Debating the Prospects For Peace in Colombia - Inter-American ...

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Inter-American Dialogue Report Rafael Nieto, lawyer and former vice minister of justice, points out that when the AUC demobilized, it was barred from elected office and was supposed to return stolen lands and goods. The FARC are more political than the paramilitaries ever were, yet both have engaged in drug trafficking, massacres, kidnappings, and extortion. Those who share Nieto’s view—and there are many in Colombia—do not see a compelling reason why the FARC should be treated more leniently than other demobilized insurgency groups. It is because of this point that former foreign minister and head of RCN Noticias, Rodrigo Pardo, is surprised that Santos chose his first term to initiate this process. The role of the international community Though the Pastrana talks involved the United Nations, the Santos administration decided on a far more limited international involvement. Only four countries—Chile, Norway, Cuba, and Venezuela—are direct participants in the talks, although the role of external actors will again prove crucial both in reaching and in implementing an agreement. Santos’ rapprochement with Chávez fostered Venezuela’s direct involvement in the negotiations. Those close to the process maintain that Chávez’s influence and contacts in the insurgency made him instrumental in bringing the FARC to the table. Legitimizing the rebels as a leftist political force—as well as ending Colombia’s armed conflict—would have been an attractive legacy for the Venezuelan leader. Chávez’s death has injected uncertainty into this process, however. Should interim president Nicolás Maduro win the presidential election, he would represent a continuation of Venezuelan regional policy, but his ability to sustain commitment to the peace process may be constrained by pressing domestic concerns and infighting within the chavista camp. For Santos, Venezuelan cooperation will be crucial to ensuring the FARC’s compliance with an agreement. Indeed, the rebels operate camps across the border where leaders direct troops and supervise drug routes. Holding talks in Havana, long the capital of the hemisphere’s leftist revolutionaries, served as a draw for the FARC. The island has also ensured a much higher degree of confidentiality than in past processes, enhancing the integrity of negotiations by reducing leaks. The process counts on the support of other international actors, notably Brasília and Washington. This is crucial. According to Pardo, this involvement allows Santos to “internally legitimize a process with polarized public opinion and a critical opposition.” The FARC undoubtedly will insist on guarantees that its members will not be extradited on trafficking charges, as has happened to many—although not all— demobilized paramilitaries, a point on which Washington will need to cooperate. The United States will likely continue behind the scenes to help reach an agreement. Looking forward, both US and regional support will play a decisive role in a post-conflict scenario. The FARC, for instance, is estimated to command $4 billion in annual revenues and its assets are spread worldwide. Logistical support in locating these holdings will be necessary. The post-conflict environment will also present major financial and administrative challenges. Ambitious bureaucratic initiatives, such as strengthening security, reintegrating combatants, and restituting land, will require sustained outside support. Finally, a broad regional strategy for illegal narcotics is essential in curtailing the influence of organized crime in Colombia. Final considerations There are some grounds for optimism that an agreement will be reached in Havana. Success, however, is far from assured. Many Colombians are skeptical of the negotiations, Santos’ popularity is tenuous, and concerns over security are rising. As of February 2013, Datexco found that 75 percent of Colombians do not believe the FARC truly wants peace, a perception that makes negotiating with the rebels all the more difficult for the government. It is crucial to assuage the public’s doubts regarding the viability of the peace process. In that spirit, current and subsequent administrations will need to make a robust commitment to developing rural areas, reintegrating combatants into society, enhancing citizen security, and restituting victims. These are immense and important undertakings that require both resources and political will. Towards this end, the international community must also sustain its engagement and support to help build an enduring peace.
Inter-American Dialogue Board of Directors Michelle Bachelet, Co-Chair, Chile Carla A. Hills, Co-Chair, United States Enrique Iglesias, Co-Vice Chair, Uruguay Thomas F. McLarty III, Co-Vice Chair, United States David de Ferranti, Treasurer, United States Peter D. Bell, Chair Emeritus, United States Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Chair Emeritus, Brazil Ricardo Lagos, Chair Emeritus, Chile Alicia Bárcena, Mexico Francis Fukuyama, United States L. Enrique García, Bolivia Donna J. Hrinak, United States Marcos Jank, Brazil Jim Kolbe, United States Thomas J. Mackell, Jr., United States M. Peter McPherson, United States Brian O’Neill, United States Pierre Pettigrew, Canada Jorge Quiroga, Bolivia Marta Lucía Ramírez, Colombia Eduardo Stein, Guatemala Martín Torrijos, Panama Elena Viyella de Paliza, Dominican Republic Ernesto Zedillo, Mexico Billie Miller, Barbados Michael Shifter President
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