The Bichard Inquiry - Report - Digital Education Resource Archive ...

‘some concern’. In fact, as DS Hibbitt acknowledged, this was
intelligence that should have been graded as the most reliable,
which means that had it been recorded onto the systems, it would
have stayed there.
2.79.3 The second flaw is that the document only looked at each of the
incidents in isolation from each other. This approach was symptomatic
of much of Humberside Police’s approach at the time and in their
evidence to the Inquiry. As DCS Baggs accepted, once a behaviour
pattern starts developing, it becomes obvious that the intelligence
should be kept.
2.80 The failure to discern and record Huntley’s behaviour pattern had a serious
consequence. It meant that police decisions were taken in isolation,
uninformed by the history of Huntley’s previous contacts with the police.
2.81 The potential importance of this was illustrated by the acceptance by
police officers that their actions might well have been different had they
known about past incidents. For example, during the investigation of
Contact 7, it appeared that Huntley had a 15-year-old ‘girlfriend’ to whom
he had given the T-shirt worn on the evening of the alleged rape. Huntley
denied that he had had a sexual relationship with her. The girl was not even
asked by the police about that relationship because they were focusing
instead on investigating the alleged rape. DS Hibbitt acknowledged that,
had he known about the earlier incidents, he might have investigated the
relationship with the 15-year-old further. Similarly, DI Billam acknowledged
that he would probably have acted differently if the link back to the past
allegations, notably Contact 2A, had been apparent.
2.82 Therefore, police decisions as to the handling and investigation of the
incidents might have been different if Huntley’s behaviour pattern had
been recognised. What cannot be known is whether the disposal of any
of the incidents would, or should, have been different as a result, or what
impact, if any, it would have had on Huntley’s subsequent conduct. The
most that can be said is that such opportunity as there was, was missed.
The caution issue – Contact 1
2.83 The Inquiry considered in some detail whether Huntley should have been
formally cautioned in relation to Contact 1. That decision now seems less
critical for the following reasons:
2.83.1 If a caution had been given, it would not have been recorded on
the PNC because this was only possible after November 1995 (and
Humberside Police did not enter old cautions retrospectively).
2.83.2 A record of Contact 1 should have been made on CIS Nominals,
whether or not a caution had been given.
2.84 In November 2003, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)
stated in their report into Humberside Police’s dealings with Huntley that, as
regards Contact 1, ‘in the opinion of both HMIC and the now current chief
officers in Humberside, Huntley should have received at least a caution for
the offence’. In their oral evidence, both Peter Todd, Assistant Inspector of
92 The Bichard Inquiry – Contacts, recruitment and vetting – the findings