Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of ...

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t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s RUSSIA MONGOLIA CHINA NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA JAPAN LAOS THAILAND VIETNAM CAMBODIA South China Sea OKINAWA TAIWAN PHILIPPINES Philippine Sea Pacific Ocean GUAM Strait of Malacca MALAYSIA SINGAPORE INDONESIA Map of East Asia xvi The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence
chapter 1 The Pertinent Question about a Nuclear Japan Not “If,” but “Why” North Korea’s nuclear weapon test in October 2006 and the subsequent “debate” in Japan about whether or not to ponder its own nuclear future brought renewed attention to the subject of Japan and nuclear weapons. Pundits and policy makers in both the United States and Japan contemplated the implications of Pyongyang’s nuclear breakout, and many wondered if this marked the beginning of fundamental change in Japanese thinking on these issues. Just as North Korea’s long-range missile test over Japanese airspace in 1998 was a major catalyst leading to Japan’s full-fledged embrace of America’s missile defense (MD) development program a few years later, might the 2006 nuclear test eventually prove to be a similar watershed moment in Japanese defense policy Would there be a rising tide of Japanese sentiment in favor of reexamining the three non-nuclear principles of non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction With a few exceptions, a survey of opinion polls, policy maker interviews, and relevant writings in both countries revealed that proponents of a nuclear Japan after North Korea’s test were largely the same small number of people who advocated such a move in prior years, without any noticeable swelling of their ranks. 3 Those who do support the idea of Japan’s developing its own nuclear deterrent often do so for very different reasons. Some (most of them American) see it as a means of “unleashing” Japan or “playing the Japan card” in Northeast Asia in the context of a stronger and more balanced U.S.-Japan alliance, while others (usually Japanese) view the nuclear option for Japan as a way to compensate for a potentially weaker alliance, a decline in deterrence credibility, or American indifference to Japan’s security needs. This highlights a wide perception gap regarding alliance durability and the basic rationale for considering a change in nuclear policies, and it is an important issue that we will examine throughout this report. While many outside observers have wondered if Japan might someday alter its nuclear policies as a result of North Korea’s test, the overall conclusion so far has been almost unanimously negative (at least in the near to mid-term). But recent consideration of that “if ” question has led to a more pertinent and pivotal discussion within and among the two countries about “why,” as in, “Why would Japan change its nuclear policies” What would cause Japan to reevaluate the deterrence power of its alliance with the United States, and what, if anything, should be done to shore up perceived shortcomings Examination of these questions has begun at both academic and official levels since late 2006, and better understanding of why Japan might reconsider long-held policies will go a long way to narrowing the perception gap mentioned above. 3 For example, see Krauthammer 2003 and 2006, Lowry 2005 and 2006, Nakanishi 2003 and 2006, and Nishibe 2003 and 2007. How precarious is a non-nuclear Japan Japan’s non-nuclear bona fides are well established. Although one-third of the known nuclear weapon states (NWS) in the world are immediate neighbors of Japan (Chi- The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence 1
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Reshaping a more multi-faceted exte
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Appendix A May 2007 Joint Statement
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The SCC members reviewed progress i
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MEF METI MEXT MIRV MLF MOD MOFA MOX
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Capaccio, Tony. 2008. Navy can’t
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Jameson, Sam. 1993. Foreign ministe
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at the Nuclear Control Institute. M
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Tanaka Akihiko. 1997. Security: A s
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About the Author and the Institute
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