALASKAOn 26 January 1962, the Commander~in~ChfefAlaskan Command asked CINCNORAD for authority todeclare Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCON's)for the Alaskan NORAD Region. Under the e~istingregulation, ANR reacted only to a DEFCO~ declaredby CiNCNORAD/CINCONAD. Because of the proximityof Alaska to the USSR, it was possible that CINCALmight precede CINCNORAD in going to a higher conditionof readiness. CINCAL reasoned that if ANRcould be brought up at the same time asAlask~Air Command, it would reduce confusio~~-;wel1 asimprove the capability of the air defense for~esto deploy in a timely and orderly manne~._--NORAD concurred and gained approval from theJCS and COSC. NORAD Regulation 55-3 was amendedon 22 May 1962. The Alaskan NORAD/CONAD Region­Command would now assume the DEFCON declared byeither CINCNORAD/CINCONAD or CINCAL, whicheverwas higher. However, the revision stipulatedthat authority to overfly Canada with nucleararmedaircraft was prohibited unless CINCNORADdeclared P'EFC_~N I or Air Defense Emergency.CHANGES IN DEW LINE PROCEDURES ...-­Northern NORAD Region recommended threechanges .in DEW line procedures in February 1962on data handling and forward telling procedures:a. A detection station, before for- ­warding to the data center the zer~ero '­(initial) track detected in an adjacentsubsector, contact the console operatorof the adjacent station to determinewhether the track was under surveillanceso as to eliminate duplicate track tellingand subsequent cease tell action bythe Data Center Controller.[ 91] , ,~• - •• r T; 1"..: . ~ !.~. ~ ; ,---~

~ , ~ .. :y ~'t,.f J'I' .J l~ •!OJ ) -: i ".. _. ~... • ~ "...I~..,.- ,b. Adjacent radar operators accept a cease tell from each other after co­ordinating their video display so as to eliminate duplicate telling. c. A time summary reportingproce­dure for density traffic telling. On 10 May, NORAD advised NNR, Alaskan NORADRegion, and USAF ADC that it concurred with thefirst two recommendation~ (a and b), subject tothe comments of ANR and ADC. NORAD said it agreedwith the basic principles of a summary reporting~~procedures, but changed the format to a "DEWSUM"report for compatibility with ICONORAMA at theNORAD COC and SAGE at the regions. ADC and ANRagreed with the a and b changes. ANR requirednormal reporting, however, and the summary reportingwas not to be used in its operations. Massraid reporting was being tested in the Canadianportion of the DEW Line at mid-year and a conferencewas scheduled for late July to work out firmprocedures. .-.­MID-CANADA LINE PRoCEDURES'E. ._ •NORAD issued a new manual on operation of theMCL (55-7) on 4 January 1962. It described themethod of identification, operating procedures,data handling, and communications.NNRrequested, in May, a change in the proceduresfor the purpose of recognizing spoofing tac- _____tics. NNR pointed out that because only north to-­ -----­south traffic was reported, any time a target aircraftreversed its heading, recrossed the linenorthbound, and then recrossed in a southerlyheading again, there was difficulty in recognizingthe threat. To solve this problem was simple:report northbound as well as southbound trafficunder certa~n conditions.[ 92 J.; ~: ~. ..' ~ .~ ;:.: (' . ',"- - .­"', ; " 01 ,:,.. • ' , \, ,.1 • " ! '• 7 'I .; _ I I ~ •. - ---- - ­

~ - ,- ,, ,,,, " ,! [ '" .. - ~I ij~'" " . ," •...... l.I.,NORAD approved the proposal for use duringfuture region evaluations and special exer~esprior to establishing a firm operational-procedure.NORAD established that at "cocked pistol,"MeL commanders would initiate telling of northboundas well as southbound penetrations and iftarget maneuvers were made within range of MeLdetection equipment and spoofing tactics wereidentified by the MeL commander, he was to advisethe NORAD sector to whom he reported andbegin telling northbound and southbound traffic.-----~- -- ------...-- ­.-'-­[93 ]-"':- ~ :;~ ••• T"~- ',t-.;', I I ,-I •• _ -- ~ , ., --.­

·,, ~ GLOSSARY-----~ - - --"----- -~ -. ~ - --- :,--'-...-. . :...- --

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ~.: ~~~~.... ~AACABMAWSADCADIZADNACAEWAEW&CAFBAFSAFSCAICBMALCOMALCOPALRIAMIANGANRAOCARADCOM:ARNGARPAARTCASMATCAT&TAWB/CBIRDIEBMEWSBUICi :Alaskan Air CommandAutomatic Ballistic Mis~e AttackWarriing SystemAir Defense CommandAir Defense Identification ZoneAir Defense of the North AmericanContinent _ ­Airborne Early WarningAirborne Early Warning and ControlAir Force BaseAir Force StationAix Force Systems CommandAnt~-I~tercontinent~~ll~ticM~ss~le ­Alaskan CommandAlternate Command Post~ ____Airborne Long Range InputAdvanced Manned InterceptorAir National GuardAlaskan NORAD RegionAir Officer CommandingArmy Air Defense CommandArmy National GuardAdvanced Research Projects Agency-­Air Route Traffic ControlAir to Surface MissileAir Training CommandAmerican Telephone and Telegraph~~_CompanyAll WeatherBiological and ChemicalBattery Integration and RadarDisplay EquipmentBallistic Missile Ea~.rning~ ~-~System - - _ ­Back Up Interceptor ControlCADINDefense Integra­Continental Ai~tion North97-- - ...-.

CCC&ECINCALCINCLANTCINCNORADCINCONADCINCSACCOCCOMAACCONADCONELRADCOSCDCDCADDR&EDEFCONDEWDNDDODDOTDRBECCMECMESDEWOFFAAFDFrSFWCFYG-I-UKHFHIPARControl CenterCommunications and ElectronicsCommander-in-Chief, Alaskan CommandCommander-in-Chief, AtlanticCommander-in-Chief, North American ,~Air Defense CommandCommander-in-Chief, ContinentalAir Defense CommandCommander-in-Chief, Strategic.. Air CommandCombat Operations CenterCommander, Alaskan Air CommandContinental Air Defense CommandControl of Electromagnetic RadiationChiefs of Sta~f CommitteeDirection CenterDefense Communications AgencyDirector of Defense Research andEngineeringDefense Readiness ConditionDistant Early WarningDepartment of National DefenceDepartment of DefenseDepartment of TransportDefence Research BoardElectronic Counter CountermeasuresElectronic CountermeasuresElectronic Systems DivisionEmergency War OrderFighterFederal Aviation AgencyFrequency DiversityFighter Interceptor SquadronFederal Warning CenterFiscal Year--~ - -Greenland-Iceland-United KingdomHigh FrequencyHigh-Powered Acquisition Radar-- -c___98 -- - - ..ec

ICBMIFFIMIJCSJTDIntercontinental Ballistic MissileIdentification Friend or FoeImproved Manned InterceptorJoint Chiefs of StaffJoint Table of DistributionLRIXLong Range InterceptorMADREMagnetic Drum Radar EquipmentMOOManpower and OrganizationMCCMilitary Cooperation CommitteeMCL Mid-Canada Line ­MIDASMissile Defense Alarm SystemNADOPNorth American Air Defense Objectives",PlanNASA National Aeronautics and S~ceAdministration ~- -- -~~NATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organizat'1onNAVFORCONAD Naval Forces Continental Ai~efenseCommandNCCNORAD Control CenterNGNational GuardNMNautical MilesNNRNorthern NORAD RegionNORADNorth American Air Defense CommandNQRNORAD Qualitative RequirementNSA National Security Agency ... --­NUDETNuclear DetonationOECOEPOSDOSR~- .Operational Employment ConceptOperational Employment PlanOffice of the Secretary of DefenseOperational Support RequirementPACAFPARLQRCR&DRARCAPacific Air ForcesPrince Albert Radar LaboratoryQuick Reaction Capability --:;.----::.--::._Research and DevelopmentRegular ArmyRadio Corporation of America99- - - ~

RCAFRWICSACSAGESAMSCATANASCATERSIFSLBMSORSPADATSSPOUEUSAUSAFUSAFEUSMCUSNVHFWE ADESZIRoyal Canadian Air ForceRegional Warning Information CenterStrategic Air Co~nandSemi-Automatic Ground EnvironmentSurface to Air MissileSecurity Control of Air Trafficand Air Navigational AidsSecurity Control of Air Trafficand Electromagnetic RadiationsSelective Identification yeature ­Submarine Launched Ballistic MissileSpecific Operational RequirementSpace Detection and Tracking SystemSpecial Project Officer--­Unit EquipmentUnited States ArmyUnited States Air ForceUnited States Air Forces in EuropeUnited States Marine CorpsUnited States NavyVery High FrequencyWestern Electric Air Defense EngineeringServices~ "Zone of the Interior... - -. -­-"-­100- - -~

INDEX --.­I (J I10 2 - b G,w,. (c.

'~?;_ .~ J(!; .~.~ '..''''''..................................................~ ..;................................................ . INDEXAEW&C: change in employmentprocedures, 20-23 signment to NNR,Bangor Sector: reas­8-11~Alaskan Region: DEFCONstatus of, 91; organizationof, 1-4ALCOP: background to,47-48; conununicationsroutes, 58; improve- ··ment in, 49-50; manningof, 7-8; secondaryALCOP, 50; StrategicAlert Cadre, 48-49Alerting System: NORADrequirement for, 88-89ARADCOM: region headquarters,collocationwith NORAD region headquarters,6-7~...Automatic Ballistic MissileAttack WarningSystem: developmentof, 89-90; requirementfor, 58Backup Interceptor Control:background, 50­51; future of MissileMaster, 56-58; Phase I,implementation of, 52­53, RCAF participationin, 52; Phase II, deploymentpriorities,53-55; switched communications,55-56;two phases of, 51-52Biological and ~ ChemicalWarfare Warning System:automatic system,42; interim system,41-42BMEWS: ECM vulnerability,29; ~ in, 27;range deficienc¥-, 29;rearward communica~t ions, backu"p--to, 44,45; status of, 26;tracking radars, 28.BOMARC: interim controlof at North Bay,9, 63; LRAPH systemfor, 73; redeployment ~ _ _and dispersal of, 70;status of forces, G3Bomb Alarm System: reliabilityof, 40-41 -~-COC: voice circuits toNORAD ALCOP, regions, .and region ALCOP's, .59CONELRAD: . r.evis:ton of~~ -~83-84, 86-87DEW East : SAC/NORADcommunications planfor, 43, 44,45DEW Line: change in~r66~dures for, 91-92;

." .: '. ' . ~ { , ~ -" ~ , . ~......, .. , ., ,., . , ' . \ '. i ......................................... ............ ~............. .............:...............~. ~ :.SAC/NORAD Communicationsplan for, 43-45DYNASOAR:for', 76Eagle Aerie:69 ffrequirementconcept of,ECM: training for, 77-79;LRAPH, 73Evaluation of NORADForces: backgroundand agreement with ADCon, 80-81FAA: integration of airdefense and air trafficcontrol with, 81-82Federal Warning System:NORAD feeding of informationto, 88416L: reorientation of,51-55425L: costs, 46-47;status of, 46IFF Mark XII Program:status of, 84-86Interceptors: additionalCanadian, requirementfor, 62; Air NationalGuard, 60, 61; CF-IOl's,RCAF conversion to, 60­62; dispersal of forsurvival, 70-72; increasedalert postureof, 72; long range,NORAD efforts to g~,66-69; LRAPH systemfor, 73; regularforce, 60, 61; ThuleF-I02's, reduction of,62-63 ­Long Range Airborne PassiveHoming System:development of, 73Long Range Interc~~9r:background, 66-1b7; -_current efforts to ­get, 67-69~_MADRE: for SLBM detec­tion, 38, 39 Manned Aerospace DefenseSystem: NORAD requirementfor, 76Manning Changes: NORAD headquarters and re­gions, 14-16 Mid-Canada Line: new manual for operation of, 92-93; phaseout deferred, 25-26 MIDAS:status and plansfor development,~.Missile Master:of, 56-58 future Movement of Civil and Military Aircraft: priorities for, 84 National Survival Attack$­•"1.' •. , ~ .•. - ~ ~ , ~ ........

... . :..( ;- ............ ........ ..... ......................................~. .......... 9 .......... ~ ...................................... .. con­Warning System:trol of, 87 NCC's: effect on Mis­sile Master, 56-58; number of, 51-52 Nike: Army National Guard, 64; Hercules, deployment of addi­tional, 69-70; Hercu­les and SLBM defense, ''''' 66; Hercules units, manning of, 64-66; in­creased alert posture, 72-73; NORAD missile force, 65; regular force, 63-64; Zeus, background and status, 74-75 Northern NORAD Region: transition to SAGE, 4-5 NUDET:status of, 39-40 ~ . - ­Off-Shore Surveillance: AEW&C Force, 20-23; Texas Towers, 23-25 Radar: BMEWS, status and deficiencies, 26­29; gap-filler program, 18-20; Mid-Canada Line, 25-26; NORAD prime, 24; NSA satellite identifi­cation system, 35-36; SLBM detection system, 38-39; SPADATS, im­proved, 30; additional sensors, 32-34; Texas Towers, 23-25 RCAF: deferment of gap-filler pr~~am, 19-20 Regional Warning In­formation Centers: establishment of, 87-88 SAC: IFF Mark XII program,support for,84-86; low-level,.-nterceptt~ng with,79-80; northern ~reacommunications plan,43-45 ~-SAGE: backup to, 50­55; FAA use of , 81­82; gap-fillers, 18­20; Missile Master, £uture of, 56-58; switched communica­ ... -- -­tions, 55-56; vulner­ability of, 50-51 .-­Satellite Intercept Capability: interim,approval of, 75-76 SCATER: Canadian-U.S. plans for integration of, 82-84; NORAD re­quirements for, 83 ...,.,... . -.... .~ --=:-­--~~ - - -.... . ..:..Sectors of NORAD/CONAD: boundaries of, 12; changes in, 8-13 SLBM Detection System: status of, 38-39 SPADATS:additional--.­

~.a............................... ...... ............... ·~· l ·a ••••••••••• • •••••••• • • • ••••• • •••••••••• •• ••••••••• •• • ••••sensors, 32-34; developmentof, 29-30;NSA satellite identificationsystem, 35-36;SPADATS-improved, 30-32Survivability: AEW&Cforce, 22-23; BUIC, 50­56; communications, 58­59; hardened NORAD COC,46-47; increase inalert posture, 72-73;interceptor dispersal,70-72; Missile Master,future of, 56-58;NORAD ALCOP, 47-50Texas Towers: evacuationof and need for,23-25-Training: ECM, 77-79; low-level intercept, 79-80 Underground COC: costs,-"" 46-47; status of ,46Zeus: background and status, 74-75 ---- _.r........ -- ­._-....,....­,~'" .• Jik~~~~ 'H.'K.::'7: C!'-' ·1~~.,~~n:em'l-~~[l06] · · ~-c{ r.:>1, .,',.,, _. ..~ ,~~'f~~~. ' . ~~l'- - .­

DISTRIBUTION COSC 1 REDISTRIBUTED BY HQ NORAD:.: ,:-> ~:~ ~::~ :CNS, RCN 1 NHCR 1 ,~~NAPA1 CGS, Canadian Army 1 NINT 1 NNFO1 CAS, RCAF 5 NOPS 1 NOOP1 CINCLANT 1 NOEV 1 NOST1 CINCPAC 1 NOCC 1 NOOA1 CINCSAC 1 NLOG 1 NPAP -$- 1 'CINCSTRIKE 1 NPPA -a-.;-_-o- 1 NPPP1 RCAF ADC 3 NPMO . 1 ......~ .- -NPSD1 ARADCOM 3 NELC 1 NEEC1 NAVFORCONAD 2 NECO 1 NGAM1 USAF ADC 1 NGPM 1 NNCH19* NORAD Regions 3 each .... -­­NORAD SectorsHq NORADJ.. .TOTAL1 each40 110 -...-.--­* Includes 12 copies for the JCS sent by separatesubmission. .Distribution to the Se~ces· ·wil1~--: - --.-=:be made by the JCS.- - .­

'./ ~ :. :.~ ~ I.; ~ .'"'' , -.., ., 1 f~ ~, • _. : I.j d. ~ L1 d r '} _ .j L-L i'\ 'Z (q (, Z.REFERENCESCHAPTER I1. ALCOM, Plan for the Organization of the Alaskan NORAD/CONAD Region Headquarters, 19 ­J.un 62 (Doc 1, ANR Hist Rpt, Jan-Jun 62). 2. ALCOM Special Order G-5, 24 Jan 62 (Doc 2, ANR Hist Rpt, Jan-Jun 62). 3. NNR to NORAD, "Northern·....NORAD Region Organi­zation - September 1962 to July 1963," 13 ....... ~ . Apr 62 (4). . .-~ '-4. Ibid.; See also NORAD/CONAD. Historical Swnmary,Jul-Dec 61, p. 5. . 5. See Footnote 3.6. Ibid.; NORAD to NNR, "Northern NORAD Region Organization, Sep 62 - Jul 63," 14 May 62 (4). 7. Msg, NNR to NORAD, NRCS32 , 22 May 62 (4).~' . . .8. ARADCOM to NORAD, "Collocation of ARADCOM and NORAD Region Headquarters," 8 Mar 62 (6.5). 9. Ibid.."JIOo....10. 1st Ind (ARADCOM to NORAD, "Collocation ofARADCOM and NORADRegion Headquarters," 8Mar 62), NORAD to ARADCOM, n.d. (6.5).11. ADC to NORAD, "ALCOP Manning Requirements, ,.--.-~.23 May 62(51,.2 X 3).. · ·...~ . ---:-:12. Ibid.13. NORAD to USAF l\DC, "ALCOP Manning Requirements," 0 R " 0

. r " I ... , - _~. -. ' •.." ...... " ~ - , '. r ~ ., t· "., " , . ., !""( 1" " ..b1 ~.' 1. . .........::..:................,.................··~·I· ..... . ............................. III III •• III. III ••••••••••••••15. Msg, NNR to NORAD, NRCR35, 11 Jan 62 (4).r­16. Ibid.17. Msg, 30th NR to NORAD, 30-NOOP-3/N-122-62,13 Jan 62 (4). ­.18. Msg, NNR to NORAD, NRDP6, 24 Jan 62 (4).19. Msg, NORAD to NNR, NOOP-E X-297, 5 Jun 62;Msg, NNR to NORAD, NRCSl4, 13 Feb 62 (4);Memo, Capt Barnhill l 18 Jun 62 (4). ~.:_.20. Msg, NORAD to NNR, NOOP-E X-092, 13 Feb 62(4); Msg, NNR to NORAD, NRCSIO, 26 Feb 6a- .(4); Msg, NORAD to NNR, NOOP-E X-113, 7 Mar62 (4); DF, NPAP to .NHCS, nProposed NORADand CONAD General Orders,1I 19 Jun 62 (4).21. DF, CPMO to COOP, IIBangor NORAD/CONAD Sector,"29 May 62 (4). )22. Msg, Goose NORAD Sector to CONAD, GNCCR 896,19 Feb 62 (307).~:23. NNR to NORAD, . "0perational Control of DEWEast," 14 Mar 62 (307).24. Wkly Act Report, NOOP-E, 13 Apr 62; DF, NOOPto NOPS, IIOperational Control of DEW East,"4 Apr 62 (307).--25. Msg, DCADS to NORAD, KCCCR0672, 15 Jan 62(4); Memo, Col R. H. Brady to Brig Gen YarlY -r--~ '"Discontinuance of Omaha NORAD/CONAD ControlCenters,'" 10 Jan 62 (4); NORAD and CONAD GO's2, 16 Feb 62.26. DF, NPAP to NRCS, "Proposed NORAD and CONADGeneral Orders, tl 2 May 62 (4); DF, NPAP toNHCS, ltNORAD/CONAD General Orders," about 24May 62 (4); NORAD GO 20, 31 May--62; --_ .':" '::... : . ~ .' ~ , . : !. '.

. w-~........::..:.................................... .. ·1· ...................................................... 27. Memo for Record, Capt Barnhill, NPMO, 29~ay62 (4); DF, NPAP to NRCS, "Proposed NoRAD andCONAD General Orders," 13 Jun 62 (4).28. DF, NPAP to NNCH, "Proposed NORAD and CONADGeneral Orders," 13 Jun 62 (4) ..29. NORAD to -JCSt. "NORAD Manpower Requirementsfor FY 63," 29 Jan 62 (3); NPMO Memo, Lt ColJoachim to Maj Gen Wise, trJ-Staff ManpowerRequirements Not Included in the Annual Sub,.....mission to the JCS,It 8 Mar 62 (3). ~~:-30. See footnote 29.-------31. NORAD to JCS, ItNORAD Manpower Requirementsfor FY 1963," 29 Jan 62 (3); NORAD to CAS,RCAF, "NORAD Regional and Sector Organization,"12 Feb 62 (4).32. Msg, NORAD to 25th NR, NPMO 006, 19 Mar 62(4) •33. Memo, NPMO to Chief of Staff, "Joint Headquarter~f·T.~ple of Distribution, North AmericanAir Defense Command, 1 July 62," 14 May·62 (3)..~34. NORAD Paper, "Reorganization of Certain StaffElements of Hq NORAD/CONAD,1t n.d. (3); NORADto JCS, "Reorganization of 'Certain Maj or StaffElements of Headquarters NORAD/CONAD," 10 May62 (3).--- - " . >-. ..35. NORAD to JCS, "Reorganization of CertainMaj or Staff Elements of Headquarters NORAD/CONAD, u 10 May 62 (3). ­36. Ibid.; Memo, NORAD Chief of Staff to Staff,"Review of the NORAD Headquarters Organizationand Manning," 21 Mar 62 (3); Memo, LtCol Joachim to Maj Gen Wise," '''J-Staff ManpowerRequirements notincluded in the AnnualSubmission to the JCS," 8 Mar 62 (3 X 57) ........r....-aAN......................--I[ l09]~== ........~.....................-­• ., I.... • ,• • ~ .! .~ t :" :.: _( '.' , " ~ 1 .'

, ,,~,(,'. ,. ..~ I ~l \"'~T~' :','. i, I., I ; _ ••1 f! ; ~'W i......, ....::...:................................... ..f. 37. Msg, NORAD to Director, Joint Staff, JCS, , .~NPMO X007, 17 Apr .62 (3); DF, NPAP to NHG~ ­ttHigh Priority Manpower Requirement - AssistantDirectors, COC," 1 Jun 62 (3).38. Memo, Col R. H. Brady to Maj Gen Wise, '!.Trip!teport ," 2 5 May 62 (3)' . .39. DF, NPAP to NHCS, ttHigh Priority ManpowerRequirement - Assistant Directors, COC," 1Jun 62 (3).'..... ..:40. Memo, Lt 'Col Joachim, 27 Jun 62 (3).41. DF, NP~O to NGAM, "Manpower Authorization~ 9fForces Available to CINCNORAD," 22 Jun 62 (3).CHAPTER II1. ADC V-24 Control and Warning Equipment Report, 31 Nov 61. 2. Interview with Maj S. E. Aites, NEEC-E, 2 Aug62. '-'.3. ADC V-24 Control and Warning Equipment Report, 30 Jun 62. 4. RCAF ADC Programme and Requirement Summary, 1 Sep 62 (706B). 5. DF, NEEC-E to NEEC, "Trip Report Re 416L System Phasing Group Meeting, It 19 Jun 62-­(302.1) . --- . ~---.. ­"'- '~:-.. -- .:..>6. Msg, CANAIRHED to NORAD, CAS 192, 4 Jul 62(302.1) .7. Msg, NORAD to CANAIRHED, NPPP-PLX008, 6 Jul 62 (302.1). 8. Msg, USAF to ADC, NORAD, AFOOP-DE 66069, 13 Jul 62 (305). . c. ."'r~~i[ll~ ]~_~~e=5g.m·.'.rr~=~~~I...~~~...• . ·2~.~Z"""".l.m.ag'£~tt,. ..J.~ .-,1, ~\ ~ i . \. r''. , 1;;' l '., .' , / . 1 A,''O f ~. •

················································wI........•......................•........•...........•••.9. Msg, NORAD to CJCS, NOOP-E X-093, 21 Feb ~~(302.12) .10." Ibid.-11. Staff Study, Incl to NORAD to ADC, 25th~ 26th,~8th, and 32d Regions," "AEW&c Confer~nce," 9Feb 62 (302.12).12. NORAD to 26th, 32d, and . 28th Regions, "Employmentof Seaward Extension Elements, n 11 Jul ""'$0"'"62 (302.12). ~~ __13. Interview with Lt Col G. A. Riddler, Jr., ---.NOOP-E, 24 Jul 62. ----­14. ADC SO G-3, 8 Jan 62; Msg, ADC to 26th AD,ADCMO-F-3, 10 Jan 62 (302.12).15. DF, NOPS to NHCS, "Texas Tower Evacuations,"1 Mar 62 (302.12).16. Msg, NOHAD to JCS, NOOP-E X-046, 29 Jan 62(302.12) •J." :17. NORAD to Abc, "Texas Towers," 21 Sep 61 (307).18. Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 29 Jun 62; Memo, DCS/C&E to Maj Gen Low, "Current ALRI Status,"24 Apr 62 (302.12).19. RCAF ADC to NORAD, "RCAF Policy on the MCL,"7 Mar 62 (308).20. NNR to NORAD, "MCL Operations - Recognitionof Spoofing Tactics," 4 May 62 (308).21. Msg, NORAD to NNR, NOOP-E X-251, 11 May 62(308) •22. ADC to NORAD, "BMEWS Site III OperationalDate,U 2 Apr 62- (226); Wkly "Act Rept, NOOP,10 Aug 62.

I I \ I : 2 :. r ....... 'l. ... " ~I, I I ':: ' ,; ~ ,; :, I t lv 'I ~ ,;.t., ., ~ .... 1'I. -. ..b.t~......::..:....................................'117.i 23. Msg, NORAD to JCS, NPPP-PL X002, 2 Ma~ 6~~ _(226).24." Ibid.; NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62.25. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62 ..26. Ibid.; -Wkly Act Rept, NEEC, 6 Apr 61; DF,NOOA to NELC, "Briefing on AN/FPS-49," 20Apr 62 (226).27. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62;~yAct Repts, NPSD, 5 Mar 62, and NEEC, 20 Jul- ~62. -- ­-----31. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62; ADC toNORAD, "Reduced Radar Cross Section Detectionand Tracking," 2 Apr 62 (226).32. Wkly Act Rept, NELC, 12 Jun 62.33. Ibid.; Wkly Act Rept, NEEC, 6 Apr 62; WklyAct Rept, NPSD, 9 Apr 62. ­j: - ­34. Wkly Act ' ltept, NELC,' 12 Jun 62.35. Ibid... -- --­..---­36. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62; Interviewwith Lt Col J. D. Langstaff, NOOP-E, 14Aug 62. ­37. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62.38. Msg, NORAD to JCS, NOOP-E X-156, 2 Apr 62(228) •....... , ' _-.a- __ 39. NORAD Hist Sum, Jul-Dec 61; Msg, Space TrackR&D Facility, to AFSC, ESSXS 08-1-018, 11 Jan62 (228); Interview with Lt Col J. D. Langstaff,NOOP-E, 14 Aug 62...­- -'-'.I=___aaIllllElBiJl_IPCI_IIIIIII__________'[ ~ 12]e 'Wi!" En --] • ra.1,4' ': f~~~ ;,,:·~,,'J:~-:'i~• • ~ ' .. I f ' (. .. . . ~"' :,...,;,..:c

., 1 -- ,~ . ' ~' .', • -..,. ' ," j ,; : .; l ~ I:! ~ l l I ;'~ . ',l ,-:: -:- -- -- -_oWl 40. Msg, Space Track R&D Facility to AFSC, E_SBXS08-1-018, 11 Jan 62 (228); Msg, JCS to NORAD,JCS 3608, 13 Mar 62 (228); Interview withLt Col J. D. Langstaff, NOOP-E, 14 Aug 62.41. Msg, JCS to NORAD, JCS 3608, 13 .Mar 62 -(228);14sg, NORAD to JCS, NOOP-E X-156, 2 Apr 62 (228).I42. Msg, Space Track R&D Facility to AFSC~ ESSXS08-1-018,11 Jan 62 (228); Msg, CONAD to COFSUSAF, COOP-E X-058,43 Jan 62 (228); Inter-'S"....view with Lt Col J. D. Langstaff, NOOBbBrc14Aug 62. ­43. Wk1y Act Rept, NOOP t26 Apr 62; Msg, CANEIRHEDto USAF ADC, DCOM2273, 30 Apr 62 (228); DF,NOOP to NOPS, "NORAD Requirements from RCAFSensors," 12 Mar 62 (228); NORAD to CAS RCAF,NORAD SPADATS Requirements for RCAF Sensors,1I30 Jan 62 (228); Interview with Lt Col J. D.Langstaff, NOOP-E, 14 Aug 62.44. Msg, CONAD to COFS USAF, COCC-50 X021, 16 Mar62; Msg, 'CONAD to COFS USAF, .COCC-SD X029, ·4Apr 62 (~~_8);' . .45. Msg, NSA to USAF COFS, NSA R3/2-62, 8 Jan 62.(228)46. Ibid.; Msg, USAF to USAFSS, AFCIN-1C 93910,~an 62 (228).47. Msg, USAF to NSA, AFCIN-1C 75661, 23 Apr~. .(228) . --- "-...48. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62, pp. 4-5.49. DF, NPAP to NAPA 2 "DOD MIDAS Task Group, Conclusionsand Recommendations,1I 3 Jan 62. (227)50. Ibid.51. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62, pp. 4-5.~.~.........a.~.aa~.......__ u." ...............I[ 113]••~i"~?"""""F"".'n · ' a-~_G............~ti -

0, t r J .. t ,) 1 i - ~ ,, . \', 'j r t I"'1'1 \ " ," I I '-.I ,~ ': ' ; I • ' .. ; ,~Wf'......::.. ~. . .................................. . .. -1­52. Ibid.53. Ibid.; . Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 5 Mar 62.54. NORAD Command Reference Book, Jun 62, pp. ~-5.55. NORAD to JCS, "NORAD Requ'irement ' for an Off­Shore Missile Attack Warning System," 24 Feb62 (233).56. Msg, USAF to ADC, 'AFORQ 61937, 28 Jun 62 (233)$....57. Memo, UStatus Report on Follow Actions t6;:- -_Implementing NADOP 64-73," NPPP, 10 May-62 (657).58. Memorandum for the Record, S/L F. P. Boyczuk,NECO-F, 18 Jun 62 (250).59. Memorandum for Col Baril from NECO-F, IIBombAlarm System Status ,I! 1 May 62 (250).60. Ibid.; Msg, USAF to ADC, AFOAC-SC 68506, 11 . .. -.­Mar 62 (250).:~~~6l. Memo for Gen Kuter, NPAP, IlBiological andChemical Rapid Warning System," 25 Jan 62 (250).62. Wkly Act Rept~ NPSD, 22 Jan 62.63. Memo for Col Dyke, NPSD-R, nBW/CW InterimWarning System," 19 Mar 62(250).64. Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 4 Jun 62.~ ..:.,---- .. .65. Memo for the Record, "CBW System Meeting,lI 8Jun 62 (250); Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 11 Jun 62.66. Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 4 Jun 62.67. Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 28 May 62.68. Msg, . NORAD to CANAIRHED; et aI, NECO-'P 272,17 Jul 62 (57).~""__"""""__" __""__~[114]~wcai••." ••.• w........--................;,; ~) \ ;': .~ '.: .' i, 'i.

·...............................................~.. '1f769. NORAD/SAC Northern Area Communications Ob~ec~tives Plan (NACOM), May 62 (57B).CHAPTER III1. W~ly Act Rept, NPSD, 22 Jun 62; 3d NORAD C&E Conf, 10 Jul 62, 1 Aug 62 (675). 2. 3d C&E Conf, 10-11 Jul, 1 Aug 62 (675).3. Ibid.­4. Msg, ADC CCDSO to ADC, ADSP 4~234-E, 6 Apr 62 (51). --5. Msg, USAF to AFSC, AFORQ 81216, 20 Apr 62 (51).6. Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 4 Jun 62.7. NORAD to Dist, ItNORAD Strategic Alert Cadre Composition and Instructions," 27 Feb 62 (51.2). ~ .8. NORADCommand -Reference Book, 1 Jan 62, p. 12.9. NORAD to ADC , "Reaffirmation of NORAD ALCOP Requirements, 1961-1965," 28 Feb 62 (51.2). 10~ Msg, USAF to ADC, AFOOP 88516, 15 May 62(51.2) ..11. Wkly Act Rept, NPSD, 15 Jun 62; Msg, USAL;t..o_.ADC, AFOOP-DE 65209, 11 Jul 62 (51.2). --- ­12. Wkly Act Rept, NOOP-E, 8 Mar 62; 29th NR toNORAD, "29th Region Command and Control Responsibilities,II 13 Nov 61 (258); Msg, 29thNR to NORAD, 29NOCC-C 0467, 17 Jul 62 (51.2).13. Msg, NORAD to 30th NR, NOOP-E X-194, 10 Apr62 (51.2)...........ama....................~.....[l15]1• .ss:.3a ~---...............&m.....aa..........~5.m&

, .. i ~ /4. : ) ...... j : .. -

......::..:....................................~. ~t\,...,. ........................................................ :', .28. 1st Ind (NORAD to ARADCOM, "Future of M/M~28 Dec 61), ARADCOM to NORAD, 10 Jan 62:29. NORAD to ARADCOM, "Future of Missile Master,"2 Feb 62 (54.3).CHAPTER IV1. NORAD Program Progress Report, 1 Jul 62 (718).2. NORAD Program Progress Reports (Monthli~~Jan 62 through 1 Jul 62; NORAD Program;­-.­Sum~ ~mary, 1 Jan 62 (670).s. NNR Historical Report, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 62; Msg,RCAF ADC toNNR, A24, 25 May 62 (403).4. NADOP 64-73; 1 Mar 62 (657).5. ADC to NORAD, "(U) Thule Alert," 31 May 62,wll Atch, Ltr to ADCCS, same subject, 11 May62, also wll Atch (403).- ,6. NORAD to ~ 'ADC - , "(U) Thule Alert," 11 Jun 62(403).7. NORAD. Program Progress Reports, 1 Mar and 1Jul 62 (718).8. NNR Historical Summary, Jan-Jun 62.9. NADOP 64-73,' 1 Mar 62 (657); NORAD ProgramProgress Report, 1 Jul 62 (718); NORAD ..P..ro=-" ...gram Summary, 1 Jan 62 (670); Interviewswith Lt Col -No E. Cole, NOOP-O and Lt ColW. Gause, NGPM, 30 Aug 62.10. NORAD Program Progress Report, 1 Jul 62;Wkly Act Rept, NOOP-O, 25 May 62 (745).11. NORAD to ARADCOM, "National Guard Conversionto Hercules (U)," 11 Jan 62 (503); Wkly ActRept, NPPP, 12 Jan 62 (747); Interview withLt Col Thornton, NPPP, 18 Jul 62 ...........................SM.........a....[117]~....~am.....aM=-qw........................ . ', '

.......:...:................................... ~ i. .. ·1·12. NADOP 64-73, 1 Mar 62- (657).13. Msg, USAF to ADC and NORAD, AFORQ 61937, 28Jun 62 (233).14. NADOP 63-67, 31 Mar 61 (657).15. NADOP.'64-73, 1 Mar 62 (657).16. Ibid.17. JCS to NORAD,, Mar 62 (657)."Continental Air Defens~~l918. NORAD to JCS, "Defense of Northern Perimet-erand ICBM Sites (U)," 16 Apr 62 (657).19. Status Reportmenting NADOP(657) •on Follow-up Actions for Imple­64-73 (U), NPPP, 10 May 62.,j20. Interview with Cdr A. M. Gill~ NPPP, 14 Aug62.- ,21. JCS to N

.......:...:...................................~.,.b.t i........................................................ 26. (U) NORAD Qualitative Requirement for Longr~Range Airborne Passive Homing System (LRAPH)~1 Nov 1961 (150).27. NORAD Command Reference Book (701); DF,NPSD-O to NPSD, "Trip Report to -ASD, AFSC, .and Hq USAF, 28 and 29-May 1962," 6 Jun 62(403); Status Report on Follow-up Actionsfor Implementing NADOP 64-73 (U), NPPP, 10May 1962 (657).28. NADOP 64-73, 1 Mar 62 (657).29. Wkly Act Rept, NEEC, 22 Jun 62 (748)j Interviewwith Lt Col D. W. Pettigrew, NPSD-B,~lAug 62.30. Memo for Gen Kuter, NPSD-B, "Interim SatelliteIntercept Capability," 3 May 62 (232).31. NORAD to JCS, "Manned Maneuverable AerospaceDefense System (U)," 6 Jun 62 (232).CHAPTER V1. Msg, USAF to ADC, NORAD et al, AFORQ-AD'-­72887, 23 Mar 62 (150).2. Ibid.3. Interview with Maj W. H. Hogan, NPSD, 3 Aug62.4. USAF to ADC, NORAD et al, "(U) Operational Support Requirement for Air Defense Systems Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)," 14 Jun 62 (150) .5. NORAD to USAF, "(U) USAF Proposed Operational Support Requirement for Air Defense Systems Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)," 18 Jul 62 (150) .6. Msg, AFSC to ASD, SCSEI-2-1-8" 2 Jan 62 (150).7. Wkly Act Rept, NPPP, 5 Jan 62 (747) .Cm a ..nBII· u[ 119]-= ! ·1l1li .....t'" '.: frli ~ .or-' : ... ;.~~ I ~ ~~" .. ,.' { I I. , I ,', > , •f !,, !' ~ I .. , . '" •

......::..:....................................W ~..-1- .......................................................... 8. Msg, ASD to AFSC, ASNPVDI-20-10-115, 20 Oc,t.,61 (313).9~ NORAD to USAF ADC, tt(U) . Development of Low­Altitude Intercept Capability," 13 Jul 61(420) ..10. USAF ADC to NORAD, n(u) Development of LowAltitude Intercept Capability," 2 Aug 61 (420).11. SAC to NORAD, "SAC/NORAD Low Level Intercept ,l>oTraining (Proposal), It 16 Dec 1961 (420). ~:.J.~. ' .12. NORAD to SAC, "NORAD/SAC Test Directive,U 26 Mar 62 w/l atch (420). 13. NORAD Operational Evaluation Report on 32d NORAD Region, Feb 62 (600); Iriterview with W/C E. J. Greenway, NOEV, 10 Aug 62. 14. Joint Agreement on Responsibilities in PlanningNORAD Operational Evaluation Exercises,13 Apr 62 (600).15. Ltrs from~" NORAD to CINCSAC, CINCPAC, CINCLANT,RCAF ADC, -FAA and NORAD, irResponsibilities inPlanning NORAD Operational Evaluation Exer~cises," w/2 atchs, 2 Jul 62 (600).16. Interview with Lt Col M. C. Morphew, Jr., NOOP-E, 27 Aug 62. 17~ RCAF to NORAD, "NORAD Requirements for SecurityControl of Air Traffic and Electromagne!,!.--c-.=- .,..Radiation," 29 Jan 62 (254).18. NORAD to RCAF, "NORAD Requirements for SecurityControl of Air Traffic and ElectromagneticRadiations," 15 Feb 62 (254).19. RCAF to NORAD, "Priorities for Air Movementof Aircraft," 14 May 62 (254); NORAD CommandReference Book (701); Msg, NORAD to NNR,NOOP-E 206, 12 Jul 62 (254).

·..·:·..······~······················,>····W.lI ••••••".-••••• .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••• II:~s20.21~22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.NORAO Command Reference Book, p. 59 (-101-r- ­JCS to NORAD and SAC, "IFF Mark XII Implementation(U)," 17 Jan 62 (201) •.,DF, NOPS to NHCS, "(U) IFF Mark -XII Implementation,"2 Apr 62 (201); NORAD throughSAC to JCS, It(U) IFF Mark XII Implementation,"16 Apr 62 (201).Msg I JCS to NORAD i J-GS 3078, 30 Jan 62 -"(253) ~Ibid.Journal of Discussions and Decisions of {lie-­Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada­United States, 30 Apr11-3 May 62, p. 21 (655).Msg, JCS to NORAD, JCS 4978, 12 Jun 62 (253).Msg, SOPS lI5PI, Canadian Army to WesternCommand, _et a1{ 17 Mar 62 (251).Interview with Col R. E. Nourse, CanadianArmy Liai~n Officet, NORAD, 8 Aug 62.NORAD to USAF ADC, "NORAD Voice Alerting Sys­ -tem," 4 Jan 62 (251).MaS, USAF to NORAn, AFOAC-SC 79233, 15 Apr62 (251). NOMO to JCS, "(U) NORAD Command AlertingSystem Telecommunications Requirement I nMay 62 (251). ADC to NORAD, "NORAD Voice Alerting System,"18 Jun 62 (251). AT&T to ADC, 3 Mar 62 (250); ADC ADLDC to NOMD, "Automatic Ballistic Missile Attack Warning System," about 18 Mar 62 (251) . 1£t- -- ----- -- _ ......~..........._n.................(121]~-.~~T.l.ra'............~~~~a...........l_.

..... ~ .....:i.. ·1·..••...............•.............. _ .. ................................ ,. ............................................................................ ..34. 1st Ind (ADC ADLDC to NORAD, "Automatic Ba~.....listic Missile Attack Warning System," 23 Mar '.. i62) NORAD NECO-F to ADC, 6 Apr 62 (251);Interview, Bartlett wit~ Lt Col F. C. Swan,NECO, 10 Aug 62.II35. Msg, CINCAL to CINCNOR.AD; "OPN 0075," 26Jan 62 (251). .36. Msg, CINCNORAD to ComdrANR, NOOP-O X-218,22 May 62 (251). '~---.! 37. NNR to NORAn, "DEW Line Surveillance Proce'­dures - NNR Recommendations for Changes," 14I Feb 62 (306). ~ 38. NORAD to ANR, "DEW Line Surveillance Procedures,1t10 May 62 (306); NORAD to NNR, "DEWLine Surveillance Procedures," 10 May 62(306) •39. Msg, NORAn to NNR, NOOP-E 322, 19 Jul, 62 (306).40. NNR to NORAn, "MCL Operations - Recognitionof Spoofing', Tactics ,'II 4 May 62 (308).41. Msg, NORAD to NNR, NOOP-E X251, 11 May 62 (308) .~S"'""-.." -­_.a......a....m....~•••mu....sa.........[ 122]*'.~~••8~.·Fap~n...a~....................... · 2••~ • • ,.J ~ ... _ ' •• I' ,," i, '\ ,; , ' . . , \ ...