OxMo-Vol.-3-No.-1
OxMo-Vol.-3-No.-1
OxMo-Vol.-3-No.-1
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration <strong>Vol</strong>. 3, <strong>No</strong>. 1<br />
Sovereignty and Suzerainty<br />
<strong>No</strong>tions of nation-state are assumed throughout modern societies. ‘Nation-ness’, however,<br />
takes as its referent a constructed and artificial geo-political entity - one determined by the<br />
historical evolution of cultural ideologies and economic modes of production, reinforced by<br />
institutions of dominion (Anderson 1983). Winichakul (1994) suggests that within all modern<br />
geo-political bodies remain groups of distinct ethnicities that differ not only in the shape and<br />
extension of their geographical dispersion but also in their historical understandings of<br />
sovereignty and geographical space.<br />
Discussing British confoundedness at the Siamese court’s lack of concern regarding fixed<br />
demarcations of its western frontier (much of which now constitutes Kayin state’s eastern<br />
border), Winichakul details the characteristics of Siamese conceptions of non-boundedness<br />
and concludes that Siam’s boundaries were a ‘discontinuous, patchy arrangement of power<br />
units where different people of different overlords mingled together’ (Winichakul 1994: 74-<br />
9). Regular concession of territory was accepted practice within this dynamic ecosystem of<br />
power-relations, serving to fulfil the only practical imperative: preservation of the centre of<br />
political authority.<br />
Similarly, pre-colonial Burmese geographies did not associate political authority with fixed<br />
territorial limits (South 2008). To appreciate the context of the Karen in Southeast Asia we<br />
must turn from geographic concepts of fixity, line and internal homogeneity towards an<br />
analysis mapped by hierarchical power relations, spheres of influence and fluidity (Kang,<br />
2010) - which scholars have described as mandala. Only then do the political contours of precolonial<br />
East Asia make sense. In 1823, just before the first British incursion into Burma, the<br />
Karen straddled the Chakri Siam and Konbaung (Upper Burma) mandala. They may well<br />
have been de facto vassals of Shan and Mon princelings and possibly had tributary relations<br />
with Qing China.<br />
Chief S’gaw Saw Ku’s surrender of the Salween Karen after the First Anglo-Burmese war<br />
constituted incorporation into the British mandala - it did not involve a shifting of lines in<br />
Karen geographical space. It was via colonial impositions of territorial limit, sovereignty and<br />
boundedness that the indigenous Karen perspectives of space were challenged and<br />
displaced 48 . The subsuming of Karen geographies into broader territorial sovereignties was<br />
rendered pseudo-existent within colonial cartographies and affirmed by military dominance.<br />
The historical demise of ‘laissez-faire suzerainty’ is crystallised in the formation of the<br />
modern Thai-Burma border, which was established by a series of agreements - spanning over<br />
48 Indigenous geographies may problematise the application of certain categories of forced migration. Keely<br />
(1996) situates the production of refugee flows as endemic to an international system premised on multinational<br />
nation states. The fluid suzerainties of mandala, however, claim no such basis and, furthermore, scholars risk<br />
underestimating the agency of persons who pre-empt disorder by moving into new spheres of influence as an<br />
adaptive strategy. If dreams of a Karen homeland faded post-independence with the KNU’s loss of territory and<br />
latent mandala organisations of geographic space underwent resurgence as I believe some scholars (e.g.<br />
Horstmann, 2011; South, 2011: 26-7) suggest, then externally-imposed characterisations of Karen ‘refugeeness’<br />
are perhaps questionable. From the Karen perspective, does the crossing of an unrecognised line to avail<br />
themselves of a new suzerain, whether Thai Karen, an international NGO or UNHCR, constitute, in all cases, a<br />
flow of refugees Such questions are nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper.<br />
67