philosophy and the quest for truth - National Universities Commission

PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH
Professor C. S. Nwodo
University of Port Harcourt
3 rd December, 2002
The Pro-Chancellor, Sir
The Vice-Chancellor,
Members of the Governing Council,
Deputy Vice-Chancellors,
Principal Officers of the University,
Provost. College of Health Sciences,
Dean of School, of Graduate Studies
Deans of Faculties,
Distinguished Professors and Scholars,
Heads of Departments,
Staffs and Students of Unique Uniport,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen.
The concept of inaugural lecture is essentially an academic ceremony that is supposed to
serve two main purposes. It is a special occasion in which a new professor is introduced
not to a new job, but to a new rank, to his/her professorial chair. Secondly, it offers the
new professor an opportunity to make a public statement, a declaration of what he/she
professes. It is not supposed to be a valedictory lecture. This particular inaugural lecture
comes quite late as an inaugural lecture strictly speaking. However, I hope it come early
enough to imitate the practice in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Port
Harcourt.
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I am grateful to the Vice-Chancellor and the University of Port Harcourt authorities for
offering me this opportunity to deliver like others before me, my own inaugural lecture. I
appreciate this unique opportunity very much.
Mr. Vice-Chancellor Sir, I claim to be a professional of philosophy in that sense of
philosophy as love of wisdom, which indicates a strong desire for knowledge, truth and
wisdom. The kind of philosophy, I profess is a sincere desire and search for truth and
wisdom without any presumption of having already acquired truth or wisdom. I would be
untruthful to the spirit of true philosophy as I understand it, if I stand here and claim that
as a professor of philosophy I have already acquired wisdom and already in possession of
the truth. The search for knowledge, truth and wisdom is a life-long endeavour.
Philosophy is one discipline that is everybody’s business in the sense that every normal
human being, the specialist as well as the non-specialist, is involved, on regular basis, in
some philosophical thinking and reasoning. Each individual is regularly confronted with
fundamental issues about human existence. It is the business of philosophy to help people
acquire a proper understanding of, and a reasoned approach to, certain basic ideas
concerning human existence. These are ideas we need in order to function properly as
human beings and at various levels in human society. They are in the words or Mortimer
Adler “the ideas basic and indispensable to understanding ourselves, our society, and the
world in which we live.” (Six Great Ideas, p.3) Mr. Adler calls them great ideas and lists
six of them which he further divides into two groups, categorizing them into ideas we
judge by: Truth, Goodness and Beauty; and ideas we act upon: Liberty, Equality and
Justice. In this lecture I would like to limit myself to only one of these six great ideas, to
the idea of Truth.
The quest for truth is universal among human beings “In the course of each week, every
one of us probably says ‘That’s true’ or ‘that’s false’ a dozen times” ( Adler Ibid p.4). On
the surface, it does not appear difficult or complicate to ask people what they mean when
they say “That’s true or “That’s false” A problem is likely to arise however, when one’s
idea of truth is challenged, or when one is called upon to defend or justifying one’s claim
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to be speaking the truth. Respect for truth constitutes an advanced stage of human
development. However, commitment to truth is still a higher level of human civilization.
Among philosophers, the problem of truth is so central that it is always there even when
something else is the subject matter for discussion. Practically every philosophical theory
or system is taken to be an endeavour towards, philosophers, past and present, at one time
or the other, in one way or another have had to come to terms with the problem of truth,
either directly or in their quest for knowledge. Like everything else in philosophy, the
problem of truth is treated differently by different philosophers. For some philosophers
the problem is a linguistic one, dealing with the meaning of the term “true” or “truth”.
Some other philosophers consider truth as an epistemological issue centered around the
question of human knowledge, about man’s capacity to attain true knowledge of reality.
For still another group of philosophers, truth is fundamentally ontological, concerned
with the truth of reality and the reality of truth.
In this lecture I would like us to look at truth as a moral problem. The moral emphasis
here does not suggest that the other aspects of truth: the linguistic, the epistemological
and the ontological are less important. However, I am strongly persuaded that the issue of
morality is fundamental to human existence. Man may rightly be defined as a “rational
animal”. But he is also a moral being. As a matter of fact, man’s moral nature forms part
of this rational nature. Morality constitutes such an essential part of man that moral
considerations determine whether a person should be classified as a good or a bad person
in absolute terms. One may be a bad teacher, a bad student or even an incompetent
administrator without necessarily being a bad person. However, when one is morally bad,
he or she becomes a bad person without qualification. Morality therefore affects the
entire human personality, constituting an essential requirement of the human being both
as an individual and as a member of society.
By looking at truth as basically a moral problem, no suggestion is here implied that
truthfulness alone constitutes the entire realm of morality. However, truthfulness does
constitute a very significant aspect of morality. A better understanding of the idea of truth
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is likely to lead to respect for truth, which constitutes, as earlier stated, an advanced stage
of human civilization. Still more significant is commitment to truth which goes beyond
mere understanding of the idea of truth, beyond respect for truth and entails involvement
and personal commitment to truth. Commitment to truth constitutes a challenge to the
individual to endeavour to become a decent human being and an effective member of the
human society. It is the business of philosophy to assist in “getting the idea of truth a
little clearer than it is for most people…”. When people attempt to get “a better
understanding of the idea of truth, they are, of course, philosophizing whether or not they
consciously think of themselves as doing so.” (Adler Ibid p.4).
The quest for truth in philosophy could be reduced to two basic approaches – speculative
and moral. The speculative approach to the problem of truth encompasses the search for
knowledge manifested in the various philosophical theories regarding the nature of reality
and man’s experience of it, regarding correct understanding of the true nature of reality.
There are two elements to this approach to truth. First there is the claim, the assumption
that reality, the subject matter of such quest is out there, objective and true. Secondly,
there is the assurance that the object of such search can be known. So right form the
beginning of philosophy truth is seen as both the truth of being, the truth of reality and
the truth of knowledge.
The ethical or moral approach to truth has two possible levels of analysis, one general
and the other personal. Generally speaking every discipline, every theory or doctrine aims
at a true explanation of reality. No normal person or persons would consciously propound
a false doctrine specifically as false. The normal thing is always to offer one’s theory or
doctrine as true, as a true explanation of reality, even if such doctrine turns out to be
false. At the personal level, each individual in his or her utterances and statements claims
to be speaking the truth and would like to be regarded as truthful. It is obvious from the
above analysis that the moral element pervades every aspect of the problem of truth.
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ARISTOTLE ON TRUTH
At this juncture, it would be good to clarify a few issues regarding truth and falsehood.
The tradition in philosophy of defining one’s key concepts as well as that of
demonstration by reasoned argument or proof dates back to Plato and Aristotle. They
held that the business of “scientific” knowledge is first the discovery and then the
description of the essential nature of things, their essences. These essences, they believed,
could be discovered by the aid of abstraction or “intellectual intuition”. Once discovered,
each essence can be giving a name and can be described. It is this description in words of
the essence of something that they call its “definition”. It is natural therefore that
Aristotle would be one of the earliest philosophers to give us an account of the essence of
truth, its definition. He defines truth as an agreement or correspondence between
statement and fact or reality; between a representation in the mind and what is
represented.
His treatment of the notion of truth is linked to his analysis of the concept of being, (the
Greek on, plural onta). Aristotle teaches that the term being (on) has four different
meanings: Accidental being (on kata symbebekos). Being in the sense of being true (on
hos alethes). Being (on) of the categories, and finally potential and actual being (on
dynamei jai energeia). It is the second of these Being in the sense of being true that
interests us.
In many of Aristotle’s works including De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics and
Metaphysics, the meaning of truth differs according to the context. This tends to create
some problems. One fundamental problem connected with Aristotle’s treatment of the
notion of truth is an agreement or correspondence between our statement or thought and
reality. Based on this he would say that truth is located in the statement we make and not
in things. In another place he would turn round to say just the opposite, that truth is found
in statements as well as in things. In Book VI of the Metaphysics we are told: “For the
true judgment affirms where the subject and the predicate really are combined, and denies
where they are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite of his allocation….
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For falsity and truth are not in things… but in thought…” (Met. VI. 4. 1027b 20). It is
quite clear from the above quotation that truth and falsehood are located in our thoughts
and statements and not in objects, and that things are neither true nor false. They exit or
they do not exist. A statement to be true has to agree or correspond with things the way
things are. The essence of truth consists in agreement or correspondence between our
statement, our claim and reality. Similarly, falsehood involves a disagreement or lack of
correspondence between our statement and reality. Stated slightly differently, the same
formula says: “The true affirms where there is connection and denies where there is
separation; the false conversely, has in each case the contrary opposite”. It is important to
point out that a true statement is not equivalent to an affirmative statement. An
affirmative proposition could be false while a negative one could be true. All that is
required is for our statement to agree with the fact of the situation whether affirmative or
negative. A proposition which declares a true statement to be true, is itself true while a
proposition which affirms that a false statement is false is equally true. Here truth is a
matter of objectivity, of intellectual honesty. Aristotle says clearly that “he who claims
what is opposite to reality is in error.” (Met. BK IX. 10).
All along the impression has been created following the above analysis that in Aristotle
truth is found in statements only and not in things. The fact of the matter is that Aristotle
is not consistent in this regard. In an earlier passage in the same work, he tells us: “Thus
things are called false either because they not or because they generate an impression of
something which is not.” (Met V. 29. 1024b 17). There are quite a few other instances
where these contradictory statements occur, where we are first told that truth is found in
statements only and not in things, only to be told else where that things and objects can
be true or false. To properly resolve these apparently contradictory statements it would be
good to distinguish the various meanings of the term “truth” in Aristotle. Strictly
speaking, there are no contradictions involved in Aristotle’ treatment of the meaning of
truth. It was stated earlier that his treatment of truth is linked with his treatment of the
notion of being. Since being in Aristotle has various senses, truth is treated variously by
him. As Brentano explains “Like the name of being… the word “true” has many senses
and can be applied to different things… The senses of truth differ, depending on whether
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we speak of understanding and judgements, or of the truth of simple representations and
definitions, or whether we call things themselves true.” (On the Several Senses of Being
in Aristotle, p. 17). In a further analysis Aristotle tells us that eternal or necessary truth
differs from temporal or changeable truth depending on the circumstances of the case in
question. If Copernicus is right and the earth revolves round the sun, then it remains true
eternally and necessarily. On the other hand the weather may in the course of a day
change, turning from cold to warm. In this case it would be true to say it is warm and it is
not warm. But one cannot add in this case “at the same time”. Similarly a definition can
be both true and false. If it applies to something to which it belongs it is true, if to
something alien to it, it is false. Fundamentally, Aristotle holds that truth belongs
primarily to statements since they affirm or deny a relationship of correspondence.
However, truth can also be applied to our perception of reality even though there is no
judgement involved in perception. If we perceive an object that is actually present to us,
our perception is true. The object itself can be true or false if we make true or false
assertion of their existence, or when it is a fake, a misrepresentation of something such as
a counterfeit coin. Aristotle makes it clear that our correct perception of reality and our
affirmation of that perception have no effect on the reality in question. In other words, a
reality or state of affairs is not the case because we correctly perceive or affirm its
existence. Rather our statement is true because it correctly represents reality. It is reality
that determines the truth of our statement since our statement has to agree with it.
At the end of his analysis Aristotle discusses truth as a moral issue Brentano declares
emphatically: “Finally, truth and falsity are especially applied to man. Someone is called
false either because he delights in false speech and likes to speak untruth even if he has
no advantage from it (the liar), or because he invokes false opinion in others… Opposed
to this is the concept of the truthful man…” (Brentano P.22) Aristotle criticizes Plato for
arguing in Lesser Hippias that the same person can be true or false, and for failing to
distinguish between one who can lie and one who likes to deceive. This criticism is
significant because it points to a fundamental difference between the two men Aristotle
and Plato regarding truth as moral issue. Plato’s argument “that truth and false are one
and the same” (Brentano’s translation) is much more than a sophistry. It is a scandal in
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moral philosophy the passage in question (Lesser Hippias 367c/d) is the conclusion of a
long drawn out argument in which Plato tries to prove that a person can be both true and
false at the same time in the same respect; and that the truthful person is no better than
the untruthful person. “Do you see, then, that the same man is false and also true about
the same matters And the true man is not a whit better than the false, for indeed he is
the same with him and not the very opposite, as you were just now imagining.” Aristotle
calls Plato’s attempt to prove that a man can be both true and false in the “same matters”
“misleading” because as he puts it, Plato’s argument “assumes” that a person “is false
who can deceive”. Plato is wrong here according to Aristotle. The capacity to deceive is
different from an actual deceiver. Furthermore, Plato’s argument according to Aristotle
creates the impression that one who is voluntarily bad is better of morally. (Met. V.29.
1025) By using the word “misleading” to describe Plato’s argument, Aristotle seems to
show more concern about the importance of and respect for truth. Aristotle would seem
to be saying to Plato that truth is much more than the internal consistency of an argument
or proof. A proof must not just give the impression of truth, it must be true, which means
it must correspond to reality. There is no way, morally speaking, it can be defended and
maintained that the truthful man “is not a whit better than the false” as Plato tries to
argue. Aristotle has given us a clear definition of truth as a relation of correspondence
between our statement and objective reality. Additionally, he has given us the various
meaning of truth and their applicability, as well as the importance of respect for truth.
PLATO ON TRUTH
In the Republic, the Laws and several other dialogues, Plato gives extensive treatment to
the notion of truth. In the Laws he gives what may be regarded as a general account of
truth that applies to both the gods and men. “Now of all things good, truth holds the first
place among gods and men alike. For him who is to know felicity and happiness, my
prayer is that he may be endowed with it from the first, that he may live all the longer a
true man.” (Laws 730c). Here truth is regarded as not only good but as the highest good.
It is also made a requirement for all those both high and low who aspire “to know felicity
and happiness”. For those who desire a long life of happiness an early start of
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truthfulness is strongly recommended. There is however, some ambiguity in the wording
of this passage. It says “my prayer is that he may be endowed with it”. The suggestion
would seem to be, especially with the word “prayer”, that truthfulness is not something
acquired through man’s effort of the will but rather through some divine benevolence.
The idea of being “endowed with it” would seem to corroborate the suggestion.
Whatever interpretation one gives to the above passage, one thing is quite clear, truth is
the highest good for the gods and for all men.
It is well known that in Plato’s political programme there is class division and all men are
not equal. At the top of the social scale are the rulers, the philosopher kings, who are
followed by the military class, while the artisans bring up the rear. Two characteristics
attributes place the philosopher kings apart from others, which entitle them to rulership,
their eugenics and their education. The eugenic formula used in their breeding make them
a special racial breed. They are also educated specifically in dialectics, with special
knowledge of the world of Forms or Ideas. They alone have the true Knowledge of the
Ideal World, of the nature of true Reality. Consequently, the general requirement of
truthfulness applies to them in a special way.
In the Republic Plato tries to justify the choice of philosopher kings as rulers of the state
on the grounds of both their education and their “philosophical nature”. “It would be
strange indeed, he said, to choose others than the philosophers… for this very knowledge
of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.” (Republic BK VI. 484 d). By
carefully breeding and training a class of citizens Plato hopes to produce philosopher
kings, people with the “trait of the philosophical nature”, with a natural disposition
towards truthfulness and wisdom. What is required then is: “The spirit of truthfulness, a
reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.”
(Republic BK VI.485 c). From the above passages, two facts emerge. First, Plato
recognizes the importance of truth in his political programme, although his commitment
to truth as we shall see later, is a completely different argument. Second, Plato’s class
division is characterized by racism, a self-conscious racial superiority on the part of the
rulers and an internalized acceptance of their own natural and intellectual inferiority on
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the part of the lower classes. Plato’s political programme constitutes one of the earliest, if
not the earliest, recorded account of racism as a conscious and deliberate political
programme. We shall discover when we return later to this issue that Plato’s racism and
other subsequent forms of racism are all founded upon falsehood.
To return to Plato’s recognition of the importance of truth in his political programme, in
answer to the question who are the true philosophers he says they are lovers of wisdom
and truth. “ Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers Those for whom the
truth is the spectacle of which they are enamored.” Popper translates this passage slightly
differently: “whom do you call true philosophers – those who love truth.” (Republic BK
V. 475 e). Further down in book VI, Plato argues that no reasonable person can
“controvert” or “deny” the fact “that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth.”
(501 c). Popper is of the opinion that Plato is insincere and untruthful when he makes
these statements about the importance of truth and about the true philosopher being the
lover of truth. “But he himself is not quite truthful when he makes these statement. He
does not really believe in it, for he bluntly declares in other places that it is one of the
royal privileges of the sovereign to make full use of lies and deceit..” (The open society
and its Enemies. Vol 1, 139). Popper then quotes part of Republic book 111 where Plato
clearly advocates the use of lies ad deceit on the part of the same Philosopher kings for
the good of the state. Popper’s translation of the passage in question reads thus: it is the
business of the rulers of the city, if it is anybody’s, to tell lies, deceiving both its enemies
and its own citizens for the benefit of the city; and no one else touch this privilege.”
(Republic BK 111. 389 b/c). It is obvious from the above that even though Plato claims
that truth is the highest good, it is not the absolute good but a relative good that can be
subordinated to something higher, the good of the state. It is not just Plato’s own
insincerity and untruthfulness that are here at issue, nor “the principle of political
expediency” of using lies and deceit to achieve some political objective; but rather the
sinister “privilege and double standards of morality contained in the statement: and no
one else must touch this privilege.” In Plato’s state, while the philosopher kings, who by
definition are lovers of wisdom and truth are allowed to lie and deceive their people and
their enemies alike, others are forced under pain of severe punishment to tell the truth: “If
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the ruler catches anyone else in a lie… then he will punish him for introducing a practice
which injures and endangers the city…” (Rep. 389 c/d. Popper’s translation and italics).
Those praise singers of Plato who idealize him, who refuse to see anything wrong in his
totalitarianism and who may think that Plato is incapable of entertaining such rascally
thought may be reminded that there are other places where Plato expresses similar and
even more scandalous views, where he hopes to deceive not just enemies and ordinary
citizens but also the rulers of his Idea State. Special mention must be made in this
connection of Plato’s doctrine of racism which Popper calls Plato’s “greatest propaganda
lie… his racialism…”. This is his famous or rather infamous “Myth of Blood and Soil,
known as the Myth of the Metals in Man and of the Earthborn”. (The Open Society 1 pp.
139 – 140).
According to some experts Plato uses the myth in his dialogues to expound a doctrine he
really believes in, but fells he cannot express it in a rational way. However, in this
particular case of the Myth of the Metals in Man, Plato declares bluntly right from the
beginning that it is a lie, a fabrication. Using Socrates as the main speaker in the dialogue
Plato has this to say: “How, then, said I, might we contrive one of those opportune
falsehoods of which we were just speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible
the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city” (Rep. BK III. 414 b/c). When
asked “What kind of fiction do you mean” Plato replies: “Nothing unprecedented, said I,
but a sort of Phoenician tale… But that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely
to happen in our day and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable” (Rep.
414c). His bashfulness in coming up with this “propaganda lie” is quite understandable
considering the fact we are here dealing with lies and deceit at the highest level, among
the rulers of the state. “And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to
speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the
rest of the city…” (Rep. BK III. 414 d). There is no denying the fact that Plato intends to
deceive even the philosopher kings. “It is not for nothing, he said, that you were bashful
about coming up with you lie”. After a protracted preamble brought about by bad
conscience and shame, Plato reconstructs an old tale that started among the Orient,
passing through Egypt into Greece through the work of Hesiod. Popper calls it Plato’s
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myth of racism and summaries its central doctrine this way. “God--has put those who are
capable or ruling, silver into the auxiliaries, and iron and copper into the peasant and the
other producing classes. (Rep. 415 a). What follows is a detailed programme of racial
discrimination and what to do with children born with a mixture of different metals.
Initially Plato allowed children born with a mixture of gold and silver to be “appointed
guardians, and ---- auxiliaries.” He later withdrew that concession. The general rule now
is that any child with a mixed race must be demoted to the status of the lower parent. No
child with mixed blood is allowed to claim the status of a higher parent. A strict
observance of this injunction is the greatest responsibility of the rulers of the city. There
is an added dimension to the rulers of the city. There is an added dimension to the whole
myth. The rulers are to invent another lie “alleging that there is an oracle that the state
shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian.” (Rep. BK III. 415
e). It is obvious from the above that most if not all main doctrines of subsequent racism
are traceable to Plato.
Plato is not interested in truth as an intrinsic good. He is interested in making sure his lies
are not found out, which is another name for deceit. He is constantly devising one form of
deceit after another, all for the good of the state or the citizens, he claims. “It seems likely
that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the
benefit of their subjects.” (Rep. BK V. 459 c/d). In his breading programme meant to
produce super-Greeks, Plato recommends a balloting devise that would shield the rulers
from detection in the event of an unfavourable result from mating. “Certain ingenious
lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may
blame chance and not the rulers.” (Rep. 460 a). While the offspring of the good, of the
successful “conjugation” are given special treatment” “the offspring of the inferior, and
any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will be properly disposed of in
secret, so that no one will know what has become of them.” (Rep. 460 c).
Given what we know about Plato, it is difficult to speak about his personal commitment
to truth. Popper seems to express the same view when he says: “Plato’s opportunism and
his theories of lies makes (sic) it, of course, difficult to interpret what he says.” (The
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Open Society I p. 143). Despite this difficulty, Popper thinks Plato has subordinated truth
to political power. “On the other hand, we cannot doubt that Plato subjects the Socratic
love of truth to the more fundamental principle that the rule of the master class must be
strengthened.” (The Open Society I p. 143). It is not only on the question of truth where
Plato differs from Socrates, they differ also with regard to the very meaning and use of
the word “philosopher” as well as the term “wisdom”. For Socrates “philosopher” is love
of wisdom in the sense of a strong desire, a craving for wisdom that is not yet acquired.
For Plato the philosopher is not in search of wisdom, he already has it. In the words of
Popper, Plato’s “philosopher is not the devoted seeker for wisdom, but its proud
possessor. He is a learned man, a sage.” (The Open Society I p. 144). Similarly, for
Socrates to be wise is to know one’s limitations to know that one does not know
everything. The wise man of Socrates is one who is aware of what he knows as well as
what he does not know. “Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know
himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others
know and think that they know and do really know, and what they do not know and fancy
that they know when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. And this is
wisdom…” (Charmides 167 a). Plato’s notion of wisdom is quite different. His wise men
are concerned with “eternal realities” in the Ideal World. They “have no time to look
down at the affairs of men…”
When it comes to personal commitment to truth we see the same dissimilarity.
Commitment do truth means calling justice just and injustice unjust and standing by
one’s conviction. Socrates narrates how on two different occasions first under the
Athenian democracy and then under the oligarchy, he risked his life in defence of truth
and justice. Under a democratic rule Socrates was a member of the city council and his
group was then “acting as the executive”. A proposal was put forward to try “en bloc”
“ten commanders who had failed to rescue the men who were lost in naval engagement”.
He was the only one who opposed the proposal because “en bloc” trial was
unconstitutional. Despite the imminent danger of death or at least imprisonment, Socrates
stood his ground.
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Under the oligarchy, the “Thirty Commissioners” Socrates with four others was
summoned “to the Round Chambers and instructed us to go and fetch Leon of Salamis
from his home for execution.” “on this occasion, however, I again made it clear not my
words but by my actions that death did not matter to me at all --- but that it mattered all
the world to me that I should do nothing wrong or wicked.” Socrates continues,
“Powerful as it was, that government did not terrify me into doing a wrong action. When
we came out of the Round Chamber, the other four went off to Salamis and arrested
Leon, and I went home. I should probably have been put to death for this, if the
government had not fallen soon afterward.” ( Ap. 32 c – d). He died in obedience to the
law of the land even though innocent. It was for him a matter of being true to himself. It
is difficult to imagine Plato behaving in the same way.
AQUINAS ON TRUTH:
Aristotle’s treatment of truth that links it with being has its influence on subsequent
approaches to the notion of truth. St. Thomas Aquinas who represents the Middle Ages
depends heavily on Aristotle. Aquinas links three concepts together – the true, the
knowable and the good all of which he says are related to being. As a preamble, Aquinas
explains that the true is the proper object of the intellect just as the good is the proper
object of the will or appetite. There is a difference however between the intellect and the
appetite regarding their separate objects. The intellect possesses what it knows, the will
or appetite reaches out towards what it desires. In other words, the “good, is in the
desirable thing, and the term of the intellect, namely the true, is in the intellect itself”.
(The Summa Theological. Q. 16. Art. 1.). There is a further qualification regarding the
relation between the true and the intellect. This has to do with the manner in which the
true is said to be in the intellect. Aquinas tells us that “since the true is in the intellect in
so far as the intellect is conformed to the thing understood, the aspect of the true must
needs pass from the intellect to the thing understood…” (The Summa Q. 16 Art. 1). The
relationship goes both ways because it is not alone the intellect that is related to the
object, the latter is equally related to the object, the latter is equally related to the
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intellect…” so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some
relation to the intellect.” (The Summa Ibid).
That relationship is further explained in terms of “essential” and “accidental”
dependence. When a thing depends on the intellect for its existence that relationship is
essential. It is accidental if it does not depend on the intellect for its being. Any artifact is
said to be essentially related to the intellect or mind that designed it. A house is said to be
true when it conforms to its design in the architect’s mind. Similarly “natural things are
said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
mind.” (The Summa Q. 6 Art. 1). Accidental relation obtains in a situation where the
thing does not depend on the knowing intellect, where the thing does not depend on the
knowing intellect, where the intellect is not the source of its being. Aquinas sums up the
analysis this way: “Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
things according as they are related to the intellect as their source”. (The Summa Ibid.)
The intellect performs two operations in relation to truth, that of knowing and that of
affirming, it knows when it possesses the form for the thing it knows. But it must take a
further step of affirming the conformity of the form it possesses with the thing it
apprehends. It is only then that it “knows and expresses truth”. Truth may be in the
intellect in the sense that the intellect knows what the form of a thing is, but not
necessarily” “as the thing known is in the knower”. This further stage is realized when
the intellect affirms in a proposition that what it possesses is the form of what it
apprehends. This completes the process.
Reflecting on Aristotle’s argument that the various meanings of truth are predicated upon
the different senses of being, Aquinas relates the notion of being to the good and the true.
A thing is considered good to the extent that it “has the nature of what is desirable”.
Similarly, the true has relationship to knowledge on a account of its relation to being.
“Now everything is knowable in as far as it has being.” (The Summa Q. 16 Art. 3). It
follows then that both the good and the true are convertible with being. While the good
adds to being the notion of the desirable, the true adds the idea of the knowable. Being
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and truth are so linked that “the true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being be
also apprehended; since being is included in the notion of the true.” The relationship is a
two way relationship. “The case is the same if we were to compare the intelligible object
with being. For being cannot be understood except because being is intelligible.” ( The
Summa… Q. 16 Art. 3). Even though the true and the good are related to, and are
convertible with, being the true is prior to the good on two grounds. Truth regards being
directly and immediately while goodness regards being from a particular perspective, as
desirable. Secondly, it is clear that knowledge precedes desire or appetite. One cannot
desire what one does not know. Since the true is to knowledge what the good is to desire,
“the true must be prior in nature to the good”.
Aquinas pushes the objectivity of truth to its ultimate by asserting that God is truth, and
without reference to theology or revelation. It is all done within the context of his
argument that truth is primarily in the intellect if “it apprehends a thing as it is”; and
secondarily in things “according as they have their being conformable to an intellect”. On
both accounts truth “is to the greatest degree found in God”. God’s being does not merely
conform to His intellect; His being “is the very act of His intellect.” Besides, “His act of
understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and every other being and
every other intellect; and He Himself is His own being and act of understanding”. (The
Summa…Q. 16 Art.5).
To the question “whether there is only one truth according to which all things are true”,
Aquinas makes a distinction between conformity with the object and conformity with the
intellect, between truth in things and truth in the intellect. He argues that since there are
many intellects and even many things known by the same intellect, there are bound to be
many cases of true affirmations. However, truth as it is in things is quite different. “…all
things are true by one primary truth, to which each one is assimilated according to its
own entity. And thus, although the essences of forms of things are many, yet the truth of
the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.” (The
Summa… Q. 16. Art. 6).
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In summary, Aquinas following Aristotle holds that truth is a relation of conformity
between the intellect and the object. The primary location of truth is in the statement and
secondarily in the object. The true is related to both the good and being, is convertible
with being as intelligible. The highest being must necessarily be the highest truth. God
being the highest Being is also the highest truth both in His intellect and in His being.
Things exist objectively and are really knowable. Their being real does not depend on
our knowledge of them. Things will still be there whether or not we know or think of
them. When we come to know them our knowledge becomes objective and reliable to the
extent that it reflects things the way they are in reality. When we now express our
knowledge of reality in a proposition truth in its primary sense arises because our
statement corresponds to things the way they are objectively. Both Aquinas and Aristotle
make allowance for truth in the secondary sense, the truth not of the proposition but of
the object. An object is true if it conforms to people’s idea of it, to a standard to its
ultimate, to God’s mind. For things to be true, they must correspond to the idea of them
in God’s mind. Since truth is by definition a conformity, whatever is to be true must
conform to something, the proposition to the object, the object to the intellect, divine or
human. Things remained very much like this regarding the essence and place of truth
until the arrival of Descartes.
DESCARTES ON TRUTH
With Rene Descartes arose a new emphasis on mind and body dualism, which was bound
to have effect on the problem of truth. Descartes reduces all reality to two basic
substances – material substance and spiritual substance. He then defines matter as
extension without thought and mind or spirit as thought without extension, and identifies
man with mind, a conscious thinking subject. By elevating the conscious ego/subject over
and above everything else including the object, Descartes places the problem of truth in a
new direction. The true becomes the rational, that which is clear and distinct to a
knowing subject under the control of his reason informed by self-evident principles. The
intellect now turned into the conscious subject by Descartes, becomes the pre-eminent
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place of truth. The intellect becomes the agent who knows, who apprehends and affirms
or denies the presence of the object or the absence thereof.
There is another side to the subject – object dualism. It is an opposition in which the
object is assumed to be out there, in front of the subject and independent of him, in the
way of the subject now subjected to the object, which he has to overcome or be overcome
by it. The reality of the object is considered indisputable hence the notion of objectivity
sometimes synonymous with truth.
There is another sense in which the objective is elevated above the subjective, when the
subjective entails the unreal and the imaginary. Here the subjective carries with it the idea
of that which is personal to the individual, private in the sense of not shared by others; in
a sense non-cognitive because not rational but emotional or sentimental. In the face of all
this opposition to the subjective, the objective continues to enjoy a high level of
respectability at least in some quarters, particularly among scientists. The arrival of
Immanuel Kant in the European philosophic scene changed the situation.
KANT ON TRUTH
Kant’s involvement in the subject-object conceptual framework dates back to 1770, the
year of his Dissertation. Three issues among others stood out in the Dissertation – The
first was the distinction between the noumenal world and the phenomenal world, between
the worlds of things as they are in themselves and the world of things as they appear to
us. It is a distinction that involves the subject dichotomy. The second issue was that of the
concept of transcendence, which later developed into his transcendental idealism. It was
designed by Kant even at that early stage as a means of safeguarding the object by
purging the subject of any “impure” or empirical or a posteriori elements. The last issue
was the notion of space and time as not being really out there, but being “mere forms of
our sensibility”, in other words, space and time are not objective realities. They are mere
subjective conditions of the human mind, part of the structure of the human mind. The
insight gained from the discovery in the Dissertation of the subjectivity of space and time
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ecame a basis for later doctrines especially the problem of the truth of synthetic a priori
judgments later to be raised in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant sometimes attaches
specific meaning to the term “pure”. He uses it in opposition to the empirical and the a
posteriori, to indicate the a priori, the uncontaminated, by the senses. Space and time are
“pure forms of sensibility”, the a priori condition for human sense perception. Similarly,
mathematics, as well as metaphysics, can be shown to be both synthetic and a priori as
long as “its concepts and principles” are predicated upon the subject’s reason whose
forms are transcendental, a priori and necessary. Kant uses the doctrine of the
transcendental subject to safeguard the objectivity of the object. Since the transcendental
subject is not any particular individual subject it is free from subjectivism and from any
limiting conditions, a necessary condition for preserving the objectivity of the object.
Kant’s transcendentalism plays also another role, it elevates reason above nature. Reason
guides and controls the will thereby making the will independent of desires and passions.
When the will is under the control of reason man become autonomous and independent of
material desires and passions, ready to obey the command of reason and the requirements
of duty. This is the foundation of Kant’s universal moral principle as well as his ethics of
duty for its own sake. The individual will has been purified of any unworthy motive by
pure reason making it receptive to the categorical imperative. Man can now live a truly
moral life, an authentic life, life according to reason.
HEGEL ON TRUTH
With Hegel a different rationalism emerges. He begins by postulating a spiritual principle
or substance he calls Idea-in-itself, dynamic and self-creative. When it externalizes itself
in space he calls it Nature. When Nature evolves to the level of self-consciousness it is
called Spirit. This constitutes the Hegelian triad of Idea – Nature – Spirit which evolves
dialectically as thesis – antithesis – synthesis. The synthesis forms a new thesis for
further development. The evolution of Spirit in time Hegel calls History which he defines
as the “autobiography of God”. History is the process of divine self-liberation towards
absolute freedom, which Hegel says is at different stages of realization in the world. The
Europeans, particularly the Prussians constitute according to Hegel the most advanced
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manifestation of freedom and hence of Hegel’s Spirit that never touched or passed
through the African continent. The Prussian state of Hegel’s time is declared by Hegel
the highest realization of Divine Reason on earth. Hegel has a lot to say about the state of
his day: “The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth… we must therefore worship
the State as the manifestation of the Divine on earth… The State is the march of God
through the world… The State is real; and… true reality is necessary. What is real is
eternally necessary… The State is the actually existing, realized moral life.” (Hegel:
Philosophy of History & The Philosophy of Law. Quoted in Popper: The Open Society---
II, p. 31). Schopenhauer who was Hegel’s contemporary and who knew Hegel personally
called him a paid state agent who was more interested in personal gain than in the quest
for truth. “Philosophy,” lamented Schopenhauer, “brought afresh to repute by Kant… had
soon to become a tool of interests; of state interest from above, of personal interests from
below… Truth is certainly the last thing they have in mind… Philosophy is misused,
from the side of the state as a tool, from the other side as a means of gain… who can
really believe that truth also will thereby come to light, just as a by-product”
(Schopenhauer: Works (1888) Vol. II P. XVII. Quoted in Popper The Open Society II p.
3). This disregard for truth on the part of the Hegel casts a serious doubt on other areas of
his philosophy.
There are other objectionable elements that characterize Hegel’s brand of rationalism. He
is accused of a new form of dogmatism devoid of rational argument. He has also been
accused along with some of his romantic contemporaries of ushering in immediately after
Kant, an “age of dishonesty”, an age that first started with intellectual irresponsibility
followed by “moral irresponsibility”. That lack of honesty both moral and intellectual
has been pointed out by a number of objective commentators on Hegel.” “The character
of honesty, that spirit of undertaking an inquiry together with the reader, which permeates
the works of all previous philosophers, disappears here completely. Every page witnesses
that these so called philosophers do not attempt to teach, but to bewitch the reader.”
(Popper. Ibid. p. 21) The accusation of the destruction of an existing positive tradition is
quite serious and Popper in a footnote mentions another serious case of it, namely
Hegel’s historical relativism. “By his historical relativism – by his theory that truth is
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elative, depending on the spirit of the age – he helped to destroy the tradition of
searching for the truth, and of respecting truth”. (Popper Ibid. p. 308 Note 30). It is clear
from the forgoing that Hegel has not contributed positively to the advancement of the
quest for truth.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER ON TRUTH
Among contemporary philosophers who have discussed the problem of truth Martin
Heidegger stands out conspicuously. His essay “On the Essence of Truth” is one of the
most penetrating accounts of the nature of truth. A concentration on the essence of truth
is intended to look at the nature of truth in general which must be grasped first before any
further analysis of the various notions of truth, before any particular truth or
manifestation of truth. Heidegger reviews the opinions of previous philosophers on truth
and finds them unsatisfactory. Traditionally truth has been defined as a correspondence
between the representation of the intellect and the object represented. Heidegger explains
that the traditional understanding of truth is based on two things: Christian theology that
makes God’s mind the ultimate foundation of truth as correspondence; and modern
rationalism that started with Descartes and continued by Kant. Since Descartes,
Heidegger argues, the subject-object dichotomy has dominated every aspect of human
life including philosophical reflection. Subjectivism understands truth as an agreement
between subject and object in which the subject dominates the object. It forms part of the
prevailing attitude of the conquest and domination of the universe and everything in it,
truth included. Any conceptual framework that informs the prevailing understanding of
reality will naturally determine the meaning of truth. The subjectivistic approach to
reality has been the approach of traditional Western philosophy to truth. Heidegger
argues that the status quo is unsatisfactory because it does not got go deep enough. He
maintains that to discuss the issue of agreement or correspondence satisfactorily, one has
to inquire into the possibility and also into the ground of the possibility of the theory of
correspondence. Here Heidegger introduces two key concepts namely, “overtness” and
“letting-be”. Overtness or openness involves a situation in which a representation of an
object by a subject is made possible because the object opens itself up to the
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apprehension of the subject, makes itself accessible to the subject, on its own; neither
dictated to, nor prompted by, the subject. This openness constitutes the possibility of any
representation, any correspondence.
Man as a rational and a moral being is more disposed to this openness than animals. In
his dealings with things and fellow human beings man will understand and appreciate the
true nature of things and situations as a consequence of the element of openness in which
the inner structure of reality is thrown open for an authentic grasp and adequate
appreciation of man and things, of values and ideas, of everything in the universe. There
are two important points to be made here. Heidegger’s concept of “overtness” constitutes
a condition for authentic human existence and civilization. Secondary, it constitutes in a
very special way a condition for the possibility of truth as correspondence. Unless things
open themselves up to man an unless he allows things to show themselves as they are, a
true representation will not take place. There must be overtness before any correct
representation.
Heidegger’s second key concept of “letting-be” is explained in terms of freedom to allow
things be as they are and as they are meant to be. It involves the idea of respect for things
in general as beings and human beings in particular. Heidegger is quite justified in saying
that the traditional notion of truth as correspondence is not deep enough.
Heidegger now goes into what he considers the real essence of truth. The Greeks were the
first people on record who posed the question about truth even before Pilate on asked
Jesus “What is truth” and left without waiting for an answer or definition. The Greeks,
Heidegger explains, used the word A-letheia to express what we today call Veritas in
Latin and Truth in English, insisting rather strongly that the Greek word should be
written A-Letheia that is, with the a-privative, because that was how the earliest users of
the language used it. It means in English not correspondence but un-concealment, disclosure,
un-veiling or dis-covery. Truth as un-concealment means a general disclosure of
being in totality, not any particular being. A-letheia as truth in the sense of revelation of
being refers to the essence of truth and not to any particular form of truth. Secondly, the
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implication is that truth as unconcealment presupposes a prior concealment of being in its
totality, a prior darkness and obscurity of nothingness before the discovery, the un-veiling
of being. The third implication is that truth, as un-concealment of the previously
concealed requires effort on the part of man, what Heidegger calls Dasein. The effort is
necessary because man (Dasein) exists in both unconcealment and concealment. The
concealment is the mystery of Being that had always been hidden from man (Dasein)
from all eternity until of recent there occurred a monumental event, the dis-covery of
being. Heidegger calls the mystery the danger of un-truth which consists in the possibility
that man (Dasein) may forget the fact of un-truth as concealment of being. There is
another danger, though a minor one compared to the un-truth of concealment. Heidegger
calls it Erring. It consist in man’s failure to grasp reality in its completeness and to
appreciate it as it is and as it supposed to be. Man may insist that his partial view of
reality is complete.
At this juncture Heidegger goes into the explanation of the event of truth as unconcealment
and the conditions of its possibility. In this connection he introduces two
key concepts – Ex-sistence and Ex-position. Ex-sistence is an ex-position of a thinker to
the revelation of being, to the disclosure of reality in totality. It is the transportation of a
thinker, any original thinker not necessarily a philosopher, from the darkness of
concealment to the overtness of unconcealment. That is the event, the happening of truth
as A-lethia. This is truth in its original and authentic meaning and which covers truth in
all its forms and manifestations. The event of truth as un-concealment, taking place in
exposition and overtness constitutes the very possibility of human history and human
civilization. Real and authentic civilization is made possible only when man, exposed to
the un-concealment of being, learns to understand and appreciate beings – human and
non-human – allowing them to be as they are and as they are supposed to be. This is the
most fundamental transformation in man and the beginning of culture, history and
civilization.
The role of the philosophers, or as Heidegger calls them, the thinkers, is to initiate the
process and articulate the new transformation so that others, the non-philosophers, may
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with more accurate conceptualization, begin to internalize the new approach to reality
and to authentic human existence.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
At this point in our discussion it is appropriate to make one or two comments about the
philosophers we have so far discussed. Their treatment of truth leans heavily on the side
of epistemology which tends to make it intellectualistic and academic. Truth is a moral
issue and truthfulness is a moral virtue. It should not be discussed simply at the level of
the abstract. Telling the truth is a moral obligation binding on all rational human beings.
From Aristotle to Heidegger the problem of truth is treated with antiseptic detachments as
if one is discussing the rules of grammar or the laws of logic. Truth is different and
truthfulness is not an easy virtue to cultivate. One would have liked to see our great
philosophers show a more serious concern about the virtue of truthfulness, and its
importance in human life. This is a very serious omission considering the fact that
Socrates made such a big issue of truthfulness as a moral demand on each person as an
individual.
This lack of personal involvement is also reflected upon their treatment of falsehood.
Some of them like Plato and Hegel advocate falsehood as a useful instrument depending
on certain circumstances. One would not have expected such serious scandal from
eminent European philosophers. This only goes to show that truthfulness is no an easy
virtue and that staying consistently truthful is even more difficult. This is not the same as
saying that truthfulness is an impossible virtue and should better be forgotten.
Heidegger’s theory of un-truth as the concealment of being is grossly inadequate. Even
the expression un-truth is too vague an alternative term for falsehood or lie. A lie is a
deliberated falsehood or misinformation with the intention to deceive. It would be an act
of serious moral irresponsibility on the part of anybody to create the impression that
falsehood does not constitute a grave moral problem. Falsehood asks us to lie in order to
achieve the rewards and benefits of truth. One would have liked to see our philosophers,
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especially the very serious and influential ones, take up the truth – untruth problem and
give it the sort of attention that it deserves.
This inaugural lecture started with the claim that truth is one of the basic ideas upon
which authentic human existence is constituted. It is high time we brought the discussion
close to home and raises concrete issues about truth – untruth within our own social
context. The quest for truth is a quest for an authentic way of life that satisfies our needs
both spiritual and material. What it means is that not every way of life is good enough in
human society, ours included. A life of truthfulness is a comprehensive picture of a
decent person, not necessarily glamorous, but at least sincere. Ideally it starts with each
individual member of a family within the family where one is most at ease both with
himself or herself and with other members of the family. It is virtually impossible for any
member of the family being truthful or untruthful without being noticed. It is usually
noticed and even pointed out by others in the family. Unfortunately some families these
days are rarely together for a long time and certain habits go unnoticed. Truthfulness in
the family is the foundation of spiritual values as well as material values.
When we move from the family to the level of the larger society the situation gets more
complicated and also more difficult. However it is still possible to achieve or at least to
make sincere effort to cultivate a culture of truthfulness in the larger society. The school
and educational institutions have always been regarded as the right place to go for proper
education, and as Achebe would say, “that really educates”. It was not so long ago when
Nigerian educational system produced some of the best minds in the world. If our
educational system and the whole education environment were to improve, we could still
achieve some modest success. As it is now, the situation is almost hopeless. Something
has to be done before it is too late.
If each person takes care of his or her little corner of the Nigerian society, no matter how
small or how limited in range that corner may be, a whole lot could be achieved. The
University of Port Harcourt, unique as it is, happens to be our own corner of the Nigerian
society. The University, any University, is the conscience of the larger society. The
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Faculty of Humanities by the nature of its programme is the conscience of the University.
Going further still, the Department of Philosophy is the conscience of the Faculty. It is a
matter of conscience and a sense of responsibility. If each one of in the University of Port
Harcourt were to take care of his or her little corner of the University a whole lot could be
achieved. And I am limiting myself to the need for truthfulness in all our dealings from
the family to our different places of work. It is not asking too much, in fact it is like a
minimum wage, a basic requirement for authentic human existence. It is not easy either.
Truthfulness is not an easy virtue to cultivate. But we have to start something very soon,
today, here and now, by renouncing all forms of falsehood. As I said earlier, it is a matter
of conscience and personal responsibility. It is not something tangible, nor physically
perceptible. It takes place inside. It is not even noticed on the face of an individual. It is
not done for any other reward. It is an end in itself, although its effects on our society will
be enormous.
We do not really have much choice about the matter if we want to survive both physically
and spiritually. A society without any respect for truthfulness will remain spiritually poor.
Questions about honesty, personal integrity, keeping one’s promises, will not normally be
raised in such a society as the individual begins to develop a robust conscience. Life there
is bound to be a life of crude and vulgar materialism, which no matter however dazzling
and apparently attractive, will never be complete nor authentic. And if there happens to
be much wealth physically available in the place, one is sure to find mindless opulent
existence lived at the level of the superficial. With the world now become a global village
some of the citizen can and do carry their malady with them to other places. Many
Nigerians who travel outside the country, even within black Africa, with the Nigerian
passport, know how it feels when one’s honesty and one’s personal integrity are under
suspicion because of the previous records of other Nigerians. When the individual is not
wanted outside and no longer at ease in the country, then something radical has to
happen.
There is need in the Nigerian society of today for reflective, critical thinking. We need to
accept truthfulness as a standard, as a reference point, a common denominator by which
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to live as a nation. Without it life will not have real meaning and no authentic direction.
With it a whole lot could be achieved in the family and in the larger society; not just for
today but forever.
In conclusion I may point out that there is no need for extra funding at the University and
in the home for my proposal to work. All it takes is for each person to be truthful first to
himself or herself and then be truthful in all his/her dealings. It is quite simple and
modest, but its effect both now and for the future will be tremendous. Of that much, I am
certain.
Thank you. Mr. Vice-Chancellor Sir;
Thank you Ladies and Gentlemen for your gracious patience.
Work Cited
Adler, Mortimer J. Six Great Ideas. New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1981.
Aquinas, Thomas . The Summa Theologica. Edited with an introduction by Anton C.
Pegis. New York: The Modern Library, 1948.
Brentano, Franz. On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. Edited and Translated by
Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975
Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History:
Introduction. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Heidegger, Matins, “ On the Essence of Truth”. Translated by R. F. C. Hull and Alan
Crick in Existence and Being. Introduction and Analysis by Werner Brock. Chicago:
Gateway Edition, 1970.
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Kant, Immanuel. Analytic of the Beautiful. Translated by Walter Cerf. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs – Merill, 1963.
Plato. The Collected Dialogues. Edited by Edit Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1973.
Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1977. Vols. I & II.
Rauche, G. A. Contemporary Philosophical Alternatives and the Crisis of Truth. The
Hague: Martins Nijhoff, 1970.
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