final feb cover - Indian Airforce

Feb 2012
AEROSP CE
Safety
inside
2
‘Chalta-Hai’ - The Story
of Leaking Hose
8
Focus with Energy
& Commitment...
18
FFI & FOD Parade
Common Theme

Feb 2012
AEROSP CE
Vol.193
Safety
Director General (Inspection & Safety)
Air Mshl AP Garud VM
Principal Director Aerospace Safety
Air Cmde R Marwaha VSM
Chief Editor
Gp Capt DK Singh
Editors
Wg Cdr GS Bishen
Cdr Nikhil Saolapurkar
Sqn Ldr Shashank Sharma
Editorial Assistants
Mr Rakesh Kumar Singh
Mrs S Sangeetha
Cpl RS Thokchom
Graphic Design
JWO G Ramesh
Sgt Chetan Chauhan
Sgt DK Chatterjee
Mr Rajib Paul
Articles/Suggestions may be sent to:
Editor, Aerospace Safety
Institute of Flight Safety
Air Force Palam, New Delhi-110 010
Tele : 011-25672871, 23247789(AFNET)
Fax: 011-25675059
e-mail: editorfsmiaf@yahoo.com
AFNET: flightsafety@dg.iaf.in
Every article must be accompanied
by a brief bio-data and passport size
photograph of the author.
'Aerospace Safety' magazine can be
viewed on the intranet at
http://www.iaf.in/dg/dgissite/fltmagazine.htm
and on the internet at
http://www.indianairforce.nic.in
Suggestions and inputs on Quality
Control issues of the IAF could be sent
to DG(I&S), IAF by e-mail at the
following address: dg_is@yahoo.com
Round-the-clock contact of Principal
Director Aerospace Safety:
Tele:
011-26172738 (Off)
21125130, 21125131 (AFNET)
011-27018241 (Res)
+91-9717095606 (Mob)
e-mail: pdfs_iaf_in@indiatimes.com
AFNET: pdfs@dg.iaf.in
inside
2 Chalta Hai-The Story of Leaking Hose
Gp Capt VVN Srikanth
4 First Air Crash in the History of Aviation
Gp Capt CN Ghosh VM
8 Focus with Energy & Commitment, Execute with Passion
and Precision
AVM Subramanyam
12 MCC - A Bond between Operation and Maintenance
Sgt Aruni Kumar
16 The Over Enthusiastic Comrade
Sqn Ldr MD Sharma
18 FFI and FOD Parade: Common Theme
Gp Capt Narinder Taneja
22 Why this ‘Press-on-Itis’ Ji
Wg Cdr Ashish Kapoor
26 Safe Ground Runs and Safety Norms
WO Kishore Kumar S
28 Accident Brief
32 Good Show
34 Well Done
36 Message
2 12
18
The opinions expressed in the ‘Aerospace Safety’ magazine are
the personal views of the authors, and do not reflect the official
policies of Air HQ. Contributions are welcome, as are comments
and criticism. The Editorial Board reserves the right to make any
improvement/change in the manuscripts.

Editorial
he article on 'First Air Crash in the History of Aviation' takes us down the memory lane and
recounts the initial odds in the history of aviation. We have indeed moved a long way in the
Tform of technological advancements in the field of aviation and the way we in which any
mission is carried out in present day scenario.
The intricacies involved in a successful mission in the present day, especially in military
aviation, pose a comprehensive challenge and necessity of effective and meticulous synergy. Once
this is achieved or close to it, there comes the 'Human Factors' in undertaking the set organizational
goals effectively and still safely. The articles like 'Chalta Hai', 'MCC – A Bond Between Operations
and Maintenance' and 'Safe Grounds Run and Safety Norms' highlight the importance of these
intricacies and the need to undertake the given task meticulously.
The necessity of grooming an Airwarrior with multi tasking capabilities and its inherent
challenges in the form of loss of 'focus' towards undertaking a mission or achieving a target needs
attention. The supervisors at all levels need to be proactive in their approach in ensuring that the
present genre of Air warriors are focused in their tasks and carry no distractions to the aircraft.
Happy landings!
(DK (DK Singh) Singh)
Group Group Captain Captain

Gp Capt VVN Srikanth
2 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

When questioned as to when had the leak started,
he replied that it had been there for a long time and
since there was only one refueling cart in the unit,
it could not be repaired
This incident happened in a RPA Sqn. The RPA
refueling is done with the help of a wheel
based refueling cart that is towed by the MM
Jeep. It is a gravity based refueling equipment
which has a long hose pipe. One day while strolling
on a routine walk around the Sqn Hangar, I noticed
a Heron RPA being refueled by the tradesmen on
duty. The senior most technical tradesman present
there was a Sgt with 18 years of service with a team
of two LACs with limited experience on the RPAs. It
was noticed by me that the fuel was leaking from
the metal joint of the refueling hose and there
was a pool of fuel on the ground. It was evident
that the tradesmen were aware of the leaking hose,
but continued with their refueling activity. On
questioning the Sgt as to why he was continuing
in-spite of fuel leakage, he replied that such
leakage is normal and that there was no problem
in continuing with the refueling activity. Once the
refueling was completed the safaiwala would come
and mop up the fuel on ground. When questioned
as to when had the leak started, he replied that it
had been there for a long time and since there was
only one refueling cart in the unit, it could not be
repaired. The refueling activity was stopped by me
and it was directed that the refueling be done only
if the hose was repaired even at the cost of stopping
flying. The hose was repaired locally by changing
the rubber seal in about an hour.
It is evident that the refueling activity with
the leaking hose continued due to the ‘Chalta Hal’
attitude. Even the senior supervisors continued
with the practice. Analysis of the event brought out
following aspects:
The senior Sgt had in the past probably
seen refueling activity being undertaken with a
leaking hose while working on other ac and felt
that it was safe. Having such activities/shortcuts
being adopted as he grew up in service, as a
senior supervisor he permitted similar activity. It
was indirectly being conveyed to those young
tradesmen who would continue in service for
another 15-20 years, that such wrong practices/
shortcuts are acceptable.
There needs to be proper supervision of
all activities, and no shortcuts should be adopted
which could lead to the juniors observing and
learning from each one of us.
In this case the Sgt cannot be blamed
because he grew up in the system fraught with
such examples. I am sure there is no aviator who
has not come across a scenario wherein the aircraft
were refueled with leaking hoses. Those from
the MiG-21 fleet are aware of instances wherein
the engine tradesman sits on the fuselage and
refuels with fuel dripping from the sides a practice
accepted as normal procedure.
All of us agree that a right man for the right
job is very important. But, it works only when the
right man gets the right training at the right time.
Correct lessons should be imparted at all times
and incorrect practices nipped at the budding
level for a safe and bright aerospace power.
It is very true that, “What mind does not
know eyes cannot see” -Therefore, be aware and
be conscious of Safety. ‘It is not my job’ and ‘chalta
hai’ attitude are sure precursors to an accident/
incident.
-Gp Capt VVN Srikanth
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 3

BLAST FROM THE PAST Safety Journal Vol XXIX, 1/90
Gp Capt CN Ghosh VM
Orville Wright was the first of the two
creators of the modern aeroplane, who
also met with an air-crash in the very
beginning of the history of aviation. Luckily,
this disaster did not turn him away from planes,
otherwise what turn the history of aviation may
have taken is anybody’s guess. The courage and
determination, so typical of a flyer, that Orville
displayed then, is being emulated and displayed
even today by thousands of flyers all over the
world.
It was thick of winter. On 23 December 1907
the slumber of the US Army was disturbed by what
is a quirk of history. The US Signal Corps decided
to buy a lighter than air machine and advertisedaccordingly.
The advertisement stated :-
“Lighter than air machine is required. It should
have the capability to carry two men on a sustained
flight of sixty minutes. Its range should be atleast
125 miles and an average speed of 40 miles over a
course of ten miles had to be attained. The ability
should be there to steer it in all directions easily.
Also the plane had to be constructed in such a way
that it could be taken apart for transportation by
truck and easily reassembled.”
The advertisement stirred a hornets’ nest.
The Signal Corps become a centre of journalistic
4 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

abuses, not because it had been slow to recognise
the invention, but because it had done so at all.
The New York Globe wrote in an editorial :-
“One might be inclined to assume from the
following announcement “The US Army is asking for
bids for a military airship” that the era of practical
human flight had arrived or that the government
had seriously taken up the problem of developing
this means of travel. A very brief examination of
the conditions imposed suffices, however to prove
this assumption a delusion. A machine such as is
prescribed on the Signal Corps specifications would
record the solution of all the difficulties in the way
of the heavier than air airships, and, in fact, finally
give mankind almost as complete control of the
air as it now has of the land water. Nothing in any
way approaching such a machine has even been
constructed.”
The Globe brushed aside the claims of Wright
brothers as unconfirmed rumour.
Even the American magazine of Aeronautics
in its January 1908 edition castigated the Signals
Corps for its imaginative scheme. It said “There
is not a single flying machine in the world which
could fulfil these specifications at the present
moment perhaps the Signals Corps has been too
much influenced by the hot air of theorizers in
which aeronautics unfortunately abounds.
The press was more or less correct at that time
because no lighter than air machine could have
satisfied the Army requirement. But press was also
totally unaware that two years earlier in 1905 the
Wright brothers had made more than 40 flights
in an improved model of their original biplane at
Huffman’s pasture on the outskirts of their native
Dayton, Ohio. The journalistic fraternity did not
show any interest about the happenings at Dayton
and did not give any credence to the claim of the
Wrights.
However, in response to the advertisement,
the War Department received 41 applications. The
War Department was shocked by this because they
were more or less sure that only one application
would come, that too from Wright Brothers. On
scrutiny it was found that most applications were
the brainstorm of imaginatives. All but three
applications were rejected because they did not
put up a required 10 per cent of the proposed
cost of the airplane as security deposit. A Chicago
inventor JF Scoot deposited $ 1000 and promised
delivery within 185 days. Another was a well
known experiment. August M. Herring promised
to deliver a plane within 180 days at a cost of
20,000 dollars. The Wrights bid was $ 25,000 with
delivery in 290 days.
The War Department was in a fix. Receipts
of the two unforeseen bids created a problem.
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 5

Chances were that Herring and Scoot had nothing
practical to offer. But as per the regulations, the War
Department was committed to giving the contract
to the lowest bidder. They were also worried because
if Herring and Scoot failed to deliver anything, the
War Department would face severe criticism from
an already skeptical press. Faced with this dilemma
General Alklen accompanied by Captain Chandler
called upon Secretary of State William Howard
Taft. Taft immediately went to President Roosevelt,
who was a staunch supporter of flying and could
possibly guarantee payment to all the successful
bidders. As expected President Roosevelt agreed
to pay for all the three successful machines from
the contingency fund at his disposal. The War
Department thereafter announced that it would
buy three planes from each of the three bidders
if they confirmed to the specified requirements.
On receipt of this communication, Scoot removed
himself from the competition and asked for the
refund of his deposit money. Though it was
supposed to be forfeited, the War Department
repaid the amount in order to save the trouble and
possible disappointment of testing an aeroplane
that may not get off the ground. But Herring did
not give up so easily. He tried his best to get the
contract and sub-contract the same to Wright
brothers. However on 08 February 1908 the Wright
brothers were given contract with a provision that
10 percent of $ 25,000 purchase price would be
deducted for each mile per hour the machine fell
short of the forty mile per hour goal.
For instance, if the machine flew only thirty nine
miles per hour, the Wrights would be penalised
2,500 dollars, if only thirty eight miles then
another 2,500 dollars would be subtracted from
the purchase price and so on. But the contract also
said that a 10 cent bonus for each mile per hour
the plane attained above the stipulated speed,
would be paid.
Having signed this historical contract the
Wright brothers concentrated towards the
development their machine. During all their early
experiments they had continued to fly lying prone,
upto the lower wing, caged in by struts and wires
and directed plane by shifting the hips from side to
side. This was not a practical thing and as a result
the brothers devised a different control system
to enable the pilot to sit and fly. Over the leading
edge of the bottom wing they installed two seats,
one for the pilot and the other for the passenger.
They also invented a new engine capable of
producing thirty five horse power steadily.
The Wright Brothers built two machines as
per the specifications and flew them at Kitty
6 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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Hawk. One them was to be taken by Orville to
Fort Myer, Virginia for the demonstration before
the War Department officials. The other airplane
was to go with Wilber to France where a separate
syndicate had been formed to produce Wright air
planes and to sell them to European Governments.
Before his departure, Wilber decided to try the
plane’s ability to carry two men. He flew with
Charles W Furnas, a Mechanic in their factory, on
14 May 1908. Therefore, Charles Furnas can be
called as ‘History’s First Airplane Passenger’.
Orville arrived at Fort Mayer in the third
week of August, and on 3rd September he
decided to carry out his first flight. But again
there was a general lack of interest which
disheartened Orville. The press refused to give
any credit to the Wright Brothers. However the
second demonstration flight was well attended,
thousands of people thronged the field to watch
this astonishing spectacle. Presumably the press
was informed earlier, as a result, reporters flocked
to the field to see the second flight. Orville took
his friend, Lt. P Lahm, a Signals Corps balloonist,
for a six aerial trip. Gradually Orville increased his
endurance in the air until on 17 November, when
Orville met with the first disaster.
mishap, the newspapers however did not forget to
report the stunning achievements of the Wright
airplane also.
Next year on July 27, Orville fulfilled the
War Department requirement. He exceeded the
requirement for a two man flight with lieutenant
Lahin as passenger. He remained in the air for one
hour, twelve minutes and forty seconds. Three
days later on 30 July he made a speed run with
Lieutenant Benyanin D Foulais aboard, averaging
42.5 miles per hour over a ten miles route. The
Signals Corps took delivery of the machine on 02
Aug 1909 and the Wrights were paid 5000 dollars
as bonus because the speed limit was exceeded
by two miles. The aeroplane was intended purely
for scouting and communication work. Thus the
Wright flyer was the FIRST MILITARY AIRPLANE to
be put into practical service by any government.
It was used that October at the newly established
Army airfield at college park, Maryland, to teach
two Signal Corps officers to fly. Wilbur Wright was
their first instructor.
-Gp Capt CN Ghosh VM
On that date Lieutenant Thomas E Selfridge
wanted to be the passenger with Orville. Orville
acceded to his request and took off with Selfridge
as the passenger. The plane climbed to an altitude
of 125 feet and was in a turn, when suddenly the
starboard propeller cracked.
The aircraft came out of the turn, losing its
thrust. The disparity in pitch between the two air
screws caused a terrific vibration to that flimsy
structure. Orville tried an emergency landing
but the rudder collapsed The plane crashed from
fifty feet off the ground. The First Disaster in
Aviation History took place. Selfridge died
within few hours of the crash. Orville survived
with a fractured left thigh, four broken ribs and
severe shock. The mishap became a front page
news in the newspapers. While writing about this
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 7

AVM Subramanyam
8 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

“
I have three focus areas for you- The first is
that come what may, SU-30s moves in here by
1 st April. The second is that the operating surfaces
need lot of attention, and thirdly, the bird activity
gives me nightmares. I don’t care if paperwork
suffers or if command rings me up ...
When Sachin Tendulkar puts his pads
on in the dressing room and waits for
his turn at the nets or to go into bat
during a match, nobody dares talk to him as he
retreats into his ‘Zone’. One of the most endearing
photographs of the penalty shootout that
decided the 1992 football World Cup final was
the one that caught the German goalkeeper, Jens
Lehman, staring into oblivion even as his coach
was desperately trying to shove a piece of paper
into his hands. The paper had all the details of
Argentinian penalty takers. All he did was to look
at two names; the names of the two penalty takers
who had the most predictable directions. Jens
Lehman saved both those penalties by diving the
right way. Talk to any solo mountaineer or read
their memoirs. When they crawl out of their tents
early in the morning for the final assault, the first
thing they do is to look up, size up the enemy,
slowly gather their kit to give themselves time
to go over the plan for the last time with go-nogo
and contingency plans, say a prayer, look at
the watch and set off. Closer home, how many
times have you seen a colleague sit quietly for
a moment or two before a sortie, trying to declutter
his mind and focus on the job at hand. At
the same time, how many times have we seen a
Flt Cdr or a CO, break away from a formation as
it is walking to the aircraft saying “I’ll be back in
a minute, AOC is on the line”, So then! I can hear
many of you say; “What’s the big deal” The deal
here honey is all about focus and execution, two
very vital ingredients of Mission Accomplishment
and Flight Safety.
Apart from Mission being the first of the three
IAF Core Values, why I have chosen to concentrate
on Focus and Execution is because these are
areas that need constant attention and have the
greatest impact on Flight Safety. Let me begin
with Focus. I have a serious problem with trying
to understand as to how we can retain focus in
an environment that does its best to distract us.
Then, we are told that we have to multi-task! The
icing on the cake is when we are told to shift focus
without adequate explanation and expected to
cope. What Chaos!! Why did I say-Chaos If you
understand the concept of Chaos in modern day
living and warfare, you will be able to focus with
intensity on the right things at the right time.
The onus of creating an environment wherein
different layers of leadership have different
spans of focus rests with senior leadership. The
mechanics of focus differs at various levels and
defining these areas is the key to focus oriented
leadership. Lest the reader thinks that I am
waffling around with words, let me try and give
you a practical example of what focus means to
different people. An AOC-in-C of an operational
command has numerous focus areas, which he
prioritises and aligns with the tasks assigned to
his command and the overall Mission Statement
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 9

of the IAF. He focuses, delegates, shifts focus,
monitors execution, evaluates results, comes
back to the original point of focus and continues
with this chain. Along the way, he drops issues,
adds on issues and in the process creates a focus
chain that is self-sustaining if there is energy and
commitment in the system. Moving down the
chain, what does focus mean at the station level.
I took over as COO at one of the premier air bases,
which was getting prepared for the new induction
of SU-30s. The AOC there, a man of few words,
spoke in monosyllables and dismissed you from
his office in five minutes by swivelling in his chair
back to a game of Solitaire. In my first meeting
with him sometime in Jan 2004, he told me very
bluntly, “Subbu, I have 3 focus areas for you- The
first is that come what may, SU-30s moves in here
by 1 st April. The second is that the operating
surfaces need lot of attention, and thirdly, the
bird activity gives me nightmares. I don’t care
if paperwork suffers or if command rings me up
about minor snafus from your end, but I want
you on the move, on the airfield, in the towereverywhere
except your office” He asked me to
bring him a plan of action in one week, approved
the plan with minor modifications and followed it
up with full support. To say that we worked hard
would be an understatement and I can say without
hesitation that it was only Focus with loads of
luck and nothing else that facilitated accident
10 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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free flying during the initial months after the SU-
30s inducted at Bareilly. I do not have an issue
with energy, I have seen that our people have no
shortage of energy; it is just that leadership at all
levels need to channelize and focus that energy.
There is no shortage of commitment either, but
a trend that I have seen setting in is that the gap
between the fully committed and the partially
committed is growing wider. To my mind, this is
inevitable in the light of multiple environmental
pressures and opportunities. Today, commitment
is not only a function of your duty& pride for
the uniform, but also about opportunity. While
duty, honour, country, service and unit remain as
important as ever, let us not be overly altruistic.
As a strategy, it may be a good idea to also link
Focus and commitment with opportunities for
personal growth and progress.
Enough about Focus but let me shift focus
onto Execution with Passion and Precision as it
is directly linked to Excellence, the second of the
IAF Core Values. I have no issues with our ability to
execute with precision. It is the passion that I have
seen missing at times. Where is passion actually
needed Certainly not in the cockpit! You need
passion in the preparatory phase before any mission
or project. It is passion that will allow you to dig up
all possible that there is to know about an adversary,
a target, or a system. It is passion that will allow you
to analyse trends and bring that extra bit to the
table, the extra bit that may, in the final analysis,
be the difference between success and failure,
or even between life and death During the Kargil
Operations, 17 Sqn could not have maintained 100%
serviceability without passionate commitment from
the STO and his team. Op Geronimo, the mission to
kill Osama-Bin-Laden succeeded without any own
casualties because of Execution with passion and
precision. It also succeeded because of relentless
Focus. So! In your own areas and in your own
humble ways think about
- AVM Subramanyam
Focusing with Energy
& Commitment
Executing with Passion &
Precision
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 11

Sgt Aruni Kumar
12 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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MCC is central repository of information related to
maintenance personnel, equipment and activities
and the successful function of the whole organization
depends upon continuous exchange of information
among them.
Aerospace Power is widely accepted as
the most important factor of future
wars. This is primarily attributable to its
incredible versatility and applicability in any
situation, whether in peace or in conflict. The
exponential increase in Aerospace Power over
the period is attributable to advancements in the
technology. Technology and Aerospace Power
is synergistically linked and these advancements
impinge on the overall maintenance philosophy
of aerospace systems. Only after an affirmation
of optimum level of maintenance on ground
can an operational mission commence. Just like
the maxim “front is do co mo”, maintenance is
do co mo (do co mo is a Japanese word means
“everywhere”). Maintenance in broader sense
involves all activities and actions taken to prepare
man and machine for operations and sustain the
same with required intensity and duration.
In order to achieve the optimum level
of maintenance in the field there is a great
need to develop a philosophy of maintenance
management. In this case, ‘CONTROL’ becomes
one of the key factors of this management
theory. It is on the lines of the same that the
‘Maintenance Control Center’ has evolved in our
esteemed organization.
Maintenance Control Centre was brought
into existence as per AFO 71/71 with a specific
aim to obtain the most effective and efficient use
of all available resources of manpower, aircraft
and other technical resources. It is this setup,
through which close direction and control of the
maintenance activities is done. For the system
to fulfill this aim, all the relevant information in
respect of aircraft, manpower, ground support
equipment, materials, spares and servicing work
load is made available to it, through an efficient
communication system.
Considerable improvement in maintenance
efficiency could be seen after the set up of MCC.
This has become possible due to observance of
the underlined principles :
Clarity of purpose.
Economy of effort.
Maintenance of morale.
Accountability.
MCC : A BOND BETWEEN OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE
Operational and Maintenance philosophy
in the present scenario has become so
interdependent and overlapping that it is
difficult to talk of any particular one in isolation.
Maintenance Control Centre (MCC) plans all the
maintenance activities in coordination with the
operational commitments. Also, it plays a vital
role in ensuring optimal techno logistic support.
Various maintenance activities need to be
studied in depth and deliberated in order to plan
maintenance activities with an aim to ensure
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 13

minimum down time for an aircraft, besides
monitoring the life of component.
MCC is a maintenance organization which is
seamless, adaptive and knowledge and capability
centric. It has its appropriate place in the overall
decision making process at higher levels of
the organization. It is the central repository of
information related to maintenance personnel,
equipment and activities. The successful
function of the whole organization depends
upon continuous exchange of information
among them. Today, in the era of information
technology, rapid dissemination of information is
imperative for the modern armed forces. Correct
documentation along with fastest means of
communication is an inevitable factor in effective
maintenance administration which in turn has
significant impact on the operational activities.
All efforts need to be made to ensure
effectiveness of MCC that enhance maintenance
activities and in turn operational capabilities.
Following are the suggested measures which
must be taken into consideration to strengthen
this bond :
99 Proper planning before under taking any
maintenance activities.
99 Proper direction of the planned work.
14 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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99
Proper controlling of the planned work.
99 Proper analysis of the activities and
maintenance of technical records.
99 Any Concessions need to be revalidated
and action initiated for the same.
99 Regular review of Tech Orders needs to
be carried out.
99 We must ensure that No aircraft passing
out after servicing/major snag rectification is
cleared till documents, including cannibalization
are complete and vetted.
99 In order to ensure that only capable
person is working on the flying machine a
proper record of proficiency book 1081 of
every individual is to be maintained.
99 Proper manning plan of the human
resource.
99 Finally, for all of the above, all necessary
aids must be provided by the Technical
administration.
- Sgt Aruni Kumar
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 15

Sqn Ldr MD Sharma
Ejections are associated with a significant
possibility of spinal injuries. Therefore
it is essential that an ejected pilot be
immobilised at the landing site itself and
transferred to a hospital with minimal handling
so as to prevent any deterioration in his condition
and to prevent any subsequent complications.
However, to expedite the rescue proceedings,
many a times, these pilots are brought to the
SMC/hospitals in a friend’s car or motorbike.
This well-intentioned action can have disastrous
consequences for the injured pilot. It happened
at our station once.
The Institute of Flight Safety team was
carrying out a practice inspection of our station
and I was chosen to attend to any emergency
that might require medical attendance.
16 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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Surely enough, an on-base crash was
simulated and the knight in shining armour
with a stethoscope around his neck was called
upon to attend to two aircrew who had ejected.
Answering the call of duty, I reached the ‘crash’
site and found two ‘pilots’ lying face down and a
horde of people watching every action of mine.
Not one given to stage fright, I turned the ‘ejected
pilot over, applied the cervical collars, scooped
them up in scoop stretchers and strapped them
down on spinal board stretchers.
Just as I started feeling good about a job
well done, lo! Horror of horrors! An officer from
our station drove up to the ambulance and
opened the rear door of his car. What happened
next was nothing short of a comedy of errors. He
pointed to the rear seat and told me, “ I have an
ejected pilot on the back seat. Evacuate him to
the hospital!”
Without batting an eyelid, I grabbed an
innocent bystander airman; put him in the car’s
rear seat, promptly put him on the stretcher with
a cervical collar and loaded the stretcher on to
the ambulance. Job done; story over! Or is it
If one analyses the sequence of events, it was
apparent that the ‘friend’ had no clue about what
he was doing. The golden rule of evacuating an
ejected aircrew is - Suspect spinal injury until
proved otherwise and act accordingly. In such
a situation, the last thing a doctor wants to see
is the aircrew being brought to the hospital or
SMC in a car, or even worse, a motorbike by an
over-enthusiastic comrade rather than in an
ambulance. However, in this particular case, this
was precisely what had happened.
Countless articles have been written in
this regard and the issue has been discussed
‘ad nauseam’ in various forums. However, such
episodes still occur with alarming regularity.
Why is it that despite considerable effort, ejected
aircrew still arrive at the SMC/hospitals in cars or
motorbikes
There is an emergent need to sensitize our
flying men and the medical men about the
potentially catastrophic ramifications of such
actions.
In case of an ejection, the human spine is
subjected to a considerable amount of force with
a very high onset rate within a very short span
of time. This, combined with the fact that the
aircrew’s posture at the time of ejection might
have been less than perfect, raises the distinct
possibility of him having sustained a spinal
injury. In such a situation, it is imperative that the
spine be stabilised and movement restricted to
a minimum before evacuating the pilot to the
SMC/hospital. This not only stabilises the spine
in case of a fracture, but also prevents further
deterioration of the pilot’s condition which
may result from unnecessary and completely
avoidable movement.
Carrying an ejected aircrew in a car or
motorbike might sound like a good idea, especially
if the pilot seems to be apparently alright and is
walking and talking. However, nothing could be
further from the truth. Given the fact that the guy
just got his spine hammered along the long axis,
allowance should always be made for an outside
chance of a spinal injury. Even if he claims to
be fine and is in high spirits, there might be an
overt injury lurking underneath, which might
be diagnosed later on MRI. At that moment, he
needs to lie down, be immobilised so as to restrict
spinal movement to a minimum and evacuated
to the hospital. Sitting in a car or on a motorbike
may aggravate the damage which might have far
reaching consequences on the ejected aircrew’s
flying career.
The car might be air conditioned and very
comfortable; but by giving a lift to the ejected
aircrew, the well intentioned, over-enthusiastic
comrade may end up doing more damage than
good.
-Sqn Ldr MD Sharma
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 17

Gp Capt Narinder Taneja
18 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

Have you heard of the acronym FFI The
most possible answer from across the
readers would be yes. The acronym FFI
stands for ‘free from infection’. As an Air warrior
in charge of a small cafeteria serving tea to an
individual section or a large Tech Flt cafeteria
in the technical area of a base to the different
messes, the word FFI is obviously familiar.
Because, month after month and year after year,
you will encounter the Medical officer coming
on the monthly sanitary round or inspection
(whichever way you may look at it) and asking
for the FFI chart. The FFI is supposed to have the
nominal roll of all food handlers working in an
eating establishment. And the monthly record
of their inspection by the SHO staff at the SMC.
And yet, at least in a sizeable proportion of the
eating establishments, the MO / SMO routinely /
regularly observes in the sanitary diary that FFI
chart not up-to-date.
FFI is just one small component of the
checklist that the MO is looking at during the
sanitary inspection. You go through the sanitary
diary of any station across the Armed Forces and
you will find common threads across all of them.
Pest-o-flash U/S, not installed, Aqua guard and
coolers (leaking, U/S, not clean), food containers in
the kitchen stores without lids/ kept on the floor/
untidy/ inadequate, meat chopping block not
maintained clean with salt on top, food samples
inadequate in quantity/ not up to date/ not
labeled etc. These are very common yet recurrent
and almost ubiquitous observations.
The question is : Why do we need a policing
authority, so to say, to come every month and ask
for the FFI chart when the implications of healthy
food handlers are so obvious and known to
everyone Why should food containers in a mess
be inadequate or why should aqua guards not be
repaired urgently/ immediately.
Do the answers to these questions have
relation with flight safety Though not obvious as
a direct relation, the ensuing discussion will make
it amply clear how we approach a preventive
activity, be it preventive health and preventive
medicine or preventive safety on ground or
preventive flight safety.
Besides the lack of importance given to any
preventive activity, there are possibly more yet
subtle and complex explanations that can also
be put forward and placed in the context of flight
safety.
Ignorance
It is possible that there is a general ignorance
about the importance of public health measures
among personnel at various levels of the
organisation, starting from the Cdr at the base
down to the last worker in the chain of individuals
practicing public health measures.
Inadequate interest in the job
It is important that each and every person
takes pride in his/ her job, be it the Safaiwala,
the cook or the catering clerk in the mess. If we
all decided that we would do the job to a high
standard of excellence, we will automatically
ensure that we are knowledgeable about the job
and will play our role in either ensuring public
health or in promoting positive health. If the food
handling staff are aware that they have a skin
infection and how it can cause a bout of food
poisoning, they will themselves remain off from
food handling duty and not wait for someone
else to point that out. Good knowledge, the will
to make a change and little extra effort will make
a huge impact on public health. This is what
preventive health is all about.
Similar logic applies to FFI. Rather than taking
it only as a medical inspection requirement, if
the significance of FFI, of each element of the
examination and hygiene of the food handlers
is understood by the staff, then the staff will and
should take pride in declaring themselves. ‘I am
free from infection ‘are you’ (Something on the
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 19

lines of the slogan of Census of India 2011. I have
been counted, have you)
Inadequate Pride
As was the case with inadequate interest
so is inadequate pride in one’s job, sometimes
presuming that it is a small job. The various
categories of food handlers may be made to
believe that there’s is a small time work, preparing
and serving food day in and day out. Yet we can
assist these people in developing sense of pride
by recognizing their role in our health. .
Recognition
Pride also comes from recognition. My three
best working hands in the SMC at my previous
unit were the gardener, an ayah and a lascar. All
these three individuals, performing seemingly
ordinary work were duly acknowledged by the
station with award of best civilian awards. They
were our partners in success.
FFI vs FOR
Does the above explanation sort of ring
common bells as far as flight safety is concerned.
Let’s discuss one example of flight safety activity:
FOR parade and see how it matches with FFI.
Every morning in the briefing you will hear the
ATC rep telling you that 40 people including two
Safaiwallas reported for the FOR parade. Even if
one is absent, the Group Cdr has an apologetic
tone and tells the Cdr that he will find out about
the defaulter and come back to him. Possibly 24
or 30 people, who were doing the parade earlier,
were missing foreign objects lying on the runway
and the number had been increased to 40. Then
one morning, an angry AOC got up and after
a sarcastic smile, he suddenly shouted at the
audience. FOR parade was a parade, gentlemen
and not a stroll in the garden or a morning walk.
FOR parade is serious business and if required,
he will increase the number of people on the
parade till he got an absolutely foreign object
clear runway for flying ops. He meant business
and he was absolutely right. But the question is
what about those 40 people and 2 safaiwallas
and the duty officer Are they ignorant Largely,
No. Every Air Warrior in the IAF knows (or ought
to know) the damage to man and machine even
a small foreign object can do. It is just that some
proportion of these people chose to decide that
FOR is not my responsibility or there is no pride
in the chore (which is a secondary duty to be
logged).
Inadequate knowledge understanding of the
problem: A safety perspective.
To be fair to a certain proportion of personnel
who have spent their initial years in non-flying
establishments, their awareness of flight safety
20 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

activity and hazards to FS could be low. It is the
organization’s responsibility that flight safety is
taught right from the initial days of exposure to
Air force. It should not be left to be an on the job
exposure. It should also not be left to an individual’s
motivation and interest to understand his role in
flight safety And the flight safety people should
best do this.
Inadequate interest in job
You detail an individual for a duty, which he
does once in 2-3 months. Chances are that he will
go, do the ‘duty’ without his heart in it. Does he
put his full mind and body in the parade Very
likely he may be proceeding on leave that dayor
he is thinking that soon after the parade he
has to take his pregnant wife to the hospital for
a check up, or he has been put for this parade as
a punishment. Can we expect any genuine work
from him He may see and yet not see. You may
want to say that all these are beyond the control
of the organisation. The question is, we have
heard time and again that aviators should leave
all their worries when they enter the cockpit (Not
that it may be humanly possible) but I have never
heard in any FS talk that gentlemen, for that 40-
45 mins of the FOR parade shut out your mind
from all diversions. Your 100% focus should be on
the runway and the foreign objects lying there.
Pride and recognition
I do not recall a FS award in the station to
someone for doing a great FOR parade. Why don’t
we announce that so and so people have picked up
so many foreign objects in the month Announce
the names of the members of the FOR parade of that
day. Let there be a sense of pride and achievement
that FOR is also acknowledged. Every foreign object
that an individual picks up is eventually his significant
contribution to FS by preventing an incident/
accident. May be a slogan like: “each one, pick one,
prevent one” to show as his contribution to FS will go
a long way in enhancing safety.
Where does the above discussion lead us to Any
activity, whose results are not immediate, tends to
get less of importance and attention. However, with
dissemination of the importance of the activity, the
critical role that each individual in the chain of that
activity plays, it is expected that everyone involved
will take pride in his role in preventing illnesses or
incidents on the ground /air. Recognition should also
be given to successful preventive activities that may
not lead to immediate positive objective outcomes
such as ensuring high hygiene and sanitation in
the station of doing a marvelous job during an FOR
parade.
-Gp Capt Narinder Taneja
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 21

Wg Cdr Ashish Kapoor
The radio jockey on the car stereo said that
Kolaveri di means murderous rage and the
song… well it has a catchy tune. I walked
into the office with the freshness of the tune
lingering in the mind. Later in the day, as I picked
up yet another file on aircraft accident caused by
press-on-itis or get-home-itis the phrase ‘Kolaveri
di’ was replaced by ‘Why this press-on-itis ji’ A
large number of accidents/incidents flashed
across in my thoughts.
Press-on-itis or Get-home-itis simply means
the condition when a pilot undertakes a flight as
per a fixed plan despite deteriorating conditions
when common sense would have a dictated
a more safer alternative say to divert or for a
helicopter simply to carry out a precautionary
landing.
In Nov 2010, a Friday, a Mi-17 was to return
back from a high altitude helipad detachment to
a base in the plains on completion of detachment.
The captain a Flt Lt, an experienced pilot in the
area, was planned to go on leave the same evening.
The co-pilot was another Flt Lt, a course junior to
the captain, who was on his first commitment
to the area. The CoI findings bring out that the
reported weather was marginal at the helipad,
Visibility 1500m in Rain and Mist and at the pass,
Visibility 1000m partially clear, when the aircraft
took off from the helipad at 1204h. At 1205h the
weather at the helipad reportedly deteriorated to
22 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

800m in Rain Fog! The aircraft crashed after a few
minutes of Take Off. In the absence of flight data
and cockpit voice recorder, both having been
destroyed in the post accident fire, the exact
cause of the crash has not yet been ascertained.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that ‘Press-onitis’
as a factor would have contributed to the
accident.
In Sep 10, a Saturday, a Chetak was to return
on completion of detachment from one airfield
to another. The ferry back had been planned the
day before but could not be accomplished due
to bad weather. The ferry was planned at 1030h
but the ferry out had to be delayed till arrival and
handing over of detachment to the new crew
who just ferried in at about 1100h. The ferry back
had been planned with two refueling halts. The
aircraft took off at 1213h, two minutes before a
weather warning came into effect at departure
airfield. The captain communicated his change
of destination to a helipad not in the flight plan
but which offered refueling and saved him one
refueling halt back to base minutes after take off to
the departure airfield. The radar at hill top helipad
location informed the captain of deterioration of
visibility and drifting in of ground level clouds at
their site to the captain well in time. The captain,
probably hoping that the clouds will drift away,
continued towards his revised en-route refueling
halt. The captain was a Sqn Ldr with Cat/IR B/Green
and the copilot was a Flt Lt with Cat/IR C/White.
Subsequently, an attempt was made to land in nil
visibility leading to a fatal Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT) accident. Another unfortunate case
of press-on-itis when the option to select a field
and land was so much feasible.
In Feb 2001 a Mi-8 took off from an ALG for an
air maintenance sortie. The weather was marginal
but within limits. By the time the aircraft returned
from the drop the weather around the ALG had
packed up. Apparently, the crew decided to
make an attempt to press on despite the weather
resulting in a fatal CFIT accident. The crew were
planned to return back to base on completion of
the sortie. Another unfortunate case of press-onitis.
Why others Way back in 1991, I was ferrying
a Mi-8 from base to a ALG in Arunachal for a
detachment. On reaching the valley mouth I
found the visibility reducing to about 1.5 Kms and
less and the cloud ceiling had dropped forcing
me to descend to 100 m AGL. I gave blind R/T
call declaring my intention to divert to alternate
and turned away. But within minutes of my call I
heard the captain of a Mi-17 give a call that he was
crossing the ridge for the ALG and was changing
over to its frequency. I allowed the call to hurt
my ego and re-revised my plan to proceed once
again to the original destination. We were lucky to
have reached the ALG safely that day. But I guess
I learned my lesson. Years later on completion
of a long detachment at an airfield two Mi-25s
were to be ferried back to base. I was leading
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 23

the formation when we encountered bad weather
enroute. I diverted and the formation landed at an
abandoned runway despite R/T calls from other
aircraft in the air in the vicinity at that time that
they were proceeding to destination. The sortie
to base was resumed on improvement in weather.
A case of Press-on-itis corrected by crew resource
management, wherein the inputs from the co-pilot
and flight engineer on their comfort level, dictated
a safer decision.
So, what are the causal factors They are a
‘page lot’ and the aircrew must always be aware
so that they can recognize the symptoms and take
preventive measures:-
P- Poor Crew Resource Management is a
key factor towards Press-on-itis accidents. No one
in the multi crew cabin puts his view point strongly
and even the support services personnel leave it
to the captain thinking ‘he knows best’.
A- Almost there, and we can hack it
feeling.
G- Get the job done. A captain may try
to prove to oneself, a junior and impressionable
crew or a colleague in the peer group that ‘Ek bar
commitment kar di to kar di’.
E- Ego is certainly one of the major factors
in Press-on-itis. How foolish would it appear to
back track one’s own well considered decisions
and the desire to demonstrate superior skills are
one of the causal factors.
L- Loss of Situational Awareness. This
is something totally avoidable in a multi crew
environment and even for single pilot aircraft alert
support service personnel can chip in with correct
professional advice but they don.
O- Overconfidence leading to incorrect
24 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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Press-on-itis or Get-home-itis simply means the
condition when a pilot undertakes a flight as per a fixed
plan despite deteriorating conditions when common sense
would have dictated a more safer alternative to divert or
simply to carry out a precautionary landing.
planning and consideration of what if scenarios
will ultimately lead to faulty aeronautical decision
making.
T- Task saturation, especially when
fatigued can lead to being trapped into the
press-on -itis syndrome. Target fixation due
too competitive an environment within the
squadron can lead to overlooking of the golden
rule of aviation that the first thing one must do
is fly your machine safely. I know of many a crew
on a check sortie who in the excessive effort to
impress as regards TOTs have been lax on the
other parameters be it height maintenance or
laid down speed restrictions so that in the debrief
they can say we were within +/- 5 seconds at the
waypoints.
The preventive methods which flow out
of an understanding of the causal factors are
‘Why FACE B’:-
W- Crew need to be taught to ask ‘Why’
‘What if’ scenarios are covered during general
and exercise briefings as emergencies during
training and combat missions. But a look at a large
number of accidents suggests that there is a need
for the supervisors to ensure that such elements
are adequately discussed and briefed even for
seemingly routine sorties and ferry flights.
F- Fuel planning for adverse weather
and clear fuel markings on the map at critical
waypoints to ensure correct Go/ No Go decisions
will lead to avoiding press-on-itis scenarios.
A- Crew need to be trained to select
suitable and safer ‘Alternatives’. Risk assessment
training must factor fatigue at the end of a long
flight
C- The service must have a demonstrated
‘Commitment’ to safety. No undue pressure
must be put to undertake missions especially for
VIP flights as it sends the conflicting message of
different rules for different people.
E- There must be adequate ‘Emphasis’ on
observing laid down minima and adherence to
SOPs.
B- During ‘Briefings’ bring out Go/ No Go
criteria. Be aware of your/ crew desire for presson-itis.
During debrief analyze decision making
during the sortie. Just because you made it does
not mean that the decision making was flawless.
Bring out the errors made and draw appropriate
lessons.
Press-on-itis is a dangerous mental state. Many
accidents are caused or are suspected to have
been caused by it. Awareness of unreasonable
pressure to get to destination, either self generated
or due company policy, would lead to steps to
avoid the same. Good training that stresses
awareness, setting of boundaries or tramlines,
sound knowledge of SOPs, planning ahead for
contingencies and disciplined adherence to
minima are the key to avoiding press-on-itis. Have
a safe flight and happy landings!
-Wg Cdr Ashish Kapoor
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 25

SAFE GROUND RUNS AND SAFETY NORMS
WO Kishore Kumar S
It was a hot summer of north and in the scorching
heat we left the safety bay to attend the ground
run in tech flight. Usually, as per the policy, three
safety operators and one SVO attends the ground
run in CFT. One crew takes position near the aircraft
during start ups with the BCF hose and applicator
laid out to react in case of any eventuality.
On reaching, we found the aircraft ready;
however, the crew was clearing the ground
equipment which were not required at the site.
One Appa (start up vehicle) was parked near the
aircraft and the gang leader asked the MTD to
remove the vehicle from the ground run site to
start the ground run. The moment MTD switched
on the ignition of the vehicle, a big ball of fire came
out of the vehicle engine and the vehicle was on
fire with close proximity to the aircraft. Alarm
bells rang and panic buttons were pressed. We
were just positioning the CFT near the aircraft for
ground run. Suddenly, one crew took out the BCF
hose reel and the other crew on top of the CFT
operated the cylinder to extinguish the fire.
However, in panic, nobody knew which lever
was to be opened, whether applicator valve by the
operator or the pipe line valve near the cylinder
junction by the IC. With a bang, the Halon gas
compressed by nitrogen in the cylinder came
out blasting the hose and emptying the costly
gas from the BCF cylinders just by wasting in the
air. Thank God, the vehicle fire was extinguished
with the help of CO2 trolley parked nearby thus
ensuring the safety of aircraft.
Ground run environment in any tech flight
is quite demanding and stress full. Most of the
time with resource crunches and other ops
26 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

and admin limitations, often a compromise on
safety tends to happen. With the present policy
of multi-skilling the tech crew to assist the CFT
crew during ground run, a need to create safety
awareness among the technicians involved in
the ground run is vital. Most of the time, non
availability of adequate designated properly
paved parking bays for CFTs with adequate run
out distance near the ground run point pose a
problem in providing a conducive atmosphere
near the AB point. With everybody sticking on to
their own constraints and SOPs, the safety takes
a back seat. Often CFTv vehicles are compelled
to reverse near the parked aircraft which is highly
irregular. The positioning of CFT becomes a
formality at such places. Although the SOPs on
positioning of CFTs and responsibilities as per
AFO 126/98 have been laid out in SSOs of all the
flying stations, it is everyone’s responsibility to
ensure that a compromise on safety in a hurry to
complete the ground run doesn’t happen.
Identifying SNCOs of different trades and
streams as independent Safety Inspectors within
the units to report directly and confidentially
with UFS&IOs or on the lines of QAS sections in
BRDs can directly contribute in enhancing
the safety environment of any workplace
without compromising on discipline
a n d service ethos in the best
i n t e r e s t of aerospace safety. Tech
flights should
ensure more and more
technicians are multi-skilled in
fire safety operations
to support the CFT crew
and also should explore
the feasibility of
introducing rapid
i n t e r v e n t i o n
vehicles with
extinguishing
media which
can be used
to ensure safety
during ground runs
and can be manned
independently and self sufficiently by the multiskilled
technicians themselves. Thus the criticality
in manning additional CFTs during flying hours
and repositioning the CFTs from tech flight to tech
flight and sqn to sqn can be avoided. The growing
incidents of MT accidents in flying environments
is a matter of concern and one reason is surely lack
of safety consciousness and supervisory control
among each and every individual.
I have learnt one thing from the situation that
I have faced from the above incident - the need
to polish the skills and keeping in touch with the
operating procedures as per the requirement
of work place, balanced with a cool, composed,
mind can only help us to react situationally in
emergencies and to ensure safety. The need to
create a safe environment at every work place is
each and every air warriors responsibility. With
lot of stress on our training policies based on
modular patterns and restructuring, if the desired
result needs to be borne, then I feel we need to
redefine our HR recruitment by including the
psychological testing like the one followed in SSBs
which can help in identifying the right people for
the right job with a positive attitude. The work
culture inculcated in the young stage based on
procedures and policies will go a long way in
developing a sound and disciplined professional
in the future. “Supervision means Superior Vision”.
-WO Kishore Kumar S
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 27

ON 03 Jul 11, 907514-F Cpl SK Yadav, Ops Asst was detailed as Surveillance Technician
and was manning Alpha Channel at the SU. At 1650 hrs, the civil aircraft with Chief
Minister of the State on board, requested climb from its planned flight level 020 to 060.
Aware of the degrading weather conditions of the sector he reconfirmed from the aircraft
whether the climb was due to bad weather. On confirmation, he immediately reported
the matter to the Sector Director Sqn Ldr R Sharma. After assessing the situation, SD
cleared the climb and instructed ST to advice the pilot about enroute and destination bad
weather. Further, taking view of the prevalent weather condition and in consultation with
the SD, Cpl Yadav advised the pilot to abandon the mission and land at nearest diversion.
He also coordinated the priority landing of the aircraft by doing necessary liaison with
civil agencies at the nearest base.
Cpl SK Yadav displayed keen observation, promptness and high professionalism and
prevented a possible incident/accident involving Chief Minister of the state.
Good Show Cpl SK Yadav
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
On 11 Jul 11, Sqn Ldr Santharam Sure (26282-B) F (P) was authorized to fly an air
experience sortie with a Medical Officer. While opening power for takeoff, he heard
some abnormal noise from the engine. It was similar to the noise of cockpit pressurization
valve fluttering, which subsided below 80% RPM. However, Sqn Ldr S Sure observed that
the noise was different from a normal running of an engine, and he aborted the sortie
and switched off without making any power changes till switch off. Post flight inspection
revealed corrosive pitting of stator blades of the turbine, which was noticed only after the
removal of the engine for inspection.
Sqn Ldr S Sure displayed keen observation and prompt decision thereby avoiding a
possibly disastrous situation.
Good Show Sqn Ldr Santharam Sure
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
32 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
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On 29 On 29 Jun 11, 785748-R Cpl Amitava Datta AFSO was detailed to supervise
the MES personnel for repair of inverter at Runway Controller hut. During the
progress of the task he observed that the arrester barrier was slightly lowered. Taking
necessary clearance from the tower, he proceeded to the barrier and found that the
barrier was of lesser height. He requested tower to lower and raise the barrier again.
On raising of the barrier, he measured the center height and found it to be less than
the required minimum barrier height. Sensing the danger, he declared arrester barrier
as unserviceable and requested for assistance of CCR party. On inspection by CCR
party it was revealed that the stanchion on the eastern side was struck.
Cpl A Datta displayed keen observation and professional approach and prevented
a potentially disastrous situation.
Good Show Cpl Amitava Datta
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
On 27 Jun 2011, 768211-H Sgt AK Saini Eng/Fit was detailed to carry out Post Flight
on Searcher MK II RPA. During Post Flight check, he noticed a minute crack on
water pump driving belt. Further investigations revealed a crack of 3mm width on
top layer of the belt. If it would have gone unnoticed it could have resulted in failure
of oil pump leading to overheating and seizure of engine.
Sgt AK Saini displayed a high Degree of professionalism and averted a possible
accident/incident.
Good Show Sgt AK Saini
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 33

On 29 Aug 11, Flt Lt GPS Brar (28714-G) and Flt Lt M Rana (29251-K) were authorized to fly an
RTR mission in an AVRO ac. During the preflight inspection the aircrew noticed a small
paint scratch resembling a crack on the port wing between engine nacelle and fuselage.
Aircrew brought it to the notice of DSS personnel and asked for further investigation. On
investigation a 1” crack was found on upper surface of the wing. A detailed investigation
subsequently revealed a crack on the supporting stringer as well and few loose rivets. If
unnoticed, this crack would have resulted into a catastrophic disaster.
Flt Lt Brar and Flt Lt Rana have displayed a high degree of professionalism and keen
observation thereby preventing a potential accident/incident.
Well Done Flt Lt GPS Brar & Flt Lt M Rana
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
ON 13 Aug 11, Flt Lt Rohan Atul Atre (29880-G) F (P), was authorized to carry out ground
run on Mi-17 IV helicopter, after 50 hrs servicing and MGB change, along with 775533-
F Sgt Rajesh Chako Flt Engr. During start-up, they heard unusual noise coming from engine
and MGB bed. Flt Lt Atre promptly asked Flt Eng to carry out a switch off. The origin of the
noise could not be established at unit level. After thorough inspection carried out by the
special rectification team, it was ascertained that abnormal noise was present. However,
after removing the port engine it was found out that No.1 gene was unserviceable and the
shaft giving drive to the gene had broken.
Flt Lt A Atre and Sgt Rajesh Chako displayed keen sense of observation thereby isolating
the weak link in the chain of events which could have led to a possible catastrophe.
Well Done Flt Lt Rohan Atul Atre &Sgt Rajesh Chako
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
34 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

ON 11 Aug 11, 743927-H Cpl Sandip Kumar Ghosh Rad/Fit was detailed for guard
duty. During the course of his duty he heard an unusual sound from the RPA parked
in the blast pen. He rushed to the site and noticed high intensity sparks emanating
from the forward payload compartment of the Heron RPA. He immediately raised
an alarm and took assistance from the other air warrior on guard duty. 742787-H Cpl
Lindo Antony Rad/Fit reacted to the situation immediately and assisted Cpl SK Ghosh
in extinguishing the fire and got the situation under control.
Cpl S K Ghosh and Cpl Lindo Antony displayed dedication to duty, situational
awareness, prompt action and good team effort thereby averting a incident/
accident.
Well Done Cpl SK Ghosh and Cpl Lindo Antony
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
ON 22 Aug 11, Sqn Ldr MK Khan (27008-R) F (P) was detailed to fly an A&E check
sortie on a Dornier aircraft. After carrying out the complete air test profile, while
rejoining the pilot heard an audio warning on the headset which was coupled with
the low oil pressure warning light coming on. The torque of the starboard engine was
also fluctuating beyond the permissible limits. On checking the engine parameters,
the pilot found the oil pressure of the starboard engine had dropped below the red
mark. He analysed the situation correctly and switched off the starboard engine
in air. He thereafter carried out a safe single engine landing at the base. Post flight
inspection revealed heavy oil leak from the starboard engine.
Sqn Ldr MK Khan displayed high degree of professionalism in handling the
emergency and his timely action averted significant damage to the engine.
Well Done Sqn Ldr MK Khan
(R Marwaha)
Air Cmde
PDAS
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 F e b r u a r y Aerospace Safety 35

LEAVING THE AIR FORCE
JOIN THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION
Stay connected to another organization which is similar and provides fraternity bond
between the ‘Service’, the ‘Served’ and the ‘Serving’.
Aims to achieve integration of Veteran Air Warriors of the AFA family and empower
them through welfare activities across the country.
Awards scholarship to School/College going wards of serving and veteran air
warriors/widows.
Provides grants/assistance to members, their widows & dependents, to meet their
emergent requirement.
Provides reasonable and dignified accommodation for life through a ‘Senior Citizen
Homes’ at nominal charges.
Provides free legal advice to members on service/personal issues.
Publishes the ‘Eagle Eye’ for Bonding, Awareness and Updation on pension, ECHS,
AFGIS, DGR, IAFBA and DPP&R. ` 500/- for lifetime and ` 50/- for two issues.
Assistance to members, widows and families on pension/family pension/benefits.
Timely grant to widow on demise of the member.
Rehabilitation assistance through placement cell at AFA.
Can avail benefits of the Marshal of the Air Force and Mrs. Arjan Singh Trust.
WHEN & WHO CAN BECOME A MEMBER- Any person who has served in the Air Force
as Officer, Airman or NC(E) for a duration of one year or more excluding the period of
initial training and has retired /released/discharged.
BECOME A LIFE MEMBER, PAY MEMBERSHIP FEE ONLINE AT AFA WEBSITE
www.afa-india.org
36 Aerospace Safety F e b r u a r y 2 0 12
INDIAN AIR FORCE

BEWAR E
PROP
LLERS
AVOID TH
E
C
T

ARTICLES & SUGGESTIONS
We plan to bring special editions of our Aerospace
Safety Magazine.
¯April Issue - Summer Special
¯May
Issue - Maintenance Special
You are requested to pen down your experiences in
the form of articles highlighting the above theme.
Our address is :
Editor, Aerospace Safety
Institute of Flight Safety
Air Force Palam,
New Delhi - 110 010
Round-the-clock contact of PD Flight Safety: Tele: 011-26172738, Mob: +91-9717095606 e-mail: pdfs_iaf_in@indiatimes.com
Articles/Suggestions may be sent to: Editor, Flight Safety Magazine, Institute of Flight Safety, New Delhi-110 010 e-mail: editorfsmiaf@yahoo.com