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A SERIES OF ARTICLES FRoM THE 2011 EMEA CoMPENSATIoN ...

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<strong>THE</strong> PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE CHALLENGE<br />

The financial crisis that began in late 2007 heightened<br />

the need for remuneration committees to make<br />

discretionary decisions outside the established<br />

annual bonus and LTI plan rules due to flaws in target<br />

setting, unanticipated events and volatility of business<br />

performance. The new, revised, country-specific<br />

corporate governance codes and institutional investor<br />

guidelines in Europe provide that remuneration<br />

committees should no longer rely only on the formulaic<br />

incentive pay outcomes but should instead make<br />

appropriate adjustments to align pay-for-performance<br />

linkages.<br />

The Corporate Governance Code in the Netherlands,<br />

for example, clearly states that if a variable<br />

remuneration component conditionally awarded in<br />

a previous financial year would, in the opinion of the<br />

Supervisory Board, produce an unfair result due to<br />

extraordinary circumstances during the period in<br />

which the predetermined performance criteria have<br />

been or should have been achieved, the Supervisory<br />

Board has the power to adjust the value downwards or<br />

upwards.<br />

In Germany, the Act on the Appropriateness of<br />

Management Board Compensation (VorstAG) that<br />

came into force in 2009 provides that the Supervisory<br />

Board should (previously the word “may” was used)<br />

reduce the Management Board’s compensation to an<br />

appropriate level, if the company’s situation deteriorates<br />

to such an extent that maintaining the previous level<br />

of compensation would be unfair. Therefore, by<br />

incorporating corrective mechanisms and a judgement<br />

element, remuneration committees’ decisions gain<br />

a deeper sense of integrity and reasonableness and<br />

deliver a more comprehensive executive remuneration<br />

message.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

Pay-for-performance analyses are not likely to be<br />

a cure-all, and they won’t eliminate all instances in<br />

which outside groups perceive a disconnect between<br />

performance and rewards. Instead, they are a tool<br />

that should be considered as a supplement to other<br />

best practices that represent sound governance<br />

and process in compensation planning. Paying<br />

for performance, and being perceived to pay for<br />

performance in all situations, can be a significant<br />

challenge. However, using a structured evaluation<br />

process and applying sound judgement and corrective<br />

mechanisms can continually reinforce the alignment of<br />

pay and performance.<br />

Piia Pilv is Mercer’s Executive Rewards Service Segment Leader for <strong>EMEA</strong>.<br />

Based in Amsterdam, she can be reached at +31 20 431 3864 or piia.pilv@mercer.com.<br />

Kimmo Sollo is Mercer’s Human Capital Business Leader in the Nordics.<br />

Based in Espoo, Finland, he can be reached at +358 9 8677 4315 or kimmo.sollo@mercer.com.<br />

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