Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp - Woodrow ...

In the epoch of openness the military will be subject to groundless criticism for not having been firm in
asserting their views and preventing the introduction of troops on Afghani territory. The initiative of the USSR KGB
[in this matter] will gradually be forgotten. None of the higher party or government officials will deign to assume
responsibility for the consequences of the political decision to introduce troops into Afghanistan and none of them will
face any punishment.
The CC CPSU Politburo had embarked on such a difficult step although its members had not analyzed it
themselves until the end: what revolution had they gathered to defend In the estimation of the former chief of the
KGB First Main Directorate Leonid Shebarshin: “The entire undertaking was prepared in a situation of such secrecy
that there was simply no critical data analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, not only from the point of view of the
factional intra-Party fighting or the fighting with the government, but also from the historic, national, religious, and
ethnic points of view.” In my view, this decision was the result of opportunistic approaches to the situation in
Afghanistan, mistakes, failures, and the fatal miscalculations of our special services and missions in Kabul, and also a
superficial analysis of the situation and insufficient forecasting of the development of the situation in and around
Afghanistan by analysts in Moscow, although it was based on the highest interests of the country.
If we assess the situation from today’s perspective a conclusion can be drawn: the transfer of power from the
“Khalq” to “Parcham” did not substantially change the situation since both PDPA factions were not fundamentally
distinct from one another at the theoretical level and neither had influence among or the support of the majority of the
people. Objectively, the most suitable candidate for us capable of providing some stability in the country without
bringing it to the point of civil war would possibly have been an influential, authoritative figure in Afghanistan not
connected with the PDPA. But at that time such an alternative was not even considered; this would have been a
seditious thought – a betrayal of the ideals of socialism…
Cables which later arrived from the DRA seemingly confirmed the correctness of the steps taken by the
Soviet leadership regarding Afghanistan. According to a report of the KGB representative, during meetings with him
on 12 and 17 December, Amin said that the Afghan leadership would welcome the presence of Soviet Armed Forces
in a number of strategically important locations in the northern provinces. The forms and methods of extending
military aid should be determined by the Soviet side. The USSR can have military garrisons in the locations it wishes,
e.g., take under guard all facilities where there is Soviet-Afghan collaboration and protect DRA lines of
communications.
REPORT FROM KABUL
(Secret) 11
(Urgent)
…On 12 and 17 December 1979 the KGB representative met with H. Amin. The following
statements of Amin deserve attention.
Amin insistently adhered to the idea of the need for the direct participation of the Soviet Union in
deterring the combat operations of the rebel groups in the northern regions of the DRA. His
reasoning boiled down to the following:
- the present Afghan leadership will greet the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces at a
number of strategically important points in the northern regions of the DRA…
Amin said that the forms and methods of extending military aid should be determined by
the Soviet side;
- the USSR can have military garrisons wherever they want;
- the USSR can take under guard all facilities where there is Soviet-Afghan collaboration;
- the Soviet troops could take DRA lines of communications under guard…
11 [Translator’s note: Previously published in Lyakhovskiy’s “Tragediya I Doblest’ Afgana’, previously translated]
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