Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp - Woodrow ...
Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp - Woodrow ...
Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp - Woodrow ...
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guilty party with all the severity of the law! For we were on the territory of a friendly country and<br />
any accidental shot or carelessly tossed word could serve as a cause of an international scandal.<br />
The longer I heard Yasha the more the conviction grew in me that something was wrong<br />
here. Rather, everything was wrong. Or I had lost my mind and was ina<strong>pp</strong>ropriately evaluating<br />
reality and what Semenov said; or was it HE who was out of sorts Everything that he had said was<br />
so divorced from reality that I somehow couldn’t even find the words to comment on this plan. This<br />
was complete adventurism, elementary ignorance of the situation, and the most complete<br />
incompetence…<br />
Of course this was not something that was Semenov’s idea. Some big boss had drawn up<br />
the plan. Yasha had already told me then that the high command had put him, the chief of our entire<br />
group, in a foolish position and in a practically hopeless situation: here’s your plan of operations –<br />
fulfill it…<br />
In principle the opinion of all the “Zenit” troops was the same: the proposed plan was an<br />
absurdity born of an ignorance of the situation. An obvious dilettante had drawn up the plan. But no<br />
one then talked openly aloud about this. Everyone understood that this was a decision of some high<br />
command unknown to us. It was not precluded that our Party advisers here had also had a hand. By<br />
the way, the bespectacled briefer who was explaining to us about Amin the usurper, judging from his<br />
manners and smooth speech, completely looked like a representative of the latter [trans. note: the<br />
Party advisers]…<br />
A day later it was explained to us in the morning that we were going to Kabul at night.<br />
However the standdown was given at noon. The adventurist version of the plan had been scuttled.<br />
Well, thank God!<br />
The snipers from the special KGB subunits did not manage to kill Amin. “Zenit” officers Vladimir Tsvetkov<br />
and Fedor Yerokhov set the sights of the sniper rifles at Bagram at 450 meters, chose positions along Amin’s usual<br />
route of travel, set up a watch, and specified withdrawal routes to the Soviet Embassy, but each time, before they<br />
passed a reinforced guard was set up along the whole route and the vehicles moved at enormous speed and the “Zenit”<br />
troops could not carry out the mission.<br />
Through inertia, for three more days (14-16 December) work continued in Bagram to prepare to seize the<br />
palace in the center of Kabul with the forces of the special services and the “Muslim” battalion (scouting, working out<br />
the details of the assault, coordination – down to the smallest details), but this was preparation for operations which<br />
had been proposed to begin in the event of the success of a new subversive action against Amin.<br />
However the next attempt against him on 16 December ended in failure. They tried to poison Hafizullah<br />
Amin but his nephew Asadullah Amin, the chief of the counterintelligence service, drank the Pepsi Cola with the<br />
“contents”; he was sent to the USSR for treatment with a very serious attack of hepatitis. Soviet doctors saved him but<br />
after the change of government in Kabul he ended up in Lefortovo Prison where attempts were made to learn from him<br />
the circumstances of the murder of Taraki and other information. However Asadullah Amin conducted himself<br />
worthily and firmly at interrogations and said nothing. He was then deported to Afghanistan and executed there by the<br />
new regime.<br />
An An-12 aircraft urgently flew in from Fergana for the members of the future Afghan government headed by<br />
Babrak Karmal and they again left for the USSR.<br />
According to Yuriy Izotov, an officer of Group “A”:<br />
We had to return to Tashkent again when the operation did not come off; it was not<br />
cancelled, but postponed. We met there with future members of the CC PDPA Politburo whom<br />
Valentin Ivanovich Shergin and his guys were guarding. I noted that the Afghans were unha<strong>pp</strong>y<br />
about the inactivity and I suggested they throw knives. I led them out to the street, set up the boards,<br />
and began to train. Then I led Anahita to work in the dacha where we had been fishing with her. I<br />
had to disperse them somewhat to keep dark thoughts from them. But then they seated us in the<br />
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