Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp - Woodrow ...

When we crossed the Soviet border in flight we heard an order to prepare our weapons and
be ready for any surprises on landing; possibly we would have to go into combat immediately.
We landed at Bagram at night. We were met there by our guys from the groups of Yuriy
Izotov and Valentin Shergin who were guarding the new government of Afghanistan in hardstands…
Only in the second half of 24 December was Kolesnik informed that the decision had been approved and that
the battalion would carry out the mission in full strength with the reinforcements. But none of the leaders in
Afghanistan at that time had signed this plan. It was obvious that already the vicious practice was formed of leaders
giving verbal orders and then denying their own words. They simply said, “Act!” Thus they had to go into battle
without a written order. Such “activity” acquired its widest usage in Gorbachev’s time.
Major Khalbayev began right away to carry out the first-priority measures of preparing for the assault while
Col. Gen. Magometov and Col. Kolesnik were summoned for talks with Headquarters [trans. note: Moscow]. What
caused the delay became clear only much later.
The problem was that Marshal Ustinov was holding a meeting of the command staff of the Defense Ministry
at this time in Moscow at which he announced the decision made by the CC CPSU Politburo to deploy troops to
Afghanistan. At the meeting were deputies to the Minister, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed
Forces and the Commanding General of the Airborne Troops, and several chiefs of main and central directorates. The
Defense Ministry issued the order to deploy an airborne division and an independent airborne regiment of the Airborne
Troops, a motorized rifle division of the Turkestan Military District, and an independent motorized rifle regiment of
the Central Asian Military District to Afghanistan. At the same time the order was given to bring a number of
formations and units of the Ground Forces into full combat readiness as well as aviation units of military districts
bordering the DRA for a possible increase in the size of the grouping of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. On the copy of
the points of the speech at this meeting preserved in the General Staff Archives there is a notation in red pencil made
by Ustinov: “Special importance and secrecy.”
By that time a total of about 100 formations, units, and installations had been deployed, including the HQ of
the 40 th Army; a composite air corps; four motorized rifle divisions (three in the Turkestan Military District and one in
the Central Asian Military District); artillery, surface-to-air missile, and airborne assault brigades; independent
motorized rifle and missile artillery regiments; and signals, intelligence, logistics, and repair units. An airborne
division, an independent airborne regiment, and airfield technical and airfield support units were brought up to full
strength.
More than 50,000 officers, sergeants, and soldiers were called up from the reserves to bring units up to
strength and about 8,000 vehicles were sent from the economy…Mobilization measures of such scale had never before
been conducted in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts. Accordingly, local governments, directors of
enterprises and farms [khozyaystva], draft boards, and military units turned out not to be prepared for them.
For example, during the first days of mobilization no one paid attention to the quality of the specialists filling
out the subunits – everyone was confident that the usual inspection was being done and everything would end after
reports of its conclusion. But when the commanders and draft boards were notified about possible further operations
there began an emergency replacement of reservists already called up and sent to units. A keen shortage of scarce
specialists (tank and BMP driver-mechanics, anti-tank guided missile and radar operators, and gunners [of artillery
pieces]). Such a situation is explained by the fact due to poor knowledge of the Russian language soldiers from the
Central Asian republics, as a rule, served out their draft obligation in construction or motorized rifle units where they
could not acquire the required specialties.
A great number of the reservists were not found because of poor recordkeeping in draft boards, violations of
the residential passport system, confusion in street names…Many reservists avoided receiving [call-up] notices under
various pretenses, fleeing their places of residence [or] presenting false certifications of illness. Many reserve officers
never had served in the army and had no practical skills in military specialties – they had trained in military
departments of higher educational institutions. In short, the troops encountered a whole series of serious problems in
their first months in Afghanistan and during the war this was always fraught with unforeseeable consequences.
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