DO PATENT POOLS ENCOURAGE INNOVATION? EVIDENCE ...

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Eleven other pools operated like cross-licensing agreements, and did not grant licenses to any outside firms. 19 For example, the hydraulic oil pumps pool that formed in 1933 attempted to limit competition by acquiring every important patent for oil pumps. 20 Similarly, the five members of the 1933 pool for machine tools divided their patents into fields of use and granted members exclusive rights to those fields. Although nine pools licensed to competitors, three of these pools, for, lecithin, variable condensers, and furniture slip covers, licensed to one, three, and two firms respectively to prevent regulatory intervention. For example, infringement suits against the variable condensers pool terminated in license grants (Vaughan, 1956, p. 52). Pools that included foreign firms (from Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Denmark, and Switzerland) divided world markets to prevent imports and fix prices. For example, leading manufacturers of water-conditioning products in the U.S., England, Germany, France, Belgium, and Spain assigned exclusive territories by granting each other the right to use the trade name “Permutit” in certain countries. Patent rights and technical information was not shared with outside manufacturers. REFERENCES Baron, Justus, and Tim Pohlmann. “Patent Pools and Patent Inflation.” CERNA Working Paper, 2010. 19 These arrangements resembled cross-licensing agreements in which companies grant each other licenses that resolve blocking patents without licensing to other firms (Shapiro 2001). 20 Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952). 23
Bessen, James. “Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies.” Working Paper No. 0401, Research on Innovation, 2004. Bittlingmayer, George. “Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement.” Journal of Law and Economics, 1998, 31(1), pp. 227-248. Cameron, Colin and Pravin Trivedi. Regression Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Carlson, Steven. “Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 1999, 16, pp. 359-399. Choi, Jay Pil. “Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation.” Michigan State University Working Paper, 2003. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.” <strong>DO</strong>J and FTC: 1995. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. “Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition,” Washington, DC: GPO, 2007. Department of Justice. Business Review Letter for DVD Standards Pool, June 10, 1999 (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm). Department of Justice. Business Review Letter for RFID Patent Pool, October 21, 2008 (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/238429.pdf). Dequiedt, Vianney, and Bruno Versaevel. “Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D.” Working Paper No. 703, Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique, Université de Lyon, 2007. Field, Alexander. “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century.” American Economic Review, 2003, 93(4), pp. 1399-1414. Field, Alexander. “Chained Index Methods and Productivity Growth during the Depression.” Santa Clara University, Working Paper, 2011. Gilbert, Richard. “Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evaluation.” Stanford Technology Law Journal, 2004, no. 3 (April 2004): http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/04_STLR_3 Griliches, Zvi. R&D and productivity : the econometric evidence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 24
Page 1 and 2: DO PATENT POOLS ENCOURAGE INNOVATIO
Page 3 and 4: optimal price for the complete prod
Page 5 and 6: States in 1938. The Supreme Court a
Page 7 and 8: creation of a pool for each pool pa
Page 9 and 10: while grant-backs and the presence
Page 11 and 12: Of the 20 pools that formed between
Page 13 and 14: patents per year before and after t
Page 15 and 16: not include any patents that were i
Page 17 and 18: D. Controlling for the age of the p
Page 19 and 20: A related test explores whether the
Page 21 and 22: a mean of 1.93 cited patents per su
Page 23: V. ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE ON ANTI-COMPET
Page 27 and 28: Wooldridge, J.M. “Distribution-fr
Page 29 and 30: Technology High Tension Cables Wate
Page 31 and 32: TABLE 4: OLS - DEPENDENT VARIABLE I
Page 33 and 34: TABLE 6: OLS RESTRICTING THE SAMPLE
Page 35 and 36: TABLE 8: FIXED-EFFECTS POISSON - DE
Page 37 and 38: TABLE 10: VARIATION IN LICENSING OL
Page 39 and 40: TABLE 12: GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OLS- DEP
Page 41 and 42: Electric Generators Price-fixing; D
Page 43 and 44: 4 FIGURE 3 - AVERAGE PATENTS BY SUB
Page 45 and 46: FIGURE 7 - POOL SUBCLASS AND POOL M
Page 47: 90 Pool Start Year 10 9 Pool Start

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