OxMo-Vol.-3-No.-1

Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration Vol. 3, No. 1
ideology was thus fatefully bound up with territorial claims and inevitably sectarian in nature.
The importation of a politics of ethnicity and religiosity, meanwhile, had profoundly adverse
implications for Burman-Karen relations. Finally, as noted above, decolonisation and
unfulfilled S’Gaw expectations completed the alignment of ultimate conditions which
generated conflict in Eastern Burma. But how is conflict situated in relation to Karen forced
migration Conflicts of the globalised-era are internal; connected with identity struggles,
resource disputes and ethnicity (David 1997). The Tatmadaw-KNU conflict can likewise be
seen as a protracted process of state formation. Many highland cultures of Southeast Asia
historically resisted hegemonic incorporation into lowland states (Scott 2009). Zolberg
(1983) draws explicit links between colonial-era heterogenisation of subject-societies,
decolonisation, the targeted persecution of minorities and their subsequent forced migration.
Arendt (1966: 273) wrote that the ultimate consequence of nation-building for minorities was
‘assimilation or liquidation’; the Tatmadaw’s use of exemplary violence, their militarisation
of space and the displacement of Karen communities can be understood strategically, as a
systematic means of gaining control not over territory - but over a population. For the
Tatmadaw, inducing displacement serves as a functional method of nation-building. In this
sense, displaced Karen have fallen victims to the consequences of two nation building
projects: the failed claims of the KNU and the painful, protracted process of state formation
favoured by the junta.
In discussing patterns of Karen forced migration, it is important to distinguish between two
types. Sudden movements of large populations, such as whole communities, in response to
intensifications of conflict are distinct from the slow erosion of human security (vis-à-vis
military appropriations of land, forced porterage, arbitrary taxation, etc.) which leads to low
volume, yet more or less constant movements of individuals and families.
South (2007) characterises the bulk of Karen forced migration as ‘armed conflict-induced’.
The KNU, however, no longer presents a significant military threat to the Tatmadaw. Instead,
the last few decades have seen the emergence of a highly asymmetrical warfare, engendering
the KNU’s adoption of guerrilla tactics. In response, the junta’s ‘Four Cuts’ counterinsurgency
programme, introduced by Ne Win in the 1960s, has sought to strangle flows of
food, funds, intelligence and recruits to rebel groups by targeting civilian populations, often
involving the forced relocation of whole villages 52 . The KNU, unable to protect communities
from such retaliation, often ‘evacuate’ (relocate) them in advance of Tatmadaw campaigns
and serial displacement is common – South (2007) records a group of 36 Karen having
undergone over 1,000 instances of forced migration.
In contrast, Heppner (2005: 19-21) emphasises ‘unintentional displacement’ or the
culmination of numerous, repeated human rights abuses ‘in the absence of direct fighting’
[emphasis in original]. Multiple abuses, such as extortion and forced labour, act in concert to
erode the economic security of communities. At first, the most economically vulnerable are
displaced and then richer villagers follow; as assets are sold, vulnerability increases and the
Tatmadaw’s demands focus on incrementally fewer people. Heppner (2005) cites studies
demonstrating higher than average rates of displacement in areas relatively secure from
fighting to propose that few Karen are displaced by actual conflict and argues that the
militarisation of indigenous locales serves to exert control over minority populations, as
noted above.
52 The Burma Library provides a long catalogue of such events: http://burmalibrary.org/show.phpcat=342
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