Debating the Prospects For Peace in Colombia - Inter-American ...

Inter-American Dialogue
Report
legacy of frustrated attempts, many are at least moderately
optimistic. Colombia has changed in important ways over
the last decade, and the architects of the process have taken
pains to avoid the mistakes of the past. Taken together, the
panorama has never seemed more favorable.
A different country
At the turn of the 21st century, insecurity was rampant in
Colombia. Under the Pastrana administration, the FARC’s
forces were estimated at 18,000 strong while nearly half the
country lacked a government security presence. In 1999,
the Defense Ministry reported nearly 2,000 terrorist acts,
more than 3,000 kidnappings, and a homicide rate that
exceeded 60 per 100,000 (and peaked three years later at
70 per 100,000). The government, largely on the defensive,
lacked serious bargaining power to push an agreement with
the insurgency.
The turnaround ushered in by Pastrana’s successor,
President Álvaro Uribe (2002–
2010), was dramatic. Bolstered
by some US$7 billion in US
assistance, an aggressive military
response vastly diminished
the rebels’ capabilities. Between
2002 and 2009, kidnappings
declined to just 200 a year,
homicides were halved, and FARC forces were reduced to
roughly 9,000 fighters while many of their leaders were
captured or killed. Unlike eleven years ago, the insurgency
is aware that it cannot win this fight through strength of
arms, even if some of its leaders claim otherwise in public.
This reality—perhaps more than any other factor—greatly
improves the prospects for an agreement.
Uribe’s efforts to improve security also involved negotiations
with another armed group, the Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia (AUC). By the turn of the century, this counter-insurgent
response to leftist guerrillas had exacerbated
already rampant violence and was heavily involved in the
drug trade. In 2002, the AUC began talks to demobilize
and, over the course of several years, more than 31,000
paramilitaries turned over their weapons. Violence was
reduced, but less than 10 percent of the demobilized has
been processed by the 2005 Peace and Justice Law intended
to reincorporate paramilitaries into civilian life, deliver justice
to leaders, and provide restitution for victims. Many
former AUC members also formed new criminal bands (las
bacrim). It is hoped that the broader lessons learned from
this, as well as the institutional experience of reintegrating
demobilized combatants, will facilitate future reintegration.
A different process
According to Cepeda, the most promising difference in the
current process is a more manageable agenda. The six items
the two sides agreed to discuss—rural development, the
FARC’s political participation, an end to the conflict, drug
trafficking, victims’ rights, and implementation—are not
intended to resolve the larger political, economic, or social
issues that fuel the armed conflict. Rather, the primary objective
in Havana is to cease hostilities so that larger societal
challenges can be addressed. This stands in stark contrast
to the much more unwieldy agenda of the Pastrana talks,
which consisted of ten articles covering over 100 issues.
Other improvements to the peace process include:
Unlike eleven years ago, the insurgency is
aware that it cannot win this fight through
strength of arms, even if some of its leaders
claim otherwise in public.
NN
Holding negotiations abroad. This condition seeks to
increase the integrity of the talks by reducing leaks and
“lowering the temperature” in Colombia itself.
NN
Evaluation and ground rules. In contrast to talks under
the Pastrana administration, protocol and evaluation
mechanisms have been established. Additionally, Cuba
and Norway are acting as guarantors to the process
with Venezuela and Chile as “companions.”
NN
No demilitarized zone. During the last round of talks,
the government granted the FARC a “safe zone”
roughly the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut
combined. While generous, this gesture ultimately
proved unproductive. The FARC exploited the opportunity
to regroup and hide its kidnapped victims without
fear of military incursion. With no demilitarized
areas or ceasefires from the Santos administration this
time, there is greater pressure on the guerrillas to reach
an accord in a timely manner.
DEBATING THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA 3