03.01.2015 Views

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemistry and ...

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemistry and ...

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemistry and ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Summary<br />

Construction Option 4: Construct a consolidated nuclear SNM-capable Hazard Category 2<br />

laboratory below ground with a separate building to house administrative offices <strong>and</strong> support<br />

functions (total of two buildings).<br />

S.2.2<br />

Alternatives Considered but Not Analyzed in Detail<br />

A number of alternatives were considered but were not analyzed in detail in <strong>the</strong> CMRR EIS. As<br />

required in <strong>the</strong> CEQ’s NEPA regulations (40 CFR 1502.14[a]), <strong>the</strong> reasons <strong>for</strong> elimination from<br />

detailed study are discussed in this section. Alternatives may have been eliminated from fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

consideration because of technical immaturity, prohibitive cost, regulatory unacceptability,<br />

failure to meet siting criteria, or because <strong>the</strong>y do not support <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>and</strong> need of <strong>the</strong> EIS.<br />

Removing CMR Capabilities from LANL or Altering <strong>the</strong> Operational Level of<br />

Capabilities: The alternative of removing CMR capabilities from LANL or altering <strong>the</strong><br />

operational level of <strong>the</strong>se capabilities was considered <strong>and</strong> dismissed. DOE considered<br />

maintaining CMR capabilities (along with o<strong>the</strong>r capabilities at LANL) in 1996 as part of <strong>the</strong><br />

review of <strong>the</strong> Stockpile Stewardship <strong>and</strong> Management Program <strong>and</strong> made programmatic<br />

decisions at that time that required <strong>the</strong> retention of CMR capabilities at LANL. In 1999, DOE,<br />

through its LANL SWEIS analyses, concluded that specific decisions regarding <strong>the</strong> replacement of<br />

<strong>the</strong> CMR Building <strong>for</strong> its continued operations <strong>and</strong> capabilities support were not <strong>the</strong>n mature due<br />

to <strong>the</strong> lack of in<strong>for</strong>mation regarding <strong>the</strong> proposal(s). With <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> LANL SWEIS<br />

impact analysis, however, DOE made a decision on <strong>the</strong> level of operations at LANL that included<br />

<strong>the</strong> level of operational capabilities housed by <strong>the</strong> CMR Building. Having made <strong>the</strong>se critical<br />

decisions related to <strong>the</strong> maintenance of CMR capabilities at LANL to support critical NNSA<br />

missions within <strong>the</strong> past 7 years, NNSA will not revisit <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

Considering <strong>the</strong> CMRR Project as Part of <strong>the</strong> “Integrated Nuclear Planning” Initiative at<br />

TA-55: The option of including <strong>the</strong> CMRR Project environmental review as part of <strong>the</strong> INP<br />

initiative <strong>for</strong> TA-55 was considered <strong>and</strong> dismissed. The various potential LANL Security<br />

Category I nuclear facilities are independent of one ano<strong>the</strong>r in terms of <strong>the</strong>ir individual<br />

operations <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> capabilities <strong>the</strong>y house; <strong>the</strong> existing structures are of differing ages <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>re<strong>for</strong>e replacement of <strong>the</strong> aging structures would become necessary at different times; <strong>the</strong><br />

construction of major facilities within a relatively tight geographic area would require that <strong>the</strong>y<br />

be staggered so that <strong>the</strong> area can physically accommodate <strong>the</strong> necessary construction laydown<br />

sites <strong>and</strong> storage areas needed; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> additional security elements required <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> construction<br />

<strong>and</strong> startup of operations in Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities also predicates <strong>the</strong> need <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

separate construction in terms of schedule. Based on <strong>the</strong> recent TA-18 EIS, NNSA made a<br />

decision to move <strong>the</strong> TA-18 capabilities <strong>and</strong> materials to ano<strong>the</strong>r DOE site away from LANL <strong>and</strong><br />

TA-55. NNSA is separately considering <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>and</strong> operation of a pit manufacturing<br />

facility on a scale greater than can currently be accommodated by LANL’s existing facilities <strong>and</strong><br />

is considering TA-55 as a possible site. NNSA will eventually need to consider decisions on<br />

relocating or upgrading <strong>the</strong> aging TA-55 LANL Plutonium Facility, which is about 30 years old;<br />

however, any proposal <strong>for</strong> such a project is very speculative <strong>and</strong> a decision would not be<br />

appropriate at this time.<br />

S-19

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!