Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp - Woodrow ...

while coming in for a landing at Kabul (the crew commander was Captain Golovchin); 37 paratroopers were on board.
All the paratroopers and seven crew members died.
A meeting of chiefs of advisory bodies was held on 25 December. In the course of the briefing all the advisers
received orders – do not allow Afghan units to act against our troops in Kabul. Military advisers and specialists who
had worked in the DRA Air Defense Forces established control over all anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition
storage locations in order to prevent possible hostile actions by Afghan servicemen during the airlift of the airborne
troops. They even took several anti-aircraft installations out of service temporarily (they removed sights and [firing]
locks). Thus, the unhindered landing of aircraft with paratroopers was ensured.
A group of officers worked around in the clock in the USSR Armed Forces General Staff which followed the
situation and the fulfillment of the measures to deploy Soviet troops, prepared reports, and made suggestions to
Varennikov; the latter, in turn, reported to the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the CC CPSU.
The Defense Minister was vitally interested in the progress of the fulfillment of the assigned mission. Ustinov
summoned the deputy chief of the lead directorate of the Main Operations Directorate Gen. German Burutin to his
office and studied the situation for an hour, asking for clarifications: “Why are troops going across the pontoon bridge
so slowly They reported to me that they would be going much faster…How much time can the paratroopers hold out
in Kabul if there is active resistance on the part of Afghan troops loyal to Amin”
Improvised meetings arose in the course of the march of the combat columns (when they stopped at
population centers). Many residents greeted Soviet soldiers with flowers. Soldiers of the DRA army and members of
the Committees to Defend the Revolution were especially friendly to us.
On 26 December a combat collaboration meeting was held in Pul-e Khomri where our troops and the troops
of the [Afghan] 10 th Infantry Regiment of the 20 th Infantry Division were present. In their speeches the Afghan
servicemen expressed gratitude for the international aid and readiness for collaboration. They chanted slogans of
Soviet-Afghan friendship.
But it was not so everywhere. Some Afghans regarded the appearance of Soviet troops with suspicion and did
not enter into contact with them. There were also displays of hostility. Our troops began to come under fire from
individual detachments of the armed opposition. But the General Staff Directive did not specify the procedure and
conditions for the use of weapons and they were forced to return fire.
For example, on the morning of 26 December at the Salang Pass a group of rebels attacked subunits of the
airborne assault battalion of Capt. Khabarov. The commander of a reconnaissance patrol, Lt. Nikolay Krotov, died
while repelling this attack. A motorized rifle regiment under the command of Lt. Col. Viktor Kudlay en route from
Khorog to Fayzabad was constantly subjected to attack by small groups of rebels who destroyed the only road in the
mountains and obstructed traffic. As a result [the regiment] made only 10 km a day.
On 26 December the CC CPSU General Secretary held a meeting at his dacha in which Andropov, Ustinov,
Gromyko, and Chernenko participated. They discussed the progress of implementation of CC CPSU Decree Nº
P176/125 of 12 December. Chernenko made the record of this meeting.
DOCUMENT
Ref Nº P176/125 of 12 December 1979
Top Secret
On 26 December (Cdes. L. I. Brezhnev, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, and K. U.
Chernenko were present at the dacha) the progress of implementation of CC CPSU Decree Nº P 176/125 of 12.12.79
was reported by Cdes. Ustinov, Gromyko, and Andropov.
Cde. L. I. Brezhnev, having approved the plan of action in this matter scheduled for the time being by the
comrades, expressed a number of wishes.
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