Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of ...

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t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s of the state”) and recognized his own role in that outcome. “For Japan, a member of the United Nations and expecting 36 See, in particular, Payne 2008. 37 In fact, the “alliance” was not explicitly named as such in Japanese official statements and documents until May 8, 1981, in a joint statement by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko and President Ronald Reagan. This created a small controversy back in Japan, where the media questioned if this was now a “military alliance” or an “anti-Soviet alliance,” and eventually Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi had to explain in the Diet that the “alliance” term was nothing more than an affirmation of the close political, economic, and cultural affairs between the two countries (Associated Press 1981). its benefits, to avoid support of its peacekeeping mechanisms is selfish behavior… [and] I myself cannot escape responsibility for the use of the Constitution as a pretext for this way of conducting national policy” (Pyle 2007). In the forty-five years since Yoshida wrote those words, there has been very little fundamental change. It seems clear that the legacy of relying on the United States for extended deterrence lives on in Japan, even if discomfort with the status quo is growing. This discomfort stems from different sources of concern, with some worried that extended deterrence might become less reliable and less credible (so they seek closer ties with Washington). Meanwhile, others are more focused on changing the whole nature of the postwar relationship with the United States, by climbing into the front seat and taking more security and diplomatic matters into their own hands. This is not necessarily an anti-U.S. position, but it indicates more noticeable chaffing under the postwar legal and diplomatic restraints that Japan agreed to live with for the sake of national development. The short tenure of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo probably best exemplified this latter group. In his first major parliamentary policy address, Abe stated, “It is now time to embark anew and boldly revise the postwar regime,” which he linked to constitutional revision and education reform, among other policy changes. He cited the need to “reconstruct our legal basis for national security that fits the current times” (Kyodo News 2007). Abe’s failure to realize his goals partly reflects how little consensus actually exists in Japan regarding adjustments to the status quo, though the fact that constitutional revision was that high on the prime minister’s agenda at all represents a significant change. But it is not just new thinking about deterrence in Japan that is affecting the alliance relationship, as deterrence discussions in Washington are also having a major impact. With the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. intellectual and policy debates about deterrence tools and targets have become more frequent and vigorous. Whereas during the latter half of the Cold War, Washington settled on a “balance of terror” approach with the Soviet Union that allowed for mutual vulnerability, or “mutual assured destruction,” modern theorists began to question the utility of those policies in today’s security environment. 36 The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) sought to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in sustaining deterrence and proposed a new planning framework consisting of 1) strategic nuclear and non-nuclear forces, 2) active and passive defenses, and 3) a responsive infrastructure capable of adapting quickly to a changing security setting. Deterrence doctrine has become muddled, however, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seeking more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations, or even preemption or preventative war to deal with undeterrable threats. The Obama administration will have its own chance to influence U.S. nuclear policy as it prepares for a new 2009- 10 NPR, which is mandated by Congress. In light of this pending review, this chapter, while focusing primarily on the view from Tokyo, also examines evolving U.S. thinking about extended deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons and how Washington’s perspective could affect the U.S.-Japan alliance now and in the future. Opening up the nuclear umbrella The U.S.-Japan alliance established by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (security treaty) did not begin with any mention of extended deterrence or a so-called nuclear umbrella protecting Japan. 37 Public aversion to any mention of nuclear weapons was quite strong, and Japan’s somewhat optimistic perception of the security situation in East Asia at the time did not force policy makers to seriously question the necessity and credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. China’s first nuclear test in 1964 changed Tokyo’s views to some degree, but the official response to the nuclear test by the Japanese government was relatively muted, and China was not the target of Japan’s defense planning at that time (Nishihiro 1995). Though Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and others occasionally talked publically about the idea of sliding under an American “nuclear umbrella” as early as 1965, it was still a controversial concept in the mid-1960s. In the Diet, left 26 The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s wing politicians argued that this was just a policy pushed by Washington so that the United States could increase its influence over non-nuclear states (House of Councilors 1965). More than a few Japanese feared entanglement in a nuclear exchange of some sort that could take place on the Korean peninsula or involve the United States and the Soviet Union. That is why Sato’s request to McNamara in 1965 for nuclear protection was kept secret. Even inside the bureaucracy, there were arguments that deviated from the government’s quiet acceptance of American nuclear protection. In early 1966, for example, Shimoda Takezo, then the administrative vice-minister of MOFA, stated in a press conference that he thought Japan was not under the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Kurosaki 2006, 196-97). This comment was replaced by MOFA’s “unified viewpoint” a few days later, a handy double negative that in essence conveyed that it was not accurate to say that Japan was not covered by the nuclear umbrella. In fact, as noted earlier, Sato had already taken the initiative in January 1965 to clarify the U.S. commitment to Japan, which formed the modern basis of U.S. extended deterrence visà-vis Japan (Asahi Shimbun 2008). Sato, initially a supporter of Japanese nuclear armament (at least in theory), changed his mind when confronted with Washington’s strong non-proliferation policy and his government’s own internal studies suggesting that reliance on U.S. nuclear arms was the best way forward for Japan. None of the conceivable alternatives, either domestic nuclear weapons production, nuclear sharing with the United States, or overtly denying itself America’s nuclear protection, was considered viable at that time by most Japanese policy makers. This is why Sato subsequently pushed Washington to clarify its commitment to the defense of Japan on several occasions, especially in meetings with President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 and 1967 (Kurosaki 2006). Still, the leaders’ joint statement after their meeting in January 1965 made only oblique reference that “the President reaffirmed the United States’ determination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside” (U.S.-Japan Joint Statement 1965). Little by little, discussion in Japan and between the allies about extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella became more open and more common. The main drivers behind this phenomenon in the mid- to late 1960s included China’s nuclear breakout, the pending 1970 deadline for extending the U.S.-Japan security treaty after its initial, ten-year term, and international debate about the NPT including issues such as deployment of nuclear weapons to NNWS and the security of those states. Combined with other factors, this led to Sato’s announcement of the three non-nuclear principles in 1967, to his articulation of the “four pillars” policy in 1968, and eventually to Japan’s decision to sign the NPT in 1970 (though Japan waited six years before ratifying the treaty). The four-pillars policy was important because it left no doubt about Japan’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The policy identifies the three non-nuclear principles as one pillar, accompanied by three additional pillars: 1) promoting nuclear power for peaceful purposes, 2) promoting global nuclear disarmament, and 3) relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for protection from “the international nuclear threat” (National Diet 1968). With the four pillars policy, one could say that the nuclear umbrella was officially and fully opened (or at least formally recognized as such), and it has remained open ever since. From Japan’s perspective, the umbrella was only meant (ostensibly) to deter a nuclear attack. It was not meant to deter a conventional attack. This was clearly stated whenever the government mentioned the nuclear umbrella in public. 38 From the historical record, it is not clear if that was a commonly held position by the allies, or if one country (or both) believed that nuclear weapons could have a broader deterrence role. In fact, throughout the forty years since the four pillars policy was announced, U.S. and Japanese policy makers and alliance managers have spent little time trying to define in any detail the scope and nature of that umbrella. Today, North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test and a changing U.S. nuclear posture have prompted serious reflection on some of these issues, even if the primary goal is overall alliance strengthening rather than resolving specific nuclear deterrence questions. Japanese scholars themselves have noted that throughout the Cold War Japan rarely discussed or debated extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and only recently have academics and policy makers begun to examine these concepts more closely from a theoretical and 38 Most Japanese government reports (such as Japan’s NDPG FY2005-), reiterate the policy that U.S. nuclear weapons are a deterrent against a nuclear attack on Japan (Defense Agency of Japan 2006, 428), but some have suggested a broader role in deterring other WMD attacks (Council on Security and Defense Capabilities 2004). Targets, Tools, and Trends 27
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Tanaka Akihiko. 1997. Security: A s
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About the Author and the Institute
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