(U) 1962 NORAD CONAD History Jan-Jun.pdf - US Northern ...

", ': ~ ': . ~ :'BMEWS Gaps. At the beginning of 1962, NORADrecognized several deficiencies in the p~e~~tlyplanned BMEWS system.* One of the most seriousof these were the gaps in BMEWS that. would permitthe USSR to evade the net by firing extremely lowangleICBM shots. Of the three primary holes inNORAD's missile defense (the second and third involvingthe submarine-launched ballistic missileand global range ballistic missile), NORAD consideredthe low-angle ICBM possibility the mostthreatening.~"..With low-angle ICBM shots, both sur~~e .andeffectiveness could be attained. With only slightreductions in effectiveness (lower accuracy beingcompensated for by high-yield warheads), t~ -USSRcould fire a ballistic missile from its own territory.at a trajectory giving it a re-entry angle aslow as 7 0 • Since BMEWS was designed and deployedto detect missiles with re-entry angles between15 0 and 65 0 only, the missiles would slip rightunder the net. A great many soft SAC and air defensesites, as well as key industrial areas,were vulnerable to such an attack.-- -', .... ~.;;: ..NORAD ~!-huS'considered it highly important to"plug these gaps. In May 1962, the command developeda program to fill the gaps between Sites I-and II and Sites I and III, the latter being themore serious of the two. The program called fora gap-filler radar on the northern coast of Icelandto take care of the Sites I-III gap and atracking radar at Site II to cover the Sites I-IIgap. The program also called for the use of the·Shemya radar in a manual mode to scan to ~ - west_of Site II. This program was forwarded to USAFand the Secretary of Defense for their consideration.* For BMEWS rearward communications improvements,-- - -see- section entitled NORAD/SACNo.rthern .Ar-ea . ... ­Communications Objectives Plan, this chapter,pages 43 to 45.. [ 27]: • :. ~ .. ~ I I. • r I• " • 'J" l' • , . : J- .- - --=,. .