Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of ...

t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
potentially reach Okinawa and Guam, as well as a mobile,
solid-fueled short-range missile (SRBM) that would be very
difficult to intercept (Hildreth 2008). North Korea might
be able to arm its missiles with a variety of warheads (such
as conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological), though
its skill level in the non-conventional areas is questionable.
Although the accuracy of DPRK missiles has been derided
in the past, a battery of test launches in July 2006 suggested
that North Korea has improved its SRBM and MRBM
performance (Bodansky 2006). Besides a missile attack (or
threat of attack), North Korea can also undermine Japanese
security more broadly through nuclear or missile proliferation
to certain countries in the Middle East, such as Iran
and Syria. High-ranking Japanese politicians and officials
have said quite plainly that “North Korea is our greatest
concern [and]…represents a clear threat to the security of
Japan” (Koike 2007).
Keeping up with South Korea
Although South Korea is by no means considered to be
a threat to Japan, the ROK’s military modernization program
is worth mentioning for its possible long-term implications.
This program, launched in 2006, is known as Defense
Reform 2020 for the year by which this intense period
of force and command restructuring is meant to be completed.
Reform 2020 will reduce the size of the ROK military
overall (particularly the army), but strengthen its capabilities
through acquisition of state-of-the-art weapons,
communications, surveillance, and mobility
systems. The reform plan is expected to
be financed at a total cost of over 620 trillion
won (or roughly $640 billion) over a decade
and a half, which is supposed to be achieved
through steady increases in defense spending
at a rate of over 9 percent per annum
between 2006 and 2010, and smaller rates
thereafter. 18
Major ROK acquisitions include up to six
large Aegis-equipped destroyers (the KDX-
III), Asia’s largest amphibious landing and transport vessel
(Dokdo LPH), several three-thousand-ton submarines,
dozens more F-15K fighter jets, and a significantly enhanced
command and control system bolstered by an independent
network of satellites that will allow Seoul to
manage operations thousands of kilometers off peninsula
18 Lower than expected
GDP growth, however,
will likely delay the
original schedule by
some five years or more.
19 U.S. officials estimate
that China’s actual defense
spending was roughly
$60 billion in 2001, and
that it was about $120 billion
in 2008. See U.S. Department
of Defense 2008b
and U.S. House Armed Services
Committee 2008.
(Chosun Ilbo 2007). A new large naval base is planned for
Jeju Island, strategically located at the intersection of the
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Korea Strait (Jung
2007). South Korea is most likely to use these new capabilities
in concert with Japan (either through direct cooperation,
which has arguably strengthened in recent years,
or in conjunction with U.S. forces), but the potential for
competition in the future does not lie far below the surface.
This is subtly (but poignantly) reflected in many of
the names given to these new weapons systems by the
ROK government, celebrating past leaders who fended off
Japanese attacks (such as Jung Ji or King Sejong) or reiterating
a territorial claim (such as Dokdo). The Dokdo issue
in particular soured ROK-Japan relations in 2008, and
Japanese descriptions of these rocky islets as Japan’s own
territory prompted ROK officials to consider cutting off
high-level military exchanges (Jung 2008a).
Much ado about China
Overall, China is the major long-term concern for Japanese
defense planners, diplomats, and politicians. As one Japanese
defense official described it, “China is larger in the
region than the U.S. perceives” (interview 2007b). Another
Japanese diplomat offered, “China today is like Japan in the
1920s…spending twice as much as Japan on military forces,
yet many frailties persist inside its borders…so much is unknown.
China could repeat the mistakes that Japan made
in the 1930s and 1940s, through bad judgment and distorted
perspectives about how the world works…or could be
made to work. Bad things happen on miscalculations.” He
concluded, “The United States is not as worried about China
as it should be…it should demonstrate more concern”
(interview 2007c).
The main source of Japan’s concern is not simply that
China is spending more on defense and modernizing its
forces (though China’s defense budget has roughly doubled
since 2001). 19 It is instead the nature of this modernization
and the relatively quick and substantial investment
in certain capabilities that are steadily eroding the
allies’ ability to dominate the skies and seas around East
Asia as they once could. Moreover, Chinese strategic force
modernization will raise the potential costs to the United
States that U.S. policy makers must weigh when considering
an option of intervening against Chinese interests
on Japan’s behalf. For Japan, it is less a specific sense of
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The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence