CHAPTER V REFUTATION OF BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER V
REFUTATION OF BAUDDHA
PHILOSOPHY
172

CHAPTER 5
REFUTATION OF BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY
Introduction.
áa´kara refers to the three main schools of Buddhism. They
are Sarv¡stivada, Vijµ¡nav¡da and á£nyav¡da. The Sarv¡stiv¡dins
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accept the reality of both the outside and the inside world 1 . The
Vijµ¡nav¡dins maintain the theory that thought alone is real 2 . The
á£nyav¡dins agree that everything is void 3 , but all of them agree that
everything is momentary. According to Nataliya Ì¿ayeva, “As shown
by the Advaitist, the Buddhists are classified under different sects in
accordance with their interpretation of reality. Some maintain that
everything exists ‘Sarvo ¡sti iti sarv¡stiv¡di, others allow for the
existence of consciousness , that is , Vijµ¡nav¡da, and there are some
who claim everything to be void, that is , á£nyav¡da. The general
definition applied by áa´kara to all Buddhist schools is derived from
the term Vin¡¿a, destruction, annihilation; it points out the core of
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the teaching, namely, the idea of the non-existence of Ëtman as a
separate ontological reality. Therefore, Buddhism is determined by
him as Vain¡¿ikamata, which can be roughly rendered as a teaching
about non-existence 4 ”. áa´kara has been regarded by his opponents
as a Crypto-Buddhist (Pracchanna-Bauddha). Many opponents of
áa´kara regarded him as a Crypto Buddhist, because there are
parallels between Advaita Ved¡nta and Mah¡y¡na Budhism,
especially in connection with the principle of avidya and two truthsthe
Param¡rthika (the absolute) and the Vyavah¡rika (the practical).
Both these systems accept avidya as that which is to be removed, and
both of them accept the twofold division of avidya-cognitional and
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conational aspects. But áa´kara gives more emphasis to investigation
and inquiry. But Bauddha gives more emphasize to mind control
and morality. Avidya , in its cognitional aspect , has provided a
‘path’. According to Bauddha concept of Avidy¡: ‘path’ is the
practice relating to prajµa. According to áa´kara, the path consists
of investigation into the Ved¡nta texts , and the inquiry into
Brahman. Against the Bauddha notion of momentariness, áa´kara
emphasized on eternity of fundamental principle. These are the
points of difference between áa´kara and Buddhists. The following
concepts of Bauddha philosophy are refuted by áa´kara. They are :
(1)theory of causation , (2) the concept of Ëk¡¿a, (3) the theory of
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origination of an entity from absence, (4) the concept of self intuition
, (5)the concept that object entity and cognition are the same, (6) The
concept that all worldly cognitions are unreal like dream, (7) the
concept of svasamvedana pratyakÀa, (8) the concept of V¡sana,
(9)the concept of alayavijµ¡n as the abode of v¡sana, and (10)the
concept of antarjµeyar£pa as object entity.
Sarv¡stiv¡da
The Sarv¡stiv¡da school of H¢nay¡na Buddhism is in its
approach realistic. It is divided into two: Sautr¡ntika and
Vaibh¡Àika. The Vaibh¡Àika attaches itself to Vibh¡Àa ,a
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commentary on Abhidharma work and it may be called
presentationalism (The doctrine that in perception the mind has
immediate cognition of the object). The Vaibh¡Àika-s maintain the
independent existence of mind and matter.
The Sautr¡ntik¡s are attached to s£tra and they may be called
advocates of representationalism. (The doctrine that perceived
objects as only a representation of real external objects). The
Sautr¡ntik¡s maintain the theory that all external things are
inferable. But the scholars agree that both these schools are equally
realistic. áa´kara refuted theses two schools bearing the name of
Sarv¡stiv¡da.
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Refutation of the Buddhist theory of causation
The Buddhist theory of causation is called Prat¢tya-s¡mulpada
or the theory of dependent origination. Regarding the concept of
causation, the Sarv¡stiv¡da holds the view that all constructed things
are independently originated 5 . The famous Buddhist thinker
Kamala¿ila says that it is the chief jewel among all the teachings of
the Buddha. According to Dr. Vijaya Rani, this theory has a wide
scope. It covers the problem of causal relationship, the theories of
momentariness, of disconnected flow, of no soul, of ¿£nyata and so
forth 6 . The effect elements come forth only when the cause element is
there (dharma-sthitita).
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According to áa´kara, the term samud¡ya 7 can be interpreted
in two ways: (1) the evolutes having as cause the elements of fire,
water, earth and wind, and (2) the mentals having thought as their
cause 8 . The Sarv¡stiv¡dins and their followers recognize the view that
the external reality is either element or elemental and the internal
reality is either mind or mental. They say that both these together
make up this universe. The external
world is made up of the
aggregation of atoms 9 . These atoms are four kinds i.e., atoms of
earth, i.e., hard, (b) atoms of water, i.e., viscid ,(c) atoms of fire, i.e.,
hot, (d) atoms of air, i.e., mobile. These atoms are gathered together
in to aggregates. With the connection of the internal world, the five
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personal skand¡s are the cause. They are: r£pa skandh¡, vijµ¡na
skandh¡, vedan¡ skandh¡, samjµ¡ skandh¡ and samsk¡ra skandh¡ 10 .
By the aggregation of these skandh¡s the internal world is produced.
According to áa´kara, the above view of Sarv¡stiv¡da is
unacceptable because no cause is established for the existence either
of the aggregate of elements and evolutes or of the aggregate of
thought and mental 11 . These two types of aggregates can never be
formed at all. The unintelligent momentary atoms and the
momentary skandh¡s cannot form any systematic whole. áa´kara
continually says that if individual atoms could engage in activity on
their own account, then their activity would never cease 12 . So there is
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no aggregation. Without the aggregation the worldly things cannot
exist. But the Sarv¡stiv¡dins suppose that on the basis of the series of
the dependent origination (prat¢tyas¡mulp¡da) the aggregate can be
formed. Dr Vijaya Rani gives two definitions to Prat¢tyas¡mulp¡da,
i.e., an origination after getting the causes, and an origination after
the destruction of the causes 13 . On the basis of the formation of
aggregates the series of Prat¢tyas¡mulpada can be explained’ 14 . The
series is – avidy¡, samsk¡ra, vijjµ¡na, n¡ma, r£pa, Àad¡yatana,
spar¿a, vedan¡, t¤À¸a, up¡d¡na, bh¡va, jati, jara, mara¸a, ¿oka,
parivedana, dukha, etc 15 . Through this series an uninterrupted chain
of cause and effect is constituted. This chain cannot take place
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without the aggregates. The Sarv¡stiv¡dins hold the view that the
aggregates are the reality, by the s£tra: itaretarapratyay¡tvatiti
cennolpattim¡tra nimittatv¡t 16 .
áa´kara refutes these concepts of
Sarv¡stiv¡dins. According to áa´kara, the formation of the aggregates
are explained by the mutual causality of the series of dependent
origination. He refutes them by saying that though the preceding
one is the cause of the subsequent one, there is nothing which can be
the cause of the whole of the aggregate. According to him, the atoms
cannot combine themselves even when they are assumed to be
permanent and eternal, because the atoms are momentary
aggregates
without which the nid¡nas would be deprived of an
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abode. He says that Bauddhas may accept nescience as an efficient
cause for the aggregates, Since the aggregates follow one another in a
series 17 . The aggregates are formed on the basis of nescience, they
follow one another as a series in an endless world. It causes an
aggregate being born distinct from an aggregate, which is born
similar according to rule, or is born either similar or dissimilar,
according to no rule. In the former case, a man could never be
reborn in a different state. In the latter case, he could in an instance
be transformed into something else. áa´kara argues against the
Sarv¡stiv¡da concept of series by asking how aggregates can be born
from other aggregates in an endless series. In that case , liberation
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would be desired by one but attained by another. So, the series
stands in a relation of successive causality and it cannot be the cause
of the aggregates, and there being no permanent enjoyer, there is
neither any need of the aggregate. The mere existence of the
preceding moment means its causal efficiency. This also cannot be
acceptable because no effect can arise without imbibing the nature of
the cause which is permanent as it continues to exist in the effect
and thus the Bauddha doctrine of momentariness is not acceptable.
Through the commentary of the s£tra –uttarolp¡de ca
p£rvanirodh¡t 18 , áa´kara establishes that the successive causality
spoken of in the series of avidy¡, samsk¡ra etc. is untenable. The
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Sarv¡stiv¡dins argues that everything is created; the antecedent thing
would already have ceased to exist at the next moment (ulpanna
vin¡Àa) 19 . According to the Abhidhar-mako¿a, “the uninterrupted
succession of moments following one another is duration. The latter
moment is the substitute of the former moment because of
similarity” 20 .
áa´kara refutes this argument thus - it is intended by the
Sarv¡stiv¡din that the entity having a perfected condition in the
previous moment cause of entity in a later moment. This is not
possible, because of the occurrence of connection with a second
moment when there is the hypothesis of the further activity of an
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entity 21 . áa´kara states that if existence (bh¡va) of the cause be its
activity (vy¡p¡ra) ,then the effect is imbued with the nature of the
cause. The cause lasts for more than one moment and the principle
of momentariness is tresspassed. The Sarv¡stiv¡din say that existence
is its activity 22 . áa´kara refuted the point saying that it is impossible
because of the impossibility of arising of an effect. As that which is
not imbued with the nature of the cause since everything is
momentary, the antecedent thing would already have ceased to exist
at the next moment, when the subsequent thing is created 23 . So it can
be the cause of the other.
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According to the view Sarv¡stiv¡da, áa´kara says that the cause
and effect can continue to exist without the colouring of the effect by
the cause. áa´kara replies that such a position would bring about
confusion.
áa´kara says that the Sarv¡stiv¡din cannot admit any causal
process issuing from the momentary cause and influencing effect.
The characteristic of cause influences the characteristic of the effect.
That concept cannot be denied by the Sarv¡stiv¡din. If it is still
maintained to be the cause, then one has to accept that existence
comes out of non-existence. For example, the cloth is produced by
the non-existent yarns. Otherwise, one can think that clay can
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produce the cloth. The doctrine of momentariness would go against
the principle that the effect is the cause in a new form. This principle
shows that the cause existed in the effect, which means that the
process of the causation is not momentary 24 .
According áa´kara, on account of the momentariness of things
‘origination and destruction’’ will be synonymous. A momentary
entity as a product must go through the state of origination,
existence and destruction. So, every entity must have a life span of at
least three moments. áa´kara examines that three alternatives for
explaining the origination and cessation. 1. Svar£pa (entity exists in
its own form). 2. Avst¡ntara (entry existed in another state). 3.
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Vastv¡ntara (production of an altogether different thing) 25 . The
Abhidharmako¿a also presents the concept of origination and
cessation constitute by the Sarv¡stiv¡dins, through three alternatives,
i.e., a thing in its own form (svar£pa), another state (avast¡ntara)
and altogether different thing (vastv¡ntara) as the characteristics of
dharma 26 .
These alternatives pointed out by áa´kara cannot be
applied logically to the Sarv¡stiv¡dins doctrine. áa´kara says that
according to the first view, the origination and destruction constitute
the own-formation of a given thing. So the origination and
destruction are equivalent to thing itself. According to the second
view, áa´kara’s position that the origination and cessation represent
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the initial and final stages of the given thing which presuppose an
intermediate stage. Then the given thing will have relation with the
three moments and is no longer momentary. Therefore the
Sarv¡stiv¡da concept is trespassed. According to the last view, the
given thing is altogether disconnected from origination and
destruction. So , it must be regarded as everlasting. Therefore, the
Sarv¡stiv¡da concept is refuted by áa´kara’.
Some Sarv¡stiv¡dins says that the origination and cessation of
a given thing signify merely the perception and non-perception. It is
in opposition to the Sautr¡ntika concept. The Sarv¡stiv¡dins say that
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“there is no pram¡¸a for the cessation and origination of a given
thing” 27 .
áa´kara refutes this concept and says that if our perception
and non-perception of a given thing constitute the birth and
cessation, one will have to say that these are the characteristics of a
seer, not the characteristic of a given thing. So áa´kara thoroughly
says that the ultimate nature of a given thing is permanent and it is
not momentary 28 .
According to the Sarv¡stiv¡da concept, cause and effect exist
simultaneously at the next moment. That means the cause lasts for
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more than one moment. This opinion is against the Sarv¡stiv¡da
theory of momentariness .
áa´kara cannot accept the theory of momen-tariness, because
his Advaita principle of eternal entity is contradictory to it. That is
why áa´kara refuted the concept of Sarv¡stiv¡da emphatically.
Refutation of Vaibh¡Àika theory of Destruction
áa´kara criticizes the Vaibh¡Àikas view that the
pratisamkhy¡nirodha, apratisamkhy¡nirodha and ¡k¡¿a are
indefinable, non-placeable and external. áa´kara regards these as
definable, placeable and external. The pratis¡mkhya-nirodha is
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concerned with the momentary existence of dharm¡-s and is
admitted to have a cause, e.g., when a jar is broken by a man with a
stick. The apratisamkhy¡nirodha is concerned with the cessation of
an entity, e.g., natural decay of things 29 .
The famous Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu defines
pratisamkhy¡nirodha as the cessation of the Sa¿ravadharmas by
means of transcendental knowledge. Yamakami Sogen pointed out
that this is the summon bonum of the Sarv¡stiv¡din who considers it
to be synonymous with nirvana also, the Vijjµ¡nav¡dins consider it
merely as a stage leading to nirv¡¸a 30 .
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Vasubandhu defines the apratisamkhy¡nirodha as a complete
cessation of the mixing of elements (dharm¡-s) due to the
unavailability of the required conditions 31 .
The famous Buddhist logician Vasubandhu asserts that “the
destruction of existent things is without any cause (¡kasmik¡hetuka);
Because a produced thing has its causes but destruction is only the
negation of existence and hence nothing can be done of that which
itself is non-existent 32 ”.
The Vaibh¡Àik¡-s think that the pratis¡mkhya-nirodha,
apratis¡mkhya nirodh and ¡k¡¿ are non-placeable insubstantial
and indefinable. The destruction proceeded by the mind of entities is
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known a cessation with understanding. The destruction preceded by
without the mind if entity is known as the apratisamkhy¡nirodha.
The absence of hindrance is known as ¡k¡¿a 33 .
According to áa´kara these two kinds of destruction do not
happen because the series of dependently originated dharm¡-s
cannot be broken, the nid¡n¡s are related to each other as cause and
effect. The nid¡n¡s of dependently originated dharmas must be
inseparably connected with its previous states. So the indefinable
destruction is not possible.
áa´kara argues that these two kinds of destruction cannot be
found in the individual members of the series. In the momentary
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existence of each member, there is no conscious destruction. It is not
an unconscious destruction also, because the individual member is
not altogether destroyed, e.g., When a pot is destroyed we find the
existence of clay. On account of the heat, the drop of water
disappears and we see it existing in the other form like steam. In
Bauddha concept of vin¡¿a, there is nothing related to any other
form or other substance 34 . So their concept is not accepted by
áa´kara.
In the words of Yamakami Sogen, áa´kara has mistaken in
representing the said two nirodh¡s . áa´kara critically says that the
two kinds of destruction are either the result of perfect knowledge or
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of the meaninglessness of the path. Thus, both concepts are not
accepted by áa´kara. If we accept the first idea it is against the
Bauddha principle of causeless destruction. If we accept the later
concept, there is the cause of the meaningless of the path. Thus, both
concepts are rejected by áa´kara.
Refutation of the concept of Ëk¡¿a
According to the Buddhist philosophy, pratisamkhy¡-nirodha
and apratisamkhy¡nirodha are indefinable. Refutation of these have
already been described earlier. Then he takes the third entity Ëk¡¿a.
According to the Buddhistic view the Ëk¡¿a is also indefinable. The
indefinability of Ëk¡¿a is refuted
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y áa´kara in Brahmas£trabh¡Àya 35 . According to Abhidharmako¿a,
the Sarv¡stiv¡dins define ¡k¡¿a as that having for its
measure the absence of tangible .
According to Sarv¡stiv¡dins there are two kinds of ¡k¡¿a: (1)
unconstructed dharma (2) the space as element. The space element
included within the sense base of the visible. Ëk¡¿a as unconstructed
dharma has for its nature non-hindrance .
In áa´kara’s words, like the pratisamkhy¡nirodha and
apratisamkhy¡- nirodha, the ¡k¡¿a is also a given thing. From verse,
¡tman¡h ¡k¡¿a sambh£tah 36 we know that ¡k¡¿a is a substance. As
the Bauddha do not accept the áruti as a pram¡¸a, the anum¡na is
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also be adopted to prove the substantiality of ¡k¡¿a. Ëk¡¿a is similar
to earth, air, etc. They are recognized to be entities in consequence of
their being the substratum of properties like smell, cold etc, similarly
the ¡k¡¿a, it being the substratum of sound, ought to be recognized
as an entity 37 . Therefore áa´kara refuted the Bauddha concept by
saying that ¡k¡¿a should be definable.
áa´kara refutes the Sarv¡stiv¡da definition of ¡k¡¿a i.e., ¡k¡¿a as the
absence of material flow without hindrance (sapratigha
dravyabh¡vam¡tra). He presents the example of the flying of the
birds in the sky. When a bird flies in ¡k¡¿a, there is the presence of
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obstruction, hence another bird that may try to fly will find no scope
for doing so. In
this case, anything with the help of which the absence of obstruction,
is specified will itself be the possible entity - ¡k¡¿a, and it will not be
mere absence of hindrance 38 . In the series of question referred to
Baudha dar¿ana, there is a question of “what is the basis of earth”.
They say that the wind is the basis of earth. The next question is,
“what is the basis of wind”. Their answer is the ¡k¡¿a is the basis of
wind. From this we get the conclusion that if ¡k¡¿a is not a given
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thing the above answer is not correct. Therefore ¡k¡¿a must be an
entity 39 .
Refutation of the origination of object entity from absence
According to áa´kara, the Sautr¡ntikas notion that birth as existence
subsequent to non-existence (abh£tva bh¡vutpada) is questionable.
Their idea is not accepted by áa´kara. Because they do not accept the
permanent and eternal cause of a given thing, but they argue that an
entity
is derived from non-existence. For example, they say that, from the
destruction of a seed a sprout is formed. Like, when the milk is
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destroyed, the curd is formed, from the lump of a clay a pot is
formed. So the Sautr¡ntikas say that from the absence the entity is
formed.
áa´kara argues against their concept. He says that if a thing
can arise out of absence, then anything can arise out of anything.
áa´kara says that if this theory was true, then no one would have to
exert himself to attain any end, since ends could be attain without
means. If the nirv¡¸a is born from absence there would be the
perfection of the lazy people also because the attainment of absence
is very easy. Therefore áa´kara thoroughly refutes the view that there
should be no evidence to prove that the entity is born from absence.
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Refutation of Vijµ¡nav¡da
Vijµ¡nav¡da
The Vijµ¡nav¡dins argue for the non-existence of external
objects. In Brahs£tra¿a´karabh¡Àya, áa´kara has presented five
arguments put forward by Vijµ¡nv¡dins to prove the non-existence of
external objects (1) If external objects exist, they are either atoms or
aggregates of atoms. But they can be neither and are therefore nonexistent.
(2) Even those who admit the existence of external objects,
admit different forms of their cognitions. But if forms of cognitions
are admitted, they suffice for the practical purpose of our life, and
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the existence of external objects becomes unnecessary. (3) Objects
and their cognitions are invariably perceived together. Therefore they
are identical with each other. (4) Waking cognitions apprehend
themselves like dream cognitions. Both are similar to each other.
Both are not produced by external
objects . (5) The variety of pratyayavaicitra is due to the variety of
v¡san¡- vaicitra. These arguments are refuted by áa´kara.
Refutation of self-intuition.
The concept of self intuition of Buddhists is connected with
the non separation of three factors that is subject, object and self
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intuition. In Pram¡¸a samuccaya, Dinn¡ga proves that these three
factors are inseparable.
According to the concept of the Vijµ¡nav¡dins the jµeya is not
different from jµ¡na. The famous Vijµ¡nav¡di Dharmak¢rti says that
when we see a blue lotus, the blue and cognition of blue are not
different entities. One should recognize their difference as due to the
false cognition. Like the astigmatic seeing the double moon, but the
moon is single.
áa´kara in his commentary on the Brahmas£tra “nabh¡va
upalabdeÅ” 40
tries to deny the dependent object entity of
Vijµ¡nav¡da. He puts forward the five types of the p£rvapakÀins . (1)
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According to áa´kara the Vijµ¡nav¡dins note that the object entity is
composed of atoms. It is untenable. If object entities are different
from atoms, they can no longer be said to consist of atoms. He
continually says that if they are identical with atoms they cannot be
aggregates. For example, about the objects like posts, there will not
be the notion of atoms etc. There is no collection of atoms such as
posts, etc because of the impossibility of ascertaining the posts etc.,
by means of otherness or non-otherness from atoms.
(2) The Vijµ¡nav¡dins argue that the variety of cognition is
explained only by the variety of sense object. Therefore, the sense
object have a formation similar to their cognitions.
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(3) In áa´kara’s words, the Vijµ¡nav¡dins argue that the
ascertainment of sense - object and perception are identical.
(4) According to áa´kara Vijµ¡nav¡dins say that consciousness
is to be considered as similar to a dream. The images occur in a
dream without the presence of corresponding object entities.
Likewise in the waking stage also the images occur without the
eternal object entities. For example, the concepts of gandharva
nagara, marumar¢cika, magic, etc, are only the imaginary subject
and object, there is no eternal reality.
(5) According to áa´kara, the Vijµ¡nav¡dins say that the variety of
concepts can be explained by the presense of v¡sana 41 .
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These are the five arguments put forward by áa´kara for refuting
the Vijµ¡nav¡din’s concept. It is very interesting to examine the
refutational attempts of áa´kara against the Vijµ¡nav¡dins as a
revelation of his own philosophical concept. According to áa´kara
there is an external object on the ground of perception itself. There
is no absence because of perception. The absence indeed of an
outer object entity cannot be ascertained. The outer object entity is
perceived in accordance with the notion as post, wall , pot, cloth,
likewise . The absence of a thing being perceived is not possible.
Refutation of Antarjµeyar£pa as the object entity
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áa´kara criticizes the famous Vijµ¡nav¡din, Dinn¡ga’s concept
antarjjµeyar£pa as the object entity. He takes a verse from
Dinn¡ga’s Ëlambanapar¢kÀa which defines the object entity as the
inner form of knowledge which appears though it were external;
“yatantarjµeyar£pan tu bahirvad avabh¡sate 42 .
áa´kara raises his objection against the Vijµ¡v¡dins
saying that their usage “bahirvad” betrays their acceptance of the
external object-entity. “The external thing is well known to the
whole world, then why do you apply the affix vat is (as if) . How
should you say the affix ‘vat’ as external to objects 43 ”. áa´kara
asks.
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áa´kara employs his argument for identity of objective reference
against the Vijµ¡nav¡dins. According to his principle, x is y, not x is
like y. This is a post, this is a wall , these type of knowledges are
produced by the people for the worldly existence of the sense-objects
of perception. áa´kara says that people say that “this is a cow, not an
animal like cow”. If the Bauddha argues the object -entity is bahirvat
(like external), on the ground of the impossibility of external things,
áa´kara answers to it that the possibility or impossibility of the
things is to be determined on the basis of pram¡¸a 44 .
Then the Vijµ¡nav¡din says that the sense-objects correspond
to our cognitions 45 . So there is no necessity of sense-object. áa´kara
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efutes the point by saying if there is no sense-object, there is no
cognition also.
Refutation of the theory that object entity and cognition are the
same.
The Vijµ¡nav¡din views that the simultaneity of notion and
sense object are identical. For example, blue and the notion of blue
occur simultaneously. áa´kara replies that the simultaneous
experience of notion and sense-object proves only that sense-object
constitutes the means to the notion.
áa´kara argues that there is a distinction between sense object
and its notion on the basis of the difference between vi¿eÀa¸a and
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vi¿eÀya 46 . He presents, cognition of a pot, a cloth and a jar etc as
example. In connection with a white cow and a black cow, the
difference lies in between whiteness and blackness. It is not based
on cowness 47 . So áa´kara says that the object entity and cognition
are different.
Refutation of Svasamvedana PratyakÀa
áa´kara refutes the Vijµ¡nav¡da concept of svasamvedana
pratyakÀa Dharmak¢rti defined svasamvedana pratyakÀa as selfapprehension
of every cognition and every mental phenomenon 48 .
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According to áa´kara, the Bauddha concept is that each cognition
is of essential self-illuminating nature like lamp. The presence of
perception indicates the presence of an external object-entity on
the grounds that it is not of a luminous nature like a lamb, as is
the perception 49 . The perception is not experienced for itself apart
from the object-entity because of the contradictoriness of activity in
itself .
áa´kara says that according to the Vijµ¡v¡dins concept, the
perceptions are self-luminous and they do not need to be
apprehended by a witness apart from themselves. The two
arguments given by the Vijµ¡nav¡dins to explain their concept are
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the following. (1) the danger of infinite regression is there that an
apprehending agent would again in turn require an apprehending
agent. (2) The concept of perceptions, like lamp etc, have light as
their nature 50 .
áa´kara explains that the witnessing self is of the nature of the
knowing subject and consequently it does not need to be
apprehended from the point of view of infinite regression. So we
can know the diversity of the self – existence of the witness and the
notion 51 .
To the second argument áa´kara replies that the perceptions are
self luminous like the lamp. A conscious agent does not involve in
215

infinite regression. There he proceeds to affirm the necessity of a
conscious agent. Such notions are like existence of thousand lamps
situated in the middle of a dense cave 52 .
According to áa´kara, an interior conscious agent is needed
for the perception to be manifest. According to him the concept of
the Ved¡ntins are differ from the Vijµ¡nav¡dins because the first
phase of the perception involves the association of the eye with the
lamp 53 .
áa´kara points out that self is one and permanent and
eternal. But the perceptions acknowledged by Buddhist are
momentary and fleeting 54 .
216

áa´kara considers the Vijµ¡nav¡din’s argument of infinite
regression as directed against the notion of the self. They say that if
perception was to be apprehended by another. Then it causes other
perception and so on 55 . So there arises the problem of anavasth¡
áa´kara refutes this point by saying that the witnessing
self (perceiver) and the viÀaya (perceived) both are of different
natures related to each other i.e., perceiver and perceived. So their
result of their association does not cause the infinite regression 56 .
There fore the Bauddha theory of consciousness is not acceptable to
Advaita Ved¡nta because no one can say that Devadatta is the son
of a barren woman. In áa´kara’s words we get the conclusion that
217

the very nature of consciousness itself proves the existence of
external things different from consciousness 57 . So the perception
is self manifested.
Refutation of the theory that all worldly cognitions are unreal like
dream
The Vijµ¡nav¡dins declared that the waking stage and dream
stage are similar in so far as they deny the external objects. But
áa´kara raises the question that if the dream state and walking
state are alike, how does direct perception happen.
On account of momentariness, the mental perception does
not operate at the same time as sensory perception but in a moment
218

afterwards. There is a question whether the mental perception has
the same object in the sensory perception. Dinn¡ga says that the
external object is not being denied here, but the external object of
which our representation is a faithful copy is being denied. This
means that the form of the inner knowable which appears as if it
were external, is the object 58 . This is denied by the Vijµ¡nav¡dins.
According to the Vijµ¡nav¡dins, the differences between
waking state and dream state can be compared to the difference
between upalabdhi (perception) and sm¤ti (remembrance). Both the
mental perception and remembrance occur subsequent to the fading
out of sensory perception.
219

áa´kara refutes the above concept of Vijµ¡nav¡dins in the
following way- how can similarity of the waking state and dream
state be established . He puts forward two arguments to refute
their concept. The contents of the dream state are negated by the
waking state. But the contents of waking state is not negated by
anything and any where 59 . This is the difference between perception
and the waking state 60 .
áa´kara says that the Vijµ¡nav¡da argument is not correct.
Perception means the direct perception of an object. For example, a
father beholds his son rather than merely remembers him 61 .
220

According to áa´kara, the analogy of the dream only
emphasizes the temporal gap that exists between sensory perception
which is subsequent to the former. áa´kara concludes that the dream
state is a kind of memory and the waking state is real perception of
object entity.
Refutation of the concept of v¡sana
The Vijµ¡nav¡dins explain knowledge on the basis of habitual
(v¡sana)
energies without any reference to external object. The
221

concept of habitual energy is closely connected whith ¡layavijµ¡na.
The notions of ¡layavijµ¡na and v¡sana are primarily associated with
karma and phala.
According to Mah¡y¡nasamgraha the v¡sana means the
generative cause of things by virtue of their simultaneous birth and
destruction 62
. The ¡layavijµ¡na and v¡sana are intended by the
Vijµ¡nav¡dins to replace the external object. These ideas are intended
by the Vijµ¡nav¡dins to explicate the process of action and
destruction.
áa´kara says that the Vijµ¡nav¡din’s concept of v¡sana should
be refuted because v¡sana could not originate. If there is no external
222

object entity. The v¡sana is formed by the perception of external
thing 63 .
The Vijµ¡nav¡dins say that the objects are not perceived externally
because it is precisely owing to the perception of objects that a variety
of v¡sana (mental tendencies) corresponding to the diverse objects
can arise. áa´kara refuted this concept of the Vijµ¡nav¡dins by asking
how a variety of tendencies can arise when no object is perceived. If
these tendencies have no beginning, this infinite regression will
amount to a baseless assumption like the blind leading the blind.
223

According to áa´kara, the object entity is external to the mind.
For the establishment of his concepts he puts forward two
arguments: (1) the v¡sana cannot originate independently of the
perception of external -object-entity (2) The perception of externalobject-entities
can take place without the v¡sana 64 .
More over, he says that the v¡sana is a kind of qualification
which requires a basis. But the Vijµ¡nav¡dins deny such a basis.
There fore áa´kara says that there is no birth of v¡sana without the
224

perception of the object-entity 65 . He negates their concept, i.e., the
v¡sana is associated which the notions of action and effect.
á£nyav¡da
á£nyav¡da of the Bauddhas goes counter to everything. It goes
against the áruti, Sm¤ti and every other means of right knowledge.
So áa´kara refuted the whole concepts of á£nyav¡da by the help of
áruti, sm¤ti and yukti 66 . áa´kara dismisses the á£nyav¡da saying
that system is more contradicted.
Resume
In the refutation of Bauddha concepts áa´kara gave more
importance to yukti. Through the refutation, áa´kara
225

did not distinguish between Sarv¡stiv¡da and Sautr¡ntika schools.
áa´kara dismisses the á£nyav¡da by saying that the system is
contradicted by Sm¤ti, Yukti and áruti.
áa´kara abandoned the
main principle of Bauddha (kÀa¸ikav¡da) saying that the cause
lasts for more than one moment.
226

NOTES AND REFERENCE
1 kecit sarv¡stiv¡dinaÅ, BSSB. 2. 2. 4. 18 tadastivad¡¿iÀt¡Å yehi sarva
mast¢ti vadanti at¢taman-¡gatam praty¡tpannam sarv¡stivad¡Å (A.
K. and A. K. bh¡Àya v 25)
2 kecitvijµ¡stivam¡travav¡din¡Å, BSSB. 2.2.4.18
227

3 kecit sarva¿£nyatva v¡dinaÅ, BSSB.2.2.4.18
4 Nataliya Isayeva, Sankara and Indian Philosophy.pp.146 - 147
5 prat¢tyasamulp¡dopade¿apradh¡namidambhagavataÅ
pravacanaratnam. T.P.p. 13.
6 Dr. Vijaya Rani, Buddist Philosophy presented in m¢m¡-msa¿loka
v¡r -tika. p. 110. IV
7 samud¡ya ubhayahetukepi tadapr¡ptiÅ, B.S.2.2.4.18
8 Yoyamubhayahetuka ubhayaprakaraÅ samud¡yaÅ pare-À¡mabhi
preto¸uhetuka¿ca bh£tabhautikasamhatir£paÅ skandahetuka¿ca
paµcaskandh¢r£paÅ tasminnubhayah-etukepi samud¡yeabhi
preyam¡ne tadapr¡ptiÅ sy¡tsa-mud¡yapraptiÅ. BSSB.2.2.4.18.
228

9
bh£tam bhautikam bahyam cittam ca kamadhyantaramiti
vibh¡gaÅ, Ibid.
10
tatha r£pavijµ¡na vedana samjµ¡ samsk¡rasamjµak¡Å
paµcaskand¡Å, Ibid.
11 Yoyamubhayahetuka ubhayaprak¡raÅ samudayaÅ pare-
À¡mabhipreto¸uhetuka¿ca bh£tabhautika samhatir£paÅ
skandhahetuka¿ca paµc-askandh¢r£paÅ tasminnubha ya he
tukepi samudaye abhipreyam¡ne tadapr¡ptiÅ sy¡-
dsamud¡yapr¡ptiÅ, Ibid.
229

12 anyasya ca kasyacicetanasya bhoktuÅ pra¿¡siturva sthi-rasya
samhanturanabhyupagam¡t nirapekÀaprav¤tyabh-yupagame ca
prav¤tyanuparamaprasa´g¡t, Ibid.
13 Dr. Vijaya Rani, Buddhist philosophy presented in M¢m¡msa¿loka
v¡rtika. p.110. IV
14 heturatra samutp¡daÅ samutpannam phalam matam.
hetubh£tama´gam prat¢tyasamutp¡daÅ samutpadhyate
samad¢tik¤tva phalabh£tama´gam prat¢tyasamutpann-am.
evam sarv¡¸yang¡nyubhayath¡siddhyati. hetubha-lavat na caivam
satyavyavasth¡ bhavantyapekÀabhed¡t. yadapekÀya
230

prat¢tyasamutpado na tadevapekÀya prat¢-tyasamutpannam
hetubhalavat pit¤putravacca, A.K. III.28.
15 tec¡vidy¡dayovidy¡ samskaro vijµ¡nam, n¡ma r£pam Àa·¡yatanam
spar¿o vedan¡ t¤À¸¡, up¡d¡nam, bhavo, j¡tirjar¡, mara¸am, ¿okaÅ,
parivedana, dukham, durm-anastetyevamjat¢yaka
itaretarahetukaÅ saugate samaye kvacitsamkÀipta nirdistaÅ
kvacitprapaµcit¡Å, BSSB. 2.2.4.19.
16 B.S.2.2.4.19
17 atha manyase samgh¡ta ev¡nadau sams¡re samtaty¡n-urvartante
tad¡¿ray¡¿raya¿cavidhy¡daya iti, tadapi samgh¡t¡tsamgh¡t¡ntaramul-padhyam¡nam,
niyamena va
231

s¡d¤¿amevolpadhyate, aniyamena v¡ sad¤¿am visa-d¤¿am
volpadhyeta. BSSB.2.2.4.19
18 B.S. 2.2.4.20
19 kÀa¸abha´gav¡dinoyamabhyupagama uttaransmin-kÀa¸a
ulpadhyam¡ne p£rvaÅ kÀa¸o nirudhyata iti. BSSB.2.2.4.20.
20 uttarottara kÀa¸¡nubandhaÅ sthitiriti p£rvasya kÀa¸a-syottaraÅ
kÀa¸aÅ. pratinidhibh£taÅ s¡d¤¿yatataÅ sa
p£rvaÅkÀa¸¡dyapyavatiÀata, iveti k¤tvottaraÅ kÀa¸aÅ
sthitirucyate. A.K.II.46.
21 nirudham¡nasya niruddhasya v¡ p£rvakÀa¸asy¡bh¡vagrastatv¡duttarakÀa¸ahetutv¡nupapatteÅ.
atha bh¡va-bh£taÅ
232

pariniÀpann¡vasthaÅ p£rvakÀa¸a uttarakÀa¸asya
heturityabhipr¡yastath¡pi nopapadhyate. bh¡vabh£ta-sya
punarvy¡p¡rakalpan¡y¡m kÀa¸¡ntarasambandha-prasa´g¡t.
BSSB.2.2.4.20.
22 bh¡vasya vy¡p¡raÅ ityabhipr¡yasthat¡pi naivopapa-tyate. BSSB. 2.2.
4.20.
23 bh¡vabh£tasya punarvy¡p¡rakalpan¡y¡m kÀa¸¡ntarasambhandhaprasa´g¡t.
Ibid.
24 evamapy¡dhyantamadhyakÀa¸atrayasambandhitv¡tva-stunaÅ
kÀa¸ikatv¡bhyu pagamahaniÅ atathatyantavyatirikt¡vevolp¡danirodhau
vastunaÅ sy¡t¡ma¿vamahiÀa-vad, tato
233

vastu ulp¡danirodh¡bhy¡msams¤Àamiti vas-tunaÅ ¿¡¿vatatva
prasa´gaÅ. Ibid.
25 apicolpadanirodau n¡ma vastunaÅ svar£pameva v¡ sy¡-
t¡mavasth¡ntaram v¡ vastvantarameva v¡ sarvath¡pi
nopapadhyate. Ibid.
26 lakÀa¸¡nipunajanijar¡sthitiranityat¡ etani hi samsk¤tasya catv¡ri
lakÀa¸¡ni yatrait¡nibhavantis¡dharmaÅsamskar-t¡lakÀyate
viparyayadasamsk¤taÅ tatraj¡stust¡ndharm¡-mjanasthitiÅ
sth¡payati jar¡ jarayati anityat¡ vina¿yati. A.K.11.45,46.
27 taded¡k¡¿am pa¿yata iti sautr¡ntik¡Å na hyete j¡tyad-ayo dharma
dravyataÅ samvidhyante yath¡bhivyaµjate kim k¡ra¸am
234

pram¡¸¡bh¡v¡t. nahyeÀ¡m dravyato-stitvekiÆcidapi pram¡¸amasti
pratyakÀ¡num¡nam¡pt¡-gama v¡ yath¡ r£p¡d¢n¡m dharm¡¸¡miti.
A.K .II .46
28 yadi ca dar¿an¡dar¿ne vastuna ulpadanirodausy¡t¡m evamapi
d¤t-À¤dharmo tau na vastudharm¡viti vastunaÅ ¿¡¿vatatva
prasa´ga eva. BSSB 2.2.4.20.
29 dvividho hi vin¡¿a siddheÅ pratiÀedha lakÀa¸aÅ tath¡-
hikÀa¸¡didharm¡ bh¡va eva k¡le vina¿yat¢ti k¤tv¡ vin¡-¿a
ity¡khy¡yate yadv¡ bh¡va svabh¡va pracyutilakÀa¸a
pradhvams¡paran¡ma vin¡¿¡n¡m vina¿atitatra p£rva-sminn¡¿e
235

yadyayam hetumatvas¡dhana pary¡nuyogaÅ kriyate
yathoktairhetubhiÅ tath¡ siddas¡dhyat¡. T.P. pp. 373-374.
30 Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, p.1.6
31 ulp¡datyanta vighno nirodhoapratisamkhyay¡. A.K.1.6
32 ¡kasamiko hi bhav¡n¡m vin¡¿aÅ. kim k¡ra¸am k¡ry-asya hi k¡ra¸am
bhaati, vin¡¿a¿c¡bh¡vaÅ. ya¿c¡bh¡-vasya kim karthavyam. A.K.
bhasyam. p.569
33 api ca vain¡¿ik¡Å kalpayanti buddhibodhyam tray¡danyatsamsk¤tam
kÀa¸ikam ceti. tadapi ca trayam pratisaÆkhy¡pratisaÆkhy¡nirodh¡vak¡¿am
cety¡cakÀate tra-yamapi
caitadvastv¡bh¡vam¡tram nir£p£khyamiti man-yante
236

uddhip£rvakaÅ kila vin¡¿o bh¡v¡n¡m pratisaÆ-khy¡nirodho
n¡ma bh¡Àyate, tadvipar¢to apratisaÆkhy¡ nirodhaÅ. BSSB.
2.2.4.22
34 n¡pi bh¡vatgocarau sambhavataÅ nahi bh¡v¡n¡m nira-nvayo
nir£p¡khyo vin¡¿aÅ sambhavati, sarv¡svapyav-asth¡su
pratyabhijµ¡balen-¡nvay¡vaccedadar¿an¡t. Ibid.
35
¡k¡¿asyed¡n¢m nir¡kriyate. ¡k¡¿e c¡yukto nir£pakhyatv¡bhyupagamaÅ.
BSSB. 2.2.4.24.
36 Tai. Up. 2.1
37 “¿abdagu¸akam¡k¡¿am”. T.S. p. 13.
237

38 api c¡vara¸¡bh¡vam¡tram¡k¡¿amiccatamekasminsu-par¸e
pataty¡vara¸asya. vidhyam¡natv¡tsupar¸¡ntarasyolpittisatonavakasatvaprasa´gaÅ
yatr¡vara¸¡bh¡vas-tatra
patiÀyat¢ticet. yen¡vara¸¡bh¡ve vi¿eÀyate tattarhi
vastubh£tamev¡k¡¿amsy¡t, n¡vara¸¡ bh¡vam¡tram. BSSB.2.2.4.24
39 saugate hi samaye p¤thvi bhagavaÅ kim samni¿rayaÅ ity-asmin
prativacanaprav¡he ‘p¤thvy¡d¢namante’ ‘v¡yuÅ kim
samni¿rayaÅ’ ity¡sya pra¿nasya prativacanam bha-vati
‘v¡yur¡k¡¿a samni¿rayaÅ’ iti. tad¡k¡¿asy¡vastutve na samaµjasam
sy¡t tasm¡dayuktam ¡k¡¿asyavastut-vam. Ibid.
40 B.S. 2.2.4.20
238

41 svapn¡divadccedam d¤Àtavyam. yath¡hi svapnam¡y¡-
mar¢cyudukagandharvanagar¡di pratyaya vinaiva bahyen¡rthena
gr¡hyagr¡hak¡kara bhavanti, evam j¡garita-gocara api
stambh¡dipratyayam bhavitumarhant¢tyava-gamyate
pratyayavi¿eÀ¡t.BSSB. 2.2.5.28
42 Hattori Masaki, Dinn¡ga on perception. p.107
43 atascaivameva sarve laukik¡ upalabhante yatpraty¡ca-kÀa¸am api
b¡hy¡rthameva vy¡cakÀate yadantarjµeya-r£pam
tadbahirvadavabh¡sata iti. tepi sarvalokaprasi-ddhameva
bahiravabh¡sam¡nam samvidam pratilabh¡-m¡naÅ
239

praty¡khy¡tuk¡maÀca b¡hyamartham bahirvaditi vatk¡ram
kurvanti. itaretara hi kasm¡dbahirvaditi br£yuÅ BSSB. 2.2.5.28
44 nanu bahyasy¡rthasyasambhav¡t bahirvadavabh¡sata
ityadhyavasitam n¡yam s¡dhuradhyavasayo ataÅ pram-
¡¸aprav¤tyaprav¤ttip£rvakau sambhav¡sambhav¡vadh-¡ryate na
punaÅ sambhav¡sambhavap£rvike pram¡¸a-prav¤ttyaprav¤ttiÅ.
Ibid.
45 na ca jµ¡nasya viÀayas¡r£payadviÀayan¡¿o bhavati, asati viÀaye
viÀayas¡r£py¡nupapatteÅ, bahirupalab-de¿ca Ibid.
240

46 ata eva sahopalmabhaniyamopi pratyayaviÀayayorup¡-
yopeyabh¡vahetuka n¡ bhedahetuka ityabhyupagana-tanvyam.
Ibid.
47 api ca khaajµ¡nam paajµ¡namiti vi¿eÀa¸ayoreva kha-
apaayorabhedo na vi¿eÀasy¡sya jµ¡nasya. yath¡ ¿uklo gauÅ
k¤À¸o gauriti ¿auklaka¤À¸ayoreva bhedo na gotv-asya. dv¡bhy¡m
ca bhed¡dev¡sya siddhobhavatyeka-smacca dvayoÅ.
tasm¡darthajµ¡nayorbhedaÅ. Ibid.
48
sarvacittacaitt¡n¡m¡tmasamvedanam. Nyaya Bindu. 1.10
49
b¡hyopyarthoanubhayata eveti yuktamabhyupagantum. atha
vijµ¡nam prak¡¿¡tmakatv¡tprad¢pavatsvayame-v¡nubh£yate na
241

that¡ bahyopyartha iticet, svatmani kriyavirodh¡dev¡. BSSB
2.25.28
50
nanu vijjµ¡nasya svar£pavyatiriktagr¡hyatve tadapya-nyena
gr¡hyam tad¡pyanyenetyanavasth¡ pr¡pnoti. api ca
prad£pavadavabh¡s¡tmakatvatjµ¡neÀa jµ¡n¡-ntarm kalpayataÅ
samtv¡dva¿y¡vabh¡sakabhav¡nupa-patteÅ.
kalpan¡narthakyamiti tadubhayamapyasat. Ibid.
51
vijµ¡namubhayata eva vijµ¡nas¡kÀi¸o graha¸¡d¡na-kÀa¸olp¡d¡d
anavasth¡ ¿a´k¡mupapatteÅ. s¡kÀi prat-yayayo¿ca svabh¡va
vaiÀamy¡dupalabdupalabhy¡bh¡-vopapatteÅ. Ibid.
242

52
kimc¡nyat prad¢pavadvijµ¡namavabh¡sak¡ntaranira-pekÀam
syam-eva prathat iti br£vat¡mcapram¡¸aga-myam
vijµ¡namavagant¤kami-tyuktam sy¡t. ¿il¡khana madhyastha
prad¢pa¿¡ghasahasraprathanavat. Ibid.
53
b¡damevam , anubhav¡rupatvattu vijµ¡nasyesto naÅ
pakÀastv¡yanujµ¡yata iti cet. na anyasy¡avagantu¿ca-kÀuÅ
s¡dhanasya prat¢p-¡diprathana darÀan¡t. atovi-jµ¡nasyaya
avibh¡syatve avi¿eÀ¡tyevanyasminnavaga-ntari prath¡nam
prad¢pavadityvagamyate. Ibid.
243

54
s¡kÀi¸ovagantuÅ svayamsiddhat¡mupakÀipata svayam prathate
vijµ¡namityeÀa mama pakÀastvaya v¡coyukt-yantare¸¡¿rita iti
cet. Ibid.
55
nanu vijµ¡nasya svar£pa vyatirikta gr¡hyatve tad¡py-anyena
gr¡hyam tad¡pyanyena ityanavastha. Ibid.
56
s¡kÀipratyayayo¿ca svabh¡vavaiÀamy¡dupalabdhupalabhyabh¡vopapatteÅ.
Ibid.
57 ataÅ prad¢pavad vijµ¡nasy¡pi vyatirikt¡vagamyatva-masmabhiÅ
pras¡dhitam. Ibid.
58 yat analarjµeya r£pam tu bahirvad avabh¡sate sorthaÅ (quotes
by Hattori Massaki Dinnaga on perception pp. 102 .61)
244

59 b¡dhyate hi svapnopalabdam vastu pratibuddhasya
mayopalabdhomah¡janasam¡gama iti, nahyasti……. naivam
j¡garitopalabdhamvastustambh¡dikam kasya-cidapyavsthayam
b¡dhyate. BSSB. 2.2.5.29
60
api ca sm¤tireÀ¡ yatsvapnadar¿anam upalabdhistu
jagaritadar¿anam Ibid.
61
sm¤tyypalabdlyo¿ca pratyakÀam¡ntaram svayamanu-bh£yate
sarthaviprayoga samprayog¡tmakamiÀam putram smar¡mi
noplabdha up- alabddumicc¡m¢ti. BSSB. 2.2.5.29
62
M.S p. 226.
245

63
anupalabhyam¡neÀu tvartheÀu kimnimitt¡ vicitr¡ v¡s-an¡
bhaveyuÅ an¡ditvepyandhaparampar¡ny¡yen¡prathiÀaiv¡navasth¡.
BSSB. 2.5.30
64
api ca v¡san¡ n¡ma samsk¡ra vi¿eÀaÅ, samsk¡ra¿ca
¡¿rayamantare¸¡ vakalpante evam loke d¤Àatv¡t. na ca tava
v¡san¡¿rayaÅ ka¿cidastim pram¡¸atonupala-bdheÅ. Ibid.
65
sthirasvar£patve tvalayavijµ¡nasya siddh¡ntah¡niÅ api ca
vijµ¡nav¡depi kÀa¸ikatv¡bhyupagamasya sam¡n¡t-vadhy¡ni
b¡hy¡rthav¡de kÀa¸ikatvanibhandhanani du- Àa¸¡nyudbh¡vitani
uttarolpade ca p£rvanirodh¡t itye-vam¡d¢ni
t¡nih¡pyanusamgh¡tavy¡ni. BSSB 2.2.5.31
246

66
¿£nyav¡di pakÀastu sarva pram¡¸a vipratiÀiddha iti
tadnir¡kara¸¡ya n¡daraÅ kriyate. Ibid.
247