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15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 219<br />
MATRIMONIAL ASSETS AND THE 3 rd PARTY—<br />
TO START A NEW FIGHT, TO JOIN IN THE FRAY, TO<br />
SPEAK FROM THE SIDELINES, OR TO LIVE IN<br />
BLISSFUL IGNORANCE…<br />
An analysis <strong>of</strong> the jurisdictional and procedural issues<br />
which arise when the matrimonial assets to be divided by<br />
the court in the ancillary matters proceedings subsequent<br />
to a divorce involve 3rd party interests, or potential 3rd<br />
party interests. 1<br />
1 Introduction<br />
1 A newly married couple will usually set up a home together. In<br />
the course <strong>of</strong> their married life, they may buy a car, do renovations to<br />
their house, and make investments in the stock market. They may take<br />
loans to do these things, either from their friends and relatives, or from a<br />
financial institution or company. Together, or separately, they may set up<br />
bank accounts, companies, and business ventures with their friends,<br />
family members or business acquaintances. No man is an island, 2<br />
particularly for the socially and economically successful. The husband<br />
and wife could be connected to many other people, not just emotionally<br />
and socially, but economically. The husband, when fulfilling his role as a<br />
son, nephew, friend, employee, boss, business partner, and so on, may be<br />
involved in significant financial transactions, commitments and<br />
obligations. The same would be true for the wife.<br />
2 When the marriage breaks down and the couple get divorced, the<br />
court then has the task <strong>of</strong> dividing the matrimonial assets between the<br />
couple (“the ancillary matters”). In the course <strong>of</strong> doing this, the court<br />
may find itself faced with the prospect <strong>of</strong> dealing with, and deciding on,<br />
the interests and concerns <strong>of</strong> all the third parties—i.e. all those family<br />
members, friends, business acquaintances and creditors <strong>of</strong> the divorcing<br />
couple who have economic connections with either or both <strong>of</strong> them—in<br />
1<br />
2<br />
The phrase “3rd party” in this article is used to describe all those parties aside from<br />
the husband and wife who claim to have an interest in an asset which is claimed by<br />
either the husband or the wife, or both, to be a matrimonial asset within the meaning<br />
<strong>of</strong> Section 112 (Power <strong>of</strong> court to order division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Women’s Charter (Cap. 353) (“Section 112”). It should not be confused with the<br />
term “third party” which is used to describe a party brought into an action by the<br />
defendant under Order 16 <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court.<br />
John Donne, 1684.
220<br />
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the form <strong>of</strong> joint investments, friendly or commercial loans, monies kept<br />
in a bank account, shareholdings in a company, a piece <strong>of</strong> property, and<br />
so on.<br />
3 For example, the father <strong>of</strong> the husband may claim that the car<br />
which his son is driving is actually his, and not a matrimonial asset<br />
which should be divided by the court. 3 The husband may claim that half<br />
the monies in a particular bank account in both his and his business<br />
partner’s names belong to his business partner, while his wife contends<br />
that the entire contents <strong>of</strong> that bank account actually belong to the<br />
husband. 4 The wife may claim that all the shares in a particular company<br />
which are in the names <strong>of</strong> the husband’s mistress and his two illegitimate<br />
children with her actually belong to the husband. 5 The husband’s mother<br />
may claim that she lent a sum <strong>of</strong> money to the husband and wife to<br />
purchase their matrimonial home, while the wife asserts that this sum<br />
was a gift to herself and her husband, and not a loan. 6<br />
4 For the purposes <strong>of</strong> this article, the person, aside from the<br />
divorcing couple (who shall be termed “the husband and wife”), who:<br />
(i) claims (or on whose behalf it is claimed by the husband and/or<br />
the wife that) an interest in an asset which is claimed by either or<br />
both the husband and wife to be a matrimonial asset; and/or<br />
(ii) claims (or on whose behalf it is claimed by the husband and/or<br />
the wife) to have loaned monies to either or both the husband<br />
and wife, which he expects to be returned to him at some point in<br />
the future<br />
shall be known as the “3 rd party”.<br />
The term “3 rd party issues” shall be used to refer to the issues set out in<br />
paragraphs 4 (i) and (ii) above.<br />
5 Numerous jurisdictional and procedural questions arise in<br />
relation to the 3 rd party and 3 rd party issues:<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
This was the case in Audrey Lee Dawn (m.w.) v Chow Hoo Siong [2003] SGDC 47;<br />
Chow Hoo Siong v Audrey Lee Dawn [2003] SGHC 235<br />
This was the case in Yow Mee Lan (m.w.) v Chen Kai Buan [2000] 4 SLR 466<br />
This was the case in Lam Siew Lan (m.w.) v Lian Tong Looi (unreported, Divorce<br />
Petition No. 1816 <strong>of</strong> 1999)<br />
This was the case in Lee Sew-Iam Richard@Lee Siew Wian v Yeo Siew Keng Lilian<br />
(m.w.) and Another (unreported, Divorce No. 193 <strong>of</strong> 1995)
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 221<br />
(i) Does the court dealing with the ancillary matters also have the<br />
jurisdiction to deal with the 3 rd party issues<br />
(ii) Even if the court had such jurisdiction, can the 3 rd party<br />
nonetheless choose to start his own proceedings in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
3 rd party issues in an ordinary civil court Should such<br />
proceedings be heard together with the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings<br />
(iii) Alternatively, is the 3 rd party allowed to intervene in the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings If so, how does he go about<br />
doing this<br />
(iv) What will happen if the 3 rd<br />
ancillary matters proceedings<br />
party does not intervene in the<br />
(v) If the 3 rd party does intervene in the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings, what procedure should be adopted at the hearing<br />
(i.e. open court hearing with cross-examination <strong>of</strong> all witnesses,<br />
or chambers hearing without cross-examination as <strong>of</strong> right)<br />
(vi) What effect does (a) the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> Judicature (Transfer<br />
<strong>of</strong> Matrimonial, Divorce and Guardianship <strong>of</strong> Infants<br />
Proceedings to District Court) Order (“the Transfer Order”)<br />
(which, inter alia, gave the District Court the jurisdiction to hear<br />
and determine any proceedings under Part X <strong>of</strong> the Women’s<br />
Charter, regardless <strong>of</strong> the monetary amount involved, in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> divorce petitions filed on or after 1 April 1996) and (b) the<br />
Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> Judicature (Transfer <strong>of</strong> Matrimonial, Divorce<br />
and Guardianship <strong>of</strong> Infants Proceedings to District Court) Order<br />
2003 (“the Second Transfer Order”) 7 (which, inter alia, gives<br />
7 Section 2 (Proceedings transferred to District Court) <strong>of</strong> the Transfer Order states:<br />
(1) Any proceedings under—<br />
(2) (a) section 59 and Part X <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353); …<br />
commenced in the High Court on or after 1 st April 1996 shall be transferred to and<br />
be heard and determined by a District Court.<br />
(3) All matters or causes relating to proceedings referred to in sub-paragraph (1)<br />
commenced before 1 st April 1996 shall continue to be heard and determined by the<br />
High Court.<br />
The Second Transfer Order repealed the Transfer Order. The Transfer Order is therefore<br />
only applicable to divorce petitions filed on or after 1 April 1996 and before 15<br />
December 2003. Section 2 (Proceedings Transferred to District Court) <strong>of</strong> the Second<br />
Transfer Order states:<br />
[continued next page]
222<br />
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the District Court the jurisdiction to hear and determine any<br />
proceedings under Part X <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter, save for<br />
contested applications for the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets<br />
where the gross value <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets are asserted by<br />
any party to the proceedings to be worth S$1.5 million or above,<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> divorce petitions filed on or after 15 December<br />
2003) have in relation to all the above questions, if any<br />
6 This article organises and categorises the questions set out<br />
above, in order to provide a framework which can be used to analyse any<br />
situation in which 3 rd party issues arise. It will also put forward the<br />
author’s views on how these questions should be answered, and<br />
illustrates these with examples <strong>of</strong> how the <strong>Singapore</strong>, English and<br />
Malaysian courts have answered such questions in the past.<br />
2 Jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> court hearing ancillary matters to hear<br />
the 3 rd party issue<br />
7 Under Section 112(1) <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353), 8 the<br />
court has the power to order the division between the parties <strong>of</strong> any<br />
matrimonial asset or the sale <strong>of</strong> any such asset and the division between<br />
2. —(1) Subject to paragraph 2(2), any proceedings under —<br />
(a) section 59 and Part X <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353); or<br />
(b) the Guardianship <strong>of</strong> Infants Act (Cap. 122),<br />
commenced in the High Court on or after 15 December 2003 shall be transferred to and<br />
be heard and determined by a District Court.<br />
(2) In matrimonial proceedings under Part X <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter transferred to a<br />
District Court under paragraph (1), where<br />
(a) an application is made for the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets; and<br />
(b) the said application is contested; and<br />
(c) the gross value <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets is asserted by any party to the<br />
proceedings, in the manner required by the Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Subordinate<br />
Courts, to be <strong>of</strong> or above the value <strong>of</strong> $1.5 million,<br />
the proceedings shall, upon the direction <strong>of</strong> the Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Subordinate Courts that<br />
the ancillary issues are ready for hearing, be transferred to and be heard and determined<br />
by the High Court.<br />
(3) In sub-paragraph (2), “gross value <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets” means the total value <strong>of</strong><br />
the assets, disregarding any outstanding liabilities attaching thereto or any personal<br />
liabilities.<br />
8<br />
Section 112(1) (Power <strong>of</strong> court to order division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets) states: The<br />
court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant <strong>of</strong> a decree <strong>of</strong><br />
divorce, judicial separation or nullity <strong>of</strong> marriage, to order the division between the<br />
parties <strong>of</strong> any matrimonial asset or the sale <strong>of</strong> any such asset and the division<br />
between the parties <strong>of</strong> the proceeds <strong>of</strong> the sale <strong>of</strong> any such asset in such proportions<br />
as the court thinks just and equitable.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 223<br />
the parties <strong>of</strong> the proceeds <strong>of</strong> the sale <strong>of</strong> any such asset in such<br />
proportions as the court thinks just and equitable.<br />
8 Does this section give the court dealing with the issue <strong>of</strong> the<br />
division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets the jurisdiction to also deal with 3 rd<br />
party issues, or must a separate civil suit be taken out to deal with the 3 rd<br />
party issues<br />
9 Note: This question is discussed in section 2.1 on the basis that<br />
the civil suit to be taken out in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issues is to be<br />
taken out in a court <strong>of</strong> the same jurisdiction as the court dealing with the<br />
ancillary matters—i.e. either both the civil suit and the ancillary matters<br />
would be heard in the High Court or both the civil suit and the ancillary<br />
matters would be heard in the District Court. The particular jurisdictional<br />
issues which would arise if the civil suit is taken out in the High Court,<br />
but the ancillary matters are being heard in the District Court will be<br />
discussed in section 2.2. For the purposes <strong>of</strong> this article, the term<br />
“Family Court” will be used to refer to the District Court which deals<br />
with the ancillary matters.<br />
2.1 Must a separate civil suit be taken out to deal with the<br />
3rd party issues<br />
2.1.1 Yes—Court dealing with ancillary matters has no<br />
jurisdiction to deal with 3 rd party issue<br />
10 One view is that 3 rd party issues should not be dealt with by the<br />
Family Court, as Section 112 appears only to refer to the parties to the<br />
divorce proceedings (i.e. the husband and wife). On this view, a civil suit<br />
should be taken out to resolve the 3 rd party issues, and, if necessary, the<br />
ancillary matters should be adjourned to await the outcome <strong>of</strong> the civil<br />
suit. This approach was taken by the parties in the case <strong>of</strong> Liu Ah<br />
Moy@Liu Ah Lin (m.w.) v Lim Seck Yeow and Another. 9 In this case, the<br />
husband acquired a property in the names <strong>of</strong> himself and his mistress<br />
during the course <strong>of</strong> the marriage, which property was subsequently sold.<br />
The wife filed a divorce petition in the Family Court on 15 April 1999,<br />
and a decree nisi was granted on 18 August 2000, with the ancillary<br />
matters being adjourned to chambers. The wife then filed an originating<br />
summons in the High Court on 20 April 2001 seeking a declaration that<br />
the husband’s mistress held her half share <strong>of</strong> the said property in trust for<br />
the husband and that the husband’s mistress’ share <strong>of</strong> the sale proceeds<br />
9<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No. 581 <strong>of</strong> 1999
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<strong>of</strong> the said property constituted part <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets subject to<br />
division in the pending matrimonial proceedings (the 3 rd party issue).<br />
When the originating summons came up for hearing, the High Court held<br />
that half <strong>of</strong> the sale proceeds <strong>of</strong> the property should be released to the<br />
husband’s mistress, and that the other half (amounting to $1,072,511.69)<br />
belonged to the husband and formed part <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets. This<br />
sum was to be held by stakeholders until the final disposal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matrimonial proceedings. The Family Court then proceeded to deal with<br />
the division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets (final orders being made on 31<br />
May 2002), giving the wife, inter alia, a 25% share <strong>of</strong> the husband’s<br />
half-share in the sale proceeds, i.e. the $1,072,511.69. It should be noted,<br />
however, that there was no pronouncement by the Family Court that the<br />
Family Court would have had no jurisdiction to deal with the 3 rd party<br />
issue. 10 Only the order in respect <strong>of</strong> maintenance was appealed (and<br />
which was varied by the High Court). No comment was made by the<br />
High Court at the appeal regarding the Family Court’s jurisdiction (or<br />
the lack there<strong>of</strong>) to deal with the 3 rd party issue.<br />
11 In the case <strong>of</strong> Yu Wei Shin v Yong Kim Ying (m.w.), 11 the<br />
husband claimed that certain properties were held by the respondent’s<br />
wife’s brothers on trust, or partially on trust, for him. The wife disputed<br />
this. The court hearing the ancillary matters (the Family Court) did not<br />
deal with this issue, stating that until there was a determination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
parties’ respective right and interest in the properties, they must be<br />
excluded from the pool <strong>of</strong> assets for division. The court ordered that<br />
these properties be held for both the husband and wife in equal shares<br />
should they succeed in claiming them (“order in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd<br />
party issue”). This implies that a civil suit would have to be taken out<br />
by one <strong>of</strong> the parties for a declaration as to whether the properties were<br />
held by the wife’s brothers in trust for the husband or not—and hence<br />
that the court hearing the ancillary matters had no jurisdiction to deal<br />
with the matter. On appeal, the High Court varied certain <strong>of</strong> the orders<br />
made by the Family Court in respect <strong>of</strong> the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial<br />
assets. However, the order in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue was not<br />
varied.<br />
10<br />
11<br />
See Section 2.2 for a discussion on the Family Court’s jurisdiction to deal with 3 rd<br />
party issues involving assets worth more than $250,000.<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No. 663 <strong>of</strong> 2000
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 225<br />
2.1.2 No—Court dealing with the ancillary matters has the<br />
jurisdiction to deal with the 3 rd party issue<br />
12 It is submitted, however, that the better view is that the court<br />
dealing with the issue <strong>of</strong> the division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets should<br />
also have—and does have—the jurisdiction to deal with 3 rd party issues.<br />
This is because the court would naturally have to decide what the<br />
matrimonial asset is first, before being able to make any orders under<br />
Section 112. Deciding the extent <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party’s interests would be<br />
something that must be done in the course <strong>of</strong> deciding what constitute<br />
the matrimonial assets. Such a decision would be more conveniently and<br />
expeditiously decided by the same forum, and therefore should be.<br />
13 The English position appears to support this view. In the English<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Tebbutt v Haynes and another, 12 the court held that on an<br />
application by a spouse under section 24 <strong>of</strong> the Matrimonial Causes Act<br />
1973 for a property adjustment order, 13 the court had the jurisdiction to<br />
determine not only the rights and interests <strong>of</strong> the husband and wife in the<br />
12<br />
13<br />
[1981] 2 All ER 238<br />
Section 24 <strong>of</strong> the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Property adjustment orders in<br />
connection with divorce proceedings, etc.) grants the English court the power to<br />
make property adjustment orders and is the equivalent <strong>of</strong> our Section 112. It is<br />
dissimilar to Section 112, however, in its wording and scope. Section 24(1) states<br />
that:<br />
On granting a decree <strong>of</strong> divorce, a decree <strong>of</strong> nullity <strong>of</strong> marriage or a decree <strong>of</strong> judicial<br />
separation or at any time thereafter (whether, in the case <strong>of</strong> a decree <strong>of</strong> divorce or <strong>of</strong><br />
nullity <strong>of</strong> marriage, before or after the decree is made absolute), the court may make<br />
any one or more <strong>of</strong> the following orders, that is to say—<br />
(a) an order that a party to the marriage shall transfer to the other party, to any<br />
child <strong>of</strong> the family or to such person as may be specified in the order for the<br />
benefit <strong>of</strong> such a child such property as may be so specified, being property to<br />
which the first-mentioned party is entitled, either in possession or reversion;<br />
(b) an order that a settlement <strong>of</strong> such property as may be so specified, being<br />
property to which a party to the marriage is so entitled, be made to the<br />
satisfaction <strong>of</strong> the court for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the other party to the marriage and <strong>of</strong><br />
the children <strong>of</strong> the family or either or any <strong>of</strong> them;<br />
(c) an order varying for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the parties to the marriage and <strong>of</strong> the<br />
children <strong>of</strong> the family or either or any <strong>of</strong> them any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial<br />
settlement (including such a settlement made by will or codicil) made on the<br />
parties to the marriage;<br />
(d) an order extinguishing or reducing the interest <strong>of</strong> either <strong>of</strong> the parties to the<br />
marriage under any such settlement;<br />
subject, however, in the case <strong>of</strong> an order under paragraph (a) above, to the<br />
restrictions imposed by section 29(1) and (3) below on the making <strong>of</strong> orders for a<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> property in favour <strong>of</strong> children who have attained the age <strong>of</strong> eighteen.
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property but also the rights and interests <strong>of</strong> 3 rd parties who had<br />
intervened in the application 14 to claim an interest in the house:<br />
“It is fundamental to the s 24 jurisdiction that the judge should<br />
know over what property he is entitled to exercise his discretion.<br />
If there is a dispute between a respondent spouse and a third<br />
party as to the ownership <strong>of</strong> a particular item <strong>of</strong> property which<br />
stands in the respondent’s name, that dispute must be resolved<br />
before the judge can make an effective final order under s 24.<br />
There are only two ways <strong>of</strong> resolving such a dispute. Either the<br />
Family Division proceedings must be adjourned pending the trial<br />
<strong>of</strong> the claim in other proceedings, or the dispute must be decided<br />
in the s 24 proceedings by allowing the 3rd party to intervene.<br />
The latter course was adopted in the instant case. It has not been<br />
suggested, and I do not think it would be right to suggest, that<br />
the court had no jurisdiction to permit Mrs Tebbutt [the 3 rd party]<br />
to intervene. There could be no purpose in her intervention<br />
except to decide that dispute. I think that in a case like the<br />
present the Family Division has jurisdiction under s 24 to<br />
decide property rights.” (per Brightman LJ at page 245)<br />
(emphasis added)<br />
14 The <strong>Singapore</strong> courts appeared to have adopted a similar<br />
approach, although they have not stated the jurisdictional position as<br />
explicitly as it has been stated in Tebbutt. In the Shi Fang case, supra,<br />
for example, the court at first instance (the High Court) held that shares<br />
in the husband’s name, but which were claimed by the husband’s father<br />
to belong to him, actually belonged to the husband. This aspect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
judgment was not appealed against by the husband. However, at the<br />
appeal hearing, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal expressed the view that the shares<br />
were in fact held on trust by the husband for the father—indicating that if<br />
this issue had been the subject matter <strong>of</strong> an appeal by the husband, the<br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal would have had no reservations in dealing with the<br />
same. In the case <strong>of</strong> Audrey Lee Dawn, supra, the Family Court decided<br />
that the car purchased by the respondent husband’s father (worth<br />
$90,000 at the time <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters hearing) and which he<br />
claimed to be his, actually belonged to the respondent husband. 15 In Yow<br />
14<br />
This case deals with 3 rd parties who had formally intervened to join the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings as parties. See Section 4 below for a discussion in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
scope <strong>of</strong> the court’s jurisdiction in relation to 3 rd parties who do not formally<br />
intervene to join the ancillary matters proceedings.<br />
15 On appeal, the High Court accepted this finding, though it held that as the car was a<br />
gift by the respondent husband’s father to the responasdent, [continued next page]
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 227<br />
Mee Lan, supra, the Family Court found that half the money in two<br />
Malaysian bank accounts in the joint names <strong>of</strong> the respondent husband<br />
and his business partner (amounting to RM 349,837.58) belonged to the<br />
respondent husband. On appeal, the High Court held that the whole <strong>of</strong><br />
this sum belonged to the respondent husband. In the case <strong>of</strong> Krygsman<br />
Juliet Angela (m.w.) v Lee Cung Meng Joseph, 16 the husband claimed<br />
that his stake in a property (Berwick Drive) owned with two <strong>of</strong> his sisters<br />
and a brother-in-law (purchased at the price <strong>of</strong> $1.44 million, and<br />
claimed by the husband not to have changed much in value at the time <strong>of</strong><br />
the ancillary matters hearing) was only $14,400. The Family Court<br />
accepted the husband’s position in this respect. The Family Court’s<br />
decision in the division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets was upheld by the High<br />
Court on appeal, including that aspect <strong>of</strong> its judgment dealing with the<br />
Berwick Drive property. 17<br />
15 The cases cited above support the position that the <strong>Singapore</strong><br />
courts are both willing and able to deal with 3 rd party issues when<br />
dealing with the ancillary matters, in the absence <strong>of</strong> any separate civil<br />
suit being filed regarding the said 3 rd party issues.<br />
2.2 Family court’s jurisdiction to deal with 3 rd party issues<br />
involving amounts or claims <strong>of</strong> over $250,000<br />
16 Under the Transfer Order, the Family Court was given the<br />
jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceedings under Part X <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Women’s Charter, regardless <strong>of</strong> the monetary amount involved, in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> divorce petitions filed on or after 1 April 1996. It applies to all<br />
divorce petitions filed on or after 1 April 1996 and before 15 December<br />
2003. Under the Second Transfer Order, the Family Court is given the<br />
jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceedings under Part X <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Women’s Charter, save for contested applications for the division <strong>of</strong><br />
matrimonial assets where the gross value <strong>of</strong> the assets is asserted by any<br />
party to the proceedings to be $1.5 million or above, in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
divorce petitions filed on or after 15 December 2003. Does this include<br />
3 rd party issues which involve assets worth more than $250,000, since the<br />
jurisidictional limit <strong>of</strong> the District Court is $250,000 18<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
gift by the respondent husband’s father to the respondent, it was not a matrimonial<br />
asset available for division, as there had been no substantial improvement to the car<br />
by the wife or by the wife and husband together during the marriage.<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition 2123 <strong>of</strong> 1999<br />
Lee Chung Meng Joseph v Krygsman [2001] 1 SLR 579<br />
See Section 2(b) (Interpretation) Subordinate Courts Act (Cap. 321)
228<br />
<strong>Singapore</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Journal (2003)<br />
17 One argument against the Family Court having such jurisdiction<br />
is that the Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order were never<br />
meant to give the Family Court the jurisdiction to determine issues and<br />
to make orders which could, in the absence <strong>of</strong> a divorce, only have been<br />
dealt with or made by the High Court. This is because in dealing with<br />
such 3 rd party issues, the principles relevant to ordinary civil proceedings<br />
(concepts such as the resulting trust or constructive trust, for example)<br />
must be applied, and not the principles relevant to the division <strong>of</strong><br />
matrimonial assets set out in the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353). It may be<br />
argued that it would not be appropriate for the Family Court, as a<br />
specialist court in family matters, tasked with applying family law<br />
principles to its cases, to be making decisions and dealing with issues<br />
requiring the application <strong>of</strong> civil principles in those cases where only the<br />
High Court would have had jurisdiction (i.e. those cases involving<br />
amounts or claims <strong>of</strong> over $250,000). On this view, the approach taken<br />
in Liu Ah Moy, supra, should be adopted, i.e. a civil suit must be filed in<br />
the High Court to deal with the 3 rd party issue, before the ancillary<br />
matters are heard in the Family Court.<br />
18 However, it would <strong>of</strong>ten be more convenient, expeditious and<br />
cost-effective for the 3 rd party issues as well as the ancillary matters to be<br />
dealt with by the same forum. Thus, either the High Court should hear<br />
both matters, or the Family Court should. It is submitted that the Transfer<br />
Order and the Second Transfer Order were not intended to automatically<br />
remove this advantage (i.e. <strong>of</strong> having one forum hearing all the relevant<br />
issues) from every single divorce case involving a 3 rd party issue in<br />
relation to amounts or claims worth more than $250,000. Therefore, it is<br />
submitted that a purposive interpretation <strong>of</strong> the Transfer Order and the<br />
Second Transfer Order be adopted: the better view is that the Transfer<br />
Order and the Second Transfer Order were intended to allow the Family<br />
Court to step into the shoes <strong>of</strong> the High Court, in this regard, ie. the<br />
Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order were meant to cover those<br />
situations involving 3 rd party issues even if they are in relation to<br />
amounts or claims worth more than $250,000.<br />
19 There are local authorities to support this view. In Lau Loon<br />
Seng v Sia Peck Eng, 19 the Family Court held that 155,000 shares in a<br />
certain company (<strong>of</strong> which 115,000 were held in the name <strong>of</strong> one 3 rd<br />
party, and 40,000 were registered in the name <strong>of</strong> a second 3 rd party) were<br />
held on trust for the husband. The Family Court ordered that the shares<br />
be valued within two months <strong>of</strong> the date <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters orders,<br />
19<br />
[1999] 4 SLR 408
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 229<br />
thus indicating that the value <strong>of</strong> the shares would not affect the Family<br />
Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the same. The Family Court’s orders<br />
were upheld on appeal to the High Court. In Lam Siew Lan, supra, the<br />
Family Court found that shares in a company (worth $1,668,800) which<br />
were registered in the names <strong>of</strong> the respondent husband’s mistress and<br />
two illegitimate children actually belonged to the husband, and that the<br />
wife should be given 20% <strong>of</strong> the value <strong>of</strong> these shares. This order was<br />
not varied on appeal. In the case <strong>of</strong> Ong Tong Liang v Lim Siew Cheng<br />
Jeanette 20 the Family Court found it suspicious that the respondent<br />
husband had transferred 80% <strong>of</strong> a certain property (the Ivory Heights<br />
apartment) to his mother in October 1997, after he filed a divorce<br />
petition in July 1997. The court held that this was a sham transaction,<br />
designed to keep assets out <strong>of</strong> the reach <strong>of</strong> his family. The full value <strong>of</strong><br />
this asset (at its open market price <strong>of</strong> $550,000) was included in the pool<br />
<strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets available for division. The wife was awarded a<br />
50% share <strong>of</strong> the total pool <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets (worth $1,440,400).<br />
The court ordered that the husband pay the wife the sum <strong>of</strong> $330,000,<br />
being the remainder <strong>of</strong> her share <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets (the<br />
matrimonial home (worth $390,400) was already in the wife’s name.) On<br />
appeal, the High Court varied the order made by the Family Court by<br />
reducing the sum <strong>of</strong> $330,000 to $260,895. 21 However, no comment was<br />
made by the High Court that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to deal<br />
with the 3 rd party issue in this case.<br />
2.3 Side-stepping the jurisdictional question<br />
20 The question <strong>of</strong> whether the court hearing the ancillary matters<br />
has the jurisdiction to deal with 3 rd party issues can be avoided entirely,<br />
however, if the court does not have to decide what the 3 rd party’s share in<br />
the matrimonial asset is.<br />
2.3.1 By agreement<br />
21 If parties come to an agreement on what constitutes the<br />
matrimonial asset, the court will not have to make a decision as to the 3 rd<br />
party’s share <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial asset before deciding what constitutes<br />
the matrimonial asset. 22 For example, in the case <strong>of</strong> Tan Hock Soon v<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No 2208 <strong>of</strong> 1997<br />
No judgment was written by the High Court for this case, nor was an oral judgment<br />
given.<br />
All parties must be a party to the agreement, however, as no consent judgment or<br />
order has any operation against a party not shown to have consented; The Doctrine <strong>of</strong><br />
Res Judicata, Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley (3 rd Ed, 1996), at p. 23, para 41
230<br />
<strong>Singapore</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Journal (2003)<br />
Dolly Chew Jee Kee Neo (m.w.), 23 a matrimonial home (which had a net<br />
worth <strong>of</strong> $913,000 at the time <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters hearing) was<br />
purchased by the husband, wife and their eldest daughter as tenants-incommon<br />
in equal shares. There were disputes as to the exact sums paid<br />
for the property by the husband and the eldest daughter. The husband<br />
took out an originating summons in the High Court to determine the<br />
eldest daughter’s beneficial ownership <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial home, but<br />
subsequently withdrew it on the day <strong>of</strong> the hearing. The eldest daughter<br />
had filed affidavits in the ancillary matters hearing to state her claim <strong>of</strong> a<br />
one-third share <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial home. At the ancillary matters<br />
hearing, however, the parties accepted that the eldest daughter’s share in<br />
the matrimonial home would be one-third, leaving two-thirds <strong>of</strong> the net<br />
value <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial home as matrimonial assets to be divided<br />
between the husband and the wife. There was therefore no need for the<br />
court to decide the value <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial asset to be divided as far as<br />
the matrimonial home was concerned. The appeal in this case was<br />
dismissed by the High Court.<br />
2.3.2 Orders contingent on future litigation<br />
22 The court can also make orders on the basis that another forum<br />
will be dealing with the 3 rd party issue, as was done in the case <strong>of</strong> Yu Wei<br />
Shin, supra. In that case, the court ordered that certain properties in the<br />
names <strong>of</strong> 3 rd parties (the wife’s brothers) be held for both the husband<br />
and wife in equal shares should they succeed in claiming them, without<br />
deciding whether the said properties were indeed held by the 3 rd parties<br />
on trust for the husband and wife. However, as it is submitted that the<br />
court (whether the High Court or the Family Court) has the jurisdiction<br />
to deal with the 3 rd party issues, it is further submitted that the court<br />
dealing with the ancillary matters should decide the 3 rd party issues itself,<br />
unless separate proceedings in respect <strong>of</strong> those 3 rd party issues in another<br />
forum have already been commenced. 24<br />
23 An example <strong>of</strong> how the court can make orders on the basis that<br />
another forum will be dealing with the 3 rd party issue, in a situation<br />
where separate proceedings in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue have already<br />
commenced, is the case <strong>of</strong> Leong Choon Kum (m.w.) v Chia Kin Tuck. 25<br />
The husband in this case had filed a suit in the High Court (OS 554 <strong>of</strong><br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No. 2489 <strong>of</strong> 1997<br />
For a discussion <strong>of</strong> the various courses <strong>of</strong> action the court could take if separate<br />
proceedings are commenced in another forum, see Section 6.<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No. 1621 <strong>of</strong> 1998; appeal in this matter not disposed <strong>of</strong><br />
at the time <strong>of</strong> writing.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 231<br />
2002) against his three siblings. He sought a declaration from the court<br />
that a certain property (the Ringwood bungalow) belonged to the estate<br />
<strong>of</strong> his late mother and that the legal owners (his siblings and himself)<br />
only held the property on trust for the mother’s estate. If the property<br />
belonged to the mother’s estate, the husband’s share would be 50%<br />
under the will <strong>of</strong> the mother. If the property belonged to the legal<br />
owners, the husband would have a one third share in the property. The<br />
court’s decision on whether the property belonged to the mother’s estate<br />
would therefore affect the pool <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets available for<br />
distribution. The High Court suit was still pending at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ancillary matters hearing in the Family Court. The Family Court<br />
nonetheless proceeded to hear the ancillary matters, and to make an<br />
“alternative order”. The wife was given a 15% share <strong>of</strong> the husband’s<br />
one third share <strong>of</strong> the Ringwood bungalow, on the basis that the property<br />
belonged to the legal owners. However, the Family Court went on to<br />
order that in the event that the High Court found that the Ringwood<br />
bungalow belonged to the estate <strong>of</strong> the husband’s mother (thus entitling<br />
the husband to 50% <strong>of</strong> the property), the husband was to pay the wife<br />
15% <strong>of</strong> his additional 16.66% 26 share in the property.<br />
2.3.3 Clearly not a matrimonial asset<br />
24 The court may decide that the asset or part <strong>of</strong> the asset claimed<br />
by the 3 rd party is clearly not a matrimonial asset, without having to<br />
decide the 3 rd party’s share <strong>of</strong> that asset. For example, in the case <strong>of</strong> Goh<br />
Heok Hoon (m.w.) v Ang Kok Keng, 27 the husband claimed that certain<br />
monies in a bank account were held by him on trust for his mother. The<br />
wife claimed that these monies belonged to the husband. She did not<br />
claim that they were a gift from the husband’s mother to her, or to both<br />
her and her husband. After examining the evidence, the Family Court<br />
stated that it was not clear whether the monies were held by the husband<br />
on trust for his mother, or whether the said monies were a gift from his<br />
mother to him, but held that in any event, whether a trust or a gift, they<br />
were not a matrimonial asset, and would not be taken into account in the<br />
division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets. (The appeal by the husband against the<br />
orders on division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets was dismissed.)<br />
25 It is important, therefore, to analyse the claims being made by<br />
each <strong>of</strong> the parties, in order to ascertain whether the court must make a<br />
decision regarding the 3 rd party’s share in the matrimonial asset before<br />
26<br />
27<br />
Which is roughly 50% less 33.33% (the one third share).<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No. 602801 <strong>of</strong> 2001
232<br />
<strong>Singapore</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Journal (2003)<br />
making a decision regarding the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets. If the<br />
court does not have to do so, then the question <strong>of</strong> whether the court has<br />
the jurisdiction to do this does not even arise.<br />
2.4 Loans and liabilities<br />
26 3 rd party issues crop up not just in relation to assets owned<br />
(either beneficially or legally) by the husband and wife, but also in<br />
relation to their loans and liabilities. The 3 rd party may have lent sums <strong>of</strong><br />
money to either or both husband and wife. The 3rd party may be an<br />
institution such as a bank, which may have a mortgage on the<br />
matrimonial home, or an individual such as a relative <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
parties, who has been given no security at all in respect <strong>of</strong> the loan that<br />
he has made. Does the court have jurisdiction to deal with such loans and<br />
liabilities<br />
2.4.1 Court’s jurisdiction to deal with loans between husband<br />
and wife<br />
27 In the High Court case <strong>of</strong> Chong Li Yoon v Soo Yook Thong, 28<br />
the petitioner wife had prayed, inter alia, for the respondent husband to<br />
repay her all the loans and debts incurred by her on his behalf. The court<br />
dismissed this prayer, holding that liabilities and obligations in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
loans and debts are matters in the law <strong>of</strong> contract and quasi-contract<br />
respectively, and not ancillary matters in divorce proceedings. As such,<br />
the court had no jurisdiction to grant an order <strong>of</strong> repayment <strong>of</strong> a loan<br />
between husband and wife in the course <strong>of</strong> matrimonial proceedings and<br />
the aggrieved party should seek redress through a separate civil action.<br />
This approach was not followed, however, in the later High Court case <strong>of</strong><br />
Yeong Swan Ann v Lim Fei Yen (m.w.). 29 In this case, the wife claimed<br />
against the husband during the hearing <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters for a loan<br />
<strong>of</strong> $22,300, which had been given by the wife to the husband during the<br />
marriage. The court ordered the husband to return the loan, on the basis<br />
that it was not in the interests <strong>of</strong> the parties, especially the wife, to allow<br />
“legal niceties” 30 to affect the necessity <strong>of</strong> ordering a clean break<br />
between the parties in respect <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets. If the wife had<br />
to start fresh proceedings to recover the loan, the “clean break” between<br />
the parties would be affected. The High Court’s decision was upheld by<br />
the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, which stated that the sum <strong>of</strong> money (i.e. the loan <strong>of</strong><br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
[1993] 3 SLR 181<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No 1307 <strong>of</strong> 1995<br />
Ibid, per Lai Siu Chiu J, at para 27.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 233<br />
$22,300) “formed part <strong>of</strong> the assets belonging to the parties at the time<br />
the application was made under section 106 [now section 112] to divide<br />
their matrimonial assets and it was thus well within the jurisdiction <strong>of</strong><br />
this court to order the husband to pay this sum <strong>of</strong> money to the wife.” 31<br />
This practical approach is commendable for saving the parties financial<br />
as well as emotional costs. Indeed, the High Court had observed that “the<br />
acrimonious relationship between the parties would not be improved but<br />
would be further exacerbated if the wife was forced to start fresh<br />
proceedings (which she could ill afford) to recover this and the other<br />
amount.” 32<br />
28 It is therefore clear that the court dealing with the ancillary<br />
matters has the jurisdiction to order the repayment <strong>of</strong> loans between the<br />
husband and wife. The Family Court has also exercised its jurisdiction in<br />
this regard. (See the case <strong>of</strong> Lee Geok Mui v Goh Tong Hiang, 33 where<br />
the court ordered the sum <strong>of</strong> $30,000 to be paid by the husband to the<br />
wife, in respect <strong>of</strong> various loans given by the wife to the husband.) 34<br />
2.4.2 Court’s jurisdiction to deal with loans from and liabilities<br />
to 3rd parties 35<br />
29 The question which follows is whether the court has a similar<br />
jurisdiction to deal with loans made by 3 rd parties to either or both the<br />
husband and wife. It is submitted that it does.<br />
30 Under Section 112(2)(b) the court has a duty, when deciding the<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets, to take into account “any<br />
debt owing or obligation incurred or undertaken by either party for their<br />
joint benefit or for the benefit <strong>of</strong> any child <strong>of</strong> the marriage”.<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
Yeong Swann Ann v Lim Fei Yen [1999] 1 SLR 651, per Yong Pung How CJ<br />
Supra note 29, per Lai Siu Chiu J, at para 27<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No 3777 <strong>of</strong> 2000<br />
The appeal in this case was withdrawn.<br />
For the same reasons as set out in Section 2.2 above, it is submitted that the Family<br />
Court has the jurisdiction to deal with loans from or liabilities to 3 rd parties which are<br />
over $250,000. Under Section 112(2), the court has the duty to take into account,<br />
inter alia, the existence and size <strong>of</strong> loans from and liabilities to 3 rd parties before<br />
making a decision on the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets. It would be more<br />
convenient, cost-effective and expedient for the same forum which decides the<br />
division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets to also determine the issue <strong>of</strong> loans from or liabilities<br />
to 3 rd parties.
234<br />
<strong>Singapore</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Journal (2003)<br />
31 The existence and size <strong>of</strong> any debts due by either or both the<br />
husband and wife to 3 rd parties are therefore issues which must be<br />
decided by the court before it makes orders under Section 112. Thus, the<br />
court clearly has the jurisdiction to decide on the existence and size <strong>of</strong><br />
such debts. Does the court only have the jurisdiction to deal with such<br />
debts when they are for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family, however<br />
2.4.2.1 Taking into account “any debt owing or obligation<br />
incurred or undertaken by either party for their joint<br />
benefit or for the benefit <strong>of</strong> any child <strong>of</strong> the marriage”.<br />
(a) How court may deal with loans from and liabilities to 3 rd parties 36<br />
(“the debt”)<br />
32 Once the court has determined that the debt exists, and the size<br />
<strong>of</strong> the debt, it may:<br />
(i)<br />
Decide that the value <strong>of</strong> a particular asset should be reduced,<br />
taking into account the size <strong>of</strong> the debt<br />
33 See, for example, the case <strong>of</strong> Lee Chung Meng Joseph v<br />
Krygsman, supra, where the court calculated the value <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matrimonial home (Jalan Tarum) (valued at $1.2 million) by taking into<br />
account an outstanding housing loan <strong>of</strong> $670,000 and an outstanding<br />
overdraft <strong>of</strong> $150,000. Thus, the net value <strong>of</strong> Jalan Tarum was found to<br />
be $380,000. In the same case, there was also another property which<br />
was purchased by the husband together with his brother-in-law, the<br />
wife’s father and another person. This property was developed into a pair<br />
<strong>of</strong> semi-detached houses, one <strong>of</strong> which was sold. The remaining unit was<br />
valued at $1.75 million. However, the development project as a whole<br />
incurred a loss <strong>of</strong> $682,255, <strong>of</strong> which the husband claimed he would be<br />
liable for a quarter share. The court accepted the husband’s position in<br />
this regard, and included this liability when calculating the pool <strong>of</strong><br />
matrimonial assets.<br />
(ii)<br />
Take the size <strong>of</strong> the debt (which only one party, i.e. either the<br />
husband or the wife, is committed to repaying) into account in<br />
the overall division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets<br />
36<br />
The discussion in this section will proceed on the basis that the court has the power to<br />
make all the orders set out in 2.4.2.1(a)(i)-(iv). Issues as to the court’s power to make<br />
orders in situations where the 3 rd parties have/have not been given notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings or been joined/not been joined as parties to the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings are dealt with in Section 4.4.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 235<br />
34 See, for example, the case <strong>of</strong> Chan Choy Ling v Chua Che<br />
Teck, 37 where the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that the debts incurred by the<br />
wife were substantial, and would have to be paid and discharged by her<br />
(the said debts had been taken out by the wife and consisted <strong>of</strong> a housing<br />
loan from the wife’s employer and a bridging loan from a bank). The<br />
court took this into account in ordering that the wife be allowed to retain<br />
the matrimonial home without any payment to the husband.<br />
(iii)<br />
Order one party to take over the liability to the 3 rd party, and to<br />
take this liability into account in the overall division <strong>of</strong><br />
matrimonial assets<br />
35 See, for example, the case <strong>of</strong> Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet<br />
Bernadette. 38 In this case, a loan was taken from OCBC Finance<br />
<strong>Singapore</strong> Ltd by the husband and wife to purchase the matrimonial<br />
home. This loan consisted <strong>of</strong> a term loan <strong>of</strong> $600,000 and a revolving<br />
credit facility <strong>of</strong> up to $500,000. It was agreed between the husband and<br />
wife that the term loan <strong>of</strong> $600,000 was to be serviced by the husband<br />
and the revolving credit facility <strong>of</strong> up to $500,000 was to be serviced by<br />
the wife. The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal ordered, inter alia, that the husband<br />
should transfer all his estate and interest in the matrimonial home to the<br />
wife, and in consideration <strong>of</strong> this, the wife should pay the husband a<br />
lump sum <strong>of</strong> $1 million and procure the discharge <strong>of</strong> his liability to the<br />
finance company, i.e. taking over the entire liability to the finance<br />
company herself.<br />
36 Also see the case <strong>of</strong> Yuan Hsiang Ping v Phua Gek Hong, 39<br />
where the parties’ liabilities far exceeded their assets, and the court had<br />
to decide upon the division <strong>of</strong> the liabilities as well as the assets. The<br />
Family Court held that there should be no division <strong>of</strong> the husband’s<br />
assets which consisted <strong>of</strong> his car, business, Central Provident Fund<br />
monies and shares held in his name, which were collectively worth<br />
$16,514.21. The Family Court further ordered that the wife was to<br />
transfer her share <strong>of</strong> a property in Malaysia (worth $44,000) to the<br />
husband. However, the husband was to be solely liable for the debts<br />
incurred jointly by the parties, amounting to $218,936.30, as he had<br />
always managed all the family finances. The wife had been a homemaker<br />
for the duration <strong>of</strong> the marriage. (On appeal, the High Court<br />
ordered that the Malaysian property should be sold, and 50% <strong>of</strong> the net<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
[1995] 3 SLR 667<br />
[1997] 2 SLR 27<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition No 2216 <strong>of</strong> 1997
236<br />
<strong>Singapore</strong> <strong>Academy</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Journal (2003)<br />
sale proceeds should be paid to the wife. No judgment was written by the<br />
High Court in the matter.)<br />
37 Another example is the case <strong>of</strong> Ng Kim Seng v Kok Mew Leng. 40<br />
In this case, the High Court had ordered that the matrimonial home be<br />
divided between the wife and the husband in the proportion fourth-fifths<br />
to one-fifth, and that the wife would have the sole discretion either to sell<br />
the matrimonial home to a third party and make payment <strong>of</strong> one-fifth<br />
share <strong>of</strong> the net sale proceeds to the husband, or to retain the matrimonial<br />
home for herself and pay him the sum <strong>of</strong> $144,000. On appeal, the Court<br />
<strong>of</strong> Appeal upheld these orders. However, it further ordered the wife to<br />
repay her father the sum <strong>of</strong> $52,423.44 advanced by him to the husband<br />
and wife for the redemption <strong>of</strong> the mortgage on the matrimonial home.<br />
(iv)<br />
Order one or both parties to repay the loan in full to the 3 rd party<br />
from the sale proceeds <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial asset<br />
38 See, for example, the case <strong>of</strong> Lee Sew Iam Richard@ Lee Siew<br />
Wian v Yeo Siew Keng Lilian (m.w.) and Another, 41 where the husband’s<br />
mother had made a loan <strong>of</strong> $350,041.61 to the couple to purchase a flat.<br />
At the ancillary matters stage, the parties disagreed as to whether the<br />
husband’s mother should be repaid her loan with interest and if so, at<br />
what rate. The High Court ordered that the said flat be sold and that the<br />
husband’s mother’s loan be repaid to her together with interest at 6% per<br />
annum, commencing from the date <strong>of</strong> completion <strong>of</strong> the purchase <strong>of</strong> the<br />
flat up to the date <strong>of</strong> completion <strong>of</strong> the sale, from the sale proceeds <strong>of</strong> the<br />
flat.<br />
(b)<br />
Whether loan from 3 rd party must be for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
39 In the case <strong>of</strong> Ong Tong Liang v Lim Siew Cheng Jeanette,<br />
supra, the debts incurred by the husband were held by the court to be<br />
gambling debts or for the husband’s personal business ventures. The<br />
husband in this case had made little indirect financial contributions to the<br />
family. The court held that these debts, being <strong>of</strong> a personal and business<br />
nature, were not undertaken for the joint benefit <strong>of</strong> the parties, or for the<br />
child <strong>of</strong> the marriage. In the circumstances, they were not debts coming<br />
within the definition <strong>of</strong> section 112(2)(b) and hence were not taken into<br />
account when determining the value <strong>of</strong> the pool <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets. 42<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
[1992] 2 SLR 872<br />
unreported, Divorce No. 193 <strong>of</strong> 1995<br />
The orders made in respect <strong>of</strong> the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets were varied on<br />
appeal, but no judgment was written by the High Court.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 237<br />
40 In contrast, in the case <strong>of</strong> Yuan Hsiang Ping, supra, the court<br />
was <strong>of</strong> the view that the husband had not recklessly speculated in shares<br />
or accumulated debts. The size <strong>of</strong> the parties’ liabilities had its cause in<br />
the untimely crash <strong>of</strong> the stock market and property market in 1998. The<br />
wife knew that her husband invested heavily in the stock and the<br />
property markets to generate income and enable her to maintain a fairly<br />
high standard <strong>of</strong> living, and all loans taken by the husband in this regard<br />
were taken with the wife’s knowledge. The liabilities were therefore<br />
taken into account in deciding the division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets. 43<br />
41 These two cases seem to indicate that the court will only take<br />
into account those debts incurred for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family when<br />
making an order under Section 112, and hence when making any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
orders set out in Section 2.4.2.1(a)(i)-(iv) above. In addition, the<br />
definition <strong>of</strong> what constitutes a debt for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family has also<br />
appeared to have been confined, in the said cases, to those debts which<br />
are undertaken with the intention or purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring assets or<br />
generating income for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family.<br />
42 It is submitted, however, that the better view is that:<br />
(i)<br />
The scope <strong>of</strong> what qualifies as a debt incurred for the benefit <strong>of</strong><br />
the family should be widened, to include those debts which were<br />
not incurred with the intention or purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring assets or<br />
generating income for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family, but which could<br />
have resulted in this. For example:<br />
If a husband buys a $5,000 watch for himself after the date <strong>of</strong> the<br />
marriage (which has appreciated in value to $8,000 by the time<br />
<strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters hearing), and takes a $5,000 loan to do<br />
so, the watch will be considered a matrimonial asset for division,<br />
notwithstanding that it was not bought with the intention <strong>of</strong><br />
benefiting the family. It seems only fair, in that case, that the<br />
$5,000 debt which was taken to purchase the watch should be<br />
taken into account in assessing the value <strong>of</strong> the watch for the<br />
purposes <strong>of</strong> the division. Otherwise, the party who did not<br />
acquire the asset would have the benefit <strong>of</strong> claiming a share in it,<br />
43<br />
On appeal, the Family Court’s order that the wife’s share <strong>of</strong> the Malaysian property<br />
be transferred to the husband was varied, in that the High Court ordered that the said<br />
property was to be sold and that the wife was to be paid half the sale proceeds. All<br />
the other orders made by the Family Court were not varied. No judgment was written<br />
by the High Court in this matter, however.
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at its full value, without having to share in the burden <strong>of</strong> any<br />
loans taken out to acquire it. This would not be equitable.<br />
43 Thus, in the example given above, the wife will be able to obtain<br />
a share <strong>of</strong> the watch, which, after taking into account the $5,000 loan,<br />
will have a net value <strong>of</strong> $3,000. However, if the watch has depreciated in<br />
value to $2000 by the time <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters hearing, then after the<br />
watch is sold, the husband would still have a debt <strong>of</strong> $3,000. Will this<br />
$3,000 debt be taken into account in the division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial<br />
assets After all, the debt was not incurred for the family, but for the<br />
husband’s own purposes—i.e. a watch for himself to wear. Would the<br />
wife have to share in the debt <strong>of</strong> $3,000 if the value <strong>of</strong> the watch<br />
depreciates, in the same way as she would be able to share in the pr<strong>of</strong>it<br />
<strong>of</strong> $3,000 if the value <strong>of</strong> the watch appreciates On the analysis <strong>of</strong> Ong<br />
Tong Liang and Yuan Hsiang Ping set out above, the inference seems to<br />
be that she would not. However, this result seems inequitable to the<br />
husband. It is submitted that the better view is that the wife should share<br />
in the burden as well as the benefit, and that therefore the debt <strong>of</strong> $3,000<br />
should be taken into account as well.<br />
44 In this regard, it is suggested that a distinction may be drawn<br />
between loans taken out to acquire assets (even those considered as<br />
luxuries) or to generate income (business debts, for example) which, if<br />
the assets had some value, and pr<strong>of</strong>it had been made, would have been<br />
included in the pool <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets available for division; and<br />
loans taken out to acquire gifts for third parties (such as the husband’s<br />
mistress) or spent on activities (such as the husband’s overseas holiday<br />
with his mistress) from which the family did not, and could never, expect<br />
to benefit. The former should definitely be taken into account when<br />
making an order under Section 112, and hence when making any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
orders set out in Section 2.4.2.1(a)(i)-(iv) above.<br />
(ii)<br />
The court should also take into account those debts incurred for a<br />
party’s sole benefit, even for those cases where the family did<br />
not, and could never, expect to benefit from the same.<br />
45 Section 112(2) 44 states that the court may take into account “all<br />
the circumstances” <strong>of</strong> the case, and not just the factors listed within that<br />
44<br />
Section 112(2) <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353) states: “It shall be the duty <strong>of</strong> the<br />
court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under subsection (1) and, if so, in<br />
what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case, including the<br />
following matters:<br />
[continued next page]
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 239<br />
section. Thus the court is not confined to taking into account only those<br />
debts taken out for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family, as set out in Section<br />
112(2)(b). It is clear that any loans taken out by a party would have an<br />
impact on firstly, that party’s ability to pay the other party for his/her<br />
share <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets, and/or the amount <strong>of</strong> cash the party<br />
would have in hand/be able to realise after the assets are divided; and<br />
secondly, that party’s ability to maintain his/her own standard <strong>of</strong> living<br />
after the divorce. It is submitted that these are relevant factors to be taken<br />
into account as part <strong>of</strong> “all the circumstances” <strong>of</strong> the case under Section<br />
112(2).<br />
46 Thus, the fact that the debt was incurred for a party’s sole benefit<br />
(in cases where the family did not, and could never, expect to benefit<br />
from the debt) rather than for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family should not<br />
automatically mean that the court has no jurisdiction to make any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
orders set out in Section 2.4.2.1(a)(i)-(iv) above in relation to that debt.<br />
The fact that it was incurred for the party’s sole benefit is merely one <strong>of</strong><br />
the factors to be taken into account in deciding what orders to make in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> that debt.<br />
(c)<br />
Repayment <strong>of</strong> 3 rd party loan from matrimonial assets<br />
47 Of all the orders which the court could make, as set out in<br />
Section 2.4.2.1(a)(i)-(iv) above, the order which would be <strong>of</strong> the greatest<br />
benefit, and the most interest, to a 3 rd party would be the order that he is<br />
to be repaid his debt from the matrimonial assets. In the previous<br />
paragraph, it was submitted that the court hearing the ancillary matters<br />
has the jurisdiction to make orders in relation to liabilities which were<br />
not incurred for the benefit <strong>of</strong>, or which were not incurred with the<br />
intention <strong>of</strong> benefiting, the family. The fact that the said liabilities were<br />
not incurred for the benefit <strong>of</strong>, or with the intention <strong>of</strong> benefiting, the<br />
family is merely one <strong>of</strong> the factors to be taken into account in the making<br />
<strong>of</strong> such orders. The following section explores the balancing exercise<br />
undertaken by the court in this respect:<br />
(a) the extent <strong>of</strong> the contributions made by each party in money, property or work<br />
towards acquiring, improving or maintaining the matrimonial assets;<br />
(b) any debt owing or obligation incurred or undertaken by either party for their joint<br />
benefit or for the benefit <strong>of</strong> any child <strong>of</strong> the marriage;<br />
(c) the needs <strong>of</strong> the children (if any) <strong>of</strong> the marriage….etc.
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Secured Creditors<br />
48 At this juncture, it should be noted that this discussion does not<br />
concern the secured creditor. The secured creditor is assured <strong>of</strong><br />
repayment—from the particular asset which he holds as security for his<br />
loan. He does not need an order from the court dealing with the ancillary<br />
matters in order to recover his loan. Whether the money loaned by the<br />
secured creditor was actually used for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family or not is a<br />
matter about which the husband and wife may be in dispute. The court’s<br />
findings in this regard may affect the orders made in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets. However, such disputes and findings<br />
will not concern nor affect the secured creditor, who will be able to<br />
recover his debt from the particular asset which he holds as security<br />
before it can be divided between the husband and wife.<br />
Unsecured creditors<br />
49 Unsecured creditors would range from judgment creditors who<br />
are institutions—credit card companies, for example, to friends and<br />
relatives who lent the money for a specific purpose (for example, to buy<br />
the matrimonial home, or to pay for the children’s school fees). If the<br />
unsecured creditors are not given an order to be repaid their loans from a<br />
particular asset, or from the pool <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets, then their only<br />
recourse is in commencing proceedings in the civil courts. It is submitted<br />
that a distinction should be drawn between the scenario where the debt<br />
can be linked to a particular matrimonial asset, and when it cannot.<br />
(i)<br />
Where debt can be linked to a particular matrimonial asset<br />
50 Certainly, if the debt to the 3 rd party can be linked to the<br />
acquisition <strong>of</strong> a particular matrimonial asset, that would be a very strong<br />
factor in the 3 rd party’s favour. It is submitted that if such a factor exists,<br />
then the court need not go on to consider any other factors before<br />
ordering that the 3 rd party be repaid his loan from that particular<br />
matrimonial asset. One concern with this approach is that this may place<br />
the 3 rd party in the position <strong>of</strong> a secured creditor when he never had any<br />
security for the loan which he made. However, this can be rationalised<br />
by adopting the High Court’s reasoning in Lee Sew Iam Richard, supra,<br />
where the High Court opined that the 3 rd party lender without security<br />
played the same role vis-à-vis the husband and wife as a secured<br />
creditor, and should therefore be entitled to repayment <strong>of</strong> the loan in the<br />
same way as a secured creditor would.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 241<br />
“Another bone <strong>of</strong> contention between the parties was as to<br />
whether the husband’s mother should be repaid her loan with<br />
interest and if so, at what rate. The first issue was easily disposed<br />
<strong>of</strong> by asking, what would have been the alternative if the mother<br />
had not extended the loan The answer must surely be that the<br />
parties or one <strong>of</strong> them would have had to borrow the required<br />
sum from a financial institution. Why then should there be any<br />
difference when the mother lent the parties the monies drawn<br />
from her overdraft account with DBS Bank… I could see no<br />
distinction between a direct borrowing by the parties from a<br />
bank and indirect borrowing by them through the husband’s<br />
mother; in both instances interest is payable and I held that the<br />
repayment to the husband’s mother should include<br />
reimbursement <strong>of</strong> interest at a lower rate (6%) than what she had<br />
to pay DBS Bank (7%) on her overdraft facility.” (per Lai Siu<br />
Chiu J)<br />
51 It should be noted, in this regard, that the 3 rd party lender who is<br />
not a secured creditor would <strong>of</strong>ten be a close family member or friend <strong>of</strong><br />
the husband and wife. The money would have been lent on the strength<br />
<strong>of</strong> the personal relationship the lender had with either or both the<br />
husband and wife. In this regard, the husband and wife would have<br />
benefited from a loan <strong>of</strong> money, which they may not have been able to<br />
obtain from a commercial source. Even if they had managed to obtain<br />
such a loan from a commercial source, there would <strong>of</strong>ten be no interest<br />
charged in respect <strong>of</strong> the “friendly” loan, and no need to provide any<br />
security. Since both the husband and wife would have benefited from the<br />
3 rd party’s generosity in this respect during the marriage, it seems only<br />
equitable that upon the breakdown <strong>of</strong> the marriage, the 3 rd party should<br />
be repaid the monies he had advanced with interest.<br />
(ii)<br />
Where debt cannot be attributed to any particular matrimonial<br />
asset<br />
52 Where the debt cannot be attributed to any particular<br />
matrimonial asset, the court should consider a whole range <strong>of</strong> factors in<br />
deciding whether to order the 3 rd party to be repaid from the pool <strong>of</strong><br />
matrimonial assets (“the repayment order”).<br />
53 Although the English case <strong>of</strong> Harman v Glencross 45 involves a<br />
discussion <strong>of</strong> legislation <strong>of</strong> which there is no equivalent in <strong>Singapore</strong>, it<br />
45<br />
[1986] 1 All ER 545
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is nonetheless a good illustration <strong>of</strong> the type <strong>of</strong> balancing exercise which<br />
the court may undertake when deciding whether to make an order in<br />
favour <strong>of</strong> a 3 rd party creditor. In this case, the husband’s creditor (in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> his business debts) had obtained a charging order under<br />
Section 1(a) <strong>of</strong> the Charging Orders Act 1979 46 in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
husband’s interest in the matrimonial home. The wife had obtained a<br />
decree nisi before the charging order had been obtained. When the wife<br />
discovered the existence <strong>of</strong> the charging order, she applied for it to be<br />
discharged, or, in any event, not enforced until the hearing <strong>of</strong> her<br />
application for ancillary relief. The registrar ordered that the charging<br />
order was to be subject to any order made in the ancillary proceedings<br />
and further ordered, in the ancillary proceedings, that the husband’s<br />
interest in the matrimonial home was to be transferred to the wife. The<br />
registrar’s order was upheld on appeal by the judge, and subsequently by<br />
the English Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal. It was held that the court had to strike a<br />
balance between “the normal expectation <strong>of</strong> the creditor and the<br />
hardship to the wife and children if an order is made” (per Fox LJ, at<br />
page 562 d-e). The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal discussed various factors which had<br />
been considered by the court below in its decision:<br />
“(1) She had been previously cheated by her husband. The judge<br />
did not expressly decide this issue <strong>of</strong> fact, but in any event it can<br />
have little or no significance when weighed in the balance<br />
against the rights <strong>of</strong> the judgment creditor. (2) She was not a<br />
party to the debt incurred by the husband and never agreed to the<br />
debt being incurred. (3) The judgment creditor could, if he had<br />
wished, have asked for the debt to be made a charge on the<br />
house before he advanced the money. (4) The judgment creditor<br />
was the partner <strong>of</strong> the husband and knew <strong>of</strong> the husband’s wife<br />
and children and home.<br />
Points (2), (3) and (4) are all points which it was legitimate for<br />
the judge to consider…Finally, he considered the point that the<br />
effect <strong>of</strong> a charging order absolute would (on the figures) be to<br />
transfer the whole <strong>of</strong> the husband’s interest in the house to the<br />
judgment creditor, leaving the wife with nothing to claim against<br />
in the divorce proceedings. The judgment creditor, if the<br />
46<br />
There is no equivalent <strong>of</strong> this section in <strong>Singapore</strong>. A creditor in <strong>Singapore</strong> who<br />
wishes to recover his debt may apply for a writ <strong>of</strong> seizure and sale to sell the debtor’s<br />
interest in the immovable property under Order 47 Rule 4 <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court.<br />
However, if the immovable property is in joint names <strong>of</strong> the debtor and another<br />
person, the creditor may only attach and sell the debtor’s share <strong>of</strong> the immovable<br />
property, not the entire immovable property.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 243<br />
charging order absolute were discharged, would still have his<br />
judgment debt. However, since the husband had no assets other<br />
than his share in the house, without a charging order, or some<br />
other method <strong>of</strong> reaching that share (e.g. bankruptcy), that<br />
judgment debt was likely to be worthless. Counsel for the<br />
judgment creditor was justified in saying that this point was<br />
merely restating the problem: on the figures in this case it was all<br />
or nothing.” (per Balcombe LJ at page 558 b-e)<br />
“The court is required, under the 1979 Act, to consider all the<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case. One <strong>of</strong> those circumstances is the<br />
position <strong>of</strong> the creditor; to prevent him recovering his debt<br />
against the only property <strong>of</strong> the debtor which is available may<br />
cause great hardship to him. The creditor has put in no evidence<br />
<strong>of</strong> hardship in the present case, but other cases may be very<br />
different.” (per Fox LJ at page 563 f-g) (emphasis added)<br />
54 On the facts, since the creditor had put in no evidence as to his<br />
circumstances, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that the judge had been entitled<br />
to decide that the hardship to the wife if the charging order was not<br />
varied (in the manner that it was by the registrar) was an overwhelming<br />
factor outweighing the creditor’s interests. 47<br />
55 In the light <strong>of</strong> the foregoing, it is submitted that the factors<br />
which should be included for consideration by the court when deciding<br />
whether to make the repayment order 48 are:<br />
I<br />
Purpose <strong>of</strong> the debt<br />
56 If the debt was taken for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the family, or if it was<br />
taken to acquire assets (even those considered as luxuries) or to generate<br />
income (business debts, for example) which, if the assets had some<br />
value, and pr<strong>of</strong>it had been made, would have been included in the pool <strong>of</strong><br />
matrimonial assets available for division, then that should be a factor in<br />
favour <strong>of</strong> making the repayment order.<br />
II<br />
Other party’s knowledge <strong>of</strong> and consent to the debt<br />
57 If the other party knew <strong>of</strong> and consented to the debt being taken<br />
out, that should be a factor in favour <strong>of</strong> making the repayment order.<br />
47<br />
48<br />
See para (2) <strong>of</strong> the holdings at p. 546.<br />
The list <strong>of</strong> factors is not meant to be exhaustive, but only to highlight the key factors<br />
to be taken into account.
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III Why the 3 rd party did not obtain security for the<br />
debt/Relationship between 3 rd party and the husband<br />
and/or wife<br />
58 If the 3 rd party is a commercial institution and did not obtain<br />
security for the debt, then there is no reason why the court should put<br />
him in the position <strong>of</strong> a secured creditor, as he has not bothered to look<br />
after his own interests, in this regard. It is submitted that the court would<br />
be less reluctant to make the repayment order in respect <strong>of</strong> a 3 rd party<br />
who is an individual, and who seems to have given the loan for reasons<br />
<strong>of</strong> love and affection (for example, the 3 rd party is a close family member<br />
<strong>of</strong> either the husband and wife). This is because the 3 rd party individual<br />
could not have taken the same steps as a commercial creditor to protect<br />
his interests.<br />
IV<br />
V<br />
VI<br />
Hardship to the family if the repayment order is made<br />
Hardship to the 3 rd party if no repayment order is made<br />
Size <strong>of</strong> the debt<br />
59 If there are sufficient matrimonial assets to discharge the debt as<br />
well as to divide between the parties, then the court would be less<br />
reluctant to make the repayment order<br />
VII<br />
Lack <strong>of</strong> full and frank disclosure<br />
60 If the court holds that a party (who has incurred the debt) has<br />
refused to make full and frank disclosure, it may infer that he has<br />
sufficient assets from which to satisfy the debt, and therefore not be<br />
inclined to make the repayment order. As the court in Rayney v Spencer 49<br />
had opined, “The underlying policy in the Charter is not to allow the<br />
husband to deprive the wife and children by diminishing his assets.”<br />
61 Admittedly, the balancing exercise that the court has to<br />
undertake is a difficult one, as each case would turn on its own facts. It is<br />
also not possible to state with any precision the weight that is to be given<br />
to each factor. In this regard, it should be noted that Harman v<br />
Glencross, supra, was cited in Rayney v Spencer, supra, in the context <strong>of</strong><br />
the court’s observation that: “The English courts’ attempts to balance the<br />
49 [1995] 2 SLR 153
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 245<br />
claims <strong>of</strong> a wife against the claims <strong>of</strong> her husband’s creditors are not<br />
free from uncertainty.” (per KS Rajah J)<br />
2.5 Jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> court hearing ancillary matters to deal<br />
with 3 rd party issues<br />
62 In the light <strong>of</strong> the foregoing, it is submitted that:<br />
(1) The court dealing with the ancillary matters upon divorce,<br />
whether it is the High Court or the Family Court, also has the<br />
jurisdiction to deal with any 3 rd party issues which may arise in<br />
relation to the ancillary matters; and<br />
(2) The Family Court has the jurisdiction to deal with 3 rd party<br />
issues involving matrimonial assets or liabilities which are <strong>of</strong> a<br />
sum greater than $250,000<br />
3 Filing a separate civil suit<br />
63 Notwithstanding that the court dealing with the ancillary matters<br />
has the jurisdiction to deal with the 3 rd party issues, does the 3 rd party, or<br />
the husband, or the wife, still have the right to file a civil suit (in the<br />
High Court, District Court or Magistrate’s Court (“the ordinary civil<br />
court”) depending on the size <strong>of</strong> his claim) in respect <strong>of</strong> these issues<br />
after divorce proceedings have commenced<br />
64 It is submitted that the 3 rd party should not be deprived <strong>of</strong> his<br />
right to file a civil suit in the ordinary civil court just because the party<br />
that he lent money to, or entered into a financial transaction with, is<br />
involved in divorce proceedings. This submission is also applicable to<br />
the husband and wife—i.e. that the husband and wife should not be<br />
deprived <strong>of</strong> their right to file a civil suit in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue in<br />
the ordinary civil court just because they happen to be involved in<br />
divorce proceedings at the time that they wish to file the civil suit. These<br />
arguments apply with particular force in the case <strong>of</strong> divorce petitions<br />
filed on or after 1 April 1996 and before 15 December 2003, where, as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> the Transfer Order, the ancillary matters proceedings will be<br />
heard by the Family Court, no matter what the monetary value <strong>of</strong> the<br />
assets or liabilities involved, but a civil suit which is filed in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
the 3 rd party issue involving assets (or liabilities) <strong>of</strong> a sum more than<br />
$250,000 would have to be commenced in the High Court. (The same<br />
arguments would apply in respect <strong>of</strong> divorce petitions filed on or after 15<br />
December 2003, where, as a result <strong>of</strong> the Second Transfer Order, all<br />
ancillary matters proceedings will be heard by the Family Court, unless
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the gross value <strong>of</strong> the assets involved in a contested application for the<br />
division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets is asserted by a party to be $1.5 million or<br />
more.) A party may prefer the High Court to deal with the 3 rd party issue,<br />
notwithstanding that the costs <strong>of</strong> commencing a High Court suit are<br />
greater than the costs <strong>of</strong> joining the Family Court proceedings. It is<br />
submitted that it is unlikely that the Transfer Order and the Second<br />
Transfer Order were intended to automatically deprive a 3 rd party in this<br />
situation <strong>of</strong> his right to have his dispute heard in the High Court.<br />
Moreover, the 3 rd party may not even be aware <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
divorce proceedings at the time that he wishes to make his claim against<br />
the husband and/or the wife.<br />
65 It is submitted, therefore, that the 3 rd party, or the husband, or the<br />
wife, may rightfully file a civil suit in the ordinary civil court. Such a suit<br />
should not be struck out on the grounds that the civil court has no<br />
jurisdiction to hear it. However, whether the civil suit will be:<br />
(1) allowed to continue in the civil court at the same time as the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings;<br />
(2) ordered to be transferred to the court hearing the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings; or<br />
(3) ordered to be stayed until the ancillary matters proceedings are<br />
concluded,<br />
is a separate issue, which will be dealt with in Section 6.<br />
66 If, for example, the 3 rd party files a suit in the ordinary civil court<br />
against the husband claiming that he lent money to that person, or is the<br />
owner or part-owner <strong>of</strong> a matrimonial asset which is in the husband’s<br />
name, the wife should have the right to intervene in that suit, as any<br />
decision made would affect the pool <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets available for<br />
division, and hence affect the interests <strong>of</strong> the wife. Of course, the<br />
principles applied by the court in deciding the case, even if the wife<br />
intervenes in the matter, would be civil principles, and not the principles<br />
set out in the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353). If the wife is not given any<br />
notice <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party’s suit, and judgment is given against the husband,<br />
the wife could apply to set that judgment aside on the grounds that it was<br />
obtained by collusion. Whether this would succeed would depend on all<br />
the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case. But it would appear that in a situation<br />
where the husband had allowed judgment by default to be entered<br />
against him in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party, or had taken a similar position to<br />
that advanced by the 3 rd party at the hearing, which led to a judgment
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 247<br />
being made in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party, then it is submitted that the wife’s<br />
application to set that judgment aside would have a reasonable chance <strong>of</strong><br />
success. 50<br />
4 3 rd party’s involvement in the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings 51<br />
4.1 Reasons for 3 rd party’s involvement in the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings<br />
4.1.1 From the 3 rd party’s perspective<br />
“I was never ruined but twice: once when I lost a lawsuit,<br />
and once when I won one.” (Voltaire (1694-1778))<br />
67 The 3 rd party, particularly an individual, would usually not want<br />
to get involved in the ancillary matters proceedings (or any other<br />
litigation) if he does not have to. Being involved in litigation may mean<br />
having to incur his own legal costs, having to spend time giving<br />
instructions at the lawyer’s <strong>of</strong>fice and attending court, paying party and<br />
party costs, and so on.<br />
68 The reasons that the 3 rd party would still want to be involved in<br />
the ancillary matters proceedings in spite <strong>of</strong> all these potential<br />
disadvantages would be:<br />
(a) To ensure that he will be able to put forward his version <strong>of</strong><br />
events in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3rd party issue, in order to have the<br />
matter decided in his favour; and/or<br />
(b) To ask for orders to be made in his favour, and to be able to<br />
enforce these orders; and/or<br />
50<br />
51<br />
In this regard, see the case <strong>of</strong> Mehaffey v Mehaffey [1905] IR 292, where a third party<br />
was granted leave to set aside a judgment, obtained by collusion between the plaintiff<br />
and defendant (who were husband and wife), which affected his pecuniary interests.<br />
The third party was also given leave to intervene and defend the action in the name <strong>of</strong><br />
the defendant, on giving him a proper indemnity.<br />
Of course, a separate civil suit may be filed in the ordinary civil court by the 3 rd<br />
party, the husband or the wife. This course <strong>of</strong> action has been dealt with in the<br />
previous section. This section focuses on what the 3 rd party can do in relation to the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings, as opposed to what can be done to commence separate<br />
proceedings.
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(c) To be able to appeal any findings or orders made against him;<br />
and/or<br />
(d) If any findings are made in his favour, for this to act as an issue<br />
estoppel, preventing the husband and/or wife from starting or<br />
defending an action comprising the same subject matter in the<br />
future.<br />
4.1.2 From the perspective <strong>of</strong> the husband and wife<br />
69 As far as the husband and wife are concerned, they would<br />
usually not want to involve the 3 rd party in the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings, as it may mean a lengthier hearing, as well as having to<br />
spend extra time and legal costs dealing with the 3 rd party’s evidence,<br />
applications, and legal representatives. The reasons that either the<br />
husband and/or wife would want the 3 rd party to be involved in the<br />
ancillary matters in spite <strong>of</strong> the potential disadvantages would be:<br />
(a) To ensure that the 3 rd party will give evidence in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
3 rd party issue, which will be in accordance with the position that<br />
the husband/wife has taken on that issue; and/or<br />
(b) To ask for orders to be made against the 3 rd party, and to be able<br />
to enforce them against him; and/or<br />
(c) If any findings are made against the 3 rd party, to estop the 3 rd<br />
party from starting or defending an action comprising the same<br />
subject matter in the future.<br />
70 The following question then arises:<br />
To what extent and how must the 3rd party be (a) notified <strong>of</strong> and (b)<br />
involved in the ancillary matters proceedings in order to achieve the<br />
various objectives (as set out in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 above) <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd<br />
party, the husband and wife<br />
4.2 Notice and joining as a party<br />
71 If the 3 rd party is not given due notice <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings (“due notice”), 52 and the husband/wife does not take steps to<br />
join him as a party to the proceedings, he will not be a party to the<br />
52 What constitutes “due notice” is discussed in Section 5.1.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 249<br />
proceedings (“non-party without notice”). If the 3 rd party is given due<br />
notice <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters proceedings, the 3 rd party may choose<br />
either to:<br />
(a) Take no part in the ancillary matters proceedings (“non-party<br />
with notice”)<br />
(b) Join the ancillary matters proceedings as a party (“a party”)<br />
under Order 15 Rule 6 (Misjoinder and nonjoinder <strong>of</strong> parties) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Rules <strong>of</strong> Court 53 (“join/joining as a party”).<br />
4.3 Giving evidence and making findings<br />
4.3.1 Giving evidence<br />
72 It is submitted that whether the 3 rd party is a party to the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings or not, he can still give evidence in the<br />
proceedings. A 3 rd party who is a party to the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings would give evidence in the proceedings for himself.<br />
73 A 3 rd party who is a non-party to the proceedings would give<br />
evidence in the proceedings as a witness for either the husband or the<br />
wife, if he is requested by them to do so. He may also set out his position<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue in his affidavits. Pursuant to this, he may<br />
be cross-examined in court. See, for example, Audrey Lee Dawn, supra,<br />
(respondent husband’s father filed an affidavit and was cross-examined<br />
in court), Lee Sew-Iam Richard, supra (petitioner husband’s mother filed<br />
an affidavit in court), and Kng Poey Choo (m.w.) v Ong Chong Ken<br />
Kenneth and Another 54 (respondent husband’s father filed an affidavit in<br />
court). In none <strong>of</strong> these cases were the 3 rd parties joined as parties to the<br />
proceedings.<br />
4.3.2 Making findings<br />
74 Findings can obviously be made for or against a 3 rd party who is<br />
a party to the ancillary matters proceedings. However, it is also clear that<br />
in family cases the court is prepared to make findings for or against a<br />
non-party to the proceedings, even if he does not give evidence in the<br />
proceedings, or been given due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
53<br />
54<br />
See Section 5.2 for a full discussion <strong>of</strong> Order 15 Rule 6.<br />
[2003] SGDC 83; the respondent wife’s appeal in this case was dismissed on 25<br />
August 2003.
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75 In the case <strong>of</strong> Ong Cheng Leng v Tan Sau Poo, 55 for example, the<br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal reversed findings made by the High Court that it was<br />
the husband and not the 3 rd party who paid for two properties (at Emerald<br />
Hill and Wan Tho) and for two cars which were all solely registered in<br />
the 3 rd party’s name. The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal did not state, however, that the<br />
High Court should not have dealt with this issue without the 3 rd party<br />
being joined as a party or called as a witness for the ancillary matters<br />
hearing. In Lam Siew Lan, supra, the court held that shares registered in<br />
the 3 rd party’s name still belonged to the husband. This was not varied on<br />
appeal. A similar decision was made in Lau Loon Seng, supra. In Yow<br />
Mee Lan, supra, it was held that the monies in two Malaysian bank<br />
accounts in the names <strong>of</strong> the respondent husband and his business<br />
partner belonged solely to the husband. In none <strong>of</strong> these cases does it<br />
appear that the respective 3 rd parties gave evidence in the proceedings, or<br />
were even given due notice <strong>of</strong> them.<br />
76 It is submitted that this approach is a sensible one. This is<br />
because the court would not wish to open the floodgates to 3 rd parties<br />
joining or giving evidence in the family court proceedings. This would<br />
almost inevitably make matters more acrimonious, costly and protracted,<br />
because the 3 rd parties would normally be well known to either or both<br />
the husband and wife, and would usually be aligned to one <strong>of</strong> them.<br />
(“the floodgates to 3 rd parties argument”) This is why the court should<br />
usually leave it to the husband and wife to decide what evidence, and<br />
from whom, they wish to obtain this evidence to support their respective<br />
cases. The court should therefore be slow to insist that a particular 3 rd<br />
party give evidence in the proceedings before making findings in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue, even if these findings are against the 3 rd party. (The<br />
question <strong>of</strong> whether such findings will operate as issue estoppels against<br />
the 3 rd party, however, in any future litigation regarding the same issues,<br />
is dealt with in Section 4.6.)<br />
77 But note: if the court intends to make orders against the 3 rd party,<br />
i.e. orders which will directly affect the 3 rd party’s pecuniary or<br />
proprietary interests, the 3 rd party should be given due notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings and joined as a party to the proceedings (see Section 4.4.<br />
below). If the findings to be made against the 3 rd party are required in<br />
order for such orders against the 3 rd party to be made, it follows that the<br />
3 rd party would have to be given due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings and joined<br />
as a party to the proceedings before such findings are made. This is<br />
because there would be no point in the court making such findings<br />
55 [1993] 3 SLR 137
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 251<br />
against the 3 rd party if the court could not go on to grant the orders<br />
sought against the 3 rd party (i.e. because the 3 rd party had not been given<br />
due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings and/or been joined as a party to the<br />
proceedings).<br />
4.4 Making and enforcing orders for or against the 3rd<br />
party<br />
4.4.1 Types <strong>of</strong> Orders<br />
78 Three types <strong>of</strong> orders can be made in relation to the 3 rd party:<br />
(a) orders directly against the 3 rd party, for example, ordering the 3 rd<br />
party to transfer an asset in his name, or to pay a sum <strong>of</strong> money to the<br />
husband or wife<br />
(b) orders which are directed against the husband and/or wife, but<br />
which directly affect the 3 rd party’s interest<br />
79 See, for example, the case <strong>of</strong> Lim Gwek Quee (m.w.) v Peter<br />
William Cunningham 56 , where the Family Court ordered one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
parties to take steps to wind up the family companies (the 3 rd parties)<br />
rather than making any orders against the 3 rd parties themselves 57 . This<br />
order was not varied on appeal. Also see the case <strong>of</strong> Chee Bong Yeo v<br />
Teo Soon Hoe and Anor 58 . The plaintiff in this case (the 3 rd party) had<br />
applied for the setting aside <strong>of</strong> an order made in the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings which was to the effect that a property registered in the<br />
husband’s name (which the 3 rd party claimed belonged to her) was a<br />
matrimonial asset, and the right, title and interest in the property, or the<br />
proceeds <strong>of</strong> sale there<strong>of</strong>, was to be divided between the husband and<br />
wife in the ratio <strong>of</strong> 60:40.<br />
80 It is suggested that the test laid down in Pegang Mining Co Ltd v<br />
Choon Sam & Ors, 59 which was followed in Pelangi Airways Sdn Bhd v<br />
Mayban Trustees Bhd 60 be adopted when considering whether an order<br />
made by (or sought from) the court falls into this category <strong>of</strong> orders, that<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
60<br />
unreported, Divorce Petition 2399 <strong>of</strong> 1999<br />
Though in this case, the court would, in any event, not have been able to make a<br />
winding up order against any <strong>of</strong> the companies as no winding up proceedings had<br />
been commenced at the time <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters hearing. Moreover, the winding<br />
up proceedings would have to be commenced and heard in the High Court.<br />
unreported, OS No. 239 <strong>of</strong> 1996<br />
[1969] 2 MLJ 52<br />
[2001] 2 MLJ 237
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is: will the intervener’s (i.e. the 3 rd party’s) right against or liabilities to<br />
any party to an action be directly affected by any order made in the<br />
action 61 Or to put it another way, would the order given “directly affect<br />
a third person in his legal rights or in his pocket” 62 One example <strong>of</strong> this<br />
would be a declaration that the sale <strong>of</strong> certain lands to a third party is<br />
null and void—see the case <strong>of</strong> Chang Ching Chuen & Ors v Aik Ming<br />
(M) Sdn Bhd (Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd, Intervener) 63 . In this<br />
case, certain lands were sold to the 3 rd party (i.e. Pekan Nenas Industries<br />
Sdn Bhd) by the defendants, but the registration <strong>of</strong> the transfer <strong>of</strong> the<br />
lands could not be effected as the first plaintiff applied for a declaration<br />
that the said sale was null and void, and obtained an interim injunction<br />
against the transfer until the dispute between the plaintiffs and the<br />
defendants was resolved. The court held that the 3 rd party was entitled to<br />
intervene in the matter on the basis that its interests vis-à-vis the sale <strong>of</strong><br />
the lands would be affected by the declaration sought. This was because<br />
a significant amount <strong>of</strong> the purchase price for the lands had already been<br />
paid by the 3 rd party to the defendants, and the 3 rd party wanted to<br />
register the transfer <strong>of</strong> the lands.<br />
81 Such orders directly affecting the 3 rd party’s interest must be<br />
distinguished from orders made for the division <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets<br />
which take into account certain findings in respect <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue,<br />
but do not directly affect the 3 rd party’s interest. For example, in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Lau Loon Seng, supra, the High Court held that certain shares<br />
registered in the 3 rd parties’ names actually belonged to the husband.<br />
However, no order was made which necessitated the sale or transfer <strong>of</strong><br />
these shares. The court merely ordered the husband to pay the wife the<br />
value <strong>of</strong> her division in the shares. A similar order was made in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Lam Siew Lan, supra. In these two cases, findings were made against<br />
the 3 rd party, but no orders which directly affected their interest. Of<br />
course, if it is the case that the asset registered in the 3 rd party’s name<br />
must be sold in order to satisfy the court order in respect <strong>of</strong> the division<br />
<strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets (for example, because the husband would not<br />
have the funds to pay the wife her share in the asset unless it is sold),<br />
then it would appear that the order for division would operate, albeit<br />
indirectly, as an order directly affecting the 3 rd party’s interest.<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
See para (2) <strong>of</strong> the holdings in the Pelangi Airways case, supra.<br />
per Lord Denning MR in Gurtner v Circuit [1968] 1 All ER 328, at p 332 b-c<br />
[1995] 2 MLJ 43
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 253<br />
(c) orders in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party, for example, ordering the<br />
husband and/or wife to pay the 3 rd party a sum <strong>of</strong> money, or to transfer<br />
an asset in their names to the 3 rd party.<br />
4.4.2 Orders made for or against a party<br />
82 Where a party has intervened in the matter, 64 or been joined as a<br />
party to the proceedings on the court’s own motion, 65 the court is entitled<br />
to make any orders it sees fit in relation to that party. 66 Such orders are<br />
obviously enforceable by any <strong>of</strong> the parties to the proceedings.<br />
4.4.3 Orders made against a non-party<br />
83 The case <strong>of</strong> Razman bin Hashim v South East Asia Insurance<br />
Co. 67 held that it would be a breach <strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> natural justice for<br />
an order to be made against a non-party. In this case, the Malaysian High<br />
Court had held that the driver <strong>of</strong> a motorcar and the deceased rider <strong>of</strong> a<br />
motorcycle who had collided with each other had both been responsible<br />
for injuries to the appellant (the pillion rider on the motorcycle) and<br />
apportioned their liability on a 50:50 basis. The motorcar driver was a<br />
party to the suit, but the motorcycle rider was not, nor was he called as a<br />
witness, since he had died as a result <strong>of</strong> the collision. On appeal, the<br />
court held that the order apportioning liability should not have been<br />
made. It was made in breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice, as the non-party had not<br />
been heard in the matter. Also see the case <strong>of</strong> Soh Lai Chan and Another<br />
v Kuah Peng Hock and Another 68 where the High Court held that it<br />
would be inappropriate to make any order prejudicial to a person who<br />
was not a party to the proceedings. (The plaintiff in this case had urged<br />
the court to declare that the transfer <strong>of</strong> certain shares to the non-party by<br />
the first defendant should be declared void.) In the English case <strong>of</strong> Kalsi<br />
v Kalsi 69 the court held that the court could not issue injunctions against<br />
persons who were not parties before the court, except in very exceptional<br />
circumstances:<br />
“It is only in extremely limited circumstances that persons or<br />
entities who are not parties before the court can be affected by<br />
orders <strong>of</strong> the court. Even in the case <strong>of</strong> a Mareva injunction,<br />
64 As the husband’s aunt and mother did in Tebbutt, supra.<br />
65 See TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra and another [1992] 2 All ER 245<br />
66 See the Holdings at paragraph (1), page 246 <strong>of</strong> TSB Private Bank International, supra.<br />
67 [1995] 2 MLJ 469<br />
68 [2003] SGHC 144<br />
69 [1992] 1 FLR 511
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where third parties to whom notice has been given <strong>of</strong> the<br />
existence <strong>of</strong> the injunction become involved, it is only in a<br />
secondary capacity, i.e. aiding and abetting the breach <strong>of</strong> the<br />
injunction by the party to the action to whom that injunction is<br />
directed. Again, it has always been recognized that there is an<br />
inherent jurisdiction in the court to commit third parties who are<br />
not before it as parties ‘in the case <strong>of</strong> a contempt in the face <strong>of</strong><br />
the court’. Apart from these rare exceptions, the distinction<br />
must be clearly drawn between those authorities which support,<br />
albeit as an interim measure only, ex parte orders against parties<br />
who have been joined in the action by the plaintiff, and those<br />
who are not parties before the court at all.” (per Purchas LJ at<br />
page 520)<br />
84 In accordance with the principle set out in the cases cited above,<br />
none <strong>of</strong> the family cases cited in this article feature orders made directly<br />
against the 3 rd party, i.e. orders which require the 3 rd party to transfer<br />
property, pay sums <strong>of</strong> money, and so on, to any other party in the<br />
proceedings. The court simply does not, and should not, have the power<br />
to make orders directly against a non-party. However, in the cases <strong>of</strong><br />
Peter Cunningham and Chee Bong Yeo, supra, the 3 rd parties were not<br />
given notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, but orders were nonetheless made which<br />
affected their interests directly. It is submitted, however, that the better<br />
view is that the court should not, and cannot, make orders directly<br />
affecting the 3 rd party’s interest, even if these orders are directed against<br />
the husband and/or the wife—as, in effect, these would operate in the<br />
same manner as orders directly against the 3 rd party.<br />
85 Indeed, the Peter Cunningham case can be distinguished on the<br />
basis that the husband and wife in this case were the directors and<br />
shareholders <strong>of</strong> the companies ordered to be wound up. These companies<br />
were therefore the alter egoes <strong>of</strong> the parties to the proceedings. It was<br />
therefore not necessary to give them due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, or to<br />
join them as parties to the same. In the Chee Bong Yeo case, there was<br />
another property registered in the husband’s name in addition to the<br />
property claimed by the 3 rd party, which was also held by the court to be<br />
a matrimonial asset, and which was ordered to be divided between the<br />
parties. It is thus possible that the court dealing with the ancillary matters<br />
was <strong>of</strong> the view that the wife’s share <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial assets could<br />
have been satisfied without the sale <strong>of</strong> the property claimed by the 3 rd<br />
party, and did not seriously contemplate that the property claimed by the<br />
3 rd party might have to be sold in order for the judgment to be satisfied.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 255<br />
4.4.4 Orders made against a non-party with notice<br />
86 If due notice is given <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters proceedings to the<br />
3 rd party, and the 3 rd party does not apply to be joined as a party to the<br />
proceedings, ought this to suffice to enable the court to:<br />
(a) make orders directly against the 3 rd party, and/or<br />
(b) orders directed against the husband and/or wife but which<br />
directly affect the interest <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party (collectively, “orders<br />
against the 3 rd party”)<br />
It is submitted that it should not suffice.<br />
4.4.4.1 Need for clarity in status, rights and duties <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party<br />
87 The purpose <strong>of</strong> making the 3 rd party a party to the proceedings<br />
under Order 15 Rule 6 is to ensure that:<br />
(i) he is aware <strong>of</strong> the exact claims that are being made against him<br />
at each stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings;<br />
(ii) he has the opportunity to assemble documents and instruct<br />
counsel as a party, rather than as a witness in the main dispute<br />
between the husband and wife;<br />
(iii) he is able to participate fully in each stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings by<br />
attending hearings and making submissions in the matter; and<br />
(iv) he is served with all the relevant documents in the proceedings at<br />
each stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
88 As a party, he will be entitled to request for, and to be served, the<br />
documents filed in court by the other parties, to take out discovery<br />
applications against the other parties, and to attend and make<br />
submissions at all hearings. Conversely, the other parties to the<br />
proceedings will be able to request to be served documents filed in court<br />
by the party, apply for discovery against him as a party, and so on. It is<br />
only when the 3 rd party is fully aware <strong>of</strong> the case against him, is updated<br />
on and has the opportunity to be fully involved at each stage <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings, that it would be fair to make orders against the 3 rd party at<br />
the final hearing.
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89 It is arguable that it is possible for a 3 rd party to be one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
“full participants in the battle” 70 although he is not formally made a<br />
party. Thus, it may be argued that if the 3 rd party has received due notice<br />
<strong>of</strong> the proceedings and has full knowledge <strong>of</strong> the same, the court should<br />
be able to make orders against the 3 rd party, even though he has not been<br />
formally made a party.<br />
90 It is submitted, however, that to be a “full participant in the<br />
battle”, not only would the husband and wife have to give him due notice<br />
<strong>of</strong> the proceedings, but they should also treat him as they would any<br />
other party to the proceedings at each subsequent stage <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings. For example, if a fresh affidavit is filed by the wife which<br />
touches on the 3 rd party issue after the 3 rd party is given due notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings, this should be served on the 3 rd party. This is particularly<br />
important for ancillary matters where there are no pleadings, unlike in<br />
ordinary civil cases. The parties’ cases must be gleaned from the<br />
affidavits and affidavits in reply which they file in the weeks or months<br />
preceding the ancillary matters hearing (which may go up to three, four,<br />
five, or even more “rounds”).<br />
91 The danger with the approach <strong>of</strong> assuming that if the 3 rd party is<br />
treated as if he were a “full participant in the battle”, he thus becomes<br />
one (thus enabling the court to make orders against the 3 rd party), is that<br />
it opens the possibility <strong>of</strong> all sorts <strong>of</strong> factual disputes arising regarding<br />
the extent to which the 3 rd party has been given notice and kept informed<br />
<strong>of</strong> the proceedings, how this has been done, and by whom.<br />
92 In the case <strong>of</strong> Kalsi, for example, the wife had taken out an<br />
application to, inter alia, prohibit her husband and his three brothers<br />
from exercising any rights <strong>of</strong> occupation they might have in the<br />
matrimonial home, and that their rights <strong>of</strong> occupation should be<br />
suspended or restricted upon such terms as the court deemed fit. This<br />
application came up for hearing, and was adjourned. The court noted that<br />
there was some doubt as to whether the brothers were present at this<br />
hearing, but it was probable that they were aware <strong>of</strong> the proceedings. At<br />
the adjourned hearing, counsel for the husband indicated that he did not<br />
oppose the application, but informed the judge that he had no<br />
instructions to appear for the brothers. Ultimately, on the judge refusing<br />
to adjourn the matter, and stating that the brothers would have to<br />
represent themselves, it was agreed by the brothers that counsel for the<br />
husband should be instructed by them. After hearing the husband’s<br />
70<br />
per Purchas LJ, in Kalsi, at p 518.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 257<br />
counsel, the judge made an order restraining the brothers from remaining<br />
at, or entering the matrimonial home until an application for ancillary<br />
relief made in the proceedings had been adjudicated upon, or until<br />
further order. None <strong>of</strong> the brothers were parties to the proceedings. The<br />
court observed:<br />
“At the adjourned hearing…the only indication <strong>of</strong> the wife’s<br />
case—namely that based upon an express trust granting her and<br />
her husband exclusive possession—was to be found in the<br />
paragraph in the affidavit to which I have already referred [i.e.<br />
the wife’s affidavit in support <strong>of</strong> her application]. There are no<br />
grounds for being certain that the brothers were aware that this<br />
was the case being made by the wife, or the details upon which<br />
she based her case. There was no evidence that the brothers had<br />
been served with a copy <strong>of</strong> her affidavit. They were not parties to<br />
the application and would only be aware <strong>of</strong> documents, etc by<br />
virtue <strong>of</strong> secondhand information obtained from the<br />
husband…In addition there appears to be some conflict between<br />
the parties as to the stages during which any particular brother<br />
might or might not have been in court.” (per Purchas LJ, at page<br />
518)<br />
93 The court held that the judge should have joined the brothers as<br />
parties to the proceedings, as this would at least have given them a status<br />
before the court which would have made them subject to the court’s<br />
jurisdiction.<br />
94 Thus, it appears that once the 3 rd party is made a party to the<br />
proceedings, his status vis-à-vis the court and the other parties would be<br />
completely clear, as would the rights and duties <strong>of</strong> all the other parties in<br />
relation to the 3 rd party, and vice versa. The situation if he is not made a<br />
party to the proceedings is much more ambiguous.<br />
95 It is therefore submitted that if orders against the 3 rd party are<br />
requested, the appropriate course <strong>of</strong> action to take is to apply to join him<br />
as a party. If this has not been done, then the court should not make<br />
orders against the 3 rd party, no matter what documents have in fact been<br />
served on the 3 rd party, and the extent to which he may already have<br />
participated in the proceedings (for example, by attending ancillary<br />
matters pre-trial conferences, filing witness affidavits, and so on). 71<br />
71<br />
An exception should be made, however, in respect <strong>of</strong> costs awards against the nonparty.<br />
The court may award costs against a non-party inass [continued next page]
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96 It is further submitted that the “floodgates to 3 rd parties”<br />
argument” 72 will not make a difference in this regard, unlike in the case<br />
where mere findings (without orders) are made against the 3 rd party. This<br />
is because when mere findings are made against the 3 rd party, but no<br />
orders are made against him, the 3 rd party can continue his life as normal.<br />
He is not required to do anything, and nothing will be done to him or to<br />
his property or money. However, when orders are made against him, he<br />
must obey them, or go through the trouble <strong>of</strong> setting them aside. The<br />
consequences to the 3 rd party in terms <strong>of</strong> time and costs in doing this are<br />
potentially very serious. The balance is therefore in favour <strong>of</strong> protecting<br />
the 3 rd party’s rights, in this regard.<br />
4.4.5 Orders should not be made against non-party with or<br />
without notice<br />
97 In the light <strong>of</strong> the foregoing, it is submitted that orders against<br />
the 3 rd party should not be made if the 3 rd party is a non-party, whether<br />
with or without notice. If such orders are indeed made, the 3 rd party<br />
should be able to apply to set aside such orders and his application would<br />
be granted as a matter <strong>of</strong> course.<br />
98 Note: There is a regime under Order 15 Rule 13A (Notice <strong>of</strong><br />
action to non-parties) <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court to ensure that non-parties in<br />
relation to certain types <strong>of</strong> proceedings (i.e. estate and trust cases 73 ), who<br />
will or may be affected by the judgment <strong>of</strong> the court, will have the<br />
opportunity to participate in the suit. The rule provides a procedure for,<br />
inter alia, such persons to be notified, for them to become a party to the<br />
action by entering an appearance, and to be bound by any judgment<br />
given in the proceedings if they do not enter appearance. It is submitted,<br />
however, that this rule is not applicable to 3 rd party issues. 74 The mere<br />
fact that such a regime exists in respect <strong>of</strong> certain types <strong>of</strong> proceedings<br />
indicates that for all other proceedings, a non-party is not bound by any<br />
orders made against him.<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
party. The court may award costs against a non-party in circumstances where the<br />
non-party had initiated the action in the name <strong>of</strong> the plaintiff. See The Karting Club<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Singapore</strong> v David Mak & Ors (Wee Soon Kim Anthony, Intervener) [1992] 2 SLR<br />
483.<br />
Set out in Section 4.3.2 above<br />
See Order 15 Rule 13A(6).<br />
In this regard, see the discussion on Order 15 Rule 13A in Section 4.8.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 259<br />
4.4.6 Orders in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party<br />
99 The parties to the proceedings can apply to the court for<br />
whatever orders they wish, including orders in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party.<br />
However, if the 3 rd party is not a party to the proceedings, it is submitted<br />
that he has no locus standi to appear before the court and to ask for any<br />
order to be made in his favour. If he would like to ask for such an order,<br />
he should join the proceedings as a party.<br />
100 However, as the 3 rd party is benefited, rather than prejudiced, by<br />
an order in his favour, the reasons for the principle that he should be<br />
made a party to the proceedings before an order may be made against<br />
him are not applicable. Furthermore, if the 3 rd party issues are dealt with<br />
at the same time as the main ancillary matters issues, all parties would be<br />
saved the time and costs <strong>of</strong> future litigation in the matter. This is<br />
especially important in cases where the 3 rd party is closely connected to<br />
either or both the husband and wife by blood and emotional ties, and<br />
little purpose would be served in drawing them into the litigation<br />
unnecessarily. The “floodgates to 3 rd parties argument” is therefore<br />
applicable to this situation.<br />
101 The courts appeared to have acted in accordance with this<br />
rationale, and made orders in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party even though he was<br />
not a party to the proceedings. Such orders in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party have<br />
been directed against either or both the husband and wife. For example,<br />
in Ng Kim Seng, supra, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal ordered the wife to repay her<br />
father a loan he had advanced the husband and wife to redeem the<br />
mortgage for the matrimonial flat. In Lee Sew-Iam Richard, supra, the<br />
High Court ordered, inter alia, that the husband and wife sell the<br />
matrimonial flat, and repay the husband’s mother her loan from the sale<br />
proceeds.<br />
102 It is submitted that this is the correct approach, for the following<br />
reasons: (a) the 3 rd party benefits from the order, (b) the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings are not unnecessarily protracted by the inclusion <strong>of</strong> an<br />
additional party, and (c) the 3 rd party issue is dealt with. 75<br />
103 However, it is doubtful whether a non-party can enforce orders<br />
made in his favour. 76 It is submitted that the better view is that he may<br />
75<br />
76<br />
Though this will not necessarily guarantee that no future litigation in the matter will<br />
take place—see Section 4.6.<br />
A party can obviously enforce any orders made in the proceedings against any other<br />
party to the proceedings.
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not. After all, he chose not to participate in the proceedings. He was<br />
never at risk <strong>of</strong> having orders made against him. It seems inequitable that<br />
he should benefit from an order made in his favour if he never bore any<br />
risk or burden in the litigation in which that order was made. If he would<br />
like to enforce the order made in his favour, therefore, either the husband<br />
or the wife will have to take steps to enforce the order, and not the 3 rd<br />
party. Alternatively, the 3 rd party could commence a separate civil suit in<br />
the ordinary civil court to try and obtain the same result as the order<br />
made in his favour in the ancillary matters proceedings. 77 The evidence<br />
given in the ancillary matters court may be used in the cross-examination<br />
<strong>of</strong> the witnesses in the civil suit, if they give evidence in the civil suit<br />
which is contrary to the evidence they had given in the ancillary matters<br />
court.<br />
4.5 Right to appeal<br />
104 If findings and orders are made against the 3 rd party, the 3 rd party<br />
may wish to appeal against them. The husband or wife may also wish to<br />
appeal against the court’s decision, in this regard.<br />
4.5.1 Of a party<br />
105 A party to the proceedings clearly has the right to appeal against<br />
any judgment which he feels is not in his favour. For example, in the<br />
English case <strong>of</strong> Perez-Adamson v Perez-Rivas (Barclays Bank plc, third<br />
party), 78 the divorcing wife applied for a property adjustment order under<br />
section 24 <strong>of</strong> the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as well as for an order to<br />
set aside the third party bank’s legal charge over the matrimonial home.<br />
It was the third party bank which appealed against the order <strong>of</strong> the High<br />
Court setting aside the bank’s legal charge over the matrimonial<br />
property, and ordering that the sale proceeds <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial home be<br />
transferred to the wife.<br />
106 It should be noted, however, that a party who allows judgment to<br />
be made against him by default <strong>of</strong> appearance has no right <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
without leave. A wilful failure to participate in the proceedings and<br />
acquiescing to the order would provide grounds for refusal <strong>of</strong> leave. (In<br />
77<br />
As to whether the other party would be estopped from denying the 3 rd<br />
claim—see Section 4.6.<br />
78 [1987] 3 All ER 20<br />
party’s
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 261<br />
this regard, see the case <strong>of</strong> Fairview Schools Bhd v Indrani a/p<br />
Rajaratnam & Ors (No 1) 79 )<br />
4.5.2 Of a non-party without notice<br />
107 A non-party who was not given due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings<br />
may apply to have the original order set aside, and to have a re-trial <strong>of</strong><br />
the matter. This is what happened in the case <strong>of</strong> Kalsi, supra, where it<br />
was held that the 3 rd parties (the husband’s brothers) should have been<br />
joined as parties to the wife’s application to, inter alia, restrict the said<br />
brothers from exercising their rights <strong>of</strong> occupation in the matrimonial<br />
home. The court hearing the application had made a restraining order<br />
against the brothers. One <strong>of</strong> the brothers appealed from the order granted<br />
as an intervener, pursuant to leave granted to him both to intervene and<br />
to appeal out <strong>of</strong> time. The court allowed the appeal and ordered the<br />
wife’s application to be remitted to the English High Court for rehearing,<br />
thus giving the wife the opportunity properly to formulate the nature <strong>of</strong><br />
her claim for relief against the 3 rd parties, and to join them as defendants.<br />
108 The non-party without notice can therefore apply to intervene in<br />
order to appeal against the order made against him, and have the matter<br />
remitted for a re-trial. Leave will be granted to him to do this as a matter<br />
<strong>of</strong> course. In this regard, it should be noted that an application to be<br />
joined as a party under Order 15 Rule 6 may be made after judgment if it<br />
is intended to apply to set the same aside. 80<br />
4.5.3 Of a non-party with notice<br />
109 Will a non-party who was given due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings<br />
but did not apply to join them as a party have the same right to appeal<br />
110 The court in In re Securities Insurance Company 81 had stated, in<br />
relation to a scheme <strong>of</strong> arrangement approved by the court, that a person<br />
who, without being a party, was either bound by the order made by the<br />
court or was aggrieved by it or was prejudicially affected by it, could not<br />
appeal against it without leave. 82 The court went on to add, however, that<br />
79<br />
80<br />
81<br />
82<br />
[1998] 1 MLJ 99<br />
See paragraph 15/6/17 at page 199, <strong>Singapore</strong> Civil Procedure 2003.<br />
[1894] 2 Ch D 410<br />
In this case, a judge had made an order sanctioning a scheme <strong>of</strong> arrangement in a<br />
voluntary winding-up <strong>of</strong> a company. An appeal was filed by persons whose interests<br />
as creditors were affected by the scheme, but who had not opposed the scheme at the<br />
meeting <strong>of</strong> creditors, nor appeared before the judge when his sanction was applied<br />
for, nor obtained leave to appeal. The appeal was dismissed.
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the non-party would not “require much”, 83 and that it would be “very<br />
easy” 84 to obtain leave.<br />
111 The Malaysian Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, however, in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Tradium Sdn Bhd v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin & Anor 85 was <strong>of</strong> the<br />
view that these words, i.e. that the non-party would not “require much”<br />
to obtain leave to appeal, were spoken at a time “when the wide<br />
jurisdiction to permit intervention in all original proceedings now<br />
contained in O 15 r6(2) 86 was absent.” 87 , and held that leave should not<br />
be granted to a non-party to intervene in a case in order to appeal the<br />
decision if he could have applied to be joined as a party at an earlier<br />
stage but failed to do so.<br />
112 It is submitted, however, that the more lenient view expressed in<br />
In re Securities Insurance Company, rather than the strict view in<br />
Tradium should be followed.<br />
113 In the Tradium case 88 , supra, the Malaysia Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal had<br />
observed:<br />
The applicant admittedly did not wish to face an order for costs.<br />
Nevertheless, while enjoying that protection [i.e. <strong>of</strong> being a nonparty],<br />
it attacked the first respondent’s arguments before the<br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
86<br />
87<br />
88<br />
per Lindley LJ, at p 413.<br />
per Kay LJ, at p 414.<br />
[1995] 1 MLJ 668.<br />
This is equivalent to Order 15 Rule 6(2) <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court which allows the court,<br />
either <strong>of</strong> its own motion, or upon application to, inter alia, order any person to be<br />
added as a party to an action.<br />
Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA.<br />
The applicant in this case was a property developer. The plans for one <strong>of</strong> its proposed<br />
developments, although approved by the second respondent, met with opposition<br />
from the first respondent. The first respondent applied to the High Court for leave to<br />
apply for an order <strong>of</strong> certiorari to quash the second respondent’s approval. Although<br />
the grant <strong>of</strong> certiorari would affect the applicant financially, it made no attempt to<br />
intervene to have itself added as a party as it did not wish to face an order for costs in<br />
the event the first respondent succeeded in its application. The applicant had been<br />
served with the relevant papers, although there was no application to join it as a<br />
party. However, it participated in the proceedings and made submissions in the<br />
matter. The High Court then granted the certiorari and quashed the approval. The<br />
second respondent appealed against the decision. The applicant then applied to add<br />
himself as a party to appeal against the decision that was rendered, for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
appealing separately to the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal. This application failed, but the applicant<br />
did not appeal the decision. It then moved the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal by a notice <strong>of</strong> motion,<br />
for inter alia, an order that it be permitted to intervene and take part as an intervener<br />
in the appeal. The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal refused the motion.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 263<br />
judge. In my view, the applicant was no better than a sniper who,<br />
whilst concealed and protected by the foliage in which he hides,<br />
proceeds to take pot-shots at his unsuspecting opponent. He was<br />
not prepared to take on all the risks <strong>of</strong> a full battle and, when the<br />
event went against him, decided to change his role. Ought he to<br />
be permitted to do this I think not: for both principle and<br />
authority are against him. (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA)<br />
114 In Tradium, the 3 rd party appears to have been treated as if he<br />
was a party (by being allowed to make submissions in the proceedings<br />
and having orders made which affected him financially)—except that he<br />
was in an even better position, because as a non-party, he did not have<br />
the risk <strong>of</strong> facing an order for costs. Because it considered that the nonparty<br />
had been in a better position than a party would have been, the<br />
court decided that he could not appeal against the decision made. It is<br />
submitted, however, that the basis <strong>of</strong> this reasoning is flawed, firstly<br />
because the non-party should not have had the locus standi to make<br />
submissions in court and should therefore have been prevented from<br />
taking “pot-shots at his unsuspecting opponent”. The non-party should<br />
never have been placed in a better position than a party. Secondly, no<br />
orders should have been made which affected the non-party’s pecuniary<br />
interests without making him a party to the proceedings first. 89 It is<br />
therefore submitted that the views expressed by the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in<br />
Tradium regarding the non-party’s rights <strong>of</strong> appeal should not be<br />
followed. (Admittedly, in In Re Securities, supra, an order was made<br />
against persons whose interests as creditors were affected by the scheme<br />
<strong>of</strong> arrangement without their being joined as parties. But this may be<br />
explained on the basis that in a company’s winding up situation, there<br />
may be many creditors, and it would not have been practical to join<br />
every single one <strong>of</strong> them as parties before the court was able to approve<br />
the scheme <strong>of</strong> arrangement.) 90<br />
89<br />
90<br />
In this regard, see Sections 4.4.3-4.4.5 above.<br />
Kay LJ had observed in In Re Securities, supra, that the appellants in this case had<br />
the opportunity <strong>of</strong> joining themselves as parties to the proceedings, but failed to do<br />
so, and that in the circumstances, the case was not one in which leave to appeal ought<br />
to be given. It is submitted that this comment should be disregarded firstly on the<br />
basis that it is dicta, since the court was not asked to decide whether the appellants<br />
should be granted leave to appeal, but whether they needed leave to appeal.<br />
Secondly, the comment can be explained on the basis that in a company’s winding up<br />
case, there could potentially be many creditors. It would be commercially unviable if<br />
a scheme <strong>of</strong> arrangement that had been agreed to by those creditors who attended the<br />
creditors’ meeting could be appealed against by any creditor who had notice <strong>of</strong>, but<br />
chose not to, attend the meeting. Thus, for practical reasddons, [continued next page]
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115 In the light <strong>of</strong> the foregoing, it is submitted that although leave is<br />
required before the 3 rd party who is a non-party with notice may<br />
intervene to appeal against the decision made against him, such leave<br />
would be granted quite readily.<br />
4.6 Issue estoppel based on res judicata<br />
4.6.1 In respect <strong>of</strong> a party<br />
116 A party to any legal proceedings will be estopped from bringing<br />
or defending any future action the substance <strong>of</strong> which involves an issue<br />
which has been decided by the court in those legal proceedings—as the<br />
matter would then be res judicata. 91 In this regard, declaratory judgments<br />
may also create a res judicata. 92 A party who intervenes in the<br />
proceedings is considered a party. 93<br />
117 The English case <strong>of</strong> Tebbutt, supra, illustrates the operation <strong>of</strong><br />
the principle <strong>of</strong> issue estoppel based on res judicata. In this case, the<br />
wife filed a divorce petition in the Family Division in October 1973. A<br />
decree nisi was granted in May 1974. She then applied for a property<br />
adjustment order under Section 24 <strong>of</strong> the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.<br />
The husband (who had gone missing from September 1973) had<br />
purchased a property in his name in October 1970. The wife prayed for<br />
the transfer <strong>of</strong> this property to her. At the material time, the husband’s<br />
mother and the husband’s aunt were the occupants <strong>of</strong> this property. The<br />
husband’s aunt had agreed with the husband that although the husband<br />
would be the legal owner <strong>of</strong> the property, the husband’s aunt would be<br />
91<br />
92<br />
93<br />
chose not to, attend the meeting. Thus, for practical reasons, (which would not really<br />
be applicable to non-company’s winding up cases) those creditors who could have<br />
joined themselves as parties to oppose the scheme <strong>of</strong> arrangement, but failed to do so,<br />
should not be allowed to appeal.<br />
See The Doctrine <strong>of</strong> Res Judicata, Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, (3 rd Ed,<br />
1996), at p 4 for a definition <strong>of</strong> res judicata:<br />
“In English law a res judicata is a decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal having<br />
jurisdiction over the cause and the parties which disposes once and for all <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matters decided, so that except on appeal they cannot afterwards be relitigated<br />
between the same parties or their privies....In every case the decision estops or<br />
precludes any party to the litigation or his privies from disputing, against any other<br />
party or his privies, in later litigation, the correctness <strong>of</strong> the earlier decision. The<br />
same claim cannot be raised again between them, and this principle extends to all<br />
matters <strong>of</strong> law and fact which the decision necessarily established as the legal<br />
foundation <strong>of</strong> the conclusion reached by the court.” (Also see pp 88-89, para 182 <strong>of</strong><br />
the same text on the topic <strong>of</strong> Issue Estoppel).<br />
Ibid at p 71, para 159.<br />
Ibid at p 112, para 218.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 265<br />
liable for the mortgage instalments, and when she paid <strong>of</strong>f the mortgage,<br />
would be entitled to call for the transfer <strong>of</strong> the full legal and beneficial<br />
ownership <strong>of</strong> the property to her. On the hearing <strong>of</strong> the wife’s property<br />
adjustment order application, the registrar ordered that notice be given to<br />
the husband’s aunt. Subsequently, leave was given to the husband’s aunt<br />
and the husband’s mother to intervene in the wife’s application, which<br />
they duly did. The husband’s aunt gave evidence at a “very full<br />
hearing” 94 before the registrar, and subsequently at the appeal hearing.<br />
The appeal court found that the wife had no claim to the property except<br />
to the extent that the husband had contributed to its purchase. A few days<br />
before the judgment was given in the appeal, the husband’s aunt issued a<br />
writ in the Chancery Division claiming that she was entitled to an<br />
interest in the property against the husband and wife. The wife put in a<br />
defence and counterclaim. The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that the wife was<br />
estopped from asserting that she was entitled to a share in the equity <strong>of</strong><br />
the house:<br />
The principle involved is that <strong>of</strong> issue estoppel. A person should<br />
not have to fight all over again the selfsame issue that has been<br />
decided before, provided that the party against whom the<br />
estoppel is raised has had a fair and full opportunity to<br />
contest the issue, so that it would not be just to allow him to<br />
reopen the matter in subsequent proceedings. (per Brightman<br />
LJ, supra, at page 244 b-c)<br />
4.6.2 In respect <strong>of</strong> a non-party without notice<br />
118 It appears that only parties to an action are bound by issue<br />
estoppel. 95 A non-party without notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings will not be<br />
bound, as he would not have had a “fair and full opportunity” to contest<br />
the matter.<br />
4.6.3 In respect <strong>of</strong> a non-party with notice<br />
119 But if a non-party was given due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, and<br />
had a “fair and full opportunity” to join the same, but failed to do so,<br />
should he be bound by issue estoppel subsequently<br />
94<br />
95<br />
per Brightman LJ, at p. 243 f-g.<br />
Supra note 91, at p 110.
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120 The case <strong>of</strong> Seah Peng Koon, 96 for example, would seem to<br />
indicate that he should. In this case, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that the<br />
applicant in this case could have intervened in earlier proceedings in<br />
1981 (“the 1981 proceedings”), but chose not to do so. 10 years later, he<br />
started proceedings involving the same issue dealt with in the 1981<br />
proceedings. The court held that he was estopped from challenging the<br />
decision made in the 1981 proceedings, stating that the principle in the<br />
probate division is that where a will is in question, a party who has<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> the proceedings and has a right to intervene, and does not<br />
intervene, is prima facie bound by the result <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
4.6.3.1 Non-party with notice should not be bound by issue<br />
estoppel<br />
121 It is submitted, however, that the better view is that the nonparty<br />
with notice should not be so bound, for the following reasons:<br />
(a) Need for certainty regarding what constitutes a “fair and full<br />
opportunity” to contest the case<br />
122 It is only when the 3 rd party is fully aware <strong>of</strong> the case against<br />
him, is updated on and has the opportunity to be fully involved at each<br />
stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, that it would be equitable for him to be<br />
prevented from re-litigating the same issues which were dealt with in the<br />
proceedings. What, however, constitutes a “fair and full opportunity” to<br />
contest the issue It is submitted that (as in the case where orders are<br />
made against the 3 rd party) not only would the husband and wife have to<br />
give the 3 rd party due notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, but they should also treat<br />
him as they would any other party to the proceedings at each subsequent<br />
stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
123 The kind <strong>of</strong> uncertainties which can arise in this regard are<br />
illustrated by the case <strong>of</strong> Chee Bong Yeo. The plaintiff in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Chee Bong Yeo started proceedings in the High Court to declare that a<br />
certain property (St. Patrick’s Road) was held on trust for her by the first<br />
defendant (who was the husband in the ancillary matters proceedings),<br />
although the court dealing with the ancillary matters had decided that the<br />
husband was in fact the beneficial owner <strong>of</strong> the said property. The<br />
plaintiff claimed to have been ignorant <strong>of</strong> the fact that she might be in<br />
danger <strong>of</strong> losing her property as a result <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings, and that she was not kept informed <strong>of</strong> the progress <strong>of</strong> the<br />
96 [1993] 2 SLR 353
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 267<br />
divorce hearing or the hearing <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters. She was only told<br />
that she might have to give evidence in the ancillary matters proceedings.<br />
However, she contradicted herself several times in court, admitting that<br />
she had been told about the divorce, and even admitting at one stage that<br />
she had been told that the St. Patrick’s Road property might be involved<br />
in the ancillary matters proceedings. The court observed that her<br />
evidence in this regard was “somewhat confused” 97 . (Her application was<br />
eventually dismissed, but not on the grounds <strong>of</strong> issue estoppel.)<br />
124 It is submitted that in order to prevent such uncertainties arising<br />
as to the extent to which the 3 rd party has been given a “full and fair<br />
opportunity” to contest the case, the most appropriate course <strong>of</strong> action to<br />
take is to apply to join him as a party. Once this is done, the 3 rd party’s<br />
status vis-à-vis the court and the other parties would be completely clear,<br />
as would the rights and duties <strong>of</strong> all the other parties in relation to the 3 rd<br />
party, and vice versa. The 3 rd party ought to then be estopped from<br />
relitigating the same issues dealt with in the proceedings to which he is a<br />
party. Conversely, if this has not been done, the 3 rd party should not be<br />
estopped from relitigating these issues, no matter what documents have<br />
in fact been served on him, and the extent to which he may already have<br />
participated in the proceedings (for example, by attending ancillary<br />
matters pre-trial conferences, filing witness affidavits, and so on).<br />
(b) Order 15 Rule 13A 98<br />
125 The same arguments as set out in Section 4.4.5 above are<br />
applicable to issue estoppel, i.e. the fact that a specific provision (in the<br />
form <strong>of</strong> Order 15 Rule 13A <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court) has been created for<br />
certain specific proceedings (i.e. estate and trust cases) to ensure that<br />
non-parties with notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings will be bound by any<br />
judgment given in default <strong>of</strong> their appearance, implies that the non-party<br />
in all other cases should not be so bound, whether with or without notice.<br />
126 The case <strong>of</strong> Seah Peng Koon, supra, can probably be explained<br />
on the basis that it was a probate case, and Order 15 Rule 13A (which is<br />
only applicable for estate and trust cases) was not enacted at the time that<br />
the 1981 proceedings were instituted, nor at the time where the Court <strong>of</strong><br />
97<br />
98<br />
per Judith Prakash J, Chee Bong Yeo, supra at para 20.<br />
See Section 4.8 below for a discussion on the applicability <strong>of</strong> the Order 15 Rule 13A<br />
regime to 3 rd party issues.
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Appeal heard the applicant’s case. 99 It should also be noted that the Court<br />
<strong>of</strong> Appeal’s pronouncement regarding the principle that a party who has<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> the proceedings and has a right to intervene, and does not<br />
intervene, is prima facie bound by the result <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, was<br />
stated to be in respect <strong>of</strong> the probate division, and not any other type <strong>of</strong><br />
case. Thus, it is submitted that the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal was merely filling the<br />
gap which Order 15 Rule 13A now fills, and was not making a general<br />
pronouncement that a non-party with notice would be bound by issue<br />
estoppel.<br />
4.6.3.2 Mutuality <strong>of</strong> estoppels<br />
127 In The Doctrine <strong>of</strong> Res Judicata, supra, it is stated:<br />
“The principle is that res judicata estoppels in civil cases are<br />
mutual, and a party is only bound in favour <strong>of</strong> another if a<br />
contrary decision would have bound him.” 100<br />
128 This means that if the 3 rd party (who is a non-party to the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings) is not bound by issue estoppel, then<br />
neither should the party to the ancillary matters proceedings (“the<br />
original party”) be bound, vis-à-vis the 3 rd party.<br />
129 Thus, if the original party commences fresh proceedings against<br />
the 3 rd party on the same issues which were dealt with in the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings, then the 3 rd party may not raise the defence <strong>of</strong> issue<br />
estoppel against that party based on the judgment given in the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings. For example, the court may hold that half the<br />
beneficial interest in a property registered in the 3 rd party’s name actually<br />
belongs to the husband, and therefore order the husband to pay the wife<br />
the sum <strong>of</strong> $50,000 to represent her share <strong>of</strong> the husband’s share <strong>of</strong> that<br />
property. The husband may subsequently start proceedings against the 3 rd<br />
party claiming a beneficial interest in the whole <strong>of</strong> the property. The 3 rd<br />
party cannot raise an issue estoppel against the husband based on the<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> the court in the ancillary matters proceedings to prevent the<br />
husband from laying a claim to the whole <strong>of</strong> the property, rather than<br />
half <strong>of</strong> it.<br />
99<br />
Order 15 Rule 13A was only introduced in 1997. Note Pinsler’s remarks on it being<br />
an “entirely new provision” (<strong>Singapore</strong> Court Practice 2003, para 15/13A/1, at<br />
p 374).<br />
100 Supra note 91, at pp 110-111.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 269<br />
130 Alternatively, if the 3 rd party commences fresh proceedings<br />
against the original party on the same issues which were dealt with in the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings, and the original party seeks to re-open all<br />
the issues, rather than to abide by the findings made in the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings, the 3 rd party may not raise issue estoppel as a<br />
defence against the original party based on the judgment given in the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings. For example, if the court finds that the 3 rd<br />
party has loaned the sum <strong>of</strong> $50,000 to the husband to purchase the<br />
matrimonial home, and orders this sum to be repaid to the 3 rd party by<br />
the husband, and the husband refuses to pay the 3 rd party, the 3 rd party<br />
may then start proceedings against the husband to recover this sum. The<br />
husband will not be estopped by the judgment <strong>of</strong> the court in the<br />
ancillary matters from disputing the existence as well as the size <strong>of</strong> the<br />
debt.<br />
131 However, in both the scenarios set out above, any evidence<br />
tendered in the ancillary matters proceedings may also be tendered in the<br />
fresh proceedings in the ordinary civil court, and if there is any<br />
contradiction between the evidence given in the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings and the evidence given in the fresh proceedings, the<br />
appropriate adverse inferences may be drawn.<br />
4.7 In practice—for cases where 3 rd party is a non-party<br />
with or without notice<br />
132 In practice, however, it would seem that issues regarding the 3 rd<br />
party’s appeal rights and the question <strong>of</strong> issue estoppel seldom arise,<br />
notwithstanding that the 3 rd party is a non-party with or without notice <strong>of</strong><br />
the ancillary matters proceedings.<br />
133 It is submitted that this is because the 3 rd party would <strong>of</strong>ten be a<br />
friend or relative <strong>of</strong> either the husband or wife, and aligned to that party<br />
(“the original party the 3 rd party is aligned to”).<br />
134 If an order against the 3 rd party (who is a non-party to the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings) is given, the original party that the 3 rd<br />
party is aligned to, will usually be the one to appeal against that order.<br />
Thus, the question <strong>of</strong> whether the 3 rd party has the right to appeal against<br />
that order would normally not arise, nor would there be any future<br />
litigation started by the 3 rd party in the ordinary civil court in the matter.<br />
135 If an order in favour <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party is given, the original party<br />
that the 3 rd party is NOT aligned to will appeal against the order, rather<br />
than start fresh proceedings in the matter. The party against whom that
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order is directed will <strong>of</strong>ten be the party whom the 3 rd party is aligned to.<br />
(In Ng Kim Seng, supra, for example, the wife was ordered to repay her<br />
own father the loan that he gave the husband and wife to purchase the<br />
matrimonial home.) In the light <strong>of</strong> the relationship between the 3 rd party<br />
and the original party the 3 rd party is aligned to, it is unlikely that the 3 rd<br />
party would take legal steps to enforce the order, and that there would be<br />
any future litigation in this regard.<br />
136 Alternatively, the order may be drafted in such a manner that in<br />
practice the husband and/or wife will have no choice but to comply with<br />
it. For example, in the case <strong>of</strong> Lee Sew-Iam Richard, supra, the<br />
matrimonial home was ordered to be sold, and the net proceeds divided<br />
between the parties only after the husband’s mother’s loan was repaid to<br />
her. The solicitors handling the conveyance <strong>of</strong> a property subject to this<br />
type <strong>of</strong> order would ensure that the 3 rd party would be repaid on the day<br />
<strong>of</strong> completion <strong>of</strong> the sale <strong>of</strong> the property.<br />
137 If there are findings made by the ancillary matters court in<br />
favour <strong>of</strong> or against the 3 rd party, but no orders are made for or against<br />
the 3 rd party, then the 3 rd party is not practically affected by the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings. It is the husband and/or the wife who would appeal<br />
against any orders directed against him/her, and not the 3 rd party. In the<br />
light <strong>of</strong> the relationship between the 3 rd party and the original party the<br />
3 rd party is aligned to, as well as considerations <strong>of</strong> time and expense, it is<br />
submitted that future litigation over issues which have already been dealt<br />
with by the ancillary matters court is, in practice, unlikely.<br />
138 In addition, there is the consideration for the original parties and<br />
the 3 rd party that, even though they are not bound by issue estoppel<br />
regarding the 3 rd party issues, the chances <strong>of</strong> the ordinary civil court<br />
making findings which are different from the court hearing the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings may not be high, particularly if the 3 rd party has<br />
given evidence in the ancillary matters proceedings.<br />
4.8 Order 15 Rule 13A<br />
139 Order 15 Rule 13A states:<br />
“(1) At any stage in an action to which this Rule applies, the<br />
Court may, on the application <strong>of</strong> any party or <strong>of</strong> its own motion,<br />
direct that notice <strong>of</strong> the action be served on any person who is<br />
not a party thereto but who will or may be affected by any<br />
judgment given therein.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 271<br />
…<br />
A person may, within 8 days <strong>of</strong> service on him <strong>of</strong> a notice under<br />
this Rule, enter an appearance and shall thereupon become a<br />
party to the action, but in default <strong>of</strong> such appearance and subject<br />
to paragraph (5) he shall be bound by any judgment given in the<br />
action as if he were a party thereto.<br />
If at any time after service <strong>of</strong> such notice on any person the writ<br />
or originating summons is amended so as substantially to alter<br />
the relief claimed, the Court may direct that the judgment shall<br />
not bind such person unless a summons is issued and served<br />
upon him under this Rule.<br />
This Rule applies to any action relating to—<br />
(a)<br />
(b)<br />
the estate <strong>of</strong> a deceased person; or<br />
property subject to a trust.” (emphasis added)<br />
“The rule augments the policy <strong>of</strong> the existing rules to ensure that<br />
all persons who might be affected in estate and trust cases are<br />
given the appropriate notice.” (See <strong>Singapore</strong> Court Practice<br />
2003, Jeffrey Pinsler, at page 374, paragraph 15/13A/1)<br />
(emphasis added)<br />
140 Order 15 Rule 13A(6) states that the rule applies to any action<br />
relating to the estate <strong>of</strong> a deceased person, or to any property subject to a<br />
trust. If the 3 rd party issue concerns a property which is alleged by the<br />
husband or wife to be held on trust for or by the 3 rd party, would the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings—or at least the 3 rd party issue—then fall<br />
under Order 15 Rule 13A 101<br />
141 It is submitted that the plain reading <strong>of</strong> Order 15 Rule 13A(6)<br />
indicates that the rule was intended only to apply to “pure” estate or trust<br />
cases, where the main action is substantially about the estate or trust<br />
property issue, and not to an ancillary matters hearing, where the trust<br />
issue involving the 3 rd party is just a sub-issue <strong>of</strong> the issue <strong>of</strong> the division<br />
<strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets between the husband and wife, which may itself be<br />
101<br />
No explanation <strong>of</strong> the scope <strong>of</strong> the term “action relating to property subject to a<br />
trust” may be found in the relevant sections <strong>of</strong> <strong>Singapore</strong> Civil Procedure 2003 (see<br />
p 227) and <strong>Singapore</strong> Court Practice 2003, Jeffrey Pinsler (see page 374).
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just one <strong>of</strong> the many issues between those two parties. Therefore, Order<br />
15 Rule 13A(6) will not assist in resolving the issues <strong>of</strong> how to give<br />
notice <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters proceedings to the 3 rd party, and whether<br />
he will be bound by any judgment given by the ancillary matters court if<br />
he does not join the proceedings as a party.<br />
4.9 Summary<br />
142 Table 1. provides a summary <strong>of</strong> the issues set out in Sections<br />
4.3-4.6 above.<br />
Table 1.<br />
Status, Rights and<br />
Liabilities <strong>of</strong> 3 rd Party at<br />
the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings<br />
Party<br />
Non-Party without<br />
notice<br />
Non-Party with notice<br />
Whether 3 rd party can give<br />
evidence<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.3.1<br />
Yes. See Section 4.3.1 Yes. See Section 4.3.1<br />
Whether findings can be<br />
made for or against the 3 rd<br />
party<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.3.2<br />
Yes. See Section 4.3.2 Yes. See Section 4.3.2<br />
Whether orders can be<br />
made and enforced against<br />
the 3 rd party<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.4.2<br />
No. See Section 4.4.3<br />
and 4.4.5<br />
No. See Section 4.4.4 and<br />
4.4.5<br />
Whether orders in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
the 3 rd party can be made<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.4.6<br />
Yes, but the 3 rd party<br />
does not have the locus<br />
standi to request for such<br />
orders. Only the parties<br />
to the action do. See<br />
Section 4.4.6<br />
Yes, but the 3 rd party<br />
does not have the locus<br />
standi to request for such<br />
orders. Only the parties to<br />
the action do. See Section<br />
4.4.6<br />
Whether orders in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
the 3 rd party can be<br />
enforced by the 3 rd party<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.4.6<br />
No. See Section 4.4.6 No. See Section 4.4.6<br />
Whether 3 rd party has the<br />
right to appeal against an<br />
order made against him<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.5.1<br />
Leave is required for the<br />
3 rd party to intervene in<br />
order to appeal against<br />
an order made against<br />
him, but it will be<br />
granted as a matter <strong>of</strong><br />
course. See Section 4.5.2<br />
Leave is required for the<br />
3 rd party to intervene in<br />
order to appeal against an<br />
order made against him,<br />
but it will be granted<br />
quite readily. See Section<br />
4.5.3
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 273<br />
Whether the 3 rd party will<br />
be estopped from<br />
commencing future<br />
litigation involving issues<br />
already dealt with by the<br />
ancillary matters court<br />
Yes. See<br />
Section<br />
4.6.1<br />
No. See Section 4.6.2 No. See Section 4.6.3<br />
143 Thus, if the husband and wife are seeking orders against the 3 rd<br />
party, and/or anticipate future litigation (after the ancillary matters court<br />
has decided the matter) regarding the 3 rd party issue, then they should<br />
apply to join him as a party to the action. If they are not seeking such<br />
orders 102 and they do not anticipate such future litigation, then there is no<br />
necessity, from their point <strong>of</strong> view, to have the 3 rd party joined as a party,<br />
or even to give him notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
144 The 3 rd party, on the other hand, would probably want to be<br />
given notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, in order that he may know and<br />
understand the case against him, and decide what further steps he may<br />
wish to take in the matter. He would only want to join the proceedings as<br />
a party, however, if he would like to: (a) ask for orders to be made in his<br />
favour and to be able to enforce them, and (b) have the 3 rd party issue<br />
conclusively dealt with by the Family Court, and to have the same rights<br />
to participate in such proceedings, and to appeal the decision made, as<br />
any other party.<br />
4.10 Court’s role in ordering notice be given to 3 rd party/3 rd<br />
party be joined as a party to the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings<br />
145 In a situation where the husband and wife do not wish to give the<br />
3 rd party notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, or where the 3 rd party has been given<br />
notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, but neither he, the husband nor the wife has<br />
102 The husband and wife may try to avoid seeking orders against the 3 rd party, whilst<br />
still requesting the court to deal with the 3 rd party issue, in the following ways:<br />
(a) Order the value <strong>of</strong> the asset in the 3 rd party’s name, or alleged by the 3 rd party<br />
to be owned by him beneficially, to be taken into account in the division <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matrimonial assets instead <strong>of</strong> seeking an order for the sale <strong>of</strong> that asset (See, for<br />
example, the cases <strong>of</strong> Lau Loon Seng and Lam Siew Lan, supra, discussed in<br />
Section 4.4.1(b) above).<br />
(b) Agree on the extent <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party’s share in the asset, so that the court does<br />
not have to make a decision on the issue. (See Section 2.3.1 above, in this<br />
regard.)
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made an application for the 3 rd<br />
proceedings:<br />
party to be joined as a party to the<br />
When should the court order:<br />
(a) the husband and/or wife to give notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings to the<br />
3 rd party<br />
(b) that the 3 rd party be joined as a party to the proceedings<br />
4.10.1 Giving notice<br />
146 If it is clear that the husband and/or wife are seeking orders<br />
against the 3rd party at the ancillary matters hearing, then the court<br />
should order that the 3rd party be given due notice <strong>of</strong> the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings, in order to allow the 3rd party the opportunity to<br />
apply to be joined as a party <strong>of</strong> his own accord.<br />
147 If orders against the 3rd party are not being sought, the court<br />
then has to balance the following factors:<br />
Factors in favour <strong>of</strong> giving the 3 rd party due notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings<br />
(a)<br />
the requirements <strong>of</strong> natural justice<br />
148 The 3 rd party ought to be notified <strong>of</strong> any matter which would<br />
affect his interests, however indirectly, in such a manner that he will be<br />
able to understand all the issues raised by, and the cases <strong>of</strong>, the<br />
respective parties, and to have the opportunity to participate in the<br />
proceedings as a party if he so wishes. In this regard, the court should<br />
consider:<br />
(i)<br />
Whether the 3 rd party already appears to have knowledge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings<br />
149 For example, if the 3 rd party has already filed witness affidavits<br />
in the proceedings, or written a letter to one <strong>of</strong> the parties indicating that<br />
he is not interested in taking part in the proceedings, this “natural<br />
justice” factor would have less weight.<br />
(ii)<br />
The nature <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party issue
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 275<br />
150 If the 3 rd party issue concerns an asset <strong>of</strong> considerable value, for<br />
example, then it would be more important for the 3 rd party to be notified<br />
<strong>of</strong> the proceedings and/or joined as a party to the same.<br />
(b)<br />
(c)<br />
Avoiding the delay, inconvenience and expense <strong>of</strong> a separate<br />
trial on the 3 rd party issue, by having all matters finally dealt with<br />
in the same forum at the same time, thus saving the court’s as<br />
well as the parties’ resources<br />
Avoiding the danger <strong>of</strong> conflicting decisions which would be<br />
present if there was a separate trial on the 3 rd party issue<br />
151 In respect <strong>of</strong> factors (b) and (c) above, the court should consider<br />
the likelihood <strong>of</strong> future litigation regarding the 3 rd party issue taking<br />
place in the ordinary civil court. The greater the likelihood, the stronger<br />
the reason for notifying the 3 rd party <strong>of</strong> the proceedings and joining him<br />
as a party to the same. In deciding the likelihood <strong>of</strong> future litigation, the<br />
value <strong>of</strong> any asset concerned and whether the husband, wife, and 3 rd<br />
party are high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile/exceptionally litigious parties are relevant factors.<br />
Factor against giving the 3 rd<br />
proceedings<br />
party due notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
(d) the floodgates to 3 rd parties argument (see Section 4.3.2<br />
above)—i.e. an increase in time, expense and acrimony <strong>of</strong><br />
involving 3 rd parties in the proceedings<br />
152 The lesser the value <strong>of</strong> any asset concerned, the stronger this<br />
factor would be.<br />
Neutral factor<br />
(e)<br />
the 3 rd party will not be bound by any order made against him,<br />
nor prevented from litigating the issues in future if he is not duly<br />
notified <strong>of</strong> and/or not made a party to the proceedings (see<br />
Sections 4.4 and 4.6 above)<br />
Guiding principle in respect <strong>of</strong> giving notice<br />
153 It is submitted that where the factors for and against giving<br />
notice to the 3 rd party are evenly balanced, the court should generally<br />
order that notice <strong>of</strong> the proceedings be given to the 3 rd party.
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4.10.2 Joining as a party<br />
154 If it is clear that the husband and/or wife are seeking orders<br />
against the 3 rd party at the ancillary matters hearing, then the court<br />
should order that the 3 rd party be joined as a party to the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings, as orders may not be made against a non-party to the<br />
action. 103<br />
155 The court must balance the following factors when deciding<br />
whether to order, <strong>of</strong> its own motion, that the 3 rd party be joined as a party<br />
to the proceedings when the 3 rd party himself, the husband, and the wife,<br />
have not applied for this to be done:<br />
Factors against joining the 3 rd<br />
proceedings<br />
party as a party to the<br />
156 The same factor as set out in paragraph (d) <strong>of</strong> Section 4.10.1<br />
above (i.e. the floodgates to 3 rd parties argument) would be applicable.<br />
Consequences <strong>of</strong> being a party to litigation<br />
157 Once the 3 rd party is joined as a party to the proceedings, he<br />
would be vulnerable to costs and other orders being made against him.<br />
His credit rating may also be affected by being a party to litigation.<br />
Factors in favour <strong>of</strong> joining the 3 rd party as a party to the<br />
proceedings<br />
158 The factors in favour <strong>of</strong> joining the 3 rd party as a party to the<br />
proceedings would be the same factors set out in paragraphs (a)-(c) <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 4.10.1 above (i.e. the requirements <strong>of</strong> natural justice; avoiding<br />
the delay, expense and inconvenience <strong>of</strong> a separate trial; and<br />
avoiding the danger <strong>of</strong> conflicting decisions).<br />
159 Paragraph (e) <strong>of</strong> Section 4.10.1 would, once again, be a neutral<br />
factor.<br />
Guiding principle in respect <strong>of</strong> joining 3 rd party (when orders<br />
against the 3 rd party are not being sought)<br />
160 If the factors set out above are evenly balanced, the court should<br />
not order the 3 rd party to be joined as a party. This is on the basis that<br />
103<br />
In this regard, see Section 4.4.3-4.4.5 above.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 277<br />
parties should not be compelled to litigate against persons whom they do<br />
not wish to engage in litigation with. In this regard, see the case <strong>of</strong> Tajjul<br />
Ariffin bin Mustafa v Heng Cheng Hong, 104 where the court stated:<br />
“(4) Generally, in common law and chancery matters, a plaintiff<br />
who considers that he has a cause <strong>of</strong> action against a defendant is<br />
entitled to pursue his remedy against that defendant alone and he<br />
cannot be forced to pursue his remedy against other persons who<br />
he has no wish to sue. (See Per Wynn-Perry J in Dollfus Mieg et<br />
Compagnie SA v Bank <strong>of</strong> England.)…<br />
(6)… a defendant against whom no relief is sought by the<br />
plaintiff will generally not be added against the wishes <strong>of</strong> the<br />
latter. (See Hood-Bars v Frampton & Co.).<br />
…he [the plaintiff] should be allowed to proceed against the<br />
defendant <strong>of</strong> his choice…There may be cogent reasons for his<br />
not wanting to proceed against the intended second defendant;<br />
for example the intended second defendant, who is alleged by<br />
the defendant to have been wholly or partly at fault, may be a<br />
friend or next <strong>of</strong> kin <strong>of</strong> the plaintiff, or the joinder may result in<br />
unnecessary prolongation <strong>of</strong> the trial or in the plaintiff having to<br />
shoulder the burden <strong>of</strong> additional costs should he fail against<br />
both the defendants. There may, <strong>of</strong> course, be other reasons.”<br />
(per Edgar Joseph JR SCJ)”<br />
4.10.3 Where 3 rd party/other parties apply for joinder<br />
161 If the 3 rd party himself, after having been given due notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings, applies to join the proceedings, or if either the husband and<br />
wife apply to join the 3 rd party to the proceedings, the test for whether to<br />
allow the appplication will be whether the 3 rd party’s proprietary or<br />
pecuniary rights would be affected by the court’s decision. (See the cases<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pegang Mining, Pelangi Airways, Chang Ching Chuen and Gurtner v<br />
Circuit, supra, discussed in Section 4.4.1(b) above). The factors<br />
discussed in paragraph 4.10.1(a)-(c) would also be relevant.<br />
104<br />
[1993] 2 MLJ 143
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5 Procedure<br />
5.1 Notice<br />
162 What would constitute due notice <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings to the 3 rd party<br />
163 It is submitted that the ancillary matters affidavits filed in court<br />
which contain the husband’s and wife’s respective claims and positions<br />
on the 3 rd party issue should be personally served on the 3 rd party,<br />
together with a covering letter giving a brief summary <strong>of</strong> the claims<br />
being made against the 3 rd party. In the case <strong>of</strong> Kalsi, supra, for example,<br />
the court noted that the only indication <strong>of</strong> the wife’s case was contained<br />
in a paragraph in the supporting affidavit to her application, which<br />
should have been served on the non-parties.<br />
164 If the ancillary matters affidavits have not been drafted yet, then<br />
a letter setting out the husband’s and wife’s respective claims and<br />
positions on the 3 rd party issue should be personally served on the 3 rd<br />
party. This was done in the case <strong>of</strong> Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v<br />
Chang Chin Chuen & Ors and another appeal 105 , where the plaintiffs’<br />
solicitors wrote to the intervener’s solicitors giving them notice <strong>of</strong> an<br />
injunction taken out by the plaintiffs on the sale <strong>of</strong> certain lands to the<br />
intervener and alleging that it was not a bona fide purchaser <strong>of</strong> the same.<br />
165 The covering letters in both the above situations should notify<br />
the 3 rd party <strong>of</strong> the date <strong>of</strong> the next ancillary matters pre-trial conference<br />
in the case, so that the 3 rd party may attend to inform the court <strong>of</strong> his<br />
intentions in respect <strong>of</strong> the case—i.e. whether he will be joining the<br />
proceedings as a party, starting a separate civil suit, and so on.<br />
5.2 Joinder<br />
166 The Women’s Charter (Matrimonial Proceedings) Rules 2003 do<br />
not contain any provisions governing the joinder <strong>of</strong> 3 rd parties. The<br />
relevant rule in the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court to govern the joinder <strong>of</strong> a 3 rd party is<br />
Order 15 Rule 6:<br />
Misjoinder and nonjoinder <strong>of</strong> parties (O. 15, r. 6)<br />
6. —(1) No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason <strong>of</strong> the<br />
misjoinder or nonjoinder <strong>of</strong> any party; and the Court may in any<br />
105<br />
[1995] 2 MLJ 770; related to the case <strong>of</strong> Chang Chin Chuen, supra, discussed at<br />
Section 4.4.1(b) above.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 279<br />
cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so<br />
far as they affect the rights and interests <strong>of</strong> the persons who are<br />
parties to the cause or matter.<br />
(2) Subject to the provisions <strong>of</strong> this Rule, at any stage <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings in any cause or matter, the Court may, on such<br />
terms as it thinks just and either <strong>of</strong> its own motion or on<br />
application —<br />
…<br />
(b) order any or the following persons to be added as a party,<br />
namely:<br />
(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose<br />
presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters<br />
in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely<br />
determined and adjudicated upon; or<br />
(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or<br />
matter there may exist a question or issue arising out <strong>of</strong> or<br />
relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the<br />
cause or matter which in the opinion <strong>of</strong> the Court it would be<br />
just and convenient to determine as between him and that party<br />
as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.<br />
(3) An application by any person for an order under paragraph<br />
(2) adding him as a party must, except with the leave <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Court, be supported by an affidavit showing his interest in the<br />
matters in dispute in the cause or matter or, as the case may be,<br />
the question or issue to be determined as between him and any<br />
party to the cause or matter.<br />
167 Thus, a party may apply to join a 3 rd party to the proceedings by<br />
filing a summons-in-chambers together with a supporting affidavit.<br />
Alternatively, he may make an oral application to do so, or the court may<br />
do so <strong>of</strong> its own motion at the ancillary matters hearing or at an ancillary<br />
matters pre-trial conference. The 3 rd party’s name will then appear in the<br />
title to the action, as in the case <strong>of</strong> Perez-Adamson v Perez-Rivas<br />
(Barclays Bank plc, third party), supra (emphasis added). (See Order 15<br />
Rule 8 (Provisions consequential on making <strong>of</strong> order under Rule 6 or 7)<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court for details on the procedures to be followed once a<br />
person is ordered to be joined as a party under Order 15 Rule 6.)
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5.3 Ancillary matters hearing<br />
168 What procedure should be adopted at the hearing <strong>of</strong> the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings involving 3 rd party issues, where the 3 rd party has<br />
joined the proceedings as a party i.e.<br />
a) An open court trial, with cross-examination as <strong>of</strong> right; or<br />
b) A hearing in chambers, without cross-examination as <strong>of</strong> right<br />
169 If the 3 rd party had taken out a separate civil suit in the ordinary<br />
civil court, he would have had a right to an open court trial, with crossexamination<br />
as <strong>of</strong> right. However, it is submitted that by joining the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings, the 3 rd party is taken to have consented to<br />
following the same hearing procedures as for all family cases, where, as<br />
a matter <strong>of</strong> practice, the ancillary matters are adjourned to chambers for<br />
hearing.<br />
170 In this regard, it should be noted that family disputes do not<br />
seem to be treated in the same way as civil cases, where crossexamination<br />
is an automatic right. Applications under Section 59<br />
(Questions between husband and wife as to property to be decided in<br />
summary way) <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353), and the<br />
Guardianship <strong>of</strong> Infants Act, are by way <strong>of</strong> originating summons. The<br />
matters are heard in chambers, and the evidence is usually given by way<br />
<strong>of</strong> affidavits <strong>of</strong> evidence-in-chief and affidavits in reply. It seems to be a<br />
matter <strong>of</strong> policy that family disputes should be heard in chambers where<br />
all the evidence is usually tendered by way <strong>of</strong> affidavit, rather than in<br />
open court trials where witnesses take the stand. This may be to protect<br />
the privacy <strong>of</strong> the parties, as well as to save them time and costs.<br />
171 As the 3 rd parties to the proceedings are <strong>of</strong>ten closely connected<br />
to the husband and/or wife socially and emotionally, and/or related to<br />
either or both <strong>of</strong> them, it is submitted that the same policy regarding the<br />
protection <strong>of</strong> the parties’ privacy and the saving <strong>of</strong> time and costs should<br />
be extended to those ancillary matters hearings involving 3 rd party issues,<br />
where the 3 rd party has joined the proceedings as a party, i.e. such<br />
hearings should be done in chambers, without cross-examination as <strong>of</strong><br />
right.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 281<br />
6 Where separate civil suit is filed, which court to hear<br />
the 3rd party issue<br />
172 If the 3 rd party or the husband or the wife takes out a separate<br />
civil action in the ordinary civil court to deal with the 3 rd party issue<br />
(“the civil suit 106 ”), will it be consolidated with, or transferred to the<br />
ancillary matters court to be heard together with, the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings Should it be<br />
173 The answers to these questions will depend on which civil court<br />
the suit is filed in, i.e. District Court/Magistrate’s Court or the High<br />
Court, as well as which court the ancillary matters are pending to be<br />
heard in, i.e. the Family Court or the High Court. 107<br />
174 Note: If a party has not filed a separate civil suit at the time that<br />
the ancillary matters are adjourned to chambers for hearing, but indicates<br />
that he wishes to do so at an ancillary matters pre-trial conference, then,<br />
as a matter <strong>of</strong> practice, the Family Court would usually allow him a<br />
reasonable length <strong>of</strong> time to do so (this being his right 108 ), before<br />
proceeding with the hearing <strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters.<br />
6.1 Reasons for having the civil suit and the ancillary<br />
matters heard by the same court<br />
175 The case <strong>of</strong> Shi Fang v Koh Pee Huat, 109 illustrates how 3 rd party<br />
issues are <strong>of</strong>ten so closely related to the issues in the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings that the court’s preference is to have them resolved in the<br />
same forum, and at the same time. In this case, the husband had taken<br />
out a civil suit to resolve the issue <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party’s interest. He sought,<br />
inter alia, a declaration that a particular house which was registered in<br />
his name was held by him in trust for his father. The wife subsequently<br />
petitioned for divorce, and claimed maintenance and a share <strong>of</strong> the<br />
106 The term “civil suit” will be used to refer to all matters commenced in the ordinary<br />
civil court, no matter whether the originating process was a writ <strong>of</strong> summons,<br />
originating summons, petition, etc.<br />
107 In accordance with the Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order, the ancillary<br />
matters in respect <strong>of</strong> all divorce petitions filed on or after 1 April 1996 and before 15<br />
December 2003 will be dealt with by the Family Court, and the ancillary matters in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> all divorce petitions filed on or after 15 December 2003, save for contested<br />
applications for the division <strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets where the gross value <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matrimonial assets is asserted by a party to the proceedings to be $1.5 million or<br />
above, will be dealt with by the Family Court.<br />
108 See Section 3 above.<br />
109 [1996] 2 SLR 221
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matrimonial assets (including the house which was the subject matter <strong>of</strong><br />
the civil suit) consequent upon the dissolution <strong>of</strong> her marriage with the<br />
husband (“the ancillary matters”). When the civil suit came on for<br />
hearing (before the ancillary matters had been disposed <strong>of</strong>), the parties<br />
agreed (in response to the trial judge’s suggestion) that the evidence in<br />
one set <strong>of</strong> proceedings would be used for the purpose <strong>of</strong> the other, as<br />
there were common issues <strong>of</strong> fact in both sets <strong>of</strong> proceedings. Both sets<br />
<strong>of</strong> proceedings were heard before the same judge. The judge dealt with<br />
the issues raised in the proceedings as if they had been consolidated.<br />
There was only one judgment covering both proceedings. At the appeal<br />
hearing, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that short <strong>of</strong> a formal order for<br />
consolidation, the two proceedings were effectively consolidated in the<br />
court below.<br />
176 This case illustrates that there may be a certain value to having<br />
the civil suit dealt with by the court dealing with the ancillary matters.<br />
Not only may the hearing process be made more convenient and<br />
expedient, but the quality <strong>of</strong> the decision-making process may also be<br />
enhanced. The relevant factors in identifying situations where it would<br />
be expedient for the court dealing with the ancillary matters to also deal<br />
with the civil suit are as follows:<br />
(a) There are common issues <strong>of</strong> law in both matters;<br />
(b) There are common issues <strong>of</strong> fact in both matters;<br />
(c) There are common witnesses in both matters; and<br />
(d)<br />
The 3 rd party issue is connected with the main issues in the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings in such a way as to make it<br />
necessary for the court dealing with the civil suit to be apprised<br />
<strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters, and vice versa.<br />
177 The presence <strong>of</strong> factors (a)-(c) above would mean that time and<br />
costs (on the part <strong>of</strong> the parties and their witnesses, as well as the court)<br />
could be saved by having both matters dealt with by the same forum.<br />
These factors would also increase the benefit to be obtained from the<br />
familiarity and depth that a court dealing with both matters would have<br />
<strong>of</strong> the parties’ situation, as a whole. The presence <strong>of</strong> factor (d) above<br />
would indicate that the decision-making process would be enhanced by<br />
having the same forum deal with both matters.<br />
178 An example <strong>of</strong> a situation falling within factor (d) above can be<br />
found in the English case <strong>of</strong> Harman v Glencross, supra, where the court
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 283<br />
dealt with the husband’s judgment creditor’s application for a charging<br />
order against the matrimonial home, as well as the wife’s application for<br />
ancillary relief pursuant to the granting <strong>of</strong> a decree nisi. The court noted:<br />
“..Unless it appears to the court hearing the application for the<br />
charging order absolute that the circumstances are so clear that it<br />
is proper to make the order there and then, the usual practice<br />
should be to transfer the application to the Family Division so<br />
that it may come on with the wife’s application for ancillary<br />
relief and one court can then be in a position to consider all<br />
the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case.” (per Balcombe LJ at page 559<br />
a-b, emphasis added)<br />
179 A similar situation arose in the case <strong>of</strong> Customs and Excise<br />
Commissioners v A and another 110 where the wife filed an application for<br />
ancillary relief in the county court pursuant to the granting <strong>of</strong> a decree<br />
nisi. In the meantime, the husband was convicted <strong>of</strong> drug trafficking, and<br />
a confiscation order was made against him in the Crown Court under the<br />
Drug Trafficking Act 1994. The Crown Court appointed a receiver over<br />
all the husband’s assets, save for the matrimonial home and the surrender<br />
value <strong>of</strong> the policies, for the purpose <strong>of</strong> enforcing the confiscation order.<br />
The Customs and Excise Commissioners applied for the matrimonial<br />
home and the policies to be included in the realisable property. Both<br />
matters were ordered to be heard by the Family Division <strong>of</strong> the High<br />
Court.<br />
“It is a commonplace <strong>of</strong> family law for parties’ liabilities to<br />
exceed their assets. A husband may have substantial debts to<br />
third parties which he wishes to clear by using his share <strong>of</strong> the<br />
prospective proceeds <strong>of</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> the matrimonial home.<br />
Exercising its jurisdiction under ss 24 and 25 <strong>of</strong> the 1973 Act in<br />
such a case, the court may well transfer the husband’s interest in<br />
the property to the wife, thereby leaving him to meet his<br />
liabilities from other sources…In a case such as the present,<br />
the court does not artificially delete Mr A’s debts and then<br />
consider the adjustment <strong>of</strong> assets. If the court has jurisdiction<br />
to make orders under s 24 <strong>of</strong> the 1973 Act in these<br />
circumstances, what it does, in simple terms, is to decide<br />
whether, in all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case, and applying<br />
the s 25 criteria (which themselves include the fact that Mr A’s<br />
share <strong>of</strong> the house and the policies are the subject <strong>of</strong> a<br />
110<br />
[2002] 2 All ER 736
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confiscation order under the 1994 Act), the house and the<br />
policies should be transferred from Mr A to Mrs A thereby<br />
leaving Mr A with a continuing liability under the confiscation<br />
order.” (per Wall J, at page 760, b-e) (emphasis added)<br />
180 In other words, a kind <strong>of</strong> balancing exercise must be undertaken<br />
between the needs <strong>of</strong> the family and the rights <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party 111 —and<br />
this can only be properly done if both the civil suit and the ancillary<br />
matters are heard by the same court.<br />
6.2 Which court to hear the civil suit and the ancillary<br />
matters<br />
181 Diagram A illustrates the different permutations for which courts<br />
may hear the civil suit and the ancillary matters. The different<br />
permutations concern which court the civil suit is filed in, and which<br />
court the ancillary matters are pending before.<br />
111<br />
In this regard, it should be noted that Section 112 (Power <strong>of</strong> court to order division<br />
<strong>of</strong> matrimonial assets) <strong>of</strong> the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353) requires the court to<br />
consider “all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case” when making orders for the division <strong>of</strong><br />
the matrimonial assets.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 285<br />
Diagram A<br />
* In accordance with the Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order, all<br />
ancillary matters in respect <strong>of</strong> divorce petitions filed on or after 1 April 1996<br />
and before 15 December 2003 will be dealt with in the Family Court, and all<br />
ancillary matters in respect <strong>of</strong> divorce petitions filed on or after 15<br />
December 2003, save for contested applications for division <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matrimonial assets which gross value is asserted by a party to the<br />
proceedings to be worth $1.5 million or more, will be dealt with in the<br />
Family Court.<br />
** All references to a “Section” in this diagram are to a section in this article.<br />
*** It appears that a civil suit filed in the Magistrate’s Court (if the amount is<br />
below the current jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> a District Court) may only be transferred to<br />
the District Court if it involves an important question <strong>of</strong> law or fact (See the
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differing views in two High Court decisions, in this regard—at Section 6.4.3<br />
below)<br />
6.3 If the civil suit and the ancillary matters need not be<br />
heard by the same court<br />
182 If, after considering all the factors set out in Section 6.1(a)-(d)<br />
above, it appears that the civil suit and the ancillary matters need not be<br />
heard by the same court, then the two suits may either proceed<br />
concurrently, or one set <strong>of</strong> proceedings may be stayed until the other is<br />
disposed <strong>of</strong>.<br />
183 An example <strong>of</strong> where the latter has been done is the case <strong>of</strong> Tian<br />
Ah Poon (m.w.) v Teo Guan Seng and Anor. 112 The wife in this case had<br />
filed a divorce petition on 22 February 2001. A decree nisi was granted<br />
on 23 April 2002, and the ancillary matters were adjourned to be heard<br />
later. On 9 April 2002, the wife, a shareholder in a company <strong>of</strong> which the<br />
husband was a director and shareholder, commenced an action in the<br />
High Court (in OS 488 <strong>of</strong> 2002) under Section 216 (Personal remedies in<br />
cases <strong>of</strong> oppression or injustice) <strong>of</strong> the Companies Act (Cap. 50) against<br />
the company itself, the husband (who was a director and shareholder <strong>of</strong><br />
the company), and other directors and shareholders <strong>of</strong> the company (5<br />
defendants in all). The wife alleged that the husband had deliberately<br />
increased his shareholding in the company to dilute her interest in the<br />
same, and prayed for, inter alia, an order that the husband purchase all<br />
the shares owned by the wife at a fair value to be determined by the court<br />
or by an independent valuer. The wife then applied to transfer the<br />
divorce proceedings to the High Court and have it consolidated with OS<br />
488 <strong>of</strong> 2002. The High Court did not make the order for transfer and<br />
consolidation, but instead ordered that the ancillary matters in the Family<br />
Court be stayed pending the final determination (and any appeal<br />
therefrom) <strong>of</strong> the High Court suit. 113<br />
184 Generally, if a party starts a civil suit in connection with the 3 rd<br />
party issue (either before or after the divorce petition is filed), and the<br />
matter is not resolved (or not close to being resolved) before the ancillary<br />
matters are adjourned to chambers for hearing, and there is no<br />
application for the civil suit to also be heard by the Family Court, the<br />
Family Court will, in all probability, adjourn the hearing <strong>of</strong> the ancillary<br />
112 unreported, Divorce Petition No. 600679/2001<br />
113 Order made 24 June 2002. No judgment was written by the High Court in this matter.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 287<br />
matters until the civil suit has been dealt with 114 . This is what was done in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Liu Ah Moy, supra, where the ancillary matters were heard<br />
only after orders were made in the wife’s originating summons filed in<br />
the High Court to seek, inter alia, a declaration that the husband’s<br />
mistress held her half share <strong>of</strong> the said property in trust for the husband.<br />
This was also done in the case <strong>of</strong> Soh Lai Chan, supra, where the wife<br />
took out an originating summons in the High Court under Section 73B <strong>of</strong><br />
the Conveyancing and <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> Property Act (Cap 61) seeking a<br />
declaration against the husband and his brother that the transfer <strong>of</strong> the<br />
husband’s shares in a certain company to his brother was void as against<br />
her. The ancillary matters proceedings before the Family Court had been<br />
stayed pending the determination <strong>of</strong> this suit.<br />
6.4 If the civil suit and the ancillary matters should be<br />
heard by the same court<br />
185 If it is decided that the civil suit should be heard by the same<br />
court dealing with the ancillary matters, then the question arises <strong>of</strong> what<br />
are the applicable provisions governing the transfer <strong>of</strong> the cases to the<br />
same court.<br />
6.4.1 Civil suit filed and ancillary matters pending in courts <strong>of</strong><br />
the same jurisdictional limits<br />
186 If a civil suit is filed in:<br />
(a) the District Court (civil division) 115 and the ancillary matters are<br />
pending in the Family Court; or<br />
(b) the High Court and the ancillary matters are pending in the High<br />
Court<br />
there is no need for an application for either the civil suit or the ancillary<br />
matters to be transferred to a court <strong>of</strong> a different jurisdictional limit.<br />
114 However, the court may also render a decision on the ancillary matters first, without<br />
waiting for the civil suit to be heard. In such cases, the court can make alternative<br />
orders—i.e. one set <strong>of</strong> orders on the basis that there will be a certain outcome in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> the civil suit, and one set on the basis that there will be an opposite<br />
outcome. (In this regard, see the case <strong>of</strong> Leong Choon Kum (m.w.) v Chia Kin Tuck,<br />
supra, discussed in Section 2.3.2)<br />
115 The position if the civil suit is filed in the Magistrate’s Court is dealt with in Section<br />
6.4.3.
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187 The party who would like the two matters to be heard by the<br />
same court may apply under Order 4 Rule 1 (Consolidation, etc., <strong>of</strong><br />
causes or matters) <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court to consolidate the matters, have<br />
them heard at the same time, or to have one heard immediately after the<br />
other, or to have one matter stayed, pending the determination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
other matter.<br />
6.4.1.1 Order 4 Rule 1<br />
188 Order 4 Rule 1 states as follows:<br />
1. —(1) Where two or more causes or matters are pending, then,<br />
if it appears to the Court —<br />
(a) that some common question <strong>of</strong> law or fact arises in both or<br />
all <strong>of</strong> them;<br />
(b) that the rights to relief claimed therein are in respect <strong>of</strong> or<br />
arise out <strong>of</strong> the same transaction or series <strong>of</strong> transactions; or<br />
(c) that for some other reason it is desirable to make an order<br />
under this Rule,<br />
the Court may order those causes or matters to be consolidated<br />
on such terms as it thinks just or may order them to be tried at<br />
the same time or one immediately after another or may order any<br />
<strong>of</strong> them to be stayed until after the determination <strong>of</strong> any other <strong>of</strong><br />
them.<br />
(2) An order for consolidation must be in Form 1 and shall direct<br />
that the cause or matter in which the application is made shall<br />
thence forward be carried on in such other cause or matter and<br />
that the title <strong>of</strong> such other cause or matter be amended by adding<br />
thereto the title <strong>of</strong> the cause or matter in which the application is<br />
made.<br />
6.4.1.2 To consolidate, try at the same time, or try in immediate<br />
succession<br />
189 It is submitted that an order under Order 4 Rule 1 for the civil<br />
suit to be consolidated, tried at the same time, or tried in immediate<br />
succession with the ancillary matters proceedings would be made if the<br />
factors set out in Section 6.1(a)-(d) above are satisfied.
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190 Consolidation may be ordered where the parties could have been<br />
joined in a single action pursuant to Order 15 Rule 4. 116 It should be<br />
noted that:<br />
“If an order for consolidation had been made, only one set <strong>of</strong><br />
solicitors would represent the lead plaintiff and the<br />
determination <strong>of</strong> the court would bind all parties. The other<br />
plaintiffs would have to pay the costs <strong>of</strong> their solicitors with no<br />
recourse against or indemnity from the defendants.” (per Lai<br />
Kew Chai J, Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong & Anor and<br />
other actions (3) 117 at paragraph 4)<br />
191 In Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong, supra, it was held that it<br />
was generally impossible to consolidate actions where the plaintiffs in<br />
the actions had been and continued to be represented by different<br />
solicitors who had, in each case, completed their research, getting-up<br />
and, had been in the process <strong>of</strong> discovery <strong>of</strong> documents and other<br />
information “in relation to matters which could extend back a quarter <strong>of</strong><br />
a century” 118 This was because it would not be possible to obtain the<br />
agreement <strong>of</strong> all the parties regarding the conduct <strong>of</strong> the action, and it<br />
would be “unjust and too overbearing” 119 to compel all the parties to<br />
agree to one set <strong>of</strong> solicitors, to terminate their retainers <strong>of</strong> their<br />
solicitors, and pay their solicitor and client costs without the prospect <strong>of</strong><br />
any recourse from the defendants should the plaintiffs succeed in their<br />
claims.<br />
192 The court in Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong & Anor and<br />
other actions (3), supra, was <strong>of</strong> the view that where it was not possible<br />
for multiple actions to be consolidated, the next best alternative was to<br />
order that they be tried at the same time.<br />
193 There seems to be little practical difference between<br />
consolidation and ordering actions to be tried at the same time, aside<br />
from the issues <strong>of</strong> separate legal representation and costs. The court<br />
observed that “In a trial <strong>of</strong> all the actions at the same time, the<br />
attendances <strong>of</strong> witnesses, counsel and <strong>of</strong> the parties need not be<br />
repeated. Counsel for plaintiffs and defendants in most cases <strong>of</strong> trials <strong>of</strong><br />
multiple actions at the same time had in practice sensibly agreed that<br />
116 See <strong>Singapore</strong> Court Practice 2003, Jeffrey Pinsler, at p 70, para 4/1/1<br />
117 [1997] 3 SLR 178<br />
118 per Lai Kew Chai J, Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong & Anor and other actions (3),<br />
supra, at para 4.<br />
119 Ibid, at para 11.
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evidence led in one action would be treated as having been led in all<br />
other actions…In such trials <strong>of</strong> several actions, which involve common<br />
issues <strong>of</strong> fact and the same questions <strong>of</strong> law, the preparation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
opening statements, list <strong>of</strong> issues, list <strong>of</strong> propositions <strong>of</strong> law and bundle<br />
<strong>of</strong> documents in accordance with the Practice Directions should again<br />
be approached on a combined basis wherever practicable and<br />
convenient. In such trials, a trial judge also encourages a common core<br />
bundle <strong>of</strong> documents for ease <strong>of</strong> reference and in the interest <strong>of</strong> a speedy<br />
trial.” (per Lai Kew Chai J, Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong & Anor<br />
and other actions (3), at paragraph 5)<br />
194 In the light <strong>of</strong> the foregoing, it is submitted that the key to<br />
deciding whether the civil suit should be consolidated with the ancillary<br />
matters or merely ordered to be tried at the same as the ancillary matters<br />
is the number <strong>of</strong> parties (aside from the husband and wife) who are<br />
involved in the civil suit, the extent to which they have each obtained<br />
separate legal representation, and how far advanced the civil suit is—<br />
which would indicate how much work has been done thus far by the<br />
various parties’ lawyers, and the legal costs incurred.<br />
195 If there is no need for the civil suit and the ancillary matters to<br />
be consolidated or tried at the same time, the court may order the matters<br />
to be tried in immediate succession, usually before the same judge. This<br />
would usually be in a situation where: (i) the issues must be dealt with<br />
discretely—i.e. where the outcome in the first matter would affect the<br />
decision in the second matter in such a way that it would not be possible<br />
to hear the second matter without knowing the outcome in the first<br />
matter; or (ii) where the issues may be dealt with discretely, and factor<br />
(c) in Section 6.1 (i.e. common witnesses in both matters) above is<br />
present, but not factors (a), (b) and (d) (i.e. common issues <strong>of</strong> law and<br />
fact, and a close connection between the 3 rd party issue and the ancillary<br />
matters such that the court dealing with the civil suit must be appraised<br />
<strong>of</strong> the ancillary matters, and vice versa).<br />
196 When the matters are consolidated or tried at the same time, each<br />
witness giving evidence will give evidence <strong>of</strong>, and be cross-examined<br />
(where applicable) on all the issues raised in the civil suit as well as the<br />
ancillary matters proceedings. The affidavits <strong>of</strong> evidence in chief will be<br />
drafted to reflect this. One judgment will be written covering both<br />
matters. In the Shi Fang case, this is what took place (see Section 6.1<br />
above). Where the matters are tried in succession, then, strictly speaking,<br />
the witnesses called and the affidavits <strong>of</strong> evidence in chief filed in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> the first matter should only be in relation to the issues arising<br />
in the first matter. A decision will then be made in respect <strong>of</strong> the first
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 291<br />
case. After that decision is made, the court will proceed to hear the other<br />
matter immediately thereafter. The witnesses called and the affidavits <strong>of</strong><br />
evidence in chief filed will only address those issues in respect <strong>of</strong> that<br />
second matter. Pinsler has observed that the process <strong>of</strong> successive<br />
hearings is administratively convenient and saves the witnesses, who are<br />
involved in two or more actions, the expense <strong>of</strong> having to attend court on<br />
two or more separate occasions 120 .<br />
6.4.1.3 Order for Stay<br />
197 However, as stated earlier, the court may also order one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matters (usually the ancillary matters) to be stayed until the other is<br />
determined 121 (“order for stay”). In the order for stay situation:<br />
(a) Hearing dates for the first matter would be fixed first. Only after<br />
the first matter is disposed <strong>of</strong> would parties then apply for a second<br />
set <strong>of</strong> hearing dates for the second matter.<br />
(b) The affidavits to be filed in respect <strong>of</strong> the second matter would<br />
usually be held back, pending the outcome <strong>of</strong> the first matter. All<br />
other steps to be taken to prepare for the hearing <strong>of</strong> the second matter<br />
(interlocutory applications, for example) would also be stayed until<br />
the first matter is disposed <strong>of</strong>.<br />
198 If the matters are ordered to be tried in immediate succession,<br />
however, preparations for the hearing <strong>of</strong> both matters would proceed<br />
concurrently. The same set <strong>of</strong> hearing dates will be given for both<br />
matters.<br />
199 This means that in order for stay situations, witnesses and parties<br />
would have to attend court on at least two separate occasions, and the<br />
time taken for all matters to be finally disposed <strong>of</strong> would be longer than<br />
if the matters were ordered to be tried in immediate succession.<br />
200 It is submitted that an order for stay would be more appropriate<br />
than an order that the matters be tried in immediate succession if the<br />
factors in Section 6.1 (a)-(d) were not present, and (i) the preparation (in<br />
120 See <strong>Singapore</strong> Court Practice 2003, Jeffrey Pinsler at p 74.<br />
121 For an example <strong>of</strong> where this was done, see the case <strong>of</strong> Leong Choon Kum (m.w.) v<br />
Chia Kin Tuck, supra, where the Family Court ordered the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings stayed until a certain date, when a High Court suit involving the husband<br />
and wife would have been disposed <strong>of</strong>. (Family Court judgment dated 22 August<br />
2000) On appeal, however, the High Court ordered that the High Court suit be<br />
transferred down to the Family Court. (See Section 6.4.2.2).
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particular, the contents <strong>of</strong> the affidavits which would have to be<br />
prepared) for the second matter would be significantly affected by the<br />
outcome <strong>of</strong> the first matter (ii) the decision in the first matter would<br />
inevitably affect the decision in the second matter, and it is not possible<br />
to make “alternative orders” 122 and (iii) an appeal in respect <strong>of</strong> the first<br />
matter is very likely. In such a situation, it would make sense for all<br />
work on the second matter to be stayed, pending the determination<br />
(including any appeal) <strong>of</strong> the first matter.<br />
6.4.1.4 What hearing procedure should be used if the civil suit and<br />
the ancillary matters are ordered to be consolidated/heard<br />
at the same time 123<br />
201 One reason that a party may wish to have the matter dealt with<br />
by the ordinary civil court would be because they prefer the procedural<br />
regime governing the trials <strong>of</strong> ordinary civil cases to that governing the<br />
hearing <strong>of</strong> ancillary matters. The differences in the two procedural<br />
regimes are as follows:<br />
(a) Ordinary civil suit procedure<br />
(i)<br />
(ii)<br />
(iii)<br />
(iv)<br />
Parties’ respective cases will be set out in pleadings;<br />
Only one set <strong>of</strong> affidavits <strong>of</strong> evidence-in-chief will be<br />
filed by all parties and their witnesses;<br />
The trial will be held in open court; and<br />
Each party will be able to cross-examine all the other<br />
parties and their witnesses, as <strong>of</strong> right<br />
(b) Ancillary matters procedure<br />
(i)<br />
(ii)<br />
Parties’ respective cases will be set out in affidavits filed<br />
by them;<br />
There may be several “rounds” <strong>of</strong> affidavits filed by all<br />
parties;<br />
122 See Section 2.3.2 for an example <strong>of</strong> a case where alternative orders were made.<br />
123 Where the civil suit and the ancillary matters are tried one after the other, the open<br />
court trial procedure should be used for the civil suit and the ancillary matters<br />
procedure should be used for the ancillary matters.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 293<br />
(iii)<br />
(iv)<br />
The hearing will take place in chambers 124 ; and<br />
Witnesses may only be cross-examined with the court’s<br />
leave.<br />
202 It is submitted that the procedural regime governing the ordinary<br />
civil suit is not necessarily more advantageous to all parties. In respect <strong>of</strong><br />
items (i) and (ii) for each <strong>of</strong> the above categories, it is submitted that<br />
parties will be able to set out and ascertain the other parties’ cases<br />
whether they are set out in pleadings or affidavits. Indeed, the ancillary<br />
matters procedure, with its several “rounds" <strong>of</strong> reply affidavits, would<br />
seem to give the parties more than one chance to set out their case, and<br />
even to raise queries concerning the other parties’ cases, unlike the more<br />
structured pleadings regime. In respect <strong>of</strong> item (iii) for each <strong>of</strong> the above<br />
categories, there seems to be no obvious advantage, as far as the parties<br />
are concerned, <strong>of</strong> having the matter heard in open court rather than in<br />
chambers. A chambers hearing would in fact give the parties more<br />
privacy.<br />
203 It is submitted that the most significant procedural difference lies<br />
in item (iv)—the right <strong>of</strong> cross-examination. It is beyond the scope <strong>of</strong><br />
this article to discuss the advantages or otherwise <strong>of</strong> being able to crossexamine<br />
witnesses. Suffice to say that it is still open to the party in an<br />
ancillary matters hearing who wishes to apply for cross-examination <strong>of</strong><br />
any witness to file a summons-in-chambers together with a supporting<br />
affidavit to seek the court’s leave to do so before the said ancillary<br />
matters hearing. This was done in Audrey Lee Dawn, supra, and Ong<br />
Tong Liang, supra, for example.<br />
204 It is therefore submitted that the court should lean in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
adopting the ancillary matters hearing procedure in circumstances where<br />
the ancillary matters have been consolidated to be heard with the civil<br />
suit, or ordered to be tried at the same time as the civil suit. This is<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the unique nature <strong>of</strong> family and family-related disputes,<br />
where there is a concern to protect the privacy <strong>of</strong> the parties. In this<br />
regard, see the discussion in Section 5.3 above.<br />
124 As a matter <strong>of</strong> practice, all ancillary matters in respect <strong>of</strong> which no consent order has<br />
been recorded on the date <strong>of</strong> the granting <strong>of</strong> the decree nisi will be adjourned to be<br />
heard in chambers after the granting <strong>of</strong> the decree nisi.
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6.4.2 Civil suit filed and ancillary matters pending in courts <strong>of</strong><br />
different jurisdictional limits---the High Court and the<br />
Family Court 125<br />
6.4.2.1 Power to transfer matters from High Court to Family Court<br />
and vice versa<br />
205 Only the High Court has the power to transfer a matter from the<br />
High Court to the Family Court, and vice versa. The High Court’s power<br />
comes from Section 18 (Powers <strong>of</strong> High Court) <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Judicature Act (Cap. 322) (“SCJA”):<br />
“18. —(1) The High Court shall have such powers as are vested<br />
in it by any written law for the time being in force in <strong>Singapore</strong>.<br />
(2) Without prejudice to the generality <strong>of</strong> subsection (1), the<br />
High Court shall have the powers set out in the First Schedule.<br />
(3) The powers referred to in subsection (2) shall be exercised in<br />
accordance with any written law or Rules <strong>of</strong> Court relating to<br />
them.”<br />
First Schedule<br />
Transfer <strong>of</strong> proceedings<br />
10. Power to transfer any proceedings to any other court or to or<br />
from any subordinate court, and in the case <strong>of</strong> transfer to or from<br />
a subordinate court to give any directions as to the further<br />
conduct there<strong>of</strong>, except that this power shall be exercised in such<br />
manner as may be prescribed by Rules <strong>of</strong> Court.<br />
206 There are specific provisions in the Subordinate Courts Act<br />
(Cap. 321) (“SCA”) governing the transfer <strong>of</strong> cases to and from the High<br />
Court, however. Section 18 <strong>of</strong> the SCJA must be read together with these<br />
specific provisions. As stated in the case <strong>of</strong> Ong Pang Wee and Ors v<br />
Chiltern Park Development Pte Ltd: 126<br />
125 The position if the civil suit was filed in the Magistrate’s Court is dealt with in<br />
Section 6.4.3 below.<br />
126 [2003] SGCA 9
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 295<br />
“..the scope <strong>of</strong> the High Court’s power to transfer proceedings<br />
from a lower court to itself cannot be determined by looking<br />
only at the SCJA. In fact it would be wrong to do so as s 18(3)<br />
provides that the powers ‘shall be exercised’ in accordance with<br />
written law. Parliament had therefore intended the High Court to<br />
have regard to other applicable written laws before exercising<br />
the power to transfer proceedings to itself and to act in a manner<br />
that was ‘in accordance with’ or consistent with those provisions<br />
in so doing. In this case, the applicable written law is the SCA<br />
and the High Court can only exercise its powers <strong>of</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong><br />
proceedings as provided for in this Act.” (per Judith Prakash J, ,<br />
at paragraph 14)<br />
6.4.2.2 Civil Suit filed in High Court to be heard by Family<br />
Court—Transfer down from High Court<br />
207 An example <strong>of</strong> a case where this was done is Chia Kin Tuck v<br />
Leong Choon Kum and Anor (Suit 1665 <strong>of</strong> 1999). On 7 May 1998, the<br />
wife had commenced divorce proceedings against the husband in<br />
Divorce Petition No. 1621 <strong>of</strong> 1998. A decree nisi was granted on 7<br />
January 2000, and the ancillary matters were adjourned to be heard in<br />
chambers. The husband then filed a suit (i.e. Suit 1665 <strong>of</strong> 1999) in the<br />
High Court on 24 November 1999 against the wife and a 3 rd party for the<br />
return <strong>of</strong> a sum <strong>of</strong> $1 million which he alleged had been given to the<br />
wife to be deposited into two bank accounts for the purpose <strong>of</strong> meeting<br />
his sons’ educational expenses, and which had been wrongfully<br />
transferred to the account <strong>of</strong> the 3 rd party. The husband had applied to<br />
stay the ancillary matters proceedings until the High Court suit was<br />
disposed <strong>of</strong>. This application was granted by the Family Court. On<br />
appeal by the wife, the High Court ordered the High Court suit to be<br />
transferred to the Family Court, to be heard by the same judge dealing<br />
with the ancillary matters 127 .<br />
208 The provision governing the transfer <strong>of</strong> suits from the High<br />
Court to the Family Court is Section 37 SCA (“Section 37”):<br />
General power to transfer from High Court to District Court<br />
37. —(1) In any action commenced by way <strong>of</strong> writ <strong>of</strong> summons<br />
in the High Court in the exercise <strong>of</strong> its original civil jurisdiction,<br />
127 Order made on 23 October 2000. No judgment was written. A new suit number was<br />
given for the transferred suit—DC(T) 600872 <strong>of</strong> 2000
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any party may for any sufficient reason at any time apply to the<br />
High Court for an order that the proceedings be transferred to a<br />
District Court.<br />
(2) The High Court may thereupon, if it thinks fit, order that the<br />
proceedings be transferred accordingly notwithstanding any<br />
other provisions <strong>of</strong> this Act. (emphasis added)<br />
209 The effect <strong>of</strong> this section is to give “the High Court an<br />
unfettered discretion to transfer at any time any proceedings commenced<br />
by writ <strong>of</strong> summons to the district court. The words ‘notwithstanding any<br />
other provisions <strong>of</strong> this Act’ have the effect <strong>of</strong> vesting in the High Court<br />
the jurisdiction to increase the ordinary civil jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the district<br />
court.” (per Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was), Australian Master<br />
Builders Co Pty Ltd v Ng Tai Tuan 128 )<br />
(a)<br />
Only proceedings commenced by a writ <strong>of</strong> summons may be<br />
transferred down<br />
210 It should be noted that under Section 37, only actions<br />
commenced by way <strong>of</strong> writs <strong>of</strong> summons may be transferred down from<br />
the High Court to the District Court. Thus, if an originating summons is<br />
to be transferred from the High Court to the Family Court, it must first<br />
be “converted” into a writ under Order 28 Rule 8 (Continuation <strong>of</strong><br />
proceedings as if cause or matter begun by writ) <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court 129 .<br />
128 [1987] SLR 539<br />
129 Order 28, Rule 8 <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court states:<br />
8. -(1) Where, in the case <strong>of</strong> a cause or matter begun by originating summons, it<br />
appears to the Court at any stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings that the proceedings should<br />
for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ, it<br />
may order the proceedings to continue as if the cause or matter had been so<br />
begun and may, in particular, order that pleadings shall be delivered or that any<br />
affidavits shall stand as pleadings, with or without liberty to any <strong>of</strong> the parties to<br />
add thereto or to apply for particulars there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
(2) Where the Court decides to make such an order, Order 25, Rules 2 to 7, shall,<br />
with the omission <strong>of</strong> so much <strong>of</strong> Rule 7 (1) as requires parties to serve a notice<br />
specifying the orders and directions which they require and with any other<br />
necessary modifications, apply as if there had been a summons for directions in<br />
the proceedings and that order were one <strong>of</strong> the orders to be made thereon.<br />
(3) This Rule applies notwithstanding that the cause or matter in question could<br />
not have been begun by writ.<br />
(4) Any reference in these Rules to an action begun by writ shall, unless the<br />
context otherwise requires, be construed as including a reference to a cause or<br />
matter proceedings in which are ordered under this Rule to continue as if the<br />
cause or matter had been so begun.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 297<br />
It will not be possible to transfer ancillary matters pending in the High<br />
Court to the Family Court, as the originating process would be a petition<br />
and not a writ <strong>of</strong> summons. In this regard, other types <strong>of</strong> actions such as<br />
bankruptcy, companies’ winding up actions and probate matters, which<br />
are commenced by petitions, may also not be transferred from the High<br />
Court to the Family Court.<br />
(b)<br />
Proceedings commenced under specific legislation only giving<br />
jurisdiction to High Court<br />
211 It is further submitted that if the High Court proceedings were<br />
commenced under specific legislation only giving jurisdiction to the<br />
High Court (for example, an application taken out under Section 73B <strong>of</strong><br />
the Conveyancing and <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> Property Act (Cap. 61) 130 (as was done in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Soh Lai Chan, supra)) such proceedings would fall outside<br />
the scope <strong>of</strong> Section 37. The High Court would therefore not have the<br />
power to transfer the case down to the District Court. The rationale for<br />
this is that if Parliament has expressly given the jurisdiction over cases<br />
coming under the specific legislation to the High Court alone, the courts<br />
should not go against Parliament’s intention by transferring such cases to<br />
the District Court under Section 37.<br />
212 This argument is reinforced by the fact that there is already a<br />
specific legislative mechanism for the District Court to be conferred<br />
jurisdiction to deal with certain classes <strong>of</strong> cases that only the High Court<br />
would have had jurisdiction to deal with. Under Section 28A (Allocation<br />
<strong>of</strong> proceedings to District Court) <strong>of</strong> the SCJA, the Chief Justice may by<br />
order direct certain classes <strong>of</strong> cases commenced in the High Court to be<br />
heard by the District Court, and confer jurisdiction on the District Court<br />
to do so. 131 (The Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order, which<br />
130 The term “court” in the Act is defined as “High Court”—see Section 2(Interpretation)<br />
<strong>of</strong> the said Act.<br />
131 Section 28A SCJA states:<br />
(1) The Chief Justice may, where he considers it necessary or expedient to improve<br />
efficiency in the administration <strong>of</strong> justice and to provide for more speedy disposal <strong>of</strong><br />
proceedings commenced in the High Court, by order direct such class or classes or<br />
description <strong>of</strong> proceedings as may be specified in the order to be heard and<br />
determined by the District Court.<br />
(2) Notwithstanding any other written law, any order under subsection (1) —<br />
(a) may confer jurisdiction on a District Court to hear and determine —<br />
(i) any proceedings specified in the order which, but for the order, the District Court<br />
would not have jurisdiction to hear and determine by reason only <strong>of</strong> the fact that the<br />
amount involved exceeds the monetary limit <strong>of</strong> its jurisdiction; or<br />
(ii) any proceedings relating to any <strong>of</strong> the ma tters referred to in [continued next page]
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give the District Court jurisdiction to hear certain family matters which<br />
would otherwise be the exclusive province <strong>of</strong> the High Court, would be<br />
an example <strong>of</strong> such legislation.) It is submitted that if the High Court had<br />
the power to transfer down any case it saw fit under Section 37 SCA to<br />
the District Court, this would obviate the need for Section 28A SCJA.<br />
(c)<br />
Reason for transfer<br />
213 In the Australian Master Builders case, supra, the court was <strong>of</strong><br />
the view that the applicant for a transfer must show something more than<br />
a speedier trial and/or savings in costs (the latter merely being a<br />
consequence <strong>of</strong> the transfer) in order to be granted leave to transfer<br />
proceedings from the High Court to the District Court. It is submitted<br />
that if there are good reasons (<strong>of</strong> the kind set out in Section 6.1(a)-(d)<br />
above) for wanting the civil suit to be heard together with the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings, then this should suffice to justify the transfer <strong>of</strong> the<br />
civil suit to the Family Court. The Family Court would already have<br />
dealt with the divorce itself. It would therefore be an appropriate forum<br />
to hear both the civil suit and the ancillary matters proceedings. The<br />
more advanced the ancillary matters proceedings in the Family Court by<br />
the time the question <strong>of</strong> whether the civil suit should be transferred<br />
arises, the stronger the reason for transferring the civil suit to the Family<br />
Court.<br />
214 However, as stated in Australian Master Builders, supra, in<br />
situations;<br />
“…where the issues <strong>of</strong> fact may be complicated or are in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> a subject matter not normally tried in such courts [i.e. the<br />
(ii) any proceedings relating to any <strong>of</strong> the matters referred to in section 17 (a) to (e); and<br />
(b) may make such incidental provision for the transfer <strong>of</strong> the proceedings to the District<br />
Court (including matters relating to procedure and costs) as the Chief Justice thinks<br />
fit.<br />
Section 17 (Civil jurisdiction — specific) SCJA states:<br />
17. Without prejudice to the generality <strong>of</strong> section 16, the civil jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the High<br />
Court shall include —<br />
(a) jurisdiction under any written law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes;<br />
(b) jurisdiction under any written law relating to matters <strong>of</strong> admiralty;<br />
(c) jurisdiction under any written law relating to bankruptcy or to companies;<br />
(d) jurisdiction to appoint and control guardians <strong>of</strong> infants and generally over the persons<br />
and property <strong>of</strong> infants;<br />
(e) jurisdiction to appoint and control guardians and keepers <strong>of</strong> the persons and estates <strong>of</strong><br />
idiots, mentally disordered persons and persons <strong>of</strong> unsound mind; and<br />
(f) jurisdiction to grant probates <strong>of</strong> wills and testaments, letters <strong>of</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> the<br />
estates <strong>of</strong> deceased persons and to alter or revoke such grants.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 299<br />
District Court] or the issues <strong>of</strong> law are <strong>of</strong> sufficient complexity<br />
that to allow them to be tried by a district court would merely<br />
open another tier <strong>of</strong> appeal and thus prolong the ultimate<br />
disposal <strong>of</strong> the case.”,<br />
then the court should consider transferring the ancillary matters<br />
proceedings from the Family Court to the High Court instead. (In this<br />
regard, see Section 6.4.2.3(a) below.)<br />
(d) Order 89 Rule 3<br />
215 The procedural rule governing the transfer <strong>of</strong> cases from the<br />
High Court to the District Court is Order 89 Rule 3, which states:<br />
Procedure on transfer from the High Court (O. 89, r. 3)<br />
3. —(1) Where an order is made by the High Court for the<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> any proceedings from the High Court to the<br />
Subordinate Courts, the Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court must<br />
send to the Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Subordinate Courts the file <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings, all documents, exhibits and a certified copy <strong>of</strong> the<br />
notes <strong>of</strong> evidence (if any) <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
(2) The Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Subordinate Courts must give notice <strong>of</strong><br />
the transfer to every party to the proceedings.<br />
(3) Subject to any directions in the order <strong>of</strong> the High Court, the<br />
trial shall proceed as if the proceedings were commenced in the<br />
Subordinate Courts.<br />
(e) Order 4 Rule 1<br />
216 Once the order has been made for the civil suit to be transferred<br />
down from the High Court to the Family Court, it may be consolidated<br />
with, ordered to be tried at the same time as, ordered to be tried in<br />
immediate succession with the ancillary matters proceedings, or an order<br />
for stay may be made. (For a discussion on Order 4 Rule 1, see Section<br />
6.4.1 above.)
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6.4.2.3 Civil suit filed in the High Court to be heard with ancillary<br />
matters—transfer up <strong>of</strong> ancillary matters from the Family<br />
Court<br />
217 An example <strong>of</strong> a case in which this was done is Wong Ser Wan v<br />
Ng Bok Eng Holdings Private Limited and Another (Suit No. 310 <strong>of</strong><br />
2003/H) (“Suit No. 310”). The basis <strong>of</strong> Suit No. 310 was that certain<br />
shares and property had been transferred to the defendants by the<br />
plaintiff’s husband with the intention to, inter alia, dissipate and dispose<br />
<strong>of</strong> his assets to deprive the plaintiff <strong>of</strong> a just and equitable division <strong>of</strong> the<br />
said shares and property in the event <strong>of</strong> a dissolution <strong>of</strong> marriage. The<br />
plaintiff wife in Suit No. 310 had commenced divorce proceedings<br />
against the husband (in Divorce Petition No. 2545 <strong>of</strong> 1999) and obtained<br />
a decree nisi before the said suit was filed. The plaintiff then applied,<br />
inter alia, for the actions in the divorce petition, as well as several<br />
maintenance summonses which she had taken out, to be transferred to<br />
the High Court. The application was dismissed by the assistant registrar,<br />
but allowed on appeal by the High Court 132 . The ancillary matters had not<br />
been disposed <strong>of</strong> at the time <strong>of</strong> the application. The High Court further<br />
ordered that the actions be heard and determined immediately after the<br />
trial <strong>of</strong> Suit No. 310, before the same High Court judge.<br />
218 The provision governing the transfer <strong>of</strong> cases from the District<br />
Court to the High Court is Section 38 SCA 133 , which states:<br />
132 Order made on 7 May 2003. No judgment was written by the court.<br />
133 It may be argued that since the Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order, which<br />
gave the District Court jurisdiction to hear certain family matters, were made by the<br />
Chief Justice pursuant Section 28A SCJA (see the discussion on Section 28A SCJA<br />
at Section 6.4.2.2 (b) above), this removes the power <strong>of</strong> a High Court judge to<br />
transfer the ancillary matters in a divorce case from the Family Court to the High<br />
Court under Section 38 SCA. It is submitted, however, that the better view is that the<br />
Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order did not so remove the power <strong>of</strong> the<br />
High Court judge. This is because, on a plain reading <strong>of</strong> Section 28A SCJA, the<br />
Chief Justice is empowered to confer jurisdiction on the District Court to deal with<br />
certain matters, but the section does not expressly state that the High Court may no<br />
longer deal with such matters after such jurisdiction is conferred on the District<br />
Court. The latter position would unfairly deprive parties whose divorce petitions have<br />
been filed in the Family Court <strong>of</strong> a potential avenue in the disposal <strong>of</strong> their cases<br />
which is available to parties in ordinary civil suits filed in the District Court. It is<br />
therefore submitted that the Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order were not<br />
intended to preclude the High Court from being able to deal with ancillary matters in<br />
all cases, and that, therefore, in appropriate cases, the ancillary matters may be<br />
transferred up from the Family Court to the High Court under Section 38 SCA.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 301<br />
General power to transfer from District Court to High Court<br />
38. Where it is made to appear to the High Court, on the<br />
application <strong>of</strong> a party to any civil proceeding pending in a<br />
District Court, that the proceeding by reason <strong>of</strong> its involving<br />
some important question <strong>of</strong> law, or being a test case, or for any<br />
other sufficient reason, is one which should be tried in the High<br />
Court, it may order the record to be transferred to the High<br />
Court.<br />
(a)<br />
Important question <strong>of</strong> law, test case, any other sufficient reason<br />
219 It is submitted that the condition <strong>of</strong> “any other sufficient reason”<br />
under Section 38 SCA would be satisfied if (i) there are strong reasons<br />
(<strong>of</strong> the kind set out in Section 6.1(a)-(d) above) for why the civil suit<br />
ought to be heard by the same court which deals with the ancillary<br />
matters, and (ii) the civil suit may not be transferred from the High Court<br />
to the Family Court as it was not commenced by a writ <strong>of</strong> summons—for<br />
example, it is a bankruptcy matter which was commenced by way <strong>of</strong> a<br />
petition—or if it was commenced under specific legislation giving<br />
jurisdiction only to the High Court. (See Section 6.4.2.2(a) and (b)<br />
above.)<br />
220 Therefore, the question that has to be asked first, is whether it is<br />
possible for the High Court suit to be transferred to the Family Court. If<br />
not, then the next question that has to be asked is whether the ancillary<br />
matters in the Family Court involve an important question <strong>of</strong> law or<br />
would be a test case. If so, then they should be transferred up to the High<br />
Court, to be heard with the civil suit.<br />
221 If the ancillary matters do not involve an important question <strong>of</strong><br />
law or do not constitute a test case, then the considerations set out in the<br />
Australian Master Builders case, supra (i.e. issues <strong>of</strong> fact which are so<br />
complicated, issues <strong>of</strong> law which are so complex, etc. that to allow them<br />
to be tried by a district court would merely open another tier <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
and thus prolong the ultimate disposal <strong>of</strong> the case) must be considered,<br />
both in relation to the ancillary matters as well as the civil suit, in order<br />
to decide whether the civil suit should be transferred to the Family Court,<br />
or whether the ancillary matters should be transferred up to the High<br />
Court.<br />
(b) Order 89 Rule 2
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222 The relevant procedural rule governing the transfer <strong>of</strong> District<br />
Court matters to the High Court is Order 89 Rule 2 <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court,<br />
which states:<br />
Procedure on transfer from the Subordinate Courts (O. 89, r. 2)<br />
2. —(1) Where an order is made by the High Court for the<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> any proceedings from the Subordinate Courts to the<br />
High Court, the Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Subordinate Courts must send to<br />
the Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court the file <strong>of</strong> the proceedings,<br />
all documents, exhibits and a certified copy <strong>of</strong> the notes <strong>of</strong><br />
evidence (if any) <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
(2) The Registrar <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court must give notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
transfer to every party to the proceedings.<br />
(c) Order 4 Rule 1<br />
223 As in the case <strong>of</strong> orders for “transfers down” from the High<br />
Court to the Family Court, once the order has been made for the ancillary<br />
matters to be transferred from the Family Court to the High Court, it may<br />
be consolidated with, ordered to be tried at the same time as, ordered to<br />
be tried in immediate succession with the ancillary matters proceedings,<br />
or an order for stay made be made. (For a discussion on Order 4 Rule 1,<br />
see Section 6.4.1 above.)<br />
6.4.2.4 Civil suit filed in the District Court to be heard with<br />
ancillary matters pending in the High Court—Transfer up<br />
<strong>of</strong> civil suit to High Court<br />
224 The relevant provision governing the transfer up <strong>of</strong> a civil suit<br />
filed in the District Court is Section 38 SCA, discussed in Section 6.4.2.3<br />
above. Once again, it must be shown that there is an important question<br />
<strong>of</strong> law, test case or some other sufficient reason before the transfer up <strong>of</strong><br />
the civil suit to the High Court will be allowed.<br />
225 Note the High Court case <strong>of</strong> Rightrac Trading v Ong Soon Heng<br />
& Lim Kim Choon 134 , however, where Lai Siu Chiu J opined that where a<br />
party to a District Court Suit applies to transfer his claim to the High<br />
Court when his claim is $250,000 or less, he must first satisfy the court<br />
that the proceedings involve some important question <strong>of</strong> law, is a test<br />
134 [2003] SGHC 236
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 303<br />
case, or for any other sufficient reason should be transferred up—but<br />
where his claim is over $250,000, he need not satisfy the court in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> these factors. (It is submitted that this principle, though<br />
applicable to civil suits filed in the District Court, should not be<br />
applicable to ancillary matters proceedings in the Family Court, as this<br />
would render the Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order<br />
nugatory.)<br />
226 If the court must be satisfied that the proceedings involve some<br />
important question <strong>of</strong> law, is a test case, or for any other sufficient<br />
reason should be transferred up, it is submitted that strong reasons (<strong>of</strong> the<br />
kind set out in Section 6.1(a)-(d) above) why the civil suit must be heard<br />
by the court dealing with the ancillary matters proceedings would satisfy<br />
the latter requirement, in the light <strong>of</strong> the fact that ancillary matters may<br />
not be transferred from the High Court to the District court, as the<br />
originating process was a petition (see Section 6.4.2.2(a) above).<br />
227 Paragraphs (b) and (c) <strong>of</strong> Section 6.4.2.3 above would be<br />
applicable to this scenario.<br />
6.4.3 Civil Suits filed in the Magistrate’s Court<br />
6.4.3.1 Ancillary matters pending in the High Court<br />
228 It is not possible to transfer ancillary matters pending in the High<br />
Court to the Magistrate’s Court (Section 37 SCA only gives the High<br />
Court the power to transfer matters to the District Court, and not the<br />
Magistrate’s Court. In any event, only proceedings commenced by a writ<br />
<strong>of</strong> summons may be transferred down to the District Court under Section<br />
37 SCA). Neither is it possible to transfer a Magistrate’s Court suit to the<br />
High Court. (See the case <strong>of</strong> Ong Pang Wee v Chiltern Park<br />
Development Pte Ltd, supra). Thus, in such a situation, at most, the<br />
parties may apply for one matter to be stayed until the other is heard.<br />
6.4.3.2 Ancillary matters pending in the Family Court<br />
229 The Transfer Order and the Second Transfer Order only gave<br />
jurisdiction to the District Court to hear divorce cases, but not the<br />
Magistrate’s Court. Therefore, it is not possible to transfer the ancillary<br />
matters pending in the Family Court to the Magistrate’s Court. Under<br />
Section 53 SCA 135 , the Magistrate’s Court may transfer matters to the<br />
135<br />
Section 53 (Transfer from Magistrates’ Courts to District Courts) states:<br />
A Magistrate’s Court may, either <strong>of</strong> its own motion or on the [continued next page]
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District Court. There are two conflicting High Court cases on whether<br />
the applicant must satisfy the requirement that there is an “important<br />
question <strong>of</strong> law or fact” to be decided before his case can be transferred<br />
to the District Court, or whether he need do so only if if the amount<br />
claimed in his case is below the current jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> a District Court.<br />
(See the High Court judgments in Tan Kok Ing v Tan Swee Meng &<br />
Others, Rightrac Trading v Ong Soon Heng & Lim Kim Choon and Seow<br />
Hock Ann and Chiltern Park Development Pte Ltd v Ong Pang Wee &<br />
Ors 136 )<br />
230 The relevant procedural rule for the transfer <strong>of</strong> Magistrate’s<br />
Court matters to the Family Court would be Order 89 Rule 4 (Transfer <strong>of</strong><br />
proceedings within the Subordinate Courts) <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court. 137<br />
After the Magistrate’s Court matter is transferred to the Family Court, it<br />
may be ordered to be consolidated with, tried at the same time as, tried in<br />
immediate succession with, the ancillary matters, or an order for stay<br />
may be made under Order 4 Rule 1 <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> Court.<br />
7 Conclusion<br />
231 When the 3 rd party issue rears its head, should the husband or<br />
wife in the divorce proceedings force the 3 rd party to join the ancillary<br />
matters proceedings as a party Should they even notify him about the<br />
proceedings, or should they allow him to live in blissful ignorance<br />
232 Should the 3 rd party ‘start his own fight, join in the fray, speak<br />
from the sidelines’, or try to live ‘in blissful ignorance’ When the<br />
deputy registrar at the ancillary pre-trial conference or the judge hearing<br />
the ancillary matters realises that there is a 3 rd party issue, should she<br />
order the 3 rd party to be notified <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, or acquiesce in the<br />
136<br />
137<br />
A Magistrate’s Court may, either <strong>of</strong> its own motion or on the application <strong>of</strong> a party<br />
to an action, transfer the action to a District Court on the ground that some<br />
important question <strong>of</strong> law or fact is likely to arise.<br />
[2003] 1 SLR 657; [2003] SGHC 236; and [2002] 4 SLR 79, at para 38,<br />
respectively.<br />
Order 89 Rule 4 states:<br />
(1) Where a Subordinate Court is satisfied that any proceedings in that Court ought<br />
to be tried in some other Subordinate Court, it may order the proceedings to be<br />
transferred to the other Court.<br />
(2) Any order under paragraph (1) may be made by the Court on its own motion or<br />
on the application by summons <strong>of</strong> any party to the proceedings.<br />
(3) Where an order under paragraph (1) is made by the Court on its own motion,<br />
the Registrar must give notice <strong>of</strong> the transfer to every party to the proceedings.
15 SAcLJ Matrimonial Assets and the 3 rd Party 305<br />
husband and wife’s decision to allow him to live ‘in blissful ignorance’<br />
Should she go further, and make him a party to the proceedings<br />
233 As this article has shown, the answers to these questions for each<br />
<strong>of</strong> these players will vary, depending on a host <strong>of</strong> factors. It is submitted<br />
that the most important factor would be what orders (if any) are being<br />
sought against the 3 rd party by the husband and/or the wife.<br />
234 It is therefore vital that the divorcing husband and wife look out<br />
for, and crystallise, the 3 rd party issues as early as possible, so that all<br />
parties—the 3 rd party and the court included—can formulate their<br />
respective strategies for dealing with these issues well before the<br />
ancillary matters hearing date. This would ensure that the conduct <strong>of</strong> the<br />
action will be cost-effective and expedient in respect <strong>of</strong> all parties, and<br />
the 3 rd party’s level <strong>of</strong> involvement in the same will be in accordance<br />
with the interests <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
LIM HUI MIN ∗<br />
∗ BA (Oxon.), BCL, District Judge, Family and Juvenile Court. The views expressed are<br />
my own and do not necessarily reflect the views <strong>of</strong> the Subordinate Courts, <strong>Singapore</strong>.