Debating the Prospects For Peace in Colombia - Inter-American ...

Latin America Working GRoup
Report
Debating the Prospects
For Peace in Colombia
Cameron Combs and Tim Heine
Introduction
On September 4, 2012, Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos announced that his government would begin formal
peace negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) in Oslo, Norway, and Havana, Cuba—
sparking hope that the hemisphere’s longest internal armed
conflict may finally be coming to a close. Since the conflict
began, violence in the Colombian countryside has displaced
millions of people and claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.
Turing the page on this chapter would represent a monumental
step toward addressing the litany of Colombia’s social ills.
Disarming the nation’s largest insurgency is an irresistible
legacy for a Colombian head of state and, sensing an opportune
moment for peace, Santos began laying the groundwork
for negotiations as soon as he assumed office in 2010. On
the foreign policy front, he quickly patched relations with
President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, who went on to play
an important role in bringing the FARC to the table. For two
years, the Santos administration secretly engaged the insurgency
in preliminary negotiations while pushing an ambitious
legislative agenda at home.
Santos has also worked closely with congress to set the
stage for a peace process beginning with the Law of Public
Order in February 2011. Dubbed the “spinal cord” for the
current dialogues, the measure suspends arrest warrants for
representatives of the insurgency and authorizes negotiations
to take place outside the country. In June 2011, historic legislation
was adopted restituting the victims of armed conflict.
Returning lands and supporting those displaced or harmed
by violence will facilitate the reintegration process in a postconflict
scenario. Also importantly, in June 2012 legislators
approved a constitutional framework for bringing justice to
demobilized guerrillas. Once the subsequent laws are in effect,
the reform will institute alternative sentencing procedures for
FARC combatants should an agreement in Havana materialize.
Despite these actions, the obstacles to peace remain daunting.
Prompted by an Inter-American Dialogue event with six
leading Colombian analysts and former officials on January
31, 2013, this report explores the prospects for peace and provides
background on the process’ most contentious debates.
What has changed
A crucial distinction must first be drawn between a peace
accord and peace itself. The former refers simply to a formal
cessation of hostilities—currently the topic of discussion in
Havana. The latter recognizes that the implementation of any
agreement presents a unique set of long-term challenges. As
prominent diplomat and academic Fernando Cepeda characterized
it, an accord merely converts an armed conflict into a
political one. Violence, or any of the deep-seated roots of the
conflict, will continue to be a challenge for years, even if the
guerrillas agree to lay down arms.
Santos’ effort marks the fourth instance in which the
Colombian government has been seated across the negotiating
table from the FARC, the last round having taken place under
the presidency of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). Despite this
APRIL 2013

Inter-American Dialogue
Report
Foreword
In 2001, the Inter-American Dialogue launched the Colombia Working Group, a “brain trust” of top-flight analysts
and former officials from the Western Hemisphere and Europe, to debate pressing issues and develop
innovative policy solutions. The group’s conclusions were disseminated in a series of working papers aimed
at informing discussion on the Colombia question. At the outset, the initiative focused on the peace negotiations
between President Andrés Pastrana and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Although
the working group has since evolved and now encompasses a broader, regional agenda, Colombia remains
central to the Dialogue’s work.
Eleven years after the collapse of the first peace talks, the administration of Juan Manuel Santos has
reopened dialogue with the insurgency. On January 31, the Inter-American Dialogue invited six prominent
Colombian analysts—including members of the original working group—to engage in a public debate on the
prospects for a peace agreement and the challenges of implementation. The speakers’ diverse perspectives
offered Washington’s policy community a sense of the complexity of this undertaking, and what is at stake
for Colombia.
This report, prepared by Cameron Combs and Tim Heine of the Inter-American Dialogue, takes stock of
the debate and seeks to identify key points of agreement and disagreement. Combs, a program assistant
who graduated summa cum laude from Carleton College, has written for major publications on a variety of
Latin American themes. Heine, a research assistant at the Dialogue on a Fulbright scholarship, has worked
in Bogotá for the German Press Agency and holds an MA in International Relations and Security Studies from
the Maxwell School.
The Dialogue is deeply grateful to the AlvarAlice Foundation for its generous support of this initiative.
We also extend thanks to the first-rate Colombian speakers at the January meeting: Fernando Cepeda,
Juanita León, Antonio Navarro, Rafael Nieto, Rodrigo Pardo and Alejandro Santos. For access to a video of
the January 31 event and the Colombia Working Group papers, we invite you to visit the Dialogue’s website
(www.thedialogue.org).
Michael Shifter
President
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legacy of frustrated attempts, many are at least moderately
optimistic. Colombia has changed in important ways over
the last decade, and the architects of the process have taken
pains to avoid the mistakes of the past. Taken together, the
panorama has never seemed more favorable.
A different country
At the turn of the 21st century, insecurity was rampant in
Colombia. Under the Pastrana administration, the FARC’s
forces were estimated at 18,000 strong while nearly half the
country lacked a government security presence. In 1999,
the Defense Ministry reported nearly 2,000 terrorist acts,
more than 3,000 kidnappings, and a homicide rate that
exceeded 60 per 100,000 (and peaked three years later at
70 per 100,000). The government, largely on the defensive,
lacked serious bargaining power to push an agreement with
the insurgency.
The turnaround ushered in by Pastrana’s successor,
President Álvaro Uribe (2002–
2010), was dramatic. Bolstered
by some US$7 billion in US
assistance, an aggressive military
response vastly diminished
the rebels’ capabilities. Between
2002 and 2009, kidnappings
declined to just 200 a year,
homicides were halved, and FARC forces were reduced to
roughly 9,000 fighters while many of their leaders were
captured or killed. Unlike eleven years ago, the insurgency
is aware that it cannot win this fight through strength of
arms, even if some of its leaders claim otherwise in public.
This reality—perhaps more than any other factor—greatly
improves the prospects for an agreement.
Uribe’s efforts to improve security also involved negotiations
with another armed group, the Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia (AUC). By the turn of the century, this counter-insurgent
response to leftist guerrillas had exacerbated
already rampant violence and was heavily involved in the
drug trade. In 2002, the AUC began talks to demobilize
and, over the course of several years, more than 31,000
paramilitaries turned over their weapons. Violence was
reduced, but less than 10 percent of the demobilized has
been processed by the 2005 Peace and Justice Law intended
to reincorporate paramilitaries into civilian life, deliver justice
to leaders, and provide restitution for victims. Many
former AUC members also formed new criminal bands (las
bacrim). It is hoped that the broader lessons learned from
this, as well as the institutional experience of reintegrating
demobilized combatants, will facilitate future reintegration.
A different process
According to Cepeda, the most promising difference in the
current process is a more manageable agenda. The six items
the two sides agreed to discuss—rural development, the
FARC’s political participation, an end to the conflict, drug
trafficking, victims’ rights, and implementation—are not
intended to resolve the larger political, economic, or social
issues that fuel the armed conflict. Rather, the primary objective
in Havana is to cease hostilities so that larger societal
challenges can be addressed. This stands in stark contrast
to the much more unwieldy agenda of the Pastrana talks,
which consisted of ten articles covering over 100 issues.
Other improvements to the peace process include:
Unlike eleven years ago, the insurgency is
aware that it cannot win this fight through
strength of arms, even if some of its leaders
claim otherwise in public.
NN
Holding negotiations abroad. This condition seeks to
increase the integrity of the talks by reducing leaks and
“lowering the temperature” in Colombia itself.
NN
Evaluation and ground rules. In contrast to talks under
the Pastrana administration, protocol and evaluation
mechanisms have been established. Additionally, Cuba
and Norway are acting as guarantors to the process
with Venezuela and Chile as “companions.”
NN
No demilitarized zone. During the last round of talks,
the government granted the FARC a “safe zone”
roughly the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut
combined. While generous, this gesture ultimately
proved unproductive. The FARC exploited the opportunity
to regroup and hide its kidnapped victims without
fear of military incursion. With no demilitarized
areas or ceasefires from the Santos administration this
time, there is greater pressure on the guerrillas to reach
an accord in a timely manner.
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Restoring the
Colombian countryside
Land lies at the heart of the armed conflict. Indeed, as
Alejandro Santos of Semana contends, the use and the
high concentration of ownership of Colombia’s countryside
defined the country’s historical trajectory and constitutes
the “central theme” of the FARC’s struggle. It has also
become a flagship issue of the Santos administration. It is
the first item on the negotiators’ agenda.
Fortunately, the stated interests of both the FARC and the
Santos administration converge in several respects. Juanita
León of La Silla Vacía notes that in lieu of radical Marxist
proclamations, many positions publicly espoused by the
FARC are policies the government seeks to implement.
Recent FARC communiqués, for instance, have focused on
extending titles to landowners, increasing rural production,
and restoring lands to the forcibly displaced—all of which
are hallmarks of the agrarian policy spearheaded by Minister
of Agriculture Juan Camilo Restrepo. Both sides also hope to
redress the concentration of land ownership—more than 50
percent of Colombia’s land is held by 1 percent of its population—and
to find alternative uses for drug production areas.
Despite this common ground and months of negotiations,
the talks have been unable to move past the issue of land,
a reflection of how sensitive it is. Furthermore, the process
threatens some powerful interests, chiefly the livestock
industry. Ranchers hold almost 39 million hectares of land,
opposed to the 5 million used for farming, and have a history
of collaborating with paramilitaries to expand their holdings.
In the last few months, the ranchers’ guild has mobilized
to sink the peace process. And even some Colombians
who recognize that reform is necessary argue that such a
crucial issue should not be decided with terrorists behind
closed doors in Havana but, rather, in the halls of congress.
Reclaiming and restoring rural areas
Establishing an integral state presence in rebel territory constitutes
both a short and long-term challenge. As defense
minister, Santos initiated a flagship program to build up
non-military institutions in regions seized from the guerrillas.
Funding challenges and bureaucratic inertia have, however,
hamstrung that initiative. Bringing territories back into
the government’s fold after decades of independent operation
is no small feat. It will require both resources and time.
Past experiences, particularly with the AUC, show how
destabilizing demobilizations can be. As existing security
structures are dismantled, splinter groups begin to compete
for control. This is particularly true along drug routes, where
illicit revenues are highest and state forces are the weakest.
To avoid these power vacuums, Antonio Navarro Wolff, a
national politician and demobilized M-19 rebel, asserts that
the FARC must play a role. Police and military forces, for
instance, could absorb guerrilla fighters and employ their
local knowledge and community ties. However, many
Colombians resist the notion of FARC fighters becoming
soldiers and police officers. Whatever the ultimate strategy,
demobilizations alone will not eliminate the countryside’s
illegal economies. Policies, therefore, must give priority to
citizen security while recognizing that drug trafficking and
crime will continue for the foreseeable future.
At the same time, efforts must continue to develop rural
areas. An astonishingly high percentage of landowners do
not possess property titles, increasing their vulnerability to
usurpation by armed groups and denying them a tool for
acquiring credit. The government is trying to rectify this,
but much remains to be done. Improved infrastructure and
land production will not only help to address Colombia’s
chronic inequality, they will produce viable alternatives to
crime. Jobs must be available for former guerrillas if recidivism
is to be reduced. Yet stigma remains for ex-combatants
seeking work. It is encouraging that the peace process has,
so far, sought to incorporate the private sector.
Another pressing security challenge is the assurance that
displaced victims can safely return home. Santos’ restitution
law has been in effect for a little over a year, and safety
guarantees have already become a major impediment.
Immediate steps must be taken to guarantee that persons
initiating restitution claims are not threatened by the illegitimate
occupants of their land.
The politics of peace
Negotiating with an armed insurgency represents something
of a paradox. In this case, the dilemma stems in large part
from the fact that the FARC identifies as a legitimate political
movement, even asserting that its members are the true
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Inter-American Dialogue
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victims in Colombia. The rebels may very well reject any
accord that requires recognition of their crimes or denies
them political participation.
The Colombian public, meanwhile, largely views FARC
members as criminals with political aspirations. When
Santos announced last fall that formal peace talks would
take place, Semana reported that nearly 80 percent of
Colombians supported his choice. Since the beginning of
this process, however, equally high margins oppose the
FARC participating in politics while maintaining that they
must serve jail time for kidnappings, murders, and displacements.
In short, the majority of Colombians view the
proceedings in Havana not as truce-seeking negotiations
between two legitimate political forces but as the FARC’s
opportunity to negotiate the terms of its surrender.
The government is caught in the middle of these clashing
perspectives. On the one hand, the president wants peace
as quickly as possible. A cessation of hostilities would bolster
his political standing and
ensure the legacy he covets. On
the other hand, Colombians are
increasingly skeptical of the process.
A February 2013 poll by
Datexco found only 20 percent
of citizens believe negotiations
will actually end in a deal, down
from a majority just a few months earlier. The quicker an
accord is signed, the better for the president. Yet the more
the government presses for the FARC to pay for its crimes,
the longer negotiations will endure as the insurgency insists
on leniency.
This places Santos in a tough position. Either he strikes
a hard line and faces public ire for prolonging the increasingly
unpopular negotiations, or he speeds up the talks and
deals with the repercussions of granting concessions to an
insurgency with virtually no public sympathy. The government’s
strategy seems to have been the sequencing of the
agenda. Justice and political participation for the FARC will
not be addressed until after common ground is reached on
the land issue. If talks move past that point and the public
senses an end to the armed conflict, it may become more
inclined to accept unpopular concessions. Some experts,
however, argue that Santos can employ the FARC’s low
popularity to his advantage. If talks succeed, the president
can take credit for a historic peace agreement; if they fail,
the public will blame the insurgency and credit Santos for
at least trying to negotiate.
Campaign season
For the reform to take effect, congress must still
decide how precisely it defines “political” crimes,
how to punish them, and what the parameters for
political participation will be.
By codifying a transitional justice framework into law,
congress agreed to allow perpetrators of “political” crimes
to be processed under a different set of procedures than
“normal” criminals. Should the conflict end, prosecutors
could only press charges for those “most responsible” for
crimes against civilians while giving lower-ranking soldiers
a free pass. The congress also leaves open the possibility
for demobilized guerrilla members to participate in politics.
These provisions generated considerable controversy when
the law passed in June 2012.
But this legal framework remains, after all, just a framework.
For the reform to take effect, congress must still
decide how precisely it defines “political” crimes, how to
punish them, and what the parameters for political participation
will be. This is a much more contentious issue. These
concepts were initially elaborated in very broad terms at a
time when Colombians did not even know that peace talks
were taking place. Should an agreement be signed, legislators
will assume responsibility for the unpopular concessions
enticing the FARC to lay down arms.
And it gets more complicated. Santos has set November
2013 as a deadline for an agreement. Colombians will vote,
however, for congress and the president in March and May
of 2014. If negotiations continue right up to the deadline,
congress could find itself passing a highly contentious piece
of legislation while in full-fledged reelection mode. Uribe
has become the most vocal critic of the current president
and the peace process, lambasting Santos for going soft on
security and for negotiating with terrorists. Uribe’s political
machine is gearing up to field candidates in the upcoming
elections—he is rumored to be weighing a run for the senate
himself—on a platform that largely opposes preferential
treatment for the FARC.
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Rafael Nieto, lawyer and former vice minister of justice,
points out that when the AUC demobilized, it was barred
from elected office and was supposed to return stolen lands
and goods. The FARC are more political than the paramilitaries
ever were, yet both have engaged in drug trafficking,
massacres, kidnappings, and extortion. Those who share
Nieto’s view—and there are many in Colombia—do not see
a compelling reason why the FARC should be treated more
leniently than other demobilized insurgency groups. It is
because of this point that former foreign minister and head
of RCN Noticias, Rodrigo Pardo, is surprised that Santos
chose his first term to initiate this process.
The role of the
international community
Though the Pastrana talks involved the United Nations, the
Santos administration decided on a far more limited international
involvement. Only four countries—Chile, Norway,
Cuba, and Venezuela—are direct participants in the talks,
although the role of external actors will again prove crucial
both in reaching and in implementing an agreement.
Santos’ rapprochement with Chávez fostered Venezuela’s
direct involvement in the negotiations. Those close to the
process maintain that Chávez’s influence and contacts in the
insurgency made him instrumental in bringing the FARC
to the table. Legitimizing the rebels as a leftist political
force—as well as ending Colombia’s armed conflict—would
have been an attractive legacy for the Venezuelan leader.
Chávez’s death has injected uncertainty into this process,
however. Should interim president Nicolás Maduro win the
presidential election, he would represent a continuation of
Venezuelan regional policy, but his ability to sustain commitment
to the peace process may be constrained by pressing
domestic concerns and infighting within the chavista
camp. For Santos, Venezuelan cooperation will be crucial
to ensuring the FARC’s compliance with an agreement.
Indeed, the rebels operate camps across the border where
leaders direct troops and supervise drug routes.
Holding talks in Havana, long the capital of the hemisphere’s
leftist revolutionaries, served as a draw for the
FARC. The island has also ensured a much higher degree of
confidentiality than in past processes, enhancing the integrity
of negotiations by reducing leaks.
The process counts on the support of other international
actors, notably Brasília and Washington. This is crucial.
According to Pardo, this involvement allows Santos to “internally
legitimize a process with polarized public opinion and
a critical opposition.” The FARC undoubtedly will insist on
guarantees that its members will not be extradited on trafficking
charges, as has happened to many—although not all—
demobilized paramilitaries, a point on which Washington
will need to cooperate. The United States will likely continue
behind the scenes to help reach an agreement.
Looking forward, both US and regional support will play
a decisive role in a post-conflict scenario. The FARC, for
instance, is estimated to command $4 billion in annual
revenues and its assets are spread worldwide. Logistical
support in locating these holdings will be necessary. The
post-conflict environment will also present major financial
and administrative challenges. Ambitious bureaucratic initiatives,
such as strengthening security, reintegrating combatants,
and restituting land, will require sustained outside
support. Finally, a broad regional strategy for illegal narcotics
is essential in curtailing the influence of organized
crime in Colombia.
Final considerations
There are some grounds for optimism that an agreement
will be reached in Havana. Success, however, is far from
assured. Many Colombians are skeptical of the negotiations,
Santos’ popularity is tenuous, and concerns over security are
rising. As of February 2013, Datexco found that 75 percent
of Colombians do not believe the FARC truly wants peace,
a perception that makes negotiating with the rebels all the
more difficult for the government. It is crucial to assuage
the public’s doubts regarding the viability of the peace process.
In that spirit, current and subsequent administrations
will need to make a robust commitment to developing rural
areas, reintegrating combatants into society, enhancing citizen
security, and restituting victims. These are immense and
important undertakings that require both resources and
political will. Towards this end, the international community
must also sustain its engagement and support to help
build an enduring peace.

Inter-American Dialogue
Board of Directors
Michelle Bachelet, Co-Chair, Chile
Carla A. Hills, Co-Chair, United States
Enrique Iglesias, Co-Vice Chair, Uruguay
Thomas F. McLarty III, Co-Vice Chair, United States
David de Ferranti, Treasurer, United States
Peter D. Bell, Chair Emeritus, United States
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Chair Emeritus, Brazil
Ricardo Lagos, Chair Emeritus, Chile
Alicia Bárcena, Mexico
Francis Fukuyama, United States
L. Enrique García, Bolivia
Donna J. Hrinak, United States
Marcos Jank, Brazil
Jim Kolbe, United States
Thomas J. Mackell, Jr., United States
M. Peter McPherson, United States
Brian O’Neill, United States
Pierre Pettigrew, Canada
Jorge Quiroga, Bolivia
Marta Lucía Ramírez, Colombia
Eduardo Stein, Guatemala
Martín Torrijos, Panama
Elena Viyella de Paliza, Dominican Republic
Ernesto Zedillo, Mexico
Billie Miller, Barbados
Michael Shifter
President

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