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Response to motion for summary judgment - Kentucky.com

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officers.’” Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6 th Cir. 2002). For this reason alone, <strong>summary</strong><br />

<strong>judgment</strong> may still be premature with respect <strong>to</strong> Kristine LaFoe, especially <strong>to</strong> the extent the criminal<br />

trial may shed light on how she lied about and covered-up incidents of excessive <strong>for</strong>ce. However,<br />

at this stage of the case, LaFoe has testified that she could have seen officers alone with Gerald in<br />

Cell P-7 but does not remember whether she did. (LaFoe Depo., Ex. 8, p. 57-58).<br />

C. Clarence McCoy and Maria Jones are not entitled <strong>to</strong> <strong>summary</strong> <strong>judgment</strong>.<br />

Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical <strong>for</strong>ce, 9 the core judicial<br />

inquiry is whether <strong>for</strong>ce was applied in a good faith ef<strong>for</strong>t <strong>to</strong> maintain or res<strong>to</strong>re discipline, or<br />

maliciously and sadistically <strong>to</strong> cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).<br />

“Although the maintenance of prison security and discipline may often require that prisoners be<br />

subjected <strong>to</strong> physical contact which at <strong>com</strong>mon law would be actionable as an assault, a violation<br />

of the Eighth Amendment will nevertheless occur if the offending conduct reflects an unnecessary<br />

and wan<strong>to</strong>n infliction of pain.” Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6 th Cir. 1995). In this<br />

case, the question is not whether physical <strong>for</strong>ce was necessary, but whether it occurred at all. If the<br />

prison guards used <strong>for</strong>ce, there is no question but that this use of <strong>for</strong>ce was wan<strong>to</strong>n and unnecessary.<br />

Anthony Estep testified that Gerald Cornett was not uncooperative or <strong>com</strong>bative in any way, and that<br />

Cornett did not say or do anything that deserved any type of physical <strong>to</strong>uching beyond being<br />

pat/frisked. (Estep Depo. at 49). Clarence McCoy also testified that Gerald Cornett did not do<br />

anything <strong>to</strong> give McCoy a reason <strong>to</strong> put his hands on him. (McCoy Depo. at 29-30). “‘If a guard<br />

decided <strong>to</strong> supplement a prisoner’s official punishment by beating him, this would be<br />

9 Although not particularly relevant, it should be noted that Cornett’s claims arise under the Fourteenth<br />

Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as opposed <strong>to</strong> the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,<br />

because Cornett was a pre-trial detainee. See Leary v. Livings<strong>to</strong>n County, 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6 th Cir. 2008).<br />

34

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