The Bichard Inquiry - Report - Digital Education Resource Archive ...

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Introduction and summary by Sir Michael Bichard 1 On 17 December 2003, Ian Huntley was convicted of the murders of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells. It is difficult to exaggerate the horror which these murders caused or to begin to imagine the grief of the girls’ families. 2 In the days following Huntley’s conviction, there was widespread public disquiet when it became clear that he had been known to the authorities over a period of years. In fact, he had come to the attention of Humberside Police in relation to allegations of eight separate sexual offences from 1995 to 1999 (and had been investigated in yet another). This information had not emerged during the vetting check, carried out by Cambridgeshire Constabulary at the time of Huntley’s appointment to Soham Village College late in 2001. 3 This Inquiry was set up by the Home Secretary to: ‘Urgently enquire into child protection procedures in Humberside Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary in the light of the recent trial and conviction of Ian Huntley for the murder of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells. In particular to assess the effectiveness of the relevant intelligence-based record keeping, the vetting practices in those forces since 1995 and information sharing with other agencies, and to report to the Home Secretary on matters of local and national relevance and make recommendations as appropriate.’ 4 As I made clear in my opening statement in January 2004, my aim has been to discover what happened, why it happened and what lessons could be learned and conclusions drawn. That has inevitably involved asking some tough questions and criticising individuals and organisations. 5 Huntley alone was responsible for, and stands convicted of, these most awful murders. None of the actions or failures of any of the witnesses who gave evidence to the Inquiry, or the institutions they represented, led to the deaths of the girls. 6 However, the Inquiry did find errors, omissions, failures and shortcomings which are deeply shocking. Taken together, these were so extensive that one cannot be confident that it was Huntley alone who ‘slipped through the net’. The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary 1
7 The detailed facts and findings are set out in the body of the report. In this summary, I highlight the main conclusions. In Humberside and North East Lincolnshire Humberside Police 8 One of the key failings was the inability of Humberside Police and Social Services to identify Huntley’s behaviour pattern remotely soon enough. That was because both viewed each case in isolation and because Social Services failed to share information effectively with the police. It was also because, as the Humberside Chief Constable admitted in his evidence, there were ‘systemic and corporate’ failures in the way in which Humberside Police managed their intelligence systems. 9 These failures were all the more surprising given the emphasis all the witnesses placed on the importance of intelligence and the need to identify patterns of criminal behaviour as early as possible. 10 The reality in Humberside was very different. The process of creating records on their main local intelligence system – called CIS Nominals – was fundamentally flawed throughout the relevant period. Police officers at various levels were alarmingly ignorant of how records were created and how the system worked. The guidance and training available were inadequate and this fed the confusion which surrounded the review and deletion of records once they had been created. 11 This confusion was so serious that there was not even a common understanding of what was meant by ‘weeding’, ‘reviewing’ and ‘deletion’. It cannot now be ascertained how many records were lost without proper review. The only sensible inference is that a significant number were lost. It cannot be known whether the confusion contributed to the deletion of the information in the only intelligence report on Huntley, filed by Police Constable Harding, in July 1999, or whether the deletion was an error of judgement or simply a mistake. However, the ‘haemorrhaging’ of intelligence casts serious doubts on the usefulness of other Humberside Police records. 12 The failures in the use of CIS Nominals were compounded by the fact that other systems were also not being operated properly. Information was not recorded correctly onto the separate CIS Crime system. It took four years (from 1999 to 2003) for those carrying out vetting checks to be told that the CIS 2 system, introduced in late 1999, also allowed them to check a name through the CIS Crime system. 13 Equally, the Child Protection Database (CPD), as operated, was largely worthless because the information put onto it was regarded as unreliable. CPD records were not reviewed or deleted for ten years, and even when it was finally realised that this database could be an important vetting tool (1998), it took a further four years to use it for that purpose. 14 As a result of these failures, there was not one single occasion in all of the contacts with Huntley when the record creation system worked as it should have done. The various investigations of Huntley from 1995 onwards within 2 The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary
Page 1 and 2: The Bichard Inquiry Report A Public
Page 3: © Parliamentary copyright 2004 The
Page 6 and 7: The recruitment and vetting process
Page 10 and 11: Humberside might well have been dif
Page 12 and 13: conducted by them that it is unlike
Page 14 and 15: contribute to the failure of record
Page 16 and 17: Nonetheless, I have already said th
Page 18 and 19: Referral of sexual offences against
Page 20 and 21: Recommendations for action A nation
Page 22 and 23: • age or power imbalances; • ov
Page 24: Checking processes 22 The Registere
Page 27 and 28: the basis of the majority of the do
Page 29 and 30: 2 Contacts, recruitment and vetting
Page 31 and 32: 1.5 Huntley was charged in relation
Page 33 and 34: eferrals to Social Services or the
Page 35 and 36: 1.37 One version of Form 547 was fi
Page 37 and 38: ‘... 1 there must be evidence of
Page 39 and 40: Case to ‘lie on file’ 1.66 When
Page 41 and 42: 1.83 There are real doubts that she
Page 43 and 44: 1.94 It appears from a Social Servi
Page 45 and 46: 1.106.5 EF’s mother went to Pelha
Page 47 and 48: A joint police and Social Services
Page 49 and 50: Contact 6 allegation: rape involvin
Page 51 and 52: 1.163 DS Hibbitt told the Inquiry t
Page 53 and 54: 1.182 It then sets out a number of
Page 55 and 56: 1.197 According to Social Services
Page 57 and 58: met on several occasions, were very
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‘Ian Kevin HUNTLEY aka NIXON 31/0
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1.243 It is significant that the ap
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and Selection Procedures: vetting t
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Mr Roger Walker, an employee of EPM
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1.282 In his response to the Inquir
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(to start in July). The cost of bri
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Changing the system - the ‘batch
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‘Comments’ field on the databas
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1.326 There is continuing work to d
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• AS refers to an ‘arrest summo
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eceived) to 24 December 2001 (the d
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What would have been revealed if th
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2 Contacts, recruitment and vettin
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2.10.2 DS Hibbitt and DC Chatha (a
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2.25 In reality, Form 839 would, i
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2.37 The fact that it was not used
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Social Services had no systems - ma
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2.60 A system that automatically d
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• whether or not the alleged abus
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was that the computer gave the bail
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Constabulary, who produced the repo
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the continuation of those failures.
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2.108 He also accepted that the ti
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adopting the National Strategy for
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ecurring. They kept recurring witho
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2.144.4 Why was the letter from Mr
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25 I cannot, therefore, state that
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2.162 The errors and failings I ha
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3 National systems and structure -
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equiring compliance with the releva
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Review, inspection and the strategi
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3.39 While ACPO guidance aims to he
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A record within 24 hours of arrest
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Information management The National
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3.74.3 ACPO Crime Committee’s pol
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3.86 An application for a criminal
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3.97 In December 2003, the Home Off
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4.4 Having € said that, guidance
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the wealth of information held, but
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4.31 € Although CRISP (see paragr
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Recommendations Investment should b
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4.44 € The new Code should seek t
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Recommendations A Code of Practice
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4.54 € If these arrangements were
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Recommendation HMIC should develop,
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Recommendation All posts, including
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Checking applicants’ addresses 4.
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Continuing problems 4.95 € Althou
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4.110 € It is unsurprising that t
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Benefits of a central register 4.12
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Third-party information 4.133 € T
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Glossary 4x4 system - a subjective
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CRISP - Cross Regional Information
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National Policing Plan - a document
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Appendix 1 Areas of interest to the
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Appendix 2 Evidence received by the
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Organisation Name Oral (O) Written
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Organisations that provided written
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3 The job of inputting information
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• the ‘general information’ s
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CIS Crime 28 The second CIS applica
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Social Services records 42 Social S
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the Committee of Inquiry into the S
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sexual, violent or drug offences wo
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29 Under the Enhanced Disclosure re
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Vetting procedures 50 In some count
Page 196:
Index A full printed index is inclu
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