Debating the Prospects For Peace in Colombia - Inter-American ...

Inter-American Dialogue
Report
Rafael Nieto, lawyer and former vice minister of justice,
points out that when the AUC demobilized, it was barred
from elected office and was supposed to return stolen lands
and goods. The FARC are more political than the paramilitaries
ever were, yet both have engaged in drug trafficking,
massacres, kidnappings, and extortion. Those who share
Nieto’s view—and there are many in Colombia—do not see
a compelling reason why the FARC should be treated more
leniently than other demobilized insurgency groups. It is
because of this point that former foreign minister and head
of RCN Noticias, Rodrigo Pardo, is surprised that Santos
chose his first term to initiate this process.
The role of the
international community
Though the Pastrana talks involved the United Nations, the
Santos administration decided on a far more limited international
involvement. Only four countries—Chile, Norway,
Cuba, and Venezuela—are direct participants in the talks,
although the role of external actors will again prove crucial
both in reaching and in implementing an agreement.
Santos’ rapprochement with Chávez fostered Venezuela’s
direct involvement in the negotiations. Those close to the
process maintain that Chávez’s influence and contacts in the
insurgency made him instrumental in bringing the FARC
to the table. Legitimizing the rebels as a leftist political
force—as well as ending Colombia’s armed conflict—would
have been an attractive legacy for the Venezuelan leader.
Chávez’s death has injected uncertainty into this process,
however. Should interim president Nicolás Maduro win the
presidential election, he would represent a continuation of
Venezuelan regional policy, but his ability to sustain commitment
to the peace process may be constrained by pressing
domestic concerns and infighting within the chavista
camp. For Santos, Venezuelan cooperation will be crucial
to ensuring the FARC’s compliance with an agreement.
Indeed, the rebels operate camps across the border where
leaders direct troops and supervise drug routes.
Holding talks in Havana, long the capital of the hemisphere’s
leftist revolutionaries, served as a draw for the
FARC. The island has also ensured a much higher degree of
confidentiality than in past processes, enhancing the integrity
of negotiations by reducing leaks.
The process counts on the support of other international
actors, notably Brasília and Washington. This is crucial.
According to Pardo, this involvement allows Santos to “internally
legitimize a process with polarized public opinion and
a critical opposition.” The FARC undoubtedly will insist on
guarantees that its members will not be extradited on trafficking
charges, as has happened to many—although not all—
demobilized paramilitaries, a point on which Washington
will need to cooperate. The United States will likely continue
behind the scenes to help reach an agreement.
Looking forward, both US and regional support will play
a decisive role in a post-conflict scenario. The FARC, for
instance, is estimated to command $4 billion in annual
revenues and its assets are spread worldwide. Logistical
support in locating these holdings will be necessary. The
post-conflict environment will also present major financial
and administrative challenges. Ambitious bureaucratic initiatives,
such as strengthening security, reintegrating combatants,
and restituting land, will require sustained outside
support. Finally, a broad regional strategy for illegal narcotics
is essential in curtailing the influence of organized
crime in Colombia.
Final considerations
There are some grounds for optimism that an agreement
will be reached in Havana. Success, however, is far from
assured. Many Colombians are skeptical of the negotiations,
Santos’ popularity is tenuous, and concerns over security are
rising. As of February 2013, Datexco found that 75 percent
of Colombians do not believe the FARC truly wants peace,
a perception that makes negotiating with the rebels all the
more difficult for the government. It is crucial to assuage
the public’s doubts regarding the viability of the peace process.
In that spirit, current and subsequent administrations
will need to make a robust commitment to developing rural
areas, reintegrating combatants into society, enhancing citizen
security, and restituting victims. These are immense and
important undertakings that require both resources and
political will. Towards this end, the international community
must also sustain its engagement and support to help
build an enduring peace.