Richard Goorevich Director

Office of
International Regimes and Agreements
NA-243
Richard Goorevich
Director
(202) 586-2331
ECCO Seminar May 2005

NA-243: Technical Lead on
Nuclear Technology for USG
Functional Overview
Domestic Controls
International Controls
Other
DOE Complex Industry Multilateral Safeguards
•Support to
•DHS/CBP
•DHS/ICE
•DHS/U.S. Coast Guard
•FBI
• DOC/BIS/EE
•Surplus Equipment
• Deemed Exports
•Nuclear Software
•CRADAs
•NCI/IPP
•NP Seminar Series
•ECI
•Part 810
Authorizations
•Munitions
•Dual-Use
•NRC Assurances
•NSG
•Zangger Cmtee
•Wassenaar Arrgmt.
•Add’l Protocol
•MTCR/AG
•Safeguards
Policy
•Additional Protocol
Implementation
•IAEA Board of
Governors and
General Conference
2

NA-20
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Deputy Administrator - Paul M. Longsworth
NA-24
ADA Cheri Fitzgerald
DADA Cynthia Lersten
Acting Policy Director
Adam Scheinman
OFFICE OF DISMANTLEMENT
& TRANSPARENCY
Director - Kurt Siemen
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES & AGREEMENTS
Director - Rich Goorevich
Budget - Lynn Ashby (FED)
Admin - Renetta Zanco (GEM)
Travel - Joanne Frysiak (GEM)
OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY,
COMPLIANCE & COOPERATION
Director - Monte Mallin
LICENSING OPERATIONS AND COMPLIANCE
Deputy Director - Anatoli Welihozkiy
PINS – Barbara McIntosh
U.S. Domestic Export Licensing
(DOC/DOS/NRC/810s)
DOE-Complex issues associated w/equipment
and technology
Interagency enforcement support
COUNTERING PROLIFERANT NETWORKS
Deputy Director - Bob Swartz
Coordinates the following IRA crosscutting activities:
Proliferation networks coordination (PSI … )
Asian Affairs
NON-NUCLEAR SECURITY
Team Leader - Vacant
NUCLEAR SUPPLY & TRANSFERS
Team Leader - Melissa Krupa
NUCLEAR TREATIES & AGREEMENTS
Team Leader - Sean Oehlbert
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
Team Leader – Jon Phillips
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Australia Group
Missile Technology Control Regime
Wassenaar Arrangement
DOMESTIC (NON-NUCLEAR LICENSING)
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
Non-Nuclear Interdiction Groups
(MTAG/Shield)
Sanctions Work
Team Leader Vacancy
Michael Bedke
Aysun Scott
Mark Kinglsey
CBW/MT Vacancy
DOMESTIC (NUCLEAR LICENSING)
Nuclear Referral List from EAR / ITAR
Technology Transfers (Part 810)
Nuclear Interdiction (NIAG)
Classified Tech Transfer
MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger
Committee)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
IAEA AFFAIRS
NUTRAN
Physical Protection: Bilats, IPPAS, CPPNM,
INFCIRC/225
Code of Conduct of RAD Sources
Melissa Krupa
Tatiana Delorm
Ed Fox
Russ Hibbs
Zan Hollander
Heather Looney
Kim Mamodo
Drew Nickels
Carl Thorne
Arthur Wendel
MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS
Conference on Disarmament
NUCLEAR TREATIES
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Technical Cooperation Program
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ)
- Treaty of Tlatelolco
- Treaty of Rarotonga
- Bangkok Treaty
- Pelindaba Treaty
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR
PEACEFUL COOPERATION
(AEA SECTION 123)
Administrative Arrangements
Subsequent Arrangements
Nuclear Material Management &
Safeguards System (NMMSS)
NRC Licensing
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Workshops
Sean Oehlbert
Tatiana Delorm
Judy Gibson
Dunbar Lockwood
Drew Nickels
Carl Thorne
Vacancy
IAEA
Safeguards Policy
Additional Protocol Implementation
U.S. Voluntary Offer (List of Eligible
Facilities)
Board of Governors
TECHNICAL
Proliferation Resistant Fuel Cycle
Technologies (PRFCT)
Safeguards Equipment Development
Jon Phillips
Michael Bedke
Ron Cherry
Zan Hollander
Dunbar Lockwood
John Murphy
Ed Wonder
7/21/2005 9:47 AM
3

Nuclear Supply and
Transfers

Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Security:
Areas of Licensing Responsibility
• Industry
‣ Part 810 Specific and
General Authorizations
‣ Dual-Use License Reviews
‣ Chemical, Biological,
Nuclear, Missile, and
Electronic devices /
Semiconductor
Manufacturing Equipment
‣ Munitions License Reviews
‣ Sections 5 and 16:
Explosives and Nuclear
Weapon Design and Test
Equipment
‣ Assurance Requests for
NRC Exports
• DHS/CBP & ICE & U.S. Coast
Guard; FBI; DOC/BIS/EE
Support
• DOE Complex
‣ Maintain NP Guidelines/Sensitive
Subjects/Countries Lists
‣ Provide Guidance on:
‣ Foreign Travel by DOE Funded
Scientists and Engineers
‣ Deemed Exports (Foreign Hires)
‣ International Programs (IPP, NCI,
MPC&A, etc.)
‣ Surplus Property
‣ ECI Review of DOE Publications
‣ Review Transfer Nuclear Software
‣ Provide NP Seminar Series
‣ Support “Pit-Out” Reviews
5

Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Security: Non-
Licensing Areas of Responsibility
• Multilateral Regime Support
‣ Nuclear Suppliers Group
‣ NPT Exporters Committee
(Zangger)
‣ International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)
‣ Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR)
‣ Wassenaar & Australia Group (AG)
• Other Issues
‣ Bilaterals
‣ IAEA Code of Conduct for
Radioactive Sources
‣ Interdiction (NIAG, President’s
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
‣ Sanctions
‣ NISS (NSG Information Sharing
System)
Physical Protection
‣ Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material
‣ IAEA INFCIRC/225 Updates
‣ Physical Protection Bilateral
Consultations
• Technical Projects
‣ Economic Globalization
‣ Machine Tools
‣ SNET List Review
‣ Technical Review Group
‣ Commercialization of DOE lab technology
(CRADAs)
‣ Stable Isotope Separation
‣ Graphite Controls
‣ Proliferation Research and Analysis (PRAP)
Projects
‣ Proliferation Trade Control Directory
(PTCD)
6

Nuclear Supply & Transfers:
Multilateral Export Controls
Purpose:
• Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by:
– delaying a nuclear program and allowing other means, such as
diplomacy, to help;
– causing an end-user to accept a less capable and more costly
option; and
– allowing for countries to take a principled position on nuclear
nonproliferation
7

Nuclear Supply & Transfers:
Multilateral Export Controls
Strategies:
• Strengthen the multilateral
supplier regimes through
continued U.S. technical
leadership
• Cooperate with the U.S.
interagency, DOE and
NNSA offices, and likeminded
multilateral partners
to promote peaceful nuclear
trade and nonproliferation
objectives
Strategies
• Promote adherence to
multilateral nuclear
supplier arrangements in
support of USG
nonproliferation policy
• Ensure that the NNSA
program offices and
contractors are fully
apprised of all multilateral
commitments and
obligations
8

Nuclear Supply & Transfers: Technical
and Nonproliferation Studies
Mission:
• Initiate studies on rapidly developing technologies and
initiatives before problems arise
– Technical studies: Accelerator Production of Tritium; Naval
Reactor Technologies
– Multilateral negotiations: Conversion technologies; Plutonium
Isotope Separation
– Policy studies: Globalization study
• Pursue an active role in preventing proliferation.
• Protect U.S. national security interests and peaceful nuclear
trade.
• Conceptual change from “export control” to “supplier
policy.”
9

MULTILATERAL SUPPLIER GROUP
MEMBERSHIP
• As of the 2004 Plenary in Sweden, the newest NSG members are: China,
Estonia, Lithuania and Malta. (Date of Information: June 2005)
Argentina Greece Romania
Australia Hungary Russia
Austria Ireland Slovakia
Belarus (NSG only) Italy Slovenia
Belgium Japan South Africa
Brazil Kazakhstan (2002) Spain
Bulgaria Korea, Republic of Sweden
Canada Latvia Switzerland
China (2004) Lithuania (2004) Turkey
Cyprus (NSG only) Luxembourg Ukraine
Czech Republic Malta (2004) United Kingdom
Denmark Netherlands United States
Estonia (2004)
New Zealand
Finland
Norway
France
Poland
Germany
Portugal
10

Nuclear Supply & Transfers:
Physical Protection
• Amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to address new post-9/11
nuclear terrorism concerns
• Updating IAEA INFCIRC/225 to address these new
nuclear security concerns and threats
• Bilateral Physical Protection Consultations and Visits:
‣to evaluate the application of physical protection
measures for exported U.S.-origin materials as outlined
in the Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act as export license requirements!
The new structure of NA-243 allows the coordination of these
two important elements of nuclear transfer security: export
controls and physical protection requirements!
11

Non-Nuclear Security

Non-Nuclear Security
• Since FY03, NA-243 has been reviewing missile
and chem-bio export license cases
• Participation in missile and chem/bio multilateral
regimes: Australia Group, Biological Weapons
Convention and MTCR
• Non-nuclear interdiction groups: MTAG, Shield
• Technical and Nonproliferation Studies
• Technical Review Group to identify cross-over
items controlled for both nuke & missile reasons
13

Nuclear Treaties & Agreements

Nuclear Treaties & Agreements
• Subsequent
Arrangements
• Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT)
• Conference on
Disarmament
• Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty (FMCT)
• Nuclear Weapons Free
Zones
• Nuclear Material
Management &
Safeguards System
(NMMSS)
• DOE’s Nuclear
Nonproliferation
Seminars
• IAEA Technical
Cooperation Program
15

Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear Safeguards
• Safeguards Policy
• Safeguards Equipment Development (w/NA-242)
• IAEA Board of Governors and IAEA General
Conference Support
• Additional Protocol implementation
• Proliferation Resistant Fuel Cycle Technologies
• U.S. Voluntary Offer (List of Eligible Facilities)
17

Technology Transfer Control
Objectives:
• To identify materials, equipment, and technology of
proliferation concern
• To prevent transfers to proliferants (through foreign
national visits and assignments in DOE complex)
• To protect against inadvertent transfers (of ECI and
proprietary data)
• To weigh proliferation and security concerns against value
of scholarship, technology advance, and economic benefit
• To implement U.S. Government policy on transfers of
materials, equipment, and technology
18

Technology Transfer Control
Mechanisms of Transfer:
• Sales, donations, loans, leases, exports
• Technical exchanges and communications
• Work-for-others, Cooperative Agreements, patent
assignments
• Publications and presentations
• Visits and assignments to DOE sites
• Foreign travel by DOE personnel
19

Technology Transfer Control
Transfer Control Principle:
• Whatever the transfer mechanism, export control review is
mandatory by U.S. law and regulation
Control Measures:
• Export control review of all proposed transfers, exchanges,
publications, presentations, visits and assignments, and
foreign travel
• Export control requirements placed in all transfer
agreements
• DOE/NNSA approval required for retransfers
20

Technology Transfer Control
Areas under 30-day export control review by DOE
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) list
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) list
• Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological warfare related
list
• Category 3:
• Export control regulations – Departments of Energy,
Commerce, and State, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• DOE/NNSA
‣ Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation
‣ Sensitive Countries List
‣ Sensitive Subjects List
‣ Technology experts and export control personne
21

DOE Guidelines on Export Control
and Nonproliferation Updated
• Separated export control concerns for equipment and technology.
• Added more footnotes for technical background.
• Sale of equipment in the U.S. is not a deemed export, if sale is open to public. ***
• Added more info on Part 810 authorizations.
• Added more on exceptions and exemptions.
• Updated ECI markings.
• Emphasized the NSG, SSL, NTRB are just references, the governing documents
are the laws and regulations.
• *** Proposed DOC regulation in F.R. (May 27 th comment deadline) on “use” would
be deemed export if export controlled equipment is “operated”.
22

Guidelines (continued)
• Added a statement about originating organization using discretionary publication
control over EAR 99 unclassified information that might be a proliferation
concern.
• Added a reference to the Federal Property Regulations.
• Added a 5-year record retention period for the export or deemed export of ECI.
• Added a note that property transfer approval be addressed in the initial funding
document.
• Added a section on the prerelease of software.
• Added Appendix 3 on DOE directives.
• General update and editing
23

Export Controlled Information (ECI)
Export Controlled Information (ECI) - Technical
information whose export requires a license
• ECI should be protected if uncontrolled dissemination would
adversely affect U.S. national security or nonproliferation
objectives
• DOE policy on dissemination of ECI must balance
commitments to:
‣ U.S. nonproliferation and national security goals
‣ Scientific and technological advance
‣ Benefit to U.S. industry
‣ Benefit to U.S. taxpayer
‣ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements
24

Export Controlled Information (ECI)
ECI (continued):
• Restricting release of ECI:
‣ Publications:
• Edit sensitive data
• Limit distribution
‣ Presentations:
• Edit sensitive data
• Limit audience
25

Surplus Property
Transfer of Surplus Property:
• Equipment and materials must be made useless for nuclear
purposes
• Transfer agreement must include strict nonproliferation conditions
• There is a presumption of destruction for NSG Trigger list items
and for weapons components
• For items deemed too valuable to destroy:
‣ Request exception from DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
‣ May require modifying equipment to render it useless for nuclear
purposes
‣ Must get DOE/NNSA approval for retransfer or export
26

Industry Export Control
Dual-Use Export Licensing:
• Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce the
lead
• Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implements
Sections of note:
– 15 CFR Part 738, Special Country Policies
– 15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy -- CCL Based Controls
– 15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy -- End-User and End-Use
Based Catch-All Controls
– 15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses
– 15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes Nuclear
Referral List)
27

Industry Export Control
Munitions Licensing:
• Under jurisdiction of the Department of State, Office of
Defense Trade Controls
• International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Part 121
• DOE reviews nuclear-related cases
– Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents
– Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment
• Authority
– Arms Export Control Act 1976
• Review process similar to dual-use cases, except without
time limits or escalation
28

Industry Export Control
NRC Exports:
• Nuclear exports requiring special or general licenses
• 10 CFR Part 110
• Authority
– Atomic Energy Act of 1954
• DOE assists NRC in securing assurances from foreign
governments that exports of nuclear materials and equipment
will be for peaceful uses
• DOE provides general license request confirmations
29

New Export Control Initiatives
• Developing a self-assessment program aimed at the
DOE Complex. Elements being contemplated are
sensitive subject list training, “deemed export”
procedure review in Complex and export control
classification procedures for high risk property.
• Pilot funding has been provided to Sandia, ORNL and
SRNL to examine high risk property classification.
The self-assessment program is currently being
developed by NA-243 with support from ORNL and
SRNL.
30

New Export Control Initiatives
• To provide an aid to high risk property classification,
and other NA-243 projects, a data base is under
development, the Proliferation Trade Control
Directory (PTCD), that will serve as a reference
identifying export controlled equipment, material and
components, their available images, U.S. and foreign
suppliers, technical specifications, and Export Control
Commodity Numbers (ECCNs) and cross - referenced
Harmonized Tariff System Numbers.
31

AREAS FOR ASSISTANCE
• Continue to maintain existing and develop new expertise
necessary to support NA-243 initiatives
• Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation awareness
into security briefings for new personnel
• In the interim, ensure that “deemed exports” and ECI
applicability review are done for all foreign national visits
and assignments and foreign travel by federal and contractor
personnel
• Target professional societies and groups of industry for
nonproliferation awareness training
• Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshops
and Seminars
32

NA-243 NEWS
• Develop introductory export licensing and nonproliferation
awareness material for new DOE and DOE contractor
personnel to be distributed as part of security briefing
• Expand outreach to scientific and technical communities to
increase export licensing and nonproliferation awareness
‣ Seek opportunities to promote awareness at professional
society conventions and meetings, or through publications
33

Forward Thinking for Export Licensing
• New nuclear weapons reduction agreement with Russia will
require increased nonproliferation effort
• Propose to add a mandatory check-off block to FACTS to ensure
that visited offices conduct “deemed exports” applicability
review
• Propose to add a mandatory check-off block to FTMS to ensure
traveling official conduct export control applicability review
• Develop an unclassified database of questions and responding
guidance from NA-243
– Categorize by areas of NA-243 responsibilities
– Make accessible through the NA-243 web site
– Continuously update database with newly posed questions
34

The New Age of Export
Controls
Recent developments influencing
export controls

The President’s Initiatives
President Bush’s February 11 WMD speech at the
National Defense University outlined a number of
new initiatives, including initiatives related to
export controls, to help mend the gaps in the
nonproliferation regime which allow proliferators
to acquire WMD-significant items and
technologies
• The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the G-8 are
now working to adopt these measures
36

New NSG Initiatives
In his speech, the President specifically called on the NSG to
implement some of these measures, including:
• Establishing the Additional Protocol as a condition of
supply by ‘05
• Banning transfers of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies
• Suspending nuclear trade to states found in noncompliance
with IAEA safeguards obligations
These issues are now being deliberated within the NSG
37

UNSCR 1540
Another positive step for export controls was the passage
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
in April 2004, which obligates all countries to:
‣ Refrain from providing support in acquiring,
manufacturing, transferring or using WMD
‣ Adopt and enforce adequate export controls
‣ Adopt and enforce transit, transshipment and
retransfer controls
‣ Work with their industries and public to inform
them of these obligations
38

Radioactive Source Export
Controls
The 2003 IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety &
Security of Radioactive Sources calls for import and
export controls on a subset of radioactive sources
which could be used in a “dirty bomb”
• Over 40 countries developed import/export Guidance
to support this objective
• This import/export Guidance calls for end-use and
end-user evaluations, notifications of shipments, and
recipient authorization
• The USG is currently developing regulations to
uphold these import/export provisions, to go into
effect January 1, 2006
39

The New Frontier
of Export Controls
• Recent revelations such as the A. Q. Khan illicit
procurement network demonstrate the need for
strengthened export controls
• The President’s Initiatives and the passage of
UNSC Resolution 1540 emphasize the importance
of export controls as a nonproliferation tool
• PSI and other interdiction efforts are reinforcing
export control efforts by interdicting illegallytransferred
and/or illicitly-procured items
What next for export controls
40

THE END